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E M I S S I O N S S C E N A R I O S 
How will the world's climate change in the coming century? The answer to this question depends on how human societies 
develop in terms of demographics and economic development, technological change, energy supply and demand, and land use 
change. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios describes new scenarios of 
the future, and predicts greenhouse gas emissions associated with such developments. These scenarios are based on a thorough 
review of the literature, the development of narrative "storylines", and the quantification of these storylines with the help of six 
different integrated models from different countries. The scenarios provide the basis for future assessnlents of climate change 
and possible response strategies. The report illustrates that future emissions, even in the absence of explicit climate policies, 
depend very much on the choices people make; how economies are structured, which energy sources are preferred, and how 
people use available land resources. The IPCC published previous greenhouse gas emissions scenarios in 1990 and 1992. The 
current scenarios introduce many innovative aspects, such as narrative descriptions of the scenarios, inclusion of information 
on the availability of energy technologies, and an analysis of international equity issues. 
This IPCC Special Report is the most comprehensive and state-of-the-art assessment available of greenhouse gas emissions 
scenarios, and provides invaluable information for industry, policy-makers, environmental organizations, and researchers in 
global change, technology, engineering and economics. 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic is the Leader of the Transitions to New Technologies Project at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA), in Austria. 
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Foreword 
The Intergovernmental Panel on CHmate Change (IPCC) was 
jointly established by the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) to assess the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant for the understanding of the risk of 
human-induced climate change. Since its inception the IPCC 
has produced a series of comprehensive Assessment Reports on 
the state of understanding of causes of climate change, its 
potential impacts and options for response strategies. It 
prepared also Special Reports, Technical Papers, 
methodologies and guidelines. These IPCC publications have 
become standard works of reference, widely used by 
policymakers, scientists and other experts. 
In 1992 the IPCC released emission scenarios to be used for 
driving global circulation models to develop climate change 
scenarios. The so-called IS92 scenarios were pathbreaking. 
They were the first global scenarios to provide estimates for the 
full suite of greenhouse gases. Much has changed since then in 
our understanding of possible future greenhouse gas emissions 
and climate change. Therefore the IPCC decided in 1996 to 
develop a new set of emissions .scenarios which will provide 
input to the IPCC third assessment report but can be of broader 
use than the IS92 scenarios. The new scenarios provide also 
input for evaluating climatic and environmental consequences 
of future greenhouse gas emissions and for assessing 
alternative mitigation and adaptation strategies. They include 
improved emission baselines and latest information on 
economic restructuring throughout the world, examine 
different rates and trends in technological change and expand 
the range of different economic-development pathways, 
including narrowing of the income gap between developed and 
developing countries. To achieve this a new approach was 
adopted to take into account a wide range of scientific 
perspectives, and interactions between regions and sectors. 
Thiough the so-called "open process" input and feedback from 
G.O.P. Obasi 
Secretary-General 
World Meteorological Organization 
a community of experts much broader than the writing team 
were solicited. The results of this work show that different 
social, economic and technological developments have a strong 
impact on emission trends, without assuming explicit climate 
policy interventions. The new scenarios provide also important 
insights about the interlinkages between environmental quality 
and development choices and will certainly be a useful tool for 
experts and decision makers. 
As usual in the IPCC, success in producing this report has 
depended first and foremost on the co-operation of scientists 
and other experts worldwide. In the case of this report the 
active contribution of a broad expert community to the open 
process was an important element of the success. These 
individuals have devoted enormous time and effort to 
producing this report and we are extremely grateful for their 
commitment to the IPCC process. We would like to highlight 
in particular the enthusiasm and tireless efforts of the co-
ordinating lead author for this report Nebojsa Nakicenovic and 
his team at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg/Austria who ensured the high 
quality of this report. 
Further we would like to express our sincere thanks to: 
• Robert T. Watson, the Chairman of the IPCC, 
• The Co-chairs of Working Group III Bert Metz and 
Ogunlade Davidson, 
The members of the writing team. 
The staff of the Working Group III Technical Support 
Unit, including Rob Swart, Jiahua Pan, Tom Kram, and 
Anita Meier, 
N . Sundararaman, the Secretary of the IPCC, Renate 
Christ Deputy Secretary of the IPCC and the staff of the 
IPCC Secretariat Rudie Bourgeois, Chantai Ettori and 
Annie Courtin. 
K . Topfer 
Executive Director 
United Nations Environment Programme 
and 
Director-General 
United Nations Office in Nairobi 
Preface 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
established jointly by the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) to assess periodically the science, impacts, and socio-
economics of climate change and of adaptation and mitigation 
options. The IPCC provides, on request, scientific and 
technical advice to the Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its bodies. In response to a 1994 evaluation of 
the earlier IPCC IS92 emissions scenarios, the 1996 Plenaiy of 
the IPCC requested this Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) (see Appendix I for the Teims of Reference). This 
report was accepted by the Working Group III (WGIII) plenary 
session in March 2000. The long-term nature and imcertainty 
of climate change and its driving forces require scenarios that 
extend to the end of the 21st century. This report describes the 
new scenarios and how they were developed. 
The SRES scenarios cover a wide range of the main driving 
forces of future emissions, from demographic to technological 
and economic developments. As required by the Terms of 
Reference, none of the scenarios in the set includes any future 
policies that explicitly address climate change, although all 
scenarios necessarily encompass various policies of other 
types. The set of SRES emissions scenarios is based on an 
extensive assessment of the literature, six alternative modelling 
approaches, and an "open process" that solicited wide 
participation and feedback from many groups and individuals. 
The SRES scenarios include the range of emissions of all 
relevant species of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and sulfur and 
their driving forces. 
The SRES writing team included more than 50 members from 
18 countries who represent a broad range of scientific 
disciplines, regional backgrounds, and non-governmental 
organizations (see Appendix II). The team, led by Nebojsa 
Nakicenovic of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) in Austria, included representatives of six 
scenario modeling groups and lead authors from all three 
earUer IPCC scenario activities - the 1990 and 1992 scenarios 
and the 1994 scenario evaluation. The SRES preparation 
included six major steps; 
• analysis of existing scenarios in the literature; 
• analysis of major scenario characteristics, driving 
forces, and their relationships; 
• fonnulation of four narrative scenario "storylines" to 
describe alternative futures; 
• quantification of each storyline using a variety of 
modelling approaches; 
• an "open" review process of the resultant emission 
scenarios and their assumptions; and 
• three revisions of the scenarios and the report 
subsequent to the open review process, i.e., the formal 
IPCC Expert Review and the final combined IPCC 
Expert and Government Review. 
As required by the Terms of Reference, the SRES preparation 
process was open with no single "official" model and no 
exclusive "expert teams." To this end, in 1997 the IPCC 
advertised in relevant scientific journals and other publications 
to solicit wide participation in the process. A web site 
documenting the SRES process and intermediate results was 
created to facilitate outside input. Members of the writing team 
also published much of their background research in the peer-
reviewed literature and on web sites. 
In June 1998, the IPCC Bureau agreed to make the 
unapproved, preliminary scenarios available to climate 
modelers, who could use the scenarios as a basis for the 
assessment of climatic changes in time for consideration in the 
IPCC's Third Assessment Report. We recommend that the new 
scenarios be used not only in the IPCC's future assessments of 
climate change, its impacts, and adaptation and mitigation 
options, but also as the basis for analyses by the wider research 
and policy community of climate change and other 
environmental problems. 
Ogunlade Davidson and Bert Metz 
Co-chairs of IPCC WGIII 
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Why new I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l P a n e l on C l i m a t e Change 
scenarios? 
The I n t e r g o v e r m n e n t a l P a n e l o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e (IPCC) 
d e v e l o p e d l o n g - t e r m e m i s s i o n s c e n a r i o s i n 1 9 9 0 a n d 1 9 9 2 . 
These scenaiios have been widely used in the analysis of 
possible climate change, its impacts, and options to mitigate 
climate change. In 1995, the IPCC 1992 scenarios were 
evaluated. The evaluation recommended that significant 
changes (since 1992) in the understanding of driving forces of 
emissions and methodologies should be addressed. These 
changes in understanding relate to, e.g., the carbon intensity of 
energy supply, the income gap between developed and 
developing countries, and to sulfur emissions. This led to a 
decision by the IPCC Plenary in 1996 to develop a new set of 
scenarios. The new set of scenarios is presented in this report. 
What a r e scenarios and what is their purpose? 
F u t u r e greenhouse gas ( G H G ) emissions a r e tlie p r o d u c t of 
very c o m p l e x d y n a m i c systems, d e t e r m i n e d by d r i v i n g f o r c e s 
such as d e m o g r a p h i c development, s o c i o - e c o n o m i c 
development, a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e . Their future evolution 
is highly uncertain. Scenarios are alternative images of how the 
future might unfold and are an appropriate tool with which to 
analyze how driving forces may influence future emission 
outcomes and to assess the associated uncertainties. They assist 
in climate change analysis, including climate modeling and the 
assessment of impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. The 
possibility that any single emissions path will occur as 
described in scenarios is highly uncertain. 
What a r e the m a i n characteristics of the new scenarios? 
A set of s c e n a r i o s was d e v e l o p e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e r a n g e of 
d r i v i n g f o r c e s a n d emissions i n t h e s c e n a r i o l i t e r a t u r e so as t o 
reflect c u r r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d k n o w l e d g e a b o u t u n d e r l y i n g 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s . They exclude only outlying "surprise" or 
"disaster" scenarios in the literature. Any scenario necessarily 
includes subjective elements and is open to various 
ЫегсгеЫиот. Preferences for the scenaiios presented here 
vary among users. No judgment is offered in this report as to 
the preference for any of the scenarios and they are not 
assigned probabilities of occurrence, neither must they be 
inteipreted as policy recommendations. 
The s c e n a r i o s a r e based o n a n extensive assessment of d r i v i n g 
f o r c e s a n d emissions i n t h e s c e n a r i o l i t e r a t u r e , a l t e r n a t i v e 
m o d e l i n g a p p r o a c h e s , a n d a n "open process" ' t h a t s o l i c i t e d 
' The open process defined in the Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) Terms of Reference calls for the use of multiple 
models, seeking inputs from a wide community as well as making 
scenario results widely available for comments and review. These 
objectives were fulfilled by the SRES multi-model approach and the 
open SRES website. 
w i d e p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d feedback. These are all-important 
elements of the Terms of Reference (see Appendix I). 
F o u r different n a r r a t i v e s t o r y l i n e s w e r e d e v e l o p e d t o d e s c r i b e 
c o n s i s t e n t l y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between e m i s s i o n d r i v i n g f o r c e s 
a n d t h e i r e v o l u t i o n a n d a d d c o n t e x t f o r t h e s c e n a r i o 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n . Each storyline represents different 
demographic, social, economic, technological, and 
environmental developments, which may be viewed positively 
by some people and negatively by others. 
The s c e n a r i o s c o v e r a w i d e r a n g e of t h e m a i n d e m o g r a p h i c , 
e c o n o m i c , a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l d r i v i n g f o r c e s of G H G a n d sulfur 
emissions^ a n d a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e l i t e r a t u r e . Each 
scenario represents a specific quantitative interpretation of one 
of four storylines. A l l the scenarios based on the same storyline 
constitute a scenario "family". 
As r e q u i r e d by t h e Terms of Reference, t h e s c e n a r i o s i n t h i s 
r e p o r t do n o t i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l c l i m a t e i n i t i a t i v e s , w h i c h 
means t h a t no s c e n a r i o s a r e i n c l u d e d t h a t e x p l i c i t l y assume 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n 
f o r C l i m a t e C h a n g e ( U N F C C C ) o r t h e emissions t a r g e t s of t h e 
K y o t o P r o t o c o l . However, G H G emissions are directly affected 
by non-climate change policies designed for a wide range of 
other purposes. Fuzthermore government policies can, to 
varying degrees, influence the G H G emission drivers such as 
demographic change, social and economic development, 
technological change, resource use, and pollution 
management. This influence is broadly reflected in the 
storylines and resultant scenarios. 
F o r each s t o r y l i n e s e v e r a l different s c e n a r i o s w e r e d e v e l o p e d 
u s i n g different m o d e l i n g a p p r o a c h e s t o e x a m i n e t h e r a n g e of 
outcomes a r i s i n g f r o m a r a n g e of models t h a t use s i m i l a r 
assumptions a b o u t d r i v i n g f o r c e s . Six models were used which 
are representative of integrated assessment frameworks in the 
literature. One advantage of a multi-model approach is that the 
resultant 40 SRES scenarios together encompass the cuiTent 
range of uncertainties of future G H G emissions arising from 
different characteristics of these models, in addition to the 
current knowledge of and uncertainties that arise from scenario 
driving forces such as demographic, social and economic, and 
broad technological developments that drive the models, as 
described in the storylines. Thirteen of these 40 scenarios 
explore variations in energy technology assumptions. 
^ Included are anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (COj), 
methane (CH^), nitrous oxide (NjO), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF^), hydrochloro-
fluorocaibons (HCFCs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the aerosol 
precursor and the chemically active gases sulfur dioxide (SO^), 
carbon monoxide (CO), niüogen oxides (N0,,), and non-methane 
volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs). Emissions are provided 
aggregated into four world i-egions and global totals. In the new 
scenarios no feedback effect of future climate change on emissions 
from biosphere and energy has been assumed. 
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Box SPM-1: The Main Characteristics of the Four SRES Storylines and Scenario Families. 
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Figure SPM-1: Schematic illustration of S R E S scenarios. Four qualitative storylines yield four sets of scenarios called 
" fami l ies" : A l , A 2 , B l , and B 2 . Altogether 40 S R E S scenarios have been developed by six modeling teams. A l l are equally 
val id with no assigned probabilities of occurrence. The set of scenarios consists of six scenario groups drawn from the four 
famil ies: one group each in A 2 , B l , B 2 , and three groups within the A l family, characterizing alternative developments of 
energy technologies: A l F I (fossil fuel intensive), A l B (balanced), and A I T (predominantly non-fossil fuel). Wi th in each 
famüy and group of scenarios, some share "harmonized" assumptions on global population, gross world product, and final 
energy. These are marked as " H S " for harmonized scenarios. " O S " denotes scenarios that explore uncertainties in driving 
forces beyond those of the harmonized scenarios. The number of scenarios developed within each category is shown. For 
each of the six scenario groups an illustrative scenario (which is always harmonized) is provided. Four illustrative marker 
scenarios, one for each scenario family, were used in draft form in the 1998 S R E S open process and are included in revised 
form in this report. Two additional illustrative scenarios for the groups A l F I and A I T are also provided and complete a set 
of six that illustrate al l scenario groups. A l l are equally sound. 
B y 2100 the world w i l l have changed in ways that are difficult to imagine - as difficult as it would have been at the end of the 
19th century to imagine the changes of the 100 years since. Each storyline assumes a distinctly different direction for future 
developments, such that the four storylines differ in increasingly irreversible ways. Together they describe divergent futures that 
encompass a significant portion of the underlying uncertainties in the main driving forces. They cover a wide range of key 
"future" characteristics such as demographic change, economic development, and technological change. For this reason, their 
plausibil i ty or feasibil ity should not be considered solely on the basis of an extrapolation of c u r r e n t economic, technological, 
and social trends. 
• The A l storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that 
peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major 
underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with 
a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The A l scenario family develops into three groups 
that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. The three A l groups are distinguished 
by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive ( A l F I ) , non-fossil energy sources ( A I T ) , or a balance across al l sources 
(A1B)3 . 
^ Balanced is defined as not relying too heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar improvement rates apply 
to all energy supply and end use technologies. 
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• The A2 storylme and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and 
preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in continuously 
increasing global population. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth 
and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
• The B l storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global population that peaks in mid-
century and declines thereafter, as in the A l storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service 
and information economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the mtroduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social, and envh-onmental sustainability, includmg 
improved equity, but without additional clknate initiatives. 
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, 
and environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously increasing global population at a rate lower than A2, 
intermediate levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the В1 and 
A l storylines. While the scenario is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local 
and regional levels. 
W i t h i n each s c e n a r i o f a m i l y t w o m a i n types of s c e n a r i o s w e r e 
d e v e l o p e d - those w i t h h a r m o n i z e d assumptions a b o u t g l o b a l 
p o p u l a t i o n , e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , a n d final energy use a n d those 
w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e s t o r y l i n e . Together, 26 
scenarios were harmonized by adopting common assumptions 
on global population and gross domestic product (GDP) 
development. Thus, the harmonized scenarios in each family 
are not independent of each other. The remaining 14 scenarios 
adopted alternative interpretations of the four scenario 
storylines to explore additional scenario uncertainties beyond 
differences in méthodologie approaches. They are also related 
to each other within each family, even though they do not share 
common assumptions about some of the driving forces. 
There a r e six s c e n a r i o g r o u p s t h a t s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 
e q u a l l y s o u n d t h a t span a w i d e r a n g e of u n c e r t a i n t y , as 
r e q u i r e d by t h e Terms of Reference. These encompass four 
combinations of demographic change, social and economic 
development, and broad technological developments, 
corresponding to the four families ( A l , A2, B l , B2), each with 
an illustrative "marker" scenario. Two of the scenario groups of 
the A l family (AlFI , AIT) explicitly explore alternative 
energy technology developments, holding the other driving 
forces constant, each with an illustrative scenario. Rapid 
growth leads to high capital turnover rates, which means that 
early small differences among scenarios can lead to a large 
divergence by 2100. Therefore the A l family, which has the 
highest rates of technological change and economic 
development, was selected to show this effect. 
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a d e c i s i o n of t h e I P C C B u r e a u i n 1 9 9 8 t o 
r e l e a s e draft s c e n a r i o s t o c l i m a t e m o d e l e r s f o r t h e i r i n p u t i n 
t h e T h i r d Assessment R e p o r t , a n d subsequently t o s o l i c i t 
comments d u r i n g t h e open process, one m a r k e r s c e n a r i o was 
chosen f r o m each of f o u r of t h e s c e n a r i o g r o u p s based o n t h e 
s t o r y l i n e s . The choice of the markers was based on which of 
the initial quantifications best reflected the storyline, and 
features of specific models. Marker scenarios are no more or 
less likely than any other scenarios, but are considered by the 
SRES writing team as illustrative of a particular storyline. 
These scenarios have received the closest scrutiny of the entire 
writing team and via the SRES open process. Scenarios have 
also been selected to illustrate the other two scenario groups. 
Hence, this report has an illustrative scenario for each of the six 
scenario groups. 
W h a t a r e the m a i n d r i v i n g forces of the G H G emissions i n 
the scenarios? 
T h i s R e p o r t r e i n f o r c e s o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e m a i n 
d r i v i n g f o r c e s of f u t u r e greenhouse gas t r a j e c t o r i e s w i l l 
c o n t i n u e t o be d e m o g r a p h i c c h a n g e , s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c 
development, a n d t h e r a t e a n d d i r e c t i o n of t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
c h a n g e . This finding is consistent with the IPCC 1990, 1992 
and 1995 scenario reports. Table SPM-1 (see later) summarizes 
the demographic, social, and economic driving forces across 
the scenarios in 2020, 2050, and 2100". The intermediate 
energy result (shown in table S P M 2, see later) and land use 
results^ reflect the influences of driving forces. 
Recent g l o b a l p o p u l a t i o n p r o j e c t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y l o w e r t h a n 
those i n t h e IS92 s c e n a r i o s . Three different population 
trajectories that coixespond to socio-economic developments in 
the storylines were chosen from recently published projections. 
The A l and B l scenario families are based on the low 
Intemational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
1996 projection. They share the lowest trajectory, increasing to 
8.7 billion by 2050 and declining toward 7 billion by 2100, 
which combines low fertility with low mortality. The B2 
scenario family is based on the long-term U N Medium 1998 
population projection of 10.4 billion by 2100. The A2 scenario 
family is based on a high population growth scenario of 15 
billion by 2100 that assumes a significant decline in fertility for 
most regions and stabilization at above replacement levels. It 
falls below the long-term 1998 U N High projection of 18 
billion. 
Technological change is not quantified in table SPM-1. 
5 Because of the impossibility of including the complex way land use 
is changing between the various land use types, this information is not 
in the table. 
6 Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r 
-3.5 i i I ! ! I > ! I I I 1 L^-l f ^ ^ i I I I 
1900 1950 2000 2025 2050 2100 
Figure SPM-2: Global COj emissions related to energy and industry (Figure SFM-2a) and land-use changes (Figure SPM-2b) 
from 1900 to 1990, and for the 40 SRES scenarios from 1990 to 2100, shown as an index (1990 = 1). The dashed time-paths 
depict individual SRES scenarios and the area shaded in blue the range of scenarios from the literature as documented in the 
SRES database. The scenarios are classified into six scenario groups drawn from the four scenario families. Six illustrative 
scenarios are highlighted. The colored vertical bars indicate the range of emissions in 2100. The four black bars on the right of 
Figure S P M - l a indicate the emission ranges in 2100 for the IS92 scenarios and three ranges of scenarios from the literature, 
documented in the SRES database. These three ranges indicate those scenarios that include some additional climate initiatives 
(designated as "intervention" scenarios), those that do not ("non-intervention"), and those that cannot be assigned to either 
category ("non-classified"). This classification is based on a subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database and was 
possible only for energy and industry emissions. SAR, Second Assessment Report. 
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Figure SPM-3: Total global annual CO^ emissions from all sources (energy, industry, and land-use change) from 1990 to 2100 
(in gigatonnes of carbon (GtC/yr) for the families and six scenario groups. The 40 SRES scenarios are presented by the four 
families ( A l , A2, B l , and B2) and six scenario groups: the fossil-intensive A l F I (comprising the high-coal and high-oil-and-gas 
scenarios), the predominantly non-fossil fuel AIT, the balanced A l B in Figure SPM-3a; A2 in Figure SPM-3b; B l in Figure 
SPM-3c, and B2 in Figure SPM-3d. Each colored emission band shows the range of harmonized and non-haiTnonized scenarios 
within each group. For each of the six scenario groups an illustrative scenario is provided, including the four illustrative marker 
scenarios ( A l , A2, В1, B2, solid lines) and two illustrative scenarios for A l F I and A I T (dashed lines). 
A l l s c e n a r i o s d e s c r i b e f u t u r e s t h a t a r e g e n e r a l l y m o r e affluent 
t h a n t o d a y . The scenarios span a wide range of future levels of 
economic activity, with gross world product rising to 10 times 
today's values by 2100 in the lowest to 26-fold in the highest 
scenarios. 
A n a r r o w i n g of i n c o m e differences at?iong w o r l d r e g i o n s i s 
assumed i n many of t h e SRES s c e n a r i o s . Two of the scenario 
families, A l and B l , explicitly explore alternative pathways 
that gradually close existing income gaps in relative terms. 
T e c h n o l o g y i s a t l e a s t as i m p o r t a n t a d r i v i n g f o r c e as 
d e m o g r a p h i c c h a n g e a n d e c o n o m i c development. These 
driving forces are related. Within the A l scenario family, 
scenarios with common demographic and socio-economic 
driving forces but different assumptions about technology and 
resource dynamics illustrate the possibility of very divergent 
paths for developments in the energy system and land-use 
patterns. 
The SRES s c e n a r i o s c o v e r a w i d e r r a n g e of energy s t r u c t u r e s 
t h a n t h e 1S92 s c e n a r i o s . This reflects uncertainties about future 
fossil resources and technological change. The scenarios cover 
virtually all the possible directions of change, from high shares 
of fossil fuels, oil and gas or coal, to high shares of non-fossils. 
I n most s c e n a r i o s , g l o b a l f o r e s t a r e a c o n t i n u e s t o decrease f o r 
some decades, p r i m a r i l y because of i n c r e a s i n g p o p u l a t i o n a n d 
i n c o m e g r o w t h . T h i s c u r r e n t t r e n d i s e v e n t u a l l y r e v e r s e d i n most 
s c e n a r i o s w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t e v e n t u a l i n c r e a s e i n f o r e s t a r e a by 
2 1 0 0 i n t h e B l a n d B2 s c e n a r i o f a m i l i e s , as c o m p a r e d t o 1 9 9 0 . 
Associated changes in agricultural land use are driven principally 
by changing food demands caused by demographic and dietary 
shifts. Numerous other social, economic, institutional, and 
technological factors also affect the relative shares of agricultural 
lands, forests, and other types of land use. Different analytic 
methods lead to very different results, indicating that future land 
use change in the scenarios is very model specific. 
A l l t h e above d r i v i n g f o r c e s n o t o n l y i n f l u e n c e CO2 emissions, 
b u t a l s o t h e emissions of o t h e r G H G s . The relationships 
between the driving forces and non-CO^ G H G emissions are 
generally more complex and less studied, and the models used 
for the scenarios less sophisticated. Hence, the uncertainties in 
the SRES emissions for non-CO^ greenhouse gases are 
generally greater than those for energy CO^^. 
* Therefore, the ranges of non-CO^ GHG emissions provided in the 
Report may not fully reflect the level of uncertainty compared to CO^, 
for example only a single model provided the sole value for 
halocarbon emissions. 
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Figure SPM-4: Total global cumulative COj emissions (GtC) from 1990 to 2100 (SP]V[-4a) and histogram of their distribution 
by scenario groups (SPM-4b). No probability of occurrence should be inferred from the distribution of SRES scenarios or those 
in the literature. Both figures show the ranges of cumulative emissions for the 40 SRES scenarios. Scenarios are also grouped 
into four cumulative emissions categories; low, medium-low, medium-high, and high emissions. Each category contains one 
illustrative marker scenario plus alternatives that lead to comparable cumulative emissions, although often through different 
driving forces. This categorization can guide comparisons using either scenarios with different driving forces yet similar 
emissions, or scenarios with similar driving forces but different emissions. The cumulative emissions of the IS92 scenarios are 
also shown. 
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W h a t is the range of G H G emissions i n the S R E S scenarios 
and how do they relate to d r i v i n g forces? 
The SRES s c e n a r i o s c o v e r most of t h e r a n g e of c a r b o n d i o x i d e 
( C O ^ ; see F i g u r e s S P M - 2 a a n d S P M - 2 b ) , o t h e r G H G s , a n d 
sulfur emissions f o u n d i n t h e r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e a n d SRES 
s c e n a r i o d a t a b a s e . Their spread is similar to that of the IS92 
scenarios for CO^ emissions from energy and industry as well 
as total emissions but represents a much wider range for land-
use change. The six scenario groups cover wide and 
overlapping emission ranges. The range of G H G emissions in 
the scenarios widens over time to capture the long-term 
uncertainties reflected in the literature for many of the driving 
forces, and after 2050 widens significantly as a result of 
different socio-economic developments. Table SPM-2b 
summarizes the emissions across the scenarios in 2020, 2050, 
and 2100. Figure SPM-3 shows in greater detail the ranges of 
total emissions for the six scenario groups of scenarios 
that constitute the four families (the three scenario families A2, 
B l , and B2, plus three groups within the A l family A l F I , AIT , 
and A l B ) . 
Some SRES s c e n a r i o s show t r e n d r e v e r s a l s , t u r n i n g p o i n t s ( i . e . , 
i n i t i a l e m i s s i o n increases f o l l o w e d by decreases), a n d 
crossovers ( i . e . , i n i t i a l l y emissions a r e h i g h e r i n one s c e n a r i o , 
b u t l a t e r emissions a r e h i g h e r i n a n o t h e r s c e n a r i o ) . Emission 
trend reversals (see Figures SPîvl-2 and SPM-3) depart from 
historical emission increases. In most of these cases, the 
upward emissions trend due to income growth is more than 
compensated by productivity improvements combined with a 
slowly growing or declining population. 
I n many SRES s c e n a r i o s CO2 emissions f r o m loss of f o r e s t 
c o v e r peak after s e v e r a l decades a n d then g r a d u a l l y d e c l i n e ' ' 
(Figure S P M - l b ) . This pattern is consistent with scenarios in 
the literature and can be associated with slowing population 
growth, followed by a decline in some scenarios, increasing 
agricultural productivity, and increasing scarcity of forest land. 
These factors allow for a reversal of the current trend of loss of 
forest cover in many cases. Emissions decline fastest in the В1 
family. Only in the A2 family do net anthropogenic COj 
emissions from land use change^ remain positive through 2100. 
As was the case for energy-related emissions, C O 2 emissions 
related to land-use change in the A l family cover the widest 
range. The diversity across these scenarios is amplified through 
the high economic growth, increasing the range of alternatives, 
and through the different modeling approaches and their 
treatment of technology. 
Total c u m u l a t i v e SRES c a r b o n emissions f r o m a l l sources 
t h r o u g h 2 1 0 0 r a n g e f r o m a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7 7 0 G t C t o 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 5 4 0 G t C . According to the IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (SAR), "any eventual stabilised 
concentration is governed more by the accumulated 
' In the new scenarios no feedback effect of future climate change on 
emissions from the biosphere has been assumed. 
anthropogenic C O j emissions from now until the time of 
stabilisation than by the way emissions change over the 
period." Therefore, the scenarios are also grouped in the report 
according to their cumulative emissions.^ (see Figure SPM-4). 
The SRES scenarios extend the IS92 range toward higher 
emissions (SRES maximum of 2538 GtC compared to 2140 
GtC for IS92), but not toward lower emissions. The lower 
bound for both scenario sets is approximately 770 GtC. 
T o t a l a n t h r o p o g e n i c methane (CH^) a n d n i t r o u s o x i d e (N^O) 
emissions span a w i d e r a n g e by t h e e n d of t h e 2 P ' c e n t u r y (see 
F i g u r e s S P M - 5 a n d S P M - 6 d e r i v e d f r o m F i g u r e s 5.5 a n d 5 . 7 ) . 
Emissions of these gases in a number of scenarios begin to 
decline by 2050. The range of emissions is wider than in the 
IS92 scenarios due to the multimodel approach, which leads to 
a better treatment of uncertainties and to a wide range of 
driving forces. These totals include emissions from land use, 
energy systems, industry, and waste management. 
M e t h a n e a n d n i t r o u s o x i d e emissions f r o m l a n d use a r e l i m i t e d 
i n A l a n d B l f a m i l i e s by s l o w e r p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h f o l l o w e d by 
a d e c l i n e , a n d i n c r e a s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y . After the 
initial increases, emissions related to land use peak and 
decline. In the B2 family, emissions continue to grow, albeit 
very slowly. In the A2 family, both high population growth and 
less rapid increases in agricultural productivity result in a 
continuous rapid growth in those emissions related to land use. 
The r a n g e of emissions of H F C s i n t h e SRES s c e n a r i o is 
g e n e r a l l y l o w e r t h a n i n e a r l i e r I P C C s c e n a r i o s . Because of new 
insights about the availability of alternatives to HFCs as 
replacements for substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol, 
initially HFC emissions are generally lower than in previous 
IPCC scenarios. In the A2 and B2 scenario families HFC 
emissions increase rapidly in the second half of the this century, 
while in the A2 and B2 scenario families the growth of emissions 
is significantly slowed down or reversed in that period. 
Sulfur emissions i n t h e SRES s c e n a r i o s a r e g e n e r a l l y b e l o w t h e 
IS92 r a n g e , because of s t r u c t u r a l changes i n t h e energy system 
as w e l l as c o n c e r n s a b o u t l o c a l a n d r e g i o n a l a i r p o l l u t i o n . 
These reflect sulfur control legislation in Europe, North 
America, Japan, and (more recenüy) other parts of Asia and 
other developing regions. The timing and impact of these 
changes and controls vary across scenarios and regions^. After 
^ In this Report, cumulative emissions are calculated by adding 
annual net anthropogenic emissions in the scenarios over their time 
horizon. When relating these cumulative emissions to atmospheric 
concentrations, all natural processes that affect carbon concentrations 
in the atmosphere have to be taken into account. 
' Although global emissions of SO^ for the SRES scenarios are lower 
than the IS92 scenarios, uncertainty about SOj emissions and their 
effect on sulfate aerosols has increased compared to the IS92 
scenarios because of very diverse regional pattems of SO2 emissions 
in the scenarios. 
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Figure SPM-5: Standardized (to common 1990 and 2000 values) global annual methane emissions for the SRES scenarios (in 
MtCH4/yr). The range of emissions by 2100 for the six scenario groups is indicated to the right. Illustrative (including marker) 
scenarios are highlighted. 
25 
Figure SPM-6: Standardized (to common 1990 and 2000 values) global annual nitrous oxides emissions for the SRES 
scenarios (in MtN/yr). The range of emissions by 2100 for the six scenario groups is indicated to the right. Illustrative (marker) 
scenarios are highlighted. 
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initial increases over the next two to three decades, global 
sulfur emissions in the SRES scenarios decrease (see Table 
SPM-lb), consistent with the findings of the 1995 IPCC 
scenario evaluation and recent peer-reviewed literature. 
S i m i l a r f u t u r e G H G emissions c a n r e s u l t f r o m v e r y different 
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c developments, a n d s i m i l a r developments of 
d r i v i n g f o r c e s c a n r e s u l t i n different f u t u r e emissions. 
Uncertainties in the future developments of key emission 
driving forces create large uncertainties in future emissions, 
even within the same socio-economic development paths. 
Therefore, emissions from each scenario family overlap 
substantially with emissions from other scenario families. The 
overlap implies that a given level of future emissions can arise 
from very different combinations of driving forces. Figures 
SPM-1, SPM-2, and SPM-3 show this for C O , . 
C o n v e r g e n c e of r e g i o n a l per c a p i t a incomes c a n l e a d t o e i t h e r 
h i g h o r l o w G H G emissions. Tables SPM- la and SPM-lb 
indicate that there ai'e scenarios with high per capita incomes 
in all regions that lead to high COj emissions (e.g., in the high-
growth, fossil fuel intensive scenario group AlF I ) . They also 
indicate that there are scenarios with high per capita incomes 
that lead to low emissions (e.g., the A I T scenario group or the 
B l scenario family). This suggests that in some cases other 
driving forces may have a greater inñuence on G H G emissions 
than income growth. 
H o w can the S R E S scenarios be used? 
I t is r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t a r a n g e of SRES s c e n a r i o s w i t h a 
v a r i e t y of assumptions r e g a r d i n g d r i v i n g f o r c e s be used i n any 
a n a l y s i s . Thus more than one family should be used in most 
analyses. The six scenario groups - the three scenario families 
A2, B l , and B2, plus three groups within the A l scenario 
family, A l B , A l F I , and A I T - and four cumulative emissions 
categories were developed as the smallest subsets of SRES 
scenarios that capture the range of uncertainties associated 
with driving forces and emissions. 
The i m p o r t a n t u n c e r t a i n t i e s r a n g i n g f r o m d r i v i n g f o r c e s t o 
emissions may be different i n different a p p l i c a t i o n s - f o r 
e x a m p l e c l i m a t e m o d e l i n g ; assessment of i m p a c t s , 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y , m i t i g a t i o n , a n d a d a p t a t i o n o p t i o n s ; a n d p o l i c y 
a n a l y s i s . CHmate modelers may want to cover the range 
reflected by the cumulative emissions categories. To assess the 
robustness of options in terms of impacts, vulnerability, and 
adaptation may require scenarios with similar emissions but 
different socio-economic characteristics, as reflected by the six 
scenario groups. For mitigation analysis, variation in both 
emissions and socio-economic characteristics may be 
necessary. For analysis at the national or regional scale, the 
most appropriate scenarios may be those that best reflect 
specific circumstances and perspectives. 
T h e r e i s no s i n g l e most l i k e l y , " c e n t r a l " , o r "best-guess" 
s c e n a r i o , e i t h e r w i t h respect t o SRES s c e n a r i o s o r t o t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g s c e n a r i o l i t e r a t u r e . Probabilities or likelihood are 
not assigned to individual SRES scenarios. None of the SRES 
scenarios represents an estimate of a central tendency for all 
driving forces or emissions, such as the mean or median, and 
none should be interpreted as such. The distribution of the 
scenarios provides a useful context for understanding the 
relative position of a scenario but does not represent the 
likelihood of its occurrence. 
The d r i v i n g f o r c e s a n d emissions of each SRES s c e n a r i o s h o u l d 
be used t o g e t h e r . To avoid internal inconsistencies, 
components of SRES scenarios should not be mixed. For 
example, the G H G emissions from one scenario and the SO2 
emissions from another scenario, or the population from one 
and economic development path from another, should not be 
combined. 
W h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g t h e i n h e r e n t u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n l o n g - t e r m 
p r o j e c t i o n s ^ ' ^ , t h e SRES s c e n a r i o s may p r o v i d e p o l i c y m a k e r s 
w i t h a l o n g - t e r m c o n t e x t f o r n e a r - t e r m a n a l y s i s . The modeling 
tools that have been used to develop these scenarios that focus 
on the century time scale are less suitable for analysis of near 
term (a decade or less) developments. When analyzing 
mitigation and adaptation options, the user should be aware 
that although no additional climate initiatives are included in 
the SRES scenarios, various changes have been assumed to 
occur that would require other interventions, such as those 
leading to reductions in sulfur emissions and significant 
penetration of new energy technologies. 
W h a t f u t u r e work on emissions scenarios would be useful? 
• Establishment of a program for on-going evaluations 
and comparisons of long-term emission scenarios, 
including a regularly updated scenario database; 
• Capacity building, particularly in developing countries, 
in the area of modeling tools and emissions scenarios; 
• Multiple storyline, multi-model approaches in future 
scenario analyses; 
• New research activities to assess future developments 
in key G H G driving forces in greater regional, 
subregional, and sectoral detail which allow for a 
clearer link between emissions scenarios and mitigation 
options; 
• Improved specification and data for, and integration o f 
the ПОП-СО2 G H G and non-energy sectors, such as land 
use, land-use change and forestry, in models, as well as 
model inter-comparison to improve scenarios and 
analyses; 
• Integration into models emissions of particulate, 
hydrogen, or nitrate aerosol precursors, and processes, 
Confidence in the quantification of any scenario decreases 
substantially as the time horizon increases because the basis for 
the assumptions becomes increasingly speculative. This is why a 
set of scenarios was developed. 
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such as feedback of climate change on emissions, that 
may significantly influence scenario results and 
analyses; 
Development of additional gridded emissions for 
scenarios which would facilitate improved regional 
assessment; 
Assessment of strategies that would address multiple 
national, regional, or global priorities; 
Development of methods for scientifically sound 
aggregation of emissions data; 
More detailed information on assumptions, inputs, and 
the results of the 40 SRES scenarios should be made 
available at a web site and on a C D - R O M . Regular 
maintenance of the SRES web site is needed; 
• Extension of the SRES web site and production of a 
C D - R O M to provide, if appropriate, time-dependent 
geographic distributions of driving forces and 
emissions, and concentrations of GHGs and sulfate 
aerosols. 
• Development of a classification scheme for classifying 
scenarios as intervention or non-intervention scenarios. 
Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 13 
£ - S i 
s -s 
-s -s 
"s i 
3 s 
« § 
I I 
1 1 
1 ^ 
s 
к о 
'С 
á i 
ее 
C5 
-S 
i l 
i § 
- c i 
o\ со 
00 u .s; « 
I ^ 
•Cl 
во ^ 
Cl. 
к 
'§ 
s: 
• Si 5 
5^  - 5 ; 
•Й 
la 
tu О 
V5 
I 
I 
ta 
I 
§3 
I 
Г-1 
S4 
< 
S 
t2 
SQ 
ça 
CQ 
о 
i 
ад 
о 
'С 
я 
I 
0 0 оо ^ 
г-^  о< о 
ЧО СП 
O N СП 
о 
МО ^ 
0 0 г-^  
•4 Ю СТ; 
г-^  оо чо 
|> ее 
0 0 
I 
ГЦ 
5© 
к ао f-
4 
NO 
ЧО t-; 
|> оо 
гЛ ó 
¿ SS ¿ 
>о t- 1^  
I> oó t-' 
se 
4D 
p 
r-' 
с о 
с о ••S о о Q «2 <N >n о 3 о о 
7-1 ^ \Г) 
1Л> r - iri 
4 
^ 4D 
s ;^  
r~- Ю о in ЧО >ri en 
0 0 
lO os 
^ ^ 
o¿ ^ со Os 
^ u~i a \ 
^ ^ r^, 
fS ^ 
r i 
tr­io 0 0 
O N 
ее U~l 
^ ^ \0 ю oo m 
t o o IN ^ vo ^ co V) ^ ^ ^ ON 
oc n 
г- о lo oo in 
со I t 
lo со <ч 
^ Г" 
IT) ^ ^ 
3« 
(N 
D о 
O N 
O N 
Ü О О О 
C N 1 0 о о О —' см es CN 
g 
8 
- H lO N O 
es к со 
г I I 
г- о 
со (N 
lo 
' о о 
t^ : TÍ 
O N O N 
о 4 '•H 
co_ 
>o 
~—' ЧС 00 
Ч f<Î I-H 
со tN со 
ç 4 0 0 N O 
l o i ( N q 
O N 
" NO 
0\ 
Q O r~; 
N O ^ 
N O 
lO (N -^^  
- - ^ •w^ 
fN| 00 NO 
NÓ <^  ^ 
1^  (N о 
O N r - ^ 
(N -4 lA 
¿ ci ¿ 
5^  
NO r i r-i 
lÓ 
i 
с < 
с 
о о 
-- X 
• с 
< 
'Н а 
3 
8 
' S .O о о е о wq о 
о се т: о р г1 
^ (N см С^  
ю 
I 
с 
5 
3 
я I 
•а 
а 
s 
I 
<1> 
Í 
о с 
I 
ей .с '> 
•с 
•а 
и 
i 
14 Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 
fe 5 
?^ .S 
tu 
Щ 
- i 
1. 
Oí 
•5 
> 
- i 
S -I 
^ -1= 
I 
I 
i 
S ^ 
I s 
о к 
•й 
ÍU 
I 
-« 
s 
I 
о s -s; о 
CQ 
i-H 
CQ 
< < 
< 
< 
< 
< 
О 
a . 
§ 
,o 
"E я с 
« a u 
so 
t~-' e\ о 
MO ^ 00 C-^  
1 l t 40 0\ 
00 s o 
о 
f<t m ^ 
aè -H >л 
t-~ о 
4 
so 
с- г-
о 
г- г-
р 
so - i 
i n 
о 
с .о 3 s й о "з о о ^ 
о, Г 4 <N 
(2 
— . - н г-i n Г Л 
00 V ^ ^ 00 <N ^ о г<-) (N 
1Л ^ О 1Л 
^ rr¡ 
f - so о lO so i n 
i n 4 00 
^ C - ) <N 
— ^ IT) ^ 
so ae 
-Ч (*ï 
-Ч fS f*^  
ТГ oe n-
t - t-- о 
i n 00 i n 
s i ^ in ( N O S •-^  00 (N t- — in IT) ^ 
r- e 00 ID -Ч IT) 
_ - < S O 
s o 00 m 
i n 
so 
^ 0\ 
s o r-l 
^ O S 
00 n 
г- г- о i n оо i n in 
m i n i n 
i n 
1Л 
CO 
D 
O S 
0-
Q 
О 
T3 
I 
О О О (N i n о О О (N <N <N 
S O 
p s o i n 
00 < r i 
i n 00 p 
t - ^ ( Г ) f ó 
а, я о 
с 
1 с 3 
8 
> 
«и 
т з 
о о 
^ O S O S 
оо rn —í 
I I I 
m s q 
! ¿ G ¿ 
•ч- so ас 
oó fñ ^ 
in OS 
I 
O S 
so M 
so 
00 so 
s o 
1 
<N 
S O 
so 
i n 00 p-
'ч" T* tN -4 in 
!¿ c i ¿ 
00 so 
so 1-Ч 
C4 i n 
s o ¿ 
1Л IT) 
l> ^ 
1 < 
2 Z 
О О О Г-1 i n о О о (S гч o( 
Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 
РЭ 00 ^ Ю 
г ч ' 00 
T ó 
IT) 
00 
00 
i ЧО го 
о о 
NO TÍ 
ЧО m 5^ NO lo и< <n s N0 rrí (N ^ \0 ^ ON NO NO 
ON NO 
oo 
ON m 
CO t U-1 
4 ó CM 
о 
00 о ON « СП t 
(•^  1Л1 сч 
^ - H (SI 00 ^ ^ -H © ON 
pa CQ ЧО p r~; .-^  NO oi 
T lA 4-
V O ^ ^ 
¡X ^. 
r i -H 
00 
ND 00 ON 
00 со 4 
uo 
Г- r~ C^ l (N CO (N 
¿ ¿ ó 
rj 1-Н 00 
(N tN о о rf f-
r- oo со ^ —' со 
1Л 
•M 
< 
Ч 
(N ON 
' 7 0 4 
^ 4 
<4 
1Л ON 
ON <n 
t- F : ON Й о 
r~- e\ lO 1-^ '=d^ 
^ 2 ^ s 
á 
со 
uo oo ON 
5 
со г- со 
о f<^  n Cl IT) 
NO ON Г-(N со 
oo t чо 
, 4 (N 
00 00 00 -H 
H 
1—< 0(2 со 
00 r i 
NO Г4 oo 
ó ¿ ¿ 
t- 00 г<^  
00 r í 
N© 
со ^ 
~" o 
CN 
со со со 
CN I 
o 
(N со Ю <N -tt oo 
UO ON 4 —' со NO 
p <N со 
cÀ có 
V 4 v¿ 
4 —I 
oo 
ON 
1Л rrt 
^ ' . \Q ^ iri — M со г- 2 — 1^  oo 
°? -^  s 
со , , Г-- oo <N 
> 0 NO o ^ ON o 
00 (N ^ <N xl-
I 1 I 
SS C- 3!/ 
Tt Tt 
NO uo 
ON ^ (N ЧО ^ NO ir> 
со ЧО 
t_ со 
ON NO со 
lA 4; NO 
22- ¿ ci 
•Ч; c^  о 
0 \ NO ci 
NO 
со 
NO 
• со 
о 
co 
со 
I 00 00 
ON 
(N NO 00 
• lo ^ со со (N ^ ^ ON ON ГГ) 
o r -
NO o 
^ со 
in ON -H 
^ ^ о 
о 
NO со (N 
s 
£ 
(S с о; u 
V5-
с 
в 
с 
£? 
c o o <U <N Ю о 
M ~ 
g CN (N tN 
È? 
с 
Б (N 
о 
о 
tN 
о о 
OI 
о о о о <N U 0 о й О о — й tN tN 
СО 
S 
с о 
03 
о 
N 
03 
СО 
^ О О О >, <N О 
ад О О 
tN tN tN 
с! 
1 6 Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 
s - i : 
CQ 
I—1 i H 
РЗ PQ 
< <! 
H 
<d 
PQ 
-s; 
< 
Os 
a, s 
1 « 
S G s 
^ ЧО r-< 
^ t 
in p 0\ 
oo Ю гл 
о о 
oé 4D TÍ 
ю о 
^ чо <S 
Т >Л 4 
с^ ; ^• 
ао 
sé 
г-н U-) O N 
г4 ON u-i 
l o 
O N U-i го 
V) ON 
^ ON iri 
r i 
00 
00 
4D со 
г- 00 
00 TÍ 
^. 
со 
i n 4 p 
o¿ |n со 
Tt f<) o 
OÑ ЧО 
1! 
Щ 
Й o o o <L> es i n o 
^ o o ^ g CN CN CN 
^ ON o íC 
° ^ 5 
WO °" O N Д со 
O N 
00
со 
I 
О 
^ TI- í - ^ о о ^ r;-
ЧС 00 g «л ^ 
4 
r—( 
^ 2 " 
ON s § 0\ 
in 
1^  
I 1 ^ „ ? 3 
N O 
4D 00 
о 
о 
CN CN СО 
О со 1—1 1—1 со 
со r i 
00 NO 
'V ó ON 00 (N l o c i со 00 ' in 
^ T í о 
^ vi 
ON 
in 
N O со 
со 
со 
lO 
со 
со in со со So о со 
оГ 
4 О à\ (N Ci CN) 
о 06 о 
1^  CN Г4 СО (N 
1 1 I 
2î S 2-
^ 00 
es о со 
CN со in 
ó ' 
i n 
f4 O 
r<\ Ti i n 
ЧО CN ^ ^ t t 00 C O -ч|-
Т Г 
es CNl ЧО 
^ in ^ 
4 C O C O 
CN ^ 
^ ' eN 
ON en 
n en 
1 ^ 
о 
CN 
CS 
<u 
e 
•c 
С 
"сЗ О О 
см 
О О О 
Q 
о о ^ 
CN fS <N 
CN 
00 
N O O N 
— (N 
00 00 
ЧО о 
Ó v C O • (N SO ' 
о — 1 
C O 
Ó N O 
J3 СЛ1 
§ 
о 
s 
'S 
g , 
s 
§ 
о о Ь CN i n S О О с CN CN 
О 
г-
2S 5 
со 
00 (N 
00 
со со со in 
1 
00 
со О ~-—' in Ci w 
о 
г» 
in 
O N 
со 
о со 
1Л O N ^ 
Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 1 7 
<4 
PS 
OO ^ ON 
О 
as 
90 
О 
d 
CN r~ 
О - ¡ 
о © 
1^  
CN 
со со 
о 
со in 3 о о 
I I со 00 CN со 
s s 
тН 4D ^ 4D V) 
O N N O со 
N O со —I i n N O 
4 см i n 
oo oo N O 
C- s s 
irj r~-
00 © ON 
r^i tn trt 
P3 (N i n CN CO t-^ CO 
oq i n CO 
t~-^  00 CO 
© r-~ 
© F H 
CO 00 —' 
'T ? 9 
ó 00 
d d <N 
NO 
© © -H 
CO 00 CM 
NO 
о ON CO 
I 
(N 
(N ON in ^ NO <N 
T* O N 4 CM CN ^ 
i n ^ ON trt NO 
О NO ON 
CO Tt t> t i n i n 
I I J 
O N N O i n CO 
C- C i l> ON NO l>. V) m <r> <Г) 
CM 
< 
< CO (N t 00 ci 
^ CO 
ON i n NO 
t-^ d t--^  
^—' ^ »—( 
да w w 
^ i n 9\ 
^ S ^ 
P ON p 
CO О СЧ 
^ vo ^ 
d d d 
fM ON 
© 
О 
N O oo 
CO 
о CO 
ON 
00 CO ON 
I (N in 
C O 
2 
N O 
« CO 
t ON 
"7 Ó 
00 N O 
© 
CO ON 
4 i n CO 
CN ] 
~ ON 
i n 
00 ^ <S ON ON r t >rt ОС 
H 
<(1 
о 
d 
00 
го —; 
CN ON 
-7 cA 
r i 
i n ^ 
^ ' 9 9 
со CN о 
o d d 
^ о Я © I © 
00 
S 
O N 00 
O N 
NO 
CO 
cn 
CTN 
NO о - H _ ON i n CM 
m CN 
ON t-~ t Tf 
pa 
1—1 < 
ON 
00 (N CN 
© 
NO P*S 
N O p CM 
r -H r -H CM 
CO о Tf 
é é 
V5 ^ 
О О 3 
Г Н ON 
Ó 
(N 
00 
r i 
NO 
ON СО 
I 
о со 
CM 
N O t 
N O 
00 r i 
•s M 
Un 
< t N O N O ^ CM СО 
N O 
d d i> 
—' CN (N 
r i © 
r l Г) 
00 O N о 
— ; d d 
I I I СО O "-^  
^ * r i 
00 
Щ go 
CN 
о 
CM 
0\ NO 
со 
NO 
I 
CM 
ON со 
со 00 
о 
t - rH * 
oc 00 
ON N O i n 1^  со со 
^ N O 
i n 4 O N 
• - H , 4 00 ^ i n C N 
NO © in -H m en -1- NC r-
ON 
О 
N O 
ON 
d 
о 
со 
E 
(2 
о. 
i 
О 
•E ce e 
Ь 
СЯ 
о 
§ О О О CM >n о о о - H 
CM CM CN 
и 
и 
Ü 
«D 
T3 
. • i 
о 
'-в 
J 
О О О (N i n о 
о О —I CM n CN 
X 
о 
¿ G 
" e g 
-S S 
Д ON 
- i 
X О 
'•3 
с 
зу 8 
I I S 
и M 
ON 
X 
о 
I 8 
•S; y <N 
б ó 
•с ~—' O N 
1 13 2 
б 2 
сл 
"x o 
§ 
CM 
o o 
g 2 
(N CM 
5' 
3 
00 
О О О 
см i n о 
о о ^ 
см CN (N 
1 8 Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 
s 
I , 
I 
I 
t Q . Sfi 
» Ш 
< < 
<í 
SQ 
< < 
Ьн 
< 
о ON ON 
т Н 
О. 
3 
о èb о 
te 
1 с a U 
IN ^ 
СО 0 0 
СО CTN 
fO ON 
lO 
U0 
00 
^ о 
ЧО го 
m' 
00 <И 
С Ч O N 
(N го 
го оо 
чо ю 
чо © 
OÑ г4 
оо 
чо 1 
0 0 
Tf 
чо CO (N 
O Ñ 
N O CO ce 
1¿ !¿ 
О 
со wo 
o^ ^' 
N O 
ON 
4 D 
N O 
I 
UO 
Ч С 
N O 
ON Ч О ON Ov f4 fO Ю 
Ч О CO 
о я 
с- о 
TÍ O N O N ?ч «л с- ЧС 2 
^ «в O N 
O N СП O N (П Г4 1> O N -J r i СП T ТГ 
T t O N Ч О 
Г-* r i 
PO N O 
r< ГЧ PO ON <-( 1Г) n fO t--
O N r< rr о r i 00 1Л O N r-
О ЧО 
СО TÍ -Ч-* ЧО О чо 
г- чо Tt СО Ю ^ со v> »о 
ï-~ го М' 00 <л •Ч' 00 -н 
00 M Ч © 
t-' OÑ 
t- чо го чо 
со "П чо 
|> Г-; со 
r i об <л 
•Ч' 00 
00 M чо 
1> чо ТГ со чо гН со "Г) чо 
|> г- со 
'^ É 2 
00 n чо 
t¿ OÑ TÍ Tf -H ON 
Ч ON /—. 
s r-r- I—1 СО O N § o СО r i •"^ 
(N ci 
ГО 0 0 4 D ЧО in 4 D 
О 
0 0 
(S 
lO 
сч го 
О со 
© t- о 00 >-( t~-^ n 
«л 
о 2 Tt 0 0 со ;2 
S S ^ - - i ;2 ^ 
0 0 CN чо ^ Г-
г- чо г-
Д ^ ^ ^ г: 
© ^ t-о t-, 
i> © т-^  r~- r l 
5 
CN 
r-r-o (N 
I 
О Oi 
in 
со So 3 R © ^ ?3 n s со 
S Д O N S 
0 0 
O N 
O N О ^ oo 
O N О 
^ v^  J о к ЧО 
!2 ^ ^ P¡ 
со O N (N —' 
— 4 D 
0 0 
O N 
in о 
4 ¿ гЛ 
чо чо 
ON I T ) 
г- г 
oo ЧО ûO о ^ (N 
(N О (M ГО 
r-~ OO 
in in 
rï ON Г) l> 
n pq 
о CN rO C^ l CNl ГО 
0 0 4 ¿ 
г- >n 
С-
rï r^ ON M 
r - ( СО 
n 
tN 4 D in ЧО Г-
OO CNI 4 со ^ со 
PO "Л гН 
•Ч- V) чо 
-s со чо со 
,—^ ,—, ,—, 
о со г- O N O S (N in г- O N Ti­ >n Г- со (N ro г 
oo 
1 
O N чо 
1 г 1 О 0 0 го С О го in ^—^ чо —^ © O N O N го ^—' N Г-. Tt СО 
»н 00 
О 
m 
(N 
© «Л 
O N 
N O Tf 
tN О 
О О - н 
о Т m - н 
—. о 
чо Tf 
O N 0 0 
3 г5 
о г-о г-
7 ó 
0 0 Tl-
^ 00 * 
Tt 
© 
in — 
O N in 
O N V 
Tl- о ^ Tl-u~¡ " ON © 
чо CN ЧО CN 
CO 
CO 
0 \ 
0 0 
O N 
CO 
O N 
d 
>< 
О 
и 3 
g 
о о <N in 
О о <N CM 
3 
о-
Ц 
и 
и 
и 
о Ь о 
ra и <N 
Ни 
и 
> 
'з 
О" 
1) 
О О S m о ^ о --^  
<N CN и 
О О О (N in о 
О О 
CN га n 
у 
S о о о са in о , о о ^ 4oCN ra n 
on 
О 
и о 
Z 
О О О n in о о о n га га 
О О О n m о 
О О — 
n d са 
2 S за S. ^ s 
.£Р 5 с 
^ V S .л Vi л 
t£ О -о 
g n u 
е 
.а о .'^  
с 
s 
л; 
.S ё 
а. с 
3 :S 
•о 
1' 
с 
ъ 
> 
,и 
о 
о - I •о 
о 
Е 
H 
3 
О, 
: Í Í 
СЛ 
Е 
S 
с о 
in 
ID 
Е2 
СГ со 
V -л с с 
о се 
о vn, 
с 
3 V -
3 <u 
<u .2 
•S •£ 
с 
g Ü 
ь ^ a о 
N O ^ 
и ^ В 
Й I Z 
Цн g с 
( J í (U 
и •§ 3 
ГТ a с 
h - I 
и л ь 
G 
60 
В 
03 
О 
-с <D 
ТЗ л 
й ад 
Т З 03 
-S <u J= 
^ -s 
.с ¿ 
0 52 
g H 
Й g 
с .SP 'S 
1 .t 
G G 
3 о 
G .2 
СЛ D 
p 73 
Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 19 
r l 
n pa 
rH гН 
pa 
< 
гН 
pa 
T H 
гН H-l 
ON 
a 
3 
£ 
о 
"E 
1 e a> u Ьн 
q Ю •—[ CM 
d i n 00 ^ * 
1 1 ó i n 
00 C-) oo d о d 
00 
о 
о О 
ON fN 00 rH fO 
rH rH 
о 
(N i n ON 
СП r-^ r-^ 
СП 
СП <N i n 
S S 00 
о t -
O rH 
CM 
о i n O N 
—: NO c c 
— ^ (N 
СП 
d i n 00 
- ^ w 
V5 ON 
NO 00 
rH C M 
f~- f-- ON 
Tt- i n r-^ 
^ (N ^ 
1 I r 
t-; —; 
00 (N СП 
r i * 1 гН NO m 
t NO ND 
—' CNl СП 
t-^ N¿ СП 
d d d 
^ d C -
n rH со 
rH cñ d 
rH n rO 
о 
NO 
и 
б 
1) 
, 3 
•о 
с 
о 
б 
О О О см i n о 
о о 
(N Г 4 CN 
СП 00 — 
^ ' 9 9 
р t-; Ю 
d О f^i 
NO 
d о © -H 
CNl 
9 
CM ON 
—: d 
I I 
- H oo о 
¿ d o 
см ON n 
rH © © 
О СП NO О 
о <N o c о о 
1 СП ( СП ó oo t . о d о 
sS —^ о 
© ^. © © © © d 
rH C M ' 
ю р 
СП ó 
о О 
V) - t 
© © 
00 о о ' о 
Т 9 9 
СП р — 
о о с м 
гН © ^ ; 
и 
б 
m 
3 
CU 
о 
с 
о 
и 
О О О 
см m о 
о О — см га С^ ) 
X 
о 
я 
о 
> 
i n 
NO 
s о 
00 
СП 
о 
§1 
ГН 2} 
I 
о 
(N 
?5 
гН 
Г< 
Ч (11 N ?1 
s 
3 
о 
m см 
r t 
00 
(N 
NO 
ON 
00 
ON 
00 
NO 
СП 
гН 
СО 
00 
гч 
NO 
чО 
со 
-2 
X 
с 
§ у Р 
^ О S 
I 
О 
3 "з 
3 g 
и . 2 
N ^ N ^ 
Г 4 
00 NO 
oo 
es со 
\^ со 
ON со r -
o 
(N 
I 
о со 
s со M m 
CM 
CM 
;o 
' x 
о 
с 
о 
t о 
3Í ^ — 
•д 1^ 
-ISS 
i Й 
и 2 
о 
о 
00 NO 00 
р~- i n t 
I со со NO 
гН NO NO trt 
(N ON i n 
—< 4D CM 
T O N 4 . 
(N (N 
i n 
^ ON IT) NO 
i n ON 
о NO 
ó 
NO о 
© 
© 1Л -H © 
о s CM 
T o ó 
о IN 
NO ' • 
NO t 
r~- 00 
Tf п О) 
NO 
^ -rt oo 
© NO r i © 
t ON CO 
CO CO 00 
T T t-^ 
о t <N 
NO NO 
00 00 
O N 
d 
• 3 
X 
о 
О О О 
r j i n о 
о о 
СЧ CM IN 
^ i n г-
ON о ON 
CO i n i n 
4 - i n 
oo 00 NO 
CO t t 
IT) t -
© ON 
IT) t n 
о NO 
CO t NO •Ñj- i n i n 
r - ON NO 
Г - i n CO 
CO CO (N 
t - ON NO 
r~- <n CO CO f<^ n 
t ON 
r~l f - NO 
^ NO о 
oo 00 T 
—< ON ON 
-!t i n oo 
w ^ 00 
^ ^ ON 
V> 00 
oe 
NO 
о ON 
i n M 
i n CM 4-
— ON Г -
t (N 
1Л Tf 
Т Г 1 Л C M 
C3N о i n r - CO CO 
rj - Nip t-p 
NO 4 ON 
— — oo 
•Ñt- i n r^j^ 
N© © i n 
rH CO m 
NO t--
o 
CO 
X 
и 
О О О 
(N i n о 
О о 
<N C^l (N 
3 
со 
Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s 
P3 
< 
< 
< 
M i n 
^ en 
NO VO 
о 
00 
I 
0\ 
ON 
00 
i n 
00 
00 (N 
4 d 
NO m 
i n i n 
f o 
00 «ri 
so q i n 
O N <si N O 
cn V 
N O ° ° ^ 
N O 00 
so ^ ^ 
ON ® 
so 
oo 
l > NO i n 
^ 00 
^ NO Th 
<—I T f 
VÔ so v i 
NO 00 
OS r o 
ТГ 
so 
i n 
I 
00 
i n 
о 
CO 
O N 
so 
OS 
i n so 
T f so 
< I 
CO OS 
NO i n 
so 
TÍ so" 
ON 
OS 
CO so 
00 so CO 
T Í so Í - ! 
•л о fs| 
r> о 
TÍ ON OÑ 
>л i > so 
r< 00 OS 
£ !2 * i 
<^ CO fs| 
t--; ON 
i H r i T Í 
CO T t T t C^l CO so 
^ CN, ^ 
ON ,H «Л 
CS CO l > 
O N C^ J T t 
© r i 00 V) OS 
CO «Л so 
r~~ CO ce n ^ 
•ч- OS 
CO l > CO 
CO « i NO ^ 00 I H 
00 so 
t-^ OS TÍ 
T t гн ON 
>e T t 
CO so 
CO V) so 
t~- CO 
C^* 00 i r i 
T t 00 ^ 
00 
t ¿ O N • 
- Ч 
OS so 
rN| 
2 
^—^ 
2 
^—^ 
CN OS о о 
(N CO oo 
О CO 
1 
1—1 c^ 1 
^ ON ó 
О Г - ON CO 
TÍ- 00 oo r—Ч T 1 
OS T f — ' 4 ^ ^—' 
О 
00 
I—1 
t- о 
T t ON so c;-
i n 1^ 
CO so 
CO 
^ ^ s i 
i n 
Й 00 25 i n ^ 
о ^ ;5 « f:;^  - H j;:^ OS ^ i q 
(N 
CO 
о 
CN 
4 CO 
r a so 
s Й 5$ 
^ Й ^ g ^ 
^ ^ <^ 
CO OS 
N O so r-co 
00 
OS 
r a 
r a 
с о 
os 
O N 
CO ^ 
Г ) СО 
I \ 
SO 00 
i n 
"-^ r--
SO 00 
r a CN 
OS i n 
r a 
С C i 
o s l o 
t-~ СЧ 
T H 
o ^ oo 
ON ^ CN 
^ r a ^ 
00 so T f 
00 o ^ 
CU' Ci C-
© -H 00 
os •4- СЧ 1—I n r H 
r a 
r a 
es 
—' r) o i n 
с о i n 
I I 
ON t--
i n CO 
r a r-^^ 
о r a 
с о r a 
CN с о 
о о NO 
i n 
w C i -
ГЧ <s 
OS r« 
^ CO 
CO i n ^ 
T f m so 
I 1 1 
00 ГЦ T f 
CO T f CO 
CO V ) ^ 
ТГ V ) so 
O N 
i n 
oo 
CO 
CN i n 
CO 
ON S O 
OS OS 
CO 
о 
i n 
I 
p -
© 
^ о 
so OS 
' о 
OS ^ о 
T f N O 
so OS oo 
s s c t 
so T H 00 
so r i 
so so 
N O 
о 
1 о 
00 T f 
— 
' © 
T t 
NO 
T f 
© 
i n ^ 
ON i n 
ON ' 7 ^§ 
OS © 
CN 
NO г ч 
CO CO 
OS 
00 
OS 
CO 
OS 
d 
CO 
o, 
i 
ел 
о 
I 
i 
o 
o 
s 
r» 
3 
и 
в 
о о 
i n о 
о "-н 
га га 
о —1 
' з 
у 
s о о ^ га i n _ 
о о •N га га и 8 ° 
ID 
У 
S О О ^ га m _ 
- о о 
« C N CN r a 
li( 
o 
o 
s s о CN 
о 
CN 
о m 
о 
r a 
z ; 
О О О 
r a i n о 
о о - H 
r^i r a Г ) 
Z 
2 о о о 
о 
Z 
<га га га 
о 2 
> N V s 
о 
и 
6 
о 
с 
о 
3 
о 
00 
с 
s а 
О 3 
. а H J 
о 
^ " t í 
ci 03 
i s 
. a § 
s 
(U 
> 
о 
1 
N 2 
о 
- 3 
-g 
•S 
i 
H 
i n 
3 
E 2 
1 . 
• з | | 
l i l 
0 i n Й 
^ a 
1 S3 ^ 
s ^ i ° 
Й Ü 
s I ^ о *^ 
U ^ В 
Й .S Z 
( Л 
3 
СЛ 
XI . 
3 D 
СЛ 3 
t - ОЗ 
r a *^ 
<u . а 
1 
I 
1 
00 й 
I 
Р ^ 3 
Ь - ё , 
• 2 3 
g 8 О 
_ X 
Й " О 
о 3 1^ 
(Л 
3¿ 
о 
00 
1 " 
Щ 00 
^ ад 
S ад 
оЗ 
i l 
2 и 
i l 
2 ^ 
00 
'S 
I 
C L , 
.S 
i 
I t 
l « ' О 
о о 
í i 
t+H 03 
^_) СЛ 
СД U 
В Й 
С (U 
TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
CONTENTS 
1. Introduction and Background 23 9.1.1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Their 
Driving Forces 36 
2. Emissions Scenarios and Their Purposes 23 9.1.2. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Energy, Industry, and Land Use 36 
3. Review of Past IPCC Emissions Scenarios 24 9.1.3. Scenario Groups and Four Categories 
of Cumulative Emissions 39 
4. SRES Writing Team, Approach, and Process 24 9.2. Other Greenhouse Gases 41 
9.2.1. Methane Emissions 42 
5. Scenario Literature Review and Analysis 25 9.2.2. Nitrous Oxide Emissions 42 
9.2.3. Halocarbons and Halogenated 
6. Narrative Scenarios and Storylines 27 Compounds 42 
9.3. Sulfur Dioxide Emissions 43 
7. Quantitative Scenarios and 9.4. Other Chemically Active Gases 44 
Modeling Approaches 29 9.4.1. Nitrogen Oxides Emissions 44 
9.4.2. Volatile Organic Compounds, 
8. Main Scenario Driving Forces Based Excluding Methane 45 
on Literature 31 9.4.3. Carbon Monoxide Emissions 45 
8.1. Population Projections 31 9.5. Emissions Overview 45 
8.2. Economic Development 32 
8.3. Structural and Technological Change 33 10. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 45 
9. Greenhouse Gases and Sulfur Emissions 36 References 56 
9.1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions 36 
T e c h n i c a l Summary 23 
1. Introduction and Background 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
decided at its September 1996 plenary session in Mexico City 
to develop a new set of emissions scenarios (see Appendix I for 
the Terms of Reference). This Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES) describes the new scenarios and how they 
were developed. 
The SRES writing team formulated a set of emissions 
scenarios. These scenarios cover a wide range of the main 
driving forces of future emissions, from demographic to 
technological and economic developments. The scenarios 
encompass different future developments that might influence 
greenhouse gas (GHG) sources and sinks, such as alternative 
structures of energy systems and land-use changes. As required 
by the Terms of Reference however, none of the scenarios in 
the set includes any future policies that explicitly address 
additional climate change initiatives', although G H G 
emissions are directly affected by non-climate change policies 
designed for a wide range of other purpose. 
The set of SRES emissions scenarios is based on an extensive 
assessment of the literature, six alternative modeling 
approaches, and an "open process" that solicited wide 
participation and feedback from many groups and individuals. 
The set of scenarios includes anthropogenic emissions of all 
relevant G H G species, sulfur dioxide (SOj), carbon monoxide 
(CO), nitrogen oxides (NO^,), and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOCs), see Table 1-1 in Chapter 1. It covers 
most of the range of G H G emissions compared with the 
published scenario literature. For example, emissions of carbon 
dioxide (COj) in 2100 range from more than 40 to less than 6 
giga (or billion) tons^ of elemental carbon (GtC), that is, from 
almost a sevenfold increase to roughly the same emissions 
level as in 1990. 
Future emissions and the evolution of their underlying driving 
forces are highly uncertain, as reflected in the very wide range 
of future emissions paths in the literature that is also captured 
by the SRES scenarios. The use of scenarios in this report 
addresses the uncertainties related to k n o w n factors. 
Uncertainties related to u n k n o w n factors can of course never be 
persuasively captured by any approach. As the prediction of 
future anthropogenic G H G emissions is impossible, alternative 
GHG emissions scenarios become a major tool for analyzing 
potential long-range developments of the socio-economic 
system and corresponding emission sources. 
Emissions scenarios are a central component of any assessment 
of climate change. G H G and SO2 emissions are the basic input 
' For example, no scenarios are included that explicitly assume 
implementation of the emission targets in the U N F C C C and the Kyoto 
protocol. 
^ Metric tons are used throughout this report. Unless otherwise 
specified, monetary units are 1990 US dollars (see Chapter 4). 
for determining future climate patterns with simple climate 
models, as well as with complex general circulation models 
(GCMs). Possible climate change, together with the major 
driving forces of future emissions, such as demographic 
pattems, economic development and environmental conditions, 
provide the basis for the assessment of vulnerability, possible 
adverse impacts and adaptation strategies and policies to 
climate change. The major driving forces of future emissions 
also provide the basis for the assessment of possible mitigation 
strategies and policies designed to avoid climate change. The 
new set of emissions scenarios is intended for use in future 
IPCC assessments and by wider scientific and policymaking 
communities for analyzing the effects of future G H G 
emissions and for developing mitigation and adaptation 
measures and policies. 
2. Emissions Scenarios and Their Purposes 
Scenarios are images of the future, or alternative futures. They 
are neither predictions nor forecasts. Rather, each scenario is 
one alternative image of how the future might unfold (see 
Chapters 1 and 4 for more detail). As such they enhance our 
understanding of how systems behave, evolve and interact. 
They are useful tools for scientific assessments, learning about 
complex systems behavior and for policymaking and assist in 
climate change analysis, including climate modeling and the 
assessment of impacts, adaptation and mitigation. 
Future levels of global G H G emissions are a product of very 
complex, ill-understood dynamic systems, driven by forces 
such as population growth, socio-economic development, and 
technological progress among others, thus making long-term 
predictions about emissions virtually impossible. However, 
near-term policies may have profound long-term climate 
impacts. Consequently, policy makers need a summary of what 
is understood about possible future G H G emissions, and given 
the uncertainties in both emissions models and our 
understanding of key driving forces, scenarios are an 
appropriate tool for summarizing both current understanding 
and current uncertainties. 
G H G emissions scenarios are usually based on an internally 
consistent and reproducible set of assumptions about the key 
relationships and driving forces of change, which are derived 
from our understanding of both history and the current 
situation. Often these scenarios are formulated with the help of 
formal models. Sometimes G H G emissions scenarios are less 
quantitative and more descriptive, and in a few cases they do 
not involve any formal analysis and are expressed in qualitative 
terms. The SRES scenarios involve both qualitative and 
quantitative components; they have a narrative part called 
"storylines" and a number of corresponding quantitative 
scenarios for each storyline. SRES scenarios can be viewed as 
a linking tool that integrates qualitative narratives or stories 
about the future and quantitative formulations based on 
different formal modeling approaches. Although no scenarios 
are value free, the SRES scenarios are descriptive and are not 
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intended to be desirable or undesirable in their own right. They 
have been built as descriptions of plausible alternative futures, 
rather than preferred developments. 
However, developing scenarios for a period of one hundred 
years is a relatively new field. This is not only because of large 
scientific uncertainties and data inadequacies. For example, 
within the 2 P'century technological discontinuities should be 
expected, and possibly major shifts in societal values and in the 
balance of geopolitical power. The study of past trends over 
such long periods is hampered by the fact that most databases 
are incomplete if we go back much further than 50 years. Given 
these gaps in our data, methods, and understanding, scenarios 
are the best way to integrate demographic, economic, societal, 
and technological knowledge with our understanding of 
ecological systems to evaluate sources and sinks of G H G 
emissions. Scenarios as an integration tool in the assessment of 
climate change allow a role for intuition, analysis, and 
synthesis, and thus we turn to scenarios in this report to take 
advantage of those features to aid the assessment of future 
climate change, impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and 
mitigation. Since the scenarios focus on the century time scale, 
tools have been used that have been developed for this puipose. 
These tools are less suitable for analysis of near-term 
developments and this report does not intend to provide 
reliable projections for the near term. 
3. Review of Past IPCC Emissions Scenarios 
The IPCC developed sets of emissions scenarios in 1990 and 
1992. The six IS92 scenarios developed in 1992 (Leggett et a i , 
1992; Pepper et a l . , 1992), have been used very widely in 
climate change assessments. In 1995 the IPCC formally 
evaluated the 1992 scenarios and found that they were 
innovative at the time of their publication, path-breaking in 
their coverage of the full range of G H G emissions and useful 
for the puipose of driving atmospheric and climate models 
(Alcamo et a i , 1995). Specifically, their global carbon 
emissions spanned most of the range of other scenarios 
identified in the literature at that time. 
The review also identified a number of weaknesses. These 
included the limited range of carbon intensities of energy 
(carbon emissions per unit energy) and the absence of any 
scenario with significant closure in the income gap between 
developed and developing countries, even after a full century 
(Parikh, 1992). Furthermore, rapid growth of sulfur emissions 
in the IS92 scenarios had been questioned on the basis that they 
did not reflect recent legislation in Japan, Europe, and North 
America and that in general regional and local air quality 
concerns might prompt limits on future sulfur emissions. 
A n important recommendation of the 1995 IPCC review was 
that, given the degree of uncertainty about future climate 
change, analysts should use the full range of IS92 emissions as 
input to climate models rather than a single scenario. This is in 
stark contrast to the actual use of one scenario from the set, the 
IS92a scenario, as the reference scenario in numerous studies. 
The review concluded that the mere fact of the IS92a being an 
intermediate, or central, CO2 emissions scenario at the global 
level at that time does not equate it with being the most likely 
scenario. Indeed, the conclusion was that there was no 
objective basis on which to assign likelihood to any of the 
scenai'ios. Furthermore, the IS92a scenario was shown to be 
"central" for only a few of its salient characteristics such as 
global population growth, global economic development and 
global CO2 emissions. In other ways, IS92a was found not to 
be central with respect to the published literature, particularly 
in some of its regional assumptions and emissions. The same is 
the case with the new set of SRES scenarios, as is shown 
below. 
The new set of SRES scenarios presented here is designed to 
respond to the IS92 weaknesses identified in the 1995 IPCC 
scenario evaluation and to incorporate advances in the state of 
the art since 1992. As in the case of the IS92 scenario series, 
also in this new set of SRES scenarios there is no single central 
case with respect to all characteristics that are relevant for 
different uses of emissions scenarios and there is no objective 
way to assign likelihood to any of the scenarios. Hence there is 
no "best guess" or "business-as-usual" scenario. 
4. SRES Writing Team, Approach, and Process 
IPCC Working Group III (WGIII) appointed the SRES writing 
team in January 1997. After some adjustments, it eventually 
came to include more than 50 members from 18 countries. 
Together they represent a broad range of scientific disciplines, 
regional backgrounds, and non-governmental organizations. In 
particular, the team includes representatives of six scenario 
modeling groups and a number of lead authors from all three 
earlier IPCC scenario activities: the 1990 and 1992 scenai'ios 
and the 1995 scenario evaluation. Their expertise and 
familiarity with earlier IPCC emissions scenario work assured 
continuity and allowed the SRES effort to build efficiendy 
upon prior work. The SRES team worked in close 
collaboration with colleagues on the IPCC Task Group on 
Climate Scenarios for Impact Assessment (TGCIA) and with 
colleagues from all three IPCC Working Groups (WGs) of the 
Third Assessment Report (TAR). Appendix II lists the 
members of the writing team and their affiliations and Chapter 
1 gives a more detailed description of the SRES approach and 
process. 
Taking the above audiences and purposes into account, the 
following more precise specifications for the new SRES 
scenarios were developed. The new scenarios should: 
• cover the full range of radiatively important gases, 
which include direct and indirect GHGs and SOj, 
• have sufficient spatial resolution to allow regional 
assessments of climate change in the global context; 
• cover a wide spectrum of alternative futures to reflect 
relevant uncertainties and knowledge gaps; 
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• use a variety of models to reflect methodological 
pluralism and uncertainty; 
• incorporate input from a wide range of scientific 
disciplines and expertise from non-academic sources 
through an open process; 
• exclude additional initiatives and policies specifically 
designed to reduce climate change; 
• cover and describe to the extent possible a range of 
policies that could affect climate change although they 
are targeted at other issues, for example, reductions in 
SO, emissions to limit acid rain; 
• cover as much as possible of the range of major 
underlying driving forces of emission scenarios 
identified in the open literature; 
• be transparent with input assumptions, modeling 
approaches, and results open to external review; 
• be reproducible - document data and methodology 
adequately enough to allow other researchers to 
reproduce the scenarios; and 
• be internally consistent - the various input assumptions 
and data of the scenarios are internally consistent to the 
extent possible. 
The writing team agreed that the scenario formulation process 
would consist of five major components: 
• review of existing scenarios in the literature; 
• analysis of their main characteristics and driving 
forces; 
• formulation of narrative "storylines" to describe 
alternative futures; 
• quantification of storylines with different modeling 
approaches; and 
• "open" review process of emissions scenarios and their 
assumptions 
As is evident from the components of the work program, there 
was agreement that the process be an open one with no single 
"official" model and no exclusive "expert teams." In 1997 the 
IPCC advertised in a number of relevant scientific journals and 
other publications to solicit wide participation in the process. 
To facilitate participation and improve the usefulness of the 
new scenarios, the SRES web site (www.sres.ciesin) was 
created. In addition, members of the writing team published 
much of the background work used for formulating SRES 
scenarios in the peer-reviewed literature^ and on web sites (see 
Appendix IV). Finally, the revised set of scenarios, the web 
sites, and the draft of this report have been evaluated through 
the IPCC expert and government review processes. This 
^ Alcamo and Nakicenovic, 1998; Alcamo and Swart, 1998; Anderson, 
1998; Gaffin, 1998; Gregory, 1998; Gregory and Rogner, 1998; 
Grübler, 1998; Michaelis, 1998; Monta and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et 
al, 1998; Price et al, 1998; de Vries et al., 2000; Fenhann, 2000; Jiang 
et al, 2000, Jung et al, 2000; Kram et al., 2000; Mori, 2000; 
Nakicenovic, 2000; Riahi and Roehrl, 2000; Roehrl and Riahi, 2000; 
Sankovski et al., 2000. 
process resulted in numerous changes and revisions of the 
report. In particular, during the approval process of Ihe 
Summary for Policymakers (SPM) in March 2000 at the 5"' 
Session of the W G III in Katmandu changes in this S P M were 
agreed that necessitated some changes in the underlying 
document, including this Technical Summary. These changes 
have been implemented in agreement with the Lead Authors. 
5. Scenario Literature Review and Analysis 
The first step in the formulation of the SRES scenarios was the 
review and the analysis of the published literature and the 
development of the database with more than 400 emissions 
scenarios that is accessible through the web site (www-
cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html); 190 of these extend to 
2100 and are considered in the comparison with the SRES 
scenarios in the subsequent Figures. Chapters 2 and 3 give a 
more detailed description of the Hterature review and analysis. 
Figure TS-1 shows the global energy-related and industrial 
COj emission paths from the database as "spaghetti" curves for 
the period to 2100 against the background of the historical 
emissions from 1900 to 1990. These curves are plotted against 
an index on the vertical axis rather than as absolute values 
because of the large differences and discrepancies for the 
values assumed for the base year 1990. These sometimes arise 
from genuine differences among the scenarios (e.g., different 
data sources, definitions) and sometimes from different base 
years assumed in the analysis or from alternative calibrations.'* 
The differences among the scenarios in the specification of the 
base year illustrate the large genuine scientific and data 
uncertainty that surrounds emissions and their main driving 
forces captured in the scenarios. The literature includes 
scenarios with additional climate polices, which are sometimes 
referred to as mitigation or intervention scenarios. 
There are many ambiguities associated with the classification 
of emissions scenarios into those that include additional 
climate initiatives and those that do not. Many cannot be 
classified in this way on the basis of the information available 
from the database. Figure TS-1 indicates the ranges of 
emissions in 2100 from scenarios that apparently include 
additional climate initiatives (designated as "intervention" 
emissions range), those that do not ("non-intervention") and 
those that caimot be assigned to either of these two categories 
("non-classified"). This classification is based on the 
subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the 
members of the writing team and is explained in Chapter 2. 
The range of the whole sample of scenarios has significant 
The 1990 emissions from energy production and use are estimated 
by Marland etal. (1994) at 5.9 GtC excluding cement production. The 
1990 base year values in the scenarios reviewed range from 4.8 
(CETA/EMF14, Scenario M A G I C O CO^) to 6.4 GtC 
(ICAM2/EMF14), see Dowlatabadi et al, 1995; Peck and Teisberg, 
1995. 
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1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 
Figure TS-1: Global energy-related and industrial emissions - historical development and future scenarios, shown as an 
index (1990 = 1). The median (50*), the 5*, and 95"^  percentiles of the frequency distribution are also shown. The statistics 
associated with scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of occurrence (e.g., the frequency distribution of the 
scenarios may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many subsequent studies). The emissions paths indicate a 
wide range of future emissions. The range is also large in the base year 1990 and is indicated by an "error" bar. To separate the 
variation due to base-year specification from different future paths, emissions are indexed for the year 1990, when actual global 
energy-related and industrial C O , emissions were about 6 GtC. The coverage of COj emissions sources may vary across the 
256 different scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time steps (for 1990 
256 scenarios, for 2020 and 2030 247, for 2050 211, and for 2100 190 scenarios). Also shown, as vertical bars on the right of 
the figure, are the ranges of emissions in 2100 of IS92 scenarios and for scenarios from the literature that apparently include 
additional climate initiatives (designated as "intervention" scenarios emissions range), those that do not ("non-intervention"), 
and those that cannot be assigned to either of these two categories ("non-classified"). This classification is based on the 
subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the members of the writing team and is explained in Chapter 2. Data 
sources: Morita and Lee, 1998a, 1998b; Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998. 
overlap with the range of those that cannot be classified and 
they share virtually the same median (15.7 and 15.2 GtC in 
2100, respectively), but the non-classified scenarios do not 
cover the high part of the range. Also, the range of the 
scenarios that apparenfly do not include climate polices (non-
intervention) has considerable overlap with the other two 
ranges (the lower bound of non-intervention scenarios is 
higher than the lower bounds of the intei-venfion and non-
classified scenarios), but with a significantly higher median 
(of 21.3 GtC in 2100). 
Historically, gross anthropogenic COj emissions have 
increased at an average rate of about 1.7% per year since 1900 
(Nakicenovic et a l . , 1996); if that historical trend continues 
global emissions would double during the next three to four 
decades and increase more than sixfold by 2100. Many 
scenarios in the database describe such a development. 
However, the range is very large around this historical trend so 
that the highest scenarios envisage about a tenfold increase of 
global emissions by 2100 as compared with 1990, while the 
lowest have emissions lower than today. The median and the 
average of the scenaiios lead to about a threefold emissions 
increase over the same time period or to about 16 GtC by 2100. 
This is lower than the median of the IS92 set and is lower than 
the IS92a scenario, often considered as the "central" scenario 
with respect to some of its tendencies. However, the 
distribution of emissions is asymmetric. The thin emissions 
"tail" that extends above the 95"' percenfile (i.e., between the 
six- and tenfold increase of emissions by 2100 compared to 
1990) includes only a few scenarios. The range of other 
emissions and the main scenario driving forces (such as 
population growth, economic development and energy 
production, conversion and end use) for the scenarios 
documented in the database is also laige and comparable to the 
variation of CO2 emissions. Statistics associated with scenarios 
from the literature do not imply probability of occurrence or 
likelihood of the scenarios. The frequency distribution of the 
database may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference 
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for scenario studies and by the fact that many scenarios in the 
database share common assumptions prescribed for the 
purpose of model comparisons with similar scenario driving 
forces. 
One of the recommendations of the writing team is that IPCC 
or a similar international institution should maintain such a 
database thereby ensuring continuity of knowledge and 
scientific progress in any future assessments of G H G 
scenarios. An equivalent database for documenting naiTative 
and other qualitative scenarios is considered to be also very 
useful for future climate-change assessments. One difficulty 
encountered in the analysis of the emissions scenarios is that 
the disünction between climate policies and non-climate policy 
scenarios and other scenarios appeared to be to a degree 
arbitrary and often impossible to make. Therefore, the wrhing 
team recommends that an effort should be made in the future 
to develop an appropriate emissions scenario classification 
scheme. 
6. Narrative Scenarios and Storylines 
Given these large ranges of future emissions and their driving 
forces, there is an infinite number of possible alternative 
futures to explore. The SRES scenarios cover a finite, albeit a 
very wide range, of future emissions. The approach involved 
the development of a set of four alternative scenario "families" 
comprising 40 SRES scenarios subdivided into seven scenario 
groups. During the approval process of the S P M in March 2000 
at the 5* Session of WGIII in Katmandu, it was decided to 
combine two of these groups into one, resulting in six groups. 
To facilitate the process of identifying and describing 
alternafive future developments, each scenario family includes 
a coherent narrative part called a "storyline," and a number of 
alternative inteфretatíons and quantifications of each storyline 
developed by six different modeling approaches. A l l the 
interpretations and quantifications of one storyline together are 
called a scenario family (see also Box 1-1 in Chapter 1 on 
terminology). Each storyline describes a demographic, social, 
economic, technological, environmental, and policy future for 
one of these scenario families. Storylines were formulated by 
the writing team in a process which identified driving forces, 
key uncertainties, possible scenario families, and their logic. 
Within each family different scenarios explore variations of 
global and regional developments and their implications for 
GHG and sulfur emissions. Each of these scenarios is 
consistent with the broad framework of that scenario family as 
specified by the storyline. Consequently, each scenario family 
and scenario group is equally sound. Chapters 4 and 5 give a 
more detailed description of the storylines, their 
quantifications, and the resultant 40 emissions scenarios. 
The main reasons for foimulating storylines are: 
• to help the writing team to think more coherentiy about 
the complex interplay among scenario driving forces 
within each and across alternative scenarios; 
• to make it easier to explain the scenarios to the various 
user communities by providing a narrative description 
of alternative futures that goes beyond quantitative 
scenario features; 
• to make the scenaiios more useful, in particular to 
analysts who contribute to IPCC WGII and WGIII; the 
social, political, and technological context described in 
the scenario storylines is all-important in analyzing the 
effects of policies either to adapt to climate change or 
to reduce G H G emissions; and 
• to provide a guide for additional assumptions to be 
made in detailed climate impact and mitigation 
analyses, because at present no single model or 
scenario can possibly respond to the wide variety of 
infonnational and data needs of the different user 
communities of long-term emissions scenarios. 
The SRES writing team reached broad agreement that there 
could be no "best guess" scenarios; that the future is inherentiy 
unpredictable and that views will differ on which of the 
storylines could be more likely. The writing team decided on 
four storylines: an even number helps to avoid the impression 
that there is a "central" or "most likely" case. The team wanted 
more than two in order to help illustrate that the future depends 
on many different underlying dynamics; the team did not want 
more than four, as they wanted to avoid complicating the 
process by too many alternatives. There is no "business-as-
usual" scenario. Nor should the scenarios be taken as policy 
recommendations. The storylines represent the playing out of 
certain social, economic, technological, and environmental 
paradigms, which will be viewed positively by some people 
and negatively by others. The scenarios cover a wide range, but 
not all possible futures. In particular, it was decided that 
possible "surprises" would not be considered and that there 
would be no "disaster" scenarios that are difficult to quantify 
with the aid of formal models. 
The titles of the storyhnes have been kept simple: A l , A2, B l , 
and B2. There is no particular order among the storylines; Box 
TS-1 lists them in alphabetic order. Figure TS-2 schematically 
illustrates the four storylines and scenario families. Each is 
based on a common specification of the main driving forces. 
They are shown, very simplistically, as branches of a two-
dimensional tree. The two dimensions shown indicate the 
global-regional and the development-environmental 
orientation, respectively. In reality, the four scenario families 
share a space of a much higher dimensionality given the 
numerous driving forces and other assumptions needed to 
define any given scenario in a particular modeling approach. 
The team decided to carry out sensitivity tests within some of 
the storylines by considering alternative scenarios with 
different fossil-fuel reserves, rates of economic growth, or rates 
of technical change within a given scenario family. For 
example, four scenario "groups" within the A l scenario family 
were explored. As mentioned, two of these four groups that 
explore fossil-intensive developments in the energy system 
were merged in the SPM. Together with the other three 
scenario families this results in seven groups of scenarios -
2 8 T e c h n i c a l S u m m a r y 
Figure T S - 2 : Schematic illustration of S R E S scenarios. The 
four scenario " fami l ies" are shown, very simplistically, as 
branches of a two-dimensional tree. In reality, the four 
scenario families share a space of a much higher 
dimensionality given the numerous assumptions needed to 
define any given scenario in a particular modeling approach. 
The schematic diagram illustrates that the scenarios build on 
the main driving forces of G H G emissions. Each scenario 
family is based on a common specification of some of the 
main driving forces. The A l storyline branches out into four 
groups of scenarios to illustrate that alternative development 
paths are possible within one scenario family. Two of these 
groups were merged in the S P M . 
Box TS-1: The Main Characteristics of the Four SRES Storylines and Scenario Families 
B y 2100 the world w i l l have changed in ways that are hard to imagine - as hard as it would have been at the end of the 19th 
century to imagine the changes of the 100 years since. Each storyline assumes a distinctly different direction for future 
developments, such that the four storylines differ in increasingly irreversible ways. Together they describe divergent futures that 
encompass a significant portion of the underlying uncertainties in the main driving forces. They cover a wide range of key 
"future" characteristics such as population growth, economic development, and technological change. For this reason, their 
plausibil ity or feasibil ity should not be considered solely on the basis of an extrapolation of c u r r e n t economic, technological, 
and social trends. 
• The A l storyline and scenario family describes a future wor ld of very rapid economic growth, low population growth, 
and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underiying themes are convergence among 
regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income. The A l scenario family develops into four groups that describe alternative directions of 
technological change in the energy system. Two of the fossil-intensive groups were merged in the S P M . 
• The A 2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and 
preservation of local identities. Ferti l ity patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population 
growth. Economic development is primari ly regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological 
change are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
• The B l storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same low population growth as in the A l 
storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in 
material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions 
to economic, social , and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate 
initiatives. 
• The B 2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social , 
and environmental sustainability. It is a world with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic 
development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B l and A l storylines. Wh i le the scenario 
is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels. 
After determining the basic features and driving forces for each of the four storylines, the team began modeling and quantifying 
the storylines. This resulted in 40 scenarios, each of which constitutes an alternative inteфretation and quantification of a 
storyline. A l l the inteфretations and quantifications associated with a single storyline are called a scenario family (see Chapter 
1 for terminology and Chapter 4 for further details). 
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effectively six equally sound groups after the merging of the 
two fossil-intensive groups in the SPM - that share common 
assumptions of some of the key driving forces and are thus not 
independent of each other. 
Al l four storylines and scenario families describe future worlds 
that are generally more affluent compared to the current 
situation. They range from very rapid economic growth and 
technological change to high levels of environmental 
protection, from low to high global populations, and from high 
to low GHG emissions. What is perhaps even more important 
is that all the storylines describe dynamic changes and 
transitions in generally different directions. Although they do 
not include additional climate initiatives, none of them are 
policy free. As time progresses, the storylines diverge from 
each other in many of their characteristic features. In this way 
they allow us to span the relevant range of G H G emissions and 
different combinations of their main sources. 
7. Quantitative Scenarios and Modeling 
Approaches 
The storylines were essentially complete by January 1998. 
After determining the basic features and driving forces for each 
of the four storylines, the six modeling groups represented on 
the writing team (on a voluntary basis) began quantifying 
them. The six modeling groups that quantified the storylines 
are listed in Box TS-2. Each model quantification of a storyline 
constitutes a scenario, and all scenarios derived from one 
storyline constitute a scenario family. The six models are 
representative of different approaches to modeling emissions 
scenarios and different integrated assessment (lA) frameworks 
in the literature and include so-called top-down and bottom-up 
models. The writing team recommends that IPCC or a similar 
international institution should assure participation of 
modeling groups around the world and especially from 
developing countries in any future scenario development and 
assessment efforts. Clearly, this would also require resources 
specifically directed at assisting modeling groups from 
developing countries. Indeed, a concerted effort was made to 
engage modeling groups and experts from developing 
countries in SRES as a direct response to the recommendations 
of the last IPCC scenario evaluation (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). 
The six models have different regional aggregations. The 
writing team decided to group the various global regions into 
four "macro-regions" common to all the different regional 
aggregations across the six models. Box TS-3 indicates that the 
four macro-regions (see Appendix III) are broadly consistent 
with the allocation of countries in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), 
although the correspondence is not exact because of changes in 
the countries listed in Annex I of U N F C C C (1997). 
A l l the qualitative and quantitative features of scenarios 
belonging to the same family were set to conform to the 
corresponding features of the underlying storyline. Together, 
26 scenarios were "harmonized" to share agreed common 
assumptions about global population and GDP (gross domestic 
product) development (a few that also share common 
population, GDP, and final energy trajectories at the level of the 
four SRES macro-regions are called "fully harmonized," see 
Section 4.1. in Chapter 4). Thus, the harmonized scenarios are 
not independent within each of the four families. However, 
scenarios within each family vary quite substantially in such 
Box TS-2: The Six IVIodeling Teams that Quantified the 40 SRES Scenarios 
In all, six models were used to generate the 40 scenarios: 
• Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan (Morita et al., 
1994); 
• Atmospheric Stabilizafion Framework Model (ASF) from ICF Consulting in the U S A (Lashof and Tirpak, 1990; Pepper 
e t a l , 1992, 1998; Sankovski et a l , 2000); 
• Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE) from the National Institute for Public Health and 
Environmental Hygiene (RIVM) (Alcamo et a l , 1998; de Vries et a l , 1994, 1999, 2000), used m connection with the 
Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (СРВ) WorldScan model (de Jong and Zalm, 1991), the Netherlands; 
• Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of Tokyo in Japan 
(Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori, 2000); 
• Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from the 
Intemational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Strubegger, 1995; Riahi and Roehrl, 
2000); and 
• Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the USA 
(Edmonds et a l , 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
These six models are representative of emissions scenario modeling approaches and different l A frameworks in the literature 
and include so-called top-down and bottom-up models. For a more detailed description of the modeling approaches see 
Appendix IV. 
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Box TS-3: SRES World "Macro-Regions" Used by All Six Modeling Teams 
The six models have different regional aggregations. The writing team decided to group the various global regions into four 
"macro-regions" common to all the different regional aggregations across the six models. The four macro-regions (see Appendix 
Ш) are broadly consistent with the allocation of the countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 1992), although the correspondence is not exact due to changes in the countries listed m Annex I of U N F C C C 
(1997): 
• The OECD90 region groups together all countries belongmg to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as of 1990, the base year of the participatmg models, and corresponds to Annex II countries under 
U N F C C C (1992). 
• The R E F region stands for countries undergoing economic reform and groups together the East European countries and 
the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. It includes Armex I countries outside Annex II as defined in 
U N F C C C (1992). 
• The ASIA region stands for all developing (non-Annex I) countries m Asia. 
• The A L M region stands for rest of the world and includes all developing (non-Annex I) countries in Africa, Latm 
America, and the Middle East. 
In other words, the OECD90 and REF regions together correspond to the developed (industrialised) countries (referred to as 
IND in this report) while the ASIA and A L M regions together correspond to the developing countries (referred to as D E V in 
this report). The OECD90 and REF regions are consistent with the Annex I countries under the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, while the ASIA and A L M regions correspond to the non-Annex I countries (UNFCCC, 1992). 
characteristics as the assumptions about availability of fossil-
fuel resources, the rate of energy-efficiency improvements, the 
extent of renewable-energy development, and, hence, resultant 
G H G emissions. Thus, after the modeling teams had quantified 
the key driving forces and made an effort to harmonize them 
with the storylines by adjusting control parameters, there still 
remained diversity in the assumptions about the driving forces 
and in the resultant emissions (see Chapter 4). 
The remaining 14 scenarios adopted alternative interprétations 
of the four scenario storylines to explore additional scenario 
uncertainties beyond differences in méthodologie approaches, 
such as different rates of economic growth and variations in 
population projections. These variations reflect the "modeling 
teams' choice" of alternative but plausible global and regional 
development compaied to "harmonized" scenarios and also 
stem from the differences in the underlying modeling 
approaches. Each of the 40 quantifications of one of the 
storylines constitutes a SRES scenario. This approach 
generated a large variation and richness in different scenario 
quantifications, often with overlapping ranges of main driving 
forces and G H G emissions across the four families. 
In addition, the A l scenario family branched out into four 
distinct scenario groups. They are based on four alternative 
technological developments in future energy systems, from 
carbon-intensive development to decaibonization. Sitnilar 
storyline variations were considered for other scenario 
families, but they did not result in genuine scenario groupings 
within the respective families. This further increased richness 
in different G H G and SO2 emissions paths, because this 
variation in the structure of the future energy systems in itself 
resulted in a range of emissions almost as large as that 
generated through the variation of other main driving forces 
such as population and economic development. It should be 
noted that future energy systems variations could be applied to 
the other storylines, but they may evolve differentiy from those 
in A l . They have been introduced into the A l storyline because 
of its "high growth with high technology" nature, where 
difterences in alternative technology developments translate 
into large differences in future G H G emission levels. 
Altogether the 40 SRES scenarios fall into seven groups: the 
three scenario families, A2, B l , and B2, plus four groups 
within the A l scenario. In the SPM, two of these groups, the 
coal and gas and oil intensive groups, were merged into one 
fossil-intensive group, leading to six groups. 
As in the case of the storylines, no single scenario - whether it 
represents a modeler's choice or hatmonized assumptions -
was treated as being more or less "probable" than the others 
belonging to the same family. Initially, for each storyline, one 
modeling group was given principal responsibility, and the 
quantification produced by that group is retened to as the 
"marker" scenario for that storyline. The four preliminary 
marker scenarios were used in 1998 to solicit comments during 
the "open process" and as input for climate modelers in 
accordance with a decision of the IPCC Bureau in 1998. The 
four marker scenarios were posted on the SRES web site 
(www.sres.ciesin) in June 1998 and were subsequently revised 
to account for comments and suggestions received tlirough this 
open scenario review process that lasted until January 1999. In 
addition to many revisions, the marker scenarios were also 
harmonized along with the other 26 scenarios that adopted 
common assumptions for the main driving forces within the 
four respective families. The choice of the markers was based 
on extensive discussion of: 
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• range of emissions across all of marker scenarios; 
• which of the initial quantifications (by the modelers) 
reflected the storyline best; 
• preference of some of the modeling teams and features 
of specific models; 
• use of four different models for the four markers. 
As a result the markers were not intended to be the median or 
mean scenarios from their respective families. Indeed, in general 
it proved impossible to develop scenarios in which all relevant 
characteristics match mean or median values. Thus, marker 
scenarios are no more or less likely than any other scenarios, but 
are those scenarios considered by the SRES writing team as 
illustrative of a parficular storyline. These scenarios have 
received the closest scrutiny of the entire writing team and via 
the SRES open process compared to other scenario 
quantifications. The marker scenarios are also those SRES 
scenarios that have been most intensively tested in terms of 
reproducibility. As a rule, different modeling teams have 
attempted to replicate the model quantification of marker 
scenarios. Available time and resources have not allowed a 
similar exercise to be conducted for all SRES scenarios, 
although some effort was devoted to reproduce the four scenario 
groups (merged into three in the SPM) that constitute different 
interpretations of the A l storyline with different models. 
Additional scenarios using the same harmonized assumptions 
as the marker scenarios developed by different modeling teams 
and other scenarios that give alternative quantitative 
inteфretations of the four storylines constitute the final set of 
40 SRES scenarios. This also means that the 40 scenarios are 
not independent of each other as they are all based on four 
storylines and subdivided into seven scenario groups (after 
merging two groups, six in the SPM) that share many common 
assumptions. In addition to many revisions of the marker and 
other harmonized scenarios, other ahemative scenarios were 
foiTuulated by the six modeling teams within each of the four 
scenario famiUes. The result is a more complete, refined set of 
40 emissions scenarios that reflects the broad spectrum of 
modeling approaches and regional perspectives. However, 
differences in modeling approaches have meant that not all of 
the scenarios provide estimates for all the direct and indirect 
GHG emissions for all the sources and sectors. In addition to 
the marker scenarios, two scenarios were also selected in the 
SPM to illustrate the alternative energy systems developments 
in the A I family. Hence, this report has an illustrative scenario 
for each of the six scenario groups in the SPM. The four SRES 
marker scenarios and the two illustrative scenarios (selected in 
the SPM) cover all the relevant gas species and emission 
categories comprehensively and thus constitute the smallest set 
of independent and fully documented SRES scenarios. 
The scenario groups and cumulative emissions categories were 
developed as the smallest subsets of SRES scenarios that 
capture the range of uncertainties associated with driving 
forces and emissions. Together, the four markers and the two 
additional illustrative scenarios selected in the S P M from the 
A I scenario groups constitute the set of SRES scenarios that 
reflects the uncertainty ranges in the emissions and their 
driving forces. Furthermore, the writing team recommends 
that, to the extent possible, these scenarios, but at least the four 
markers and the two additional illustrative scenarios selected in 
the SPM, should always be used together, and that, in general, 
no individual scenario should be singled out for any puipose. 
Multiple baselines and overlapping emissions ranges have 
important implications for making policy analysis, e.g., similar 
policies might have different impacts in different scenarios. 
Combination of policies might shape the future development in 
the direction of certain scenarios. 
8. Main Scenario Driving Forces Based on the 
Literature 
The scenarios cover a wide range of driving forces, from 
demographic to social and economic developments. This 
section summarizes the assumptions on important scenario 
drivers. For simplicity, only three of these are presented 
separately here following the exposition in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the future 
evolution of these and other main driving forces is interrelated 
in the SRES scenarios (see Tables TS-2 and TS-3 for a 
summary of the ranges of the main driving forces across the 
scenario groups in 2100). 
The SRES scenarios span a wide range of assumptions for the 
most salient scenario drivers, and thus reflect the uncertainty of 
the future. Evidently, views of the future are a time-specific 
phenomenon, and this report and its scenarios are no exception. 
However, it is important to emphasize that this is an explicit 
part of the Terms of Reference for the SRES writing team - to 
reflect a range of views, based on current knowledge and the 
most recently available literature (see Appendix I). The 
scenario quantification results reflect well the literature range, 
except for extreme scenarios. 
8 . 1 . Population Projections 
Three different population trajectories were chosen for SRES 
scenarios to reflect future demographic uncertainties based on 
published population projections (Lutz, 1996; U N , 1998; see 
Chapter 3). The population projections are exogenous input to 
all the models used to develop the SRES scenarios. The models 
used do not develop population from other assumptions within 
the model. Figure TS-3 shows the three population projections 
in comparison with the three population projections used in the 
IS92 scenarios. Global population ranges between seven and 
15 billion people by 2100 across the scenarios, depending on 
the rate and extent of the demographic transition. The insert in 
Figure TS-3 shows population development in the developed 
(industrialized) regions. The range of future populations is 
smaller than in the IS92 scenarios, particularly in the 
developed (industrialized) regions, for which the lowest 
scenario indicates a very modest population decline compared 
to IS92 scenarios. The greatest uncertainty about future growth 
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lies in the developing regions across all scenarios in the 
literature. A n equally pervasive trend across all scenarios is 
urbanization (see Chapter 3). Altogether, three different 
population projections were used in the 26 harmonized 
scenarios. Other scenarios explored alternative population 
projections consistent with the storylines. 
The lowest population trajectory is assumed for the A l and B l 
scenario families and is based on the low population projection 
in Lutz (1996), which combines low fertility with low 
mortality and central migration rate assumptions. After 
peaking at 8.7 billion in the middle of the 2P ' century, world 
population declines to 7.1 billion by the year 2100. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, this population development is 
somewhat higher than the previous low population used in the 
IS92 scenarios. The B2 scenario family is based on the U N 
median 1998 population projection (UN, 1998). The global 
population mercases to about 9.4 billion people by 2050 and to 
about 10.4 billion by 2100. This population scenario is 
characteristic of recent median global population projections, 
which describe a continuation of historical trends toward a 
completion of the demographic transition that would lead to a 
constant global population, and is consistent with recent faster 
fertility declines in the world together with declining mortality 
rates. Hence, the population is somewhat lower than previous 
U N median projections, as used in the IS92 scenarios. This 
median scenario projects very low population growth in 
today's industrialized countries, with stabilization of growth in 
Asia in the second half of the 2P ' century and in the rest of the 
world towards the end of the 2P ' century. The A2 scenario 
family is based on the high population growth of 15 billion by 
Figure TS-3: Population projections -
historical data from 1900 to 1990 
(based on Durand, 1967; Demeny; 
1990; U N , 1998), and SRES scenarios 
(based on Lutz, 1996, for high and 
low, and U N , 1998, for medium) and 
IPCC IS92 scenarios (Leggett et a l , 
1992; Pepper et a i , 1992) from 1990 
to 2100. 
2100 reported in Lutz (1996), which assumes a significant 
decline in fertility for most regions and a stabilization at above 
replacement levels. It falls below the long-term 1998 U N high 
projection of 18 billion. It is also lower than in the highest IS92 
scenario (17.6 billion by 2100). Nevertheless, this scenario 
represents very high population growth compared with that in 
current demographic literature. Some demographers attach a 
probability of more than 90% that actual population will be 
lower than the trajectory adopted in the A2 scenario family 
(Lutz et a l . , 1997). A more detailed discussion of the 
population projections used to quantify the four scenario 
families is given in Chapters 3 and 4. 
8.2. Economic Development 
The SRES scenarios span a wide range of future levels of 
economic activity (expressed in gross world product). The A l 
scenario family with a "harmonized" gross world product of 
US$529 trillion (all values in 1990 US dollars unless otherwise 
indicated) in 2100 delineates the SRES upper bound, whereas 
B2 with "harmonized" US$235 trillion in 2100 represents its 
lower bound. The range of gross world product across all 
scenarios is even higher, from US$197 to 550 by 2100. 
Although the SRES scenarios span a wide range, still lower 
and higher gross world product levels can be found in the 
literature (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Uncertainties in future 
gross world product levels are governed by the pace of future 
productivity growth and population growth, especially in 
developing regions. Different assumptions on conditions and 
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Table T S - 1 : I n c o m e per c a p i t a i n t h e w o r l d a n d by SRES r e g i o n f o r t h e IS92 ( L e g g e t t et a l , 1 9 9 2 ) a n d f o u r m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s by 
2 0 5 0 a n d 2 1 0 0 , m e a s u r e d by G D P per c a p i t a i n 1 0 0 0 US d o l l a r s ( a t 1 9 9 0 p r i c e s a n d exchange r a t e s ) . 
Income per Capita by World and Regions 
(103 1990US$ per capita) 
Regions 
Year Scenario OECD90 REF IND ASIA A L M DEV WORLD 
1990 SRES M E S S A G E 19.1 2.7 13.7 0.5 1.6 0.9 4.0 
2050 IS92a,b 49.0 23.2 39.7 3.7 4.8 4.1 9.2 
IS92c 35.2 14.6 27.4 2.2 2.9 2.5 6.3 
IS92d 54.4 25.5 43.4 4.1 5.4 4.6 10.5 
IS92e 67.4 38.3 56.9 5.9 7.7 6.6 13.8 
IS92f 43.9 21.5 35.8 3.3 4.1 3.6 8.1 
A l B * 50.1 29.3 44.2 14.9 17.5 15.9 20.8 
A2 34.6 7.1 26.1 2.6 6.0 3.9 7.2 
B l 49.8 14.3 39.1 9.0 13.6 10.9 15.6 
B2 39.2 16.3 32.5 8.9 6.9 8.1 11.7 
2100 IS92a,b 85.9 40.6 69.5 15.0 14.2 14.6 21.5 
IS92c 49.2 17.6 36.5 6.4 5.8 6.1 10.1 
IS92d 113.9 51.3 88.8 20.3 17.7 19.1 28.2 
IS92e 150.6 96.6 131.0 34.6 33.0 33.8 46.0 
IS92f 69.7 31.3 54.9 11.9 10.7 11.4 16.8 
A l B * 109.2 100.9 107.3 71.9 60.9 66.5 74.9 
A2 58.5 20.2 46.6 7.8 15.2 11.0 16.1 
B l 79.7 52.2 72.8 35.7 44.9 40.2 46.6 
B2 61.0 38.3 54.4 19.5 16.1 18.0 22.6 
* The two additional illustrative scenarios A l F I and AIT share similar assumptions with A l B . See also Appendix VII for more details 
possibilities for development "catch-up" and for narrowing 
per capita income gaps in particular explain the wide range in 
projected future gross world product levels. Given a 
qualitatively negative relationship between population growth 
and per capita income growth discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
uncertainties in future population growth rates tend to narrow 
the range of associated gross world product projections. High 
population growth would, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , lower per capita 
income growth, whereas low population growth would tend to 
increase it. This relationship is evident in empiric data - high 
per capita income countries are generally also those that have 
completed their demographic transition. The affluent live long 
and generally have few children. (Exceptions are some 
countries with small populations, high birth rates, and 
significant income from commodity exports.) This 
relationship between affluence and longevity again identiñes 
development as one of the most important indicators of human 
well being. Yet even assuming this relationship holds for an 
extended time into the future, its quantification is subject to 
considerable theoretic and empkic uncertainties (Alcamo et 
a i , 1995). 
Two of the SRES scenario families, A I and B l , explicitiy 
explore alternative pathways to gradually close existing income 
gaps. As a reflection of uncertainty, development catch-up 
diverges in terms of geographically distinct economic growth 
patterns across the four SRES scenario families. Table TS-I 
summarizes per capita income for SRES and IS92 scenarios for 
the four SRES world regions. SRES scenarios indicate a smaller 
difference between the now industrialized and developing 
countries compared with the IS92 scenarios. This tendency 
toward a substantially narrower income "gap" compared with 
the IS92 scenarios overcomes one of the major shortcomings of 
the previous IPCC scenarios cited in the literature (Parikh, 
1992). 
8.3. S t r u c t u r a l and Technological Change 
In this brief summary of the SRES scenarios, structural and 
technological changes are illustrated by using energy and land 
use as examples. These examples are characteristic for the 
driving forces of emissions because the energy system and land 
use are the major sources of G H G and sulfur emission. 
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Renewables/Nuclear 
Figure TS-4: Global primary energy structure, shares (%) of oil and gas, coal, and non-fossil (zero-carbon) energy sources -
historical development from 1850 to 1990 and in SRES scenarios. Each comer of the triangle corresponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which all primary energy is supplied by a single source - oil and gas on the top, coal to the left, and non-fossil 
sources (renewables and nuclear) to the right. Constant market shares of these energies are denoted by their respective isoshare 
lines. Historical data from 1850 to 1990 are based on Nakicenovic et a l . (1998). For 1990 to 2100, alternative trajectories show 
the changes in the energy systems structures across SRES scenarios. They are grouped by shaded areas for the scenario 
families A l B , A2, B l , and B2 with respective markers shown as lines. In addition, the four scenario groups within the A l 
family A l B , A l C , A I G , and AIT, which explore different technological developments in the energy systems, are shaded 
individually. In the SPM, A l C and A I G are combined into one fossil-intensive group A l F I . For comparison the 1S92 scenario 
series are also shown, clustering along two trajectories (IS92c,d and IS92a,b,e,f). For model results that do not include non-
commercial energies, the corresponding estimates from the emulations of the various marker scenarios by the M E S S A G E 
model were added to the original model outputs. 
Chapter 4 gives a more detailed treatment of the full range of 
emissions driving forces across the SRES scenarios. 
Figure TS-4 illustrates that the change of world primary energy 
structure diverges over time. It shows the contributions of 
individual primary energy sources - the percentage supplied by 
coal, that by oil and gas, and that by all non-fossil sources 
taken together (for simplicity of presentation and because not 
all models distinguish between renewables and nuclear 
energy). Each corner of the triangle corresponds to a 
hypothetical situation in which all primary energy is supplied 
by a single source - oil and gas at the top, coal to the left, and 
non-fossil sources (renewables and nuclear) to the right. 
Historically, the primary energy structure has evolved 
clockwise according to the two "grand transitions" (discussed 
in Chapter 3) that are shown by the two segments of the "thick 
black" curve. From 1850 to 1920 the first transition can be 
characterized as the substitution of traditional (non-fossil) 
energy sources by coal. The share of coal increased from 20% 
to about 70%, while the share of non-fossils declined from 
80% to about 20%. The second transition, from 1920 to 1990, 
can be characterized as the replacement of coal by oil and gas 
(while the share of non-fossils remained essentially constant). 
The share of oil and gas increased to about 50% and the share 
of coal declined to about 30%. 
Figure TS-4 gives an overview of the divergent evolution of 
global primary energy structures between 1990 and 2100, 
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regrouped into tlieir respective scenario families and four A l 
scenarios groups (three in the SPM) that explore different 
technological developments in the energy systems. The SRES 
scenarios cover a wider range of energy structures than the 
previous IS92 scenario series, which reflects advances in 
knowledge on the uncertainty ranges of future fossil resource 
availability and technological change. 
In a clockwise direction, A l B , AIT, and B l scenario groups 
map the structural transitions toward higher shares of non-
fossil energy in the future, which almost closes the historical 
"loop" that started in 1850. The B2 scenarios indicate a more 
"moderate" direction of change with about half of the energy 
coming from non-fossil sources and the other half shared by 
coal on one side and oil and gas on the other. Finally, the A2 
scenario group marks a stark transition back to coal. Shares of 
oil and gas decline while non-fossils increase moderately. 
What is perhaps more significant than the diverging 
developments in these three marker scenarios is that the whole 
set of 40 scenarios covers virtually all possible directions of 
change, from high shares of oil and gas to high shares of coal 
and non-fossils. In particular, the A l scenario family covers 
basically the same range of structural change as all the other 
scenarios together. In contrast, the IS 92 scenarios cluster into 
two groups, one of which contains IS92c and IS92d and the 
other the four others. In all of these the share of oil and gas 
declines, and the main structural change occurs between coal 
on the one hand and non-fossils on the other. This divergent 
nature in the structural change of the energy system and in the 
underlying technological base of the SRES results in a wide 
span of future G H G and sulfur emissions. 
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Figure TS-5: Global land-use patterns, shares (%) of croplands and energy biomass, forests, and other categories including 
grasslands - historical development from 1970 to 1990 (based on В1-IMAGE) and in SRES scenarios. As for the energy 
triangle in Figure 6-3, each comer coiTcsponds to a hypothetical situation in which land use is dedicated to a much greater 
extent than today to one category - 60% to cropland and energy biomass at the top, 80% to forests to the left, and 80% to 
other categories (including grasslands) to the right. Constant shares in total land area of cropland and energy biomass, forests, 
and other categories are denoted by their respective isoshare lines. For 1990 to 2100, alternative trajectories are shown for the 
SRES scenarios. The three marker scenarios A l B , B l , and B2 are shown as thick colored lines, and other SRES scenarios as 
thin colored lines. The ASF model used to develop the A2 marker scenario projects only land-use change related G H G 
emissions. Comparable data on land cover changes are therefore not available.The trajectories appear to be largely model 
specific and illustrate the different views and interpretations of future land-use patterns across the scenarios (e.g. the scenario 
trajectories on the right that illustrate larger increases in grasslands and decreases in cropland are M i n i C A M results). 
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Figure TS-5 illustrates that land-use patterns are also diverging 
over time. It shows the main land-use categories - the 
percentages of total land area use that constitute the forests, the 
joint shares of cropland and energy biomass, and all the other 
categories including grasslands. As for the energy triangle in 
Figure TS-4, in Figure TS-5 each comer coiTesponds to a 
hypothetical situation in which land use is dedicated to a much 
greater extent than today to two of the three land-use categories 
- 40% to cropland and energy biomass and 20% to forests at 
the top, 60% to forests and 40% to other categories (including 
grasslands) to the left, and 80% to other categories (including 
grasslands) to the right. 
In most scenarios, the current trend of shrinking forests is 
eventually reversed because of slower population growth and 
increased agricultural productivity. Reversals of deforestation 
trends are strongest in the В1 and A l families. In the В1 family 
pasture lands decrease significantly because of increased 
productivity in livestock management and dietary shifts away 
from meat, thus illustrating the importance of both 
technological and social developments. 
The main driving forces for land-use changes are related to 
increasing demands for food because of a growing population 
and changing diets. In addition, numerous other social, 
economic, and institutional factors govern land-use changes 
such as deforestation, expansion of cropland areas, or their 
reconversion back to forest cover (see Chapter 3). Global food 
production can be increased, either through intensification (by 
multi-cropping, raising cropping intensity, applying fertilizers, 
new seeds, improved farming technology) or through land 
expansion (cultivating land, converting forests). Especially in 
developing countries, there are many examples of the potential 
to intensify food production in a more or less ecological way 
(e.g. multi-cropping; agroforestry) that may not lead to higher 
G H G emissions. 
Different assumptions on these processes translate into 
alternative scenarios of future land-use changes and G H G 
emissions, most notably CO^, methane (CH^), and nitrous 
oxide (NjO). A distinguishing characteristic of several models 
(e.g., A I M , I M A G E , M A R I A , and Min iCAM) used in SRES is 
the explicit modeling of land-use changes caused by expanding 
biomass uses and hence exploration of possible land-use 
conflicts between energy and agricuhural sectors. The 
corresponding scenarios of land-use changes are illustrated in 
Figure TS-5 for all SRES scenarios. In some contrast to the 
structural changes in energy systems shown in Figure TS-4, 
different land-use scenarios in Figure TS-5 appear to be rather 
model specific, following the general trends as indicated by the 
respective marker scenario developed with a particular model. 
9. Greenhouse Gases and Sulfur Emissions 
The SRES scenarios generally cover the full range of G H G and 
sulfur emissions consistent with the storylines and the 
underlying range of driving forces from studies in the 
literature, as documented in the SRES database. This section 
summarizes the emissions of CO2, CH^, and SO,. For 
simplicity, only these three important gases are presented 
separately, following the more detailed exposition in Chapter 5 
(see Table TS-4 for a summary of the ranges of emissions 
across the scenario groups). 
9 , 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
9 . 1 . 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e E m i s s i o n s a n d T h e i r D r i v i n g F o r c e s 
Figure TS-6 illustrates the CO2 emissions across the SRES 
scenarios in relation to each of the thi-ee main scenario driving 
forces - global population, gross world product and primary 
energy requirements. The general tendencies across the driving 
forces are consistent with the underlying literature. A l l else 
being equal, the higher future global populations, higher gross 
world product, or higher primary energy requirements would 
be associated with higher emissions. However, it is important 
to note that the range of emissions is large across the whole 
range of driving forces considered in SRES, indicating the 
magnitude of the uncertainty associated with emission 
scenarios. For instance, emissions can range widely for any 
given level of future population (e.g. between 5 to 20 GtC in 
case of a low population scenario of seven billion by 2100). 
Conversely, emissions in the range of 20 GtC are possible with 
global population levels ranging from seven to 15 billion by 
2100. While the SRES scenarios do not map all possibilities, 
they do indicate general tendencies, with an uncertainty range 
consistent with the underlying literature. This emphasizes an 
important SRES conclusion: alternative combinations of main 
scenario driving forces can lead to similar levels of GHGs 
emissions by the end of the 2P ' century. Alternatively, similar 
future worlds with respect to socio-economic developments 
can result in wide differences in future GHGs emissions, 
primarily as a result of alternative technological developments. 
This suggests that technology is at least as important a driving 
force of future G H G emissions as population and economic 
development across the set of 40 SRES scenarios. 
9.1.2. C a r b o n D i o x i d e E m i s s i o n s f r o m E n e r g y , I n d u s t r y , a n d 
L a n d Use 
Figure TS-7 illustrates the range of COj emissions of the SRES 
scenarios against the background of all the IS92 scenaiios and 
other emissions scenarios from the literature documented in the 
SRES scenario database (blue shaded area). The range of 
future emissions is very large so that the highest scenarios 
envisage a tenfold increase of global emissions by 2100 while 
the lowest have emissions lower than today. 
The literature includes scenarios with additional climate 
initiatives and policies, which are also referred to as mitigation 
or intervention scenarios. As shown in Chapter 2, many 
ambiguities are associated with the classification of emissions 
scenarios into those that include additional climate initiatives 
and those that do not. Many cannot be classified in this way on 
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Figure TS-6a: Global carbon 
dioxide emissions (standardized) 
across SRES scenarios in relation 
to global population in 2100 for 
the four scenario families and six 
scenario groups. A l C and A I G 
have been combined into one 
fossil-intensive group A l F I . 
Shaded areas indicate scenario 
space for each scenario family 
and scenario group (in A l ) (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). 
Figure TS-6b: Global carbon 
dioxide emissions (standardized) 
across SRES scenarios in relation 
to gross world product in 2100 
for the four scenario families and 
six scenario groups. A l C and 
A I G have been combined into 
one fossil-intensive group A l F I . 
Shaded areas indicate scenario 
space for each scenario family 
and scenario group (in A l ) (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). 
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Figure TS-6c: Global carbon 
dioxide emissions (standardized) 
across SRES scenarios in relation 
to global primary energy 
requirements in 2100 for the four 
scenario families and six scenario 
groups. A l C and A I G have been 
combined into one fossil-
intensive group A l F I . Shaded 
areas indicate scenario space for 
each scenario family and scenario 
group (in A l ) (see Chapters 4 
and 5). 
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Figure TS-7: Global emissions from energy and industry in Figure TS-7a and from land-use change in Figure TS-7b -
historical development from 1900 to 1990 and in 40 SRES scenarios from 1990 to 2100, shown as an index (1990 = 1). The 
range is large in the base year 1990, as indicated by an "error" bar, but is excluded from the indexed future emissions paths. 
The dashed time-paths depict individual SRES scenarios and the blue shaded area the range of scenarios from the literature (as 
documented in the SRES database). The median (50*), 5*, and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The 
statistics associated with the distribution of scenarios do not imply probability of occurrence (e.g., the frequency distribution of 
the scenarios in the literature may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many subsequent studies). The 40 SRES 
scenarios are classified into six groups (that result after A l C and A I G are combined into one fossil-intensive group A l F I , as in 
the SPM), which constitute four scenario families and three A l scenario groups. Jointly the scenarios span most of the range of 
the scenarios in the literature. The emissions profiles are dynamic, ranging from continuous increases to those that curve 
through a maximum and then decline. The colored vertical bars indicate the range of the four SRES scenario families in 2100. 
Also shown as vertical bars on the right of Figure TS-7a are the ranges of emissions in 2100 of IS92 scenarios and of scenai-ios 
from the literature that apparentiy include additional climate initiatives (designated as "intervention" scenarios emissions 
range), those that do not ("non-intervention"), and those that cannot be assigned to either of these two categories ("non-
classified").^ Three vertical bars in Figure TS-7b indicate the range of IS92 land-use emissions in 2025, 2050, and 2100. 
^ This classification is based on a subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the members of the writing team and is explained in 
Chapter 2. It was not possible to develop an equivalent classification for land-use emissions scenarios. 
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basis of the infonnation available from the SRES scenario 
database and the published literature. 
Figure TS-7a indicates the ranges of emissions in 2100 from 
scenarios that apparently include additional climate initiatives 
(designated as "intervention" emissions range), those that do 
not ("non-intervention"), and those that cannot be assigned to 
either of these two categories ("non-classified"). This 
classification is based on the subjective evaluation of the 
scenarios in the database by the members of the writing team 
and is explained in Section 5 and in Chapter 2 in greater detail. 
It should be noted that the distributions of emissions of 
scenarios from the literature is asymmetric (see the emissions 
histogram in Figure 6-5 in Chapter 6) and that the thin tail that 
extends above 30 GtC by 2100 includes only a few scenarios. 
Figure TS-7a shows the ranges of emissions of the four 
families (vertical bars next to each of the four marker 
scenarios), which illustrate that the scenario groups by 
themselves cover a large portion of the overall scenario 
distribution. Together, they cover much of the range of future 
emissions, both with respect to the scenarios in the literature 
and all SRES scenarios. Adding all other scenarios increases 
the covered range. For example, the SRES scenarios span 
jointly from the 95* percentile to just above the 5* percentile 
of the distribution of energy and industry emissions scenarios 
from the literature. This illustrates again that they only exclude 
the most extreme emissions scenarios found in the literature 
that are situated out in the tails of the distribution. What is 
perhaps more important is that each of the four scenario 
families covers a substantial part of this distribution. This leads 
to a substantial overlap in the emissions ranges of the four 
scenario families. In other words, a similar quantification of 
driving forces can lead to a wide range of future emissions and 
a given level of future emissions can result from different 
combinations of driving forces. This result is of fundamental 
importance for the assessments of climate change impacts and 
possible mitigation and adaptation strategies. Thus, it warrants 
some fuither discussion. 
Another inteipretation is that a given combination of the main 
driving forces, such as the population and economic growth, is 
not sufficient to determine the future emissions paths. Different 
modeling approaches and different specifications of other 
scenario assumptions overshadow the influence of the main 
driving forces. A particular combination of driving forces, such 
as specified in the A l scenario family, is associated with a 
whole range of possible emission paths from energy and 
industry. The nature of climate change impacts and adaptation 
and mitigation strategies would be fundamentally different 
depending on whether emissions are high or low, given a 
particular combination of scenario driving forces. Thus, the 
implication is that the whole range needs to be considered in 
the assessments of climate change, from high emissions and 
driving forces to low ones. 
The A l scenario family explored variations in energy systems 
most explicitly and hence covers the largest part of the scenario 
distribution shown in Figure TS-7a, from the 95* to just above 
the 10"' percentile. The A l scenario family includes four 
groups of scenarios that explore different structures of future 
energy systems, from carbon-intensive development paths to 
high rates of decarbonization. Two of the fossil-intensive 
groups were merged into one group, as in SPM, resulting in 
three A l groups. A l l A l groups otherwise share the same 
assumptions about the main driving forces (see Chapter 6 and 
for further detail Chapters 4 and 5). This indicates that different 
structures of the energy system can lead to basically the same 
variation in future emissions as generated by different 
combinations of the other main driving forces - population, 
economic activities, and energy consumption levels. The 
implication is that decarbonization of energy systems - the 
shift from carbon-intensive to less carbon-intensive and 
carbon-free sources of energy - is of similar importance in 
detemiining the futme emissions paths as other driving forces. 
Sustained decarbonization requires the development and 
successful diffusion of new technologies. Thus investments in 
new technologies during the coming decades might have the 
same order of influence on future emissions as population 
growth, economic development, and levels of energy 
consumption taken together. 
Figure TS-7b shows that CO2 emissions from deforestation 
peak in many SRES scenarios after several decades and 
subsequently gradually decline. This pattern is consistent with 
many scenarios in the literature and can be associated with 
slowing population growth and increasing agricultural 
productivity. These allow a reversal of cuiTent deforestation 
trends, leading to eventual COj sequestration. Emissions 
decline fastest in the В1 family. Only in the A2 family do net 
anthropogenic COj emissions from land use remain positive 
through to 2100. As was the case for energy-related emissions, 
CO2 emissions related to land-use in the A l family cover the 
widest range. The range of land-use emissions across the IS92 
scenarios is narrower in comparison. 
9.1.3. S c e n a r i o G r o u p s a n d F o u r C a t e g o r i e s of C u m u l a t i v e 
E m i s s i o n s 
This comparison of SRES scenario characteristics implies that 
similar future emissions can result from very different socio­
economic developments, and similar developments of driving 
forces can result in different future emissions. Uncertainties in 
the future development of key emission driving forces create 
large uncertainties in future emissions even within the same 
socio-economic development paths. Therefore, emissions from 
each scenario family overlap substantially with emissions from 
other scenario families. 
To facilitate comparisons of emissions and their driving forces 
across the scenarios, the writing team grouped them into four 
categories of cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2100. 
However, any categorization of scenarios based on emissions 
of multiple gases is quite difficult. Figure TS-8 shows total COj 
emissions from all sources (from Figures TS-7a and b). The 40 
scenarios are shown aggregated into six groups, three for the A l 
4 0 
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Figure TS-8: Global COj emissions (GtC/yr, standardized) from all sources for the four scenario families from 1990 to 2100. 
Scenarios are also presented for the three constituent groups of the A l family (fossil-intensive A l F I group, resulting by 
merging A l C and A I G as in the SPM, the high non-fossil fuel AIT , and the balanced A l B ) and for the other three families 
(A2, B l , and B2), forming six scenario groups altogether. Each colored emission band shows the range of the scenarios within 
one group that share common global input assumptions for population and GDP. The scenarios remaining outside the six 
groups adopted alternative inteфretations of the four scenario storylines. 
family (that resuh by merging the two fossil-intensive groups 
A l C and A I G into one A l F I group as in the SPM). The 
scenarios that remain outside the six groups adopted alternative 
interpretations of the four scenario storylines. The emission 
trajectories ("bands") of the scenario groups display different 
dynamics, from monotonie increases to non-linear trajectories 
in which there is a subsequent decline from a maximum. The 
dynamics of the individual scenarios are also different across 
gasses, sectors, or world regions. This particularly diminishes 
the significance of focusing scenario categorization on any 
given year, such as 2100. In addition, all gases that contribute to 
radiative forcing should be considered, but methods of 
combming gases such as the use of global warming potentials 
(GWPs) are appropriate only for near-term G H G inventories^. 
In light of these difficulties, the classification approach 
In particular, in the IPCC WGI Second Assessment Report (SAR) 
GWPs are calculated for constant concentrations (Houghton et al., 
1996). In long-term scenarios, concentrations may change 
significantly, as do GWP values. It is unclear how to apply GWPs to 
long-tenn scenarios in a meaningful manner. In addition, the GWP 
approach is not applicable to gases such as SOj and ozone precursors. 
presented here uses cumulative COj emissions between 1990 
and 2100. CO2 is the dominant G H G and cumulative CO2 
emissions are expected to be roughly proportional to COj 
radiative forcing over the time scale of a century. According to 
the IPCC SAR, "any eventual stabilized concentration is 
governed more by the accumulated anthropogenic CO2 
emissions from now until the time of stabilization than by the 
way emissions change over the period" (Houghton et a l . , 1996). 
Therefore, the writing team also grouped the scenarios 
according to their cumulative emissions. 
Cumulative SRES carbon emissions through to 2100 range 
from less than 800 GtC to more than 2500 GtC with a median 
of about 1500 GtC. To represent this range, the scenario 
classification uses four intervals as follows: less than 1100 GtC 
(low), between 1100 and 1450 GtC (medium-low), between 
1450 and 1800 GtC (medium-high), and greater than 1800 
GtC (high). Each COj interval contains multiple scenarios and 
scenarios from more than one family. Each category also 
includes one of the four marker scenarios. Figure TS-9 shows 
how cumulative carbon emissions from the 40 SRES scenarios 
fit within the selected emission intervals (see Chapter 4 for 
further details). The 40 SRES scenarios extend the IS92 range 
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Figure TS-9: Global cumulative CO2 emissions (GtC, standardized). The ranges of cumulative emissions for the SRES 
scenarios are shown. Scenarios are grouped into four categories: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high emissions. Each 
category contains one marker scenario plus alternatives that lead to comparable cumulative emissions, although often through 
different driving forces. The ranges of cumulative emissions of the six SRES scenario groups are shown as colored vertical 
bars and the range of the IS92 scenarios as a black vertical bar. 
toward higher emissions (SRES maximum of 2570 GtC 
compared to 2140 GtC for IS92), but not toward lower 
emissions. The lower bound for both scenario sets is just below 
800 GtC. 
This categorization can guide comparisons using either 
scenarios with different driving forces yet similar emissions, 
or scenarios with similar driving forces but different 
emissions. This characteristic of SRES scenarios also has very 
important implications for the assessment of climate-change 
impacts, mitigation, and adaptation strategies. Two future 
worlds with fundamentally different characteristic features, 
such as the A l B and B2 marker scenarios, also have different 
cumulative CO2 emissions and radiative forcing, but very 
similar CO2 emissions in 2100. In contrast, scenarios that are 
in the same category of cumulative emissions can have 
fundamentally different driving forces and different CO2 
emissions in 2100, but very similar cumulative emissions and 
radiative forcing. Presumably, adverse impacts and effective 
adaptation measures would vary among the scenarios from 
different families that share similar cumulative emissions but 
have different demographic, socio-economic, and 
technological driving forces. This is another reason for 
considering the entire range of emissions in future 
assessments of climate change. 
9.2. Other Greenhouse Gases 
Of the GHGs, CO2 is the main contributor to anthropogenic 
radiative forcing because of changes in concentrations from 
pre-industrial times. According to Houghton et a l . (1996) well-
mixed GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, and the halocarbons) induced 
additional radiative forcing of around 2.5 W/m^ on a global and 
annually averaged basis. CO2 accounted for 60% of the total, 
which indicates that the other GHGs are significant as well. 
Whereas C O ^ emissions are by-and-large attributable to two 
major sources, energy consumption and land-use change, other 
emissions arise from many different sources and a large number 
of sectors and applications (e.g. see Table 5-3 in Chapter 5). 
The SRES emissions scenarios also have different emissions 
for other GHGs and chemically active species such as CO, 
NO J,, nitrogen oxides, and NMVOCs . The uncertainties that 
surround the emissions sources of the other GHGs, and the 
more complex set of driving forces behind them are 
considerable and unresolved. Therefore, the models and 
approaches employed for the SRES analyses cannot produce 
unambiguous and generally approved estimates for different 
sources and world regions over a century. Keeping these 
caveats above in mind, Table TS-4 (see later) shows the 
emissions of all relevant direct and indirect GHGs for the four 
marker scenarios and, in brackets, the range of the other 
scenarios in the same family (or scenario groups for the A I 
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family). Chapter 5 gives further detail about the full range of 
G H G emissions across the SRES scenarios. The emissions of 
other gases follow dynamic patterns much like those shown in 
Figures TS-7 and TS-8 for carbon dioxide emissions. A 
summary of G H G emissions is given in Chapter 6 and further 
details in Chapter 5. 
9 . 2 . 1 . M e t h a n e E m i s s i o n s 
Anthropogenic CH^ emissions arise from a variety of activities, 
dominated by biologic processes, each associated with 
considerable uncertainty. The future CH^ emissions in the 
scenarios depend in part on the consumption of fossil fuels, 
adjusted for assumed changes in technology and operational 
practices, but more strongly on scenario-specific, regional 
demographic and affluence developments, together with 
assumptions on preferred diets and agricultural practices. The 
writing team recommends further research into the sources and 
modeling approaches to capture large uncertainties 
surrounding future CH^ emissions. 
The resuhant CH^ emission trajectories for the four SRES 
scenario families portray complex patterns (as displayed in 
Figure 5-5 in Chapter 5). For example, the emissions in A2 and 
B2 marker scenarios increase throughout the whole time 
horizon to the year 2100. Increases are most pronounced in the 
high population A2 scenarios where emissions rise to between 
549 and 1069 (A2 marker: 900) MtCH^ by 2100, compared to 
310 MtCH4 in 1990. The emissions range by 2100 in the B2 
scenarios is between 465 and 613 (B2 marker: 600) MtCH^. In 
the A I B and B l marker scenarios, the CH^emissions level off 
and subsequently decline sooner or later in the 2 P ' century. 
This phenomenon is most pronounced in the A I B marker, in 
which the fastest growth in the first few decades is followed by 
the steepest decline; the 2100 level ends up slightly below the 
current emission of 310 MtCH^. The range of emissions in 
Table TS-4 indicates that alternative developments in energy 
technologies and resources could yield a higher range in CH^ 
emissions compared to the "balanced" technology A I B 
scenario group that includes the A I B marker scenario 
discussed above. In the fossil-intensive A l F I group (combined 
from A I C and A I G groups, as in the SPM), CH^ emissions 
could reach some 735 MtCH^ by 2100, whereas in the post-
fossil A I T scenario group emissions are con'espondingly lower 
(some 300 MtCH4 2100). Interestingly, the A l scenarios 
generally have comparatively low CH^ emissions from non-
energy sources because of a combination of low population 
growth and rapid advances in agricultural productivity. Hence 
the SRES scenarios extend the uncertainty range of the IS92 
scenario series somewhat toward lower emissions. However, 
both scenario sets indicate an upper bound of emissions of 
some 1000 MtCH^ by 2100. 
9.2.2. N i t r o u s O x i d e E m i s s i o n s 
Even more than for CH^, the assumed future food supply will 
be a key determinant of future emissions. Size, age 
structure, and regional spread of the global population will be 
reflected in the emission trajectories, together with 
assumptions on diets and improvements in agricultural 
practices. Other things being equal, N2O emissions are 
generally highest in the high population scenario family A2. 
Importantly, as the largest anthropogenic source of NjO 
(cultivated soils) is already very uncertain in the base year, all 
future emission trajectories are affected by large uncertainties, 
especially if calculated with different models as is the case in 
this SRES report. Therefore, the writing team recommends 
further research into the sources and modeling of long-term 
NjO emissions. Uncertainty ranges are correspondingly large, 
and are sometimes asymmetric. For example, while the range in 
2100 reported in all A l scenarios is between 5 and 10 M t N (7 
M t N in the A I B marker), the A2 marker reports 17 MtN in 
2100. Other A2 scenarios report emissions that fall within the 
range reported for A l (from 8 to 19 MtN in 2100). Thus, 
different model representations of processes that lead to N2O 
emissions and uncertainties in source strength can outweigh 
easily any underlying differences between individual scenarios 
in terms of population growth, economic development, etc. 
Different assumptions with respect to future crop productivity, 
agricultural practices, and associated emission factors, 
especially in the very populous regions of the world, explain the 
very different global emission levels even for otherwise shared 
main scenario drivers. Hence, the SRES scenarios extend the 
uncertainty range of future emissions significantly toward 
higher emissions (4.8 to 20.2 M t N by 2100 in SRES compared 
to 5.4 to 10.8 MtN in the IS92 scenaiios. (Note that natural 
sources are excluded in this comparison.) 
9.2.3. H a l o c a r b o n s a n d H a l o g e n a t e d C o m p o u n d s 
The emissions of halocarbons (chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), halons, methylbromide, 
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)) and other halogenated 
compounds (polyfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SFg)) across the SRES scenarios are described in detail on a 
substance-by-substance basis in Chapter 5 and Fenhann (2000). 
However, none of the six SRES models has its own projections 
for emissions of ozone depleting substances (ODSs), their 
detailed driving forces, and their substitutes. Hence, a different 
approach for scenario generation was adopted. 
First, for ODSs, an external scenario, the Montreal Protocol 
scenario (A3, maximum allowed production) from 
W M O / U N E P (1998) is used as direct input to SRES. In this 
scenario corresponding emissions decline to zero by 2100 as a 
result of international environmental agreements, a 
development not yet anticipated in some of the IS92 scenarios 
(Pepper et a l , 1992). For the other gas species, most notably 
for CFC and H C F C substitutes, a simple methodology of 
developing different emission trajectories consistent with 
aggregate SRES scenario driving force assumptions 
(population, GDP, etc.) was developed. Scenarios are further 
differentiated as to assumed future technological change and 
control rates for these gases, varied across the scenarios 
consistently with the interpretation of the SRES storylines 
presented in Chapter 4 as well as the most recent literature. 
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Second, different assumptions about CFC applications as well 
as substitute candidates were developed. These were initially 
based on Kroeze and Reijnders (1992) and infonnation given 
in Midgley and McCulloch (1999), but updated with the most 
recent information from the Joint IPCC/TEAP Expert Meeting 
on Options for the Limitation of Emissions of HFCs and PFCs 
(WMO/UNEP, 1999). An important assumption, on the basis 
of the latest information from the industry, is that relatively few 
Montreal gases will be replaced fully by HFCs. CuiTcnt 
indications are that substitution rates of CFCs by HFCs will be 
less than 50% (McCulloch and Midgley, 1998). In Fenhann 
(2000) a further technological development is assumed that 
would result in about 25% of the CFCs ultimately being 
substituted by HFCs (see Table 5-9 in Chapter 5). This low 
percentage not only reflects the introduction of non-HFC 
substitutes, but also the notion that smaller amounts of 
halocarbons will be used in many applications when changing 
to HFCs (efficiency gains with technological change). A 
general assumption is that the present trend, not to substitute 
with high GWP substances (including PFCs and SFg) will 
continue. As a result of this assumption, the emissions reported 
here may be underestimates. This substitution approach is used 
in all four scenarios, and the technological options adopted are 
those known at present. Further substitution away from HFCs 
is assumed to require a climate policy and is therefore not 
considered in SRES scenarios. The range of emissions of HFCs 
in the SRES scenario is initially generally lower than in earlier 
IPCC scenarios because of new insights about the availability 
of alternatives to HFCs as replacements for substances 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol. In two of the four 
scenarios in the report, H F C emissions increase rapidly in the 
second half of the next century, while in two others the growth 
of emissions is significantly slowed down or reversed in that 
period. 
Aggregating all the different halocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs, 
HFCs) as well as halogenated compounds (PFCs and SFg) into 
MtC-equivalents (using GWPs from IPCC SAR, 
notwithstanding the caveats given in footnote 6) indicates a 
range between 386 and 1096 MtC-equivalent by 2100 for the 
SRES scenarios. This compares with a range of 746 to 875 
MtC-equivalent for IS92 (which, however, does not include 
PFCs and SFg). (The comparable SRES range excluding PFCs 
and SFg is between 299 and 753 MtC-equivalent by 2100.) The 
scenarios presented here indicate a wider range of uncertainty 
compared to IS92, particularly toward lower emissions 
(because of the technological and substitution reasons 
discussed above). 
The effect on climate of each of the substances aggregated to 
MtC-equivalents given in Table TS-4 varies greatly, because of 
differences in both atmospheric lifetime and the radiative effect 
per molecule of each gas. The net effect on climate of these 
substances is best determined by a calculation of their radiative 
forcing - which is the amount by which these gases enhance 
the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. The radiative forcing will 
be addressed in IPCC TAR and is thus not discussed in this 
report. 
9.3. Sulfur D i o x i d e Emissions 
Emissions of sulfur portray even more dynamic pattems in 
time and space than the CO2 emissions shown in Figures TS-7 
and TS-8. Factors other than climate change (namely regional 
and local air quality, and transformations in the stmcture of the 
energy system and end use) intervene to limit future emissions. 
Figure TS-10 shows the range of global sulfur emissions for all 
SRES scenarios and the four markers against the emissions 
range of the IS92 scenarios, more than 80 scenarios from the 
literature, and the historical development. 
A detailed review of long-term global and regional sulfur 
emission scenarios is given in Griibler (1998) and summarized 
in Chapter 3. The most important new finding from the scenario 
literature is recognition of the significant adverse impacts of 
sulfur emissions on human health, food production, and 
ecosystems. As a result, scenarios published since 1995 
generally assume various degrees of sulfur controls to be 
implemented in the future, and thus have projections 
substantially lower than previous ones, including the IS92 
scenario series. Of these, only the two low-demand scenarios 
IS92c and IS92d fall within the range of more recent long-term 
sulfur emission scenarios. A related reason for lower sulfur 
emission projections is the recent tightening of sulfur-control 
policies in the OECD countries, such as the Amendments of the 
Clean Air Act in the U S A and the implementation of the Second 
European Sulfur Protocol. Such legislative changes were not 
reflected in previous long-term emission scenarios, as noted in 
Alcamo et a l (1995) and Houghton et a l . (1995). Similar sulfur 
control initiatives due to local air quality concerns are 
beginning to impact sulfur emissions also in a number of 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America (see l E A , 1999; 
La Rovere and Americano, 1998; Streets and Waldhoff, 2000; 
for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 3). As a result, even 
the highest range of recent sulfur-control scenarios is 
significantly below that of comparable, high-demand IS92 
scenarios (IS92a, IS92b, IS92e, and IS92f). The scenarios with 
the lowest ranges project stringent sulfur-control levels that lead 
to a substantial decline in long-term emissions and a retum to 
emission levels that prevailed at the beginnings of the 20* 
century. The SRES scenario set brackets global anthropogenic 
sulfur emissions of between 27 and 169 MtS by 2050 and 
between 11 and 93 MtS by 2100 (see Table TS-4). In contrast, 
the range of the IS92 scenarios (Pepper et a l , 1992) is 
substantially higher starting at 80 MtS and extending all the 
way to 200 MtS by 2050 and from 55 to 230 MtS by 2100. 
Reflecting recent developments and the literature, it is assumed 
that sulfur emissions in the SRES scenarios will also be 
controlled increasingly outside the OECD. As a result, both 
long-term trends and regional pattems of sulfur emissions 
evolve differently from carbon emissions in the SRES 
scenarios. As a general pattem, global sulfur emissions do not 
rise substantially, and eventually decline even in absolute terms 
during the second half of the 2P ' century, as indicated by the 
median of all scenarios in Figure TS-10 (see also Chapters 2 
and 3). The spatial distribution of emissions changes markedly. 
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1930 1960 1990 2020 2050 2080 2100 
Figure TS-10: Global anthropogenic SO, emissions (MtS/yr) - historical development from 1930 to 1990 and (standardized) 
in the SRES scenarios. The dashed colored time-paths depict individual SRES scenarios, the solid colored lines the four 
marker scenarios, the solid thin curves the six IS92 scenarios, the shaded areas the range of 81 scenarios from the literature, 
the gray shaded area the sulfur-control and the blue shaded area the range of sulfui-non-control scenarios or "non-classified" 
scenarios from the literature that exceeds the range of sulfur control scenarios. The colored vertical bars indicate the range of 
the SRES scenario families in 2100. For details of the two additional illustrative A l scenarios see Appendix VII. Database 
source: Grübler (1998). 
Emissions in the O E C D countries continue their recent 
declining trend (reflecting the tightening of control measures). 
Emissions outside the O E C D rise initially, most notably in 
Asia, which compensates for the declining OECD emissions. 
Over the long term, however, sulfur emissions decline 
throughout the world, but the timing and magnitude vary 
across the scenarios. It should be noted that SRES scenarios 
assume sulfur controls o n l y and do not assume any additional 
climate policy measures. Nevertheless, one important 
implication of this varying pattem of sulfur emissions is that 
the historically important, but uncertain, negative radiative 
forcing of sulfate aerosols may decline in the very long ran. 
This view is also confirmed by the model calculations reported 
in Subak et a l . (1997) and Nakicenovic et a l . (1998) based on 
recent long-term G H G and sulfur emission scenarios. 
9.4. Other Chemically Active Gases 
The SRES emissions scenarios also have different emissions 
for other GHGs and chemically active species such as CO, N0^,, 
and volatile organic compounds. The uncertainties that 
surround the emissions sources of these gases, and the more 
complex set of driving forces behind them are considerable and 
unresolved. Hence, model projections of these gases are 
particularly uncertain and the scenarios presented here are no 
exception. Improved inventories and studies linking driving 
forces to changing emissions in order to improve the 
representation of these gases in global and regional emission 
models remain an important future research task. 
The emissions of other gases follow dynamic pattems much 
like those shown in Figure TS-7 for carbon dioxide emissions. 
Further details about G H G emissions are given in Chapter 5. 
9 . 4 . 1 . N i t r o g e n O x i d e s E m i s s i o n s 
Some models of the six SRES models do not provide a 
comprehensive description of N0^, emissions or include only 
specific sectors (e.g., energy-related sources) and have adopted 
other source categories from corresponding model rans derived 
from other models. Even with a simplified model 
representation, future NO^, emission levels are mainly 
determined by two set of variables: levels of fossil energy use 
(see Chapter 4), and level and timing of emission controls, 
inspired by local air quality concerns. 
As a result the spread of NO^^ emissions is largest within the A l 
scenario family (28 to 151 MtN/yr by 2100), almost as large as 
the range across all 40 SRES scenarios (see Table TS-4). Only 
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in tlie hiigiiest emission scenarios (tlie fossil fuel intensive 
scenarios within the A l scenario family and the high 
population, coal intensive A2 scenario family) do emissions 
rise continuously throughout the 2P ' century. In the A I B 
("balanced") scenaiio group and in the B2 scenario family, 
NOjj emission levels rise less. N0^^ emissions tend to increase 
up to 2050 and stabilize thereafter, the result of a gradual 
substitution of fossil fuels by alternatives as well as of the 
increasing diffusion of N0,^ control technologies. Low 
emission futures are described by various ВI family scenarios, 
as well as in the A I T scenario group, that describe futures in 
which NOj^ emissions are controlled because of either local air 
quality concerns or rapid technological change away from 
conventional fossil technologies. Overall, the SRES scenarios 
describe a similar upper range of NO^^ emissions as the 
previous IS92 scenarios (151 M t N versus 134 M t N , 
respectively, by 2100), but extend the IS92 uncertainty range 
toward lower emission levels (16 versus 54 M t N by 2100 in the 
SRES and IS92 scenarios, respectively). 
9.4.2. V o l a t i l e O r g a n i c C o m p o u n d s , E x c l u d i n g M e t h a n e 
NMVOCs arise from fossil fuel combustion (as with NO^ ,^ 
wide ranges of emission factors are typical for internal 
combustion engines), and also from industrial processes, fuel 
storage (fugitive emissions), use of solvents (e.g., in paint and 
cleaners), and a variety of other activities. In this report 
NMVOCs are discussed as one group. As for N0^^ emissions, 
not all models include the N M V O C s emissions category or all 
of its sources. 
A relatively robust trend across all 40 scenarios (see Chapter 5) 
is a gradual increase in N M V O C emissions up to about 2050, 
with a range between 190 and 260 Mt. Beyond 2050, 
uncertainties increase with respect to both emission levels and 
trends. By 2100, the range is between 58 and 552 Mt, which 
extends the IS92 scenario range of 136 to 403 Mt by 2100 
toward both higher and lower emissions (see Table TS-4). As 
for N0^ emissions, the upper bounds of N M V O C emissions 
are formed by the fossil fuel intensive scenarios within the A l 
scenario family, and the lower bounds by the scenarios within 
the B l scenario family. Characteristic ranges are between 60 
and 90 Mt N M V O C by 2100 in the low emissions cluster and 
between 370 and 550 Mt N M V O C in the high emissions 
cluster. A l l other scenario families and individual scenarios fall 
between these two emissions clusters; the B2 marker scenario 
(B2-MESSAGE) closely tracks the median of global N M V O C 
emissions from all the SRES scenarios (see Chapter 5). 
9.4.3. C a r b o n M o n o x i d e E m i s s i o n s 
The same caveats as stated above for N0,^ and N M V O C 
emissions also apply to CO emissions - the number of models 
that represent all the emission source categories is limited and 
modeling and data uncertainties, such as emission factors, are 
considerable. As a result, CO emission estimates across 
scenarios are highly model specific and future emission levels 
overlap considerably between the four SRES scenario families 
(see Table TS-4). Generally, emissions are highest in the high 
growth fossil fuel intensive scenarios within the A l scenario 
family. Lowest emission levels are generally associated with 
the B l and B2 scenario famiUes. By 2100, emissions range 
between 363 and 3766 Mt CO, a considerably larger 
uncertainty range, particularly toward higher emissions, than in 
IS92, for which the 2100 emission range was between 450 and 
929 Mt CO (see Table TS-4). 
9.5. Emissions Overview 
Table TS-4 (see later) summarizes the emissions of GHGs, 
sulfur dioxide and other radiatively active species by 2100 for 
the four markers and the ranges for other 36 scenarios. 
Combined with Tables TS-2 and TS-3, the tables provide a 
concise summary of the new SRES scenarios. Data are given 
for both the harmonized and all scenarios. 
10. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
In summary, the SRES scenarios lead to the following findings: 
• Alternative combinations of driving forces can lead to 
similar levels and structure of energy and land-use 
patterns, as illustrated by different scenarios and 
groups. Hence, even for a given scenario outcome (e.g., 
in terms of G H G emissions) there are alternative 
combinations of driving forces and pathways that could 
lead to that outcome. For instance, significant global 
changes could result from a scenario of high population 
growth, even if per capita incomes rise only modestly, 
as well as from a scenario in which a rapid 
demographic transition (to low population levels) 
coincides with high rates of income growth and 
affluence. 
• Important possibilities for further bifurcations in future 
development trends exist within one scenario family, 
even when particular values are adopted for the 
important scenario driving force variables to illustrate a 
particular development path. The technology scenario 
groups in the A l family illustrate such alternative 
development paths with similar quantifications of the 
main driving forces. 
• Emissions profiles are dynamic across the range of 
SRES scenarios. They portray trend reversals and 
indicate possible emissions crossover among different 
scenarios. They do not represent mere extensions of 
continuous increase of GHGs and SOj emissions into 
the future. This more complex pattern of future 
emissions across the range of SRES scenarios, time 
periods, world regions, and sectors reflects recent 
scenario literature. 
• Describing potential future developments involves 
inherent ambiguities and uncertainties. One and only one 
possible development path (as alluded to, for instance, in 
concepts such as "business-as-usual scenario") simply 
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does not exist alone. And even for each alternative 
development path described by any given scenario, there 
are numerous combinations of driving forces and 
numeric values that can be consistent with a particular 
scenario description. The numeric precision of any model 
result should not distract from the basic fact that 
uncertainty abounds. However, the multi-model approach 
increases the value of the SRES scenario set, since 
uncertainties in the choice of model input assumptions 
can be separated more explicitly from the specific model 
behavior and related modeling uncertainties. 
• Any scenario has subjective elements and is open to 
various interpretations. While the writing team as a 
whole has no preference for any of the scenarios, and has 
no judgment as to the probability or desirability of 
dilïerent scenarios, the open process and initial reactions 
to draft versions of this report show that individuals and 
interest groups do have such judgments. The writing 
team hopes that this will stimulate an open discussion in 
the policymaking arena about potential futures and 
choices that can be made in the context of climate 
change response. For the scientific community, the 
SRES scenario exercise has led to the identification of a 
number of recommendations for future research that can 
further increase the understanding of potential 
developments of socio-economic driving forces and their 
interactions, and the associated G H G emissions. A 
summary of the main findings and recommendations for 
potential users of the SRES scenarios is given in Boxes 
TS-4 and Box TS-5. The writing teams' suggestions for 
consideration by the IPCC are summarized in Box TS-6. 
• Finally, the writing team believes that the SRES 
scenarios largely fulfill all specifications set out in 
Chapter 1. To support reproducibility, more detailed 
information than can be included in this report will be 
made available by individual modeling groups and 
members of the writing team through other means, such 
as web sites, peer-reviewed literature, or background 
documentation, if additional resources can be made 
available. 
In conclusion, Tables TS-2, TS-3, and TS-4 summarize the 
main characteristics of the scenario groups that constitute the 
four families, both for the harmonized and for all scenarios. 
Tables TS-2 and TS-3 summarize the ranges of the primary and 
secondary scenario driving forces, respectively. Table TS-4 
summarizes the emissions of GHGs, SOj, and ozone precursor 
emissions. Together, the three tables provide a concise 
summary of the new SRES scenarios. 
Box TS-4: Main Findings and Implications of SRES Scenarios 
• The four scenario families each have a narrative storyline and consist of 40 scenarios developed by six modeling groups. 
• The 40 scenarios cover the ftill range of GHGs and SOj emissions consistent with the underlying range of driving forces 
from scenario literature. 
• The 40 SRES scenarios fall into various groups - the three scenario families A2, В1 , and B2, plus different groups within 
the A l scenario family. The A l groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis - on coal (A lC) , oil and gas 
(AIG), non-fossil energy sources (AIT), or a balance across all sources ( A l B ) . In the SPM, the A l C and A I G scenario 
groups are combined into one fossil intensive group A l F I . A l l scenario groups are equally sound. 
• The scenarios are also grouped into four categories of cumulative COj emissions, which indicate that scenarios with 
different driving forces can lead to similar cumulative emissions and those with similar drivmg forces can branch out mto 
different categories of cumulative emissions. 
• Four from 40 scenarios are designated as marker scenarios that are characteristic of the four scenarios families. Together 
with the two additional illustrative scenarios selected from the scenario groups in the A1 family, they capture most of the 
emissions and driving forces spaimed by the full set of the scenarios. 
• There is no single central or "best guess" scenario, and probabilities or likelihood are not assigned to individual scenarios. 
Instead, the writing team recommends that the smallest set of scenarios used should include the four designated marker 
scenarios and the two additional illustrative scenarios selected from the scenario groups in the A1 family. 
• Distinction between scenarios that envisage sttingent envkonmental policies and those that kiclude direct climate policies 
was very difficult to make, a difficulty associated with many definitional and other ambiguities. 
• A U scenarios describe futures that are generally more affluent than today. Many of the scenarios envisage a more rapid 
convergence in per capita income ratios in the world compared to the IS92 scenarios while, at the same time, they jointly 
cover a wide range of GHGs and SOj emissions. 
• Emissions profiles are more dynamic than the IS92 scenarios, which reflects changes in future emissions trends for some 
scenarios and G H G species. 
• The levels of G H G emissions are generally lower than the IS92 levels, especially toward the end of the 2 P ' century, while 
emissions of SOj, which have a cooling effect on the atmosphere, are significantly lower than in IS92. 
• Alternative combinations of main scenario driving forces can lead to similar levels of G H G emissions by the end of the 
2 P ' century. Scenarios with different underlying assumptions can result in very similar climate changes. 
• Technology is at least as important a driving force of G H G emissions as population and economic development across 
the set of 40 SRES scenarios. 
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Box TS-5: Recommendations for Consideration by the User Communities 
The writing team recommends that the SRES scenarios be the main basis for the assessment of future emissions and their 
driving forces in the TAR. Accordingly, the SRES writing team makes the following recommendations regarding the emissions 
scenarios to be used in the atmosphere/ocean general circulation models (A/O GCMs) simmlations for WGI, for the models that 
will be used in the assessment of climate change impacts by WGII, and for the mitigation and stabilization assessments by 
WGIH: 
• It is recommended that a range of SRES scenarios f r o m more t h a n one f a m i l y be used i n any analysis. The scenario 
groups - the three scenario families A2, B l , and B2, plus the groups within the AI scenario family, AIB, A l C & AIG 
(combined into AlFI in the SPM), and AIT - and four cumulative emissions categories were developed as the smallest 
subsets of SRES scenarios that capture the range of uncertainties associated with driving forces and emissions. 
• The important uncertainties may be different i n different applications - for example climate modeling; assessment of 
impacts, vulnerability, m i t i g a t i o n , and adaptation options; and policy analysis. Climate modelers may want to cover the 
range reflected by the cumulative emissions categories. To assess the robustness of options in terms of impacts, 
vulnerability, and adaptation may require scenarios with similar emissions but different socio-economic characteristics, 
as reflected by the seven groups. For mitigation analysis, variation in both emissions and socio-economic characteristics 
may be necessary. For analysis at the national or regional scale, the most appropriate scenarios may be those that best 
reflect specific ckcumstances and perspectives. 
• There is no single most, likely "central" or "best-guess" scenario, either with respect to other SRES scenarios or to the 
underlying scenario l i t e r a t u r e . Probabilities or likelihoods are not assigned to individual SRES scenarios. None of the 
SRES scenarios represents an estimate of a central tendency for all driving forces and emissions, such as the mean or 
median, and none should be interpreted as such. The statistics associated with the frequency distributions of SRES 
scenarios do not represent the likelihood of their occurrence. The writing team cautions against constructing a central, 
"best-estimate" scenario from the SRES scenarios; instead it recommends use of the SRES scenarios as they are. 
• Concerning large-scale climate models, the w r i t i n g team recommends that the m i n i m u m set of SRES scenarios should 
include the f o u r designated marker scenarios and the two a d d i t i o n a l illustrative scenarios selected in the SPM f r o m the 
scenario groups in the A I family. At the minimum (a) a simulation for one and the same SRES marker scenario should 
be performed by every TAR climate model for a given stabilization ceiling, and (b) the set of simulations performed by 
the TAR climate models and stabiUzation runs for a given ceiling should include аН four of the SRES marker scenarios 
and the two additional illustrative scenarios selected in SPM from the scenario groups in the A l family. 
• The d r i v i n g forces and emissions of each SRES scenario should be used together. To avoid intemal inconsistencies, 
components of SRES scenarios should not be mixed. For example, the GHG emissions from one scenario and the SOj 
emissions from another scenario, or the population from one and economic development path from another, should not 
be combined. 
• The SRES scenarios can provide policy makers with a long-term context for near-term decisions. This implies that they 
are not necessarily well suited for the analysis of near-term developments. When analyzing mitigation and adaptation 
options, the user should be aware that although no additional clunate initiatives are included in the SRES scenarios, 
various changes have been assumed to occur that would require other policy interventions. 
• A l l 4 0 SRES emissions scenarios, their m a i n d r i v i n g forces, and underlying assumptions should be made widely 
a v a i l a b l e . Depending on resources available the scenario documentation, should e.g., be placed on the web and made 
available on a CD-ROM. In addition, the time-dependent geographic distributions of the concentrations of GHGs and 
sulfate aerosol burden, together with their corresponding radiative forcings, should also be placed on the web. 
Box TS-6: Recommendations for Consideration by the IPCC 
• Assure that the SRES scenarios, their main assumptions, and modeling approaches are widely available through a web 
site or a CD-ROM. 
• Establish a long-term facility for documentation and comparison of emissions scenarios to succeed the SRES open 
process. This should include a scenario database and analytic evaluation capabilities and should be regularly maintained. 
• An effort should be made in the future to develop an appropriate emissions scenario classification scheme. 
• Identify resources for capacity building in the area of emissions scenarios and modeling tools, with a particular emphasis 
to involve strong participation from developing countries. 
• Promote activities within and outside the IPCC to extend the SRES multi-baseline and multi-model approach in future 
assessments of climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. 
• Initiate new programs to assess GHG emissions from land use and sources of emissions other than energy-related COj 
emissions, to go beyond the effort of SRES, which was limited by tune and resources. 
• Initiate new programs to assess future developments of driving forces and GHG emissions for different regions and for 
different sectors (taking the set of SRES scenarios as reference for overall global and regional developments) to provide 
more regional and sectorial detail than time and resources allowed SRES to achieve. 
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1.1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
decided at its September 1996 plenary session in Mexico City 
to develop a new set of emissions scenaiios (see Appendix I for 
the Terms of Reference). This Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES) describes the new scenarios and how they 
were developed. 
The SRES writing team formulated a set of emissions 
scenarios. These scenarios cover a wide range of the main 
driving forces of future emissions, from demographic to 
technological and economic developments. The scenarios 
encompass different future developments that might influence 
greenhouse gas (GHG) sources and sinks, such as alternative 
structures of energy systems and land-use changes. As required 
by the terms of reference however, none of the scenarios in the 
set includes any future policies that explicifly address 
additional climate change initiatives ^ although all necessarily 
encompass various assumed future policies of other types that 
may indirectly influence GHGs sources and sinks. 
The set of SRES emissions scenarios is based on an extensive 
assessment of the literature, six alternative modeling 
approaches, and an "open process" that solicited wide 
participation and feedback from many groups and individuals. 
The set of scenarios includes anthropogenic emissions of all 
relevant G H G species and sulfur dioxide (SOj), carbon 
monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (N0^^) and non-methane 
volatile organic hydrocarbons (VOCs), as shown in Table 1-1. 
It covers most of the range of G H G emissions compared with 
the published scenario literature. For example, in the SRES 
scenarios, emissions of CO^ in 2100 range from more than 40 
to less than 6 giga (or billion) tons- of elemental carbon (GtC), 
that is, from almost a sevenfold increase to roughly the same 
emissions level as in 1990. 
Emissions scenarios are a central component of any assessment 
of climate change. Scenarios facilitate the assessment of future 
developments in complex systems that are either inherently 
unpredictable or have high scientific uncertainties, and the 
assessment of future emissions is an essential component of the 
overall assessment of global climate change by the IPCC. 
Emissions of GHGs and SO2 are the basic input for 
determining future climate patterns with simple climate 
models, as well as with complex general circulation models 
(GCMs). Possible climate changes together with the major 
driving forces of future emissions, such as demographic 
patterns, economic development and environmental conditions, 
provide the basis for the assessment of vulnerability, possible 
' For example, no scenarios are included that expUcitly assume 
implementation of the emission targets in the Kyoto protocol. 
^ Metric tons are used thioughout this report. Unless otherwise 
specified, monetary units are 1990 US dollars (see Chapter 4). 
T a b l e 1 - 1 : Names a n d c h e m i c a l f o r m u l a e o r a b b r e v i a t i o n s of 
a n t h r o p o g e n i c emissions of G H G s a n d o t h e r gases c o v e r e d i n 
t h e emissions s c e n a r i o s . 
Carbon Dioxide CO2 
Carbon Monoxide CO 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons HCFCs 
Hydrofluorocarbons HFCs 
Methane C H 4 
Nitrous Oxide N2O 
Nitrogen Oxides 
Non-Methane Hydrocarbons N M V O C s 
Perfluorocarbons PFCs 
Sulfur Dioxide SO2 
Sulfur Hexafluoride SF6 
adverse impacts and adaptation strategies and policies to 
climate change. The major driving forces of future emissions 
also provide the basis for the assessment of possible mitigation 
strategies and policies designed to avoid climate change. 
Future emissions and the evolution of their underlying driving 
forces are highly uncertain, as reflected in the very wide range 
of future emissions paths in the literature. Of the many ways 
that uncertainties have been classified in the literature (see Box 
I-1 in Section 1.2 below), this introduction uses the three 
categories of Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990): "data 
uncertainties," "modeling uncertainties" and "completeness 
uncertainties." This categorization has the advantages of a 
small number of categories and of clear descriptive titles. Data 
uncertainties reflect the reality that most historical and base 
year data sets are neither fully complete nor fully reliable. This 
is certainly true for data on population, energy consumption, 
energy efficiency, gross world product, energy resources and 
reserves, and probably true for every parameter mentioned in 
this report. Modeling uncertainties refer both to the 
approximations necessary in any model of complex 
phenomena like G H G emissions, and to the range of plausible 
but different modeling approaches, each with its own strengths 
and weaknesses. Completeness uncertainties encompass, ñrst, 
relevant factors that can be identified but are nonetheless 
excluded from an analysis - for example exclusion of criteria 
other than cost minimization in an energy model, such as 
energy security, the protection of domestic industries, and free 
trade. Second, they also include factors that may be relevant 
but are as essentially unknown to us as jet aiiplanes were to 
Thomas Malthus or 3-D seismic techniques in oil exploration 
were to John D. Rockefeller. The use of scenarios and 
storylines in this report partially addresses completeness 
uncertainties related to k n o w n factors. Completeness 
uncertainties related to u n k n o w n factors can, of course, never 
be persuasively captured by any approach. 
The IPCC developed sets of emissions scenarios in 1990 
(Houghton et a l . , 1990) and 1992 (Leggett et a i , 1992; Pepper 
et a l . , 1992). In 1994 the IPCC formally evaluated the 1992 
scenario set (Alcamo et a l . , 1995) and, in 1996, it initiated the 
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effort described in this report. The new set of emissions 
scenarios is intended for use in future IPCC assessments and 
by wider scientific and policymaliing communities who 
analyze the effects of future G H G emissions and develop 
mitigation and adaptation measures and policies. The 
emissions profiles of tlie new scenarios can provide inputs for 
GClVIs and simplified models of climate change. The new 
scenarios also contain information, such as the level of 
economic activity, rates of technological change and 
demographic developments in different world regions, required 
to assess climate-change impacts and vulnerabilities, 
adaptation strategies and policies. The same kind of 
information, in conjunction with emissions trajectories, can 
serve as a benchmark for the evaluation of alternative 
mitigation measures and policies. Finally, the new set of 
scenarios may provide a common basis and an integrative 
element for the Third Assessment Report (TAR). 
IPCC Working Group III ( WGIII) appointed the SRES writing 
team in January 1997. After some adjustments it eventually 
included more than 50 scientists. Together they represent a 
broad range of scientific disciplines, regional backgrounds and 
non-governmental organizations. In particular the team 
includes representatives of six leading groups with extensive 
expertise in modeling altemative emissions scenarios. It also 
includes a number of members who were convening and lead 
authors in all three earlier IPCC scenario activities (see above). 
Their expertise and familiarity with earlier IPCC emissions 
scenario work assured continuity and allowed the SRES effort 
to build efficiently upon prior work. Appendix II lists the 
members of the writing team and their affiliations. 
The writing team reached a consensus concerning the overall 
work program. It was agreed that the scenario development 
process would consist of four major components. 
• First, a review of existing global and regional emissions 
scenarios from the published literature and 
development of a unique database of 416 global and 
regional scenarios (accessible at a web site: www-
cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html). 
• Second, an analysis of the range of the scenarios' main 
characteristics, their relationships, and their "driving 
forces" (such as population, economic development, 
energy consumption, rates of technological change and 
G H G emissions) and the documentation of the results, 
some of which are published in the peer-reviewed 
literature.^ 
• Third, a formulation of narrative "storylines" to 
describe the main scenario characteristics, the 
development of quantitative prototype scenarios by six 
leading groups representing the main modeling 
approaches from around the world, and the publication 
of the prototype scenarios on a specially developed 
IPCC web site (sres.ciesin.org), on web sites of the 
modeling teams,'* and in the peer-reviewed literature.^ 
• Fourth, an "open" process through the IPCC web site 
(sres.ciesin.org) that involves feedback from modeling 
groups and experts worldwide, followed by the IPCC 
expert and govemment reviews that were coordinated 
by four review editors. 
Most of the background material and findings of the 
assessments conducted by the writing team have been 
documented in this report and in a series of publications 
including two special issues of intemational scientific journals, 
M i t i g a t i o n a n d A d a p t a t i o n S t r a t e g i e s f o r G l o b a l C h a n g e ^ and 
T e c h n o l o g i c a l F o r e c a s t i n g a n d S o c i a l C h a n g e . ^ 
1.2. What are Scenarios? 
Scenarios are images of the future, or alternative futures. They 
are neither predictions nor forecasts. Rather, each scenario is 
one altemative image of how the future might unfold. A set of 
scenarios assists in the understanding of possible future 
developments of complex systems. Some systems, those that 
are well understood and for which complete information is 
available, can be modeled with some certainty, as is frequently 
the case in the physical sciences, and their future states 
predicted. However, many physical and social systems are 
poorly understood, and information on the relevant variables is 
so incomplete that they can be appreciated only through 
intuition and are best communicated by images and stories. 
Prediction is not possible in such cases (see Box 1-1 on 
uncertainties inherent in scenario analysis). 
Scenarios can be viewed as a linking tool that integrates 
qualitative narratives or stories about the future and 
quantitative formulations based on formal modeling. As such 
they enhance our understanding of how systems work, behave 
and evolve. Scenarios are useful tools for scientific 
assessments, for leaming about complex systems behavior and 
for policy making (Jefferson, 1983; Davis, 1999). In scientific 
assessments, scenarios are usually based on an internally 
consistent and reproducible set of assumptions or theories 
about the key relationships and driving forces of change, which 
are derived from our understanding of both history and the 
current situation. Often scenarios are formulated with the help 
of numeric or analytic formal models. 
Future levels of global G H G emissions are the products of a 
very complex, ill-understood dynamic system, driven by forces 
e.g., www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html; www.iiasa.ac.at. 
3 Anderson, 1998; Alcamo and Swart, 1998; Gaffin, 1998; Gregory, 
1998; Gregory and Rogner, 1998; Grübler, 1998; Michaehs, 1998; 
Morita and Lee, 1998a; Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Price et al., 1998. 
^ de Vries et al., 2000; Fenhann, 2000; Jiang et al., 2000, Jung et ai, 
2000; Kram et al., 2000; Mori, 2000; Nakicenovic, 2000; Riahi and 
Roehrl, 2000; Roehri and Riahi, 2000; Sankovski et al., 2000. 
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Box 1-1: Uncertainties and Scenario Analysis 
In general, there are three types of uncertainty: uncertainty in quantities, uncertainty about model structure and uncertainties 
that arise from disagreements among experts about the value of quantities or the functional form of the model (Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990). Sources of uncertainty could be statistical variation, subjective judgment (systematic error), imperfect 
definition (linguistic imprecision), natural variability, disagreement among experts and approximation (Morgan and Henrion, 
1990). Others (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990J distinguish three main sources of uncertainty: "data uncertainties," "modeling 
uncertainties" and "completeness uncertamties." Data uncertainties arise from the quality or appropriateness of the data used as 
inputs to models. Modeling uncertainties arise from an mcomplete understanding of the modeled phenomena, or from 
approximations that are used in formal representation of the processes. Completeness uncertainties refer to all omissions due to 
lack of knowledge. They are, in principle, non-quantifiable and irreducible. 
Scenarios help in the assessment of future developments in complex systems that are either inherently unpredictable, or that 
have high scientific uncertainties. In all stages of the scenario-building process, uncertainties of different nature are 
encountered. A large uncertainty surrounds future emissions and the possible evolution of their underlying driving forces, as 
reflected in a wide range of future emissions paths in the literature. The uncertainty is fiirther compounded in going from 
emissions paths to climate change, from climate change to possible impacts and finally from these driving forces to formulating 
adaptation and mitigation measures and policies. The uncertainties range from inadequate scientific understanding of the 
problems, data gaps and general lack of data to inherent uncertamties of future events in general. Hence the use of alternative 
scenarios to describe the range of possible future emissions. 
For the current SRES scenarios, the following sources of uncertainties are identified: 
C h o i c e of S t o r y l i n e s . Freedom in choice of qualitative scenario parameter combinations, such as low population combined with 
high gross domestic product (GDP), contributes to scenario uncertainty. 
A u t h o r s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S t o i - y l i n e s . Uncertainty in the individual modeler's translation of narrative scenario storyline text in 
quantitative scenario drivers. Two kinds of parameters can be distinguished: 
• Harmonized drivers such as population, GDP, and final energy (see Section 4.1. in Chapter 4). Inter-scenario uncertainty 
is reduced in the hamionized runs as the modeling teams decided to keep population and GDP within certain agreed 
boundaries. 
• Other assumed parameters were chosen freely by the modelers, consistent with the storylines. 
T r a n s l a t i o n of t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g of L i n k a g e s between D r i v i n g F o r c e s i n t o Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n p u t s f o r S c e n a r i o A n a l y s i s . Often the 
understanding of the linkages is incomplete or qualitative only. This makes it difficult for modelers to implement these linkages 
in a consistent manner. 
M e t h o d o l o g i c a l Differences. 
• Uncertainty induced by conceptual and structural differences in the way models work (model approaches) and in the ways 
models are parameterized. 
• Uncertamty in the assumptions that underlie the relationships between scenario drivers and output, such as the 
relationship between average income and diet change. 
Different Sources of D a t a . Data differ from a variety of well-acknowledged scientific studies, since "measurements" always 
provide ranges and not exact values. Therefore, modelers can only choose from r a n g e s of input parameters for. For example: 
• Base year data. 
• Historical development trajectories. 
• Current investment requirements. 
I n h e r e n t U n c e r t a i n t i e s . These uncertainties stem from the fact that unexpected "rare" events or events that a majority of 
researchers currently consider to be "rare future events" might nevertheless occur and produce outcomes that are fundamentally 
different from those produced by SRES model runs. 
such as population growth, socio-economic development, and 
technological progress; thus to predict emissions accurately is 
virtually impossible. However, near-tenn policies may have 
profound long-term climate impacts. Consequently, policy-
makers need a summary of what is understood about possible 
future G H G emissions, and given the uncertainties in both 
emissions models and our understanding of key driving forces, 
scenarios are an appropriate tool for summarizing both current 
understanding and current uncertainties. For such scenarios to 
be useful for climate models, impact assessments and the 
design of mitigation and adaptation policies, both the main 
outputs of the SRES scenarios (emissions) and the main inputs 
or driving forces (population growth, economic growth, 
technological, e.g., as it affects energy and land-use) are 
equally important. 
G H G emissions scenarios are usually based on an internally 
consistent and reproducible set of assumptions about the key 
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relationships and driving forces of change, which are derived 
from our understanding of both history and the entrent 
situation. Often these scenarios are formulated with the help of 
formal models. Such scenarios specify the future emissions of 
GHGs in quantitative terms and, if fully documented, they are 
also reproducible. Sometimes G H G emissions scenarios are 
less quantitative and more descriptive, and in a few cases they 
do not involve any formal analysis and are expressed in 
qualitative terms. The SRES scenarios involve both qualitative 
and quantitative components; they have a narrative part called 
"storylines" and a number of corresponding quantitative 
scenarios for each storyline. Figure 1-1 illustrates the 
interrelated nature of these altemative scenario formulations. 
Although no scenarios are value free, it is often useful to 
distinguish between normative and descriptive scenarios. 
Normative (or prescriptive) scenarios are explicitly values-
based and teleologic, exploring the routes to desired or 
undesired endpoints (utopias or dystopias). Descriptive 
scenarios are evolutionary and open-ended, exploring paths 
into the future. The SRES scenarios are descriptive and should 
not be construed as desirable or undesirable in their own right. 
They are built as descriptions of possible, rather than preferred, 
developments. They represent pertinent, plausible, altemative 
futures. Their peitinence is derived from the need for policy 
makers and climate-change modelers to have a basis for 
assessing the impUcations of future possible paths for G H G 
and S O 2 emissions, and the possible response strategies. Their 
plausibility is based on an extensive review of the emissions 
scenarios available in the literature, and has been tested by 
altemative modeling approaches, by peer review (including the 
"open process" through the IPCC web site), and by the IPCC 
review and approval processes. Good scenarios are challenging 
and court controversy, since not everybody is comfortable with 
every scenario, but used intelligently they allow policies and 
strategies to be designed in a more robust way. 
Figure 1-1: Schematic illustration of altemative scenario 
formulations, from narrative storylines to quantitative formal 
models. 
1.3. Purposes and Uses of SRES Emissions Scenarios 
The assessment of climate change dictates a global perspective 
and a very long time horizon that covers periods of at least a 
century. As the prediction of future anthropogenic G H G 
emissions is impossible, altemative G H G emissions scenarios 
become a major tool for the analysis of potential long-range 
developments of the socio-economic system and 
corresponding emission sources. 
However, to develop scenarios for a period of 100 years is a 
relatively new field. Difficulties arise not only from large 
scientific uncertainties and data inadequacies, but also because 
people are not trained to think in such time-spans. We are 
educated in narrow disciplines, and our ability to model 
complex systems, at the global level, is sfill in its infancy. For 
example, within the next century technological discontinuities 
should be expected, and possibly major shifts in societal values 
and in the balance of geopolitical power. The study of past 
trends over such long periods is hampered because most 
databases are incomplete if more than 50 years old. Given 
these gaps in our data, methods and understanding, scenarios 
are the best way to integrate our demographic, economic, 
societal and technological knowledge with our understanding 
of écologie systems to evaluate sources and sinks of G H G 
emissions. Scenarios as an integration tool in the assessment of 
climate change allow a role for intuition, analysis and 
synthesis, and thus we tum to scenarios to take advantage of 
these features and aid the assessment of future climate change, 
impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation and mitigation. Since the 
scenarios focus on the century time scale, tools are used that 
have been developed for this purpose. These tools are less 
suitable for the analysis of near-term developments, so this 
report does not intend to provide reliable projections for the 
near term. 
The IPCC's 1994 evaluation of its 1992 emissions scenarios 
identified four principal uses (Alcamo et a l . , 1995): 
• To provide input for evaluating climatic and 
environmental consequences of altemative future G H G 
emissions in the absence of specific measures to reduce 
such emissions or enhance G H G sinks. 
• To provide similar input for cases with specific 
alternative policy interventions to reduce G H G 
emissions and enhance sinks. 
• To provide input for assessing mitigation and 
adaptation possibilities, and their costs, in different 
regions and economic sectors. 
• To provide input to negotiations of possible agreements 
to reduce G H G emissions. 
The SRES emissions scenarios are intended for the first, third 
and fourth uses. They do not include any additional (explicit) 
policies or measures directed at reducing G H G sources and 
enhancing sinks. Thus, they cannot be directly applied to the 
second purpose of emissions scenarios. Instead, they could be 
used as reference cases for the introduction of specific policy 
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interventions and measures in new model runs tliat siiare tlie 
same specifications for the other principal driving forces of 
future emissions. However, the SRES emissions scenarios 
include a host of other policies and measures that are not 
directed at reducing sources and increasing sinks of GHGs, but 
that nevertheless have an indirect effect on future emissions. 
For example, policies directed at achieving greater 
environmental protection may also lead to lower emissions of 
GHGs. Moreover, afforestation and reforestation measures 
increase COj sinks, and a shift to renewable energy sources 
reduces the sources of emissions. 
Within thi'ee of the broad objectives listed above, the new 
SRES emissions scenarios are also intended to meet the 
specific needs of three main IPCC user communities: 
• Working Group I (WGI), which includes climate 
modelers who need future emission trajectories for 
GHGs and aerosol precursors as inputs for the GCMs 
used to develop climate change scenarios. 
• Working Group II (WGII), which analyzes climate 
impacts and adaptation policies, first need the climate-
change scenarios produced by WGI's climate modelers. 
Second, analysts need to know the socio-economic 
changes associated with specific emissions scenarios, 
as impacts of climate change on ecosystems and people 
depend on many factors. Among these are whether the 
people arc numerous or few, rich or poor, free to move 
or relatively immobile, and included or excluded from 
world markets in technologies, food, etc. 
• WGIII, which analyzes potenüal mitigation policies for 
climate change, also needs to know the socio-economic 
settings against which policy options are to be 
evaluated. Are markets open or protected? Are 
technological options and economic resources plentiful 
or scarce? Are people vulnerable or adaptable? 
The interests of these three user groups create certain 
requhements that the SRES scenarios attempt to fulfill. For 
example, climate modelers and those who analyze climate 
impacts need scenaiios on the order of 100 years because of the 
long response time of the climate system. At the same time 
adaptation-policy analysis tends to be focused more on the 
medium-term, around 20 to 50 years. The SRES scenarios 
attempt to include enough infonnation and specific details to be 
useful to these groups. Spatially explicit emissions and socio-
economic variables are required for slightly different reasons. 
Some emissions, such as the SOj emissions that contribute to 
sulfate aerosols, have impacts that vary depending on where they 
are emitted. Climate modelers therefore need spatially explicit 
emission estimates. Similarly, impacts depend on the geographic 
pattems of changing temperatures, rainfall, humidity and cloud 
cover, and how these compare to evolving socio-economic 
patterns in specific scenarios. Impact modelers therefore need 
spatially explicit estimates of, in particular, population growth, 
migration, and the economic variables that reflect the expected 
adaptability or vulnerability of different populations and regional 
economies to different regional climate changes. 
Taking the above audiences and purposes into account, the 
following more precise specifications for the new SRES 
scenarios were developed. The new scenarios should: 
• cover the full range of radiatively important gases, 
which include direct and indirect GHGs and SO^; 
• have sufficient spatial resolution to allow regional 
assessments of climate change in the global context; 
• cover a wide spectrum of alternative futures to reflect 
relevant uncertainties and knowledge gaps; 
• use a variety of models to reflect methodological 
pluralism and uncertainty; 
• incorporate input from a wide range of scientific 
disciplines and expertise from non-academic sources 
through an open process; 
• exclude additional initiatives and policies specifically 
designed to reduce climate change; 
• cover and describe to the extent possible a range of 
policies that could affect climate change although they 
are targeted at other issues, for example, reductions in 
S O T emissions to limit acid rain; 
• cover as much as possible of the range of major 
underlying "driving forces" of emissions scenarios 
identified in the open literature; 
• be transparent with input assumptions, modeling 
approaches and results open to external review; 
• be reproducible - input data and methodology are 
documented adequately enough to allow other 
researchers to reproduce the scenarios; and 
• be internally consistent - the various input assumptions 
and data of the scenarios are internally consistent to the 
extent possible. 
1.4. Review of Past IPCC Emissions Scenarios 
The 1994 IPCC evaluation of the usefulness of the IPCC 1992 
(IS92) scenarios found that for the purposes of driving 
atmospheric and climate models, the COj emissions trajectories 
in these provided a reasonable reflection of variations found in 
the open literature. Specifically, their global C O ^ emissions 
spanned most of the range of other scenarios identified in the 
literature. Figure 1-2 shows the global, energy-related and 
industrial CO2 emissions of the IS92 scenarios ranging from 
very high emissions of 35.8 GtC to very low emissions of 4.6 
GtC by 2100 (corresponding to a sixfold increase and a 
decline by a third compared to 1990 levels, respectively). The 
shaded area in Figure 1-2 indicates the coverage of the IS92 
scenarios while the "spaghetti-like" curves indicate other 
energy-related emissions scenarios found by the IPCC review 
to be representative of the scenarios available in the open 
literature at that time (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). In the open 
literature, emissions trajectories for other gases were 
extremely thin in many instances, but the IS92 cases were not 
dissimilar to these. 
Another important recommendation of the 1994 IPCC review 
was that, given the degree of uncertainty about future climate 
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Figure 1-2: Energy-related and industrial global COj emissions for scenarios reviewed in the IPCC Report Climate Change 
1994 (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). The shaded area indicates coverage of 1S92 scenarios while the "spaghetti-like" curves indicate 
other energy-related emissions scenarios found by the IPCC review to be representative of the scenarios available in the open 
literature at that time. (Individual scenarios are listed in the Appendix of Alcamo et a i , 1995.) 
change, analysts should use the full range of IS92 emissions as 
input to climate models rather than a single scenario. This is in 
stark contrast to the actual use of one particular scenario in the 
set, the IS92a scenario, as the reference case in numerous 
studies. In fact, the IS92a scenario is often referred to in 
climate change modeling and impact studies as the "business-
as-usual" scenario and used as the only reference emissions 
trajectory. The review concluded that the mere fact of the IS92a 
being an intermediate, or central, COj emissions scenario at the 
global level does not equate it with being the most likely 
scenario. Indeed, the conclusion was that there was no 
objective basis on which to assign likelihood to any of the 
scenarios. Furthermore, the IS92a scenario was shown to be 
"central" for only a few of its salient characteristics such as 
global population growth, global economic development and 
global COj emissions. In other ways, IS92a was found not to 
be central with respect to the published literature, particularly 
in some of its regional input assumptions. The same is the case 
with the new set of SRES scenarios, as is shown below. No 
single scenario can be central with respect to all the 
characteristics relevant for different uses of emissions 
scenarios and there is no objective way to assign likelihood to 
any of the scenarios. 
1.5. Why New IPCC Emissions Scenarios? 
The 1994 IPCC evaluation of the IS92 scenarios found that the 
scenarios were innovative at the time of their publication and 
path-breaking in their coverage of the full range of G H G and 
SO2 emissions, on both a global and a regional basis. The review 
also identified a number of weaknesses. These included the 
limited range of CO^ intensities of energy ( C O 2 emissions per 
unit energy) reflected in the six scenarios and the absence of any 
scenario with significant closure in the income gap between 
developed and developing countries, even after a full century 
(Parikh, 1992). Across all six scenarios the per capita income in 
the developing countries grows only to a share of 17% to 26% 
of that of the industrial countries, compared to 6% today. 
Furthermore, since the development of the IS92 scenarios 
much has changed in our understanding of both the possible 
future G H G emissions and the climate impacts that might 
result. The most straightforwai'd change arises because the 
IS92 scenarios had to estimate data for the base year 1990 
(actual data were unavailable at the time); 1990 is no longer a 
forecast year and actual data can be used. But other changes are 
at least as important. It is now recognized that in some regions 
S O 2 emissions may be as important to climate cliange as all 
П О П - С О 2 greenhouse related gases combined - at least in the 
near-term. As a result the rapid growth of SO, emissions in the 
IS92 scenarios has been questioned. The 1994 evaluation of the 
IS92 scenario series (Alcamo et a l . , 1995) concluded, for 
instance, that projected emissions in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
did not reflect recent legislative changes such as the 
Amendments of the Clean Air Act in the US or the Second 
European Sulfur Protocol. Thus, factors other than climate 
change, namely regional and local air quality, may well prompt 
limits on future SOj emissions independent of global warming 
concerns. Restructuring in Eastern and Central Europe and the 
Newly Independent States of the fonner Soviet Union has 
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powerfully affected economic activity, with reductions in CO2 
emissions unforeseen in the IS92 scenarios. The advent of 
integrated assessment (lA) models has also made it possible 
now to construct internally consistent emissions scenarios that 
jointly consider the interactions among energy use, the 
economy, and land-use change. Some l A models account for 
interactions in both directions between driving forces of G H G 
and SO, emissions and possible impacts of climate change. 
Progress has also been made in achieving greater consistency 
among scenario characteristics such as the rates of 
technological change in different sectors. 
Owing to these advances, the 1994 IPCC review of the IS92 
scenarios concluded that new scenarios, if developed, should 
include these improvements: 
• estimation of emissions baselines and future non-CO, 
emissions, particularly from land use; 
• incorporation of the latest information on economic 
restructuring throughout the world; 
• expand the range of economic-development pathways, 
including a narrowing of the income gap between 
developing and industrialized countries; 
• examine different trends in and rates of technological 
change; 
• evaluate possible consequences of trade and market 
liberalization and privatization; and 
• reflect current emission commitments in connection 
with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1997). 
However, the Terms of Reference for SRES explicitly preclude 
additional initiatives, measures and policies specifically 
designed to reduce climate change (see Appendix I). 
1,6. SRES Approach and Process 
The 1994 IPCC review also offered recommendations about the 
process by which a new set of scenarios might be prepared. It 
recommended that the IPCC or another suitable organization act 
as an "umbrella" under which different groups could develop 
comparable, comprehensive emissions scenarios. They further 
recommended that the process for developing scenarios should 
draw on increasing experience in scenario harmonization and 
model calculations, and that it should emphasize: 
• openness to broad participation by the research (and 
stakeholder) community, particularly from developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition; 
• extensive documentation of modeling assumptions, 
inputs and outputs; 
• pluralism and diversity of groups, approaches and 
methods, although the final set of scenarios should be 
haimonized; 
• comparability across the scenarios that necessitates 
standardized reporting conventions for model inputs 
and outputs; and 
• harmonization of emission scenarios in the set to 
provide common benchmarks for scenarios from 
different modeling groups. 
Further recommendations included wide dissemination of the 
scenarios to countries, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the scientific community. As 
part of this effort, a central archive should be established to 
make available the resuUs of new scenarios to any group. The 
archive should also make available some aspects of the models 
and input assumptions used to derive the scenarios. In addition, 
special efforts are needed to improve the capabilities of 
researchers to analyze and develop scenarios, especially in 
developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition. 
As described at the beginning of this chapter, IPCC WGIII 
appointed the SRES writing team in January 1997, and the 
team reached early consensus on the four major components of 
an overall work program (outlined in Section 1.1). The SRES 
team worked in close collaboration with colleagues on the 
IPCC Task Group on Climate Scenarios for Impact Assessment 
(TGCIA) and with colleagues from all three IPCC working 
groups. As is evident from the four components of the work 
program, it was agreed that the process be an open one with no 
"official" model and no exclusive "expert teams." High priority 
was given to wide participation so that any research group 
capable of preparing scenarios for any region could participate. 
In 1997 the IPCC advertised in a number of relevant scientific 
journals and other publications to solicit wide participation in 
the process. A l l global modeling teams and regional modelers 
were invited and encouraged to participate. In this way, 
researchers with local expertise from both developing and 
developed regions could contribute to the global exercise even 
if their own research was exclusively regional. To facilitate 
participation and improve the usefulness of the new scenarios, 
the open-process web site mentioned above was created. The 
open process provided a wide access to preliminary marker 
(see below) SRES scenario results and greatly facilitated 
coordination among the writing team. It also provided 
feedback about the needs of those who would use the final 
scenarios, and suggestions for improvements. The open 
process also served to document all relevant results and 
associated assumptions for the preliminary scenarios 
developed by the participating modeling groups. 
Four storylines were developed by the whole writing team in 
an iterative process that identified driving forces, key 
uncertainties, and quanthative scenario families. The team was 
fortunate to have a number of skilled practitioners in scenario 
building. The process of quantifying the four storylines 
deserves some elaboration. The storylines were essentially 
complete by January 1998, at which time the modeling groups 
represented on the writing team began to quantify them. For 
each storyline, one modeling group was given principal 
responsibility, and the quantification produced by that group is 
referred to as the "marker scenario" for that storyline. The four 
preliminary marker scenarios were posted on the web site of 
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the open process. The choice of the marlcers was based on 
extensive discussion of: 
• range of emissions across all of marker scenarios; 
• which of the initial quantifications (by the modelers) 
reflected the storyline; 
• preference of some of the modeling teams and features 
of specific models; 
• use of different models for the four markers. 
As a result the markers are not necessarily the median or mean 
of the scenario family, but are those scenarios considered by 
the SRES writing team as illustrative of a particular storyline. 
These scenarios have received the closest scrutiny of the entire 
writing team and via the SRES open process compared to other 
scenario quantifications. The marker scenarios are also those 
SRES scenarios that have been most intensively tested in terms 
of reproducibility. As a rule, different modeling teams have 
attempted to replicate the model quantification of a particular 
marker scenario. Available time and resources have not 
allowed a similar exercise to be conducted for all SRES 
scenarios, although some effort was devoted to reproduce the 
four scenario groups^ that constitute different interpretations of 
one of the four storylines (see Figure 1-4) with different 
models. Additional versions of the preliminary marker 
scenaiios by different modeling teams and other scenarios that 
give alternative quantitative interpretations of the four 
storylines constitute the final set of 40 SRES scenarios. This 
also means that the 40 scenarios are not independent of each 
other as they are all based on four storylines. However, 
differences in modeling approaches have meant that not all of 
the scenarios provide estimates for all the direct and indirect 
G H G emissions for all the sources and sectors. The four SRES 
marker scenarios cover all the relevant gas species and 
emission categories comprehensively 
The four marker scenarios were posted on the IPCC web site 
(sres.ciesin.org) in June 1998, and the open scenario review 
process through the IPCC web site lasted until January 1999. 
The submissions invited through the open process and web site 
fell into three categories (see Appendix VI): 
• additional scenarios published in the reviewed 
literature that had not been included in the scenario 
database (see Appendix V); 
• new scenarios based on the SRES marker scenarios; 
and 
• general suggestions to improve the work of the SRES 
writing team as posted on the web site (preferably 
based on referenced literature). 
The submissions were used to revise the marker scenarios and 
to develop additional alternatives within each of the four 
scenario families. The result is a more complete, refined set of 
^ Please note that in the Summary for Policymakers, two of these 
groups were merged into one. See also the endnote in Box 1-2. 
40 new scenarios that reflects the broad spectrum of modeling 
approaches and regional perspectives. The preliminary marker 
scenarios posted on the web site were provided also to climate 
modelers, with the approval of the IPCC Bureau. 
1.7. SRES Emissions Scenarios 
1 . 7 . 1 . L i t e r a t u r e Review and A nalysis 
The first step in formulation of the SRES emissions scenarios 
was to review both the published scenario literature and the 
development of the scenario database accessible through the 
web site (www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html). Chapters 
2 and 3 give a more detailed description of the literature review 
and analysis. Figure 1-3 shows the global energy-related CO2 
emission paths from the database as "spaghetti" curves for the 
period to 2100 against the background of the historical 
emissions from 1900 to 1990. These curves are plotted against 
an index on the vertical axis rather than as absolute values 
because of the large differences and discrepancies for the 
values assumed for the base yeai- 1990. These sometimes arise 
from genuine differences among the scenarios (e.g., different 
data sources, definitions) and sometimes from different base 
years assumed in the analysis or in altemative calibrations. 
The differences among the scenarios in the specification of the 
base year illustrate the large genuine scientific and data 
uncertainty that surrounds emissions and their main driving 
forces captured in the scenarios. The literature includes 
scenarios with additional climate polices, which are sometimes 
referred to as mitigation or intervention scenarios. There are 
many ambiguities associated with the classification of 
emissions scenarios into those that include additional climate 
initiatives and those that do not. Many cannot be classified in 
this way on basis of the information available from the 
database. Figure 1-3 indicates the ranges of emissions in 2100 
from scenarios that apparently include additional climate 
initiatives (designated as intervention emissions range), those 
that do not (non-intervention) and those that cannot be 
assigned to either of these two categories (non-classified). This 
classification is based on the subjective evaluation of the 
scenarios in the database by the members of the writing team 
and is explained in Chapter 2. The range of the whole sample 
of scenarios has significant overlap with the range of those that 
cannot be classified and they share virtually the same median 
(15.7 and 15.2 GtC in 2100, respectively) but the non-classified 
scenarios do not cover the high part of the range. Also, the 
range of the scenarios that apparently do not include climate 
polices (non-intervention) has considerable overlap with the 
other two ranges (lower bound is higher) but with a 
significantly higher median (of 21.3 GtC in 2100). 
' The 1990 emissions from energy production and use are estimated by 
Marland et al. (1994) at 5.9 GtC excluding cement production. The 1990 
base year values in the scenarios reviewed range from 4.8 
(CETA/EMF14, Scenario MAGICC CO2) to 6.4 GtC (ICAM2/EMF14); 
see Dowlatabadi and Kandlikar 1995; Peck andTeisberg, 1995. 
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Figure 1-3: Global energy-related and industrial COj emissions - historical development and future scenarios, shown as an 
index (1990 = 1). The median (50*), the 5*, 25*, 75* and 95"' percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The 
statistics associated with scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of occuiTcnce (e.g., the frequency distribution 
of the scenarios may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many subsequent studies). The emissions paths 
indicate a wide range of future emissions. The range is also large in the base year 1990 and is indicated by an "eiTor" bar. To 
separate the variation due to base-year specification from different future paths, emissions are indexed for the year 1990, when 
actual global energy-related and industrial COj emissions were about 6 GtC. The coverage of COj emissions sources may vary 
across the 256 different scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time 
steps (for 1990 256 scenarios, for 2020 and 2030 247, for 2050 220, and for 2100 190 scenarios). Also shown, as vertical bars 
on the right of the figure, are the ranges of emissions in 2100 for scenarios from the literature that apparently include 
additional climate initiatives (designated as "intervention" scenarios emissions range), those that do not ("non-intervention"), 
and those that cannot be assigned to either of these two categories ("non-classified"). This classification is based on the 
subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the members of the writing team and is explained in Chapter 2. Data 
sources: Morita and Lee, 1998a, 1998b; Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998. 
Historically, gross COj emissions have increased at an average 
rate of about 1.7% per year since 1900 (Nakicenovic et a l . , 
1996); if that historical trend continues global emissions would 
double during the next three to four decades and increase more 
than sixfold by 2100. Many scenarios in the database describe 
such a development. However, the range is very large around 
this historical trend so that the highest scenarios envisage more 
than a sevenfold increase of global emissions by 2100 as 
compared with 1990, while the lowest have emissions lower 
than those of today. The median and the average of the 
scenarios lead to about a threefold emissions increase over the 
same time period or to about 16 GtC. This is lower than the 
median of the IS92 set and is lower than the IS92a scenario, 
often considered as the "central" scenario with respect to some 
of its tendencies. However, the distribution of emissions is 
asymmetric. The thin emissions "tail" that extends above the 
95* percentile (i.e., between the six and tenfold increase of 
emissions by 2100 compared to 1990) includes only a few 
scenarios. The range of other emissions and the main scenario 
driving forces (such as population growth, economic 
development and energy production, conversion and end use) 
for the scenarios documented in the database is also large and 
comparable to the variation of CO^ emissions. Statistics 
associated with scenarios from the literature do not imply 
probability of occurrence or likelihood of the scenarios. The 
frequency distribution of the database may be influenced by the 
use of lS92a as a reference for scenario studies. 
1.7.2. N a r r a t i v e Storylines and Scenario Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n s 
Given these large ranges of future emissions and their driving 
forces, there are an infinite number of possible alternative 
futures to explore. The SRES scenarios cover a finite, albeit a 
very wide, range of future emissions. To facilitate the process 
of identifying alternative future developments, the writing team 
decided to describe their scenarios coherently by narrative 
storylines. The storylines describe developments in many 
different economic, technical, environmental and social 
dimensions. The main reasons for formulating storylines are to: 
• help the writing team to think more coherently about 
the complex interplay between scenario driving forces 
within each and across alternative scenarios; 
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• make it easier to explain the scenarios to tlie various • 
user communities by providing a narrative description 
of alternative futures that goes beyond quantitative 
scenario features; 
• make the scenarios more useful, in particular to 
analysts who contribute to IPCC WGII and WGIII; the 
social, political and technological context described in 
the scenario storylines is all-important in analyzing the 
effects of policies either to adapt to climate change or • 
to reduce G H G emissions; and 
• provide a guide for additional assumptions to be made 
in detailed climate impact and mitigation analyses, 
because at present no single model or scenario can 
possibly respond to the wide variety of informational 
and data needs of the different user communities of 
long-term emissions scenarios. 
The writing team consciously applied the principle of Occam's 
Razor (i.e., the economy of thought, Eatwell et a l . , 1998). They 
sought the minimum number of scenarios that could still serve 
as an adequate basis to assess climate change and that would 
still challenge policy makers to test possible response strategies 
against a significant range of plausible futures. The team 
decided on four storylines, as an even number helps to avoid 
the impression that there is a "central" or "most likely" case. 
The writing team wanted more than two storylines to help to 
illustrate that the future depends on many different underlying 
dynamics; the team did not want more than four, as it wanted 
to avoid complicating the process by too many alternatives. 
The scenarios would cover a wide range of - but not all 
possible - futures. In particular, there would be no "disaster" 
scenarios. None of the scenarios include new explicit climate 
policies. The team decided to carry out sensitivity tests within 
some of the storylines by considering alternative scenarios with 
different fossil-fuel reserves, rates of economic growth, or rates 
of technical change. 
The storylines describe developments in many different social, 
economic, technological, environmental and policy dimensions. 
The titles of the storylines have been kept simple: A I , A2, B l 
and B2. There is no particular order among the storylines; they 
are listed in the alphabetic and numeric order: 
• The A I storyline and scenario family describes a future 
world of very rapid economic growth, low population 
growth, and the rapid introduction of new and more 
efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are 
convergence among regions, capacity building and 
increased cultural and social interactions, with a 
substantial reduction in regional differences in per 
capita income. The A l scenario family develops into 
four groups that describe alternative directions of 
technological change in the energy system.** 
^ Please note that in the Summary for Policymakers, two of these 
groups were merged into one. See also the endnote in Box 1 -2. 
The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very 
heterogeneous worid. The underlying theme is self-
reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility 
patterns across regions converge very slowly, which 
results in high population growth. Economic 
development is primarily regionally oriented and per 
capita economic growth and technological change are 
more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
The B l storyline and scenaiio family describes a 
convergent world with the same low population growth 
as in the A l storyline, but with rapid changes in 
economic structures toward a service and information 
economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the 
introduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustain ability, 
including improved equity, but without additional 
climate initiatives. 
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world 
in which the emphasis is on local solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability. It is 
a world with moderate population growth, intermediate 
levels of economic development, and less rapid and 
more diverse technological change than in the В1 and 
A I storylines. While the scenario is also oriented 
toward environmental protection and social equity, it 
focuses on local and regional levels. 
Figure 1-4 schematically illustrates the SRES scenarios. It 
shows that the scenarios build on the main driving forces of 
G H G emissions. Each scenario family is based on a common 
specification of the main driving forces. The four scenario 
families are illustrated, very simplistically, as branches of a 
two-dimensional tree. The two dimensions indicate global 
and regional scenario orientation and development and 
environmental orientation, respectively. In reality, the four 
scenarios share a space of a much higher dimensionality 
given the numerous driving forces and other assumptions 
needed to define any given scenario in a particular modeling 
approach. 
After determining the basic features and driving forces for each 
of the four storylines, the teams began to model and quantify 
them. This resulted in 40 scenarios, each constituting an 
alternative inteipretation and quantification of a storyline. A l l 
the interpretations and quantifications associated with a single 
storyline are called a scenario "family" (see also Box 1-2 on 
terminology and Chapter 4 for further details). 
In all, six models were used to generate the 40 scenarios: 
• Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the 
National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan 
(Morita et a l . , 1994); 
• Atmospheric Stabilization Framework Model (ASF) 
from ICF Consulting in the U S A (Lashof and Tirpak, 
1990; Pepper et a l . , 1992, 1998; Sankovski et a i , 
2000); 
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Figure 1-4: Schematic illustration of SRES scenarios. The 
four scenario "families" are illustrated, very simplistically, as 
branches of a two-dimensional tree. In reality, the four 
scenario families share a space of a much higher 
dimensionality given the numerous assumptions needed to 
define any given scenario in a particular modeling approach. 
The schematic diagram illustrates that the scenarios build on 
the main driving forces of G H G emissions. Each scenario 
family is based on a common specification of some of the 
main driving forces. 
• Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect 
(IMAGE) from the National Institute for Public Health 
and Environmental Hygiene (RIVM) (Alcamo et a l . , 
1998; de Vries et a i , 1994, 1999, 2000), used in 
connection with the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (СРВ) WorldScan model (de Jong and Zalm, 
1991), the Netherlands; 
• Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry 
Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of 
Tokyo in Japan (Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori, 
2000); 
• Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and 
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from 
the Intemational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Strubegger, 1995; 
Riahi and Roehrl, 2000); and the 
• Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 
USA (Edmonds et a l . , 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
These six models are representative of emissions scenario 
modeling approaches and different l A frameworks in the 
literature and include so-called top-down and bottom-up 
models. 
The six models have different regional aggregations. The 
writing team decided to group the various global regions into 
four "macro-regions" common to all different regional 
aggregations across the six models. The four macro-regions 
(see Appendix III) are broadly consistent with the allocation of 
the countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change ( U N F C C C , 1997), although the 
correspondence is not exact because of changes in the 
countries listed in Annex 1 of the U N F C C C : 
• The OECD90 region groups together all countries that 
belong to the OECD as of 1990, the base year of the 
participating models, and coiTesponds to Annex II 
countries under U N F C C C (1992). 
• The REF region comprises tiiose countries undergoing 
economic reform and groups together the East 
European countries and the Newly Independent States 
of the former Soviet Union. It includes Annex I 
countries outside Annex II as defined in U N F C C C 
(1992). 
• The ASIA region stands for all developing (non-Annex 
I) countries in Asia. 
• The A L M region stands for rest of the world and 
includes all developing (non-Annex I) countries in 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. 
In other words, the OECD90 and REF regions together 
correspond to the developed (i.e., industrialized) countries 
while the ASIA and A L M regions together coiTespond to the 
developing countries. The OECD90 and REF regions are 
consistent with the Annex I countries in the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, while the ASIA and A L M 
regions correspond to the non-Annex I countries. 
/. 7.3. T h e Range of S R E S Emissions and their 
I m p l i c a t i o n s 
The 40 SRES scenarios cover the full range of G H G and SO, 
emissions consistent with the storylines and underlying ranges 
of driving forces from studies in the literature as documented 
in the SRES database. The four marker scenarios are 
characteristic of the four scenario families and jointly capture 
most of the ranges of emissions and driving forces spanned by 
the full set of scenarios. Figure 1-6 illustrates the range of 
global energy-related and industrial CO^ emissions for the 40 
SRES scenarios against the background of all the emissions 
scenarios in the SRES scenario database shown in Figure 1-3. 
Figure 1-6 also shows a range of emissions of the four scenario 
families 
Figure 1-6 shows that the SRES scenarios cover most of the 
range of global energy-related CO2 emissions from the 
literature, from the 95* percentile at the high end of the 
distribution down to low emissions just above the 5* percentile 
of the distribution. Thus, they only exclude the most extreme 
emissions scenarios found in the literature - those situated in 
the tails of the distribution. What is perhaps more important is 
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Box 1-2 
S c e n a r i o 
G r o u p s 
S c e n a r i o s 
4 Markers and 
Emissions other Standardized Other Emissions Emissions Scenarios 
Scenarios 
Figure 1-5: Schematic illustration of SRES scenarios. The set of scenarios consists of four scenario families: A l , A2, B l and 
B2. Scenario family A l is further subdivided mto four scenario groups: A lC , AIG, A l B and AIT, (see also note below), 
resultmg in seven scenario groups together with the other three scenario families. Each famUy and group consists of a number 
of scenarios. Some of them have "harmonized" driving forces and share the same prespecified population and gross world 
product (a few that also share common final energy trajectories are called "fully harmonized"). These are marked as "HS" for 
harmonized scenarios. One of the harmonized scenarios, origmally posted on the open-process web site, is called a "marker 
scenario." All other scenarios of the same family based on the quantification of the storyline chosen by the modeling team are 
marked as "OS." Six modeling groups developed the set of 40 emissions scenarios. The GHG and SOj emissions of the 
scenarios were standardized to share the same data for 1990 and 2000 on request of the user communities. The time-
dependent standardized emissions were also translated into geographic distributions. 
SRES Terminology 
IVfodel: a formal representation of a system that allows quantification of relevant system variables. 
Storyline: a narrative description of a scenario (or a family of scenarios) highlighting the main scenario characteristics, 
relationships between key driving forces, and the dynamics of the scenarios. 
Scenario: a description of a potential future, based on a clear logic and a quantified storyline. 
Family: scenarios that have a similar demographic, societal, economic and technical-change storyline. Four scenario families 
comprise the SRES: A l , A2, B l and B2. 
Group: scenarios within a family that reflect a variation of the storyline. TheAl scenario family includes four groups designated 
by AIT, A l C , AIG and A l B (see also note below) that explore altemative structures of future energy systems. In the Summary 
for Policymakers, the A l C and AIG groups have been combined into one "fossil intensive" AlFI scenario group, thus reducing 
the number of groups constituting the A l scenario family to three. The other three scenario families consist of one group each. 
Category: scenarios are grouped into four categories of cumulative CO^ emissions between 1990 and 2100: low, medium-low, 
medium-high, and high emissions. Each category contains scenarios with a range of different driving forces yet similar 
cumulative emissions. 
Marker: a scenario that was originally posted on the SRES web site to represent a given scenario family. A marker is not 
necessarily the median or mean scenario. 
Illustrative: a scenario that is illustrative for each of the six scenario groups reflected in the Summary for Policymakers of this 
report (after combining AIG and A l C into a single AlFI group). Tliey include foiu- revised "scenario markers" for the scenario 
groups AlB, A2, B l and B2, and two additional illustrative scenarios for the AlFI and AIT groups. See also "(Scenario) Groups" 
and "(Scenario) IVIarkers." 
Harmonized: harmonized scenarios within a family share common assumptions for global population and GDP while fully 
harmonized scenarios are within 5% of the population projections specified for the respective marker scenario, within 10% of 
the GDP and within 10% of the marker scenario's final energy consumption. 
Standardized: emissions for 1990 and 2000 are indexed to have the same values. 
Other scenarios: scenarios that are not harmonized. 
Note: During the approval process of the Summary for Policymakers at the 5th Session of WGIII of the IPCC from 8-11 March 200Ü m 
Katmandu, Nepal, it was decided to combine the AlC and AIG groups into one "fossil intensive" group AlFI in contrast to the non-fossil 
group AIT, and to select two illustrative scenarios from these two Al groups to facilitate use by modelers and policy makers. This leads to six 
scenario groups that constitute the four scenario families, three of which are in the Al family. Ibese six groups all have "illustrative scenarios," 
four of which are marker scenarios. All scenarios are equally sound. See also Figure SPM-1. 
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1900 1950 2000 2050 
Figure 1-6: Range of global energy-related and industrial C O j emissions for the 40 SRES scenarios. The dashed time-paths 
depict individual SRES scenarios and the shaded area the range of scenarios from the SRES database. The median (50*), 5*, 
and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with scenarios from the literature do not 
imply probability of оссштепсе (e.g., the frequency distribution of the scenarios may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a 
reference for many subsequent studies). The 40 SRES scenarios are classified into groups that constitute four scenario families. 
Joindy the scenarios span most of the range of the scenarios in the literature. The emissions profiles are dynamic, ranging from 
continuous increases to those that curve thi'ough a maximum and then decline. The colored vertical bars indicate the range of 
the four SRES scenario families in 2100. The black vertical bar shows the range of the IS92 scenarios. See also the note in 
Box 1.2. 
that each of the four scenario families covers a sizable part of 
this distribution, which implies that a similar quantification of 
driving forces can lead to a wide range of future emissions. 
More specifically, a given combination of the main driving 
forces is not sufficient to uniquely determine a future emissions 
path. There are too many uncertainties. The fact that each of the 
scenario families covers a substantial part of the literature 
range also leads to an overlap in the emissions ranges of the 
four families. This implies that a given level of future 
emissions can arise from very different combinations of 
driving forces. This result is of fundamental importance for the 
assessment of climate-change impacts and possible mitigation 
and adaptation strategies. Thus, it wanants some further 
discussion. The emissions paths of the A l and B2 scenario 
families perhaps best illustrate these implications. 
The A l scenario family has explored variations in energy 
systems most explicitly and hence covers the largest part of the 
scenario distribution shown in Figure 1 -6, from the 95* to just 
above the 10* percentile. The A l marker (AIB) scenario 
represents a structure of the future energy mix, balanced in the 
sense that it does not rely too heavily on one particular energy 
source. The A l scenario family includes different groups of 
scenarios that explore different specific structures of future 
energy systems, from carbon-intensive development paths to 
high rates of decarbonization as captured by the two illustrative 
scenarios that span most of the emissions range for the A l 
family. A l l groups otherwise share the same assumptions about 
the main driving forces. This indicates that different structures 
of the energy system can lead to basically the same vaiiation in 
future emissions as can be generated by different combinations 
of the other main driving forces - population, economic 
activities and energy consumption levels. The implication is 
that decarbonization of energy systems - the shift from carbon-
intensive to less carbon-intensive and carbon-free sources of 
energy - is of similar importance in determining the future 
emissions paths as other driving forces. Sustained 
decarbonization requires the development and successful 
diffusion of new technologies. Thus investments in new 
technologies during the coming decades might have the same 
order of influence on future emissions as population growth, 
economic development and levels of energy consumption taken 
together. 
For example, the comparison of the A I B and B2 marker 
scenarios indicates that they have similar emissions of about 
13.5 and 13.7 GtC by 2100, respectively. The dynamics of the 
paths are different so that they have different cumulative CO^ 
emissions. To facilitate such comparisons, the scenarios were 
grouped into four categories of cumulative emissions between 
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1990 and 2100. This categorization can guide comparisons 
using either scenarios with different driving forces yet similar 
emissions, or scenarios with similar- driving forces but different 
emissions. This characteristic of SRES scenarios also has very 
important implications for the assessment of climate-change 
impacts, mitigation and adaptation strategies. Two future 
worlds with fundamentally different characteristic features, 
such as A I B and B2 marker scenarios, also have different 
cumulative COj emissions and radiative forcing, but very 
similar COj emissions in 2100. In contrast, scenarios that are 
in the same category of cumulative emissions can have 
fundamentally different driving forces and different CO,, 
emissions in 2100, but very similar cumulative emissions and 
radiative forcing. Presumably, adverse impacts and effective 
adaptation measures would vary among the scenarios from 
different families that share similar cumulative emissions but 
have different demographic, socio-economic and technological 
driving forces. This is another reason for considering the entire 
range of future emissions in future assessments of climate 
change. There is no single "best guess" or central scenario. 
The SRES emissions scenaiios also have different emissions 
for other GHGs and chemically active species such as carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic hydrocarbons. 
The emissions of other gases follow dynamic patterns much 
like those shown in Figure 1-6 for emissions. Further 
details about G H G emissions are given in Chapter 5. Emissions 
of sulfur aerosol precursors portray even more dynamic 
patterns in time and space than the C O , emissions shown in 
Figure 1-6. Factors other than climate change, namely regional 
and local air quality, and transformations in the structure of the 
energy system and end use intervene to limit future emissions. 
In view of the significant adverse impacts, SOj emissions in 
the scenarios are increasingly controlled outside countries of 
the OECD. As such the SRES scenarios reflect both recent 
legislation in North America and in Europe and recent policy 
initiatives in a number of developing countries aimed at 
reducing SOj emissions (reviewed in more detail in Chapters 3 
and 5). As a result, in the second half of the 2 F ' century both 
the trends and regional patterns of SO^ emissions evolve 
differently from those of C O , emissions in the SRES scenarios. 
Emissions outside OECD90 rise initially, most notably in 
ASIA, and compensate for declining OECD90 emissions. Over 
die long term, however, SO, emissions decline throughout the 
world, but the timing and magnitude vary across the scenaiios. 
One important implication of this varying pattern of SOj 
emissions is that the historically important, but uncertain 
negative radiative forcing of sulfate aerosols may decline in the 
very long run. 
A n important feature of the SRES scenarios is their 
implications for radiative forcing. A vigorous increase of 
global SOj emissions during the next few decades across most 
of the scenarios followed by a decline thereafter wil l lead to a 
coolmg effect that will differ from the effect that results from 
the continuously increasing SOj emissions in the IS92 
scenarios. On one hand, the reduction in global SOj emissions 
reduces the role of sulfate aerosols in determining future 
climate toward the end of the 21" century and therefore reduces 
one aspect of uncertainty about future climate change (because 
the precise forcing effect of sulfate aerosols is highly 
uncertain). On the other hand, uncertainty increases because of 
the diversity in spatial patterns of SO2 emissions in the 
scenarios. Future assessments of possible climate change need 
to account for these different spatial and temporal dynamics of 
G H G and SOj emissions, and they need to cover the whole 
range of radiative forcing associated with the scenarios. 
1.8. Structure of the Report 
The report consists of six chapters and 11 appendices. After 
this introductory chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 present the scenario 
literature review and analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the 
new SRES scenarios. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings, 
and the appendices present the méthodologie approach and 
statistical background material. 
Chapter 2 presents the assessment of anthropogenic G H G 
emissions scenarios and their main driving forces based on an 
extensive literature review. It describes the unique scenario 
database developed for this study, which contains over 400 
global and regional scenarios. The chapter presents the range 
of emissions from the scenarios in the literature with associated 
statistics such, as medians, percentiles and histograms. The 
main scenario driving forces are analyzed in the same way, 
from population and economic development to energy. 
Chapter 3 reviews the main driving forces of past and possible 
future anthropogenic G H G emissions. These include 
demographic, economic and social development, changes in 
resources and technology, agriculture and land-use change, and 
policy issues other than those related to climate. The 
relationships and possible interactions among the driving 
forces are highly complex and heterogeneous. The focus of the 
chapter is to provide an overview of the main driving forces 
and their possible relationships that are particularly relevant for 
the SRES scenarios. 
Chapter 4 presents the naiTative scenario storylines and the 
quantification of the main scenario driving forces with the six 
SRES IA models. First, an overview of the four storylines is 
given which describes their main characteristics, relationships 
and implications. Then, the 40 scenario quantifications of the 
four storylines with the six models are presented. For each 
storyline one scenario is designated as a representative marker 
scenario. Together the 40 scenarios span the range of scenario 
driving forces and their relationships presented in the previous 
two chapters. 
Chapter 5 documents anthropogenic G H G and SO2 emissions 
for the 40 SRES scenarios highlighting the four marker 
scenarios. First, C O j emissions are presented, followed by 
other GHGs, and by the assessment of indhrect effects and 
aerosols. Together the 40 scenarios span the emissions ranges 
from the literature and the four marker scenarios jointly 
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characterize both the dynamics of emissions pattems and their 
ranges. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the main characteristics of the SRES 
scenarios and findings and compares the new scenarios with 
the IS92 set as well as with other scenarios from the literature. 
The chapter addresses possible implications of the new 
scenarios for future assessments of climate change and 
concludes with recommendations from the writing team for 
user communities. 
Finally, 11 appendices conclude the report. They include for 
example the SRES Terms of Reference, a technical appendix 
that describes the six modeling approaches used to formulate 
the 40 scenarios, the scenario database and tables with further 
statistics that describe the new scenarios. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Presented in tliis cliapter is tlie assessment of more than 400 
global and regional greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios 
based on an extensive literature review. Emissions scenarios 
provide an important input for the assessment of future climate 
change. Future anthropogenic G H G emissions depend on 
numerous driving forces, including population growth, 
economic development, energy supply and use, land-use 
pattems, and a host of other human activities. These main 
driving forces that determine the emissions trajectories in the 
scenarios often also provide input to assess possible emissions 
mitigation strategies and possible impacts of unabated 
emissions. In view of the many different uses, it is not 
surprising that numerous emissions scenarios are presented in 
the literature and that the number of regional and global 
emissions scenarios is growing. 
An important characteristic of the scenarios in this Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) is that they reflect the underlying 
uncertainty, part of which derives from the range of emissions in 
the literature. The objective was to encompass the variation within 
the most important scenario driving forces and emissions, the 
complexity of possible relationships between driving forces and 
emissions, and the associated uncertainties that characterize 
altemative future developments. The SRES scenarios cover most 
of the range of the GHG emissions scenarios found in the 
Hterature, including the International Panel on CHmate Change 
(IPCC) 1992 Scenarios (IS92) series (Leggett et a l . , 1992). The 
writmg team considered the literature in creating a new set of 
scenarios. Importantly, however, the literature on existing 
scenarios provides only a general framework to aid analysis; it is 
mformative, but not determinative. 
The literature review consists of four parts; 
• documentarion of as many as possible of the 
quantitative global and regional emissions scenarios 
available both in the open literature and from 
international activities that involve documentation of 
submitted scenarios; 
• development of a scenario database to document the 
more than 400 emissions scenarios collected during the 
literature review; 
• evaluation of the ranges and relationships of the main 
scenario driving forces and the resultant emissions for 
the scenarios documented in the database; and 
• assessment of the scenario submissions received 
tlirough the SRES "open process." 
These four components of the literature review are well suited 
to document and assess the (quantitative) scenarios that assign 
numeric values to describe the future evolution of driving 
forces and emissions. 
Central to this assessment of emissions scenarios and their 
main driving forces is a unique scenario database developed by 
the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) in 
Japan for SRES (Morita and Lee, 1998). The database 
version of 3 Apri l 1998, which is assessed in this chapter, 
includes 416 different scenarios. The current database 
version can be accessed through an ftp-site 
(www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html). It is the most 
comprehensive collection of emissions scenarios in the 
publicly available literature. It includes most of the recent 
global and regional scenarios and all of the scenarios used in 
the latest IPCC evaluation of emissions scenarios (Alcamo et 
a l . , 1995). Therefore, the emissions scenarios documented in 
the database are representative of the literature in general. 
However, there are a number of ways in which the coverage 
of the scenarios in the database could be extended in the 
future. For example, inclusion of long-term emissions 
scenarios for individual countries, when available, would 
improve the regional coverage (e.g., Parikh, 1996; Murthy et 
a l . , 1997). Also, a large majority of the scenarios report only 
energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (230 
scenarios), while only some report non-energy C O , and other 
G H G emissions. This shortcoming of the emissions scenarios 
in the literature was identified in the last IPCC evaluation 
(Alcamo et a l . , 1995). 
The scenarios in the database were collected from 171 different 
literature sources and other scenario-evaluafion activities, such 
as the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF; see Weyant, 1993) and 
the International Energy Workshop (lEW; see Manne and 
Schrattenholzer, 1996, 1997). The scenarios span a wide range 
of assumptions about demographic trends, levels of economic 
development, energy consumption and efficiency pattems, and 
other factors. The aim of this chapter is to show how the 
database can be utilized for the analysis of G H G emissions 
ranges and their main driving forces. Part of this assessment of 
the emissions scenarios is based on an earlier publication on 
the analysis of scenarios documented in the SRES database 
(Nakicenovic e t a l , 1998a). 
The scenarios in the database display a large range of future 
G H G emissions. Part of the range can be attributed to the 
different methods and models used to formulate the scenarios, 
which include simple spreadsheet models, economic models, 
and systems-engineering models. However, most of the range 
results from differences in the input assumptions of the 
scenarios, in particular those of the main scenario driving 
forces. In addition, simply to compare altemative emissions 
levels across different scenaiios is not sufficient to shed light 
on internal consistency, plausibility, and comparability of the 
assumptions behind the scenarios. Analysis of the underlying 
driving forces is thus also an important part of the evaluation. 
This chapter provides an analysis of the main driving forces, 
such as population growth, economic growth, energy 
consumption, and energy and carbon intensities. Some of these 
driving forces are specified as model inputs, and some are 
derived from model outputs, so it is necessaiy to determine the 
assumed relationships among the main driving forces. 
Although the scenario database is well suited for the 
documentation of quantitative scenarios, there is also a 
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significant literature on narrative scenarios. Both scenario types 
have in common that they are generally careñiUy constructed 
descriptions of possible future developments within the bounds 
of explicit assumptions and ckcumstances (see Chapter 1 for a 
more detailed discussion about scenarios). The difference is that 
the quantitative scenarios are usually developed with the help of 
formal models so as to assign internally consistent values to the 
various scenario characteristics. 
The SRES scenarios employ both approaches - a storyline that 
gives a broad, nairative, and qualitative scenario description 
plus a number of quantifications of each storyline with six 
different models. Thus, even though both narrative stories and 
quantitative scenarios are an integral part of the SRES 
emissions scenarios, the literature review focused on the 
documentation and the assessment of quantitative scenarios, 
for two reasons. First, it was not possible to devise a 
classification system that would allow the documentation of 
many different forms of natjative scenarios. Second, the SRES 
objective was to develop a set of numeric emissions scenarios 
for use in the IPCC and other assessments of climate change. 
Therefore, in this chapter the focus is only on the literature 
review of quantitative scenarios. A more detailed discussion of 
narrative scenarios is given in Chapter 4; it deals with the four 
SRES storylines and how they are related to recent work in the 
area of qualitative scenarios. 
The literature on quantitative scenarios is large indeed. This 
assessment is focused on the scenarios that extend at least to 
2020, but about 10 scenarios with a shorter time horizon of 
2010 are also included in the database. In addition, most of the 
scenarios have a global coverage, although a few regional 
scenarios are included to enhance the coverage of some parts of 
the world. These criteria narrowed considerably the number of 
global and regional G H G emissions scenarios witii sufficient 
information to be included m the scenario literature review. 
This scenario literature review and evaluation is the second 
undertaken by the IPCC. The first was conducted to evaluate 
the IS92 set of scenarios in comparison to other G H G 
emissions scenarios found in the literature (Alcamo et a l . , 
1995)4 It was completed in 1994 and included a 
comprehensive evaluation of G H G emissions and their main 
driving forces. This second review and evaluation builds upon 
and extends the earlier IPCC assessment. Consequently, an 
effort was made in the present review to include especially the 
G H G emissions scenarios published since the presentation of 
the IS92 scenarios. 
2.2. General Overview of Scenarios 
The construction of scenarios to investigate altemative future 
developments under a set of assumed conditions dates far back. 
' The IS92 scenarios have also been analyzed with regard to short-
term adequacy (see Gray, 1998). 
Scenarios are one of the main tools used to address the 
complexity and uncertainty of future challenges. The first 
scenarios were probably designed to help plan military 
operations, often called "war games." Today, scenarios are used 
regularly by military organizations around the world for 
training and planning purposes. Military strategists and 
teachers often use very sophisticated computer models to 
develop scenarios for a multitude of different purposes. 
Scenarios are also increasingly used by enterprises around the 
world for many commercial puiposes. Perhaps the most 
famous example is that of the Shell Group in the wake of the 
so-called oil crisis, which used scenarios to plan the corporate 
response strategies (Jefferson, 1983; Schwartz, 1991). Today, 
the use of scenarios is quite widespread.. Many scenarios, 
particularly those developed for enterprises in the energy 
sector, are quantitative and include G H G emissions. Recently, 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) presented a set of scenarios developed in 
collaboration with 35 major corporations (WBCSD, 1998). 
The SRES scenario database documents a number of such 
scenarios that are in the public domain and have been 
published. 
During the past three decades many global studies have used 
scenarios as a tool to assess future C O ^ (and in a few cases also 
other GHG) emissions. One of the fnst such global studies was 
E n e r g y i n a F i n i t e W o r l d , conducted by the Intemational 
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) during the late 
1970s (Hafele et a l , 1981). Another influential series of 
scenarios that included the assessment of COj emissions was 
developed by the Worid Energy Council (WEC, 1993). 
Recently, IIASA and W E C jointly presented a set of global and 
regional scenarios that were developed with a set of integrated 
assessment models and then reviewed and revised thi'ough 11 
regional expert groups (Nakicenovic et a l , 1998b). Another 
recent set of three scenarios, based on elaborate narrative 
stories that described altemative futures, was developed by the 
Global Scenario Group (Raskin et a l . , 1998) and received 
considerable attention. 
Scenarios of future emissions played an important role from 
the beginning of the IPCC work. \ n 1990, the IPCC initiated 
the development of its first set of G H G emissions scenarios 
designed to serve as inputs to general circulation models 
(GCMs) and facilitate the assessments of climate-change 
impacts (Houghton et a i , 1990). Two years later, in 1992, the 
IPCC approved six new emissions scenarios (IS92) that 
provided altemative emissions trajectories for the years 1990 
through 2100 for such radiatively active gases as COj , carbon 
monoxide (CO), methane (CH^), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitrogen 
oxides (N0^), and sulfur dioxide (SOj) (Leggett et a l , 1992). 
They were widely used by atmospheric and climate scientists 
in the preparation of scenarios of atmospheric composition and 
climate change (Alcamo et a l , 1995). In many ways, the IS92 
scenarios were pathbreaking. They were the first global 
scenarios to provide estimates of the full suite of GHGs and at 
the time were the only scenarios to provide emissions 
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trajectories for SO^. The IS92 scenarios are marked for 
reference in many of the illustrations herein that show the 
variation of emissions and their driving forces across the 
scenarios in the SRES database. 
An important group of emissions scenarios included in this 
literature review was compiled from two international scenario 
and model comparison activities. This first group is from the 
JEW and involves structured comparisons of energy and 
emissions scenarios since 1981 (Manne and Schrattenholzer, 
1996, 1997). The participating groups provide information for 
a standardized scenario poll from which the ranges and other 
sample statistics are reported for the main driving forces and 
emissions. The other group is the E M F (Weyant, 1993) and 
also involves regular scenario comparisons, in addition to 
standardized input assumptions, such as the international oil 
price or carbon emissions taxes. Both of these international 
scenario comparison activities provide a large share of the data 
for this scenario review and comparison. They include most of 
the global and regional emissions scenarios developed by 
formal modeling approaches. A large part of these activities is 
based on the use of scenarios for the purpose of climate-change 
research. A third scientific effort that involves scenario 
comparisons is the Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
Programme (ETSAP; Kram, 1993) supported by the 
International Energy Agency (lEA). The ETSAP work involves 
scenario analysis by more than 40 scientific groups from about 
20 countries using the same modeling approach. 
In addition to the many scientific, governmental, and private 
organizations throughout the world engaged in scenario-
building, some international governmental organizations 
regularly develop global and regional scenarios that include 
GHG emissions. For example, the l E A regularly publishes 
global energy scenarios that include CO^ emissions (lEA, 
1998). Most of these scenarios are of shorter term and so are 
not suitable for the requirements of IPCC (see Chapter 1 for 
further details). Nevertheless, they are included in this 
assessment to facilitate a more comprehensive evaluation of 
emissions and their driving forces during the next few decades. 
Some studies consider scenarios that involve explicit policies 
and measures to reduce emissions of GHGs or adapt to climate 
change. Such climate change intervention, control, or 
mitigation scenarios are an important tool for the assessment of 
policies and measures that would be required to reduce future 
GHG emissions. In this report, we use the terminology from 
the most recent IPCC evaluation of emissions scenarios 
(Alcamo et a l . , 1995). Those scenarios that include some form 
of policy intervention are refemd to as i n t e r v e n t i o n s c e n a r i o s , 
while those that do not assume any climate policy measures, 
such as the 40 SRES scenarios, are referred to as n o n -
i n t e r v e n t i o n s c e n a r i o s . In some cases, intervention scenarios 
go even further and investigate more radical emissions 
reductions required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of 
these gases (in accordance with Aiticle 2 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change ( U N F C C C , 
1992)). In contrast, the SRES scenarios do not include any 
explicit additional climate policy initiatives in accordance with 
the Terms of Reference (see Appendix I). 
The SRES writing team used a general approach to identify 
intervention scenarios. According to this approach, a scenario 
is identified as an intervention scenario if it meets one of the 
following two conditions: 
• it incorporates specific climate change targets, which 
may include absolute or relative G H G limits, G H G 
concentration levels (e.g., CO2 stabilization scenaiios), 
or maximum allowable changes in temperature or sea 
level; and 
• it includes explicit or implicit policies and/or measures 
of which the primary goal is to reduce G H G emissions 
(e.g., a carbon tax or a poUcy encouraging the use of 
renewable energy). 
Note that this classification system is only a first step, and 
further work is needed to refine this taxonomy. 
Some scenarios in the literature are difficult to classify as 
intervention or non-intervention, such as those developed to 
assess sustainable development. These studies consider futures 
that require radical policy and behavioral changes to achieve a 
transition to a sustainable development path; Greenpeace 
formulated one of the first (Lazarus et a l . , 1993). This class of 
scenarios describes low emissions futures that sometimes, but 
not always, result from specific climate policy measures. Such 
sustainable development scenarios are also included in this 
assessment of the scenario literature. Where they do not 
include the explicit policies of the SRES criteria, they can be 
classified as non-intervention scenarios. However, there is a 
great deal of ambiguity as to what constitutes policies directed 
at climate change, as opposed to those directed at achieving 
sustainable development in general. Thus, some of these 
sustainable development scenarios are "non-classified" (i.e., 
the information available is insufficient to determine whether 
or not the scenarios included any additional climate policy 
initiatives). 
2.3. Emissions Scenario Database 
The SRES Emissions Scenario Database (ESD) was designed 
to fulfill several objectives: 
• To facilitate a thorough review and analysis of the 
literature. 
• To enable a statistical analysis of all scenarios in the 
database - to generate distribution functions of the 
main scenario driving forces, calculate mean and 
median values, percentiles, and other sample statistics 
(the use of such statistical analyses of the scenarios in 
the database ensures that the new SRES emissions 
scenarios generally reflect the range of emissions and 
input assumptions currenfly found in the open 
literature). 
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Table 2 - 1 : N u m b e r of r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l G H G emissions s c e n a r i o s i n t h e SRES E S D . The database (from 3 A p r i l 1 9 9 8 ) 
i n c l u d e d a t o t a l of 4 1 6 r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l s c e n a r i o s f r o m 1 7 1 sources. The i n d i v i d u a l n u m b e r of s c e n a r i o s per r e g i o n o r 
c o u n t r y exceeds t h e g l o b a l t o t a l because some s c e n a r i o s i n c l u d e b o t h g l o b a l a n d r e g i o n a l d a t a . T h e r e a r e a l s o m o r e s c e n a r i o s 
a t t h e r e g i o n a l l e v e l t h a n a t t h e g l o b a l l e v e l . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e o r i g i n a l sources of i n d i v i d u a l emissions s c e n a r i o s , t h e database 
u t i l i z e d t h e l a r g e n u m b e r of s c e n a r i o s c o m p i l e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g assessments: I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n e r g y W o r k s h o p P o l l ( M a n n e a n d 
S c h r a t t e n h o l z e r , 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 6 , 1 9 9 7 ) ; E n e r g y M o d e l i n g F o r u m ( E M F - 1 4 ; see, e.g., Weyant, 1 9 9 3 ) d a t a ; a n d t h e p r e v i o u s 
database c o m p i l e d f o r t h e I P C C ( A l c a m o et a l , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Region ID Number of Matching Scenarios Region ID Number of Matching 
Scenarios 
World 340 Europe 12 
O E C D 164 OECD Westf 13 
Non-OECD 158 Middle East/North Africa 12 
China 153 East Asia 12 
U S A 136 Extra» 12 
FSU 121 West Europe 11 
EEC 85 D C 7 
Japan 69 OSEAsia*^ 7 
FSU+EE№ 61 SubS Africa 6 
Annex P 46 Annex 2^ 6 
Non-Annex 1^  46 Opacifie 6 
Latin America 42 Poland 5 
India 36 OPEC 4 
Africa 34 United Kingdom 4 
CPAsia^ 32 L D C 4 
East Europe'^  31 Non-OPEC D O 3 
A L M ' ' 30 Hungary 3 
C A N Z 29 Switzerland 3 
Mexico and OPEC 29 INDUS'' 3 
Non-OECD Annex 1 29 Asia Pacific 2 
Middle East 27 Austria 2 
Oceania 25 Brazil 2 
Canada 24 Germany 2 
OECD Pacific^' 23 Korea 2 
SouthAsia (incl. India) 23 Netherlands 2 
OECD Europe 22 Sweden 2 
SEAsia (South and East Asia) 16 Nigeria 2 
North America 15 Other regions 26 
Abbreviations: А Ш , Africa, Latin America, and Middle East; C A N Z , Canada, Australia, New Zealand; D C , Developing Countries; E E C , European Economic 
Community; E E U , Eastern Europe; F S U , Former Soviet Union; O E C D , Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation; Opacifie. Other Pacific 
Asia; O P E C , Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; SubSAfrica , Sub Saltaran Africa; U S A , United States of Ameiica 
a. Economies under transition, Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
b. Central Planning Asia including China. 
c. Eastern and Central Europe. 
d. Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. 
e. Japan, Australia, New Zealand. 
f. O E C D Europe and Canada. 
g. South Pole and other regions with very small populations. 
h. Asia including Japan and China 
i. Developing World (less than US$(1985)]700/capita). 
j . Non-OPEC Developing Countries. 
k. Developed World (more than US$(1985)1700/capita). 
2 As defined in UNFCCC, 1992. 
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• The third objective was to malee the database accessible 
through a website (www-cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ 
ipcc.html) so that data queries, browsing, data retrieval, 
and entry of new scenarios would be possible by remote 
users, and necessitated designing a database that could 
manage flexibly large amounts of data as well as 
diverse data types. 
The database serves primarily to document the G H G emissions, 
including CO2, CH4, N , 0 , CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons), HFCs 
(hydrofluorocarbons), and other radiatively active gases such as 
SO,, CO, and N 0 ^ . In addition, it includes information about 
the main driving forces of G H G emissions, such as population 
growth and economic development, usually expressed in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP), energy consumption, and 
land use. Each of these scenario characteristics has 
subcategories and different values in time and space. The 
temporal dimension is often in steps of 10 years, but this is not 
standardized across the scenarios in the database. The spatial 
dimension refers to the regional disaggregation of the 
scenarios. Priority was given to covering all accessible 
quantitative scenarios with global and regional coverage. The 
main scenario characteristics are documented by the name and 
aggregation given in the original study. In some cases, regional 
and national scenarios are also included to improve the 
coverage of some parts of the world. (Table 2-1 lists the 
number of scenarios in the database that include a given region, 
from the global level through to some individual countries.) 
There is great diversity with respect to regional aggregation of 
scenarios in the database. Inclusion of long-term emissions 
scenarios for individual countries, when available, would 
improve the regional coverage of the database. Sectoral studies 
in developing countries, such as power system emissions (e.g., 
Chattopadhyay and Parikh, 1993) or transport system 
emissions (e.g., Ramanathan and Parikh, 1999), were also 
considered in this assessment to develop SRES emissions 
scenarios. 
A list of scenario characteristics and their frequency of 
occurrence across the 416 scenarios is given in Appendix V. 
Most of these scenarios were created after 1994. Of the 416 
scenarios 340 provide data on the global level, and 256 
scenarios of these 340 report information on C O ^ emissions. 
A large majority (230) of the scenarios report only energy-
related CO2 emissions, while only some report non-energy 
CO2 and other G H G emissions. For example, only three 
models estimate land use-related emissions: the Atmospheric 
Stabilization Framework (ASF) (Lashof and Tirpak, 1990) 
model that was used to formulate the IS92 scenarios; the 
Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect 2 ( IMAGE 
2) model (Alcamo, 1994); and the Asian-Pacific integrated 
model (AIM; Morita et a l . , 1994). Only a few scenarios report 
regional and global SOj and sulfur aerosol emissions that are 
also climatically important because of their cooling effect 
(negative radiative forcing of climate change). Box 2-1 in 
Section 2.4.1 summarizes the set of scenarios that report non-
energy-related CO2 emissions. 
The information documented in the database about emissions 
scenarios illustrates both areas that are well covered in the 
scenario fiterature and areas with substantial gaps in 
knowledge. For example, the information in the database 
strongly confirms the findings of the latest IPCC scenario 
assessment and evaluation (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). One of the 
key findings is that of all G H G emissions, COj emissions are 
by far the most frequentiy studied, and that of all the CO2 
emissions sources, fossil fuel is the source most extensively 
analyzed in the literature. In part, this is because energy-related 
sources of C O , emissions contribute more to the cun-ent and 
potential future climate forcing than any other single G H G 
released by any other human activity. In part, this is also 
because of improved data, assessment methods, and models for 
energy-related activities than for other emissions sources. 
Another information gap example is the rather diverse regional 
disaggregation chosen for different scenarios. Even when the 
regions are similar or equivalent in terms of this assessment, 
the names are sometimes different, which hampers 
comparisons. Such gaps in knowledge limit the range and 
effectiveness of the various policy options that logically follow 
from the discussion. This creates a level of uncertainty that can 
only be addressed by concentrated research efforts. 
2.4. Analysis of Literature 
Individual scenarios are considered independent entities in the 
database. Clearly, in practice, individual scenarios are often 
related to each other and are not always developed 
independenfly. Some are simply variants of others generated 
for a particular purpose. Many "new" scenarios are designed to 
track existing benchmark scenarios. A good example is the set 
of IS92 scenarios, especially the "central" IS92a scenario, 
which was often used as a reference from which to develop 
other scenarios. A further consideration is that not all scenarios 
are created in an equal fashion. Some are the result of elaborate 
effort, which includes extensive reviews and revisions; others 
are simply the outcome of input assumptions without much 
significant reflection. Some are based on extensive formal 
models, while others are generated using simple spreadsheets 
or even without any fomial tools at all. 
Numerous factors influence future emissions paths in the 
scenarios. Clearly, demographic and economic developments 
play a crucial role in determining emissions. However, many 
other factors are involved also, from human resources, such as 
education, institutional frameworks, and lifestyles, to natural 
resource endowments, technologic change, and intemational 
trade. Many of these important factors are not documented in 
the database, and sometimes not even in the respective scenario 
reports and publications. Some are neither quantified in the 
scenarios nor explicitly assumed in a narrative form. 
For this analysis, a simple scheme is used to decompose the 
main driving foices of G H G emissions. This scheme is based 
on the Kaya identity (Kaya, 1990; Yamaji et a l , 1991), which 
gives the main emissions driving forces as multiplicative 
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factors on one side of tlie identity and total COj (or GHG) 
emissions on the other. It multiplies population growth, per 
capita value added (i.e., per capita gross world product), energy 
consumption per unit value added, and emissions per unit 
energy on one side of the identity, and total COj emissions on 
the other side (Yamaji et a l . , 1991);^ it is a specific appUcation 
of a frequently used approach to organize discussion of the 
drivers of emissions through the so-called IPAT identity that 
relates impacts (I) to population (?) multiplied by affluence 
(A) and technology (T), (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
discussion). The same approach can be used for other 
emissions such as SO2. However, the driving forces might be 
different for some species of anthropogenic emissions. 
Apart from its simplicity, an advantage of analysis that uses the 
Kaya identity to decompose emissions into four main driving 
forces is that it facilitates at least some standardization in the 
comparison and analysis of many diverse emissions scenarios. 
This decomposition is very useful because it indicates where to 
seek differences in scenario assumptions that may account for 
differences in the resultant G H G emissions (Alcamo et a l . , 
1995). However, the identity is not used here to suggest 
causality. An important caveat is that these driving forces are 
not independent of each other; in many scenarios they 
explicitly depend on each other. For example, scenario builders 
often assume that high rates of economic growth lead to high 
capital turnover. This favors more advanced and more efficient 
technologies, which result in lower energy intensities. 
Sometimes a weak inverse relationship is assumed between 
population and economic growth. Thus, the scenario ranges for 
these main driving forces are not (necessarily) independent of 
each other. (See also the discussion of the relationships 
between the main scenario driving forces in Chapter 3.) 
In the following sections, scenario ranges are presented for 
each of the four factors in the Kaya identity that represent the 
main (energy-related) emissions driving forces: population, 
gross world product, energy consumption, energy intensity 
(energy per unit of gross world product) and carbon intensity 
(CO2 emissions per unit of energy). The ranges for CO2 and 
SO2 emissions are presented first because they represent the 
"dependent variable" in the Kaya identity. These are followed 
by scenario ranges for the other factors in the decomposition 
that represent the "independent variables" (main emissions 
scenario driving forces) in the identity. This sequence was 
chosen to present the main scenario driving forces because it 
corresponds to their representation in the Kaya identity; it does 
not imply a p r i o r i any causal relationships among the driving 
forces themselves or between the drivmg forces and CO2 
emissions. 
3 C O 2 = ( C 0 2 / E ) X ( E / G D P ) x ( G D P I P ) x P, where E represents 
energy consumption, G D P the global domestic product (or global 
value added) and P population. Changes in C O 2 emissions can be 
described by changes in these four factors or driving forces. 
Four complementary methods of analysis are used: 
• charts that show the distiibutions of scenarios in terms 
of their main characteristics and driving forces, 
including CO2 emissions, population growth, global 
GDP, energy consumption, energy intensity, and carbon 
intensity; 
• histograms that show the range of values of main 
scenario driving forces, together with associated 
statistics such as the mean, minimum, and maximum 
values; 
• "snowflake" diagrams, in which each of the axes 
represents the range of one of the key driving forces; 
and 
• analysis of the relationships among the main driving 
forces of energy-related CO2 emissions. 
The main findings of this scenario analysis are reported in 
Nakicenovic e t a l . (1998a). 
2 . 4 . 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions Ranges 
The span of COj emissions across all scenarios in the database 
is indeed large, with a range from more than seven times the 
current emissions levels to below current levels in 2100 (see 
Figures 2-Ia and 2-Ib). The possible interpretations of this 
large range are many. The most important is the great 
uncertainty as to how the main driving forces, such as 
population growth, economic development, and energy 
production, conversion and end use, might unfold during the 
2P ' century. A large majority of the scenarios in the database 
report only energy-related COj emissions (230 of the 256 that 
report CO2 emissions), while only some report non-energy 
CO2 and other G H G emissions. Therefore, these comparisons 
of emissions scenarios focus mostly on energy-related 
emissions. Box 2-1 summarizes the set of 26 scenarios that 
report land-use CO2 emissions. 
Figure 2-la shows the global energy-related and industrial COj 
emissions pathways from the database in the form of spaghetti 
curves for the period 1990 to 2100 against the background of 
historical emissions from 1900 to 1990. These curves are 
plotted against an index on the vertical axis rather than as 
absolute values, because of large differences and discrepancies 
for the values assumed for the base year 1990 in various 
scenarios. The discrepancies may result from genuine 
differences among the scenarios (e.g., different base years, data 
sources, and definitions'^) or from simple errors in calibration. 
The 1990 emissions from energy production and use aie estimated 
by Marland et al. (1999) at 5.9 GtC excluding cement production. It 
appears as i f four scenarios also include deforestation, which might 
explain relatively large differences in the base-year emissions 
compared to the other scenarios. Excluding these four scenarios, the 
1990 base-year values in the scenarios reviewed range from 4.8 to 6.4 
GtC. With the four scenarios the range is from 4.8 to 7.4 GtC. 
A n O v e r v i e w of t h e S c e n a r i o L i t e r a t u r e 85 
Box 2-1: Range of Land Use COj Emissions in the Database 
About 23% of the current total anthropogenic C O j emissions arise from land-use change (Pepper et al., 1992), which makes 
it an hnportant drivmg force. Direct comparison of absolute levels of land-use CO^ emissions between scenarios in the 
database is difficult because of variations in how models depict deforestation and in how modelers classify anthropogenic and 
natural land-use fluxes. In addition, models are based on different base-year data, which further complicates comparison. For 
example, the 1990 base-year emissions estimates from land-use change (e.g., deforestation) range from 0.6 to 1.4 gigatons of 
elemental carbon (GtC). However, by indexing emissions to 1990, it is possible to make more meaningful comparisons of 
trends among the 26 scenarios in the SRES database that report land-use CO^ emissions. It is important to note tiiat only three 
modeling groups produced the 26 scenarios described here. Clearly, emissions from land-use change have not been as well 
explored by the modeling community as energy-related emissions. 
Al l 26 scenarios show a decrease in COj emissions from land-use change over time and are below current levels by 2100; some 
models even report emissions reductions below zero, which suggests CO^ sequestration (e.g., through afforestation). The 
emissions range is very wide during the next few decades, but narrows considerably around mid-century. For example, there is 
more than a factor ten difference (after normalizing for base-year differences) between the highest and lowest scenarios in 2020. 
(For reference, the IS92a scenario falls slightly below the median of the range.) By 2050, however, the gap between the extremes 
narrows, and by 2100 the range is very small indeed: the highest scenario shows COj emissions from land use only 2.4 times as 
great as those found in the lowest scenario. A l l 26 scenarios in the database report COj emissions of less than 1 GtC originating 
from land-use change m 2100, and 23% of the scenarios indicate COj sequestration by the end of the 2P ' century. 
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Figure 2-la: Global energy-related and industrial CO^ emissions-'* - historical development and future scenarios, shown as an index 
(1990 = 1). Median (50*), 5*, 25^^ 75*, and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with 
scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of оссштепсе (e.g., the frequency distribution of the scenarios may be 
influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many subsequent studies). The vertical bars on the right side of the figure indicate 
the ranges for intervention, non-intervention, and non-classified scenario samples, respectively. The emissions paths indicate a wide 
range of future emissions. The range is also large in the base year 1990 and is indicated by an "error" bar (see also Figure 2-lb). To 
separate the variation due to base-year specification from different future paths, emissions are indexed for the year 1990, when 
actual global energy-related and industrial CO, emissions were about 6 GtC. The actual coverage of COj emissions sources may 
vary across the 256 different scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time 
steps (for 1990 256 scenarios, for 2020 and 2030 247, for 2050 211, and for 2100 190 scenarios). As a result of software limitations, 
only 250 scenarios can be plotted on the graph. However, the scenarios not shown are included in the assessment and have almost 
identical trajectories to the sample of 250 scenarios shown. Data sources: Morita and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a l , 1998a. 
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Figure 2-lb: Global energy-related and industrial C O , emissions^ - historical development and future scenarios (used to 
derive indexed values in Figure 2-la), shown as absolute values in GtC. Median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 95* percentües of 
the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of 
occurrence (e.g., the frequency distribution of the scenarios may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many 
subsequent studies). The vertical bars on the right side of the figure indicate the ranges for the intervention, non-mtervenfion, 
and non-classified scenario samples, respectively. The emissions paths indicate a wide range of future emissions. The range is 
also large in the base year 1990 and is clearly discernable. The actual coverage of CO2 emissions sources may vary ™ s the 
256 scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time steps (for 1990 256 
scenarios; for 2020 and 2030 247 scenarios; for 2050 211 scenarios, and for 2100 190 scenarios were analyzed). As a result of 
software limitations, only 250 scenarios could be plotted on the graph. However, the scenarios not shown are mcluded m the 
assessment and have almost identical trajectories to the sample of 250 scenarios shown in the graphic. Data sources: Monta 
and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998a. 
Figure 2-lb gives absolute values of CO2 emissions from 
various scenarios in the database. It shows the magnitude of 
differences between the scenarios in the base year 1990 and 
gives the resultant range of emissions in 2100 directly in GtC^ 
Between 1900 and 1990, global CO2 emissions have increased 
at an average rate of about 1.7% per year (Nakicenovic et a l . 
5 Some of the scenarios may also include CO^ emissions from 
industrial sources. Since non-energy-related industrial emissions are 
very low compared to the energy-related COj emissions, their impact 
on the results of the statistical analyses is negligible. It also appears as 
if four scenarios also include deforestation. These scenarios tend to 
cluster around the median and none occur in the tails of the scenaiio 
frequency distribution. Therefore, they have very little influence on 
the range. 
^ The issue of large differences in the base year quantifications across 
the range of scenarios is discussed in Chapter 4, in which are 
presented the new SRES scenarios as developed by six different 
modeling approaches utilizing different base-year specifications. 
1998b). Global emissions would double during the next three 
to four decades i f this historical trend were to continue. Many 
scenarios in the database describe such a development. 
However, even by 2030 the range is very large around this 
value of possible doubling of global emissions. The highest 
scenarios have emissions four times the 1990 level by 2030, 
while the lowest are barely above half that level. The 
divergence increases with time so that the highest scenaiios 
envisage a tenfold increase of global emissions by 2100. The 
lowest scenarios continue to decrease and some of them are 
consistent with emissions trajectories that lead to an eventual 
stabilization of atmospheric G H G concentrations. 
Figure 2-la indicates a large range between the highest and the 
lowest scenarios. Some of the scenarios on both extremes can 
be characterized as clear outliers in the far tails of the scenario 
distribution. Often, such scenarios are normative in nature, 
having been formulated for a paiticular purpose. However, 
even if these extreme tails are discarded the range is very wide. 
The 95* percentile corresponds to a sixfold increase (about 37 
GtC) by 2100, while the 5* percentile leads to a decrease to 
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about a third (2 GtC) compared to the 1990 level. This range of 
2-37 GtC in 2100 indicates the high degree of uncertainty with 
respect to the level of future G H G emissions. The emissions 
range is somewhat smaller, from 6.5 to 22 GtC, for the 25* and 
75* percentiles, respectively. However, the statistics associated 
with scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of 
their occunence. 
Some additional information about the range of future 
emissions can be obtained by examining the results from 
detailed analyses (see, e.g., Alcamo et a l . , 1996, 1998) 
conducted by Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), Edmonds et a l . 
(1986), de Vries et a l . (1994), and Mamie and Richels (1994). 
These analyses confirm that the range is very lai'ge. The 
analysis of Edmonds et a l . (1986) shows a range of 87 to 2 GtC 
by the year 2070 for the 95* and 5* percentiles, respectively; 
the range is from 27 to 4 GtC for the 75* and 25* percentiles. 
Nordhaus and Yohe (1983) estimated the range to be from 55 to 
7 GtC for the 95* and 5"' percentiles, and from 27 to 12 GtC for 
the 75* and 25* percentiles, respectively. In contrast, de Vries 
et a l . (1994) estimated a fundamentally smaller range of 24 to 
11 GtC by 2050 for the 95* and 5* percentiles, respectively, but 
they standardized some of the scenario assumptions, such as 
population and economic growth, relative to a base case. 
The SRES team also applied the criteria presented in Section 
2.2 to identify intervention scenarios from among the C O , 
emissions scenarios in the database. Of the 190 scenarios that 
reported COj emissions through the year 2100, 62 were 
classified as intervention scenarios and 88 as non-intervention 
scenarios. For 40 scenarios the infonnation available was 
insufficient to determine whether or not they included any 
climate policies. These are referred to as non-classified 
scenarios. The statistics for these three scenario samples are 
given in Table 2-2. The medians for these samples are also 
shown in Figures 2-1 с to 2-If The analysis indicates that many 
of the 88 non-intervention scenarios are emulations of IS92 
scenaiios, and many of these are emulations of IS92a. For 
example, 42 of the 88 non-intervention scenarios were 
produced by EMF-14, of which 25 are based on IS92a. 
Figure 2-lc shows spaghetti cuives for the non-intervention 
scenarios found in Table 2-2. In the year 2100 these scenarios 
cover almost the same range (1.2 GtC to 59.4 GtC) as does the 
entire sample of 190 scenarios (-2.1 GtC to 59.4 GtC). The 
sample of non-intervention scenarios includes some that have 
very low emissions, which suggests that emissions can be low 
even in the absence of explicit climate intervention policies. 
However, the non-intervention sample also has a higher median 
60 
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Figure 2-lc: Global energy-related and industrial CO2 emissions for 138 non-intervention scenarios identified from the SRES 
database. Historical development and future scenarios are shown as absolute values in GtC. Median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 
95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with scenarios from the literature do not 
imply probability of occurrence (e.g., the frequency distribution of the scenarios may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a 
reference for many subsequent studies). Again, the emissions paths indicate a wide range of future emissions. The actual 
coverage of C O , emissions sources may vary across the 138 scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario 
samples used vary across the time steps (for 1990 138 scenarios; for 2100 88 scenarios were analyzed). Data sources; Morita 
and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a l , 1998a. 
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T a b l e 2 - 2 : D a t a b a s e m i n i m u m , m a x i m u m , a n d m e d i a n CO^ emissions l e v e l s i n t h e y e a r 2 1 0 0 ( i n G t C ) . D a t a s o u r c e : M o r i t a 
a n d Lee, 1 9 9 8 . 
Number of scenarios Minimum Maximum Median 
Intervention scenarios 62 -2.1 14.4 6.0 
Non-intervention scenarios 88 1.2 59.4 21.3 
Non-classified scenarios 40 -0.4 32.4 15.2 
Total sample 190 -2.1 59.4 15.7 
than the total sample - 21 GtC in 2100 compared with the 15.7 
GtC median found in the total sample. The lower median of the 
total sample may result from downward pressure exerted by the 
inclusion of some intervention scenarios in the total sample. 
However, it could also result from the influence of IS92a-like 
scenarios (upward pressure) in the non-intervention sample 
(see also Figure 2-10-
Figure 2-Id likewise depicts spaghetti curves for the intervention 
scenarios. The entire range for the intervention scenarios is small 
compared to those of the no policy scenarios and the total set of 
scenarios. In 2100 the maximum (14.4 GtC) and the median (6 
GtC) of this sample are significantly lower than maximum and 
median values of the full and non-intervention sets. 
Figure 2-le shows the range for scenarios that could not be 
classified into these two groups because of insufficient 
infonnation in the database. The range of scenarios in this 
category is similar to that of the total sample in that it is very 
broad. The median of this set in 2100 is also similar to that of 
the total sample (15.7 GtC) and follows a similar trajectory. 
Finally, the IS92a scenario (Leggett et a i , 1992; Pepper et a l , 
1992) appears to have influenced subsequent emissions scenarios 
in the literature. The median population, gross world product, and 
primary energy consumption trends in many scenarios in the 
literature track very closely the developments in the IS92a 
scenario (Morita and Lee, 1998). This is because IS92a 
constituted a reference baseline that was emulated by different 
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Figure 2-Id: Global energy-related and industrial CO2 emissions for 75 intervention scenarios identified from the SRES 
database. Historical development and future scenarios are shown as absolute values in GtC. Median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 
95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with scenarios from the literature do not 
imply probability of occurrence. The emissions paths for intervention scenarios show a more limited range of future emissions 
than do those for the non-intervention scenarios (see Figure 2-Ic). The actual coverage of COj emissions sources may vary 
across the 75 scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time steps (for 
1990 75 scenarios; for 2100 62 scenarios were analyzed). Data sources: Morita and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a/.,1998a. 
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Figure 2-le: Global energy-related and industrial COj emissions for 43 scenarios that could not be classified as intervention or 
non-intervention scenarios from the SRES database. Historical development and future scenarios are shown as absolute values 
in GtC. Median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with 
scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of occurrence. The emissions paths for the "non-classified" scenarios 
indicate a wide range of future emissions. The actual coverage of CO2 emissions sources may vary across the 43 scenarios 
from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time steps (for 1990 43 scenarios; for 2100 
40 scenarios were analyzed). Data sources: Morita and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a/.,1998a. 
modeling groups in a number of scenario evaluation and 
comparison activities. Figure 2-If shows the set of 35 IS92a-like 
scenarios that could be classified from the set of non-intervention 
scenarios. As these scenarios appeal" to emulate IS92a, they show 
httle variation around the median of 20.3 GtC, which is about the 
emission level in that scenario (20.4 GtC) in 2100. 
The analyses in the following sections focus on the total set of 
scenarios in the database only. The distinction between 
intervention and non-intervention scenarios applies only to 
analyses of COj emissions. 
2 . 4 . 2 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions Histograms 
The first two histograms (Figures 2-2a and 2-2b) give the 
global CO2 emissions ranges for 2050 and 2100.^ The total 
range from the highest to the lowest scenario in 2100 is 
between 59 and 2 GtC,^ from about seven times the current 
Not all 256 scenarios that report global CO^ emissions cover the 
whole period to the year 2100. 
* Carbon sequestration exceeds carbon emissions in the negative 
emission scenarios. 
emissions to below zero. For about 10% of the scenarios, 
emissions in the year 2100 are half the current emissions or 
below this level. Presumably, some of the scenarios that have 
low future emissions include some policy interventions to 
reduce G H G emissions. 
The distribution of emissions in 2050 is asymmetric; most of the 
scenarios cluster in the range between 20 to 6 GtC. The thin tail 
that extends above this emissions level includes only 46 of a total 
of 211 scenarios. Altogether, the distribution implies a substantial 
increase in global CO2 emissions during the next 50 years. 
The distribution of emissions in 2100 is even more asymmetric 
than that in 2050. The emissions portray a structure that 
resembles a trimodal distribution: those that show emissions of 
more than 30 GtC (20 scenarios), those with emissions 
between 12 and 30 GtC (88 scenarios), and those that show 
emissions of less than 12 GtC (82 scenarios). That this is quite 
similar to the structure of primary energy consumption 
distribution for 2100 is not by chance. The lowest cluster may 
have been influenced by many analyses of stabilization of 
atmospheric concentrations at levels of 450-550 parts per 
million (10^) by volume (ppmv). The middle cluster appears to 
echo the many analyses that took IS92a as a reference scenario; 
it indicates the possible influence of IS92 scenarios on other 
scenarios in the literature. It is very likely that the majority of 
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Figure 2-lf: Global energy-related and industrial emissions for 35 "IS92a-like" scenarios identified from the set of non-
intervention scenarios included in the SRES database. Historical development and future scenarios are shown as absolute values 
in GtC. Median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The statistics associated with 
scenarios from the Uterature do not imply probability of occurrence. The actual coverage of COj emissions sources may vary 
across the 35 scenarios from the database included in the figure. The scenario samples used vary across the time steps (for 1990 
35 scenarios; for 2100 34 scenarios were analyzed). Data sources: Morita and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic et a l , 1998a. 
the scenarios in the middle cluster foresee a substantial 
contribution of fossil energy sources to total energy 
consumption in the year 2100; thus, in the first approximation, 
CO2 emissions can be expected to be proportional to energy 
(a) 
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~ I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 
Range (index, 1990=1) 
-I 1 I I I I I I I I I I i 
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 
Range (GtC) 
consumption. The median is 15.7 GtC, surrounded by the 
centers of the other two modes, the first at about 21 GtC and 
the second at about 9 GtC. 
Published energy-related emissions vary by a factor of 17 
between the highest and lowest scenarios for 2050 and from 
-2 to 60 GtC between the highest and lowest scenarios for 
2100. 
Figure 2-2a: Histogram showing the frequency distribution 
of global COj emissions in 2050 for 211 scenarios. The first 
horizontal axis shows indexed emissions (1990 = 1); the 
second axis indicates approximately absolute values by 
multiplying the index by the 1990 value (5.9 GtC, see 
footnote 4). For reference, the emissions of the IS92 
scenarios are indicated. The horizontal bars indicate the 
ranges for the intervention, non-intervention, and non-
classified scenario samples, respectively. The frequency 
distribution associated with scenarios from the literature does 
not imply probability of occurrence. 
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Figure 2-2b: Histogram sliowing tlie frequency distribution 
of global CO2 emissions in 2100 for 190 scenarios. The first 
horizontal axis shows indexed emissions (1990 = I); the 
second axis indicates approximate absolute values by 
multiplying the index by the 1990 value (5.9 GtC, see 
footnote 4). For reference, the emissions of the IS92 
scenarios are indicated. The horizontal bars indicate the 
ranges for the intervention, non-intervention and non-
classified scenario samples respectively. The frequency 
distribution associated with scenarios from the literature does 
not imply probability of occurrence. 
2 . 4 3 . Sulfur D i o x i d e Emissions 
An overview of global long-term scenarios of SOj emissions is 
shown in Figure 2-3. Altogether 81 scenarios in the scenario 
database report SOj emissions. Most scenarios were published 
after 1995, which indicates the importance of the influential 
and innovative emissions included in the previous IFCC 
scenario series IS92 (Pepper et a l , 1992). Apparently, they 
stimulated research on long-term frends and impacts of SOj 
emissions. 
The 1990 base-year emissions estimates in the database range 
from 55 to 91 megatons of sulfur (MtS), a seemingly large 
difference that can be explained partially by the different extent 
of coverage of SOj emissions in different models and scenario 
studies, in addition to uncertainties in emissions factors. 
Typically, lower range emissions derive from models that report 
only (the dominant) energy sector emissions, higher ranges also 
include other anthropogenic sources such as SO2 emissions 
from métallurgie processes. Differences in 1990 base-year 
values across scenario studies and a review of available SO2 
emissions inventories are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Indexed to a common 1990 basis, future SO2 emissions trends 
reveal a number of remarkable characteristics. Fhst, contrary to 
other trends discussed in this chapter, increases are generally 
modest; numerous scenarios even depict a long-term decline in 
emissions. Thus, SO2 emissions are invariably projected to be 
decoupled progressively from their underlying driving forces of 
increases in population and economic activity, and hence 
energy demand. The median across all scenarios indicates a 
gradual increase of some 22% over 1990 levels by 2050, and a 
return to 1990 levels by 2100. Only two scenarios exceed the 
range of increases in long-term SO, emissions spanned by the 
IS92 scenario series. 
A detailed review of long-term global and regional SO2 
emissions scenarios is given in Grübler (1998) and is 
summarized in Chapter 3. The most important new finding 
from the scenario literature is recognition of the significant 
impacts of continued unabated high SO2 emissions on human 
health, food production, and ecosystems. As a resuh, scenarios 
published since 1995 all assume various degrees of SO2 
emissions control and interventions to be implemented in the 
future, and are thus substantially lower than previous 
projections, including the IS92 series. In most of these 
scenarios, such low levels of SO^ emissions are not simply the 
result of direct SOj emissions control measures, such as flue 
gas desulfurization. They also result from other interventions 
in which SO2 emissions reduction is more a secondary benefit 
than a primary goal (e.g., structural changes for various reasons 
other than SO2 control). 
2 . 4 . 4 . Population Projection Ranges 
Population is one of the fundamental driving forces of future 
emissions. Most models used to formulate population 
projections for the emissions scenarios are taken from the 
literature and are exogenous inputs. Today three main research 
groups project global population - United Nations (UN, 1998, 
1999), World Bank (Bos and Vu, 1994), and IIASA (Lutz et a l , 
1997). (For more details see the discussion in Chapter 3.) Most 
of the "central" population projections lead to a doubling of 
global population by 2100 (to about 10 billion people 
compared to 5.3 billion in 1990). In recent years the central 
population projections for the year 2100 have declined 
somewhat, but are still in line with a doubling by 2100. For 
example, the latest U N (1998) medium-low and medium-high 
projections indicate a range of between 7.2 and 14.6 bilUon 
people by 2100, with the medium scenario at 10.4 billion. The 
IIASA central estimate for 2100 is also 10.4 bilUon, with a 
95% probability that world population would exceed six and be 
lower than 17 bilUon (Lutz et a l , 1997). 
While all scenarios require some kind of population 
assumptions, relatively few are reported explicitly in the SRES 
database. Figure 2-4 illustrates global population projections in 
the database. Of the 416 scenarios currently documented, only 
46 report their underlying population projections. This limited 
number indicates that, even though population is an extremely 
important driving force for emissions, it is typically either not 
reported or not well explored in most models. For the small 
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Figure 2-3: Global SO, emissions - historical development and 81 
For compaiison, the IS92 scenarios are shown, as is the range and medim^e^^"^ database, shown as an index (1990 = ]). 
Sc_max) scenarios (see also Chapter 3). The vertical bars on the right sid^ F h control (Sc_median, Sc_min, 
emissions control (intervention) scenarios and for SO2 non-control seen f ^''^^^^ indicate the ranges for the SO^ 
Hameed, 1989; Griibler, 1998; Morita and Lee, 1998. ^"^^ respectively. Data sources: Dignon and 
sample of population projections, the range is from about 20 to 
6 biUion people in 2100, with the central or median estimates 
at about 10 billion. Thus, population assumptions in the 
emissions scenarios appear to be broadly consistent with the 
recent population projections, with the caveat that only a few 
•"iderlying projections are reported in the database. un 
Figure 2-4 contrasts the altemative population projections from 
the SRES database with historical developments. The long-
term historical population growth rate has been on average 
about I % per year during the past two centuries. Between 1800 
and 1900 the global population growth rate was about 0.5% per 
year. The average annual growth rate since 1900 has been 
1.3%. Between ¡990 and 1995 the rate was 1.46%; and since 
1995 world population has been growing at a rate of 1.3% 2 . 4 . 5 . 
annually (UN, 1998). All scenarios reviewed here envisage that 
population growth will slow in the future. The most recent 
doubling of the worid's population took approximately 40 
years. Even the highest population projections in Figure 2-4 
grouped mto three clusters. The middle cluster is representative 
of the central projections, with a range of about 10 to less than 
иШюп people by 2100. The other two clusters mark the 
highest and the lowest population projections available in the 
hterature, with between 15 and 20 billion at the high end and 
about 6 billion at the low end. 
Despite these lai-ge ranges among altemative global population 
projections, the variation in this factor compared to the base 
year is the smallest of all the scenario driving forces considered 
in this comparison. Compared with 1990 values, the factor 
increase varies from 3.3 to 1.2. 
Gross W o r l d Product 
require 70 years or more for the next doubling, while in 
roughly half of the scenarios the global population does not 
double during the 2P' century. The highest average population 
growth across all projections is 1.2% per year, the lowest is 
0.1% per year, and the median is about 0.7% per year. 
hiterestingly, the population projections in Figure 2-4 are not 
evenly distributed across the full range. Instead, they are 
Economic development and growth are fundamental 
prerequisites to achieve an increase in living standards. It is thus 
not surpnsmg that assumptions about economic development 
constitute among the most important determinants of emissions 
evels m the scenarios. However, economic growth prospects 
ше among the most uncertain detenninants of future emissions. 
Figure 2-5 shows the future increase in gross worid product 
compared with the historical experience since 1950. As the 
clitterences in base-year data are relatively large, the gross 
woiid product paths are plotted as an index and spliced to 
historical data in 1990. 
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Figure 2-4: Global population - historical development and 46 scenarios from the database. Fevi^ er than 46 lines are shown 
because many of the 46 scenarios use identical population projections. Only 46 of the scenarios in the database identify their 
population projections. Data source: Durand, 1967; Demeny, 1990; U N , 1996; Morita and Lee, 1998. 
The historical gross world product growth rate has been about 
4% per year since 1950; in the scenarios the average annual 
growth rates to 2100 range from 3.2% per year to 1.1% per year, 
with the median value at 2.3% per year. Table 2-3 summarizes 
the future economic growth rates of the 148 scenarios in the 
database that report gross world product for 2100. This 
translates into a gross world product level in 2100 that varies 
from 3.2 (IS92c, Pepper et a l . , 1992) to more than 32 
(FUND/EMF Modeler's choice. Toi, 1995) times the 1990 gross 
world product. The 1990 gross world product was about US$20 
trillion (all values in 1990 US dollars), which translates into a 
range from more than US$700 to about US$65 trillion by 2100. 
Figure 2-5 also indicates that this full range includes a few 
noticeable outliers toward the high and low of future gross 
world product development. The rest of the scenarios are 
grouped much more closely together, which compresses the 
range to a factor increase of about 17 to 7 (129 out of 148 
scenarios) times compared to 1990. The degree of clustering is 
discussed in greater detail in the histograms that follow. 
2 . 4 . 6 . Gross W o r l d Product Histograms 
Figures 2-6a and 2-6b depict the range of gross world product in 
2050 and 2100 across all scenarios in the database.' The lower 
horizontal axis shows the factor increase of gross world product 
compared with the 1990 value (about US$20 trillion). The 
second horizontal axis multiplies the index by the 1990 gross 
world product to indicate absolute values for each histogram. 
' Values are shown also as indexed to 1990 values, since model base 
years and base-year values differ. 
Table 2 - 3 : F u t u r e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h r a t e s f o r t h e m a x i m u m , m i n i m u m , m e d i a n , a n d p e r c e n t i l e s of t h e 1 4 8 s c e n a r i o s i n t h e 
database t h a t r e p o r t gross w o r l d p r o d u c t f o r 2 1 0 0 ( p e r c e n t per y e a r ) . 
1990-2020 1990-2050 1990-2100 
Maximum 3.8 3.6 3.2 
95% 3.2 2.9 2.4 
75% 2.8 2.6 2.3 
Median 2.7 2.5 2.3 
25% 2.6 2.4 2.1 
5% 2.0 1.7 1.3 
Minimum 1.5 1.4 1.1 
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Figure 2-5: Gross world product - historical development and 193 scenaiios, shown as an index (1990 = 1). Data source: U N , 
1993a, 1993b; Morita and Lee, 1998. 
For 2050 most of the scenarios cluster in a rather narrow range 
around a value of about US$100 trillion. In total, 166 scenaiios 
were used to derive the histogram for 2050. This picture 
changes radically for the year 2100, with a very wide variation 
of gross world product values, from about US$700 to US$70 
trillion, and a median of US$250 trillion. As expected, the 
distribution of emissions becomes significantly wider as the 
scenarios extend further into the future. Most of the 
distribution is concentrated between about US$320 and 
US$160 trillion, with very thin and asymmetric tails. A very 
strong peak of values lies at around US$250 trillion, which 
apparently represents an apparent consensus among modelers 
based on an average economic growth rate of about 2.3% per 
year. The frequency of the mode is smaller in 2100 than in 
Figure 2-6a: Histogram showing frequency distribution of 
gross world product in 2050 for 166 scenarios. The upper 
horizontal axis shows indexed gross world product (1990 = 1); 
the lower axis indicates approximate absolute values by 
multiplying the index by the 1990 value (US$20 trillion). For 
reference, the gross world products of the IS92 scenarios are 
indicated. The frequency distribution associated with scenarios 
from the literature does not imply probability of occurrence. 
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Figure 2-6b: Histogram showing frequency distribution of 
gross world product in 2100 for 148 scenarios. The upper 
horizontal axis shows indexed gross world product (1990 = I); 
the lower axis indicates approximate absolute values by 
multiplying the index by the 1990 value (US$20 trillion). For 
reference, the gross world products of the IS92 scenarios are 
indicated. The frequency distribution associated with scenaiios 
from the literature does not imply probability of occurrence. 
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2050, which indicates that the scenarios agree less about the 
central estimated gross world product (Toi, 1995; Yohe, 1995). 
For 2050 and 2100 the gross world products for the IS92a and 
b scenarios are the same as the median for all scenarios 
reviewed (Pepper et a l . , 1992). 148 different scenarios were 
used to derive the histogram for the year 2100. 
2.4.7. Population and Gross World Product Relationships 
The scenarios in the database portray a weak relationship 
between population and economic growth; the correlation is 
slightly negative. Scenarios that lead to a very high gross world 
product are generally associated with central to low population 
projections, while high population projections do not lead to 
the highest gross world product scenarios. At extremely high 
levels of average global income the correlation is strongly 
negative. The highest per capita incomes in 2100 - in the range 
between US$30,000 and US$45,000 - are achieved with a low-
to-medium population growth. 
Figure 2-7 illustrates some of the relationships between 
population and gross world product in the scenarios. It 
compares only 39 scenarios as information about population 
and gross world product assumptions is available for only a few 
scenarios. In most of these, global population transition is 
achieved during the 2F ' century and stabilization occurs at a 
population between 10 to 12 billion people in the year 2100. 
Generally, this is associated with relatively high levels of 
economic development, in the range US$200-500 trillion in the 
year 2100. Scenarios at the lower end of this scale are labeled 
collectively as the "mid-range cluster," which includes all 
IIASA-WEC scenarios (IIASA-WEC, 1995; Nakicenovic et a i , 
1998b), IS92a and b (Pepper et a i , 1992), and AIM96 (Matsuoka 
et a i , 1994). The two highest scenarios are labeled as the "extra 
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Figure 2-7: Gross world product and population growth, 
historical development, 1950 to 1990, and scenarios in the 
database to 2100, in trillion US dollars and billion people. A l l 
endpoints of the curves correspond to 2100. 
high growth" cases, namely IS92e (Pepper et a l . , 1992) and 
IMAGE 2.1, Baseline-C (Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996). 
One scenario, IS92f, shows high population growth (over 18 
billion people by 2100) with comparatively low economic 
growth (about the same level as the mid-range cluster of 
scenarios, approximately US$300 trillion). At the other side of 
the scale are the two IS92 variants (c and d (Pepper et a i , 1992» 
with low population projections (about 6 billion people by 2100). 
2.4.8. Primary Energy Consumption Ranges 
Primary energy consumption is another fundamental 
determinant of G H G emissions. Clearly, high energy 
consumption leads to high emissions. However, what is more 
important for emissions is the structure of future energy 
systems. High carbon intensities of energy - namely high 
shares of fossil energy sources, especially coal, in total energy 
consumption - lead to scenarios with the highest COj 
emissions. The primary energy paths of different scenarios are 
compared here, and the issue of energy carbon intensity is 
considered in the next section. 
Figure 2-8 shows the primary energy consumption paths in the 
scenarios and its historical development since 1900. It gives the 
whole distribution of the 153 scenarios in the SRES database 
that report primary energy consumption, the median, and the 
95*, 75"', 25*, and 5* percentiles. As a result of the relatively 
large differences in the base-year values, the primary energy 
consumption paths are plotted as an index and spliced to the 
historical data in 1990. In 1990, primary energy was about 370 
EJ, including non-commercial energy (Nakicenovic et a l . , 
1996). 
On average the global primary energy consumption has 
increased at more than 2% per year (fossil energy alone has 
risen at almost 3% per year) since 1900. Also, the short-term 
trend from 1975 to 1995 shows a similar increase. In the 
scenarios the average growth rates to 2100 range from 2.4% 
per year to -0.1% per year, with a median value of 1.3% per 
year. 
For the full range of scenarios, the factor increase above the 
1990 level is 0.9 to 10 by 2100.'° However, Figure 2-8 
indicates that this full range includes a few noticeable outliers, 
especially toward the high end of energy consumption levels. 
The rest of the scenarios are grouped more closely together, 
which compresses the range to a factor increase of about 1.5 to 
7.5 times the 1990 level. The degree of clustering is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
Note that the highest scenario in the database reports 3400 EJ for 
primary energy consumption by 2100. Relative to the base year of 
this scenario (340 EJ), this level corresponds to a 10-fold increase. 
However, relative to the base-year value including non-commercial 
biomass (370 EJ), this level corresponds to a nine-fold increase only. 
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2 . 4 . 9 . P r i m a r y Energy Consumption Histograms 
The final two histograms, Figures 2-9a and 2-9b, give the global 
primary energy consumption ranges for 2050 and 2100, indexed 
to 1990. The total range in 2100 is between 330 EJ and 3400 EJ, 
which corresponds to difference of more than a factor of ten 
This factor range is about the same as the factor range for gross 
world product (10.7) and much larger than that for population. 
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Figure 2-9a: Histogram showing frequency distribution of 
global primary energy consumption in 2050 for 145 
scenarios. The upper horizontal axis shows indexed primary 
energy consumption (1990 = 1); the lower axis indicates 
approximate absolute values by multiplying the index by the 
1990 value (370 EJ). For reference, primary energy 
consumptions of the IS92 scenarios are indicated. The 
frequency distribution associated with scenarios from the 
literature does not imply probability of occurence. 
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Figure 2-9b: Histogram showing frequency distribution of 
global primary energy consumption in 2100 for 127 
scenarios. The upper horizontal axis shows indexed primary 
energy consumption (1990 = 1); the lower axis indicates 
approximate absolute values by multiplying the index by the 
1990 value (370 EJ). For reference, primary energy 
consumptions of the IS92 scenarios are indicated. The 
frequency distribution associated with scenarios from the 
literature does not imply probability of occurrence. 
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The distribution of primary energy consumption in 2050 is 
asymmetric, with a long but thin tail toward high levels. Most 
of the distribution is between 600 and 1300 EJ, or about 
1.5-3.5 times the 1990 level of consumption. The higher value 
corresponds to the continuation of a historical growth rate of 
global primary energy consumption of about 2.2% per year. 
Most of the scenarios cluster around 1000 EJ, which is about 
three times that of 1990. A total of 145 different scenarios were 
used to derive this histogram. 
In 2100, the distribution of primary energy consumption is 
much less concentrated and covers the full range, from about 
10 times the 1990 level (to 3400 EJ) to a slight decrease by a 
factor of 0.9 (340 EJ). However, only a few scenarios occur 
toward these extreme values of the two distribution tails. The 
rest of the observations portray an interesting structure that 
resembles a trimodal distribution. The first mode is around 
2600 EJ, the second around 1700 EJ, and the third at about 700 
EJ. The median of the whole distribution is at 1500 EJ. 
Interestingly, the continuation of the historical growth rate of 
about 2.2% per year corresponds to about 11 times the 1990 
level (about 4050 EJ in 2100), well above any values observed 
in the database. Thus, in contrast to data for 2050, all the 
scenarios for 2100 foresee a level of primary energy 
consumption that is lower than that of trend extrapolation. 
Altogether, 127 different scenarios were used to derive the 
histogram for the year 2100. 
2 . 4 . 1 0 . Relationships between P r i m a r y Energy and Gross 
W o r l d Product 
In all scenarios, economic growth outpaces the increase in 
energy consumption, which leads to substantial reductions in 
the ratio of primary energy consumption to gross world 
product, also known as "energy intensity." Individual 
technologies progress, inefficient technologies are retired in 
favor of more efficient ones, the structure of the energy-supply 
system and pattems of energy services change; these factors 
reduce the amount of primary energy needed per unit of gross 
world product. With all other factors being equal, the faster the 
economic growth, the higher the turnover of capital, and the 
greater the decline in energy intensity. 
These long-term relationships between energy and economic 
development are reflected in the majority of scenarios and are 
consistent with historical experience across a range of 
altemative development paths observed in different countries. 
Figure 2-10 shows the historical relationship since 1970 
between energy intensity and GDP per capita for various world 
regions (see I I A S A - W E C , 1995). This shorter record of 
development is contrasted with the experience of the USA 
since 1800. Although there are consistent differences among 
regions and energy paths, the level of energy intensities in 
developing countries today is generally comparable with the 
1000 
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G D P per Capita (1990 US$) 
Figure 2-10: Primary energy intensity versus GDP per capita - regional historical developments (1971 to 1990), USA (1800 to 
1990), and in global scenarios; energy intensity in M J per US dollar at 1990 prices and per capita in US dollars. Abbreviations: 
AFR, Sub-Saharan Africa; CPA, Centrally Planned Asia and China; E E U , Eastem Europe; FSU, Former Soviet Union; L A M , 
Latin America and the Caribbean; M E A , Middle East and North Africa; N A M , North America; PAO, Pacific OECD; PAS, 
Other Pacific Asia; SAS, South Asia; W E U , Westem Europe. Data sources: l E A , 1993; World Bank, 1993; Morita and Lee, 
1998; Nakicenovic et a l , 1998b. 
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range of the now-industrialized countries when they had the 
same level of per capita GDP (see Figure 2-10). The historical 
experiences illustrate that different countries and regions can 
follow different development paths; moreover, there are some 
persistent differences in energy intensities even at similar 
levels of per capita GDP. 
Global energy intensities diverge across different scenarios, as 
shown in the shaded wedge in Figure 2-10. The wedge clearly 
illustrates a persistent inverse relationship between economic 
development and energy intensity across the wide range of 
scenarios in the database, despite numerous differences among 
them. 
2 . 4 . 1 1 . C a r b o n Intensity and Decarbonization 
Decarbonization denotes the declining average carbon intensity 
of primary energy over time (see Kanoh, 1992). Although the 
decarbonization of the world's energy system shown in Figure 
2-11 is comparatively slow, at the rate of 0.3% per year, the 
trend has persisted throughout the past two centuries 
(Nakicenovic, 1996). The overall tendency toward lower carbon 
intensities results from the continuous replacement of fuels with 
high carbon content by those with low carbon content. 
The carbon intensities of the scenarios are shown in Figure 2-
11 as an index spliced in the base year 1990 to the historical 
development. The median of all the scenarios indicates a 
continuation of the historical trend, with a decarbonization rate 
of about 0.4% per year, which is similar to the trend in the 
IS92a scenario (Pepper et a l . , 1992). 
The scenarios that are most intensive in the use of fossil fuels 
lead to practically no reduction in carbon intensity. The highest 
rates of decarbonization (up to 3.3% per year) are from 
scenarios that envision a complete transition to non-fossil 
sources of energy. 
Figure 2-12 illustrates the relationships between energy 
intensities of gross world product and carbon intensities of 
energy across the scenarios in the database. Both intensities 
are shown on logarithmic scales. The starting point is the base 
year 1990 normalized to an index (1990 = 100) for both 
intensities. Scenarios that unfold horizontally are pure 
decarbonization cases with littie structural change in the 
economy; scenarios that unfold vertically indicate reduction in 
the energy intensity of economic activities with littie change in 
the energy system. Most scenarios stay away from these 
extremes and develop a fan-shaped pattem - marked by both 
decarbonization and declining energy intensity - across the 
graph in Figure 2-12. 
The fan-shaped graph illustrates the notable differences in 
policies and structures of the global energy system among the 
scenarios. For example, in a number of scenarios 
decarbonization is achieved largely through energy efficiency 
improvements, while in others it is mainly the result of lower 
carbon intensity because of the vigorous substitution of fuels. 
A few scenarios follow a path opposite to the other scenarios: 
decarbonization of primary energy with decreasing energy 
efficiency until 2040. After 2040 the ratio of C O , per unit of 
primary energy increases - in other words, recarbonization. 
Figure 2-11: Global decarbonization of primary energy - historical development and future scenaiios, shown as an index (1990 
= 1). The median (50*), 5*, 25*, 75*, and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. Statistics associated with 
scenarios from the literature do not imply probability of occurrence. Data source: Nakicenovic, 1996; Morita and Lee, 1998. 
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Figure 2-12: Global decarbonization and 
deintensification of energy in the scenarios, 
1990 to 2100; energy and carbon intensities 
shown as an index (1990 = 1). Some of the 
scenarios are identified in the figure. Data 
source: Morita and Lee, 1998. 
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Figure 2-13: Global emissions scenarios in the database and their main driving forces. The minimum, maximum and median 
(50* percentile) values for 2100 are shown on seven axes of the heptagon based on the scenarios in the database. The seven 
axes show the ranges across the scenarios in 2100 of COj emissions in GtC, population in billions, gross world product in 
trilHon US dollars at 1990 prices, gross world product growth rates in percent per year, energy intensity in M J per US dollar at 
1990 prices, primary energy in ZJ (1000 EJ) and carbon intensity in tC per TJ. 
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2 . 4 . 1 2 . Comparison of Indicators 
Figure 2-13 illustrates the database distributions of COj , 
population, gross world product, primary energy, and carbon 
intensity of energy. The circles closest to the center denote the 
minimum value of the distribution; the solid circles denote the 
median value; and the shaded circles represml the maximum 
database value for each variable. While the values are 
connected in the form of a snowflake, it is important to note 
that those of a given range (e.g., minimum, median, and 
maximum), taken together, do not necessarily yield a 
consistent or logically possible scenario. As is shown in 
Chapter 4 (Figure 4-4), actual scenarios may fall into a median 
range on some axes and into a higher or lower range on others. 
Snowflake diagrams are useful because they allow the reader to 
see at a glance the full range of values encompassed by the 
database. Subsequent snowflake diagrams plot SRES scenario 
values on the vaiious axes to illustrate where the scenarios fall 
relative to the database minimum, median, and maximum 
values. Snowflake diagrams should be used only for purposes 
of scenario classification and interpretation and not for 
scenario design, since the latter could lead to logical 
inconsistencies. 
2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter a brief overview and evaluation of the emissions 
scenarios is presented. Much of the quantitative analysis of the 
emissions scenarios is based on the unique scenario database 
developed for SRES. This database, its structure, and the 
process of assembling the data that it now contains are 
described. The database provides a valuable overview of the 
various emissions modeling approaches and scenarios in the 
literature. It is the most comprehensive ESD available, and it 
can be accessed tlirough a website (www-cger.nies.go.jp 
/cger-e/db/ipcc.html). 
The SRES database represents the basis for evaluations of 
emissions scenarios, their main driving forces, and their 
uncertainty ranges. The C O , emissions trajectories of the 
scenarios in the SRES database are presented and their 
distribution and the associated sample statistics assessed. In the 
same way, the main driving forces of future emissions -
population, economic development and energy consumption -
are analyzed. Finally, the possible relationships among these 
driving forces for the collection of emissions scenarios in the 
database are considered. 
Future levels of C O , emissions from the energy sector are a 
function of population, gross world product, the structure and 
efficiency of the economy, and the costs and availabihty of 
different sources of energy. 
The factor range for population increases by 2100 across the 
scenarios is between 1.2 and 3.3 times 1990 levels (see Figure 
2-4). This is the smallest factor increase of all the emissions 
driving forces. This probably reflects a relatively high 
consensus among demographers as to future population 
growth. However, this observation is based on a relatively 
small number of reported population projections in the 
database (46). The range in projected gross world product 
values is between 3.2 and 35 times the 1990 levels (see Figure 
2-5). The range of the factor increase of primary energy 
consumption is from 0.9 to 10 times 1990 levels (see Figure 2-
8). For energy intensity the range in 2100 is from 9.3 MJ/LJS$ 
down to 2.3 MJ/US$. 
The range in carbon intensity of primary energy is the widest 
range of all the driving forces considered here. It varies from 
0.025 to l . I times 1990 levels (about a factor of 45) in the year 
2100 (see Figure 2-11). Emissions trajectories are extremely 
sensitive to a number of driving forces, which include 
including population growth, economic growth, and energy 
intensity improvement. Variation in carbon intensity is the 
main indicator of the wide variation in energy-related COj. 
However, it is important to recognize that this is a result of the 
inputs, assumptions, methods, and types of models used to 
calculate the scenarios. 
The findings of the analysis of the scenarios in the literature 
suggest the following general conclusions: 
• the ranges over which the driving forces vary are large, 
which contributes to the wide range of future 
emissions; 
• of these driving forces, gross world product and 
population are often exogenous, while carbon and 
energy intensity are not; 
• the frequency distributions of driving forces and 
emissions are asymmetric, with long tails and often 
more than one peak; 
• for many driving forces the median and mean are closer 
to the minimum than to the maximum; 
• lack of information as to whether climate intervention 
policies and measures were included in the scenarios, 
for about 40 scenarios, means that it is not possible to 
distinguish between intervention and non-intervention 
scenarios; 
• it is hoped that IPCC or another international institution 
will , in the futiu-e, maintain this or a similar .database so 
as to assure a continuity of knowledge and scientific 
progress in G H G emissions scenarios (an equivalent 
database to document narrative and other qualitative 
scenarios would also be very useful for future climate-
change assessments); and 
• it would be useful in the future to evaluate the 
consistency of the driving forces and results of all 
scenarios included in the scenario database. In addition, 
it would be helpful to extend the database to include 
land-use change data where currentiy only land-use 
emissions are presented. As noted above, only a small 
percentage of scenarios contain information on land 
use. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Some of the major driving forces of past and future 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which 
include demographics, economics, resources, technology, and 
(non-climate) policies, are reviewed in this chapter. Economic, 
social, and technical systems and their interactions are highly 
complex and only a limited overview is provided in this 
chapter. The discussion of major scenario driving forces herein 
is structured by considering the links from demography and 
the economy to resource use and emissions. A frequently used 
approach to organize discussion of the drivers of emissions is 
through the so-called IPAT identity, equation (3.1). 
I m p a c t = P o p u l a t i o n x A j f l u e n c e x T e c h n o l o g y (3.1) 
The IPAT identity states that environmental impacts (e.g., 
emissions) are the product of the level of population times 
affluence (income per capita, i.e. gross domestic product 
(GDP) divided by population) times the level of technology 
deployed (emissions per unit of income). The IPAT identity has 
been widely discussed in analyses of energy-related carbon 
dioxide (COj) emissions (e.g., Ogawa, 1991; Parikh et a l . , 
1991; Nakicenovic et a i , 1993; Parikh, 1994; Alcamo et a i , 
1995; Gaffin and O'Neill , 1997; Gürer and Ban, 1997; O'Neill 
et a l . , 2000), in which it is often refeiTcd to as the Kaya identity 
(Kaya, 1990), equation (3.2). 
C O 2 E m i s s i o n s = P o p u l a t i o n X ( G D P I P o p u l a t i o n ) X 
X ( E n e r g y / G D P ) X ( C O J E n e r g y ) 
The Kaya multiplicative identity also underlies the analysis of 
the emissions scenario literature (Chapter 2). It can be broken 
down into further subcomponents. For instance, the energy 
component can be decomposed into fossil and non-fossil 
shares, and emissions can be expressed as carbon emissions per 
unit of fossil energy, as shown in Figure 3-1 (Giirer and Ban, 
1997). A property of the multiplicative identity is that 
component growth rates are additive. For instance, global 
energy-related COj emissions since the middle of the 19* 
century are estimated to have increased by approximately 1.7% 
per year (Watson et a l , 1996). This growth rate can be 
decomposed roughly into a 3% growth in gross world product 
(the sum of a 1% growth in population and a 2% growth in per 
capita income) minus a 1% per year decline in the energy 
intensity of world GDP (the third term in equation (3.2)) and a 
decline in the carbon intensity of primary energy (the fourth 
term) of 0,3% per year (Nakicenovic et a l , 1993; Watson et a l , 
1996). 
While the Kaya identity above can be used to organize 
discussion of the primary driving forces of CO2 emissions and, 
by extension, emissions of other GHGs, there are important 
caveats. Most important, the four terms on the right-hand side 
of equation (3.2) should be considered neither as fundamental 
driving forces in themselves, nor as generally independent 
from each other. 
Global analysis is often not instructive and even misleading, 
because of the great heterogeneity among populations with 
respect to G H G emissions. The ratios of per capita emissions 
of the world's richest countries to those of its poorest countries 
approach several hundred (Parikh et a l , 1991; Engelman, 
1994). Of course, some level of aggregation is necessary. In 
practice, the models used to produce emissions scenarios in 
this report, for example, operate on the basis of 9-15 regions 
(see Appendix IV, Table IV-1). This level of detail isolates the 
most important differences, particularly with respect to 
industrial versus developing countries (Lutz, 1993). 
The spatial and temporal heterogeneity of emission growth that 
becomes masked in the global aggregates is shown in Figure 
3-1, in which the growth in energy-related COj emissions 
since 1970 is broken down into a number of subcomponents. 
For industrial countries the population growth has been modest 
and their emissions have evolved roughly in line with increases 
(or declines) in economic activity. For developing countries 
both population and income growth appear as important drivers 
of emissions. However, even in developing countries the 
regional heterogeneity becomes masked in the aggregate 
analysis (Griibler et a l , 1993a). 
Although, at face value, the IPAT and Kaya identities suggest 
that COj emissions grow linearly with population increases, 
this depends on the real (or modeled) interactions between 
demographics and economic growth (see Section 3.2) as well 
as on those between technology, economic structure, and 
affluence (Section 3.3). In principle, such interactions preclude 
a simple linear interpretation of the role of population growth 
in emissions. 
Demographic development interacts in many ways with social 
and economic development. Fertility and mortality trends 
depend, among other things, on education, income, social 
norms, and health provisions. In turn, these determine the size 
and age composition of the population. Many of these factors 
combined are recognized as necessary to explain long-run 
productivity, economic growth, economic structure, and 
technological change (Barro, 1997). In turn, long-run per 
capita economic growth and structural change are closely 
linked with advances in knowledge and technological change. 
In fact, long-run growth accounts (e.g., Solow, 1956; Denison, 
1962, 1985; Maddison, 1989, 1995; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 
1995) confirm that advances in knowledge and technology may 
be the most important reason for long-run economic growth; 
more important even than growth in other factors of production 
such as capital and labor. Abramovitz (1993) demonstrates that 
capital and labor productivity cannot be treated as independent 
from technological change. Therefore, it is not possible to treat 
the affluence and technology variables in IPAT as independent 
of each other. 
Pollution abatement efforts appear to increase with income, 
growing willingness to pay for a clean environment, and 
progress in the development of clean technology. Thus, as 
incomes rise, pollution should increase initially and later 
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Figure 3-1: Historical trends in energy-related C O , emissions 
("carbon emissions" shown as bold gray line) and broken down 
into the components of emission growth; growth or declines of 
population, gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power 
parities (PPPs), energy use per unit of GDP (Energy/GDP), 
share of renewables in energy use (Renewable energy/Energy), 
and carbon intensity per fossil energy (Carbon/Fossil energy) 
since 1970, in million tons elemental carbon (MtC). From top 
to bottom; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD90, countries that belong to the OECD as 
of 1990), former USSR (FSU), Developing Countries (ASIA 
and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (ALM)), and 
Worid. Source; Gürer and Ban, 1997. 
decline, a relationship often retened to as the "environmental 
Kuznets curve." This process seems well established for 
traditional pollutants, such as particulates and sulfur (e.g., 
Worid Bank, 1992; Kato, 1996; Viguier, 1999), and there have 
been some claims that it might apply to G H G emissions. 
Schmalensee et a l . (1998) found that COj emissions have 
flattened and may have reversed for highly developed 
economies such as the US and Japan. Other researchers argue 
that the Kuznets curve does not apply to G H G emissions 
(Pearce, 1995; Galeotti and Lanza, 1999, Viguier, 1999). The 
flattening in emissions can be explained by normal market 
processes and does not appeal' to result from a willingness to 
pay to protect the global environment. Urbanization, 
infrastructure, poverty, and income distribution are other 
factors in the complex 1п1еф1ау between population, economy, 
and environment (see, e.g., Rotmans and de Vries, 1997; de 
Vries et a i , 1999; O'Neil l et a l , 2000). 
Technological, economic, and social innovation have long been 
means by which a greater number of people can live from the 
same environmental resources. The best known historical 
examples of major periods of innovation include the Neolithic 
revolution (beginnings of organized agriculture from around 
10,000 years ago); and the industrial revolution that began two 
centuries ago (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). In each case, 
changes in patterns of primary production (food, energy, 
materials) are linked to changes in social organization, 
institutions, economy, and technology (e.g., Mumford, 1934; 
Campbell, 1959; Landes, 1969; Hi l l , 1975; Wilber, 1981; 
Buchanan, 1992; Reynolds and Cutcliffe, 1997). The most 
remarkable change in recent decades is the so-called 
demographic transition, which has led to a stabilization of 
population in many parts of the world. No single one of these 
changes can be considered as the primary driver, and they 
cannot be considered as independent from each other; each 
play a role in an interconnected system. 
Most innovative efforts in the past two centuries were devoted 
to improving labor productivity and the human ability to 
harness resources for economic purposes. While material and 
energy efficiency improved slowly, economic growth was 
faster and thus aggregate resource use increased. 
Finally, and importantly, the high uncertainty with regard to the 
nature and extent of the relationships between driving forces of 
G H G emissions means that, with current knowledge, it is not 
possible to develop probabilistic future emission scenarios. 
Even if it were possible to derive (subjective) probability 
distributions of the future evolution of individual scenario 
driving-force variables (like population, economic growth, or 
technological change), the nature of their relationships is 
known only qualitatively at best or remains uncertain (and 
controversial) in many instances. 
The next five sections review the major driving forces of GHG 
emissions within the IPAT identity. Section 3.2 discusses the 
role of population. Section 3.3 addresses economic and social 
development processes (including technological change), 
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Section 3.4 examines energy resources and tecimology in more 
detail, and Section 3.5 addresses agriculture, forestry, and land-
use change. Section 3.6 considers other sources of П О П - С О 2 
GHÍGs. The chapter concludes with a discussion of non-climate 
policies and their potential impact on the principal driving 
forces of future emissions. Each section briefly reviews past 
trends, available scenarios, and important new methodological 
and empirical advances since the publication of previous 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emissions 
scenarios in 1992 (IS92). This chapter provides the background 
to establish recommendations for the range of driving-force 
variables to be explored in the new set of scenarios. The 
available literature and current understanding of the inherent 
uncertainties in developing very long-term scenarios are 
reflected. Each section elucidates in detail the important 
relationships between scenario driving forces, as the question 
of relationships is a new and important mandate for SRES. 
Nonetheless, most attention is paid to the possible relationships 
between population and economic growth, because this is the 
area most intensively discussed in the literature. 
3.2. Population 
3 . 2 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Population projections are arguably the backbone of G H G 
emissions scenarios, and are comparable in some ways with 
them. Population projections cover timeframes of a century or 
more, and they involve social and economic considerations and 
uncertainties similar to those in G H G emissions scenarios. 
Population projections are among the most commonly cited 
indicators of the future state of the world. Compared to the 
multitude of projection efforts they have a relatively high 
accuracy in the near-to-medium term. Even so the future is 
always unknowable and surprises are in store, as confirmed by 
a cursory review of the past history of population projections in 
which fundamental events were largely unforeseen (post-
World War II baby boom, acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) or the recent rapidity of fertility decline in 
developing countries)). 
To be useful for the development of emissions scenarios, 
population projections need a timeframe of a century or more. 
global coverage and regional disaggregations, and an 
appropriate treatment of uncertainty reflected in the variants of 
the projections. Although other "demographic units" more 
immediately linked to G H G emissions than people, such as 
automobiles or households, can be considered, the integrated 
assessment models used in this report are all based on regional 
population and, in some cases, labor-force projections. 
3 . 2 . 2 . Past Population Trends 
World annual population growth rates probably averaged less 
than 0.6% during the 18* and 19"^  centuries, passed the 1% rate 
around 1920, and peaked at 2.04% in the late 1960s (UN, 
1998). This peak coincided with growing international concern 
about population growth in general. World population reached 
1 billion in 1804, 2 billion in 1927, 3 billion in I960, 4 billion 
in 1974, and 5 billion in 1987, reaching the 6 bilhon level 
shortly before the millenium (UN, 1998). 
The population of the developing regions increased from 1.71 
bilUon in 1950 to 4.59 billion in 1996, with annual growth rates 
dropping from a peak of 2.5% in 1965 to 1.7% presently. The 
population of the more-developed regions increased from 813 
million to 1.18 billion over the same period, with annual 
growth rates dropping from 1.2% in 1950 to 0.4% presenfly 
(UN, 1998). Population distribution and growth thus differ 
markedly among major geographic regions. Latin America and 
the Caribbean was the fastest growing region between 1950 
and 1970, followed by Africa, and this is projected to remain 
the case until 2050 (UN, 1998). Table 3-1 shows the population 
levels of the major geographic areas between 1800 and the 
present. 
3 . 2 . 3 . Population Scenarios 
3 . 2 . 3 . 1 . P o p u l a t i o n P r o j e c t i o n s Used i n E m i s s i o n S c e i t a r i o s 
Since the IPCC was first convened in 1988, its Working Group 
III has generated two distinct series of emissions scenarios; the 
1990 Scientific Assessment (SA90) series of four scenarios 
(Houghton et a l . , 1990), and the IS92 series of six scenarios 
(Houghton et a l . , 1992, 1995; Pepper et a i , 1992). The four 
Table 3 - 1 : P o p u l a t i o n of t h e w o r l d a n d by m a j o r areas between 1 8 0 0 a n d 1 9 9 6 i n m i l l i o i t s . D a t a s o u r c e : UN, 1 9 9 8 . 
1800 1850 1900 1950 1996 
World 978 1262 1650 2524 5768 
Africa 107 111 133 224 739 
Asia 635 809 947 1402 3488 
Europe 203 276 408 547 729 
Latin America and Caribbean 24 38 74 166 484 
Northern America 7 26 82 172 299 
Oceania 2 2 6 13 29 
1 0 8 S c e n a r i o D r i v i n g F o r c e s 
SA90 scenarios all used the same median population projection 
- the World Bank 1987 projection (Zachariah and Vu, 1988). 
The IS92a-f series made use of three different projection 
variants, the World Bank (World Bank, 1991) 1991 projection 
and the United Nations (UN, 1992) 1992 medium-high and 
medium-low projections. 
Wexler (1996) surveyed the world population projections used 
in G H G emissions scenarios since 1990. Of the models 
surveyed, all but one employed the World Bank central 
projections. The sole exception - the DICE model of 
Nordhaus (1993; Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983) - used 
algorithmic projections based on assumed declining 
population growth rates. As noted in Chapter 2, many long-
term emission scenarios available in the literature do not even 
report their underlying population projections. In general. 
World Bank projections have been more heavily employed 
than the U N projections, apparently because of the shorter 
time horizon and longer cycle time of the U N Long Range 
projections. U N Revisions until 1994 extended only to 2025 
(now to 2050), which is too short for emissions scenarios. The 
U N Long Range series is revised less frequently, with a six-
year interval between the previous two U N Long Range 
projections. The World Bank, in contrast, updates its published 
projection every two years, and it has always been a long-
range projection, out to year 2150. In addition, the World Bank 
maintains a country-level disaggregation throughout its 
projection, unlike the U N Long Range series, which switches 
to a nine-region summary. 
In 1994, however, the World Bank discontinued the publication 
of population projections, even if these continue to be 
generated for internal uses. In contrast to the past dominance of 
World Bank projections, the SRES scenario series instead 
employs published projections from the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) along with the UN's 
Medium Long Range projection. 
3 . 2 . 3 . 2 . C u r r e n t i y A v a i l a b l e P o p u l a t i o n P r o j e c t i o n s 
World population projections are currently generated by the 
following institutions: 
• United States Census Bureau (USCB); 
• World Bank; 
• U N ; and 
• IIASA. 
The main defining characteristics of the individual projections 
and a detailed description of each projection is given in Gaffin 
(1998). 
Figure 3-2 displays these latest world population numbers from 
all four demographic organizations. Two of the four 
projections, from the World Bank and USCB, contain only one 
central estimate and are unpublished. Tliese are generated 
currently for internal organizational purposes and are not 
further considered here. 
The only population projections that cun^ently )псофога1е 
variation of the long-range fertility rates are those produced by 
U N and IIASA (Gaffin, 1998). For the U N , these variants 
result in four additional projections to the U N medium 
projection and are referred to as "low," "medium low," 
"medium high" and "high." The designations reflect the 
average world fertility rate relative to the medium projection. 
For IIASA, the primary variants also refer to world average 
fertility (and mortality) rate relative to the medium projection 
and are referred to in Figure 3-2 as "high" and "low." 
The central projections in Figure 3-3 show excellent agreement 
over the next 100 years, with the exception of the "overshoot" 
in the IIASA projection, discussed below. Although significant, 
such an agreement does not imply certainty or accuracy. 
Rather, it reflects the use of similar methodologies and 
U N 98 High 
IIASA High 
- D - U N 96 High 
- K - U N 96 Low 
U N 98 Medium High 
— 0 — U N 96 Medium 
— Л — US Census 
- o — IIASA Medium 
U N 98 Medium 
_ 4 . . World Banlc 
- Ф — IIASA Low 
U N 98 Medium Low 
U N 98 Low 
2000 2050 2100 2150 
Figure 3-2: Most recent world population projections from the four mam demographic organizations, including high and low 
variants. Two of the projections (USCB and World Bank) will not be published. Variations in future world populations are 
largely determined by different assumptions concerning the demographic transition in developing countries as well as long-
range fertility rates worldwide. 
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Figure 3-3: Central projections extracted from Figure 3-2 show excellent agreement among the central projections over the 
next 100 years (with the possible exception of the IIASA projection). 
databases, the dominance of population momentum associated 
with a young population age structure, and the assumption of 
replacement-level fertility in the long term. 
Figure 3-4 shows the breakdown of population growth 
projections in industrial countries (IND) and developing 
countries (DEV) as defined by the U N . The key conclusion to 
draw from Figure 3-4 is the dominance of the D E V population 
on future world population growth. 
The most important variable to detennine future population 
levels is fertility. To a lesser extent, future population also 
depends on mortality and migration rates. Figure 3-5 shows the 
world-average total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of 
births per woman, assumed for the various projections. 
Overall, a fairly broad range of assumptions about future world 
average fertility is encompassed by the projections. Future 
population size is very sensitive (see Figure 3-2) to 
comparatively small changes in the long-range fertility rate. 
For example, within the U N projections, a decrease of the 
asymptotic fertility rate of less than half-a-birth per woman 
(from 2.1 to 1.7) decreases population in 2100 by 46% (UN, 
1998). Only the replacement-level fertility of about 2.1 results 
in a stable population in the long run. 
Such sensitivity to small asymptotic fertility-rate changes 
indicates the high and low projections from U N and IIASA are 
all feasible scenarios of the future population (Gaffin and 
O'Neil l , 1998). 
Up to 2050, the IIASA central TFR is high compared with the 
U N and World Bank central projection. Later the IIASA central 
TFR dechnes to below replacement-level feitility rate, as 
depicted in Figure 3-5. As a result, the IIASA central forecast 
lies considerably above ail the others throughout the 21'*' 
century. After that, IIASA's below-replacement, long-term 
a 
> ^ 
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— £¡ a ^ о 
s a, о 
-b- UN 96 DEV 
IIASADEV 
- o - U S C B D E V 
- 0 - WB DEV 
_ u _ UN 96 IND 
— IIASAIND 
- o - USCBIND 
- - 0 - WBIND 
2000 2050 2100 2150 
Figure 3-4: Industrial (IND) and developing (DEV) countries' population projections from the medium (central) variants. Note 
that regional definitions differ in IIASA compared to U N projections. 
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Figure 3-5: Projected world average TFRs from the U N , IIASA, and World Bank. The older 1994 World Bank projections are 
shown, because the latest (1996) projection methodology is not published. USCB fertility rates are not readily available and so 
are omitted. U N fertility assumptions are shown only for the 1996 Revision as full detail of the 1998 data were unavailable at 
the time of drafting this report. 
fertility assumption causes the projection to decline and to 
"hit" the World Bank and U N curves in 2100. This "overshoot" 
occurs because the IIASA central scenario assumptions rely on 
an expert poll conducted in 1993 (Lutz, 1994), whereas other 
projections incorporate more recent information into their 
future assumptions (more rapid recent fertility declines in 
many developing countries; see Courbage, 1998). However, 
among demographers disagreement persists on the timing and 
rates of demographic transition in the developing countries, in 
particular- between the demographers at IIASA and those at the 
U N and World Bank (see the discussion in Lutz, 1994) on the 
differences among altemative population projections). This 
disagreement reflects important uncertainties in the projection 
of future demographic developments. The beiow-replacement, 
long-term fertility level in the IIASA central estimate is a 
hallmark of the institute's work. Demographers at IIASA 
strongly adhere to the view that there is little reason to expect 
developed nations to return to replacement-level fertility, while 
much evidence suggests that low long-term rates will persist 
(Lutz et a i , 1996). One issue here, however, is that the TFR 
measure is currently depressed in Europe, in part because 
women are delaying their childbearing until later ages 
(Bongaarts, 1998). Thus, the TFR may rise if these women do 
have children, and such a conection has to be incoфol•ated into 
the long-term TFR assumptions (e.g., see Courbage, 1998). 
Important uncertainties are by how fast and how much the TFR 
will rise. 
3 . 2 . 3 3 . Recent D e v e l o p m e n t s i n D e m o g r a p h i c P r o j e c t i o n s 
3 . 2 . 3 . 3 . 1 . D o w n w a r d r e v i s i o n s i n p o p u l a t i o n p r o j e c t i o n s 
The U N 1996 Revision generated substantial press attention in 
1997 because it f o r e c a s t nearly 500 million fewer people in 
2050 than it had in 1994. The base year of data for the U N 1996 
Revision is 1995, whereas in the 1994 Revision fertility. 
mortality, and migration rates for 1995 are forecast. The 
reduction in the population projection largely results from 
more accurate data available for 1995 (UN, 1997b, 1997c). The 
major change was the lower-than-anticipated world average 
fertility of 2.96 children per woman during the period 
1990-1995, as compared with 3.10 children per woman 
assumed in the 1994 Revision. The main reason for this 
decrease is a faster-than-anticipated decline in fertility in a 
number of couniries in south central Asia, Bangladesh and 
India, and Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya, and Rwanda (UN, 
1997c). Other important regional declines in fertility also took 
place in Brazil, the former Soviet republics, and the newly 
independent states in eastern and southern Europe (Haub, 
1997). Higher-than-anticipated mortality rates in a number of 
countries afflicted by wars and the spread of AIDS also 
contributed to the downward population revision. 
3 . 2 . 3 . 3 . 2 . D e m o g r a p h i c i m p a c t of t h e H I V a n d A I D S e p i d e m i c 
Both the U N and the Wofld Health Organization (WHO) 
conduct ongoing surveys of the global HIV (human 
immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS epidemic. The most recent 
surveys indicate that at the beginning of 1998 30.6 million 
people were infected with HIV, the vhus that causes AIDS, and 
11.7 million people have already lost their lives to the disease 
(UNAIDS and WHO, 1998). 
Since the impact of HIV and AIDS on mortality rates is 
greatest in the sub-Saharan region, the impact of the epidemic 
on population growth will be greatest there. One study 
(Bongaarts, 1996) suggests that by 2005 the annual population 
growth rates (expressed as "persons increase per thousand 
population") in sub-Saharan Africa will be about 1.4 persons 
per thousand lower than would have occurred in the absence of 
the disease. Other regions, however, will experience a much 
smaller impact in population growth so that the AIDS-related 
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deficit in world population growth rate will be only -0.4 
persons per thousand in 2005. The reason for the modest 
impact is that birth rates in many developing countries are 
much higher than the death rates, so the AIDS increase in 
mortality only partially offsets this larger difference. 
3 . 2 . 3 . 3 3 . The c o r r e l a t i o n between f e r t i l i t y a n d m o r t a l i t y 
In the recently published IIASA population projections (Lutz, 
1996), the correlations of fertility and mortality rates are also 
different to those of the U N projections. Within IIASA the 
main scenarios are labeled "central," "rapid transition," "slow 
transition," "high," and "low." In the two "transition" scenarios, 
mortality rates and fertility rates are correlated so that low or 
high mortality accompanies low or high fertility, respectively, 
in line with conventional wisdom among demographers that 
fertility declines are associated with mortality declines. This 
correlation narrows the range of projected population size as 
compared with an anticorrelation assumption. The "high" and 
"low" scenarios, by contrast, anticorrelate mortality and 
fertility and are considered quite unlikely. 
3 . 2 . 3 . 3 . 4 . P r o b a b i l i s t i c p o p u l a t i o n p r o j e c t i o n s 
Another recent development in demographic projections is that 
of probabilistic scenarios. Lutz et a l . (1997) consider, based on 
their probabilistic population projections, a doubling of world 
population unlikely. Their scenarios use fertility, mortality, and 
migration rate assumptions based on a Gaussian fit to a survey 
of demographic experts who were asked to give a range of rates 
for each region that they considered to cover the 90* percentile 
probability range. Given the Gaussian cui-ve fits to the expert 
data, a Monte Carlo simulation was run to generate 4000 
scenarios, with five-year timesteps, which have a probability 
distribution attached to them. The branch points in the fertility, 
mortality, and net migration rate curves, based on the expert 
data, were set in 1995, 2000,2030, and 2080. The probabilistic 
projections extend to 2100. The 5* and 95* percentile intervals 
are between 6.7 to 15.6 billion people by 2100, a range that 
usefully covers current knowledge on the uncertainty of future 
world population levels to be considered in SRES. It should be 
noted that such probability assignments derived from expert 
opinion are inherently subjective and do not necessarily 
suggest a corresponding likelihood of future оссштепсе. 
3 . 2 . 4 . Other Aspects of P o p u l a t i o n : A g i n g and 
U r b a n i z a t i o n 
3 . 2 . 4 . 1 . A g i n g 
Population aging has widely discussed implications for social 
planning, health care, labor force structural changes, and 
entitlement programs. As shown in Figure 3-6, percentage 
growth in the elderly age cohorts is predicted strongly by all 
projections. The figure shows the percentage of elderly age 
cohorts using the medium projection data. Importantiy, it will 
be a continuous process over the entire 2P ' century, even 
though total population size is forecast in these cases to 
stabilize during the latter half of the century. 
The detailed economic effects of such a profound and rapid 
change in social structure are not well understood (Eberstadt, 
1997). The problem is considered below in the discussion of 
the impact of population dynamics on economic development. 
In short, conventional wisdom takes a more or less neutral view 
of the effect of population growth, including the impacts of 
aging, on the rate of economic growth (Hammer, 1985; Kelley, 
1988; National Research Council, 1986). Lowered population 
growth rates (and concomitant aging) might have a beneficial 
effect on the economy through reduced youth dependency 
ratios, which result in higher savings rates (Higgins and 
Williamson, 1997). Also, population aging could reduce labor 
supply and thus reduce potential economic growth. Against this 
argument, labor scarcity induces higher wages that in tum are 
a powerful incentive to increase labor productivity. Increasing 
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Figure 3-6: Percentage of world population over 60 or 65 years of age with time for the central scenarios. The World Bank data 
are from 1994 (Bos et a l . , 1994) because the results from 1996 are not published. The USCB data are from McDevitt (1996). 
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productivity (per capita economic output) would balance 
shortfalls from possible reductions in the labor force (Disney, 
1996) . However, lowered fertility and mortality rates will also 
cause the elderly dependency ratio to increase, which might 
lead to a trend of lower savings, characteristic of elderly 
cohorts, which have a reduced incentive to save. In terms of 
public savings, without institutional reforms aging could 
eventually lead to severe strains on social security and health 
care programs supported by governments and thus to reduced 
goventmental savings (US Council of Economic Advisors, 
1997) . 
Interestingly, a case has been made that aging may have 
significant impacts on future CO2 emissions. The suggested 
mechanism for this relates to household formation rate 
(MacKellar et a l . , 1995). An aging population has a greater 
proportion of people in older age groups. Assuming age-
specific household foimation rates remain constant over time, 
as more people enter the older age cohorts the overall 
household formation rates will increase. This increase will be 
accompanied by a decline in the number of people per 
household (a process already observed in industrialized 
countries) and is related to reduced fertility rates. As small 
households consume significantly more energy per person than 
large households (Ironmonger et a l . , 1995), the various effects 
suggest COj emissions will increase with increased aging 
(MacKellar et a l . , 1995). Important uncertainties of this effect 
remain, not least because household formation rates of aging 
populations are not well understood. 
3 . 2 . 4 . 2 . U r b a n i z a t i o n 
Urbanization is also a strongly anticipated demographic trend. 
Since 1970, most urban growth has taken place in developing 
countries. It is caused by both intemal increases of the existing 
urban population and rural-to-urban migration (UN, 1997b). 
Urbanization, though, is not a rigorously modeled phenomenon 
within the projections. Essentially, future urban and rural 
growth and decline rates are simply assumed and applied to the 
projected population levels. Thus, the projections contain no 
explicit feedback mechanism from urbanization to population 
growth, even though urbanization is an important factor in 
fertility rate changes (urban populations generally have lower 
fertility rates than rural populations). Instead, urbanization 
rates are considered implicitiy within the projections of future 
fertility. It is estimated that by 2010 more than half of the 
world's population wil l live in urban areas (UN, 1996). 
Urbanization will lead to a rapid expansion of infrastructure 
and especially transportation uses (Wexler, 1996). In addition, 
urban households in developing countries use significantiy 
more fossil fuels, as opposed to biofuels, than do rural 
households. However, the choice of fuel is predominantly an 
income effect rather than a function of locale (see Murthy et 
a i , 1997), even within urban settings. Hence, urbanization 
exerts its influence on emissions primarily via higher urban 
incomes compared to rural ones. Generally, opportunities for 
higher income are considered an important driver of rural-to-
urban migration, and so contribute to rising urbanization rates 
(HABITAT, 1996). Urbanization is obviously an important 
factor for future G H G emissions. 
3.2.5. Relationships 
3 . 2 . 5 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Within the caveats in Section 3.1, a number of demographic 
studies show that population change does exert a strong first-
order scaling effect on CO^ emissions models (O'Neill, 1996; 
Gaffin and O'Neill , 1997; O'Neil l et a l . , 2000; Wexler, 1996). 
These studies support the notion that population growth and 
the policies that affect it are key factors for future emissions. 
Balanced against this, however, are other studies that take a 
more skeptical view (Kolsrud and Torrey, 1992; Birdsall, 1994; 
Preston, 1996). A full review of model results that address this 
question is given in O'Neil l (1996) and Gaffin and O'Neill 
(1997) and is not be reproduced here because of space 
limitations (for a review see Gaffin, 1998). In essence, the 
controversy is one of the relationships between population 
growth and economic development, as well as other salient 
factors that influence emissions. These relationships were first 
discussed within the context of IPCC emissions scenarios by 
Alcamo et a l . (1995) and are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
3 . 2 . 5 . 2 . The Effect of E c o n o m i c G r o w t h o n P o p u l a t i o n 
G r o w t h 
Figure 3-7 shows the long-established negative coirelation 
between fertility rates and per capita income. Clearly, richer 
countries uniformly have a relatively low fertility rate. Poorer 
countries, o n a v e r a g e , have a higher fertility rate. Lower 
fertility, however, does exist in some poor countries or regions, 
which illustrates the importance of social and institutional 
structures. 
Barro (1997) reports a statistically significant cortelation 
between per capita G D P growth and the variables life 
expectancy and fertility in his analysis of post-1960 growth 
performance of 100 countries. Other things being equal, 
growth rates correlate positively (higher) with increasing life 
expectancy and negatively (lower) widi high fertility, which 
confiims the view that the affluent live longer and have fewer 
children. 
Figure 3-7, a snapshot of many counûies passing through the 
"demographic fertility transition" can be explained from both 
economic and socio-demographic points of view (Easterlin, 
1978). Economically, Figure 3-7 can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the s u b s t i t u t i o n that families make - away from 
having children and toward consuming more goods and 
services. With greater wealth, both goods and services become 
increasingly available as part of the families' "basket of 
choices" for consumption and, accordingly, they shift away 
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Figure 3-7: TFRs in 1995 versus GDP per capita in US 
dollars at 1995 prices for most of the world's countries. Data 
source: World Bank, 1997b. 
from higher fertility to lower fertility. This move is further 
prompted by the rising relative costs of childcare, which 
include preferences that increase a child's quality of life, such 
as better schooling and extracurricular activities. 
This income effect is primarily interpreted with respect to 
fertility changes in currently developing countries. In currently 
industrial countries, any change of fertility in response to 
increasing wealth is likely to be different from and probably 
even opposite to that of developing countries' feitility. Indeed, 
there is evidence of this in Eastem Europe, Sweden, Russia, and 
(recently) the United States (UN, 1997a), and it is linked to the 
question of long-term fertility rates in industrial countries (see 
Section 3.2.3.2.). However, it is evident that future world 
population levels will be dominated by growth in developing 
countries. Thus, if it is accepted that fertility is lower with 
greater affluence, then in emissions scenarios lower populations 
will still tend to cortelate with higher per capita incomes. 
Another countervailing factor is that mortality rates should also 
decline with wealth; as an isolated effect, this obviously results 
in higher population levels. However, the combined impact of 
both fertility and mortality reduction on population size is a net 
reduction in population levels (Lutz, 1996). 
From a demographic point of view, the primary effect seen in 
Figure 3-7 is interpreted as infant and child mortality decline 
with increasing affluence. Families, in a sense, have to use 
birth control to achieve their desired number, which has always 
been lower than fertility rates. Increased affluence results in 
increased knowledge of, access to, and use of birth control, and 
accordingly families shift their reproductive behavior to lower 
fertility rates. Accompanying this basic premise is a host of 
complex social changes, including increased opportunities for 
education, employment, and non-maternal roles for women. 
Incorporation of the inverse relationship between economic 
and population growth in long-term emission scenarios is 
recent and mostly carried out in a qualitative way. Alcamo et 
a l . (1995) reviews the literature available up to 1994. 
Nakicenovic et a l . (1998a) report a long-term scenario study in 
which timing and extent of economic catch-up in developing 
countries were found to be tied to timing and pace of their 
demographic transition. Pattems of the range of per capita 
G D P growth rates for developing countries available in the 
literature (and given in Figure 3-10) also appear to reflect this 
relationship. Growth trends for the period 2020-2050 are 
generally higher than those for earlier or later periods; it is in 
this period that, according to demographic projections, the 
fastest change in demographic variables (especially fertility) 
will take place. 
3 . 2 . 6 . Conclusions 
From the available population projections, only those from the 
U N and IIASA fulfill the characteristics needed for use in 
long-term emission scenarios. First, the U N and IIASA data 
are published and available in the public domain, and second 
(more importantly) the scenarios consider uncertainty by 
developing more than just one, central demographic 
projection. 
We use the medium U N projections in the SRES emissions 
scenarios because they have greater recognition internationally, 
and garner considerable attention as evident from the press 
focus devoted to the 1996 Revision (mentioned above). In 
addition, the U N assumption of replacement-level fertility in 
the long term, in contrast to the IIASA below-replacement 
assumption, is an important normative approach widely used 
heretofore in projections. 
The rapid and slow demographic transition variants from 
IIASA projections remain attractive as the "high" and "low" 
population variants to be considered for the new IPCC 
emissions scenarios. The incorporation of a correlation 
between mortality rates and fertility (Lutz, 1996) is a logical 
first-order relationship not used in previous population variants 
and, in particular, not a feature of the U N variants. The two 
IIASA variants also represent well the uncertainty range as 
spanned by the probabilistic projections of Lutz et a l . (1997), 
which represent an important methodological advance in the 
field. As shown in Figure 3-2, the resultant IIASA population 
range falls within the range of the U N projections. 
Based on the above recommendations, Figure 3-8 compares the 
older IS92 population range with the population range 
described in this section. The population projections in IS92 
scenarios comprise the U N 1992 medium-high and 
medium-low variants for the high and low ranges with the 
World Bank 1991 projection as the central case. As seen in 
Figure 3-8, the new range for SRES is somewhat narrower and 
lower than the IS92 range. The cause is partly the positive 
correlation between mortality rates and fertility rates within the 
IIASA variants, which mildly offset each other in terms of 
future population size. Another reason is the recent downward 
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Figure 3-8: Compaj-ison of the IS92 population range (dashed lines) with the population range adopted for SRES (solid lines), 
which uses the two IIASA variants (low, high) and the U N 1998 Long Range medium projection. The correspondence to the 
four SRES scenario families ( A l , A2, B l and B2) is also shown. Generally, the new range is narrower and has significantly 
lower medium and high variant population levels, reflecting recent advances in demographic projections. Also for compai-ison, 
the probabilistic range of world population projections given by Lutz et a l . (1997) is shown. 
revision of the U N medium projection compared to earlier U N 
scenarios (as outlined above). 
The literature suggests a general inverse correlation between 
economic growth rates and population growth rates. Higher 
economic growth rates in developing countries should correlate 
with lower population growth rates in long-term scenarios and 
vice versa, because of the importance of economic 
development in bringing about the demographic fertility 
transition. This represents a distinctive change from the IS92 
trajectories. Importantly, there is still no quantitative basis for 
associating any p a r t i c u l a r economic growth curve with a 
particular population curve; this is a qualitative negative 
correlation only. Even more important is that income is not 
necessarily the best predictor of future fertility rates and many 
countries are currently moving through the demographic 
transition without a clear economic cause. Alternatively, some 
countries have failed to begin a fertility decline even though 
economic and social conditions have improved (e.g., Sathar 
and Casteriine, 1998). 
The inclusion of a household demographic unit, in addition to 
population, should be encouraged in future studies. The effect 
is linked to a strongly predicted demographic trend - aging. 
Also important are that smaller households are more energy 
intensive, per person, and that aging may continue to increase 
more rapidly than population in the future. These factors may 
increase COj emissions (MacKellar et a l . , 1995), although 
senior citizens group-living is a tendency in some 
industrialized countries. Urbanization might also have a strong 
effect on emissions because of its effect on income distribution 
and thus energy consumption pattems around the world, 
although many of these effects are included implicitly in the 
models and parameters used in this report. 
3.3. Economic and Social Development 
3 3 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Economic and social development comprises many dimensions 
and a number of indicators have been devised to assess 
progress and setbacks in human development (see Box 3-1). 
The U N defines development as the furthering of human 
choices. Such choices are neither finite nor static. Yet, 
regardless of the level of development, the three essential 
choices are to have access to the resources needed for a decent 
standard of living, to lead a long and healthy life, and to 
acquire knowledge (UNDP, 1997). Other valued choices range 
from political, economic, and social freedom to opportunities 
for being creative and productive, and to enjoy human rights 
(UNDP 1997). 
Arguably, choices are only possible once basic human needs 
for food, shelter, health care, safety, and education have been 
met. Poverty is therefore an important indicator of the absence 
of satisfactory economic development. Alleviation of poverty 
is an essential prerequisite for human development. Beyond the 
satisfaction of basic needs, the issue of what constitutes 
"development" involves many cultural, social, and economic 
dimensions that cannot be resolved by scientific methods, but 
are inherently a question of values, preferences, and policies. 
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Box 3-1: On Measures of Human and Economic Development 
Writing 220 years ago in The W e a l t h of N a t i o n s , Adam Smith noted that: "whatever the soil, climate, or extent of territory of 
any particular nation, the abundance or scantmess of its annual output fundamentally depends on its human resources - the skill, 
dexterity, and judgement of its labour" (Smith, 1970). Although economists recognized the importance of land, labor, and 
capital m explaining economic growth and national wealth, in the post-World War II period national well-being has usually been 
measured by GDP or gross national product (GNP). GDP is defined as the monetary equivalent of all products and services 
generated in a given economy in a given year. GNP equals GDP plus the net balance of mtemational payments to and from that 
economy. Few questions were asked about the underlying resource base for GDP growth and whether or not it was sustainable. 
Further, since GDP does not reflect all economic transactions it does not provide a full measure of human well-being. 
Nevertheless, GDP is very widely used because it is universally accepted as the monetary indicator of all products and services 
generated in a given economy within a given year. 
Environmental and Social Modiñcations to GDP 
More recently, several new approaches have been developed to address the inherent shortcomings of GDP measures. These 
include "green" national accounts that incorporate the role of the stocks and flows of renewable and non-renewable resources, 
and the related concept of genuine savings (UN, 1993). "Green" GDP is the informal name given to national income measures 
that are adjusted for the depletion of natural resources and degradation of the environment. The types of adjustment made to 
standard GDP include a measure of the user costs of exploiting natural resources and a value for the social costs of pollution 
emissions. In terms of measuring the sustainability of development, the green accounting aggregate with the most policy 
relevance is "genume savmg." This represents the value of the net change in assets that are important for development -
produced assets, natural resources, environmental quality, foreign assets, and human resources, which include rehjms to 
education and raw labor and the strength and scope of social mstituiions. Human resources Ш т out, not unexpectedly, to be the 
dominant form of wealth in the majority of countries (World Bank, 1997a). 
Purchasing Power Parities 
A further problem arises in intemational comparisons, in which economic indicators are converted from local currencies into a 
common currency, such as dollars. Traditionally, market exchange rates are used to make these conversions. In theory, exchange rates 
adjust so that the local currency prices of a group of identical goods and services represent equivalent value in every nation. In 
practice, such adjustments can lag far behind changing economic chcumstances. Policies, such as currency controls, may further 
distort the accuracy of market-based rates. Moreover, many goods and services are not traded internationally so market-based 
exchange rates may not reflect the relative values of such goods and services, even in theory. An alternative approach is based on 
estimates of the purchasing power of different currencies. The Intemational Comparison Project compared prices for several hundred 
goods and services in a large number of countries. On the basis of this comparison, the relative values of local currencies are adjusted 
to reflect PPP (see UNDP, 1993). In effect, the PPP currency values reflect the number of units of a country's currency required to 
buy the same quantity of comparable goods and services in the local market as one US dollar would buy in an "average" country. 
The average coimtry is based on a composite of all participating countries. In 1996 the World Bank initiated the ranking of countries 
by GDP converted at PPP rates; the effect was to reduce the income spread between the poorest and richest countries (WRI, 1997a). 
UN Human Development Index 
The UN has tried to address the shortcomings of GDP by developing The H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t I n d e x (UNDP, 1997). This index, 
produced since 1990, combines three factors to measure overall development: 
• Income as measured by real GDP per capita at PPP to represent command over resources to enjoy a decent standard of 
living. 
• Longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth. 
• Educational attainment as measured by adult literacy and school emolment. 
The U N has also developed other measures, such as the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) to assess conditions such as gender equality. 
The difficulty of incorporating these altemative measures into long-temi scenarios is that, with the exception of life expectancy, 
underlymg data or base projections (e.g. on future PPPs, levels of educational attainment, etc.) needed to develop these altemative 
indicators for future projections are not available. Therefore, this report largely focuses on traditional measures of economic 
development like GDP. Projections of PPPs are calculated by one of the six SRES models and are presented in Chapter 4. 
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Given the inherent ambiguities of such a complex, 
multidimensional issue, it is easiest to define and develop 
indicators of no development. Estimates indicate, for instance, 
that 1.3 billion people in developing countries live on incomes 
of less than US$1 (PPP based) per day, a level used to define 
the absolute poverty cut-off in intemational compaiisons 
(UNDP, 1997). An equal number of people are estimated to 
have no access to safe drinking water (UNDP, 1997) and 2 
billion people are estimated to have no access to services 
provided by the use of modern energy forms (WEC, 1993). 
Income is not an end in itself, but a way to enable human 
choices, or to foreclose them in the case of poverty. Therefore, 
levels of per capita income (GDP or GNP) have been widely 
used as a measure of the degree of economic development, as 
in many instances such levels correlate closely (as lead or lag 
indicator) with other indicators and dimensions of social 
development, such as mortality, nutiition, and access to basic 
services, etc. Average income values also do not indicate the 
distribution of income, which is an important quantity. 
Composite measures, such as the U N Human Development 
Index, are also used in historical analyses (see Box 3-1). Note, 
however, that the overall nature of scenario results may not 
vary much even if some other measure could be used, because 
often-used components, such as literacy rates, are generally 
correlated with income levels. 
In fact, per capita income is t h e (and often only) development 
indicator used in the literature for long-term energy and G H G 
emissions scenarios. This explains why this review chapter, 
while recognizing the importance of altemative dimensions 
and indicators to describe long-term human development, 
almost exclusively embraces an economic perspective. 
The widespread use of GDP or GNP per capita (however 
measured) should not distract from the fact that, while a 
powerful indicator, it does not describe all aspects of economic 
development (see Box 3-1). GDP and GNP are indicators of 
financial flows (see Box 3-1), and are not designed to measure 
stock variables such as the size of the capital stock in an 
economy. GDP and GNP relate only to goods and services that 
are subject to market transactions, t h a t i s only those activities 
that are part of the formal economy. Subsistence and other 
"gray" economic activities and socially important obligatory 
activities, such as childcare or household work, are not 
included; also, depletion allowances for natural capital and 
resources are not considered. 
Although PPP comparison (see Box 3-1) is considered a valid 
indicator of relative wealth, it is sometimes quite uncertain and 
dependent on detailed comparison exercises. As a result, even 
if studies and scenarios consistently use the same indicator of 
economic development, numeric values are often not directiy 
comparable because of large differences in base-year values. 
Comparison of growth rates are more robust, but even here 
many difficulties exist (see, e.g., Alcamo et a l . , 1995, and 
Chapter 2). 
3 . 3 , 2 . H i s t o r i c a l Trends 
Rostow (1990) described several stages in the economic 
development process: 
• First, the pre-industrial economy, in which most 
resources must be devoted to agriculture because of the 
low level of productivity. 
• Second, the phase of capacity-building that leads to an 
economic acceleration. 
• Third, the acceleration itself, which requires about two 
decades. 
• Fourth, about six decades of industrialization and 
catch-up to the "productivity frontiers" prevailing in the 
industrialized countries. 
• Fifth, the period of mass-consumerism and the welfare 
state. 
It is important not to conceptuaUze economic development as 
a quasi-autonomous, linear development path. Numerous 
socio-institutional preconditions have to be met before any 
"take off' into accelerated rates of productivity and economic 
growth can materialize (see Section 3.3.4). "Leading sectors" 
(Fogel, 1970) that drive productivity and output growth change 
over time (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Freeman, 1990), and 
different "industrialization paths" (Chenery et a l . , 1986) have 
been identified in historical analyses. Still, historical evidence, 
consistent with neoclassic growth theory, allows a number of 
generalizations as to the pattems of advances in productivity 
and economic growth. 
By and large, growth rates aie lower for economies at the 
technology and productivity frontier, compared to those 
approaching it. For instance, in the 19* century productivity 
and per capita GDP growth in the rapidly industrializing US far 
exceeded those of England, then at the technology and 
productivity frontier. Likewise, in the post-World War II period 
growth rales in Japan and most of Western Europe exceeded 
those of the US (by then at the technology and productivity 
frontier) (Maddison, 1991, 1995). High human capital 
(education), a favorable institutional environment, free trade, 
and access to technology are acknowledged as key factors for 
rapid economic catch-up (see Section 3.3.4). Likewise, 
entrenchment in progressively outdated capital and technology 
vintages acts as a retarding force against growth (Frankel, 
1955), and rapid capital turnover and possibilities to "leapfrog" 
(Goldemberg, 1991) outdated technologies and infrastructures 
provide the potential for faster economic catch-up. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive compilation of data on 
historical economic development is that of Maddison (1995). 
Table 3-2 shows Maddison's per capita GDP growth rate 
estimates for selected regions and time periods. Since 1820 
global GDP has increased by a factor of 40, or at a rate of about 
2.2% per year. Per capita GDP growth was 1.2% per year faster 
than population growth. In the past 110 years (a time frame 
comparable to that addressed in this report) global GDP 
increased by a factor of 20, or at a rate of 2.7% per year, and 
Scénario D r i v i n g F o r c e s 1 1 7 
T a b l e 3-2: P e r c a p i t a G D P g r o w t h r a t e s f o r selected r e g i o n s a n d t i m e p e r i o d s , i n p e r c e n t per y e a r D a t a s o u r c e : M a d d i s o n , 
1 9 9 5 . 
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1980 1980-1992 
Westem Europe 1.3 0.9 3.5 1.7 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U S A 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.3 
Eastem Europe 1.0 1.2 2.9 -2.4 
Latin America 1.5 1.5 2.5 -0.6 
Asia 0.6 0.1 3.5 3.6 
Africa 0.5 1.0 1.8 -0.8 
World (sample of 199 countries) 1.3 0.9 2.5 1.1 
global per capita GDP grew by a factor of more than five, or at 
a rate of 1.5% per year. There is substantial variation in the 
rates of economic growth over time and across countries. Even 
for the present OECD countries modern economic growth 
dates only from approximately 1870 onward, and for 
developing economies comparable conditions for economic 
growth and catch-up in productivity levels existed only in the 
second half of the 20* century. These approximate dates also 
set the time frame for drawing useful comparisons between 
historical experiences and future projections (see Section 
3.3.3). 
Historically, economic growth has been concentrated in 
Europe, the Americas, and Australasia. Sustained high-
productivity growth (per capita GDP growth) resulted in the 
current high levels of per capita income in the O E C D 
countries. Latecomers (such as Austria, Japan, Scandinavia) 
rapidly caught up to the productivity frontier of the other 
OECD economies (most notably that of the US) in the post-
World War П period. Per capita GDP growth rates of 3.5% per 
annum were, for instance, achieved in Westem Europe between 
1950 and 1980. Similarly, high per capita GDP growth rates 
were achieved in the developing economies of Asia. Per capita 
GDP growth rates of individual countries have even been 
higher - 8% per annum in Japan over the period 1950-1973, 
7% in Korea between 1965 and 1992, and 6.5% per year in 
China since 1980 (Maddison, 1995). Progress in increasing per 
capita income levels has been significant in many regions and 
countries over the long term, although income gaps in both 
absolute and relative terms have not been reduced in the 
aggregate. For instance, per capita GDP in Africa is estimated 
to have been about 20% of the level of the most affluent O E C D 
region in 1870; by 1990 this ratio had decreased to 6% 
(Maddison, 1995). 
Other key indicators of human development have also 
improved strongly in recent decades. For instance, since 1960 
(in little more than a generation) infant mortality rates in 
developing countries have more than halved, malnutrition rates 
have declined by one-third, primary school attendance rates 
have increased from about half to three-quarters, and the share 
of rural families with access to safe drinking water has 
increased from 25% to 65% for low-income families and to 
more than 95% for high-income families (UNDP, 1997; World 
Bank, 1999). 
Equally noticeable in Table 3-2 is the slowdown of per capita 
GDP growth in the OECD countries since the end of the 1970s 
and the serious setbacks in Eastern Europe and developing 
countries outside Asia over the same time period. After a 
decade of decline in economic output, a trend reversal to 
positive growth rates is expected to occur only after the year 
2000 (World Bank. 1998b). Even optimistic scenarios indicate 
that the pre-crises (1989) levels of per capita income cannot be 
achieved again until 2010 (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998a). 
The effects of the recent Asian financial crises are estimated to 
reduce significantly short-term economic growth in the region, 
but longer-term growth prospects remain solid. After a sluggish 
growth to the year 2000, economic growth in the developing 
countries of Asia is anticipated to resume at 6.6% per year for 
the period 2001-2007 (World Bank, 1998b). 
The past two centuries have seen major structural shifts, with 
inter-related changes in demography, economic structure, and 
technology. The world's largest economies have seen a 
continuous shift in economic structure, from agricultural 
production to industry and, to a greater extent, services (see 
Figure 3-9). During the past half-century, the industry share 
declined to leave these economies dominated by service 
sectors. A similar pattern has occurred in most other economies 
in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Another major 
feature of the past two centuries, not shown in Figure 3-9, is the 
growing role of government in the economy. The literature on 
structural change is reviewed in more detail in Jung et a l . 
(2000). 
Differences in statistical definitions make it difficult to 
compare structural change in the former centrally planned 
economies with that in mature market economies. Also, in the 
less-developed regions a marked decline in the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP has occuired in recent years, but the 
contribution of services is larger than it was historically in 
industrial countries at the same level of income. This indicates 
the dangers of using past history too literally as a guide to 
future behavior. 
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Figure 3-9: Changes in economic structure for selected countries. Data source: Maddison, 1995. 
These economic developments have accompanied the 
processes of urbanization, increased access to education, 
improved health care, and longer life expectancies. They have 
been finked to increasing complexity in economic, legal, and 
social institutions (Tainter, 1996). The pattem seen in ths six. 
countries shown in Figure 3-9 is reproduced in most parts of 
the world. In general, increasing income per capita is 
associated with a shift in production patterns, first from 
agriculture to industry, and then more gradually away from 
industry into services. Succession processes beneath these 
macro-level changes are important. Industrial sectors and 
technologies have risen and fallen in importance over the past 
few centuries. These processes and analysts' various attempts 
to find patterns to describe them are further discussed in 
Section 3.3.4. 
3 . 3 . 3 . Scenarios of Economic Development 
Unlike population projections, no long-term economic-
development scenarios are available in the literature (for an 
earlier review, see Jefferson, 1983). In fact, for economic 
projections "long term" means time horizons of up to a decade 
(e.g., World Bank, 1997b), 1998b, far too short for the time 
frame addressed in this report. The longest time frames for 
economic growth projections available in the literature extend 
to 2015 (e.g., Maddison, 1998) and 2020 (World Bank, 1997b). 
The need for long-term economic growth scenarios has arisen 
primarily in connection with long-term energy and 
environmental impact analyses. Earlier reviews on the related 
economic growth assumptions are contained in Nordhaus and 
Yohe (1983), Keepin (1986), Grübler (1994), and Alcamo et a l . 
(1995). A n expert poll on uncertainty in future GDP growtii 
projections is reported in Manne and Richels (1994). Recent 
scenario assumptions are reviewed in Chapter 2 above. 
The current state of modeling long-term economic growth is not 
well developed, not least because the dominant forces of long-
run productivity growth, such as the role of institutions and 
technological change (see Section 3.3.4), remain exogenous to 
modeis. As a resuil, productivity growth assumptions enter 
scenario calculations as exogenous input assumptions. The 
structural changes in the economy discussed in the previous 
paragraph result in additional difficulties; notably that service 
sector productivity growth is difficult to evaluate and project. 
Figure 3-10 summarizes the results of the analysis of available 
literature data on per capita economic growth, disaggregated 
into global as well as industrial and developing countries. 
Overall, uncertainty concerning productivity and hence per 
capita GDP growth is considerable. Uncertainties in 
productivity growth rates become amplified because even 
small differences in productivity growth rates in all scenarios, 
when compounded over a time frame of a century or more into 
the future, translate into enormous differences in absolute 
levels of per capita GDP. For instance, in the scenarios 
reviewed in Alcamo et a l . (1995) and Griibler ( 1994) per capita 
GDP growth rates range typically between 0.8 and 2.8% per 
year over the period 1990-2100. On the basis of an average 
global per capita income of US$4000 in 1990, global per capita 
GDP could range anywhere between about US$10,000 to about 
US$83,000 by 2100. Such uncertainties are amplified even 
more when regional disaggregations are considered, in 
particular futine productivity growth in developing countries. 
The range of views spans all the extremes between developing 
countries that lag perennially behind current income levels in 
the OECD, to scenarios in which they catch up. 
These ranges are reflected in the SRES scenarios shown in 
Figure 3-10. Exogenously assumed productivity growth rates 
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Figure 3-10: Per capita GDP or GNP growth rates, a review of the literature. Average annual growth rates for 1990 to 2020, 
2020 to 2050, and 2050 to 2100 for world, industrial (IND), and developing (DEV) regions. Literature mean, median and 
ranges compared to SRES ranges(see Chapter 4). 
coiTcspond to alternative qualitative intei"pretations as to how 
the future could unfold, ranging from SRES low (all-min) to 
SRES high (all-max) rates. Extreme scenarios of productivity 
growth or lack of growth have not been explored because the 
SRES terms of reference cover a qualified range from the 
literature; methodological (and model) pluralism is mandatory 
(extreme scenarios can be reflected across a wide range of 
modeling approaches only to a limited degree). Furthermore, 
it IS not possible to treat uncertainties of future demographic, 
economic, and technological developments as independent. 
This is shown by the conclusions of recent scenario evaluation 
exercises (Alcamo et a l . , 1995) as well as by theoretical and 
empirical evidence (e.g. Abramovilz, 1993; Barro, 1997). 
Thus, contrary to the previous IPCC IS92 scenario series (that 
varied salient scenario driving forces independently of each 
other), the SRES scenarios attempt to incorporate advances in 
the understanding of the relationships between important 
scenario drivers. From this perspective, uncertainties about 
future productivity and hence economic growth are not 
parametric, but rather are related to the uncertainties in current 
understanding and modeling of the interactions between 
demographics, productivity growth, and socio-institutional 
and technological change. These are addressed in Section 
3.3.4. 
3 . 3 . 4 . Relationships 
3 . 3 . 4 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Economic growth can either be achieved by increasing the 
factor inputs to production, such as capital and labor, or by 
increasing productivity (i.e., the efficiency by which factors of 
production are used to generate economic output). Without 
productivity growth, long-run output growth cannot be 
maintained with limited or depletable resource inputs; as a 
result, complex societies become increasingly vulnerable 
(Tainter, 1988). Changes between inputs and outputs are 
usually analyzed by drawing upon the production function 
approach pioneered by Tinbergen (1942) and Solow (1957). 
Yet, empirical analyses (e.g., Denison, 1962, 1985) quickly 
identified that quality and composition of factor inputs are 
more important in explaining long-run output growth than 
merely the quantitative growth in available factor inputs. For 
instance, at first sight population growth might be considered 
as central for economic growth, because it increases the labor 
force. Upon closer examination, however, institutional and 
social factors that govern working-time regulation, female 
workforce participation, and above all the qualification of the 
workforce (education) have been more important determinants 
of long-run economic growth (Denison, 1962, 1985) than 
simple growth in the numbers of the potential workforce 
(usually calculated as the population in the age bracket 15 to 65 
years). Another puzzling finding of Solow (1957) is that, even 
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when changes in quality and composition of factors of 
production are accounted for, increases in per capita economic 
output (productivity) remain largely unexplained, a "residual" 
in the analysis remains unclear (for a review, see Griliches, 
1996). The "residual," is usually ascribed to "advances in 
knowledge and technology" which, unlike capital and labor, 
cannot be measured directly. However, it might also be the 
result of other influences, which potentially include growing 
contributions to the economy by non-market or under-priced 
natural resources. Thus, considerable measurement and 
interpretative uncertainties remain in the explanation of 
productivity growth. 
New approaches and models extended the neoclassic growth 
model (e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossmann and 
Helpman, 1991, 1993). In these, increases in human capital 
through education and the importance of technological 
innovation via directed activity (research and development 
(R&D)) complement more traditional approaches, which 
represents a return to the earlier work of Schumpeter (1943), 
Kuznets (1958), Nelson et a l . (1967), and Landes (1969). 
3 . 3 . 4 . 2 . I n f l u e n c e of D e m o g r a p h i c s 
Neoclassic economic growth theory embraces as a general 
principle the notion that long-term per capita income g r o w t h 
r a t e is independent of population g r o w t h r a t e . Thus, a rapidly 
growing population should not necessarily slow down a 
countries' economic development. Blanchet (1991) 
summarizes the country-level data. Prior to 1980, the 
overwhelming majority of studies showed no significant 
correlation between population growth and economic growth 
(National Research Council, 1986). Recent correlation studies, 
however, suggest a statistically significant, but weak, inverse 
relationship for the 1970s and 1980s, despite no correlation 
being established previously (Blanchet, 1991). As noted in 
Section 3.2, the reverse effect of income growth on 
demographics is much clearer. 
Population aging is another consideration advanced as having 
significant influence on economic growth rates. Reductions in 
workforce availability and excessive social security and 
pension expenditures are cited as possible drivers. Section 3.2 
above concluded that evidence for a strong negative impact is 
rather elusive. Two additional points deserve consideration. 
First, population aging is not necessarily the best indicator for 
workforce availabifity, because while the percentage of the 
elderly, in particular those of retirement age, increases, the 
proportion of younger people (of pre-work or -career age) 
decreases. As a result, the percentage of the working age 
population (age 15 to 65 years) in the total population 
changes less dramatically, even in scenarios of pronounced 
aging. For instance, in the IIASA low population scenario (7 
billion world population by 2100) discussed in Section 3.2, 
the percentage of age categories 15 to 65 years changes from 
62% in 1995 to 54% by 2100. This percentage falls to 48% in 
the regions with the highest population aging (Lutz et a l . , 
1996). 
A second point is that these demographic variables only 
indicate potential workforce numbers. Actual gainfully 
employed workforce numbers are influenced by additional 
important variables - unemployment levels, female workforce 
participation rates, and finally working time. The importance 
of these variables can be illustrated by a few statistics. 
Currently, about 40 million people are unemployed in the 
O E C D countries (UNDP, 1997). The female workforce 
participation ratios vary enormously, from about 10% to 48% 
of the workforce (as in Saudi Arabia and Sweden, respectively; 
UNDP, 1997), and have been changing dramatically over time. 
For the US, for instance, female workforce participation rates 
increased from 17% in 1890 (US DOC, 1975) to 45% in 1990 
(UNDP, 1997). Similar dramatic long-term changes have 
occurred in the number of working hours in all industrial 
countries. Compared to the mid-19* century, the number of 
average working hours has declined from about 3000 to about 
1500 (Maddison, 1995; Ausubel and Grübler, 1995). However, 
in most OECD countries the trend in working time reductions 
has slowed to a halt since the early 1980s (Marchand, 1992). 
Thus, unless the rather implausible assumption is made that 
with population aging all these other important determinants of 
labor input remain unchanged, the impacts of aging are likely 
to be compensated by corresponding changes in these variables 
(e.g. greater female workforce participation, earlier retirement, 
etc.). Finally, it must be reiterated that quahtative labor force 
characteristics, most notably education, are a more important 
determinant for long-ran productivity and hence economic 
growth than mere workforce numbers. 
3 . 3 . 4 . 3 . I n f l u e n c e of S o c i a l a n d I n s t i t u t i o n a l Changes 
The importance of social and institutional changes to provide 
conditions that enabled the acceleration of the Industrial 
Revolution is widely acknowledged (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 
1986, 1990). Rostow (1990) and Landes (1969) identify many 
social and cultural factors in the "preconditions for economic 
acceleration" and in the process of economic development. 
The importance of institutions and stable social environments 
is also increasingly discussed in the literature concerned with 
current economic growth (World Bank, 1991, 1998a). Barro 
(1997), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) report a 
statistically significant relationship between rule-of-law and 
democracy indices with per capita GDP growth. Law 
enforcement and legal rights are important indicators for 
human development in their own right, but enforceable legal 
contracts are equally important for markets to function. Other 
socio-institutional factors have been identified that are 
important to productivity and economic growth: education is 
mentioned above. Income inequaUty (and resultant social 
tensions) also appears to coirelate negatively with economic 
development (Worid Bank, 1998a; Maddison, 1995). 
Strong parallels run between social, institutional, and 
technological changes (Grübler, 1998a; OECD, 1998a). In 
particular, many features common to the processes of evolution 
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in biologic organisms have been found (e.g., Teilhard de 
Chardin, 1959; Hayek, 1967; Matthews, 1984; Dawkins, 1986; 
Michaelis, 1997c). Thus, to understand these processes would 
involve: 
• A search for new behaviors, institutions, and social or 
cultural patterns. 
• Experimentation with those that are found. 
• Various methods of selecting the "fit" or "desirable" 
changes. 
• Various methods of perpetuating and diffusing those 
changes that are selected. 
Many aspects of the processes of technical change (e.g., its 
unpredictability and the importance of mechanisms such as 
path-dependence and "lock-in") also apply to social change. 
It is obviously difficult to evaluate the role of social, cultural, 
and institutional changes in economic and technical 
development. Whereas tiie monetary and technological aspects 
of change are often measurable and can be observed on a 
relatively "objective" basis, social, cultural, and institutional 
processes are hard to measure and often subjective. They tend 
to involve personal interactions among people, sometimes 
large numbers of people, over long periods. 
Nonetheless, these factors must be taken into account in the 
scenarios. The SRES approach to develop qualitative scenario 
"storylines" that provide an overall framework and background 
for quantitative scenario assumptions and model runs can be 
considered a particularly valuable strength. Storylines allow 
these issues to be addressed explicitly, even if current 
knowledge does not allow social, cultural, and institutional 
factors to be treated in a rigid, quantitative (not to mention 
deterministic) way. 
3 . 3 . 4 . 4 . I n f l u e n c e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e a n d I n v e s t m e n t 
International trade is recognized as an important source of 
economic gains, as it enables comparative advantages to be 
exploited and the diffusion of new technologies and practices. 
Equally important are domestic and intemational investments. 
From an economic perspective, trade reflects gains from 
increasing division of labor, and the historical evidence indicates 
an associated phenomenal growth. Updated (Griibler, 1998a) 
estimates from Rostow (1978) indicate an increase of more than 
a thousand-fold in intemational trade since the beginning of the 
19* century. In 1990, world trade accounted for close to US$3.4 
trillion (10'^), or 13% of world GDR Chenery et a l . (1986) and 
Barro (1997) indicate strong empirical evidence of a positive 
relationship between trade ("openness" of economies) and terms 
of trade (of the economies) on productivity, industrialization, 
and economic growth. Dosi et a l . (1990) highlight also the 
critical roles of policies and institutions in the relative success or 
failure of realizing economic gains from the intemational 
division of labor. Finally, openness to trade could have negative 
economic impacts on countries that experience a deterioration of 
terms of trade. 
Globalization is an increasingly popular term for an ill-defined 
collection of processes. The most important of these processes 
appear to be the liberalization of markets for goods, services, 
and capital, and the increasing flow of information and capital 
around the world. According to the iieoclassic model, 
globalization should benefit everyone; it helps industry in all 
countries to move closer to the productivity frontier and gives 
consumers access to a wider choice of goods and services at 
lower prices. In practice, of course, the world is more 
complicated than is assumed in the neoclassic model. 
Economists such as Dosi et a l . (1990) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) have experimented with altemative models, 
and shown that some countries may not benefit from free trade 
or from freely available information. Huntington (1996) 
observes that by "globalization," Americans and Europeans 
often mean "westernization" in the sense of global adoption of 
western social and cultural norms. This process of cultural 
convergence is a source of great concern in many parts of the 
world. However, Huntington suggests that economic 
globalization may be possible without cultural globalization. 
3.3.4.5. I n f l u e n c e of I n n o v a t i o n a n d T e c h n o l o g i c a l C h a n g e 
The importance of "advances in knowledge" and technology in 
explaining the historical record of productivity growth is 
mentioned above. In the original study by Solow (1957) this 
was estimated to account for 87% of per capita productivity 
growth (the remainder was attributed to increases in capital 
inputs). Since then further methodological and statistical 
refinements have reduced the unexplained "residual" of 
productivity growth that is equated to advances in knowledge 
and technology, but it remains the largest single source of long-
run productivity and economic growth. It is estimated to 
account for more than one-third of total GDP growth in the 
USA since 1929 (Denison, 1985), and for between 34% and 
63% of GDP growth in the OECD countries over the period 
1947 to 1973 (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995). 
The observed slowdown in productivity growth rates since the 
early 1970s is generally inteipreted as a weakening of the 
technological frontier in the OECD countries (Maddison, 
1995; Barro, 1997), although quantitative statistics (and even 
everyday experience) do not corroborate the perception of a 
slowdown in technological innovation and change. A n 
altemative inteipretation of slower recent productivity growth 
is that the O E C D countries have moved out of a long period of 
industrialization and into post-industrial development as 
service economies. In such economies, productivity is 
extremely hard to measure, partly because services comprise a 
mixture of government, non-market, and market activities, 
partly because economic accounts measure services primarily 
via inputs (e.g. cost of labor) rather than outputs, and partly 
because it is difficult to define service q u a l i t y . Nevertheless, 
labor productivity in the service sector appears to grow more 
slowly than that in the agricultural and industrial sectors 
(Millward, 1990; Baumol, 1993). The traditional concept of 
labor productivity may need revision to be applied usefully to 
the service economy. 
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Finally, another interpretation is that productivity growth lags 
behind technological change, because appropriate institutional 
and social adjustment processes take considerable time to be 
implemented (Freeman and Perez, 1988; David, 1990). Once 
an appropriate "match" (Freeman and Perez, 1988) between 
institutional and technological chairge is achieved, productivity 
growth could accelerate. Maddison (1995) observes that the 
19* century productivity surge in the USA was preceded by a 
long period of investment in infrastructure. Landes (1969) 
notes that both the German and Japanese economic 
acceleration was preceded by a long period of investment in 
education. Maddison (1995) further suggests that recent 
developments in information technology involve considerable 
investment, both in hardware and in human leaming, which 
may result in higher efficiency improvements and productivity 
gains in the future only. This perspective is consistent with the 
possible emergence of a new "techno-economic paradigm" or 
"Kondratiev wave." This complementary theory of long-tem 
economic development focuses on the interplay and 
interrelationships between institutional and technological 
change. Following Kondratiev's (1926) observation of "long 
waves" in the American economy, Schumpeter (1935) 
developed a theory to explain these waves on the basis of 
discontinuities in entrepreneurial innovations. Freeman (1990) 
emphasizes Schumpeter's view that long waves are not so 
much evident in economic statistics as in qualitative features of 
the economy. Freeman and Perez (1988) describe five 
historical waves of technical and economic change and identify 
associated economic booms and recessions (successive 
"techno-economic paradigms"). 
Work at IIASA (e.g., Hafele et a l . , 1982; Grübler and 
Nakicenovic, 1991; Nakicenovic, 1996; Grübler e t a l . , 1993b; 
Grübler, 1998a) sought to identify regularities in the market 
succession of technology in energy supply, transport, and the 
iron and steel industry. In fact, there may be a close parallel 
between the waves of technology they observe and 
Kondratiev's economic long waves. However, both empirical 
and theoretical implications of "long waves" remain unclear 
(see the review in Freeman, 1996; and especially Rosenberg 
and Frischtak, 1984). Equally, no approach can hope to foresee 
reliably the form of the next "wave." It is possible that solar 
energy and nuclear power might play a strong role, perhaps 
combined with hydrogen as an energy carrier, as suggested by 
Hafele et a l . (1982) and others. The next wave in transport 
technology might well be an increasing share for aviation and 
high speed rail (Grübler and Nakicenovic, 1991), a transition to 
0.5 litre/100 km "hypercars" (Lovins et a l . , 1993), or a radical 
change in urban planning to minimize transport needs 
(Newman and Kenworthy, 1990). These possibilities highlight 
in particular the need for technology diffusion to avoid 
technological "lock-in" to older technological vintages (Parikh 
e t a l . , 1997). 
3.3.4.6. D o t h e P o o r G e t R i c h e r a n d t h e R i c h Slow D o w n ? 
Neoclassic growth theory suggests that different capital and 
labor productivities across countries lead to differential 
productivity growth rates and hence to conditional 
convergence across different economies. Rostow (1990) 
coined the term that the "poor get richer and the rich slow 
down." The convergence theorem of neoclassic theory arises 
from diminishing returns on capital. Economies that tend to 
have less capital per worker tend to have higher rates of return 
and hence higher growth rates (see Abramovitz, 1986). 
Conversely, economies with high capital intensity (which, 
because of the relationship between capital intensity and 
productivity, are closer to or at the productivity frontier) tend 
to have lower growth rates. Evidently, economies differ in 
more respects than their capital intensities, and hence even 
neoclassic theory only postulates conditional convergence 
(after accounting for all other factors). 
The neoclassic concept of capital is usefully extended to 
include also human capital in the form of education, 
experience, and health (see, e.g., Lucas, 1988; Barro and Sala-
I-Martin, 1995). Thus, additional convergence potentials 
accrue for economies with a proportionally higher ratio of 
human-to-physical capital. Equally, the generation and 
adoption of new technologies is facihtated by high human 
capital. Yet, even with the inclusion of human capital, long-
term per capita growth must eventually cease in the absence of 
continuous improvements in technology. This cessation, 
however, mostly affects economies at the productivity frontier 
and not those that lag behind. For the latter, both theory and 
empirical evidence seem, all else being equal, to indicate 
conditional convergence (i.e., "the poor can get richer."). The 
c e t e r i s p a r i b u s condition is an impoitant qualifier for the 
convergence theorem. Evidently, the potential for conditional 
convergence and economic catch-up cannot be realized in an 
economy struck by civil war, poor institutions, or even low 
savings rates (related to the demographic transition discussed 
in Section 3.2). The recent Asian financial crisis also 
demonstrated that differential capital productivity indeed can 
lead to vast influxes of capital into developing economies, and 
appropriate assimilaflve capacities (banking systems, 
functioning legal system, institutions, etc.) need to be in place 
to use such capital flows productively (World Bank, 1998b). 
In terms of a functional relationship, therefore, per capita 
G D P growth rates are expected to be higher for economies 
with low per capita GDP levels. Notwithstanding many 
frustrating setbacks, such as the recent "lost decade" for 
economic catch-up in Africa and Latin America, empirical 
data indicate that the convergence theorem holds. Figure 3-11 
illustrates some empirical evidence put forward by Barro 
(1997) based on the experiences of some 100 countries in the 
period 1960 to 1985. 
Similar convergence trends have also been identified w i t h i n 
economies. For instance. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) find 
significant convergence trends across individual states in the 
USA, between prefectures in Japan, and between different 
regions in Europe. Bairo (1997) concludes in his analysis that 
the conditional convergence rates across these countries is 
statistically highly significant, and proceeds rather slowly at 
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Figure 3-11: Residual GDP per capita growth rates as a 
function of GDP per capita (log scale). The residual growth 
rate is that per capita GDP growth not explained by other 
factors such as education, terms-of-trade, institutional factors, 
etc., in Barro's multi-factor analysis of per capita GDP 
growth. Data source: Barro, 1997. 
2-3% per year. It may take an economy 27 years to reach 50% 
of steady-state levels (the productivity frontier) and some 90 
years to achieve 90% of that level. Based on this convergence 
criterion alone, it may well take a century (given all other 
factors set favorably) for a poor economy to catch-up to levels 
that prevail in the industrial countries today, never mind the 
levels that might prevail in affluent countries 100 years in the 
future. Barro's analysis indicates a threshold GDP per capita 
level at approximately US$3000 per year. Below that level, 
additional productivity growth potentials result from catch-up; 
beyond that level, higher per capita GDP levels make further 
productivity growth ever more difficult to achieve (as indicated 
by the negative values of the residual GDP per capita growth 
rates in Figure 3-11). 
Given the wide range in historical experiences and the slow 
rates of convergence suggested by neoclassic growth theory, it 
is not surprising that the available scenario literature takes a 
cautious view on economic catch-up. Whereas convergence 
tendencies are generally evident in scenario assumptions (see 
the signiñcantly higher GDP per capita growth rates for 
currently developing countries compared to industrial 
countries in Figure 3-10), long-term convergence rates are low. 
For instance, from all six IS92 scenarios only one (IS92e) 
assumes that developing countries outside China may 
eventually reach present OECD income levels, and even in this 
most optimistic scenario it is assumed to occur only after 2080 
(Pepper et a l . , 1992). Even in this convergence scenario per 
capita income differences remain large - a factor of five by the 
end of the simulation horizon (US$31,000 per capita GDP per 
year in developing countries outside China versus US$150,000 
O E C D average). In an influential critique Parikh (1992) 
referred to the IS92 scenario series as being "unfair to the 
South," a point also taken up in the evaluation of the IS92 
scenarios. Alcamo et a l . (1995) concluded that new IPCC 
scenarios "wi l l be needed for exploring a wide variety of 
economic development pathways, for example, a closing of the 
income gap between industrial and developing countries." With 
a few notable exceptions (e.g., the scenario developed by 
Lazarus et a l . (1993) and the Case С scenarios presented in 
IIASA-World Energy Conference (WEC) ( I IASA-WEC, 
1995) and Nakicenovic e t a l . (1998a)), the challenge to explore 
conditions and pathways that close the income gap between 
developing and industrial regions appears to have been 
insufficientiy taken up in the scenario literature, a gap this 
report aims to begin to fill. Chapter 4 describes two scenarios 
in which the ratios between regions of GDP/capita decline and 
the absolute differences increase. 
3.3.4.7. E c o n o m i c P r o d u c t i v i t y a n d E n e r g y a n d M a t e r i a l s 
I n t e n s i t y 
Evidence suggests that the physical input of energy or 
materials per unit of monetary output (materials or energy 
intensity) follows an inverted U-curve ( lU hypothesis) as a 
function of income. For some materials the lU-hypothesis 
(Moll, 1989; Tilton, 1990) holds quite well. The underiying 
explanatory factors are a mixture of structural change in the 
economy along with technology and resource substitution and 
innovation processes. Recent literature illustrates material 
consumption that rises faster than GDP in well-developed 
countries in a relationship better described as N-shaped (de 
Bruyn and Opschoor, 1994; de Bruyn, et a l , 1995; Suri and 
Chapman, 1996; Ansuategi et a l , 1997). A similar l U curve is 
observed for modem, commercial energy forms (Darmstadter 
et a l , 1977; Goldemberg et a l , 1988; Martin, 1988; 
I I A S A - W E C , 1995; Watson et a l , 1996; Judson et a l , 1999), 
although the initially rising part of commercial energy 
intensity stems from the substitution of traditional (inefficient) 
energy fonns and technologies by modem commercial energy 
forms (see also the discussion of the "environmental Kuznets 
curve" for traditional air pollutants in Section 3.1, also an 
inverted U-shaped curve). The resultant aggregate total 
(commercial plus non-commercial) energy intensity shows a 
persistent declining trend over time, especially with rising 
incomes (Watson et a l , 1996; Nakicenovic et a l , 1998a). 
Empirical evidence thus suggests that, all else being equal, 
energy and materials intensities are closely related to overall 
macroeconomic productivity. In other words, higher 
productivity (GDP per capita) is associated with lower energy 
and materials intensity (lower use of energy and materials per 
unit of GDP). 
Figure 3-12 shows material intensity versus per capita income 
data for 13 world regions for some metals (Van Vuuren et a l , 
2000; see also the discussion in de Vries et a l , 1994). Figure 
3-13 shows a similar curve for total energy intensity (including 
traditional non-commercial energy forms) for 11 world 
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regions', again as a function of per capita income (Nakicenovic 
et a l . , 1998a). 
The most important conclusion to retain from Figures 3-12 and 
3-13 is that energy and materials intensity (i.e. energy use per 
unit of economic output) tend to decline with rising levels of 
GDP per capita. Thus, energy and material productivity - the 
inverse of energy intensity - improve in line with overall 
macroeconomic productivity (as represented, e.g., by GDP per 
capita levels). Also, they tend to deteriorate when productivity 
levels fall, as happened during the start of the deep economic 
recession in Central and Eastem Europe (Govemment of 
Russian Federation, 1995). A corollary of this relationship is 
that material and energy intensities decline the faster per capita 
income grows. Thus, overall economic productivity growth 
(GDP per capita growth) and reductions in materials and 
energy use per unit GDP (materials and energy productivity 
growth) are closely related. The fundamental reason is that 
high macroeconomic growth presupposes accelerated rates of 
technical change and corresponds with a fast turnover of 
capital stock and, hence, a faster incorporation in the economy. 
This represents an important new finding for long-term energy 
and emissions scenarios that have, to date, largely treated 
economic and resource productivity growth as independent of 
' The regional definition used in Nakicenovic e t a l . , 1998a, includes: 
A F R : Sub-saharan Africa; CPA: China and Centrally Planned Asia; 
E E U : Central and Eastem Europe; FSU: Newly Independent States 
of the former Soviet Union; L A M : Latin America and the Caribbean; 
M E A : Middle East and North Africa; PAO: Pacific OECD; PAS: 
Other Pacific Asia; SAS: South Asia; W E U : Western Europe. 
Figure 3-12: Metals intensity of 
use per unit of GDP as a function 
of GDP per capita for 13 world 
regions. Metals include refined 
steel and MedAUoy (the sum of 
copper, lead, zinc, tin, and nickel). 
GDP here is measured in terms of 
purchasing power parities (PPP). 
The dashed curves are isolines that 
represent a constant per capita 
consumption of metals. The thick 
pink line indicates the inverse U -
shaped curve that best describes the 
trends in the different regions as 
part of a global metal model. Data 
source: Van Vuuren et a l . , 2000. 
each other. According to recent empirical and theoretical 
findings, they no longer can. 
Two final caveats are important. First, growth in productivity 
and intensity improvement growth have historically been 
outpaced by economic output growth. Hence, materials and 
energy use has risen in absolute tenns (see Nriagu, 1996; 
Watson et a i , 1996; Griibler, 1998a). The second caveat is that 
energy and material intensity are affected by many factors 
other than macroeconomic productivity growth and resultant 
income. OECD (1998b) notes that high rates of productivity 
increase have been associated in the past with new competitive 
pressures, strong price or regulatory incentives, catching up or 
recovery, and a good "climate for innovation." Also, the 
emergence of new technologies and resource-strategic 
considerations has led to rapid productivity growth. 
Table 3-3 summarizes selected macroeconomic, labor, energy, 
and material productivity increases that have been achieved in 
a range of economies and sectors at different times. Principally, 
it demonstrates that the least likely assumption for future 
scenarios from historical evidence is absence of productivity 
growth. Human ingenuity (as reflected in new technologies and 
new practices) historically has responded to puiposeful action 
(R&D and inventive activities) and to a wide range of policies 
to improve vastly productivity in the use of a l l factors of 
production. Of course, it remains uncertain how future 
productivity growth rates will diffuse nationally, regionally, 
and internationally. The essential lesson provided by history is 
that change is continuous and pervasive. From that perspective, 
static or "business-as-usual" scenarios need to be replaced by 
"dynamics-as-usual" scenarios, which divide into "fast" and 
S c e n a r i o D r i v i n g F o r c e s 125 
100000 
G D P per capita 1990US$ 
"slow" alternatives as a function of perceived opportunities, 
new institutional configurations, policies, and environmental 
constraints, even if these do not include climate policies (as 
mandated by the SRES Terms of Reference, see Appendix I). 
For instance, low historical rates of energy intensity 
improvement reflect the low priority placed on energy 
efficiency by most producers and users of technology. On 
average energy costs account for only about 5% of GDP. Energy 
intensity reductions average about 1 % per year, in contrast to 
improvements in labor productivity above 2% per year over the 
period 1870 to 1992. Over shorter time periods, and given 
appropriate incentives, energy intensity improvement rates can 
be substantially higher, as in the OECD countries after 1973 or 
in China since 1977, where energy intensity improvement rates 
of 5% have been observed. Rapid productivity growth can also 
occur during periods of successful economic catch-up; for 
instance, Japanese labor productivity grew at 7.7% annually 
during 1950-1973 (Maddison, 1995). Similar high-productivity 
growths were also achieved in industrial oil usage in the OECD 
or US car fuel economies after 1973. Of the examples given in 
Table 3-3, productivity increases are the highest for 
communication. Not surprisingly, many observers consider that 
given a continuation of historical trends communication may 
become a similarly important driver of economic growth in the 
future as traditional, resource- and energy-intensive industries 
have been in the past. 
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The key questions about how future development pattems 
deteimine G H G emissions thus include the following. 
Figure 3-13: Energy intensity (all 
energy forms in the higher curves, 
and commercial energy only in the 
lower curves) as a function of 
GDP per capita for 11 world 
regions since 1970. For an 
explanation of regional 
abbreviations see text. Historical 
data for the U S A since 1800 are 
equally shown. Source: adapted 
from Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998a. 
M a t e r i a l a n d energy c o n t e n t of development i n i n d u s t r i a l 
c o u n t r i e s : 
• Wi l l stmctural change toward services and increasing 
importance of information as a "raw material" reduce 
the energy and matter content of economic activity? 
• Wil l telecommunications substitute significantly for 
travel or encourage more of it? 
• Wil l growth in transportation and other energy-using 
activities, stimulated by trade liberaHzation, be offset 
by less material intensive development pattems? 
• Wil l the tendency to saturation in some energy end-use 
requirements be offset by new energy or G H G intensive 
goods and services (e.g., in leisure activities)? 
D e v e l o p m e n t p a t t e r n s i n t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s : 
• Wil l developing countties reproduce the development 
paths of industrial countries with respect to energy use 
and G H G emissions? 
• Is there a potential for technological "leapfrogging" 
whereby developing countries bypass dirty intermediate 
technologies and jump straight to cleaner teclmologies? 
L i n k s a m o n g energy, t r a n s p o r t a n d u r b a n p l a n n i n g : 
• Wi l l modal choices and urban-form decisions tend 
toward less or greater energy intensity? 
• How are significant differences within and between 
industrial and developing countries going to evolve in 
the future? 
L a n d use a n d h u m a n settlements: 
• What are the links between agriculture, forestry, mral-
to-urban migration, energy use, G H G , and sulfur 
emissions, particularly in developing countries? 
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Table 3 - 3 : Examples of p r o d u c t i v i t y g r o w t h f o r t h e e n t i r e economy a n d f o r selected sectors a n d c o u n t r i e s . D a t a sources: see 
t a b l e f o o t n o t e . 
Sector/Technology Region Productivity Indicator Period Annual Productivity 
Change (%) 
Whole economy^ 12 countries Europe GDP/capita 1870-1992 1.7 
Whole economy^ 12 countries Europe GDP/hour worked 1870-1992 2.2 
Whole economy" USA GDP/hour worked 1870-1973 2.3 
Whole economy" U S A GDP/hour worked 1973-1992 I.I 
Whole economy" Japan GDP/hour worked 1950-1973 7.7 
Whole economy" South Korea GDP/hour worked 1950-1992 4.6 
Whole economy'' World GDP/primary energy 1971-1995 1.0 
Whole economy'' OECD GDP/primary energy 1971-1995 1.3 
Whole economy'' USA GDP/primary energy 1800-1995 0.9 
Whole economy'' United Kingdom GDP/primary energy 1890-1995 0.9 
Whole economy'' China GDP/primary energy 1977-1995 4.9 
Whole economy'^  Japan GDP/material use 1975-1994 2.0 
Whole economy*^ U S A GDP/material use 1975-1994 2.5 
Agriculture^- f Ireland Tons wheat/hectare 1950-1990 5.3 
Agriculture*^ Japan Tons rice/hectare 1950-1996 2.2 
Agriculture^ India Tons rice/hectare 1950-1996 2.0 
Industry" OECD (6 countries) Value added/hour worked 1950-1984 5.3 
Industry" Japan Value added/hour worked 1950-1973 7.3 
Industry'' OECD Industrial production/energy 1971-1995 2.5 
Industry'' OECD Industrial production/oil use 1974-1986 8.0 
New cars'* USA Vehicle fuel economy 1972-1982 7.0 
New cars'* U S A Vehicle fuel economy 1982-1992 0.0 
Commercial aviation'' World Ton-km/energy 1974-1988 3.8 
Commercial aviation" World Ton-km/energy 1988-1995 0.3 
Commercial aviation" World Ton-km/labor 1974-1995 5.6 
Telephone call costs*^  Transatlantic London-NY, costs for 3 min 1925-1995 8.5 
Telephone cables^ Transatlantic Telephone calls/unit cable mass I914-1994 25.0 
Data sources: 
a: Maddison, 1995. e: Intemational Civi l Aviation Organization (ICAO) statistics, 
b: OECD and l E A statistics. f: OECD, 1998b; Waggoner, 1996; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985. 
c: WRI, 1997a. g: PAO (various years 1963-1996) Production Statistics, 
d: Including light tracks, Schipper, 1996. 
D i s t r i b u t i o n issues: 
• What are the links between development pattems, 
distribution of income, energy use and G H G 
emissions? 
The i n f o r m a l economy: 
• What is the link between informal economic activities 
and G H G emissions? 
The effect of development pattern assumptions in the 
assessment of future G H G emissions is greater for developing 
countries. As a major part of the needed infrastracture to meet 
development needs is still to be built in the developing 
countries, the spectrum of future options is considerably 
wider than that in industrial countries. The traditional 
approach to assume "business-as-usual" as the baseline is 
particularly meaningless in such cases; instead there is a need 
for multiple baselines for different scenaiios built to cover the 
range of possible futures. It cannot be assumed that 
developing countries wi l l automatically follow the past 
development paths of industrial countries. The significant 
transformations that recentiy intervened in the intemational 
economy and energy markets hightight the important dangers 
of such a double analogy, both in space and time. It can also 
be argued that many developing countries may have passed 
already any developmental bifurcation point, in which case 
developments could follow the pattems of industriaUzed 
countries. 
Both the GDP stracture and the physical basis on which it is to 
be achieved in developing countries have to be considered. A 
cracial question regards their share in the world production of 
highly energy- and pollution-intensive goods, such as steel and 
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aluminum. As the recent shift of heavy industries from the 
industrial toward the developing countries ends, long-term 
economic output could come from services and other less 
energy-intensive activities. 
Moreover, technological choices, both in production and 
consumption apparatus, can substantially decrease the energy 
demand per GDP. For instance, Chinese households are not 
bound to adopt the same model of energy-intensive 
refrigerators that have equipped American families. Similarly, 
future cement factories in developing countries should not fail 
to include up-to-date technological improvements, such as the 
dry process. 
The spatial distribution of the population and its ecoiiomic 
activities is still unclear, which raises the possibility of adopting 
urban and/or regional planning. Industrial policies directed at 
rural development and strengthening the role of small and 
medium cities would reduce the extent of rural exodus and the 
degree of demographic concentration in large cities. 
These examples show that developing countries could adopt 
anticipative strategies to avoid, in the long-term, the problems 
faced today by industrial societies ("leapfrogging"). Such 
alternative development patterns highlight the technical 
feasibility of emission futures in the developing regions that 
can be compatible with national objectives. However, the 
barriers to a more sustainable development in the developing 
regions can hardly be underestimated, and range from financial 
constraints to cultural behaviors (in both industrial and 
developing countries), which include the lack of appropriate 
institutional structures. 
3.3.5. Conclusion 
The process of economic and social development depends both 
on the ability of the current lead countries in productivity to 
maintain their technological and institutional creativity, and on 
the ability of other countries to adopt leading-edge 
technologies and institutions or to develop their own. The 
crucial issues of "how much" and "what kind" of productivity 
growth can be addressed only by describing alternative 
scenarios of future development. To develop alternative 
scenarios it is necessary to recall the important qualitative 
relationship between demographic transition and social and 
economic development. Causality links could be in either 
direction, but the importance of the relationship is recognized 
in both theoretical and empirical studies. Hence, as 
summarized in Section 3.2, this relationship should be 
incoфorated into the SRES scenarios. Scenarios of accelerated 
rates of economic and social development should therefore be 
the scenarios with an accelerated demographic transition. This 
corresponds to a linking of high per capita development with 
comparatively low population levels. 
There is a need to explore in particular pathways that close the 
development gap (see Parikh, 1992; Alcamo et a l . , 1995). As 
the likelihood of zero or even negative productivity growth in 
the developed countries is low, closure of the development gap 
requires accelerated rates of productivity growth and the need 
to overcome or avoid setbacks in per capita income growth in 
many developing countries. Scenarios that explore this 
possibility will necessarily extend beyond the range of futures 
spanned by the IS92 scenarios, as well as beyond the range of 
the majority of the "conventional wisdom" scenario literature 
on the future of developing countries. 
As a major part of the needed infrastructure to meet 
development needs still has to be built, the spectrum of future 
options is considerably wider in developing than in industrial 
countries. For instance, the technical possibilities for low 
emission futures in the developing countries are many. The 
extent of the spectrum of future options depends on the 
changes discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, but also on the 
outcome of crucial issues. These include political power 
structure, national governance and institutional structure; 
income distribution; cultural attitudes and consumption 
patterns (diets, housing, etc.), development of and access to 
modem technologies (energy, production, distribution, etc.), 
and the geographic distribution of activities (land use, urban 
settlement, transportation needs, etc.). 
Particular sets of technological and behavioral options can be 
clustered into alternative, internally consistent packages to 
represent dilïerent choices over time and so define different 
development paths for any economy. Such clusters can give 
rise to self-reinforcing loops between technical choice, 
consumer demand, and geographic distribution, which create 
"lock-in" effects and foreclosures of options in technology and 
socio-institutional innovations. The time-dependent nature of 
these choices gives rise to bifurcations and irreversibilities in 
which the shift from one development path to another entails 
important economic and political costs. 
Globalization of markets, technologies, and information 
networks may help accelerate productivity growth in the 
future. However, both economic and social losers could result 
from the globalization process. The financial instability during 
1998 has cast further doubt on the inevitability of global 
convergence as a standard model of political economy. Hence, 
a further important dimension of uncertainty to be explored in 
the scenarios is the degree of globalization or regionalization in 
economic, social, and technological development. 
The various perspectives on economic history discussed in 
Section 3.3.4 reveal several possible options for the future: 
• Perhaps the most extreme view may be that the 
development process is nearing completion in Europe, 
North America, and Australasia, so that the main 
prospect for growth is through the diffusion of existing 
best-practice technologies to the rest of the world. 
• The nature of economic development may have 
changed significantly in high-income countries, with a 
new emphasis on services, quality, and information. 
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Such development is hard to measure in material terms. 
Many writers refer to "dematerialization" and the 
emergence of the "knowledge-based" economy. 
• The start of a new "Kondratiev wave" may be 
underway, to be revealed in the early 2P ' century in a 
surge of economic growth, with the massive 
development of high-technology industries leading to 
new products of increasing value and renewed 
opportunities for fast developmental catch-up. 
As a result, scenarios can span from low dematerialization to 
high dematerialization futures associated with a wide range of 
income levels. In the former, the shift toward more value-added 
products in industry would be compensated by rising labor 
productivity and hence lower product costs. Economic 
production remains material oriented. It may be a world with 
huge underground cities, air-conditioned tourist resort areas 
with indoor beaches, a significant fraction of people in low-
density regions may fly their own aiфlanes, and robots may do 
housework in most homes. In the latter, much of the money 
flow would be associated with exchange of information and 
services. Industrial value added would be, to a large extent, 
generated from R & D and know-how, and less from increasing 
productivity in traditional industries. Educational, childcare, 
and medical services would make up a large part of personal 
expenditures. Already, all kinds of artistic and handicraft work 
have become part of the formal monetary economy, partly 
because of the booming world tourist industry. Much 
"economic growth" may revolve around the (re)distribution of 
scarce, positional goods such as space and valuable artworks. 
Therefore, the task of future scenario development entails more 
than just the adoption of altemative quantitative assumptions. 
The overall context within which altemative assumptions on 
productivity growth or energy and materials intensity take 
place needs to be made explicit. This is simply because many 
key influencing factors (e.g., institutions) cannot be assessed 
quantitatively, or the relationship between factors is known 
only qualitatively. The development of altemative qualitative 
scenario "storylines" (see Chapter 4) is therefore an important 
advance over previous IPCC scenario methodologies. 
3.4. Energy and Technology 
3 . 4 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
In this section, energy end-uses, resources, and technologies 
are reviewed. Their future evolution is of critical importance to 
future emissions levels. First, major pattems of energy end-use 
and emissions by sector are considered, followed by a 
discussion of energy resources; then energy supply 
technologies that might become of greater importance in the 
future are reviewed briefly before the current understanding 
and modeling of technological change are discussed. 
3 . 4 . 2 . Energy Use and Emissions by M a j o r Sectors 
3 . 4 . 2 . 1 . O v e r v i e w 
Sectoral energy use and G H G emissions changes are often 
discussed in terms of trends in the major end-use sectors (e.g., 
Sathaye et a l . , 1989; l E A , 1997c; Schipper et a l , 1997a; Price 
et a l , 1998). Trends reveal striking differences between sectors 
and regions of the world. The key sectors of the economy that 
use energy are industry (including agriculture), commercial, 
residential, and institutional buildings, and transportation. Key 
drivers of energy use and carbon emissions include activity 
drivers (total population growth, urbanization, building, and 
vehicle stock, commodity production), economic drivers (total 
GDP, income, and price elasticities), energy intensity trends 
(energy intensity of energy-using equipment, appliances, 
vehicles), and carbon intensity trends. These factors are in tum 
driven by changes in consumer preferences, energy and 
technology costs, settlement and infrastructure patterns, 
technical progress, and overall economic conditions. 
Table 3-4 shows that global primary energy use grew from 
191 EJ in I97I to 307 EJ in 1990 at an average annual growth 
rate of 2.5% per year. This growth tapered off in all sectors 
after 1990, and total global primary energy increased to only 
319 EJ by 1995, mainly because of the large declines 
experienced in the R E F region (see Chapter 1 for definition of 
SRES world regions) as a result of the political and economic 
restracturing of the countries within it. Table 3-4 shows that 
the industrial sector clearly dominates total primary energy 
use, followed by the buildings sector (commercial, 
residential, and institutional buildings combined), transport 
sector, and agriculture sector. 
Energy intensity is the amount of energy used to perform a 
particular service, such as to produce a ton of steel, power a 
refrigerator, or propel a vehicle. Technical progress generally 
leads to improved energy efficiency in technologies such as 
lights, vehicles, refrigerators, and manufacturing processes. 
Many studies show that considerable energy efficiency 
improvement can be realized (technically and economically) in 
the short term (10-15 years) with available technologies 
(Szargut and Morris, 1987; Ayres, 1989; Jochem, 1989; Lovins 
and Lovins, 1991; Nakicenovic et a l , 1993; WEC, 1995b; 
Watson e t a l . , 1996; Worrell e t a l . , 1997). 
In 1990, industry accounted for two-fifths of global primary 
energy use, residential and commercial buildings for a slightly 
smaller amount, and transportation for one-fifth of the total. 
These shares vary according to economic structures in each 
region (see below). Carbon emissions that result from energy 
use depend on the carbon intensity of the energy source. 
Changes in carbon intensity mainly result from fuel 
substitution, but can also arise from changes in technology or 
process. The largest shifts in carbon intensity over the long 
term are associated with changes in the energy sources used for 
power generation since 1850 (Nakicenovic and Grübler, 1996). 
Smaller but still significant shifts resulted from fuel switching 
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Table 3 - 4 : P r i m a r y energy (EJ per y e a r ) use by sector a n d r e g i o n , 1 9 7 1 t o 1 9 9 5 , a n d a v e r a g e a n n u a l g r o w t h r a t e s ( A A G R ) f o r 
1 9 7 1 t o 1 9 9 0 a n d 1 9 9 0 t o 1 9 9 5 . S o u r c e : P r i c e et a l . , 1 9 9 8 , based o n l E A , 1 9 9 7 a ; l E A , 1 9 9 7 b ; B P , 1 9 9 7 (see C h a p t e r 1 f o r 
definitions of SRES w o r l d r e g i o n s ) . 
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 AAGR 
1971-1990 
AAGR 
1990-1995 
I n d u s t r i a l Sector: 
OECD90 48.6 49.3 55.0 52.3 54.3 56.8 0.6% 0.9% 
REF 26.0 31.6 34.0 36.9 38.0 26.0 2.0% -7.3% 
ASIA 8.8 11.5 15.5 20.0 26.1 34.8 5.9% 5.9% 
A L M 4.6 6.2 8.9 10.5 11.0 13.0 4.7% 3.5% 
World 88.0 98.5 113.5 119.8 129.4 130.8 2.1% 0.2% 
B u i l d i n g s Sector; 
OECD90 44.4 48.9 52.3 56.8 62.3 68.5 1.8% 1.9% 
REF 10.7 13.0 18.2 21.0 23.0 16.2 4.1% -6.8% 
ASIA 3.6 4.6 5.6 7.9 10.2 12.9 5.7% 4.8% 
A L M 2.7 3.7 5.1 6.9 10.1 12.1 7.1% 3.8% 
World 61.5 70.3 81.3 92.6 105.6 109.8 2.9% 0.8% 
Transport Sector; 
OECD90 26.2 29.4 32.5 33.8 39.4 43.3 2.2% 1.9% 
REF 6.0 7.3 8.0 9.2 10.0 7.3 2.7% -6.0% 
ASIA 2.0 2.4 3.3 4.3 6.0 8.7 5.9% 7.6% 
A L M 3.3 4.6 6.3 7.2 7.8 9.6 4.6% 4.2% 
World 37.5 43.6 50.1 54.4 63.3 69.0 2.8% 1.7% 
A g r i c u l t u r e Sector 
OECD90 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.2% 1.6% 
REF 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.4 3.0 1.7 4.5% -10.6% 
ASIA 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.3 3.0 4.8% 5.6% 
A L M 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.6 4.7% 12.6% 
World 4.4 5.1 6.1 7.5 8.9 9.3 3.8% 0.8% 
All Sectors; 
OECD90 121.0 129.3 141.8 145.5 158.8 171.7 1.4% 1.6% 
REF 44.0 53.5 62.0 69.5 74.0 51.3 2.8% -7.1% 
ASIA 15.4 19.7 26.0 33.9 44.7 59.5 5.8% 5.9% 
A L M 11.0 14.9 21.1 25.4 29.8 36.4 5.4% 4.1% 
WORLD 191.4 217.5 251.0 274.2 307.2 318.8 2.5% 0.7% 
in industrial, commercial, and residential energy consumption. 
The relationship between total sector energy use and economic 
drivers such as GDP per capita varies across countries depends 
upon the sector. In 1995, the relationship in the transport and 
buildings sectors was relatively strong and that in the industrial 
sector was moderate (Price et a i , 1998). Income elasticities 
vary widely among the different types of energy services and 
the country or region under consideration. For example, the 
income elasticity of refrigerator ownership in most countries in 
the IND region (see Chapter 1 for definition of SRES world 
regions) is extremely low, as most households already own a 
refrigerator. The elasticity is much higher in medium-income 
countries in which refrigerator ownership is low. Other 
economic indicators, such as level of economic development in 
the industrial sector and personal consumption expenditures in 
residential buildings, are more closely correlated with energy 
use in these sectors. 
3 . 4 . 2 . 2 . I n d u s t r y a n d A g r i c u l t u r e 
Driving forces behind energy use and carbon emissions in the 
industrial sector include the state of economic development, 
consumption and trade pattems, relative costs of labor, capital, 
and energy, and availability of resources. In 1990, industry 
accounted for 42% (129 EJ) of global primary energy use. 
Between 1971 and 1990, industrial energy use grew at a rate of 
2.1 % per year, slightly less than the world total energy demand 
growth of 2.5% per year. This growth rate has slowed in recent 
years, and was virtually fiat between 1990 and 1995, primarily 
because of declines in industrial output in the REF region. 
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Energy use in tlie industrial sector is dominated by the 
industrialized countries, which accounted for 42% of world 
industrial energy use in 1990. Countries in the REF, ASIA, and 
A L M regions used 29%, 20%, and 9% of world industrial 
energy, respectively, that year. The share of industrial sector 
energy consumption within the industrialized countries 
declined from 40% in 1971 to 33% in 1995, which partly 
reflects the transition toward a less energy-intensive 
manufacturing base. The industrial sector dominates in the 
REF region, accounting for more than 50% of total primary 
energy demand, a result of the long-term policy that 
emphasized materials production and was promoted under 
years of central planning. Average annual growth in industrial 
energy use in this region was 2% between 1971 and 1990, but 
dropped by an average of 7.3% per year between 1990 and 
1995 (lEA, 1997a; l E A , 1997b; BP, 1997). 
The agriculture sector used only 3% of global primary 
commercial energy in 1990. Unlike the other sectors, the REF 
region dominated agricultural energy use in 1990, using 34% 
of the total, followed by the IND (30%), ASIA (26%), and 
A L M (10%). Between 1971 and 1990, the average amiual 
growth in primary energy used for agriculture was slower in the 
industrialized countries (2.2% per year) than in the three other 
regions, for which growth ranged between 4.5% and 4.8% per 
year. Trends in agricultural primary energy use changed 
significantly in the REF and A L M regions after 1990, with 
REF consumption dropping to an average of 10.6% per year 
and A L M consumption increasing to an average of 12.6% per 
year by 1995. 
Energy use in the industrial sector is dominated by the 
production of a few major energy-intensive commodities, such 
as steel, paper, cement, and chemicals. Rapidly industrializing 
countries have higher demands for these infrastructure 
materials and more mature markets have declining or stable 
levels of consumption. Studies of material consumption in 
industrialized countries show increases in the initial 
development of society to a maximum consumption level, 
which then remains constant or even decHnes as infrastructure 
needs are met and material recycling increases. Absolute and 
per capita consumptions of some materials appear to have 
reached levels of stabilization in many industrialized countries, 
although this is not true of all materials (e.g. paper). Expressed 
as a function of unit GDP, material intensity generally declines 
after reaching a maximum (WilUams et a l . , 1987; Wemick, 
1996; WRI, 1997b; see also Section 3.3). Although the use of 
all materials in developing countries will certainly grow, per 
capita consumption may not reach that in the industrialized 
countries, because more efficient processes and substitutes are 
available. 
Carbon intensities with respect to GDP (CO2 emissions as a 
function of GDP) in the industrial sector have been relatively 
stable in most countries except for those that are rapidly 
industrializing (Houghton et a i , 1995). This trend results from 
the changing economic structure, reduced energy intensity, and 
reduced carbon intensity of the fuel mix. A shift toward less 
carbon-intensive fuels took place between 1971 and 1992 in 
most industrialized countries, as well as in South Korea (Aug 
and Pandiyan, 1997; Schipper et a l . , 1997a). The industrial 
sector fuel mix has become more carbon-intensive in some 
developing countries, such as China and Mexico (Ang and 
Pandiyan, 1997; Sheinbaum and Rodriguez, 1997), although a 
trend away from coal to other fuels has also occurred in some 
developing countries (Han and Chatterjee, 1997). The 
contribution of fuel-mix changes to COj emissions reduction 
has been .small in most industrialized countries (Golove and 
Schipper, 1997; Schipper a/., 1997a). 
Technical energy-intensity reductions of I to 2% per year are 
possible in the industrial sector and have occurred in the past 
(Ross and Steinmeyer, 1990). The annual change in energy 
intensity in the industrial sector varied between -0.1% and 
-6.6% per year for a variety of countries from the early 1970s 
to the early 1990s. Generally, electricity intensity remained 
constant and fuel intensity declined, which reflects the 
increasing importance of electricity (lEA, 1997c). 
3 . 4 . 2 . 3 . R e s i d e n t i a l , C o m m e r c i a l , a n d I n s t i t u t i o n a l B u i l d i n g s 
In the buildings sector, household expenditure levels, appliance 
and equipment penetration levels, and the share of population 
that lives in urban areas all affect energy use. In 1990, 
residential, commercial, and institutional buildings consumed 
almost 100 EJ of primary energy, about one-third of the total 
global primary energy. Uncertainties persist with respect to 
quantities and structure of non-commercial fuel use in 
developing countries. Primary energy use in the buildings 
sector worldwide grew at an average annual rate of 2.9% 
between 1971 and 1990. Growth in buildings energy use varied 
widely by region, ranging from 1.8% per yeai' in the IND 
region to 7.1% per year in the A L M region. Growth in 
commercial buildings was higher than growth in residential 
buildings in all regions of the world, averaging 3.5% per year 
globally. In 1990, the IND region used about 60% of global 
building energy, followed by REF (22%), ASIA (10%), and 
A L M (9%) countries, respectively. • Between 1990 and 1995, 
growth in the use of primary energy in buildings slowed in all 
regions except the industrialized countries, where buildings 
primary energy use climbed at an average of 1.9% per year. 
The greatest decline occuired in the REF region, where 
buildings energy use declined by an average of 6.8% annually 
between 1990 and 1995, dominated by a 7.2% per year average 
drop in residential primary energy use. Growth in buildings 
energy use in the other two regions ~ ASIA and A L M - slowed 
during this period, but growth rates were still high, averaging 
4.8% and 3.8%, respectively (BP, 1997; l E A , 1997a; lEA, 
1997b). 
Along with population size, key activity drivers of energy 
demand in buildings are the rate of urbanization, number of 
dwellings, per capita living area, persons per residence, and 
commercial floor space. As populations become more 
urbanized and areas develop electrification, the demand for 
energy services such as refrigeration, lighting, heating, and 
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cooling increases. In the residential buildings sector, the level 
of energy demand is further influenced by population age 
distribution, household income, number of households, size of 
dwellings, and number of people per household. In the 
commercial buildings sector, factors that influence energy 
demand include the overall population level (i.e., the number of 
people who desire commercial services), the size of the labor 
force, and commercial sector income. 
The number of people living in urban areas increased from 
1.35 billion, or 37% of the total, in 1970 to 2.27 bilhon, or 
43% of the total, in 1990 (see also Section 3.2). Growth in 
urbanization was strongest in the ASIA and A L M regions, 
where the average annual increase in urban population was 
nearly 4.0% per year. This increase and the resultant income 
effects led to increased usage of commercial fuels, such as 
kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), for cooking 
instead of traditional biomass fuels. In general, higher levels 
of urbanization are associated with higher incomes and 
increased household energy use (Sathaye et a l . , 1989; Nadel et 
a l . , 1997). 
Energy consumption in residential buildings is strongly 
correlated with household income levels. Between 1973 and 
1993, increases in total private consumption translated into 
larger homes, more appUances, and an increased use of energy 
services (water heating, space heating) in most industrialized 
countries (lEA, 1997c). Dwelling size is a key determinant of 
residential energy use, and has grown with personal 
consumption expenditures in most industrialized countries. In 
the D E V region, urban areas are generally associated with 
higher average incomes (Sathaye and Ketoff, 1991). Wealthier 
populaces in developing countries exhibit consumption 
patterns similar to those in industrialized countries - purchases 
of appliances and other energy-using equipment increase with 
gains in disposable income (WEC, 1995b). 
In the commercial sector, the ratio of primary energy use to 
commercial sector GDP fell in a number of industrialized 
countries between 1970 and the early 1990s, despite a large 
growth in energy-using equipment in commercial buildings. 
Almost certainly this is an effect of improved equipment 
efficiencies combined with economic growth in the 
commercial sector unrelated to energy consumption. 
Electricity use in the commercial sector shows a relatively 
strong correlation with commercial sector GDP, although there 
is a wide range of electricity use at any given level of 
commercial sector GDP (lEA, 1997c). 
Overall energy intensity in the buildings sector can be 
measured using energy consumption per capita values. 
Between 1971 and 1990, global primary energy use in the 
buildings sector grew from 16.5 GJ per capita to 20 GJ per 
capita. Buildings per capita energy use varied widely by 
region, with the IND and REF regions dominating globally. 
Energy use per capita was higher in the residential sector than 
in the commercial sector in all regions, although average 
annual growth in commercial energy use per capita was higher 
during the period, averaging 1.7% per year globally compared 
to 0.6% per year for the residential sector (Price et a l . , 1998). 
Space heating is an important end-use in the IND and REF 
regions and in some developing countries; it accounts for half 
of China's residential and commercial building energy demand 
(Nadel et a l . , 1997). The penetration of central heating 
doubled, from about 40% of dwellings to almost 80% of 
dwellings, in many industrialized countries between 1970 and 
1992 ( lEA, 1997c). District heating systems are common in 
some areas of Europe and in the REF region. Space heating is 
not common in most developing countries, with the exception 
of China, South Korea, South Africa, Argentina, and a few 
other South American countries (Sathaye et a l . , 1989). 
Residential space-heating energy intensities declined in most 
industrial countries (except Japan) between 1970 and 1992 
because of reduced heat losses in buildings, lowered indoor 
temperatures, more careful heating practices, and 
improvements in efficiency of heating equipment (Schipper et 
a l . , 1996; l E A , 1997c). Water heating, refrigeration, space 
cooling, and lighting are the next largest residential energy 
uses, respectively, in most industrialized countries ( lEA, 
1997c). In developing countries, cooking and water heating 
dominate, followed by lighting, small appliances, and 
refrigerators (Sathaye and Ketoff 1991). Appliance 
penetration rates increased in all regions between 1970 and 
1990. The energy intensity of new appliances has declined over 
the past two decades - new refrigerators in the US were 65% 
less energy-intensive in 1993 than in 1972 (Schipper et a l . , 
1996). 
Primary energy use per square meter of commercial sector 
floor area has gradually declined in most industrial countries, 
despite countervailing trends such as growth in the share of 
electricity, increases in electricity intensity, and reduction in 
fuel use and fuel intensity. Electricity use and intensity per unit 
area increased rapidly in the commercial buildings sector as the 
penetration of computers, other office equipment, air 
conditioning, and lighting grew. Fuel intensity per unit ai-ea 
declined rapidly in industrialized countries as the share of 
energy used for space heating in commercial buildings dropped 
because of thermal improvements in buildings (Krackeler et 
a i , 1998). 
Carbon intensity of the residential sector declined in most 
industrialized countries between 1970 and the early 1990s 
(LBL, 1998). In the commercial sector, CO2 emissions per 
square meter of commercial floor area also dropped in most 
industrialized countries during this period, even though carbon 
intensity per unit area for electric end-uses increased in most 
industrialized countries, dropping only in France, Sweden, and 
Norway - countries that moved away from fossil fuels 
(Krackeler et a l . , 1998). In developing countries, (non-
commercial) biomass is often used in the residential sector, 
especially in rural areas. Increased urbanization, as well as 
increases in incomes and rural electrification, can lead to rising 
carbon intensities in buildings when sustainable biomass use is 
replaced with carbon-intensive fuels such as L P G , coal, and 
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electricity generated by fossil fuels. Conversely, if biomass use 
was previously on an unsustainable basis, the shift toward 
commercial fuels can lower carbon intensities. The trend 
toward replacement of biomass fuels by commercial fuels is 
expected to continue in developing countries (lEA, 1995). 
In addition to the energy use in buildings, Tiwari and Parikh 
(1995) drew attention to energy use for buildings construction, 
which accounts for 17% of India's carbon emissions in tenns 
of embodied energy in steel, cement, glass, bricks, etc. 
Typically, this embodied buildings energy is accounted for as 
industrial energy use in energy statistics. Tiwari and Parikh 
(1995) found that in India alternative construction methods 
could save 23% of energy use at 0.03% increase in costs. 
3 . 4 . 2 . 4 . T r a n s p o r t 
The transport sector consumed slightly over 63 EJ, or about 
20% of global primary energy, in 1990. Transport sector 
primary energy use grew at a relatively rapid average annual 
rate of 2.8% between 1971 and 1990, slowing to 1.7% per year 
between 1990 and ¡995. Industrialized countries clearly 
dominate energy consumption in this sector, using 62% of the 
world's transport energy in 1990, followed by REF (16%), 
A L M (12%), and ASIA (10%) regions. The most rapid growth 
was seen in the ASIA countries (5.9% per year) and the A L M 
region (4.6% per year). Transport energy use dropped 
dramatically in the REF region after 1990; by 1995 this region 
only consumed 11% of global transport energy use. Growth in 
transpoit primary energy use also declined slightly in the IND 
region, dropping from an average of 2.2% per year between 
1971 and 1990 to 1.9% per year between 1990 and 1995. High 
growth continued in the ASIA and A L M regions, with the 
ASIA countries increasing to an average of 7.6% per year 
between 1990 and 1995 (BR 1997; l E A , 1997a; l E A , 1997b). 
Influences on G H G emissions from the transport sector are 
often divided into those that affect activity levels (travel and 
freight movements) and those that affect technology (energy 
efficiency, carbon intensity of fuel, emission factors for nitrous 
oxide (NjO), etc.). The various driving forces and their effects 
are reviewed in detail in the IPCC Working Group II (WGII) 
Second Assessment Report (SAR) (Michaelis et a l . , 1996). 
In aggregate, transport patterns are closely related to economic 
activity, infrastructure, settlement pattems, and prices of fuels 
and vehicles. They are also related to communication links. At 
the household level, travel is affected by transport costs, 
income, household size, local settlement patterns, the 
occupation of the head of the household, household make-up, 
and location (Jansson, 1989; Hensher et a l . , 1990; Walls et a l . , 
1993). People in higher-skilled occupations that require higher 
levels of education are more price- and income-responsive in 
their transport energy demand than people in lower-skilled 
occupations (Greening and Jeng, 1994; Greening et a l . , 1994). 
Urban layout both affects and is affected by the predominant 
transport systems. It is also strongly influenced by other factors 
such as people's preference for living in low-density areas, 
close to parks or other green spaces, away from industry, and 
close to schools and other services. Travel pattems may be 
influenced by many factors, including the size of the 
settlements, proximity to other settlements, location of 
workplaces, provision of local facilities, and car ownership. A 
survey of cities around the world (Newman and Kenworthy, 
1990) found that population density strongly and inversely 
correlates with transport energy use. 
Many studies have examined the response of car travel and 
gasoline demand to gasoline price, and are reviewed, for 
example, in Michaelis (1996) and Michaelis et a l . (1996). Such 
studies typically find a measurable reduction in fuel demand, 
distance traveled, car sales, and energy intensity in response to 
fuel price increases. Studies of freight transport found 
relatively small short-term impacts of diesel price increases, 
and often produced results that were inconclusive or 
statistically insignificant. Over the longer term, price 
responsiveness is generally assumed to be larger because of 
possible technology responses. 
A n important influence on future travel may be the 
development of telecommunication technologies. In some 
instances, improved communication can substitute for travel 
as people can work at home or shop via the intemet. In others, 
communication can help to increase travel by enabling 
friendships and working relationships to develop over long 
distances, and by permitting people to stay in touch with their 
homes and offices while traveling. To the extent that 
improvements in telecommunication technology stimulate the 
economy, they are likely to result in increased freight 
transport. 
Energy intensity in the transport sector is measured as energy 
used per passenger-km for passenger transport and per ton-km 
for freight transport. Transport energy projections typically 
incorporate a reduction in fleet energy intensity in the range 0.5 
to 2% per year (Grübler et a l , 1993b; l E A , 1993; Walsh, 
1993). On-road energy intensity (fuel consumption per 
kilometer driven) of Hght-duty passenger vehicles in North 
America fell by nearly 2% per year between 1970 and 1990, to 
about 13 to 14 liters per 100 kilometers, but it is now stationary 
or rising. In other industrialized countries, changes in on-road 
fuel consumption from 1970 to the present were quite small. 
The average on-road energy intensity in North America was 
85% higher than that in Europe in 1970, but only 25 to 30% 
higher by the mid-1990s (Schipper, 1996). 
In some countries, such as Italy and France, where fleet 
average energy intensity has fallen during the past 20 years, the 
energy intensity of car travel (MJ/passenger-km) has increased 
as a result of declining car occupancy and the increasing use of 
more efficient diesel vehicles (Schipper et a l , 1993). However, 
conversion to diesel has been encouraged by low duties on 
diesel fuel relative to those on gasoline. The lower costs of 
driving diesel vehicles may have acted as a significant stimulus 
to travel by diesel car owners, and so offset much of the energy 
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saved from their high-energy efficiency. A more recent trend, 
though, is toward higher energy intensity in new cars in 
countries such as the US, Germany, and Japan (lEA, 1993). 
Factors in the recent increases in energy intensity include the 
trend toward larger cars, increasing engine size, and the use of 
increasingly power-hungry accessories (Martin and Shock, 
1989; Difiglio et a l . , 1990; Greene and Duleep, 1993; l E A , 
1993). 
Average truck energy use per ton-km of freight moved has 
shown little sign of reduction during the past 20 years in 
countries for which data are available (Schipper et a l . , 1993). 
Energy use is typically in the region 0.7 to 1.4 MJ/ton-km for 
the heaviest trucks but can be in excess of 5 MJ/ton-km for 
smaller trucks. In countries where services and light industry 
are growing faster than heavy industry, the share of small 
trucks or vans in road freight is increasing. Along with the 
increasing power-to-weight ratios of goods vehicles, these 
trends offset, and in some cases outweigh, the benefits of 
improved engine and vehicle technology (Delsey, 1991). 
Energy intensity tends to be lower in countries with large 
heavy-industry sectors, because a high proportion of goods 
traffic is made up of bulk materials or primary commodities. 
Air traffic grew about three times as fast as GDP in the early 
1970s, but only about twice as fast since the early 1980s. After 
allowing for the effects of continually falling prices, the 
elasticity of the 10-year average growth rate with respect to the 
10-year average GDP growth is not much more than 1.0 
(Michaelis, 1997a). Over the 30 years to 1990, the average 
energy intensity of the civil aircraft fleet fell by about 2.7% per 
year. The fastest reduction, of about 4% per year, was in the 
period 1974 to 1988. The large reductions in energy intensity 
during the 1970s and 1980s resulted partly from developments 
in the technology used for new aircraft in the rapidly expanding 
civil aircraft fleet and partly from increases in aircraft load 
factor (passengers per seat or percentage of cargo capacity 
filled). The aircraft weight load factor increased from 49% in 
1972 to 59% in 1990, but nearly all of this rise occurred during 
the 1970s (ICAO, 1995a, 1995b). 
Transport sector carbon intensities for personal travel, 
measured as the ratio of emissions to passenger-km traveled, 
increased in most European countries and Japan between 1972 
and 1994. This increase resulted from falling load factors 
(persons per vehicle), which were greater than improvements 
in vehicle energy intensity. The only exception among 
industrialized countries was the US, where carbon intensities 
dropped from 55 kgC/passenger-km in 1972 to 46 
kgC/passenger-km in 1994 (lEA, 1997c; Schipper et a l . , 
1997a). Carbon intensity of freight travel, measured as the ratio 
of emissions to ton-km transported, rose slightly in a number 
of industrialized countries between 1972 and 1994, mostly 
because of modal shifts to more carbon-intensive trucks 
(Schipper et a l . , 1997b). As mobility increases in developing 
countries, transport emissions could rise dramatically. 
Ramanathan and Parikh (1999) indicate passenger traffic 
growth at 8% per year and train traffic growth at 5% per year 
for India. They found that efficiency improvements could 
reduce future energy demand by 26%. I f in addition, the modal 
split changes in favor of public transport modes, these authors 
estimate a 45% reduction in energy demand (Ramanathan and 
Parikh, 1999). 
Fuels used to power transport are typically oil-based, except 
for rail, for which shifts toward electrified systems can lower 
carbon intensities depending upon the source of fuel for 
electricity generation in the country. In France, for example, 
the move toward electrified rail based on electricity generated 
by nuclear power led to lower carbon intensities (lEA, 1997c). 
Increased use of diesel engines can reduce CO2 emissions, but 
leads to greater emissions of other gaseous pollutants, such as 
NjO and carbon monoxide (CO). Use of alternative fuels, such 
as compressed natural gas, L P G , and ethanol, can significantiy 
reduce COj emissions from transport (lEA, 1995). 
3 . 4 . 3 . Energy Resources 
3 . 4 . 3 . 1 . Fo.ssil a n d F i s s i l e Resources 
The term energy resource can be defined as "the occurrence of 
material in recognizable form" (WEC, 1995a) - it is 
essentially the amount of oil, gas, coal, etc., in the ground. In 
the IPCC WGII SAR (energy primer, see Nakicenovic et a l . , 
1996) a further definitional distinction was made. Resources 
were defined as those occurrences considered "potentially 
recoverable with foreseeable technological and economic 
developments" and any additional amounts not considered as 
potentially recoverable were referred to as "occun'ences." A n 
energy reserve is a portion of the total, and depends on 
exploration to locate and evaluate a resource and on the 
availability of a technology to extract some of the resource at 
acceptable cost. Proved oil reserves, for example, are defined 
as "those quantities which geological and engineering 
information indicates with reasonable certainty can be 
recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing 
economic and operating conditions" (BP, 1996). Thus, 
reserves can increase with exploration (new or better 
information), engineering advances (better economic and 
operating conditions), and higher prices (better economic 
conditions). In essence, reserves are "replenished" by shifting 
volumes from the resource into the reserve category. Reserves 
can also be depleted through production and can decrease with 
lower prices. Throughout this section the size of reserve and 
resource figures are expressed in EJ or ZJ (i.e. 10^' J, or 1000 
EJ). 
For SRES the fossil resource categorization used is reserves, 
resources, and additional occuirences. The definition of BP 
(1996) was adopted for reserves. Resources are those 
hydrocarbon occurences with uncertain geologic assurance or 
that lack economic attractiveness. Finally, all other 
hydrocarbons that do not fall within the reserve and resource 
categories are aggregated in the category "additional 
occuirences" (i.e., occurrences that have a high degree of 
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T a b l e 3-5: G l o b a l f o s s i l a n d fissile energy reserves, r e s o u r c e s , a n d o c c u r r e n c e s ( i n ZJ (10'^^J)). G l o b a l a n d r e g i o n a l estimates 
a r e discussed i n d e t a i l i n Rogner ( 1 9 9 7 ) a n d G r e g o r y a n d Rogner ( 1 9 9 8 ) . 
Consumption 
1860-1990 1990 
Reserves 
Identified 
Conventional 
Resources 
Remaining to be 
Discovered 
Low High 
Recoverable 
with 
Technological 
Progress 
Additional 
Occurrences 
O i l 
Conventional 
Unconventional 
3.35 0.13 6.3 
7.1 
1.6 5.9 
9 >15 
Gas 
Conventional 
Unconventional 
Hydrates 
1.70 0.07 5.4 
6.9 
9.4 22.6 
20 
>10 
>22 
>800 
C o a l 5.20 0.09 22.9 80 >150 
T o t a l 10.25 0.29 48.6 >11.0 >28.5 >109 >987 
N u c l e a r 0.21 0.02 2.0 >11 > 1,000 
geologic uncertainty, are not recoverable with current or 
foreseeable technology, or are economically unwaiTanted at 
present). 
The assessment is summarized in Table 3-5. This account of 
fossil resources needs to be put in context with the long-run 
demand for these fuels and their relative production 
economics. It is the specific demand for these fuels that 
"converts" resources into reserves (Odell, 1997, 1998, 1999). 
Obviously, this is a dynamic process that, in addition to future 
demand trajectories, depends on advances in taiowledge and 
technological progress. The discussion of oil reserves below 
applies to all hydrocarbon and nuclear resources. 
In terms of exploration, the oil industry is relatively mature and 
the quantity of additional reserves that remain to be discovered 
is unclear . One group argues that few new oil fields are being 
discovered, despite the surge in drilling activity from 1978 to 
1986, and that most of the increases in reserves results from 
revisions of underestimated existing reserves (Ivanhoe and 
Leckie, 1993; Laherrere, 1994; Campbell, 1997; Hatfield, 
1997). Laherrere (1994) puts ultimately recoverable oil 
resources at about 10 ZJ (1800 billion baiTcls), including 
production to date. Adelman and Lynch (1997), while 
accepting some aspects in the propositions behind the 
pessimistic view of reserves, point to previous pessimistic 
estimates that have been wrong. They argue that "there are 
huge amounts of hydrocarbons in the earth's crust" and that 
"estimates of declining reserves and production are incurably 
wrong because they treat as a quantity what is really a dynamic 
process driven by growing knowledge." Smith and Robinson 
(1997) note improvements in technology, such as 3D seismic 
surveys and extended reach (e.g. horizontal) drilling, that have 
improved recovery rates from existing reservoirs and made 
profitable the development of fields previously regarded as 
uneconomic. Both of these increase reserves and lower costs. 
The various arguments and assessments are reviewed in greater 
detail in Gregory and Rogner (1998). To include all these views 
and to reflect uncertainty, future reserves availability cannot be 
represented by single numbers. Instead, a range of values that 
reflect the optimistic and pessimistic assumptions on extent 
and success rates of exploration activities, as well as the future 
evolution of prices and technology, needs to be considered for 
a scenario approach. To this end, the estimates of Masters et a l . 
(1994) reflect the current state of knowledge as to the 
uncertainties in future potentials for conventional oil resources. 
These estimates assess conventional oil reserves at slighdy 
above 6 ZJ, and a corresponding range of additionally 
recoverable resources between 1.6 and 5.9 ZJ. The figures 
include estimates of oil that is yet to be discovered. 
In addition to conventional oil reserves and resources, oil 
shales, natural bitumen, and heavy crude oil, together called 
unconventional oil resources, have previously been defined as 
occurrences that cannot be tapped by conventional production 
methods for technical or economic reasons, or both (Rogner, 
1996, 1997). In part these resources represent some of the huge 
amounts of hydrocarbons in the earth's cmst that Adelman and 
Lynch (1997) refer to. Technologies to extract some of these 
resources competitively at current market conditions are now 
developed and production has started in countries such as 
Canada and Venezuela. Masters et a l . (1987) put total 
recoverable resources of heavy and extra heavy crude oil at 3 
ZJ, recoverable resources of bitumen at 2 ZJ, and ultimate 
resources of shale oil in place at 79 ZJ (they do not estimate 
the proportion of shale oil that might be recovered and hence 
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give resources in place). The extent to which these 
unconventional resources might be defined as reserves in the 
future depends on the continued development of technologies 
to extract them at acceptable costs. Nakicenovic et a l . (1996) 
in IPCC WGII SAR assess all unconventional oil reserves at 
7.1 ZJ, with an additional 20 ZJ of unconventional oil 
resources estimated to be recoverable with foreseeable 
technological progress. 
Estimates of ultimately recoverable reserves of gas are less 
controversial than those for oil. Proved reserves are high, both 
in relation to current production (BP, 1996) and to cumulative 
production to date (Masters et a l . , 1994). Masters et a l . (1994) 
and Ivanhoe and Leckie (1993) note that gas discoveries need 
to be matched to an infrastructure for gas consumption, which 
is currently lacking in many parts of the world. Hence, 
exploration has been limited and the potential for discoveries 
of major quantities of gas in the 2P ' century is high. Estimates 
of gas reserves and resources are being revised continuously. 
The most up-to-date information is represented by the figures 
of the Intemational Gas Union (IGU, 1997a), which give 
conventional gas reserves of 5.4 ZJ plus 9.4 ZJ additional 
reserves, including gas yet to be discovered. On the basis of 
IGU comments that some of their regional estimates of 
reserves are extremely conservative, Gregory and Rogner 
(1998) suggest an optimistic estimate for ultimately 
recoverable reserves of 28 ZJ (5.4 ZJ reserves plus 22.6 ZJ 
additional reserves, including quantities to be discovered), 
using the same ratio of optimistic to pessimistic reserves as 
Masters et a l . (1994). 
In addition to conventional reserves, reviews of the literature 
indicate very substantial amounts of unconventional gas 
occurrences. Rogner (1996, 1997) estimated resources in place 
for coal-bed methane (CH^) of 10 ZJ, gas from fractured shale 
of 17 ZJ, tight formation gas of 7 ZJ, gas remaining i n s i t u after 
production of 5 ZJ, and clathrates at some 980 ZJ. The 
magnitude of these estimates is also confirmed in IPCC WGII 
SAR (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1996), which gives 6.9 ZJ 
unconventional gas as current reserves, and an additional 20 ZJ 
as recoverable with current or foreseeable improvements in 
technologies. The largest resource occurrence of all fossil fuels 
(even exceeding coal) is estimated to be methane clathrates. 
Also called hydrates, methane clathrates represent gas locked 
in frozen ice-like crystals that probably cover a significant 
proportion of the ocean floor and have been found in numerous 
locations in continental permafrost areas. Technologies to 
recover these resources economically could be developed in 
the future, if demand for natural gas continues to grow in the 
longer run, in which case gas resource availability would 
increase enormously. The implications of such developments 
are considered in some of the SRES scenarios. 
Coal reserves are different in character to oil and gas - coal 
occurs in seams, often covers large areas, and relatively limited 
exploration is required to provide a reasonable estimate of coal 
in place. Total coal in place is estimated at about 220-280 ZJ 
(WEC, 1995a; Rogner, 1996; 1997; Gregory and Rogner, 
1998). Of this total, about 22.9 ZJ are classified as recoverable 
reserves (WEC, 1995a; 1998), over 200 times current 
production levels. The question is the extent to which 
additional resources can be upgraded to reserves. W E C (1995a; 
1998) estimates additional recoverable reserves at about 80 ZJ, 
although it is not clear under what conditions these reserves 
would become economically attractive. Over 90% of their 
estimate of total reserves occur in just six countries, with 70% 
in the Russian Federation alone. Further coal resources are 
known to exist in various countries, some of which might be 
exploitable in the future, perhaps at high cost. However, in 
some countries the environmental damage from coal mining 
will prevent possible additional reserves being developed. In 
the IPCC w o n SAR, Nakicenovic et a l (1996) estimate that, 
in addition to today's reserves, a further 89 ZJ could, at least in 
principle, be mined with technological advances, a ligure in 
agreement with the W E C (1998) estimates. 
The picture for uranium and thorium reserves is different 
again. Current proved uranium reserves recoverable at less 
than US$130/kg amount to some 3.38 million tons (WEC, 
1998) or 2 ZJ in once-through fuel cycles. This extractable 
thermal energy would be some 60 times larger if reprocessing 
and fast breeder reactors are used (Ishitani and Johansson, 
1996). These reserves are sufficient to meet the needs of an 
expanded nuclear program well into the 2 U ' century, even 
without reprocessing and fast breeder reactors. The 
ultimately recoverable global natural uranium resource base 
is currently estimated at around 29 million tons, which 
con-esponds to 17 ZJ without reprocessing and about 1000 ZJ 
with reprocessing and fast breeder reactors (Nakicenovic et 
a i , 1996). Additionally, very limited exploration for new 
reserves has occuiTed in recent yeai-s because of the relative 
abundance of existing known reserves and the drop of real 
uranium prices from US$150/kg in 1980 to about US$30/kg 
in 1996. The exploration and development of uranium 
deposits today is probably on a par with that of the oil 
industry 100 years ago, while thorium occurrences have 
hardly been assessed. Uranium and thorium are minerals 
contained in deposits in the Earth's crust and their long-term 
availability wi l l be determined by the same process 
dynamics, in terms of knowledge and technology advances, 
as for their hydrocarbon counterparts. Once new reserves are 
required, given the comparison with the oil industry over the 
past 100 years, the potential for exploration to yield major 
discoveries at acceptable cost is enormous. From the 
perspective of occurrence alone, uranium resources are 
already known to be immense, especially if low-
concentration sources such as seawater or granite rock are 
considered. In summary, the development of nuclear power 
throughout the 2 P ' century, even based only on once-through 
reactors, is unlikely to be constrained by uranium (or 
thorium) resource limitations. 
3 . 4 . 3 . 2 . Renewable Resources 
A review of medium-term (to 2025) and long-tenn (up to 2100) 
potentials of renewable energy is given in IPCC WGII SAR 
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T a b l e 3-6: G l o b a l r e n e w a b l e energy p o t e n t i a l s f o r 2 0 2 0 t o 2 0 2 5 , m a x i m u m t e c h n i c a l p o t e n t i a l s , a n d a n n u a l f l o w s , i n EJ. D a t a 
sources: W a t s o n et a l . . 1 9 9 6 ; E n q u e t e - K o m m i s s i o n , 1 9 9 0 ? 
Consumption Potentials by Long-term Technical Annual 
1860-1990 1990 2020-2025 Potentials Flows 
Hydro 560 21 35-55 >130 >400 
Geothermal - <1 4 >20 >800 
Wind - - 7-10 >130 >200,000 
Ocean - - 2 >20 >300 
Solar - - 16-22 >2,600 >3,000,000 
Biomass 1,150 55 72-137 > 1,300 >3,000 
Total 1,710 76 130-230 >4,200 >3,000,000 
(Nakicenovic e t a l . , 1996) and shown in Table 3-6. A summary 
of the literature of renewable resource development potentials 
consistent with IPCC WGII SAR, including a detailed regional 
breakdown, is given in Christiansson (1995) and Neij (1997). 
Hydropower cun'ently provides some of the cheapest electricity 
available in the world, although the potential for new capacity 
is limited in some regions. W E C (1994, 1995a) estimates the 
gross world potential for hydroelectric schemes at about 144 EJ 
per year, of which about 47 EJ per year is technically feasible 
for development, about 32 EJ per year is economically feasible 
at present, and about 8 EJ per year is currently in operation. 
IPCC WGII SAR (Nakicenovic e t a l , 1996) gives a comparable 
medium-teiTn potential of between 13 and 55 EJ, and a 
maximum technical potential above 130 EJ. 
Other important renewable energy resources are wind and 
solar, as well as modem forms of biomass use. Biomass 
resources a r e potentially the largest renewable global energy 
source, with an annual primary production of 220 billion oven 
dry tons (ODT) or 4500 EJ (Hall and Rosillo-Calle, 1998). 
The annual bioenergy potential is estimated to be in the order 
of 2900 EJ, of which 270 EJ could currently be considered 
available on a sustainable basis (Hall and Rosillo-Calle, 1998). 
Hall and Rao (1994) conclude that the biomass challenge is 
not one of availability but of the sustainable management, 
conversion, and delivery to the market place in the form of 
modem and affordable energy services. It is also important to 
distinguish between harvesting and deforestation; the fonner 
results in afforestation, and the latter in conversion of forest 
land for other uses, such as agriculture or urban development. 
The use of biomass as an energy source necessitates the use of 
land. Based on estimates by I IASA-WEC (1995), by 2100 
about 690-1350 million hectares of additional land would be 
needed to support future biomass energy requirements for a 
high-growth scenario. However, the additional land 
requirement for agriculture is estimated to reach 1700 million 
hectares during the same period. These land requirements can 
^ A l l estimates, excluding biomass, have been converted into thermal 
equivalents with an average factor of 38.5%. 
be fulfilled if the potential additiofial arable land is taken into 
account (at present this is mostly covered by forest). Hence, 
land-use conflicts could arise, and particularly for Asia which 
is projected to require its entire potential of arable land by 
2100. Africa and Latin America may have sufficient land to 
support an expanded biomass program. One estimate (WEC, 
1994) shows that Africa can support the production of biomass 
energy equivalent to 115% of its current energy consumption 
(8.6 EJ). 
Some authors stress that increased demand for bioenergy could 
compete with food production (Azar and Bemdes, 1999). They 
note that the competitiveness between food and bioenergy 
production is not realistic in most energy-economy models; 
rather it is treated in an a d hoc fashion with the assumption that 
enough land is secured for food production. In reality an 
increasing competitiveness of bioenergy plantations may cause 
food prices to jump. Some developing regions, in particular 
Africa, are often assumed in scenarios to become major 
importers of food (Azar and Bemdes, 1999). 
Unlike hydropower, most of the technologies that could 
harness these renewable energy fonns are in their infancy and 
are generally still high cost (although wind power is becoming 
increasingly competitive in some areas). Conversely, the 
potential for improvement in technical performance and costs 
is substantial. Thus, the future resource potential of these 
renewables is lai'gely determined by advances in technologies 
and economics (discussed in Section 3.4.4). 
Advances in renewable energy technologies could materialize 
to a significant extent even in the absence of climate policies, 
a l b e i t conventional wisdom holds that such policies could 
accelerate their dilfusion considerably. According to IPCC 
WGII SAR (Nakicenovic et a l , 1996), in the medium-term (to 
2025) the largest renewable energy potentials lie in the 
development of modem biomass (70 to 140 EJ), solar (16 to 22 
EJ), and wind energy (7 to 10 EJ) as indicated in Table 3-6. In 
the long term the maximum technical energy supply potential 
for renewable energy is evidently solar (>2,600 EJ), followed 
by biomass (>1,300EJ). 
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3 . 4 . 3 . 3 . C o n c l u s i o n 
Comparatively few scenarios in the literature explicitly consider 
the inteiplay between resource availability and technological 
change, and hence the possibilities of wide-ranging alternative 
futures of fossil and renewable resource use. For fossil fuels, 
altemative resource development scenarios are described in 
Ausubel et a l . (1988), Edmonds and Barns (1992), 
I I A S A - W E C (1995), Nakicenovic et a l . (1998a), and 
SchoUenberger (1998). For renewable energy resources, 
scenarios of enhanced resource development are described in 
Goldemberg et a l . (1988), Johansson et a l . (1993), Lazaras et 
a l . (1993). Watson e t a l . (1996), and Nakicenovic e t a l . (1998a). 
A critical issue in the context of this report is how to capture 
altemative future 1п1еф1ау8 between energy technology and 
resource development, in contrast to the more traditional 
approach of assuming fixed resource quantities across all 
scenarios. This is important because the literature reviewed 
above indicates that resource availability can vary widely. For 
instance, generally oil and gas are considered the most 
constrained fossil fuel resources. Yet, a representative range 
from the literature gives cumulative production levels between 
1990 and 2100 of between 21 and 65 ZJ, with typical 
intermediate scenarios of 30-35 ZJ (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998a; 
SchoUenberger, 1998). The extreme values of cumulative 
resource use are evidently inversely related between different 
energy sources across the range of altemative scenarios. For 
instance, in scenarios with high availability of oil and gas, 
typically the use of coal or renewable resources is more limited, 
whereas in scenarios of rapid development of renewable 
alternatives, the use of fossil resources is more limited. In other 
words, future resource availability of fossil fuels as well as 
renewables is c o n s t r u c t e d in scenarios based on current 
understanding and the available literature. Resource availability 
results from altemative policies and strategies in exploration, 
R&D, investments, and the resultant resource development 
efforts. The long lead-times and enormous investments involved 
result in such strategies yielding a cumulative effect, refeiTcd to 
in the technological literature as "lock-in" (see Section 3.4.4). 
Development of alternatives can be furthered, but it can also be 
blocked when policies and investments favor existing resources 
and technologies. The most important long-term issue is how the 
transition away from easily accessible conventional oil (and to a 
lesser extent conventional gas) reserves will unfold. Wil l it lead 
to a massive development of coal in the absence of alternatives 
or, conversely, to a massive development of unconventional oil 
and gas? Alternatively, could the development of post-fossil 
alternatives make the recourse to coal and unconventional oil 
and gas (such as methane clathrates) obsolete? 
3 . 4 . 4 . Energy Supply Technologies 
3 . 4 . 4 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The recent literature on long-term energy and emission 
scenarios increasingly emphasizes that both resource 
availability and technology are inteiTelated and inherently 
dynamic (see, e.g., I IASA-WEC, 1995; Watson et a l . 1996; 
Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998a). The state of the art of theories and 
models of technological change is reviewed in Section 3.4.5. 
The literature suggests that models of endogenous 
technological change are still in their infancy, and that no 
methodologies are established that reduce the substantial 
uncertainties with respect to direction and rates of change of 
future technology developments. Differences in opinions as to 
the likelihood and dynamics of change in future technologies 
will therefore persist. Such future uncertainries are best 
captured by adopting a scenario approach. The following 
discussion on changes in energy supply and end-use 
technologies therefore reviews the literature with emphasis on 
empirically observed historical and conjectured future 
changes. The principal message is that while the future is 
uncertain, the certainty is that future technologies will be 
different from those used today. Hence the most unlikely 
scenario of future development is that of stagnation, or absence 
of change. 
3 . 4 . 4 . 2 . F o s s i l a n d F i s s i l e E n e r g y Supply T e c h n o l o g i e s 
Fossil-fueled power stations traditionally have been designed 
around steam turbines to convert heat into electricity. 
Conversion efficiencies of new power stations can exceed 40% 
(on a lower heating value basis - when the latent heat of steam 
from water in the fuel or the steam arising from the hydrogen 
content of the fuel has been excluded). New designs, such as 
supercritical designs that involve new materials to allow higher 
steam temperatures and pressures, enable efficiencies of close 
to 50%. In the long ran, further improvements might be 
expected. However, the past decade or so has seen the dramatic 
breakthrough of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs). The 
technology involves expanding very hot combustion gases 
through a gas turbine with the waste heat in the exhaust gases 
used to generate steam for a steam turbine. The gas turbine can 
withstand much higher inlet temperatures than a steam turbine, 
which produces considerable increases in overall efficiency. 
The latest designs currently under construction can achieve 
efficiencies of over 60%, a figure that has been rising by over 
1% per year for a decade. The low capital costs and high 
availability of CCGTs also make them highly desirable to 
power station operators. Gregory and Rogner (1998) estimate 
that maximum efficiencies of 71 to 73% are achievable within 
a reasonable period (on a lower heating basis; around 65 to 
68% on a higher heating basis). 
CCGTs can also be used with more difficult fuels, such as coal 
and biomass, by adding a gasifier to the front end to form an 
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) power station. 
The gases need to be hot cleaned prior to combustion to avoid 
energy losses and this is one of the key areas of development. 
The added benefit is that coal flue gas desulfurization (FGD) 
becomes unnecessary as sulfur is removed before the 
combustion stage. In addition to FGD and IGCC, fluidized bed 
combustion (FBC) technology facilitates sulfur abatement 
(adding limestone during combustion to retain sulfur) and 
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allows the utilization of low quality fossil fuels because of the 
high sulfur retention capacity. However, FGD reduces overall 
conversion efficiencies (i.e., increases COj emissions). Also, 
both FGD and F B C sulfur abatement technologies use calcium 
carbonate to reduce emissions, which increases CO2 emissions 
because of CaO liberation from CaCOj capture. The use of 
high sulfur coals in F B C requires high limestone consumption, 
which results in increased C O ^ emissions. Only IGCC reduces 
SO2 and C O T emissions, because of the higher power 
generation efficiency. 
Biomass is particularly suited to gasification. Stoll and Todd 
(1996) and Willerboer (1997) estimate that current designs for 
coal are around 9% less efficient than a standard C C G T 
burning gas. Developments to reduce heat losses through better 
heat recovery and by hot gas cleaning could potentially 
increase efficiency significantly in the next 10 to 15 years, and 
the technology can yield efficiencies of 51% now and perhaps 
65% in the longer run. 
The major potential competitor to CCGT technology is the fuel 
cell, which may be able to offer similar efficiencies at much 
lower plant sizes and so may be an ideal candidate for 
distributed combined heat and power generation. Another 
promising fuel cell application is vehicle propulsion. In 
contrast to other fossil-sourced electricity generation, fuel cells 
(similar to batteries) convert the chemical energy of fuels 
electrochemically (i.e., without combustion) into electricity 
and heat, and thus offer considerably higher conversion 
efficiencies than intemal combustion engines. In the past, high 
costs and durability problems have restricted their use to some 
highly specialized applications, such as electricity generation 
in space. Recent advances in fuel cell technology, however, 
have led to their commercial production and application in 
niche markets for distributed combined heat and power 
production (Penner et a l . , 1995). 
Although operating internally on hydrogen, fuel cells can be 
fueled with a hydrocarbon fuel, such as natural gas, methanol, 
gasoHne, or even coal. Before entering the fuel cells, these 
fuels would be converted on-site or on-board into hydrogen via 
steam reforming, partial oxidation, or gasification and 
hydrogen separation. In the longer ran and to make fuel cells 
truly zero-emission devices, non-fossil derived pure hydrogen, 
supplied and stored as compressed gas, cryogenic fiquid, metal 
hydrate, or other storage foiTn, could replace hydrocarbon 
fuels. Current fuel cell conversion efficiencies (45 to 50%) 
have yet to approach their potentials; some designs report 
efficiencies as high as 60% electrical efficiency in simple 
systems and 74% total efficiency in hybrid fuel cell and gas 
combined cycle systems (FETC, 1997). Hydrogen production 
efficiencies range from 65 to 85% for fossil-based systems, 55 
to 73% for biomass-based systems, and 80% to close to 90% 
for electrolysis (Ouellette e t a l . , 1995; Williams, 1998). 
Nuclear power is a proven technology that provides 17% of 
global electricity supply. There is currentiy no consensus 
concerning the future role of nuclear power. While it stagnates 
in Europe and North America, it continues as a strong option in 
a number of Asian countries and countries undergoing 
economic reform. Economics and security of supply are 
considerations in the choice of nuclear power, along with its 
environmental trade-offs - on a full energy chain basis, from 
mining to waste disposal and decommissioning, nuclear power 
emits littie G H G emissions. 
Public opinion is opposed to the use of nuclear power in many 
countries because of concems regarding operating safety, final 
disposal of high-level radioactive waste, and proliferation of 
weapon-grade fissile materials, as well as uranium mining and 
its environmental implications. These concerns, perceived or 
real, cannot be ignored if nuclear power is to regain the 
position of an accepted technology. In addition, changed 
market conditions call for new reactor technologies - smaller 
in scale, reduced construction periods, and improved 
economics with no compromise in safety. The industry is 
striving continuously to develop advanced reactor designs of 
much lower cost and with inherent safety concepts (i.e., 
designs that make safety less dependent on specifically 
activated technology components and human performance). 
The latest reactor technology already prevents the release of 
fission products or health-damaging radiation to the 
environment even under highly unlikely severe accident 
conditions. 
The 1998 update of the OECD cost comparison for power 
plants expected to be commercially available around 2005 
reports nuclear generating cost in the range 2.5 to 9.0 c/kWh 
(US cents per kilowatt-hour), depending on location, type of 
reactor, plant factor, plant life time, discount rate, and 
underlying fuel price escalation (OECD, 1998c). 
Reconciliation of the assumptions of the OECD report with 
those used in the IPCC WGII SAR leads to an almost identical 
cost range of 2.9 to 5.4 c/kWh, at 5% discount rate, and 7.7 
c/kWh, at 10% discount rate (Ishitani and Johansson, 1996). 
3 . 4 . 4 . 3 . Renewable E n e r g y T e c h n o l o g i e s 
Since the birth of the modem wind power industry in the mid-
1970s, it has seen a continuous chain of innovations and cost 
reductions. Christiansson (1995) discusses a leaming curve 
that relates cost reductions to installed capacity. She notes that 
the experience curve for die USA indicates a progress ratio of 
0.84 (i.e., for each doubling of installed capacity, costs of new 
installations are reduced to 0.84 of the previous level). In the 
U K , developers have the opportunity to bid to supply 
renewable electricity to the grid under the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation. In 1998, the average bid price for large wind power 
schemes was about 5 c/kWh, nearly 20% lower than in 1996 
(ENDS, 1998). The bids are made on a full commercial cost 
basis and they indicate that wind energy is cheaper than most 
of its competitors for new schemes in the U K for modest 
increments of capacity. (The exception is gas-powered CCGT 
generation.) However, wind, by nature, is intermittent and 
back-up capacity wil l be required as the proportion of 
electricity provided by wind increases, which reduces its 
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economic attractiveness. Large integrated electricity systems 
and systems tiiat contain significant amounts of hydropower 
(especially with storage) are able to cope with the fluctuations 
in wind power best (Grubb and Meyer, 1993; Johansson et a l . , 
1993). 
Solar voltaic power is on a similar learning curve to wind, with 
progress ratios of 0.82 in the U S A and 0.81 in Japan 
(Christiansson, 1995; Watanabe, 1997). Various altemative 
technologies are being developed and solar voltaics can be 
envisaged as providing electricity through large arrays of cells 
in central power generation, through arrays built into cladding 
or roofing on buildings, or through single arrays to meet 
specific puфoses. In this last form, solar cells have already 
established themselves as economic and reliable power sources 
in the provision of light, clean water, and improved health 
services to isolated rural communities (WEC, 1994). Based on 
the principle of a leaming curve, solar cell costs are expected 
to fall as capacity builds. For example, the US Department of 
Energy projects costs to fall from 38-55 c/kWh in 1995 to 
3.5-5 c/kWh in 2030 (US DOE, 1994). For another system, 
WEC estimates costs to fall from 13-23 c/kWh in 1990 to 5-10 
c/kWh in 2020 (WEC, 1994). 
Biomass, particularly wood, has been the main initial source of 
energy as countries develop and remains a substantial energy 
source in many developing countries (WEC, 1994). In addition 
to this, byproducts of agriculture and forestry can be useful 
sources of energy. The extent to which biomass can contribute 
beyond this to provide energy crops for use in, say, power 
stations or for conversion into liquid fuels depends firstly on 
the competition for land with agriculture for food production. 
This, in tum, depends on improved productivity in food 
production, the amount and type of meat and other animal 
(e.g., dairy) products in the diet, and the growth in human 
population. The future contribution of biomass will also 
depend on increased productivity in biomass production 
coupled with limitations in energy input to grow, harvest, and 
use energy crops (Ishitani and Johansson, 1996; Leemans, 
1996). Current costs of biomass (for a eucalyptus plantation in 
Uruguay) are typically put at US$1.8/GJ with projected costs 
of US$1.4/GJ and productivity at 360GJAiectare per year 
(Shell Intemational Ltd.. 1996). Agricuhural productivity is 
also growing at 2% per year with the prospects of a similar 
productivity gain for energy crops (Shell Intemational Ltd., 
1996). W E C (1994) notes that Brazil has had a program to 
grow sugar cane to produce transport fuel since the mid 1970s 
and that production has reached 62% of the country's needs; 
this may be one option for wider use as the availability of 
conventional oil starts to fall. 
Finally, other forms of renewable energy, such as geothemial 
energy, tidal energy, wave energy, ocean thermal energy 
conversion, and solar thermal power plants, could make 
significant contributions at some stage in the future, as 
geothermal energy already does in specific markets. Also, 
technologies and processes that lead to carbon sequestration as 
a by-product include enhanced oil recovery using CO2 to 
improve the viscosity of crude oil or reforestation for reasons 
of soil preservation (Ishitani and Johansson, 1996). 
3 . 4 . 4 . 4 . C o m b i n e d H e a t a n d P o w e r P r o d u c t i o n 
( C o g e n e r a t i o n ) 
The fuel effectiveness of all energy conversion processes that 
involve combustion, but also of fuel cells, can be raised 
substantially by combined heat and power generation. Utilities 
located in the vicinity of urban areas may divert the waste heat 
from combustion for residential or commercial heating puфoses. 
Industrial producers of high-temperature process heat may 
consider the generation of electricity when process temperature 
requirements are lower than the temperatures supplied. Combined 
heat and power production can accomplish fuel utilization rates of 
90% or more (Ishitani and Johansson, 1996). 
3.4.5. Understanding and M o d e l i n g Technological 
Change 
The future direction and rates of technological change are 
uncertain and therefore need to be explored when developing a 
r a n g e of altemative futures (i.e., scenarios). However, it would 
be misleading to resort to simplistic parametric variations of 
scenario assumptions without considering some basic elements 
of the nature of technological change, briefly reviewed here. 
Technological change has often been pictured in linear terms 
that involve several sequential steps: 
• Scientific discovery - an addition to biowledge. 
• Invention - a tested combination of already existing 
knowledge to a useful end. 
• Innovation - an initial and significant application of an 
invention. 
• Improvement of technology characteristics and 
reduction of costs. 
• Spread of an innovation, usually accompanied by 
improvement. 
However, this model places undue emphasis on the role of 
basic R & D and scientific knowledge as precursors and 
determinants of innovation. It also understates the role of 
interactions among different actors and between the five 
functions listed above. The emphasis in recent innovation 
literature is placed more on a "chain-link" model of innovation, 
exploiting interactions between firms' R & D departments, and 
various stages of production and marketing (Dosi, 1988; 
Freeman, 1994). Lane and Maxfield (1995) emphasize the role 
of "generative" relationships in creativity. 
Technological change is linked to the economic and cultural 
environment beyond the innovating firm in many ways, as 
described by Landes (1969), Mokyr (1990), Rosenberg (1982, 
1994, 1997), Rostow (1990), and Grübler (1998a). Innovations 
are highly context-specific; they emerge from local capabilities 
and needs, evolve from existing designs, and conform to 
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standards imposed by complementary technologies and 
infrastructure. Successful innovations may spread 
geographically and also fulfill much broader functions. The 
classic example is the steam engine, developed as a means of 
pumping water out of deep mines in Cornwall, England, but to 
become the main source of industrial motive power and the key 
technology in the rail revolution worldwide. 
Numerous examples can be used to demonstrate the mossiness, 
or complexity, of innovation processes (e.g., Griibler, 1998a; 
Rosenberg, 1994). But even if the innovation process is messy, 
at least some general features or "stylized facts" can be 
identified (Dosi, 1988; Grübler, 1998a): 
• The process is fundamentally uncertain: outcomes 
cannot be predicted. 
• Innovation draws on underlying scientific or other 
knowledge. 
• Some kind of search or experimentation process is 
usually involved. 
• Many innovations depend on the exploitation of "tacit 
knowledge" obtained through "leaming by doing" or 
experience. 
• Technological change is a cumulative process and 
depends on the history of the individual or organization 
involved. 
These five features render some individuals, firms, or countries 
better at innovation than others. Innovators must be willing and 
able to take risks; have some level of underlying knowledge; 
have the means and resources to undertake a search process; 
may need relevant experience; and may need access to an 
existing body of technology. Many of these features introduce 
positive feedback into the innovation process, so that countries 
or firms that take the technological lead in a market or field can 
often retain that lead for a considerable tiine. 
Technological change may be supply driven, demand driven, or 
both (Griibler, 1998a). Some of the most radical innovations 
are designed to respond to the most pressing perceived needs. 
Many technologies have been developed during wartime to 
address resource constraints or military objectives. 
Alternatively, some innovation (e.g., television) is generated 
largely through curiosity or the desire of the innovator to meet 
a technical and intellectual challenge. Market forces (including 
those anticipated in the future) can act as a strong stimulus for 
innovation by firms and entrepreneurs aiming either to reduce 
costs or to gain market share. For example, Michaelis (1997a) 
shows the strong relationship between fuel prices and the rate 
of energy efficiency improvement in the aviation industry; 
Michaelis (1997b) also discusses the effects of the introduction 
of competition on the organizational efficiency of the British 
nuclear industry. 
A l l innovations requhe some social or behavioral change 
(OECD, 1998a). At a minimum, changes in production 
processes require some change in working practices. Product 
innovations, if they are noticeable by the user, demand a 
change in consumer behavior and sometimes in consumer 
preferences. Some product innovations - such as those that 
result in faster computers or more powerful cars - provide 
consumers with more of what they already want. Nevertheless, 
successful marketing may depend on consumer acceptance of 
the new technology. Other innovations - such as altemative 
fuel vehicles or compact fluorescent lights - depend on 
consumers accepting different performance characteristics or 
even redefining their preferences. An important perspective on 
technical change is that of the end-user or consumer of 
products and services. Technology can be seen as a means of 
satisfying human needs. Several conceptual models have been 
developed to describe needs and motivation, although their 
empirical foundations are weak (Douglas et a l . , 1998; Maslow, 
1954; Allardt, 1993). In many cases, a given technology helps 
to satisfy several different types of need, particularly evident in 
two of the most significant areas of energy use: cars and 
houses. This tendency of successful technologies to serve 
multiple needs contributes to lock-in by making it harder for 
competing innovations to replace them fully. Hence, many 
attempts to introduce new energy efficient or alternative fuel 
technologies, especially in the case of the car, have failed 
because of a failure to meet a l l the needs satisfied by the 
incumbent technology. Different individuals may interpret the 
same fundamental needs in different ways, in tenns of the 
technology attributes they desire (OECD, 1996). Deep-seated 
cultural values or "metarules" for behavior can be considered 
to be filtered through a variety of influences at the societal, 
community, household, and individual level (Douglas et a l . , 
1998; Strang, 1997). Commercial marketing of products 
usually aims to adjust the filters, and encourages people to 
associate their deep-seated values with specific product 
attributes (Wilhite, 1997). These associations are likely to be 
more flexible than the values themselves, and provide a 
potential source of future changes in technology choice. 
Technology diffusion is an integral part of technical change. 
Uptake of a technology that is locally "new" can be viewed as 
an innovation. Often, when technology is adopted it is also 
adapted in some way, or used in an original way. Just as 
technology development is much more complicated than the 
simple exploitation of scientific knowledge. Landes (1969), 
Wallace (1995), Rosenberg (1997), and others emphasize that 
technology diffusion is highly complex. Wallace emphasizes 
the importance of an active and creative absorption process in 
the country that takes up the new technology. The implication 
of this complexity is that no general rules define "what works." 
The process of technology adoption is as context dependent as 
that of the original innovation. Rosenberg (1997) also 
emphasizes the role of movements of skilled people in the 
diffusion of technology. Transnational firms often play a strong 
role in such movements. Other factors that influence the 
technology transfer process include differences in economic 
developmental, social and cultural processes, and national 
policies, such as protectionist measures. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Dosi et a l . (1990), and others 
have attempted to capture some of the complexities in "new 
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growth" and "evolutionary" economic models. They have been 
able to demonstrate the flaws in some of the simpler solutions 
to technology diffusion often advocated - for example, they 
show how free trade might sometimes exacerbate existing gaps 
in institutions, skills, and technology. 
The complex interactions that underpin technology diffusion 
may give rise to regularities at an aggregate level. The 
geographical and spaflal distribution of successive 
technologies displays patterns similar to those found in the 
succession of biological species in ecosystems, and also in the 
succession of social institutions, cultures, myths, and 
languages. These processes have been analyzed, for example, 
in CampbeU (1959), Marchetfl (1980), Grübler and 
Nakicenovic (1991), and Grübler (1998a). An extensive review 
of the process of international technology diffusion is available 
in the IPCC Special Report on M e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d 
T e c h n o l o g i c a l Issues i n T e c h n o l o g y Transfer (IPCC, 2000). 
That report provides a synthesis of the available knowledge and 
experience of the economic, social and institutional processes 
involved. 
Many attempts to endogenize technical change in economic 
models rely on a linear approach in which technical change is 
linked to the level of investment in R & D (e.g., Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991, 1993). More importantly, this linear model has 
been the basis of many governments' strategies for 
technological innovation. As mentioned above, important 
additional features of technological change include 
uncertainty, the reliance on sources of knowledge other than 
R&D, "leaming by doing" and other phenomena of "increasing 
returns" that often lead to technological "lock in" and hence 
great difficulties in introducing new alternatives. 
These features can be captured to some degree in models and a 
great deal of experimentation has taken place with different 
model specifications. However, the first feature, uncertainty, 
means that models cannot be used to predict the process of 
technical change. This uncertainty stems partly from lack of 
knowledge - the outcomes of cutting-edge empirical research 
simply cannot be predicted. It also stems from the complexity 
of the influences on technological change, and in particular the 
social and cultural influences that are extremely difficuh to 
describe in fomal models. Recent attempts to endogenize 
technical change in energy and economic models are reviewed 
by Azar (1996). Opfimizafion models usually treat technology 
development as exogenous, but technology d e p l o y m e n t as 
endogenous and driven by relative technology life-cycle costs. 
A few G H G emission projection models (e.g., Messner, 1997) 
were developed to incorporate "leaming by doing" - the 
reduction in technology costs and improvement in performance 
that can result from experience (Arrow, 1962). Models have 
also been developed that explicifly include technological 
uncertainty to analyze robust technology policy options (e.g., 
Grübler and Messner, 1996; Messner et a l , 1996). Other 
models developed more recently 1псофога1е the effects of 
investment in knowledge and R & D (Goulder and Mathai, 
1998). Economists and others who study technological change 
have developed models that take a variety of dynamics into 
account (Silverberg, 1988). Some models focus on 
technologies themselves, for example examining the various 
sources of "increasing returns to scale" and "lock-in" (Arthur, 
1989, 1994). Other models focus on firms and other decision­
makers, and their processes of information assimilation, 
imitation, and leaming (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Silverberg, 
1988; Andersen, 1994). Few of these dynamics, apart from 
"increasing returns to scale," have been applied to the 
projection of G H G emissions from the energy sector. 
3.5. Agriculture and Land-Use Emissions 
3 . 5 . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The most important categories of land-use emissions are C O ^ 
from net deforestation, CH^ from rice cultivation, CH^ from 
enteric fermentation of cattle, and N^0 from fertilizer 
application. These sources account for nearly all the land-use 
emissions of COj (Schimel et a l . , 1995), about 53% of the 
land-use emissions of CH4 (Prather, et a l , 1995), and about 
80% of land-use emissions of N p (Prather, et a i . 1995). 
These estimates, however, have a high uncertainty. 
Measurements and analyses of other sources of CH^ and N^O 
(notably biomass burning, landfills, animal waste, and sewage) 
ai-e relatively rare, but increasing (Bogner et a l . , 1997, in the 
literature. Of the scenarios reviewed for this report (see Table 
3.7), about 20 address emissions from agriculture and land-use 
change (Lashof and Tirpak, 1990; Houghton, 1991; Leggett et 
a l . , 1992; Matsuoka and Morita, 1994; Alcamo et a i , 1998; 
Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996; Leemans et a l , 1996). 
Current assessments of G H G emissions indicate that land use or 
land cover activities make an important contribution to the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere;-' these are referreà to 
as "land-use emissions" in this report."* Of the tl-nee most 
important GHGs, the contribution of land-use emissions to total 
global COj is relatively small (23%), but it is very large for CH^ 
(74%) and N^0. Furthermore, although land-use emissions 
make up only a small percentage of global COj emissions, they 
comprise a large part (45%) of CO^ emissions from developing 
countries, and an even larger percentage of their total CH^ 
(78%) and N p (76%) emissions (Pepper et 
a l . , 1 9 9 2 ) . Hence, from a variety of perspectives, the 
contribution of land-use emissions to total emissions of GHGs 
is important, and consequently their future trends are relevant to 
the estimation of climate change and its mitigation. 
^ These activities include deforestation, afforestation, changes in 
agricultural management, and other anthropogenic land-use changes 
that result in a net flow of GHGs to or from the atmosphere. They 
exclude natural biogenic emissions and emissions that are not 
related to anthropogenic activity such as CO2 from volcanoes or 
volatile organic compounds from forests. 
We include deforestation in this category of emissions even though 
this is a process of land-cover change rather than a land-use activity. 
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Table 3-7: O v e r v i e w of s c e n a r i o s p r e s e n t e d i n Section 3.5. 
Scenario Scenario Identification Type(*) Reference 
Number 
M IS92a IPCC 1992 G R Leggett ff a l . (1992) 
1-2 IS92b IPCC 1992 G R Leggett ef a l . (1992) 
1-3 IS92c IPCC 1992 G R Leggett et a l . (1992) 
1-4 IS92d IPCC 1992 G R Leggett et a l . (1992) 
1-5 IS92e IPCC 1992 G R Leggett а/. (1992) 
1-6 IS92f IPCC 1992 G R Leggett et a l . (1992) 
1-7 IS92 SI : IPCC 1992 Sensitivity 1 
(High Deforestation, High Biomass) G R Leggett eí а/. (1992) 
1-8 IS92 S4 : IPCC 1992 Sensitivity 4 
(Halt Deforestation, High Plantation) G R Leggett et a l . (1992) 
2-1 Baseline A I M A G E 2.1 G R Alcamo, e t a l . (1996) 
2-2 Baseline В I M A G E 2.1 G R Alcamo, et a l . (1996) 
2-3 Baseline С I M A G E 2.1 G R Alcamo, et a l . (1996) 
2-4 Less В1 Changed Trade G R Leemans, e t a l . (1996) 
2-5 Less В1 No Biofuels G R Alcamo and Kreileman (1996) 
2-6 Stab 350 A l l G R Alcamo and Kreileman (1996) 
3-1 A I M , Asian Pacific Integrated Model 
Land use emission scenario G R Matsuoka and Morita (1994) 
7-1 EPA-SCW EPA (Slowly Changing World) G R Lashof and Tirpak (1990) 
7-2 EPA-RCW EPA (Rapidly Changing World) G R Lashof and Tirpak (1990) 
7-3 EPA-High Reforestation EPA (Halt G R Lashof and Tirpak (1990) 
Deforestation, High Reforestation) 
8-1 HI Houghton-Population G Houghton (1991) 
8-2 H2 Houghton-Exponential Extrapolation G Houghton (1991) 
* G = global, R = regional. 
3 . 5 . 2 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions f r o m Anthropogenic 
Land-Use Change 
A variety of changes in land use can result in anthropogenic 
COj emission or absorption. These changes most obviously 
include pemanent deforestation or afforestation. However, 
many changes in land-management practices also contribute to 
COj fluxes because of changes in standing biomass densities or 
in soil carbon. Empirical studies of such C O ^ fluxes are rare, so 
that information on current emissions is very poor. Whereas 
comprehensive information exists for forests globally, only a 
few countries have detailed information on forest and 
agricultural land-management practices. Hence, global 
estimates of COj emissions from anthropogenic land-use 
change, including those in the SRES, tend to be based entirely 
on net deforestation-afforestation and on average figures for 
carbon storage per hectare in forests. 
Emissions of COj from deforestation arise mostly from the 
burning of trees and other vegetafion in tropical forests cleared 
for agricultural use. These emissions also stem from the 
decomposifion of trees harvested for lumber, the buming of 
wood for fuel, and soil respiration. If harvested wood is 
replaced by new seedlings, it is normally assumed that the 
amount of CO-, released by decomposifion or buming is 
compensated by the COj taken up during growth of the 
seedlings and, therefore, that the net emissions of harvested 
trees is zero. Where net afforestation occurs, net emissions are 
taken to be negative (i.e. afforestation acts as a sink). 
As a consequence of inconsistencies in base-year estimates for 
net changes in forest biomass, emission estimates are 
normalized relative to their 1990 value before comparison with 
each other (Figure 3-14). Figure 3-14 also clearly depicts the 
relative change of emissions with time (Alcamo, et a i , 1995; 
Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998b). 
The scenarios of CO, emissions from land-use change have quite 
different temporal paths, and show their widest range before the 
middle of the 2P ' century (Figure 3-14). Nearly all the scenarios 
then converge to very low emissions by the end of the century. At 
their widest point, the scenarios span about a factor of 14. 
The different sets of scenarios can be grouped into roughly two 
typical paths: One set declines smoothly after 1990, while the 
other sharply increases for a few decades after 1990. After the 
middle of the 2V- century most scenarios stabilize or continue 
to decline because either the driving forces of deforestation 
equilibrate or because forests are depleted. These processes are 
discussed further below. By 2100, COj scenarios of 
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Figure 3-14: Emissions of carbon dioxide from deforestation: (a) global, (b) Asia, (c) Africa, (d) Latin America. Scenarios 
numbers are given m Table 3-7. 
deforestation range from zero to 30% of their base-year 
estimates. 
As emissions from deforestation are more significant in 
developing regions than industrial regions, few scenarios of 
COj from deforestation are available for industrial regions, so 
the focus here is on developing regions only. For Asia, 
emissions in all but one scenario (EPA-SCW, 7-1 in Table 3-7) 
steadily decline after the base year, and reach 25% or less of 
their 1990 value in 2100 (Figuie 3-14b). For Africa, emissions 
first increase before eventually decreasing in 2100 to a small 
fraction of their 1990 value (Figure 3-14c). In this scenario, 
deforestation rates decline in Asia and Africa because of the 
depletion of their forests. For Latin America, the wide range of 
scenarios reflects the wide range of views about its future rates 
of deforestation (Figure 3-14d). 
One of the main factors that affects estimates of COj from 
deforestation is the assumed deforestation rate, which is 
estimated by a wide variety of methods. For example, the 
IS92a-IS92f scenarios assume that deforested area is 
proportional to population, with a time lag of 25 years, and that 
deforestation continues until 25 years after the population 
stabilizes or until forests ai-e exhausted (Leggett et a l . , 1992). 
The I M A G E 2.1 emission estimates are based on computed 
changes in global land cover, which take into account changing 
demand for agricultural commodities. Trexler and Haugen 
(1995) compute the rate of tropical deforestation on a country-
by-country basis, and include information from questionnaires. 
Jepma (1995) uses a combination of three models (a socio-
economic model, a wood demand-supply model, and a land-
use model), while Palo et a l . (1997) correlate deforestation 
rates with income levels. To further confound this situation, the 
factors that affect deforestation vary greatly from place to 
place, and therefore need to be defined as locally as possible. 
Figure 3-15 presents population assumptions of various 
deforestation scenarios, together with the assumed or implied 
deforestation rates on a per capita basis. The shape of the 
emission curves (Fig. 3-14) follows the shape of the 
deforestation rate curves, rather than that of the population 
assumptions. However, the range of emissions is much larger 
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Figure 3-15: Selected driving forces of deforestation: (a) 
Population assumptions, and (b) Forest clearing rate per unit 
population. Both are nonnalized. Scenarios numbers are given 
in Table 3-7. 
than the range of deforestation rates. Some conclusions can be 
drawn from these data: 
• When given on a per capita basis, the range of 
deforestation rates is perhaps not as great as expected 
(about a factor of eight) considering the wide range of 
assumptions and methods used to estimate these rates. 
• The temporal trend of emissions arises from the 
temporal trend of deforestation estimates. 
• The range of emissions is strongly, but not only, 
influenced by the deforestation rates, and at its widest 
(a factor 14) can be better explained by the combined 
range of per capita deforestation rates, population, and 
carbon density. 
The role that assumed carbon density of vegetation plays in the 
estimation of emissions must be considered. To estimate 
C O T emissions, i t is necessary to estimate the carbon density of 
vegetation that is burned and decayed when forests are cleared. 
However, there is wide disagreement in the titerature as to 
typical values of carbon density because of both the many 
methods used to measure density and the wide variation in the 
mix of tropical forest vegetation. 
3 . 5 . 3 . M e t h a n e Emissions f r o m Rice Production 
CH4 emissions from rice paddies are an important emission 
category, and are reviewed in more detail in Wassmann et a l . 
(1993, 1997, 1998), Houghton et a l . (1995), and Olivier et a l 
(1996). СНд emissions are primarily a function of emission 
factors and assumed rice cropland area. In tum, emission 
factors depend on cultivation method (wet versus dry 
cultivation), water management practices, type of rice variety 
planted, and cropping pattems. Most long-term scenarios 
assume that the emission factor of CH^ per unit area of rice 
cropland remains constant with time, although estimates vary 
greatly from one scenario reference to another. 
The many approaches used to estimate the future extent of rice 
fields result in increases in the global area of rice fields from 
a factor of 0.8 to one of 1.8 by 2100 (see Alcamo and Swart, 
1998, for a brief review). One of the main factors to affect the 
future area of rice cropland is the assumed long-term 
improvement in rice productivity. The typical range of 
estimates for this variable is between 1.0 and 1.6% per year, 
depending on the region, time horizon, and reference. 
3 . 5 . 4 . M e t h a n e Emissions f r o m E n t e r i c F e r m e n t a t i o n 
Estimated emissions of CH^ from enteric fermentation depend 
on assumptions about emission factors per animal and the 
number of livestock. As summarized by IPCC (1995), emission 
factors vary greatly depending on the type of cow, their feed 
regime, and their productivity. Assumptions for the change in 
meat production from 1990 to 2100 in existing scenarios vary 
greatly, by a factor of 1.2 to 4.2. Despite the wide range of 
assumptions about meat production, emissions of the various 
scenarios do not vary by more than a factor of two, which 
indicates that other assumptions (e.g., animal productivity) 
must compensate for the differences in assumed meat 
production. 
As noted above, global estimates can mask significant 
differences in assumptions about industrial and developing 
regions. For industrial regions, neaiiy all scenarios assume a 
decline in beef production per capita, which is consistent with 
the current shift away from the consumption of beef to poultry 
and other protein sources. Meanwhile, the scenarios for 
developing countries assume a continuing increase in beef 
consumption, which grew by 3.1% per year between 1982 and 
1994, leading to an overall growth of 1.1% per year globally 
(Rosegrant et a l , 1997). 
Another factor that influences the future number of livestock is 
the change in animal productivity, that is, the weight of meat or 
dairy product per animal. The rate of increase in beef 
productivity dropped in industrial countries from 1.25% per 
year in 1967-1982 to 0.69% in 1982-1994, but increased from 
0.11 % per year to 0.61 % per year in the developing countries. 
Similar to emissions from rice fields, emissions from livestock 
are influenced not only by number of livestock (equivalent to 
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the extent of rice ai'ea), but also by changes in the productivity 
of animals as these alter the CH^ emission factor. 
Some authors doubt that assumed increases in meat production 
and animal productivity can be sustained indefinitely. For 
example, Brown and Kane (1995) argue that livestock 
production cannot be increased greatly because nearly all of 
the world's suitable rangelands are intensively exploited 
already. They claim that the rapidly growing demand for meat 
and dairy products can only be met by livestock production in 
feedlots, which would result in a rising demand for feed that 
requires further development of agricultural land and further 
GHG emissions. 
3.5.5. N i t r o u s Oxide Emissions f r o m A g r i c u l t u r e 
budgets are associated with considerable uncertainties. 
Agricultural activities and animal production systems are the 
largest anthropogenic sources of these emissions. Recent 
calculations using IPCC 1996 revised guidelines indicate that 
emission from agriculture is 6.2 MtN as N^O per year 
(IPCC, 1996; Mosier et a l . , 1998). About one-third is related to 
direct emissions from the soil, another third is related to N^O 
emission from animal waste management, and the final third 
originates from indirect emissions through ammonia 
(NH3), nitrogen oxides (N0,,), and nitrate losses. This compares 
to earlier estimates of total anthropogenic emissions that range 
between 3.7 and 7.7 MtN (Houghton et a l . , 1995). Industrial 
sources contribute between 0.7 to 1.8 MtN (Houghton et a l . , 
1995; see also Chapter 5, Table 5-3 and Section 3.6.2). 
Total natural emissions amount to 9.0 ± 3.0 MtN as N2O, so 
oceans, tropical, and temperate soils are together the most 
important source of N2O today. Atmospheric concentrations of 
N2O in 1992 were 311 parts per billion ( 10') by volume (ppbv) 
(Houghton et a i , 1995); the 1993 rate of increase was 0.5 ppbv, 
somewhat lower than that in the previous decade of 
approximately 0.8 ppbv per year (Houghton et a l . , 1996). 
Among the anthropogenic sources, cultivated soils are the most 
important, contributing 50 to 70% of the anthropogenic total 
(see Chapter 5, Table 5-3). This source of N2O is particularly 
uncertain as the emission level is a complex function of soil 
type, soil humidity, species grown, amount and type of 
fertilizer applied, etc. The second largest anthropogenic source 
of N2O is industry; two processes account for the bulk of 
industrial emissions - nitric acid (HNO3) and adipic acid 
production. In both cases N2O is released with the off-gases 
from the production facilities. Recently, N2O release from 
animal manure was identified as another significant source of 
N , 0 emissions. 
N^O emissions from agricultural soils occur through the 
nitrification and denitrification of nitrogen in soils, particularly 
that from mineral or organic fertilizers. Emissions are very 
dependent on local management practices, fertilizer types, and 
climatic and soil conditions, and are calculated by multiplying 
an emission factor by the sum of mineral and organic nitrogen 
applied as fertilizer. The emission factor depends on the 
fertilizer type and local environmental circumstances, and 
those used in IPCC (1996) resuh in an assumed loss of 1.25% 
(range 0.25 to 2.25%) of nitrogen as N2O per year. 
To estimate the trend in fertilizer use, difterent references 
employ different approaches. For example, Leggett et a l . 
(1992) directiy estimate the amount of feitilizer used, whereas 
Alcamo et a l . (1996) back-calculate fertilizer use from the 
future amount of agricultural land. Despite these difterent 
approaches, estimates of future fertilizer use are quite 
consistently given as an increase by about a factor 1.4 to 2.8 
between 1990 and 2100. 
Although the different references are consistent in their 
findings about future global fertilizer use, the question arises 
whether these are at all reasonable guesses. Some researchers 
assume that fertilizer use wil l increase even more. For 
example, Kendall and Pimentel (1994) in their "business-as-
usual" scenario assume a 300% increase in the use of nitrogen 
and other fertilizers by 2050. Moreover, most studies of future 
worid food production assume improvements in crop yield. 
These yield improvements may imply higher overall rates of 
fertilizer use because many high-yielding crop varieties depend 
on large amounts of fertilizer. 
However, some authors question whether global average 
fertilizer use will grow. For example. Brown and Kane (1995) 
note that world fertilizer use has actually fallen in recent years 
and Kroeze (1993) assumes that per capita N2O emissions from 
fertilizer consumption decrease by 50% in 2100 relative to 1990 
tlnough policies that promote the more efficient use of synthetic 
fertilizers. Future fertilizer use may also be lower than in the 
"business-as-usual" scenarios because farmers have other 
incentives to reduce nitrogen fertilizer use, such as to reduce 
farming costs and avoid nitrate contamination of groundwater. 
This brief review of the literature on prognoses of fertilizer use 
indicates that the N ^ O emission scenarios depicted in Figure 3-
16 do not take into account the full range of views about future 
trends in fertilizer use. Additional uncertainty in future 
emissions occurs because changes in the number of livestock, 
as discussed above for CH^ emissions, and animal husbandry 
practices will also affect N2O emissions. 
3 . 5 . 6 . F i n d i n g s Regarding D r i v i n g Forces 
Herein, some of the many specific factors that affect scenarios 
of land-use emissions have been discussed. From a correlation 
analysis that compared the influence of changing population, 
economic activity, and technological change on land-use 
emission scenarios, Alcamo and Swart (1998) concluded that 
population was the most influential driving force. The reason is 
the relationship between population and increasing food 
demand, which leads to more cows that produce CH^ and more 
extensive fertilized croplands that release N ^ O . Although most 
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scenarios also assume that improvements in crop and animal 
productivity wi l l partly compensate for increasing food 
demand, some authors do not believe that productivity 
increases can be sustained. For example, Kendall and Pimentel 
(1994) show a decrease, rather than increase, in per capita grain 
production because of less optimistic assumptions about the 
increase in crop productivity (0.7% per year). Brown and Kane 
(1995) point out some developments that may slow down 
productivity: 
• The backlog of unused agricultural technology (and 
hence the potential for further agricultural productivity 
increases) is shrinking. 
• Demands for water are reducing the ability of the 
hydrologie cycle to supply irrigation water. 
• In many countries, the use of additional fertilizer on 
current crop varieties does not significantly increase 
their yields. 
• Industrial countries are losing fertile land to 
urbanization. 
Brown and Kane (1995) argue that in recent years rice yields 
have either stabilized or fallen in many key rice-producing 
countries, and suggest that dramatically boosting rice yields 
above a level of 4 tons per hectare may require new 
technological advances. If the skeptics are right, and the 
assumed productivity increases of the "business-as-usual" 
scenarios are not realized, then a greater expanse of cropland 
would be needed to satisfy the same agricultural demand. This 
expansion would lead to still higher emissions of CH^ from 
rice fields and livestock, and more rapid deforestation and 
earlier peaks in the emissions of COj . However, the lower 
increase in productivity probably also implies lower fertilizer 
use per hectare, which may lower emissions of from 
fertilized soils. 
3.5.7. Conclusions 
Some of the main findings regarding different categories of 
land-use emissions are outiine below. 
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Global scenaiios of C O 2 emissions f r o m d e f o r e s t a t i o n have 
their widest range around the middle of the 2P ' century and 
converge on zero toward the end of the century. The eventual 
decrease in emissions computed by the scenarios results in part 
from the assumed slowing of agricultural land expansion in 
tropical regions. Another reason is some scenarios assume that 
forests will nearly disappear in Asia and Africa before or 
around the middle of the 2P ' century. 
Most global scenarios of CH^ emissions f r o m r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n 
show an upward trend until the middle of the 2P ' century and 
then stabilize. The global trend is chiefly influenced by 
estimates for Asia, where more than 80% of these emissions 
currently originate. Normalized global emissions range by a 
factor of three in the year 2100. The wide range has mostly to 
do with different estimates of the future rice cropland area, 
which is influenced largely by different assumptions about 
future rice productivity. 
A l l global scenarios of CH^ emissions f r o m e n t e r i c 
f e r m e n t a t i o n show an upward trend until the end of the 2P ' 
century. The maximum range of normalized emissions is by a 
factor of 2.0 (which occurs in the year 2100), the smallest 
range of the four categories of emissions examined. Also, these 
emissions have the smallest range of current estimates in the 
literature, and the smallest range of base-year estimates in the 
scenarios. Most scenarios of emissions in industrial regions 
show a stabilizing or decreasing trend, because of the 
assumption that the number of livestock will continue to 
decline with decreasing demand for beef and increasing animal 
productivity. Meanwhile, the assumed economic development 
in the developing regions will stimulate demand for beef, 
which leads to an increase in livestock (despite improvements 
in animal productivity) and higher emissions. 
Most global scenarios show tliat N2O emissions from fertilized 
soils continue to increase up to the end of the 2 P ' century, and 
the range of estimates of normalized emissions in 2100 
exceeds a factor of two. 
Tliree of the four categories of emissions show increasing 
global trends up to the end of the 21st century. The exception 
is CO2 from deforestation (see above). Hence it is likely that 
land-use emissions will continue to contribute significantly to 
the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere, especially to levels of 
CH4 and N2O. Studies of mitigation of climate change should 
take this into account and scenarios of land-use emissions 
should be included in these studies. 
Regarding regional scenarios, land-use emissions stabilize or 
decrease in industrial regions, and increase substantially in 
Africa, but less so in Asia. Emission trends in Latin America 
are between those of industrial and developing regions. These 
regional trends reflect the stabilizing demand for agricultural 
products and agricultural land in industrial countries, and the 
assumed continuation of agricultural development elsewhere. 
3.6 Other Gas Emissions 
3 . 6 . 1 . Introduction 
Driving forces of emissions other than CO2 or those of 
agriculture or land-use changes are discussed here. The direct 
GHGs N2O and CH^ are discussed first, followed by the 
indirect GHGs, which include sulfur and the ozone precursors 
NO J,, CO, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Finally, the 
many various powerful GHGs, including ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS), are discussed. 
The sources and sinks for these gases continue to be highly 
uncertain. Littie research has been carried out to evaluate the 
influences of socio-economic and technological driving forces 
on long-term emission trends of these gases. As a rule, future 
emissions of these gases are included in long-term emission 
models on the basis of simple relationships to aggregate 
economic or sector-specific activity drivers, not least because 
individual source strengths continue to be highly uncertain. 
Notable exceptions are emissions of sulfur and ODS, which 
have been more intensively studied in connection with non-
climate policy analysis in the domains of regional acidification 
and stratospheric ozone depletion. 
3.6.2. Nitrous Oxide 
Natural and agricultural soils are the dominant sources of N2O 
emissions, so future emission levels are governed by the land-
use changes and changes in agricultural output and practices 
discussed in Section 3.5.2. Nevertheless, other sources ai'c also 
important and are discussed here. 
The dominant industrial sources are the production of HNO3 
and adipic acid. The key driver for the production of HNO3 is 
the demand for fertilizer. Hence this emission source is closely 
related to the agricultural production driving forces discussed 
in Section 3.5, as well as to improvements in production 
technologies. Adipic acid, (CH2)4(COOH)2, is a feedstock for 
nylon production and one of the largest-volume synthetic 
chemicals produced in the world each year - current annual 
global production is 1.8 million metric tons (Stevens III, 1993). 
Production has an associated by-product of 0.3 kg N , O A g 
adipic acid for unabated emission, which at present results in a 
global emission of about 0.4 M t N as N2O annually. Emissions 
mostly arise in the OECD countries, which accounted for some 
95% of global adipic acid production in 1990 (Davis and 
Kemp, 1991). Fenhann (2000) reviews the (spai'se) scenario 
literature and concludes that future emissions wi l l be 
determined mostiy by two variables - demand growth as a 
result of growth in economic activity and progressively 
phased-in emission controls. 
By the early 1990s, it was estimated that about one-third of 
OECD emissions had been abated (Stevens III, 1993). This 
abatement is an accidental result of the treatment of flue-gases 
in a reductive furnace (thermal destruction) to reduce N0^ 
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emissions, wliicli coincidentally also converts about 99% of the 
into nitrogen gas (N,). In other regions only about 20% of 
emissions had been abated by the early 1990s. 
Major adipic acid producers worldwide have agreed to 
substantially reduce NjO emissions by 1996 to 1998. In July 
1991 they formed an inter-industry group to share information 
on old and new technologies developed for N^O abatement, 
such as improved thermal destruction, conversion into nitric 
oxide for recycling, and the promising low-temperature 
catalytic decomposition into N2 currently being developed by 
DuPont. The introduction of all three technologies could result 
in a 99% reduction of N.,0 emissions from adipic acid 
production (Storey, 1996). They are expected to be introduced 
at plants owned by Asahi (Japan), BASF and Bayer (Germany), 
DuPont (US), and Rhône-Poulenc (France) { C h e m i c a l Week, 
1994). After the planned changes, US producers will have 
abated over 90% of the N2O emissions from adipic acid 
production. In recent years nylon-6.6 production dropped in the 
US, Western Europe, and Japan, largely in response to capacity 
and production in other Asian countries. By 2000 production is 
expected to recover in these countries (Storey, 1996). 
Another major source of N2O is the transport sector. Gasoline 
vehicles without catalytic converters have very low, sometimes 
immeasurably small, emissions of N2O. However, vehicles 
equipped with three-way catalytic converters have N2O 
emissions that range from 0.01 to 0.1 g/km in new catalysts, 
and from 0.16 to 0.22 g/km in aging catalysts (IPCC, 1996). 
Emission levels also depend on precise engine running 
conditions. At the upper end of the emission range from aging 
catalysts, N2O emissions contribute around 25% of the in-use 
global warming impact of driving (Michaelis et a l , 1996). 
The introduction of catalytic converters as a pollution control 
measure in the majority of industrialized countries is resulting 
in a substantial increase in N , 0 emissions from gasoline 
vehicles. Several Annex I countries include projections of N^O 
from this source in their national communications to the 
U N F C C C , using a variety of projection methods (for example, 
Environment Canada, 1997; U N F C C C , 1997; V R O M , 1997). 
The projections from these counties differ substantially in the 
contribution that transport is expected to make to their national 
N2O emissions in 2020, ranging from about 10% in France to 
over 25% in Canada. They anticipate that mitigation measures 
wil l be much more effective in reducing industrial and 
agricultural emissions of N2O than mobile source emissions. 
Indeed, little research has been cartied out to identify catalytic 
converter technologies that result in lower NjO emissions. 
However, emissions are likely to be lower in countries that 
require regular emission inspections and replacement of faulty 
pollution control equipment. 
3 . 6 . 3 . M e t h a n e 
Agricultural and land-use change emission drivers are 
discussed in Section 3.5.2. The other major sources are from 
the use of fossil fuels and the disposal of waste, for which the 
driving forces are briefly reviewed here. The earlier literature 
is reviewed in В ames and Edmonds (1990). A more detailed 
recent literature review is given in Gregory (1998). 
Emissions from the extraction, processing, and use of fossil 
fuels will be driven by future fossil fuel use. CH^ emissions 
from venting during oil and gas production may decrease 
because of efforts to reduce them (IGU, 1997b). Flaring and 
venting volumes from oil and gas operations peaked in 1976 to 
1978, but a gradual reduction in volumes of gas flared and 
vented has occurred over the past 20 years (Boden et a l . , 1994, 
Marland et a i , 1998; Stem and Kaufmann, 1998). Shell 
Intemational Ltd. (1998) estimated a reduction in its own 
emissions from venting by 1 MtCH^ per year to 0.367 MtCH^ 
in the ñve years to 1997. The l E A Greenhouse Gases R&D 
Programme (1997) notes that emission reductions from the oil 
and gas sector would yield a high economic return. 
Additionally, new natural gas developments generally use the 
latest technology and are almost leak free compared to older 
systems. Taking all these factors into account, it seems plausible 
that CH4 emissions from the oil and gas sector should fall as the 
2U' century progresses. Nonetheless, the primary driver (oil and 
gas production) is likely to expand significantly in the future, 
depending on resource availability and technological change. A 
representative range from the literature, for example the 
scenarios described in Nakicenovic et a l . (1998a), indicates 
substantial uncertainty in which future levels of oil and gas 
production could range between 130 and some 900 EJ. 
Assuming a constant emission factor, future CH^ emissions 
from oil and gas could range from a decline compared to 
current levels to a fourfold increase. With the more likely 
assumption of declining emission factors, future emission levels 
would be somewhat lower than suggested by this range. 
The concentrations of CH^ in coal seams are low close to the 
surface, and hence emissions from surface mining are also low 
(lEA CIAB, 1992). Concentrations at a few hundred meters or 
deeper can be more significant; releases from these depths are 
normally associated with underground mining. Emissions per 
ton of coal mined can vary widely both from country to country 
and at adjacent mines within a country ( lEA Greenhouse Gases 
R & D Programme, 1996a). CH^ mixed with air in the right 
proportions is an explosive mixture and a danger to miners. 
Measures to capture and drain the CH4 are common in many 
countries - the captured CH^, if of adequate concentration, can 
be a valuable energy source. The techniques currently used 
reduce total emissions by about 10%. Many older, deeper coal 
mines in Europe are being closed, which will reduce emissions. 
Replacement coal mines tend to be in exporting countries with 
low cost reserves near the surface, so the emissions will be low. 
For the future, emissions will depend principally on the 
proportion of coal production from deep mines and on total 
coal production. 
A representative range of future coal production scenarios 
given in Nakicenovic et a l . (1998a) indicates a very wide range 
of uncertainty. Future coal production levels could range 
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anywhere from 14 to well over 700 EJ, between a sevenfold 
decrease to an eightfold increase compared to 1990 levels. 
Conversely, CH^ capture, either during mining or prior to 
mining, not only reduces risk to miners but also provides a 
valuable energy source. Thus, rising levels of CH^ capture for 
non-climate reasons are likely to characterize the 2P ' century. 
This would in particular apply to high coal production 
scenarios, in which most of the coal will need to come from 
deep mining once the easily accessible surface mine deposits 
have become exhausted. Growth in future emissions from coal 
mining is therefore likely to be substantially lower than growth 
in coal production. 
Domestic and some industrial wastes contain organic matter 
that emits a combination of C O , and CH_j on decomposition 
(TEA Greenhouse Gases R & D Programme, 1996b). If oxygen 
is present, most of the waste degrades by aerobic micro-
organisms and the main product is C O ^ . If no oxygen is 
present, different micro-organisms become active and a 
mixture of CO^ and C H ^ is produced. Decay by this 
mechanism can take months or even years (US EPA, 1994). 
Traditionally, waste has been dumped in open pits and this is 
still the main practice in most developing countries. Thus, 
oxygen is present and the main decay product is C O ^ . In recent 
decades, health and local environmental concerns in developed 
countries have resulted in better waste management, with lined 
pits and a cap of clay, for example, added regularly over newer 
dumps. This prevents fresh supplies of oxygen becoming 
available so the subsequent decay process is anaerobic and CH^ 
is produced. Williams (1993) notes that landfill sites are 
complex and highly variable biologic systems and many 
factors can lead to a wide variability in CH^ production. For the 
future, increasing wealth and urbanization in developing 
countries may lead to more managed landfill sites and to more 
CH4 production. However, the CH^ produced can be captured 
and utilized as a valuable energy source, or at least flared for 
pollution and safety reasons; indeed, this is a legal requirement 
in the U S A for large landfills. Future emissions are therefore 
unlikely to evolve linearly with population growth and waste 
generation, but the scenario literature is extremely sparse on 
this subject - the major source remains the previous IS92 
scenario series (Pepper et a l . , 1992). 
Different methods are used to treat domestic sewage, some of 
which involve anaerobic decomposition and the production of 
СЩ. Again, capture and use of some of the CH^ produced 
limits emissions. For the future, emissions will depend on the 
extension of sewage treatment in developing countries, the 
extent to which the techniques used enhance or limit CH^ 
production, and the extent to which the CH^ produced is 
captured and used. 
Several authors, including Rudd et a l . (1993) and Fearnside 
(1995) , note that some hydroelectric schemes resuh in 
emissions of CH^ from decaying vegetation trapped by water 
as the dams fill; these emissions climatically exceed those of a 
thennopower plant delivering the same electricity. Rosa et a l . 
(1996) , Rosa and Schaffer (1994), and Gagnon and van de Vate 
(1997) point out that the two schemes discussed by Rudd et a l . 
(1993) and Fearnside (1995) may be exceptional, with very 
large reservoir surface areas, a high density of organic matter, 
and low power output. Gagnon and van de Vate (1997) estimate 
the combined CH^ and NjO emissions from hydroelectric 
schemes at 5.5 gC equivalent per kWh compared to a range of 
80 to 200 gC equivalent per kWh for a modern fossil power 
station (Rogner and Khan, 1998); that is, hydroelectric power 
emits less than 3% and 7%, respectively. While some G H G 
emissions from new hydroelectric schemes are expected in the 
future, especially in tropical settings (Galy-Lacaux et a l . , 
1999), in the absence of more comprehensive field data, such 
schemes are regarded as a lower source of CH^ emissions 
compared to those of other energy sector or agricultural 
activities. Hydroelectric power is therefore not treated as a 
separate emission category in SRES. 
In summary, numerous factors could lead to increases in 
emissions of CH^ in the future, primarily related to the 
expansion of agricultural production and greater fossil fuel use. 
Recent studies also identify a number of processes and trends 
that could reduce CH^ emission factors and hence may lead to 
reduced emissions in the future. These trends are not yet 
sufficiently accounted for in the literature, in which CH^ 
emission factors typically are held constant. The overall 
consequence is to introduce additional uncertainty into 
projections, as the future evolution of such emission factors is 
unclear. However, from the above discussion, the least likely 
future is one of constant emission factors and the range of 
future emissions is likely to be lower than those projected in 
previous scenarios with comparable growth in primary activity 
drivers. 
3 . 6 . 4 . Sulfur D i o x i d e 
Two major sets of driving forces influence future SOj 
emissions: 
• Level and structure of energy supply and end-use, and 
(to a lesser extent) levels of industrial output and 
process mix. 
• The degree of SOj-control policy intervention assumed 
(i.e., level of environmental policies implemented to 
limit SO2 emissions). 
Grübler (1998c) reviewed the literature and empirical 
evidence, and showed that both clusters of driving forces are 
linked to the level of economic development. With increasing 
affluence, energy use per capita rises and its structure changes 
away from traditional solid fuels (coal, lignite, peat, fuelwood) 
toward cleaner fuels (gas or electricity) at the point of end-use. 
This structural shift combined with the greater emphasis on 
urban air quality that accompanies rising incomes results in a 
roughly inverted U (lU) pattern of SOj emissions and/or 
concentrations. Emissions rise initially (with growing per 
capita energy use), pass through a maximum, and decline at 
higher income levels due to structural change in the end-use 
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fuel mix and also control measures for large point sources. This 
pattern emerges also from the literature on environmental 
Kuznets curves (e.g., World Bank, 1992; I I A S A - W E C , 1995) 
and is corroborated by both longitudinal and cross-sectional 
empirical data reviewed in detail in Grübler (1998c). 
Historically, the decline in sulfur pollution levels was achieved 
simply by dispersion of pollutants (tall stacks policy). 
Subsequently, the actual emissions also started to decline, as a 
result of both structural change (substitution of solids by gas 
and electricity as end-use fuels) and sulfur reduction measures 
(oil product desulfurization and scrubbing of large point 
sources). 
Emissions for 1990 reported in the scenarios reviewed in 
Chapter 2 and in Grübler (1998c) indicate a range from 55 to 
91 MtS. The upper range is explained largely by a lack of 
complete coverage of SO2 emission sources in long-term 
scenario studies and models. Lower values coirespond to 
studies drat include only the dominant energy sector emissions 
(range of 59.7 to 65.4 MtS), and higher estimates also include 
other sources, most notably metallurgical and from biomass 
burning. None of the long-term scenario studies appears to 
include SO2 emissions from intemational bunker (shipping) 
fuels, estimated at 3 + 1 MtS in 1990 (Olivier et a l . , 1996; 
Corbett et a l , 1999; Smith et a i , 2000). Historical global 
sulfur emissions estimates are given in Dignon and Hameed 
(1989). 
Grübler (1998c) also argues that SO2 control and intervention 
policies in many rapidly industrializing countries (particularly 
those with high population densities) are highly likely to be 
phased in more quickly than the historical experience of 
Europe, North America, Japan, or Korea. This analysis is 
supported by existing policies and trends in Brazil, China, and 
India (Shukla et a l . , 1999; Rosa and Schechtman, 1996; Qian 
and Zhang, 1998). Most recent SO2 emission inventory data 
suggest that since 1990 SO2 emission growth has significantly 
slowed in East Asia compared to earlier forecasts, in response 
to the first SOj control measures implemented in China, South 
Korea and Thailand (Streets and Waldhoff 2000). Dadi et a l . 
(1998) estimate that in 1995 about 11% (1.5 MtS of a total of 
13.5 MtS gross emissions) of China's SO2 emissions were 
removed through various control measures. 
The evaluation of the IS92 scenarios (Alcamo et a l , 1995) 
concluded that the projected SOj emissions in the IS92 
scenarios do not reflect recent changes in sulfur-related 
environmental legislation, in particular the amendments to the 
Clean Air Act in the USA, and the Second European Sulfur 
Protocol. Increasingly, many developing countries are adopting 
sulfur control legislation that ranges from reduction of sulfur 
contents in oil products (e.g. China, Thailand, and India; see 
Streets et a l . , 2000), through a maximum sulfur content in coal 
(e.g. in China; see Streets and Waldhoff, 2000), to SO2 controls 
at coal-fired power plants (e.g. China, South Korea, Thailand; 
for a review see l E A , 1999). For instance, an estimated 3575 
M W of coal-fired electricity China is generated by plants 
already equipped with sulfur control devices (lEA, 1999). 
Since publication of the IS92 scenarios a number of important 
new sulfur impact studies have become available, and analyzed 
in particular: 
• Implications of acidic deposition levels of high SOj 
emissions scenarios such as IS92a (Amann et a l . , 1995; 
Posch e t a l , 1996). 
• Aggregate ecosystems impacts, especially whether 
critical loads for acidification are exceeded given 
deposition levels and different buffering capacities of 
soils (Amann et a l . , 1995; Posch et a l , 1996). 
• Direct vegetation damage, particularly on food crops 
(Fischer and Rosenzweig, 1996). 
These studies provide further infomation on the impacts of 
high concentrations and deposition of SO2 emissions, beyond 
the well-documented impacts on human health, ecosystems 
productivity, and material damages (for reviews see Cratzen 
and Graedel, 1986; WHO and UNEP, 1993; W M O , 1997). 
These studies are particularly important because they 
document environmental changes of high-emission scenarios 
by using detailed representations of the numerous non-linear 
dose-response relationships between emissions, atmospheric 
concentrations, deposition, ecosystems sensitivity thresholds, 
and impacts. A l l recent studies agree that unabated high SOj 
emissions along the Hues of IS92a or even above would yield 
high impacts not only for natural ecosystems and forests, but 
also for economically important food crops and human health, 
especially in Asia where emissions growth is projected to be 
particularly high. 
A representative result (based on Amann et a l , 1995) is shown 
in Figure 3-17, which contrasts 1990 European sulfur 
deposition levels with those of Asia by 2050 in a high SO2 
emission scenario (very close to IS 92a). Typically, in such 
scenarios, SO, emissions in Asia alone could surpass current 
global levels as early as 2020 (Amann et a l , 1995; Posch et a l , 
1996). Sulfur deposition above 5 g/m^ per year occurred in 
Europe in 1990 in the area of the borders of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Germany (the former GDR), often 
referred to as the "black triangle." In view of its ecological 
impacts it was officially designated by UNEP as an "ecological 
disaster zone." In a scenario such as IS92a (or even higher 
emissions), similar high sulfur deposition would occur by 
around 2020 over more than half of Eastern China, large parts 
of southern Korea, and some smaller parts of Thailand and 
southern Japan. 
Fischer and Rosenzweig (1996) assessed the combined impacts 
of climate change and acidification of agricultural crops in 
Asia for such a scenario. Their overall conclusion was that the 
projected likely regional climate change would largely benefit 
agricultural output in China, whereas it would lower 
agricultural productivity on the Indian subcontinent (the 
combined effect of projected temperature and precipitation 
changes would have differential impacts across various crops 
and subrogions). However, projected high levels of acidic 
deposition in China would reduce agricultural output to an 
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Figure 3-17: Current sulfur deposition in Europe (a) and 
projections for a high growth, coal-intensive scenario similar 
to IS92a for Asia in 2020 (b), in gS/ml Source: Grübler, 
1998c, based on Amann et a l . , 1995. 
extent that would more than offset any possible beneficial 
impacts of regional climate change. This is primarily because 
sulfur (and nitrogen) deposition, while acting as fertilizer for 
plant growth at lower deposition levels, negatively affects plant 
growth at higher deposition levels. Projections in a scenario 
such as IS92a are that the threshold levels wil l be surpassed 
between 2020 and 2050 for all major Asian food crops. 
The review of recent literature on acidification impact studies 
given in Grubler (1998c) concludes that the impacts on human 
health, on economically important food crops, and on 
ecosystems are so substantial as to lender any scenario with 
SOj emissions as high as, or higher than, IS92a very unlikely. 
Grübler (1998c) canied out a detailed comparison of SOj 
emissions scenarios at the global and regional level. He 
concluded that the range of future SOj emissions spanned by 
the previous high-demand IPCC scenarios (all IS92 scenarios 
except IS92c and IS92d) corresponded well with scenarios 
available in the literature that do not include any direct sulfur-
emissions control or indirect intervention measures and policies 
(Figure 3-18). Typically, in such scenarios, global SOj 
emissions could rise to between 130 and 250 MtS by 2100, and 
in some older scenarios (Matsuoka et a l . , 1994; Morita et a l . . 
199A) are projected to rise above that level. Interestingly, all 
long-term sulfur scenarios published since 1995 do not judge 
this to be a likely (not to mention environmentally desirable) 
possibility. Representative sulfur-emissions control and 
intervention scenarios (Amann et a l . , 1995; Posch et a l . , 1996; 
Nakicenovic et a h , 1998a) suggest instead an upper range of 
global emissions below 100 MtS by 2050 and below 120 MtS by 
2100, a range covered in the two low variants IS92c and IS92d 
only. These patterns were also confiimed by Pepper et a l . (1998) 
in a recent re-analysis of the previous IS92 scenarios. Using the 
same methodology as deployed in developing the IS92 
scenarios, the revised scenarios have maximum global SO, 
emissions below 142 MtS by 2020, and 56 MtS by 2100 (EPA3 
and EPA5 scenarios, respectively). The median from the more 
recent scenario hterature analyzed in Grübler (1998c) indicates 
near-constant global SO2 emissions - 77 MtS by 2020, 68 MtS 
by 2060, and 57 MtS by 2100. This global stability, however, 
masks decisive regional differences (discussed above). 
Emissions in the OECD countries will continue their declining 
trends in line with their sulfur reduction policies. Emissions 
outside OECD will rise initially with increasing energy demand, 
but sulfur controls will be progressively phased in to mitigate 
against impacts of high unabated SO, emissions on health, 
agriculture, ecosystems, and tourism. 
The need to abate local air pollution, including SO, emissions, 
is not only environmental, but also economic. For example, 
according to the World Bank (1997c, I997d) the current 
damage by environmental pollution is about 8% of GDP in 
China (and up to 20% of production in urban areas), while 
abatement costs would be between I and 2.5% of GDP. 
According to one World Bank (1997c) report, the costs are '"so 
high under the business-as-usual scenario that it is hardly 
necessary to consider the amenity and ecosystem benefits of 
cleaner air to justify action." Therefore, it is no surprise that in 
several developing regions, policies are already being 
developed and implemented to abate SOj emissions, in China, 
by 1995 coal-cleaning technology had been developed, and 
de-sulfurizing technology introduced and applied 
(Government of People's Republic of China, 1996). The SO2 
emissions target set by the Chinese government is 12.3 MtS by 
2000 as compared to 11.9 MtS in 1995. Economic 
instruments, such as pollution charges, pricing policy, 
favorable terms of investment for environmental technology, 
market creation, and ecological compensation fees, are being 
introduced in China now (UNEP, 1999). By June 1997, some 
64,000 enteфrises with heavy pollutant emissions had been 
closed for refurbishment or had ceased production. As a 
consequence, ambient concentrations of sulfur have been 
relatively stable in medium-size and small cities, and they 
have actually decreased in large cities. This change is 
occurring at significantly lower levels of income as compared 
to income levels in the U S A and Europe at the time when their 
sulfur abatement started. 
In India, several sulfur policies are being introduced currently, 
including mandatory washing of coal used 500 km away from 
the mine mouth, a policy that is expected to significantly 
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reduce SO2 emissions from coal use. Some refineries have 
already advertised their investments (and efforts) to meet this 
standard. In a landmark case on the Taj trapezium (a 10,400 
km- area surrounding the Taj Mahal), the Supreme Court of 
India has ordered a limit on the sulfur content of diesel sold in 
this area to within 0.25% (Shukla, personal communication). 
The Indian govemment has spent US$1.34 billion to reduce the 
sulfur content in diesel from 1% to 0.25% by weight (Mr. K.P. 
Shahi, Advisor to the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 
as quoted in D o w n t o E a r t h , February 15, 1999, page 15). 
These policies already have had an effect on emissions. Streets 
et a l . (2000) analyzed the impact since 1990 of these policies 
and new energy and emissions factor data on emissions in 
Asia.^ They found that emissions may have increased in Asia 
from 16.9 MtS in 1990 to only 19.3 MtS in 1995, rather than 
to the 26.7 MtS projected in the earlier studies with the 
RAINS-ASIA model. The authors conclude that SOj emissions 
in Asia have not grown nearly as fast as was thought likely in 
the early 1990s, with major implications for projections 
beyond the year 2000. It is probable that the emissions 
trajectory wi l l be even lower as a result of increasing 
environmental awareness in many countries of Southeast Asia 
and East Asia, the implementation of China's "two-control-
zone" policy, and the downtum of Southeast Asia economies in 
the late 1990s (Streets et a l , 2000). 
In Latin America, the contribution of coal-fired power plants to 
total power generation is relatively low and consequently SO2 
emissions are lower than those in other regions. This 
contribution is not expected to increase significantly in the 
^ East Asia including China, Southeast Asia, and the Indian 
subcontinent 
future. It is expected that the rate of increase of SOj emissions 
in Latin America will be reduced because environmental 
agencies in several Latin American countries are already 
enforcing strict SOj emissions standards. Also, increases in 
power generation are expected to be mainly from combined 
cycle natural gas plants (La Rovere and Americano, 1998). 
Different methodologies have been developed to assess the 
sulfur control scenarios in integrated assessment models. 
Griibler (1998c) has summarized the literature, and classifies 
three main modeling approaches: 
• Ecological targets, and analysis of events when critical 
acidification loads are exceeded (e.g., Amann et a l . , 
1995; Foell et a l , 1995; Hettelingh et a l , 1995; Posch 
et a l , 1996; Nakicenovic et a l , 1997). 
• The pollutant burden approach (e.g., Alcamo et a l , 
m i ) . 
• Income driven approaches (e.g.. Smith et a l , 2000). 
Although models differ in their analytical representation of the 
driving forces of sulfur reduction policies and also provide a 
range of possible futures, invariably all scenarios yield 
comparatively low future SOj emissions. Alcamo et a l . (1997) 
estimates a 95% probability that global SOj emissions will be 
below 120 MtS by 2050 and decline thereafter. Their 50% 
probability level suggests emissions of 90 MtS by 2050 and 57 
MtS by 2100, the latter being identical to the median from the 
scenario literature analyzed in Chapter 2. 
Increasingly, energy sector and integrated assessment models 
are able to link regional acidification models with simplified 
climate models, which enables joint analysis of sulfur and 
climate policies and impacts. Examples include the IMAGE 
model (Posch et a l , 1996) and the IIASA model (Rogner and 
Figure 3-18: Range of future sulfur dioxide emission scenarios, in MtS. Note in particular the much lower emission range of 
post-1995 sulfur dioxide emissions control and intervention scenarios compared with the earlier high-growth IS92a, b, e, and f 
scenarios. Source: Griibler, 1998c. 
S c e n a r i o D r i v i n g F o r c e s 153 
Nakicenovic, 1996; McDonald, 1999; Riahi and R o e M , 2000), 
which are linked with the acidification model RAINS for 
Europe and Asia, or the A I M (Morita et a l . , 1994) model for 
Asia. These models extend earlier energy sector models that 
dealt with a comparative costs assessment of isolated sulfur 
and carbon reductions and joint mitigation, such as the OECD 
GREEN model (Complainville and Martins, 1994) or the 
IIASA M E S S A G E model (Grübler, 1998b; Nakicenovic et a l , 
1998a). The state of knowledge and availability of models to 
study the joint benefits of sulfur and carbon emission 
reductions was reviewed in the 1995 IPCC SAR WGIII Report 
(Bruce et a i , 1996) and is expanding rapidly (CIRED et a l , 
1997; Nakicenovic et a l , 1997; Grübler, 1998c). 
3.6.5. Ozone Precursors 
IPCC Working Group I (WGI) SAR (Houghton et a l , 1996) 
confirmed the importance of tropospheric ozone as a 
greenhouse gas. Ozone is produced in the troposphere in a 
complex chain of reactions that involve the ozone precursors 
nitrogen oxides (NO^,), non-CH^ hydrocarbons or volatile 
organic compounds (NMVOCs), and CO. Therefore, it is 
important to explore possible future developments of emissions 
of these substances to analyze the evolution of tropospheric 
ozone levels. 
3 . 6 . 5 . 1 . N i t r o g e n O x i d e s 
N0^ are released through fossil fuel combustion (24 MtN per 
year around 1990), natural and anthropogenic soil release (12 
MtN per year), biomass burning (8 MtN per year), lightning (5 
MtN per year), NH3 oxidation (3 MtN per year), aircraft (0.4 
MtN/year), and transport from the stratosphere (0.1 MtN per 
year). These figures are mean estimates within a range; for fossil 
fuel combustion, aircraft emissions, and stratospheric input the 
ranges may be as narrow as 30%, but for natural sources the 
ranges may be up to a factor of 2 (Prather et a i , 1995). The 
uncertainties in the estimates are illustrated by comparison of 
the detailed emissions inventory of Olivier et a l . (1996) with the 
1994 IPCC estimates - while global total emissions estimates by 
source are very similar, at the regional level emissions estimates 
show pronounced differences, particularly in Asia. 
Fossil fuel combustion in the electric power and transport 
sectors is the largest source. Emissions from fossil fuel use in 
North America and Europe have barely increased since 1979 
because fossil fuel consumption leveled off and air quality 
abatement was enacted, but in Asia emissions are believed to 
increase by 4% annually (Prather et a i , 1995). As a result of the 
first NOjj Protocol in Europe, N0^^ emissions in Europe had 
decreased from 1987 levels by 13% in 1994, but the European 
Union is unlikely to meet its target of the 5* European Action 
Plan of a 30% reduction (EEA, 1999). An important reason is 
that it is difficult to abate N0^ emissions in the growing 
transport sector. Perhaps critically, there are significant 
differences between the characteristics of abatement of SOj and 
NOj^ emissions. While both substances have regional 
acidification effects, a priority for SO2 abatement is induced by 
its important local health effects. Also, whereas SO^ emissions 
relate closely to the type of fuel, NO^^  emissions are more 
dependent on the combustion technology and condifions. 
Few scenarios for N0^, emissions exist beyond the studies for 
Europe, North America, and Japan (IS92 scenarios are a notable 
exception). New scenarios, such as those by Bouwman and van 
Vuuren (1999) and Collins et a l . (1999) often still use IS92a as 
a "loose" baseline, with new abatement policies added as they 
were introduced in the OECD countries after 1992, according to 
current reduction plans (CRP). Collins et a l . (1999) also explore 
a maximum feasible reduction scenaiio, in which European N0^, 
emissions decrease by 60% by 2015 and North American 
emissions by 5%. In the related CRP scenaiio of Bouwman and 
van Vuuren (1999), N0^, emissions in the developing countries 
are assumed to decrease also (by more than 10%) by 2015. 
These studies, however, should be used with care as the authors 
developed their somewhat arbitrary scenarios primarily for 
atmospheric chemistry analysis; they are not based on an in-
depth analysis of the characteristics of the emissions sources and 
potential policies in the various regions outside the OECD. 
3 . 6 . 5 . 2 . C a r b o n M o n o x i d e a n d N o n - M e t h a n e H y d r o c a r b o n s 
Prather et a l . (1995) estimates the total global emissions of CO 
at 1800 to 2700 MtC per year in the decade before 1994. The 
most important of the approximately 1000 TgC anthropogenic 
sources are technological (300 to 550 MtC per year) and 
biomass burning (300 to 700 MtC per year). Technological 
sources dominate in the northern hemisphere, and include 
transport, combustion, industrial processes, and refuse 
incineration. Biomass burning dominates in the southern 
hemisphere, and includes burning of agricultural waste, 
savanna burning, and deforestation. The detailed, 
geographically explicit E D G A R database (Olivier et a l . , 1996) 
has similar emissions estimates for CO. Other sources are 
biogenics (60 to 160 MtC per year), oceans (20 to 200 MtC per 
year), and oxidation of CH^ (400 to 1000 MtC per year) and of 
NMVOCs (200 to 600 MtC per year). To a large extent, this 
oxidation nray be considered anthropogenic in origin because 
many emissions sources of CH4 and NMVOCs are of an 
anthropogenic nature. 
Global emissions estimates of N M V O C s are also very 
uncertain. Prather et a l . (1995) indicate a global total for 
anthropogenic N M V O C s of about 140 MtC per year, from road 
transport (25%), solvent use (14%), fuel production and 
distribution (13%), fuel consumption (34%), and the rest from 
uncontrolled burning and other sources. The E D G A R 
inventory by Olivier et a l . (1996) suggests that global 
emissions may be higher (178 MtC per year) because of higher 
estimates of emissions from energy production and use. As 
with CO, emissions in the northern hemisphere are dominated 
by transport and industry, while in the southern hemisphere 
biomass and biofue! burning is often the dominant source. In 
Europe, emissions of NMVOCs are controlled under the 5* 
Environmental Action Programme of the European Union and 
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the VOC Protocol of the U N Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. However, for reasons similar to 
those for NOj^, the cun'ent reduction of 11% with respect to 
1990 levels and 15% with respect to 1987 levels suggests that 
the plaimed reduction to 30% in 1999 may not be reached 
(EEA, 1999). As a consequence, threshold values for ozone 
continue to be exceeded in Europe. 
No long-term global scenarios for emissions of NMVOCs and 
CO were identified beyond IS92, which assumes increasing 
emissions. The important role of biomass combustion in these 
emissions means that a scenario with low carbon emissions 
because of an increased used of biomass energy does not 
automatically lead to low emissions of N M V O C s and CO. 
Also, emissions trends are influenced significantly by 
assumptions as to the type of combustion or other conversion 
technology (e.g. gasification) deployed in the future. If 
biomass fuel is used in modem large power plants or boilers, or 
is to be converted into modem energy carriers, CO emissions 
will be almost negligible compared to those of traditional uses. 
As with sulfur, however, it seems plausible that with rising 
incomes, abatement of the ozone precursors may be initiated in 
non-OECD regions to address local and particularly regional 
air pollution (photochemical smog). Since control of these 
substances is more difficult than that of sulfur, it may not be 
implemented until later. 
3 . 6 . 6 . Halocarbons and Other I n d u s t r i a l Gases 
This category of G H G emissions comprises a wide basket of 
different gas species that originate from a multitude of 
processes. Generally, their common characteristic is that they 
are released into the atmosphere in comparatively small 
amounts, but on a molecular basis most of the gases are long-
lived, with atmospheric lifetimes up to 50,000 years. Generally 
they have a strong greenhouse forcing per molecule (see 
Chapter 5, Table 5-7). 
Anthropogenic emissions of gases that cause stratospheric 
ozone depletion (chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochloro-
fluorocarbons (HCFCs), halons, methylchloroform, carbon 
tetrachloride, and methylbromide) are controlled by 
consumption restrictions (production plus imports minus 
exports) in the Montreal Protocol. No special SRES scenarios 
were developed for these gases because their future emission 
levels (phase out) are primarily policy driven and hence 
unrelated to scenario variations of important driving-force 
variables such as population, economic growth, or industrial 
output. Instead, the Montreal Protocol scenario (A3, maximum 
allowed production scenario) from the 1998 W M O / U N E P 
S c i e n t i f i c Assessment of Ozone D e p l e t i o n is used 
(WMO/UNEP, 1998). 
The procedures for constructing scenarios for hydro-
fluorocarbon (HFC), polyfluorocarbon (PEC), and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SFg) emissions - for which there is an extreme 
paucity of scenario literature - are based on Fenhann (2000) 
and are described in greater detail in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3. 
In this approach, future total demand for CFCs, HFCs, and 
other CFC substitutes is estimated on the basis of historical 
trends. HFC emissions are calculated using an assumed future 
replacement of CFCs by HFCs and other substitutes. The main 
drivers for the emissions are population and GDP growth. The 
sparse literature available (reviewed in Fenhann, 2000) 
indicates that emissions are related non-linearly to these 
driving forces, with important possibilities for saturation 
effects and long-term decoupling between growth in driving 
force variables and emissions. The emissions have been tuned 
to agree with emissions scenarios presented at the joint 
I P C C - T E A P expert meeting (WMO/UNER 1999). Material 
from the March Consulting Group (1999) has also been used. 
For PFCs (CF4 and C,Fg) the emissions driver is primary 
aluminum production, which is generally modeled using GDP 
and a consumption elasticity. Recycling rates are increasingly 
important, as reflected in the SRES scenarios (see Chapter 5). 
Aluminum production by the Soederberg process resulted, on 
average, in the emission of 0.45 kgCF^ per tAl and 0.02 kgC2Fg 
per tAl in 1998 in Norway. The effect of future technological 
change on the emissions factor can be assumed to be large, 
since the costs of modifications in process technology can be 
offset by the costs of saved energy. A considerable reduction in 
the emission factors has already taken place and the present 
emission factor of 0.5 kgCF^ per tAl is expected to fall to 0.15 
kgCF^ per tAl at various rates (see Chapter 5). An emission 
factor for C^Fg, 10 times lower than that of CF^ was used in the 
calculations. The present trend of not replacing CFCs and 
HCFCs with high global warming compounds like PFCs (or 
SF^) is also assumed to continue, which might underestimate 
the effect of future emissions. The only other source included 
for PEC emissions is semiconductor manufacturing, for which 
the industry has globally adopted a voluntary agreement to 
reduce its PEG emissions by 10% in 2010 relative to 1995 
levels. 
SFg emissions originate from two main activities - the use of 
SFg as a gas insulator in high-vohage electricity equipment, 
and its use in magnesium foundries, in which SFg prevents the 
oxidation of molten magnesium. The driver for the former is 
electricity demand and for the latter it is future magnesium 
production, which will depend on GDP and a consumption 
elasticity. Emission factor reductions over time that result from 
more careful handling, recovery, recycling, and substitution of 
SFg are assumed for both sources. Fenhann (2000) assumes 
that in low future scenarios SFg emissions factors decline to 
one-tenth their present values between 2020 and 2090. In high 
future scenarios, Fenhann (2000) assumes reduction levels are 
somewhat lower, ranging from 55% to 90% depending on the 
region. In the absence of scenario literature, these assumptions 
are retained here (see Chapter 5). Other applications of SFg 
include as a tracer gas in medical surgery and the production of 
semiconductors, and as an insulator in some windows. 
However, these sources are assumed to be cause less than 1% 
of the global emissions. 
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3.7. Policies 
3.7.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
"Policies" in this report are government policies. They are 
formulated against the larger background of national and 
intemational events and trends, and result from millions of 
decisions within the existing and only slowly changing 
cultural, economic, and military balances, Their 
implementation often poses considerable problems if they 
represent longer-term interests and insights. 
Government policies are among the dynamics that influence 
population growth, economic and social development, 
technological change, resource exploitation, and pollution 
management. While the role of policy has been touched upon 
occasionally in earlier sections, government policy 
development can be thought of as a process in itself. The role 
of policies in SRES needs to be considered, partly because 
governments are one of the primary audiences for the scenarios 
and partly because the scenarios are intended to form a 
reference against which mitigation strategies can be assessed 
(although, as stated earlier, the SRES terms of reference 
require the SRES scenarios to n o t consider any explicit climate 
policies). 
GHG emissions are affected by policies designed for a wide 
variety of purposes. Perhaps the most obvious are energy 
policies, but other important policy areas are those of economic 
development, technology development, education, health, 
social welfare, transport, industry, agriculture, and forestry. 
Policies in each of these areas also affect other areas. In each 
policy area various instruments are used. The choice of 
instrument may influence both the policy's success in 
achieving its primary objective and its effect on G H G 
emissions. Taxes, subsidies, regulations, information-based 
instruments, and R & D all bring different mechanisms into play 
and so have different affects. 
The remainder of this section is organized around speciflc 
policy areas or objectives. It considei's major policy issues in 
each area, and discusses the possible implications for G H G 
emissions in reference (non-mitigation) scenarios. 
3 . 7 . 2 . Policy Areas 
3 . 7 . 2 . 1 . P o p u l a t i o n a n d S o c i a l Welfare P o l i c i e s 
Given the interactions between demographics and social and 
economic development discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, 
population and social welfare policies that currently exist or are 
options for various countries can also be viewed as "non-
climate" policies (in the sense that they are not motivated by 
climate concems, but will affect future G H G emissions). 
Studies support the notion that reduced population growth 
significantly abates G H G emissions. Indeed, some integrated 
assessment models suggest that emissions scenarios may be 
more sensitive to population changes, with respect to 
nonnalized uncertainty analysis, than to other factors that 
affect emissions (Nordhaus, 1993). Therefore, social policies 
that affect fertility rates (and mortality and migration rates) 
also could have a significant impact on future emissions. By 
the same token, demographic policies for health and education 
may also affect productivity growth in a positive manner. Thus, 
the desirable objective to further development may result in 
higher economic growth, consumption, and emissions per 
capita. The overall effects are likely to vary from country to 
country. 
For instance, efforts can be made to help women avoid 
unwanted pregnancies or to reduce infant mortality. 
Demographic health surveys suggest that more than 100 
million women in less developed countries do not want to 
become pregnant, but they do not practice contraception 
(Bongaarts, 1994). The Cairo Program of Action (UN, 1995) 
estimates that US$17 billion annually would successfully 
deliver family planning and reproductive health services to the 
majority of people in developing countries who desire them. 
Family planning assistance today contributes to the observed 
recent declines in fertility rates in many developing countries. 
In one study, it was estimated that such programs over the past 
two decades reduced the present population by about 40 
million persons, which in itself may reduce future population 
levels by some 400 million people in the year 2100 (Bongaarts 
et a l , 1990). 
Other policy measures are less direct, but also exert important 
influences on fertility rates. These include improvements in 
health care and female education, especially primary school 
education, which is a factor that correlates highly with fertility 
rates in young women (Bongaarts, 1994). Similarly, measures 
that improve gender equality reduce fertility rates as they 
encourage non-maternal roles and increase employment and 
empowerment opportunities for women. Their implementation 
is currentiy unrelated to concems about global warming, yet 
their effect on this environmental issue may be significant. 
3 . 7 . 2 . 2 . P o l i c i e s t h a t Target E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t a n d 
T e c h n o l o g i c a l I n n o v a t i o n 
A wide range of policies and circumstances may contribute 
toward the desirable objective of furthering development and 
economic growth (see Section 3.3). In the short tenn, fiscal, 
monetary, and interest rate management policies ai-e among the 
main instmments used by governments. In the longer term, 
economic growth may be affected more by measures that 
influence fundamental capabilities, such as policies in 
education, and in the development of physical infrastructure, 
social and economic institutions, and national systems for 
innovation. 
As emphasized in Sections 3,3 and 3.4, the effects of economic 
growth on G H G emissions depend on economic stracture and 
technology. Govemments generally aim to encourage the 
development of particular sectors that are perceived to 
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contribute to national goals for security, food and energy 
supply, high employment, and long-term economic growth 
(Maddison, 1995). The encouragement may take many forms, 
such as direct subsidies and protection from foreign 
competition, public investment in infrastructure, training, or 
R & D , and support for collaborative development programs 
and information networks (OECD, 1997a). If governments 
support sectors that are fossil-fuel intensive, the tendency to 
increase G H G emissions is clear. However, protectionist 
policies may also reduce national economic efficiency, which 
dampens income growth and tends to restrict growth in G H G 
emissions. Conversely, if governments support the 
development of rapid-growth sectors, the tendency may be to 
promote long-term economic growth, increase household 
income and consumpfion, and hence increase G H G 
emissions. 
Over a period of 100 years the policies that most influence the 
development of G H G emissions are probably those that 
contribute to the processes of technical and social innovation, 
which themselves contribute to economic development. 
Innovation policies mostly emphasize the development of 
technologies that improve intemational competitiveness with 
new products and improved performance or reduced costs of 
existing products. The policies are not usually designed to 
achieve these and other (e.g., environmental and social) 
objectives in an integrated way (OECD, 1998b). Hence, their 
impact on G H G emissions is hard to predict, but as cunently 
constituted many national systems for innovation could tend to 
increase emissions by sfimulating economic growth. 
3 . 7 . 2 . 3 . E n e r g y , A g r i c u l t u r e a n d O t h e r Resource M a n a g e m e n t 
P o l i c i e s 
Government policies on energy and agriculture have, on the 
whole, paralleled global trends during the 20* century. Early in 
the century there was a move toward protectionism, which 
aimed to secure national self-sufficiency, especially in food and 
energy. Govemments established import quotas and tariffs, 
subsidies for domestic production, and research and investment 
programs to improve agricultural productivity and develop new 
energy sources. During the 1980s policy emphasis shifted in 
many countries, and has continued into the 1990s, toward open 
borders and reduced subsidies and R & D . Nonetheless, 
numerous energy and agricultural policies persist that 
influence production and trade pattems and hence also G H G 
emissions. 
3 . 7 . 2 . 3 . 1 . E n e r g y p o l i c i e s 
Various policies exist to promote energy efficiency and the 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies and practices. 
Govemment standards, such as appliance efficiency standards, 
motors standards, and the automobile fuel economy standards 
in the US, prescribe the energy consumption levels of 
particular commodities. Residential and commercial building 
standards require the use of energy-efficient construction 
practices and components. Information dissemination 
programs, such as the Green Lights program in the USA or 
similar programs in other countries, provide consumers with 
the information required to make purchase decisions as well as 
to install and operate energy-efficient equipment. Subsidy or 
investment credit programs are often used to promote the 
adoption of a particular technology; combined heat and power 
was promoted in The Netherlands through such a program in 
the 1980s (Parla and Blok, 1995). Other energy efficiency 
policies or programs include audits and assessments, rebate 
programs, govemment procurement programs, benchmarking 
programs, labeling programs, and technology demonstration 
programs (Worrell e t a l . , 1997). 
Many reports point to govemment subsidies as a major 
impediment to cleaner production of energy (Bumiaux et a l , 
1992; Larsen and Shah, 1992; de Moor and Calamai, 1996; 
Roodman, 1996; Greenpeace, 1997). In addition to direct 
subsidies, govemments use a wide variety of measures to 
support domestic or regional industries, or to protect legal 
monopolies. These policies inhibit innovation and can lead to 
higher levels of pollution or resource intensity than would 
occur in a less constrained market. A recent O E C D study found 
that reform of supports to coal, electricity, and transport could 
substantially reduce COj and acid rain emissions in some 
countries (OECD, 1997a). In other countries, subsidy reform 
would have minimal direct environmental benefits, but would 
increase the effectiveness or reduce the cost of environmental 
policies such as eco-taxes and emission limits. Where subsidies 
support nuclear power or other non-fossil energy sources, their 
reform could conversely lead to increased G H G emissions. 
Energy taxes also have an important influence on energy 
demand and hence G H G emissions. The majority of energy 
taxes are intended as a pure fiscal instrument or, in the case of 
road fuel taxes in some countries, to raise funds for road 
provision and maintenance. Many countries are raising these 
taxes, or considering doing so. 
3 . 7 . 2 . 3 . 2 . A g r i c u l t u r e p o l i c i e s 
Agricultural policy reform has received more attention than 
energy policy reform in recent years. Most OECD countries 
support domestic agriculture, whether through direct subsidies, 
import tariffs, or price controls. The general trend is toward a 
reduction in these supports, in part as a result of tiade 
negotiations, but also as part of the broader trend toward 
policies that reduce budget deficits and improve market 
efficiency. Supports are also being reformed to reduce their 
linkage to production volumes. Where subsidies are linked to 
the volume of production, they provide an incentive to increase 
output beyond the level of demand, which leads to surpluses. 
This incentive may tend to increase G H G emissions as a result 
of soil carbon depletion and oxidation, excessive use of 
nitrogen fertilizer leading to N2O emissions, and over-intensive 
animal farming that results in excess CH^ emissions from 
manure and from the animals themselves (OECD, 1997b; 
Storey, 1997). The overall impact of agriculture subsidy 
reforms on G H G emissions will depend on associated fiscal 
changes in other parts of the economy. 
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Overproduction in one country may be compensated to some 
extent by lower production elsewhere. However, in general, 
incentives for higher agricultural output are likely to lead to 
more production globally, with a shift from consumption of 
plant products to animal products, which are land-, resource-, 
and GHG-intensive. In a few industrialized countries a small 
trend has developed to support organic farming and regional 
marketing of foods. Future policies may thus lead to 
agricultural subsidies that are linked more to ecological and 
social factors than to the volume of production. 
3 . 7 . 2 . 3 . 3 . D e m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s 
GHG emissions are likely to be reduced by other policies for 
the sustainable use of resources, such as land, forest 
ecosystems, mineral resources, water, and soil. Insti'uments 
may include direct planning, regulations, establishing property 
rights and obligations, information, education, and persuasion, 
and a broad range of policies to support or influence the 
innovation process to encourage dematerialization (OECD, 
1998b). 
3 . 7 . 2 . 4 . E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o l i c i e s 
While environmental objectives often form part of the rationale 
for agriculture and energy policy reforms, many instruments 
are focused entirely on environmental objectives. The most 
obvious of these are pollution regulations and standards, eco-
taxes, and voluntary and other measures. 
In the context of non-mitigation G H G emission scenarios, 
probably the most important environmental policies are those 
related to sulfur emissions (see Section 3.4.3). Sulfur 
emissions are controlled for local and regional environmental 
reasons, but sulfur oxides do have a radiative impact, and sulfur 
controls can lead to the switching of fuel away from coal and 
oil. Thus, almost paradoxically, environmental policies to 
combat urban air pollution and acid rain may (via reduced 
sulfate aerosol "cooling") exacerbate climate change. Most 
sulfur control policies to date have involved either regulations 
that limit the concentration of sulfur oxides in flue gas from 
large combustion plants, or give standards for the sulfur 
content of fuel. Recently, sulfur control poUcies have become 
more sophisticated, and aim to limit aggregate emissions on a 
national or regional basis to minimize acidic deposition in a 
trans-national context. New policy instruments have also been 
introduced. The U S A has pioneered a "cap and trade" system 
with tradable emission permits (for a review see Joskow et a l . , 
1998). 
Other envnonmental poUcies with a greenhouse impact include 
controls on ODSs; urban air pollution precursor compounds 
(CO, N0^, CH4, and NMVOCs), especially from transport and 
domestic solid fuels; and controls on agricultural practice to 
reduce water pollution and soil erosion. Policies in all of these 
areas are likely to contribute to G H G mitigation. However, 
some options, such as an accelerated shift to electric vehicles 
to reduce local air pollution, could resuh in higher G H G 
emissions in the short term in certain circumstances (Michaelis 
e t a l , 1996). 
3.7.2.5. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d I n f r a s t r u c t u r e P o U c i e s 
Policies on infrastructure may have a very long-term influence 
on G H G emissions, although in many cases the causal 
relationships are complex and not understood well enough to 
justify quantitative analyses of the policy options. These 
include urban planning guidance, construction regulations, 
policies on ownership and financing of infrastructure, and user 
pricing for roads and parking. The most significant impacts on 
G H G emissions are likely to derive from policies that influence 
demand for travel by car and for freight transport by track 
(Newman and Kenworthy, 1990; MichaeUs et a l . , 1996; 
Watson et a l , 1996), those that influence energy use in 
buildings (Levine et a l , 1996; Watson et a l , 1996), and those 
that influence the conversion of forest for agriculture, or 
agricultural land for urban development. 
3 . 7 . 3 . Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of Impacts and I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of 
Policies i n S R E S 
Few of the poficies and instruments identified above can be 
represented directiy in the models typically used to produce 
G H G emission scenarios. In general, the impacts of policies 
are highly uncertain (Houghton et a l . , 1996). Price-based 
instruments have been analyzed in greater detail than other 
types of measure, and many empirical studies have been 
carried out to determine the response to price changes of 
demand for various commodities, especially energy. However, 
such research and analysis usually yields very large ranges of 
uncertainty in the magnitude of the price response, and often 
reveals a strong dependence on specific circumstances. Even 
for price-based policies, national and global effects over 
20-100 years are very uncertain. For the SRES, it is not 
possible to make a precise link between governments' 
application of specific policies and the outcome in the various 
scenarios. 
Instead, the qualitative SRES scenario storylines give a broad 
characterization of the areas of policy emphasis thought to be 
associated with particular economic, technological, and 
environmental outcomes, as reflected in altemative scenario 
assumptions in the models used to generate long-term G H G 
emission scenarios. In some selected areas, such as sulfur 
control policies, a wide body of literature can be drawn upon to 
derive specific pollution control levels or maximum emission 
trajectories consistent with a particular interpretation of a 
scenario storyline. In other areas, such as G H G gases 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, existing scenarios that 
reflect the most up-to-date information are used as direct input 
to SRES. 
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4.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4 the main characteristics of the scenarios 
developed for the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES scenarios) are presented. These scenarios cover a wide 
range of driving forces from demographic to social and 
economic developments, and they encompass a wide range of 
future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (see Chapter 5). 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview and assessment of the 
scenario literature, the main driving forces of future G H G 
emissions, and their relationships. How the driving forces are 
combined to produce a set of scenarios that cover the ranges of 
G H G emissions from the literature is described in this chapter. 
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the large uncertainty in the 
literature that surrounds both future emissions and the possible 
developments of their underlying driving forces. The 
uncertainties range from inadequate scientiñc understanding of 
the problems, through data gaps or lack of data, to the inherent 
unceitainties of future events in general. Hence altemative 
scenarios are used to describe the range of possible future 
emissions. 
The SRES approach involved the development of a set of four 
ahemative scenario "families" (see Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2). 
Each family of SRES scenarios includes a descriptive part 
(called a "storyline") and a number of altemative interpretations 
and quantifications of each storyline developed by six different 
modeling approaches (see also Box 1-1 on terminology). Each 
storyline describes a demographic, social, economic, 
technological, and policy future for each of the scenario 
families. Within each family different s c e n a r i o s explore 
variations of global and regional developments and their 
implications for G H G , ozone precursors, and sulfur emissions. 
Each of these scenarios is consistent with the broad framework 
specified by the storyline of the scenario family. 
Each storyline is basically a short "history" of a possible future 
development expressed as a combination of key scenario 
characteristics. These descriptions are styHzed and designed to 
facilitate specification and further interpretation of scenario 
quantifications. The storylines identify particular dynamics, 
visible in the world today, that might have important influences 
on future G H G emissions. They deliberately explore what 
might happen if social, economic, technical, and policy 
developments take a particular direction at the global level; 
they also pay attention to regional differences and interactions, 
especially between developing and industiialized countries. 
The broad consensus among the SRES writing team is that the 
current literature analysis suggests the future is inherently 
unpredictable and so views will differ as to which of the 
storylines and representative scenarios could be more or less 
likely. Therefore, the development of a single "best guess" or 
"business-as-usual" scenario is neither desirable nor possible. 
Nor should the storylines and scenarios be taken as policy 
recommendations. The storylines represent the playing out of 
certain social, economic, technological, and environmental 
paradigms, which will be viewed positively by some people 
and negatively by others. The SRES writing team decided on 
four storylines - an even number helps to avoid the impression 
of a "central" or "most likely" case. The team wanted more 
than two storylines to help illustrate that the future depends on 
many different underlying dynamics; the team wanted no more 
than four to avoid complicating the process with too many 
alternatives. The scenarios cover a wide range of, but not all 
possible, futures. In particular, it was decided that possible 
"suфrises" would not be considered and that there would be no 
"disaster" scenarios. The team decided to carry out sensitivity 
tests within some of the storylines by considering altemative 
scenarios with different fossil-fuel reserves, rates of economic 
growth, or rates of technical change. These sensitivity analyses 
resulted in groups of scenarios within a given scenario family 
and alternative scenario interpretations within a scenario group 
or family (see Section 4.2 below for a description of scenario 
terminology and taxonomy). 
The tities of the storylines are deliberately simple - A l , A2, 
B l , and B2. There is no particular order among the storytines 
(they are listed alphabetically). Figure 4-1 shows that the SRES 
scenarios build on the main driving forces of G H G emissions. 
Each scenario family is based on a common specification of the 
main driving forces. 
A l l four storylines and scenario families describe future worlds 
that are generally more affluent compared to the current 
situation. They range from very rapid economic growth and 
technologic change to high levels of environmental protection, 
from low-to-high global populations, and from high-to-low 
G H G emissions. Perhaps more importantiy, all the storylines 
describe dynamic changes and transitions in generally different 
directions. The storylines do not include specific climate-
change policies, but they do include numerous other socio­
economic developments and non-climate environmental 
policies. As time progresses, the storylines diverge from each 
other in many of their characteristic features. In this way they 
span the relevant range of G H G emissions and different 
combinations of their main sources. 
After the basic features and driving forces for each of the four 
storylines had been determined, the team quantified the 
storylines into individual scenarios with the help of formal 
(computer) models. While the writing team and the modeling 
groups included experts from around the world, all six 
modeling groups are based in Europe, North America, and 
Japan. As indicated above, each model quantification of a 
storyline constitutes a scenario, and all scenarios of one 
storyline constitute a "scenario family." The six models are 
representative of different approaches to emissions-scenario 
modeling and different integrated assessment frameworks in 
the literature, and include so-called top-down and bottom-up 
models. The use of different models reflects the SRES Terms 
of Reference call for méthodologie pluralism and for an open 
process (see Appendix I). The number and type of models 
chosen in the open process was on a voluntary basis. In January 
1997 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working 
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SRES Scenarios 
Figure 4-1: The four SRES scenario famihes that share 
common storyhnes are illustrated as branches of a two-
dimensional tree. The two dimensions indicate the relative 
orientation of the different scenario storylines toward 
economic or environmental concerns and global and 
regional scenario development pattems, respectively. There 
is no implication that these two are mutually exclusive or 
incompatible. In reality, the four scenarios share a space of 
a much higher dimensionality given the numerous driving 
forces and other assumptions needed to define any given 
scenario in a particular modeling approach. The A l 
storyline branches out into different groups of scenarios to 
illustrate that altemarive development paths are possible 
within one scenario family. 
Group II Technical Support Unit (IPCC WGII TSU) sent letters 
to Governments asking for nominations of modeling teams to 
contribute to SRES and advertised in a number of scientific 
journals for modelers to participate in SRES. Six different 
modeling groups from Europe, North America, and Japan 
volunteered to participate in the fonnulation and development 
of the scenarios in response to the call. It is fortunate that they 
are from three different continents and also include different 
methodological approaches used in the literature to develop 
quantitative emissions scenarios. 
The six models have different regional aggregations. The 
writing team decided to group the various global regions into 
four "macro-regions" common to all the regional aggregations 
across the six models (Box 4-1). 
In response to a number of requests from potential user groups 
within IPCC and in accordance with a decision of the IPCC 
Bureau in 1998 to release draft scenarios to climate modellers 
for their input in the Third Assessment Report, the writing team 
chose one model run to characterize each scenaiio family. 
Scenarios resulting from these runs are called "marker" 
scenarios or simply "markers." There are four marker 
scenarios, each considered characteristic for one of the four 
scenario families. The rationale and process for designating 
marker scenarios is discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.1. 
The SRES scenario quantifications of the main indicators (such 
as population and economic growth, characteristics of the 
energy system, and the associated G H G emissions) all fall 
within the range of studies published in the Hterature and 
scenarios documented in the SRES database (see Chapter 2). 
Quantitative indicators form an important part of each scenario 
description. These indicators include gross world product, 
population, supply and demand for principal energy forms, 
energy resource characteristics, the breakdown of land use, and 
emissions of various GHGs. The scenarios are designed so that 
the evolution of their indicators over the 2P ' centviry falls well 
within the range represented by scenarios from the literature 
and included in the SRES database (see Chapter 2 and Morita 
and Lee, 1998; Nakicenovic, et a l , 1998). More importantly, 
they correspond to the qualitative characteristics of the 
respective storylines. Also, they were revised iteratively within 
the six modeling approaches to achieve internal consistency on 
the basis of inputs from the entire SRES writing team and the 
SRES open process. 
Each storyline was characterized initially by two quantitative 
"targets," namely global population (15, 10, and 7 billion by 
2100 in scenarios A2, B2, and both A l and B l , respectively) 
and global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2100 (in 1990 US 
dollars, US$550 trillion for A l , US$250 trillion for A2, 
US$350 trifiion for B l , and US$250 trillion for B2). These 
quantitative targets guided the subsequent quantification of the 
SRES scenarios with different model approaches. Generally, 
the orders of magnitude of these original quantitative scenario 
"guideposts" are reflected in the final SRES scenarios (see 
Table 4-2) and have been adopted in a majority of SRES 
scenarios. Evidently, the quantitative characteristics of the four 
SRES scenario families comprise many more dimensions than 
this, in particular regional pattems, differences in resource and 
technology availability, land-use changes, non-carbon dioxide 
(COj) GHGs, etc. These are discussed in the subsequent 
Sections. 
4.2. SRES Scenario Taxonomy 
4 . 2 . 1 . Storylines 
The primary purpose of developing multiple scenario families 
was to explore the uncertainties behind potential trends in 
global developments and G H G emissions, as well as the key 
drivers that influence these (see also Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2). 
The writing team decided that narrative storylines, based on the 
futures and scenario literature, would be the most coherent way 
to describe their scenarios, for the following reasons. 
• To help the team to think more coherently about the 
complex interplay between scenario driving forces 
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within and across altemative scenarios and to enhance 
the consistency in assumptions for different parameters. 
• To make it easier to explain the scenarios to the various 
user communities by providing a narrative description 
of altemative futures that goes beyond quantitative 
scenario features. 
• To make the scenarios more useful, in particular, to 
analysts contributing to IPCC WGs II and III. The 
demographic, social, political, and technological contexts 
described in the scenario storylines are all-important in 
the analysis of the effects of policies to either adapt to 
climate change or to reduce G H G emissions. 
Box 4-1: Four SRES World Regions 
• To provide a guide for additional assumptions to be 
made in detailed climate-impact and mitigation 
analyses, because at present no model or scenario can 
possibly respond to the wide variety of infomiational 
and data needs of the different user communities of 
long-term emissions scenarios. 
The four scenario families presented in this report are 
representative of a broad range of scenarios found in the 
literature, but they are not directly based on any particular 
published scenario taxonomy or set of scenarios. Rather, the 
storylines of each scenario family were developed on the basis 
The six modeling frameworks used to develop the SRES scenarios have different regional aggregations. The writing team 
decided to group the various global regions into four "macro-regions" common to all the diiferent regional aggregations across 
the six models (Figure 4.2; see Appendix IV, Table IV-1). The individual scenarios were formulated with the respective regional 
aggregation of each model. Afterward, the input assumptions and results were summed to correspond to the four macro-regions: 
• OECD90 region groups together all member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
as of 1990, the base year of the participating models, and corresponds to the Annex II countries originally defmed in 
U N F C C C (1992). 
• REF region consists of countries undergoing economic reform and groups together the East and Central European 
countries and the Newly bidependent States of the former Soviet Union; it roughly corresponds to Annex I outside the 
Annex II countries as defined in U N F C C C (1992). 
• ASIA region stands for all developing (non-Annex I) countries in Asia (excluding the Middle East). 
• A L M region stands for the rest of the world and corresponds to developing (non-Annex I) countries in Africa, Latm 
America, and Middle East. 
In other words, the OECD90 and REF regions together roughly correspond to Annex I or industrialized (developed) countries 
(IND), while the ASIA and A L M regions together roughly correspond to the non-Annex I, or developing countries (DEV). 
Developing, or non-Annex I countries (i.e., ASIA and A L M ) , are sometimes referred to hi the text as the "South" to distinguish 
them from the mdustriahzed, or Annex I countries, of the "North" (i.e., OECD90 and REF). A detailed description of each 
region is provided in Appendix Ш. 
1 N A M North America 
2 L A M Latin Amenca and the Canbbean 
3 AFR Sub-Saharan Africa 
4 M E A Middle East and North Africa 
5 WEU Westem Europe 
6 EEU Central and Eastem Europe 
7 FSU Newly independent states of 
the former Soviet Union 
8 CPA Centtally planned Asia and China 
9 SAS South Asia 
10 PAS Other Pacific Asia 
1! PAD Pacific OECD 
Figure 4-2: SRES world 
regions A L M , ASIA, 
OECD90, and R E F The 
developing (DEV) countries, 
comprising the A L M and 
ASIA regions, roughly 
correspond to non-Aimex I 
countries of the U N F C C C 
(1992). The industrialized 
(IND) countries, comprising 
the OECD90 and REF 
regions, roughly correspond to 
Annex I countries of the 
U N F C C C . 
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of the general knowledge of this literature, and on the personal 
experience and creativity within the writing team. The writing 
team spent the better part of the first year (1997) formulating 
the storylines, which during the following two years were 
revised iteratively with the scenario development until the 
completion of the repoit. 
Four brief "future histories" captured by the SRES storylines 
differ in how global regions interrelate, how new technologies 
diffuse, how regional economic activities evolve, how 
protection of local and regional environments is implemented, 
and how demographic structure changes. The "qualitative" 
storyline characteristics include various political, social, 
cultural, and educational conditions (e.g., type of governance, 
social structure, and educational level) that often cannot be 
defined in strictiy quantitative tenns and do not directiy "drive" 
G H G emissions. These qualitative variables, however, 
participate in complex "cause-effect" relationships with 
quantitative emission drivers (e.g., economic activities, 
population levels, energy consumption). Their expficit 
inclusion in the scenario development process not only makes 
scenarios more "plausible" and "believable," but also ensures 
they do not become an arbitrary numeric combination of 
quantitative parameters. 
The SRES storylines do n o t include explicit policies to limit 
G H G emissions or to adapt to the expected global cHmate 
change, reflecting the SRES Teitns of Reference (see Appendix 
I). However, the storyline demographic, social, economic and 
technological profiles can be used in other studies to develop 
and evaluate climate-change mitigation and adaptation measures 
and policies. Such evaluation would require additional 
(prescriptive) assumptions about policies and measures to affect 
future climates and human responses to climate change now 
absent from the storylines. 
A l l four SRES "futures" represented by the distinct storylines 
are treated as equally possible and there are no "central," 
"business-as-usual," "surprise," or "disaster" futures (examples 
of which are given in Box 4.2). A l l of the storylines have 
features that can be inteipreted as "positive" or "negative" and 
Box 4-2: "Neutrality" of the SRES Scenarios 
they play out different tendencies and changes in part visible in 
the world today. To avoid the tendency to overemphasize 
"positive" or "negative" features of individual storylines, their 
titles were kept simple. Many attempts were made to capture 
the spirit of each storyline with a short and snappy title, but no 
single title was found to reflect adequately the complex mix of 
characteristics of any storyline. 
By 2100 the world wil l have changed in ways that are difficult 
to imagine, as difficult as it was at the end of the 19"^  century 
to imagine the changes of the 20"' century. However, each 
storyline takes a different direction of future developments so 
that they differ in an increasingly irreversible way. They 
describe divergent futures that reflect a significant portion of 
the underlying uncertainties in the main driving forces. The 
differences among the storylines cover a wide range of the key 
"future" characteristics, such as technology, governance, and 
behavioral patterns. Hence the plausibility or feasibility of the 
storyline assumptions should be viewed with an "open mind," 
not from a narrow interpretation of current situations and 
trends in economic conditions, technology developments, and 
social and governing structures. 
The main characteristics of future developments that take 
distinct development paths in the four storylines include (see 
also Table 4-2 for an overview): 
• Nature of the global and regional demographic develop­
ments in relation to other characteristics of the storyline. 
• Extent to which economic globalization and increased 
social and cultural interactions continue over the 2P ' 
century. 
• Rates of global and regional economic developments 
and trade pattems in relation to the other characteristics 
of the storyline. 
• Rates and direction of global and regional 
technological change, especially in relation to the 
economic development prospects. 
• Extent to which local and regional environmental 
concems shape the direction of future development and 
environmental controls. 
The SRES scenarios are mtended to exclude catastrophic fumres. Such catastiophic futures feature prominently in the Uterature. 
They typically involve large-scale envnotunental or economic collapses, and extrapolate current unfavorable conditions and 
trends in many regions. Promment examples of such scenarios include "Retrenchment" (Kinsman, 1990), "Dark Side of the 
Market World" or "Change witiiout Progress" (Schwartz, 1991), "Black and Grey" (Godet et a l , 1994), "Global Incoherence 
Scenario" (Peterson, 1994), "New World Disorder" (Schwartz, 1996), "A Visit to Befindia" (Pohl, 1994), the future evoked by 
the description of the current situation in parts of West-Africa and Central Asia (Kaplan, 1996), "Barbarization" (Gallopin et a l , 
1997), "Dark Space" (Glenn and Gordon, 1999), "Global Fragmentation" (Lawrence et a l , 1997), and "A Passive Mean World" 
(Glenn and Gordon, 1997, 1999). In this last scenario the world is carved up into three rigid and distinct trading blocs, with 
fragmented political boundaries and out-of-control ethnic conflicts. In "Global Crisis" (de Jong and Zalm, 1991; СРВ, 1992) 
protectionism leads to a vicious circle of slowing economic growth and eventually breakdown. Many of these scenarios suggest 
that catastrophic developments may draw the world into a state of chaos within one or two decades. In such scenarios GHG 
emissions might be low because of low or negative economic growth, but it seems unlikely they would receive much attention 
in the light of more immediate problems. Hence, this report does not analyze such futures. 
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• Degree to which human and natural resources are 
mobilized globally and regionally to achieve multiple 
development objectives of each storyline. 
• Balance of economic, social, technological, or 
environmental objectives in the choices made by 
consumers, governments, enterprises, and other 
stakeholders. 
Thus, the storyliires describe developments in many different 
economic, technical, environmental, and social dimensions. 
Consequently, they occupy a multidimensional space and no 
simple metric can be used to classify them. Even though they 
occupy such a multidimensional space along many driving 
forces relevant for G H G emissions, it is useful here to highlight 
just two dimensions. The fnst refers to the extent of economic 
convergence and social and cultural interactions across the 
regions and the second to the balance between economic 
objectives and environmental and equity objectives. Possible 
names for these two dimensions could be "globalization" (Box 
4-3) and "sustainability," respectively (Box 4-4). As these two 
expressions are not necessarily viewed by everyone as being 
value-free, the two dimensions could alternatively be 
designated simply as a more g l o b a l or more r e g i o n a l 
orientation and as a more e c o n o m i c or a more e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
orientation (see Figure 4-1). These dimensions are important in 
the SRES scenarios. Nevertheless, there was considerable 
resistance in the SRES writing team against such a simplistic 
classification of storylines, so it is presented here for 
illustrative purposes only. These distinctions are, in a sense, 
artificial. For example, both economic and environmental 
objectives are pursued in all scenarios, albeit with different 
levels of relative emphasis. 
The extent to which the currently observed global and regional 
orientations wil l prevail in the 2P ' century is pertinent to the 
distinction between the A l and B l scenario families on one 
side and A2 and B2 families on the other side. While the A l 
and B l storylines, to different degrees, emphasize successful 
Box 4-3: Globalization Issues 
With Ihe convergence ш governments' economic policies m the 
1990s, combined with the rapid development of communication 
networks, it is perhaps not surprising that an extensive poll of 
scenarios by the Millennium Institute suggested "globalization" 
as the main driving force that will shape the future (Gleim and 
Gordon, 1997,1999). However, some scenarios in the hterature 
explore the possibiUty that unfettered markets, usually seen as 
an mtegral element of "globalization," might destabilize society 
in ways that endanger the process (Mohan Rao, 1998). In 
UNESCO's 1998 Worid Culture Report, it is noted that 
communities are increasingly emphasizing their cultural 
individuality; meanwhile, communication and travel are 
resultmg in interactions between communities that result m the 
evolution of new "local" cultures (UNESCO, 1998). 
Huntington (1996) asserts that continental regional cultures 
may determine the shape of future geopolitical developments 
rather than globahzation. 
Box 4-4: Sustainability Issues 
Recent decades have seen considerable growth in discourse 
of environmental and social issues, represented at the global 
level by several high-level United Nations (UN) meetings on 
social and economic development and environmental 
sustainability (UNCED, 1992; U N , 1994,1995; Leach, 1998; 
Mnnasinghe and Swart,2000). The range of participants has 
expanded from the most closely involved govertmient 
ministries, businesses, and envirormiental NGOs to include a 
broad range of representation by different ministries, local 
government, businesses, professions, and community groups. 
Increased interest in sustainability issues can lead to all kinds 
of socio-economic and technological changes that may not be 
aimed explicitly at reducing G H G emissions, but which may 
in effect contribute significantly to such reductions. 
economic global convergence and social and cultural 
interactions, A2 and B2 focus on a blossoming of diverse 
regional development pathways (see Box 4-3). 
The extent to which the currentiy observed economic and 
environmental orientations will prevail in the 2P ' century is 
pertinent to the distinction between A l and A2 scenario 
families on one side and B l and B2 scenario families on the 
other side. In the B l and B2 storylines this transition is 
pursued, to different degrees, through a successful translation 
of global concerns into local actions to promote environmental 
sustainability. Altematively, in the A l and A2 storyhnes the 
emphasis remains, again to different degrees, on sustained 
economic development and achievement of high levels of 
affluence throughout the world, where environmental priorities 
are perceived as less important than those of economic 
development (see Box 4-4). 
In short, each of the storylines can be summarized as follows: 
• The A I storyline and scenario family describes a future 
world of very rapid economic growth, low population 
growth, and the rapid inttoduction of new and more 
efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are 
convergence among regions, capacity building, and 
increased cultural and social interactions, with a 
substantial reduction in regional differences in per 
capita income. The A I scenario family develops into 
four groups that describe altemative directions of 
technological change in the energy system.' 
' During the approval process of the Summary for Policymakers at 
the 5th Session of WGIII of the IPCC from 8-11 March 2000 in 
Katmandu, Nepal, it was decided to combine two of thiese groups ( 
A l C and A I G ) into one "fossil intensive" group A l F I , in contrast to 
the non-fossil group AIT , and to select two illustrative scenarios 
from these two A l groups to facilitate use by modelers and policy 
makers. This leads to six scenario groups that constitute the four 
scenario families, three of which are in the A l family. A l l scenarios 
are equally sound. 
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• The A2 storyhne and scenario family describes a very 
heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-
reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility 
patterns across regions converge very slowly, which 
results in high population growth. Economic 
development is primarily regionally oriented and per 
capita economic growth and technological change are 
more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
• The B l storyline and scenario family describes a 
convergent world with the same low population growth 
as in the A l storyline, but with rapid changes in 
economic structures toward a service and information 
economy, with reductions in material intensity, and the 
introduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability, 
including improved equity, but without additional 
climate initiatives. 
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world 
in which the emphasis is on local solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability. It is 
a world with moderate population growdi, intennediate 
levels of economic development, and less rapid and 
more diverse technological change than in the В1 and 
A I storylines. While the scenario is also oriented 
toward environmental protection and social equity, it 
focuses on local and regional levels. 
These storylines are presented in more detail in Section 4.3, 
which includes their original quantitative indicators that served 
as input to the scenario quantification process. 
42.2. Scenarios 
A l l SRES scenarios were designed as quantitative 
"interpretations" (quantifications) of the SRES qualitative 
storylines. Each scenario is a particular quantification of one of 
the four storylines. The quantitative inputs for each scenario 
involved, for instance, regionalized measures of population, 
economic development, and energy efficiency, the availability 
of various forms of energy, agricultural productivity, and local 
pollution controls. Each participating modeling group (see 
above) used computer models and their experience in the 
assessment of long-range development of economic, 
technological, and environmental systems to generate 
quantifications of the storylines. The models used to develop 
the scenarios are: 
• Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the 
National Institute of Environmental Studies (NIES) in 
Japan (Morita et a l , 1994). 
• Atmospheric Stabilization Framework Model (ASF) 
from ICF Consulting in the US (Lashof and Tirpak, 
1990; Pepper et a l , 1998; Sankovski et a l . , 2000). 
• Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect 
(IMAGE) from the National Institute for Public Health 
and Hygiene (RIVM) in the Netherlands (Alcamo et 
a l , 1998; de Vries et a l . , 1994, 1999, 2000), used in 
connection with the Central Plarming Bureau (СРВ) 
WortdScan model (de Jong and Zalm, 1991), the 
Netherlands. 
• Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry 
Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of 
Tokyo in Japan (Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori, 
2000). 
• Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and 
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from 
the International Institute of AppHed Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Strubegger, 1995; 
Riahi and Roehrl, 2000). 
• The Mini Cfimate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from 
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in 
the USA (Edmonds e t a l , 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
A more detailed description of the modeling approaches is 
given in Appendix IV. Some modeling teams developed 
scenarios that reflected all four storylines, while some 
presented scenarios for fewer storylines. Some scenarios share 
hannonized^ input assumptions of main scenario drivers, such 
as population, economic growth, and final energy use, with 
their respective designated marker scenarios of the four 
scenario families and underlying storyhnes (see Section 4.4.1). 
Others explore scenario sensitivities in titese driving forces 
through alternative interpretations of the four scenario 
storylines. Table 4-1 lists all SRES scenarios, by modeling 
group and by scenario family, and indicates which scenarios 
share harmonized input assumptions of important driving 
forces of emissions at the global level and at the level of the 
four SRES regions. Altogether, the six modeling teams 
formulated 40 alternative SRES scenarios 
A l l the qualitative and quantitative features of scenarios that 
belong to the same family were set to conform to the 
corresponding features of the underlying storyline. 
Quantitative storyline targets recommended for use in all 
scenarios within a given family included, in particular, 
population and GDP growth assumptions. Most scenarios 
developed within a given family follow these storyline 
recommendations, but some scenarios offer alternative 
interpretations. Scenarios within each family vary quite 
substantially in such characteristics as the assumptions about 
availability of fossil-fuel resources, the rate of energy-
efficiency improvements, the extent of renewable-energy 
development, and, hence, resultant G H G emissions. This 
variation reflects the modeling teams' altemative views on the 
plausible global and regional developments and also stems 
from differences in the underlying modeling approaches. After 
the modeling teams had quantified the key driving forces and 
made an effort to harmonize them with the storylines by 
' The harmonization criteria agreed by the writing team are indicated 
in Table 4-1. The classification of scenarios is quite robust against 
varying the percentage deviation harmonization criteria (see Section 
4.4.1). 
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Table 4 - 1 : C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of SRES s c e n a r i o q u a n t i f i c a t i o n s . Shown f o r each s c e n a r i o i s t h e name of t h e s t o r y l i n e a n d s c e n a r i o 
f a m i l y , f u l l s c e n a r i o name (ID), d e s c r i p t i v e s c e n a r i o name, a n d w h i c h of t h e d r i v i n g f o r c e s a r e h a r m o n i z e d a t t h e g l o b a l a n d 
r e g i o n a l l e v e l , a n d o n t h e g l o b a l l e v e l o n l y , r e s p e c t i v e l y . The l i s t e d h a r m o n i z e d d r i v i n g f o r c e s a r e p o p u l a t i o n ( P O P ) , gross 
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t ( G D P ) , a n d final energy (FE), see a l s o Section 4 . 4 . 1 . a n d T a b l e 4-4. M a r k e r s c e n a r i o s a r e i n d i c a t e d i n b o l d 
a n d a r e h a r m o n i z e d by d e f i n i t i o n , a n d a d d i t i o n a l i l l u s t r a t i v e s c e n a r i o s , then a r e a l s o h a r m o n i z e d a r e g i v e n i n i t a l i c s . The l o w e r 
t a b l e i n d i c a t e s t h e h a r m o n i z a t i o n c r i t e r i a i n terms of t h e m a x i m u m d e v i a t i o n ( % ) f r o m t h e specified c o m m o n p o p u l a t i o n , gross 
w o r l d p r o d u c t , a n d f i n a l energy development a t t h e g l o b a l a n d r e g i o n a l l e v e l s . 
Storyline Scenario ID Scenario Name Harmonized Drivers 
(on World and SRES 
Regional Level) 
Harmonized Drivers 
(on World Level) 
A l AlB-AIM A l FE, GDP, POP by definition FE, GDP, POP by definition 
A l B - A S F A l POP GDP, POP 
A IB- IMAGE A l POP GDR POP 
A I B - M A R I A A l — POR GDP"^ 
A l B - M E S S A G E A l FE, GDR POP FE, GDP, POP 
A l B - M i n i C A M A l POP POP, GDP^ 
A l C - A I M A l coal FE, GDP, POP FE, GDP, POP 
A l C - M E S S A G E A l coal POP FE, GDR POP 
A l C - M i n i C A M A l coal POP POP 
A I G - A I M A l oil and gas FE, GDP, POP FE, GDP, POP 
A I G - M E S S A G E A l oil and gas POP FE, GDP, POP 
A l G - M i n i C A M A l oil and gas POP POP GDP'' 
AIT-AIM^ A l technology GDP, POP GDP, POP 
A I T - M E S S A G E " A l technology POP GDP, POP 
A I T - M A R I A " A l technology - POP 
A l v l - M i n i C A M * ^ A l v l POP POP 
A l v 2 - M i n i C A M ' ' A l v 2 - -
A2 A 2 - A I M A2 POP FE, POP 
A2-ASF A2 FE, GDP, POP by definition FE, GDP, POP by definition 
A2G-IMAGE'= A2 gas - POP 
A 2 - M E S S A G E A2 FE, GDP, POP FE, GDP, POP 
A 2 - M i n i C A M A2 POP POP 
A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M b A2-A1 - -
B l B l - A I M B l POP GDR POP 
B l - A S F B l POP GDR POP 
BI-IMAGE B l FE, GDP. POP by definition FE, GDP, POP by definition 
В1-MARIA B l - POP 
В1-MESSAGE B l FE, GDR POP FE, GDR POP 
В1-MiniCAM B l POP GDR POP 
BIT-MESSAGE B l technology FE, GDP, POP FE, GDR POP 
BlHigh -MESSAGE B l high POP GDP, POP 
B l H i g h - M i n i C A M B l high POP POP 
B2 B2-AIM B2 FE, GDR POP FE, GDR POP 
B2-ASF B2 POP POP 
B2-IMAGE'^ B2 — — 
B 2 - M A R I A B2 — FE, GDR POP 
B2-MESSAGE B2 FE, GDP, POP by definition FE, GDR POP by definition 
B 2 - M i m C A M B2 — GDP 
B2C-MARIA B2 coal — FE, GDP, POP 
B2High-MiniCAM B2 high — GDP 
continued on next page 
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T a b l e 4.1 c o n t i n u e d 
Harmonization criteria: 
1 9 9 0 - 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 - 2 0 5 0 2 0 5 0 - 2 1 0 0 
P o p u l a t i o n World 5% 5% 5% 
4 SRES regions 10% 10% 10% 
G D P World 10% 10% 10% 
4 SRES regions 25% 25% 25% 
F i n a l E n e r g y World 15% 15% 15% 
4 SRES regions 25% 20% 15% 
" The A I T scenarios explored cases of increased energy end-use efficiency and therefore share similar levels of energy services, but not final 
energy, with the A l marker scenario. As this was an agreed upon (different) feature of this particular scenario group compared to that of the 
A l marker, the final energy harmonization criteria does not apply by design. If final energy use is excluded as harmonization criteria for the 
scenarios of the A I T scenario group the number of harmonized scenarios increases to 13 (four SRES regions and worid level) and 17 (worid 
level only), respectively. 
I' A l v l - M i n i C A M , A l v 2 - M i n i C A M , and A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M became available only late in the process (after the 15 July 1999 deadline). 
Intentionally, they describe futures that ai'e quite different in character from the other scenaiios in their respective families and are therefore 
only to a limited degree comparable to other scenarios of the A l and A2 scenario families. 
The IMAGE-resuhs for the A2 and B2 scenarios are based on preliminary model experiments done in March 1998. Due to limited resources 
it has not been possible to redo these experiments. Hence, the IMAGE-team is not able to provide background data and details for these 
scenario calculations and the population and economic growth assumptions are not fully harmonized, as is the case for the I M A G E A l and 
B l scenarios. 
•* Deviations from harmonization criteria in one time period are not considered in this classification. 
adjusting control parameters, possible diversity still remained 
(see Section 4.4.1). 
In addition, the A l scenario family developed into different 
distinct scenario groups, each based on the A l storyline that 
describes alternative developments in future energy systems, 
from carbon-intensive development to decarbonization (see 
footnote 1). (Similar storyline variations were considered for 
other scenario families, but were pursued only to a limited 
degree in scenario sensitivity analysis in order to limit the 
number of scenarios.) This further increased the richness in 
different G H G emissions paths, because this variation in the 
structure of the future energy system in itself resulted in a 
range of emissions almost as large as that generated through 
the variation of other main driving forces, such as population 
and economic development. The differentiation into various 
scenario groups was introduced into the A l storyline because 
of its "high growth with high technology" nature, in which 
differences in alternative technology developments translate 
into large differences in future G H G emission levels. 
As for the storylines, no single scenario was treated as more or 
less "probable" than others belonging to the same family. 
However, after requests from various user communities to 
reduce the number of scenarios to a manageable size, a single 
scenario within a family was selected as a representative case 
to illusfrate a particular storyline on the basis of the modeling 
teams' consensus. These scenarios were named "marker 
scenarios" or simply "markers" and were put on the SRES 
open process webpage for review. The marker scenario for the 
A I scenario storyline was developed using the A I M model; for 
the A2 storyhne using the A S F model; for the B l storyline 
using the I M A G E model; and finally for the B2 storyline using 
the M E S S A G E model (see Table 4-1). 
The choice of the markers was based on extensive discussion 
within the SRES team: 
• Which of the initial quantifications (by the models) 
reflected the story best. 
• Preference of some of the modeling teams and features 
of specific models. 
• Range of emissions across all the markers. 
• Use of different models for the four markers. 
In 1998, the preliminary descriptions and quantifications of the 
marker scenarios were posted on the SRES website for the 
open process and, in accordance with a decision of the IPCC 
Bureau, were in this way made available to climate modelers 
for their input in the Third Assessment Report. As a result of 
the inputs and comments received through the open process 
and by the entire writing team, the marker scenarios have been 
successively refined and improved without changmg their 
fundamental characteristics in terms of impoitant scenario 
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drivmg forces (population, GDP) and order of magnitude of 
G H G emissions. Subsequently, additional scenarios within 
each scenario family were developed to explore the sensitivity 
of adoptmg alternative quantitative scenario input assumptions 
on future G H G emissions. As a result the markers are not 
necessarily the median or mean of a scenario family (nor 
would it be possible to construct such a median or mean 
scenario by taking all salient scenario characteristics and 
regional results into account). The markers are simply those 
scenarios considered by the SRES writing team as illustrative 
of a particular storyline. They are not singled out as more 
likely than alternative quantitative interpretations of a 
particular scenario family and its underlying storyline. 
Perhaps they may be best described as "first among equals." 
However, as a result of time and resource limitations the 
marker scenarios have received the closest scrutiny from the 
entire writing team and through the SRES open process 
compared to other scenario quantifications. The marker 
scenarios are also the SRES scenarios most intensively tested 
m terms of leproducibility. As a rule, at least four different 
models were used in attempts to replicate the model 
quantification of a particular marker scenario. Available time 
and resources did not allow a similar exercise to be conducted 
for all SRES scenarios, albeit a more limited effort was 
devoted to reproduce the A l scenario groups (next to the A l 
marker) with different models. 
To enable a comparison of the resultant G H G emissions, the 
writing team decided to define a subset of harmonized 
scenarios within each family that share common main scenario 
driving-force assumptions, such as population or GDP growth. 
Two harmonization criteria were developed (see also Section 
4.4.1). This procedure and the harmonization criteria were 
adopted in a joint agreement among the six SRES modeling 
teams. 
"Fully harmonized" scenarios are those that share important 
driving force variables, including population, GDP, and final 
energy use for each of the four SRES regions and the world 
(according to the quantitative criteria listed in Table 4-1). Fully 
harmonized scenaiios by definition include the respective 
marker scenario. From 40 scenarios 11 are classified as 
scenarios with "full harmonization." For each scenario family 
at least two scenarios are harmonized using the most restiictive 
criteria. This also applies to the scenario groups within the A l 
scenario family, which correspondingly has the highest number 
of fully harmonized scenarios. This subset of "fully 
harmonized" scenarios serves to provide a better 
correspondence between the development of the tliree main 
driving forces and the resultant G H G emissions. The "fully 
harmonized" scenarios thus demonstrate the degree by which a 
particular marker scenario is reproducible by alternative 
modeling approaches. Therefore, "fully harmonized" scenaiios 
are not independent from each other within a particular 
scenario family (or scenario group in case of A l ) . 
"Globally hannonized" scenarios are those that share global 
population and GDP profiles within the agreed upon bounds of 
5% and 10%, respectively, over the period 1990-2100^ (see 
Table 4-1). Altogether 26'^ scenarios are categorized into this 
category and can be considered to capture the main global 
development characteristics over time for each respective 
scenario family and storyline. Again these 26 scenarios are not 
independent from each other, constituting seven distinct 
scenario groups (see also footnote 1). 
Thus, there are three different types of scenarios within each 
family; 
• One marker and a set of "fully harmonized" scenarios 
that attempt to replicate the marker scenario 
quantification. 
• A set of "globally harmonized" scenaiios. 
• A set of non-harmonized scenarios. 
In addition, two illustrative scenarios have been selected in the 
Summary for Policymakers (SPM) from the additional A l 
scenario groups (see also footnote 1). 
For the sake of simplicity, the teirn "harmonized" is used 
herein to describe global harmonization of population and 
GDP growth. "Fully harmonized" scenarios, for which the 
main objective is to assess the reproducibility of particular 
marker scenario quantifications and any remaining uncertainty 
in G H G emissions from internal model parametrizations, are 
referred to in the text where appropriate. Figure 4-3 shows the 
SRES scenarios as a set consisting of subsets that correspond 
to the four families. The A l family is in addition divided into 
different groups of scenarios. The detailed descriptions of 
inputs and outputs (other than G H G emissions) of the SRES 
markei scenarios, other harmonized scenarios, and other 
scenarios are presented in Section 4.4 (see Appendix VII for 
further numeric detail). The emissions of GHGs and other 
radiatively important species of gases are described ш Chapter 
5 (more detail is again presented in Appendix VII). 
Table 4-2 summarizes the main characteristics of the four 
SRES scenario families and their scenario groups, and gives an 
overview about the numbet of scenarios that were developed 
for each scenario group (see also Table 4-1 and Section 4.4.1). 
4.3. Scenario Storylines 
Although each of the four SRES storylines can unfold only if 
certain values are emphasized more than others, no explicit 
Deviauons withm each 10-year time period are not considered. 
"* AdditionaUy, three scenarios ( A 2 - A I M . A 2 - M i n i C A M , and B 2 -
M u u C A M ) deviate only slighdy from the global hannomzaUon 
criteria for between two to three time steps. Hence these scenarios can 
be considered as 'almost' harmonized and comparable with the olhei 
harmonized scenarios. 
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Figure 4-3: Schematic illustration of the multidimensional classification space of SRES scenarios. The set of scenarios 
consists of four scenario families ( A l , A2, B l , and B2), each of which consists of a number of scenarios. Some of these have 
"hannonized" inputs - they share similar pre-specified global population and GDP trajectories. They are marked as "HS" for 
(globally) harmonized scenarios. A l l other scenarios of the same family based on the quantification of the storyline chosen by 
the modeling team are marked as "OS." The A l family is divided into four scenario groups that explore altemative 
developments in the future energy sector. These were merged into three groups in the S P M (see also footnote 1). Finally, one 
of the harmonized scenarios is designated as the characteristic representative of each family and is the marker scenario. 
judgments have been made by the SRES team as to their 
desirability or probability. Storylines in the literature, however, 
are often explicitly intended by their authors to have a positive 
or negative connotation, and sometimes explicitly include 
assumed dominant or preferred types of governance. Thus, the 
four SRES storylines are fundamentally different in this 
respect compared to many narrative scenarios in the underlying 
literature. 
Two arguments are pertinent to the linkage between the 
scenario storylines and the underlying literature. First, a 
future regarded as negative by some people may be perceived 
as positive by others. Second, the storylines represent families 
of scenarios that can include both success and failure, 
depending on the perspective of the beholder. To quote 
Wilkerson (1995): "Like the real life from which they are 
drawn, the scenarios are mixed bags, at once wonderfully 
dreadful and dreadfully wonderful." Importantly, the 
"neutral" or "agnostic" character of SRES scenarios is an 
explicit departure from most of the underlying literature about 
storylines and narrative scenarios. 
Another important departure and an innovation unique to the 
SRES approach is the use of the storylines in conjunction with 
multiple (six) modeling approaches to develop and formulate a 
set of quantifications or scenarios that are overall consistent 
with the underlying storylines. This approach provides a 
rigorous modeling test of the underlying logic and structure of 
the storyline, while the naffative aspect of the storyline 
provides a broader, descriptive context for better understanding 
and interpretation of the scenarios. 
4 . 3 . 1 . A l Storyline and Scenario F a m i l y 
The A l storyline is a case of rapid and successful economic 
development, in which regional average income per capita 
converge - current distinctions between "poor" and "rich" 
countries eventually dissolve. The primary dynamics are: 
• Strong commitment to market-based solutions. 
• High savings and commitment to education at the 
household level. 
• High rates of investment and innovation in education, 
technology, and institutions at the national and 
intemational levels. 
• Intemational mobility of people, ideas, and technology. 
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The transition to economic convergence results from advances 
in transport and communication technology, shifts in national 
policies on immigration and education, and international 
cooperation in the development of national and international 
institutions that enhance productivity growth and technology 
diffusion. 
This may be the type of scenario best represented in recent 
literature (e.g., Shinn, 1985; U N , 1990; Schwartz, 1991; 
Peterson, 1994; Gallopin et a l . , 1997; Glenn and Gordon, 
1997, 1999; Lawrence e t a l . , 1997; Hammond, 1998; Raskin et 
a l . , 1998). Such scenarios are dominated by an American or 
European entrepreneurial, progress-oriented perspective in 
which technology, especially communication technology, plays 
a central role. Wilkerson (1995) designed various scenarios 
that share features with A l . They emphasize market-oriented 
solutions, high consumption of both tangible and intangible 
commodities, advanced technology, and intensive mobility and 
communication. In some examples of this type of scenario, 
high economic growth leads to shifts of economic power from 
traditional core countries to the current economic "periphery," 
as in the "Global Shift" scenario by СРВ (1992) and de Jong 
and Zalm (1991). The Shell scenario "New Frontiers" (Shell, 
1993) is also representative of this family. The IPCC Scenarios 
lS92a and IS92e are well-known examples of futures with high 
levels of economic growth (Leggett et a i , 1992). IIASA and 
World Energy Council (WEC) jointly developed three High 
Growth Scenarios that share assumptions on rapid 
technological progress, liberalized trade markets, and rising 
income levels (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998). 
In the A l scenario family, demographic and economic trends 
are closely linked, as affluence is conelated with long life and 
small families (low mortality and low fertility). Global 
population grows to some nine billion by 2050 and declines to 
about seven billion by 2100. Average age increases, with the 
needs of retned people met mainly through their accumulated 
savings in private pension systems. 
The global economy expands at an average amiual rate of about 
3% to 2100, reaching around US$550 trillion (all dollar 
amounts herein are expressed in 1990 dollars, unless stated 
otherwise). This is approximately the same as average global 
growth since 1850, although the conditions that lead to this 
global growth in productivity and per capita incomes in the 
scenario are unparalleled in history. Global average income per 
capita reaches about US$21,000 by 2050. While the high 
average level of income per capita contributes to a great 
improvement in the overall health and social conditions of the 
majority of people, this world is not necessarily devoid of 
problems. In particular, many communities could face some of 
the problems of social exclusion encountered in the wealthiest 
countries during the 20''' century, and in many places income 
growth could produce increased pressure on the global 
commons. 
Energy and mineral resources are abundant in this scenario 
family because of rapid technical progress, which both reduces 
the resources needed to produce a given level of output and 
increases the economically recoverable reserves. Final energy 
intensity (energy use per unit of GDP) decreases at an average 
annual rate of 1.3%. Environmental amenities are valued and 
rapid technological progress "frees" natural resources currently 
devoted to provision of human needs for other purposes. The 
concept of environmental quality changes in this storyline from 
the current emphasis on "conservation" of nature to active 
"management" of natural and environmental services, which 
increases écologie resilience. 
With the rapid increase in income, dietary patterns shift 
initially toward increased consumption of meat and dairy 
products, but may decrease subsequenfly with increasing 
emphasis on the health of an aging society. High incomes also 
translate into high car ownership, sprawling suburbia, and 
dense transport networks, nationally and internationally. 
Several scenario groups considered in the A l scenario family 
reflect uncertainty in the development of energy sources and 
conversion technologies in this rapidly changing world. Some 
scenario groups evolve along the carbon-intensive energy path 
consistent with the current development strategy of countries 
with abundant domestic coal resources. Other scenario groups 
intensify the dependence on (unconventional) oil and (in the 
longer-run) natural-gas resources^. A third group envisages a 
stronger shift toward renewable energy sources and 
conceivably also toward nuclear energy. A fourth group (which 
includes the A I B marker scenario) assumes a balanced mix of 
technologies and supply sources, with technology 
improvements and resource assumptions such that no single 
source of energy is overly dominant. The implications of these 
alternative development paths for future G H G emissions are 
challenging; the emissions vary from the carbon-intensive to 
decarbonization paths by at least as much as the variation of all 
the other driving forces across the other SRES scenarios. 
4.3.2. A 2 Storyline and Scenario F a m i l y 
The A2 scenario family represents a differentiated world. 
Compared to the A l storyline it is characterized by lower trade 
flows, relatively slow capital stock turnover, and slower 
technological change. The A2 world "consolidates" into a 
series of economic regions. Self-reliance in terms of resources 
and less emphasis on economic, social, and cultural 
interactions between regions are characteristic for this future. 
Economic growth is uneven and the income gap between now-
industrialized and developing parts of the world does not 
narrow, unlike in the A l and B l scenario families. 
' T h e coal and gas/oil intensive groups were merged into one fossil-
intensive group in the Summary for Policymakers. M o r e detailed 
information on these two groups is presented here, in Chapter 5 and 
in Append ix VII . 
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The A2 world has less intemational cooperation than the A l or 
B l worlds. People, ideas, and capital are less mobile so that 
technology diffuses more slowly than in the other scenario 
families. Intemational disparities in productivity, and hence 
income per capita, are largely maintained or increased in 
absolute terms. With the emphasis on family and community 
life, fertility rates decline relatively slowly, which makes the 
A2 population the largest among the storylines (15 billion by 
2100). Global average per capita income in A2 is low relative 
to other storylines (especially A l and B l ) , reaching about 
US$7200 per capita by 2050 and US$16,000 in 2100. By 2100 
the global GDP reaches about US$250 trillion. Technological 
change in the A2 scenario world is also more heterogeneous 
than that in A l . It is more rapid than average in some regions 
and slower in others, as industry adjusts to local resource 
endowments, culture, and education levels. Regions with 
abundant energy and mineral resources evolve more resource-
intensive economies, while those poor in resources place a very 
high priority on minimizing import dependence through 
technological innovation to improve resource efficiency and 
make use of substitute inputs. The fuel mix in different regions 
is determined primarily by resource availability. High-income 
but resource-poor regions shift toward advanced post-fossil 
technologies (renewables or nuclear), while low-income 
resource-rich regions generally rely on older fossil 
technologies. Final energy intensities in A2 decline with a pace 
of 0.5 to 0.7% per year. 
In the A2 world, social and political structures diversify; some 
regions move toward stronger welfare systems and reduced 
income inequality, while others move toward "leaner" 
government and more heterogeneous income distributions. 
With substantial food requirements, agricultural productivity in 
the A2 world is one of the main focus areas for innovation and 
research, development, and deployment (RD&D) efforts, and 
environmental concems. Initial high levels of soil erosion and 
water pollution are eventually eased through the local 
development of more sustainable high-yield agriculture. 
Although attention is given to potential local and regional 
environmental damage, it is not uniform across regions. Global 
environmental concems are relatively weak, although attempts 
are made to bring regional and local pollution under control 
and to maintain environmental amenities. 
As in other SRES storylines, the intention in this storyline is 
not to imply that the underlying dynamics of A2 are either 
good or bad. The literature suggests that such a world could 
have many positive aspects from the current perspective, such 
as the increasing tendency toward cultural pluralism with 
mutual acceptance of diversity and fundamental differences. 
Various scenarios from the literature may be grouped under 
this scenario family. For example, "New Empires" by Schwartz 
(1991) is an example of a society in which most nations protect 
their threatened cultural identities. Some regions might achieve 
relative stability while others suffer under civil disorders 
(Schwartz, 1996). In "European Renaissance" (de Jong and 
Zalm, 1991; СРВ, 1992), economic growth slows down 
because of a strengthening of protectionist trade blocks. In 
"Imperial Harmonization" (Lawrence et a l . , 1997), major 
economic blocs impose standards and regulations on smaller 
countries. The Shell scenario "Global Mercantilism" (1989, 
see Schwartz, 1991) explores the possibility of regional 
spheres of influence, whereas "Barricades" (Shell, 1993) 
reflects resistance to globalizaflon and liberalization of 
markets. Noting the tensions that arise as societies adopt 
western technology without western culture, Hunrington 
(1996) suggests that conflicts between civilizations rather than 
globalizing economies may determine the geo-political future 
of the world. 
4 . 3 . 3 . B l Storyline and Scenario F a m i l y 
The central elements of the B l future are a high level of 
environmental and social consciousness combined with a 
globally coherent approach to a more sustainable development. 
Heightened environmental consciousness might be brought 
about by clear evidence that impacts of natural resource use, 
such as deforestation, soil depletion, over-fishing, and global 
and regional pollution, pose a serious threat to the continuation 
of human life on Earth. In the B l storyline, govemments. 
businesses, the media, and the public pay increased attention to 
the environmental and social aspects of development. 
Technological change plays an important role. At the same 
time, however, the storyline does not include any climate 
policies, to reflect the SRES terms of reference. Nevertheless, 
such a possible future cannot be ruled out. 
The "Conventional Worlds-Policy Reform" scenario by 
Gallopin et a l . (1997) is a good example of such a future, 
although it includes climate policies. In "Ecotopia," Wilkerson 
(1995) describes a reaction to early decades of crime and 
chaos, in which community values triumph over individualist 
ones arid lead to resource-friendly lifestyles based on clean and 
light technologies. This scenario includes a voluntary embrace 
of cohesion, cooperation, and reduced consumption, backed by 
legislation and even corporate policies (Wilkerson, 1995). In 
the nonnative "Human Development Success" (Glenn and 
Gordon, 1997), the world achieves an environmentally 
sustainable economy by 2050, primarily through education to 
develop human potential. In "Balanced Future" (de Jong and 
Zalm, 1991; СРВ, 1992), economic equilibrium and innovation 
lead to sustainable development. The "Ecologically Driven" 
scenarios by W E C (1993) and I I A S A - W E C (Nakicenovic et 
a i , 1998) - with accelerated efficiency improvements in 
resource use - share several of the characteristics of the B l 
type of future, as does the egalitarian utopia scenario in the 
TARGETS approach (Rotmans and de Vries, 1997). 
Many additional scenarios in the literature could be seen as 
examples of this family, but may describe the changes as more 
fundamental than those of В1. The "Transformed World" of 
Hammond (1998), based on the "Great Transitions" scenario of 
Gallopin et a l . (1997), stresses the role of global technological 
innovation in addition to enlightened corporate actions, 
govemment policies, and empowerment of local groups. In 
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"Shared Space" by the Millennium Institute (Glenn and 
Gordon, 1997), resources are shared more equitably to the 
benefit of all and the greater safety of humanity. The Shell 
scenario "Sustainable World" (1989, see Schwartz, 1991) and 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
scenarios (WBCSD, 1998), "Geopolity" and "Jazz," examine 
sustainable futures. 
Economic development in B l is balanced, and efforts to 
achieve equitable income distribution are effective. As in A l , 
the B l storyline describes a fast-changing and convergent 
world, but the priorities differ. Whereas the A l world invests its 
gains from increased productivity and know-how primarily in 
further economic growth, the B l world invests a large part of 
its gains in improved efficiency of resource use 
("dematerialization"), equity, social institutions, and 
environmental protection. 
A strong welfare net prevents social exclusion on the basis of 
poverty. However, counter-currents may develop and in some 
places people may not conform to the main social and 
environmental intentions of the mainstream in this scenario 
family. Massive income redistribution and presumably high 
taxation levels may adversely affect the economic efficiency 
and functioning of world markets. 
Particular effort is devoted to increases in resource efficiency to 
achieve the goals stated above. Incentive systems, combined 
with advances in intemational institutions, permit the rapid 
diffusion of cleaner technology. To this end, R & D is also 
enhanced, together with education and the capacity building 
for clean and equitable development. Organizational measures 
are adopted to reduce material wastage by maximizing reuse 
and recycling. The combination of technical and organizational 
change yields high levels of material and energy saving, as well 
as reductions in pollution. Labor productivity also improves as 
a by-product of these efforts. Altemative scenarios considered 
within the ВI family include different rates of GDP growth and 
dematerialization (e.g., decline in energy and material 
intensities). 
The demographic transition to low mortality and fertility 
occurs at the same rate as in A l , but for different reasons as it 
is motivated partly by social and environmental concems. 
Global population reaches nine bilUon by 2050 and declines to 
about seven bilUon by 2100. This is a world with high levels of 
economic activity (a global GDP of around US$350 trillion by 
2100) and significant and deliberate progress toward 
intemational and national income equality. Global income per 
capita in 2050 averages US$13,000, one-third lower than in 
A I . A higher proportion of this income is spent on services 
rather than on material goods, and on quality rather than 
quantity, because the emphasis on material goods is less and 
also resource prices are increased by environmental taxation. 
The ВI storyline sees a relatively smooth transition to 
alternative energy systems as conventional oil and gas 
resources decline. There is extensive use of conventional and 
unconventional gas as the cleanest fossil resource during the 
transition, but the major push is toward post-fossil 
technologies, driven in large part by environmental concems. 
Given the high environmental consciousness and institutional 
effectiveness in the ВI storyline, environmental quality is high, 
as most potentially negative environmental aspects of rapid 
development are anticipated and effectively dealt with locally, 
nationally, and internationally. For example, transboundary air 
pollution (acid rain) is basically eliminated in the long term. 
Land use is managed carefully to counteract the impacts of 
activities potentially damaging to the environment. Cities are 
compact and designed for public and non-motorized transport, 
with suburban developments tightly controlled. Strong 
incentives for low-input, low-impact agriculture, along with 
maintenance of large areas of wilderness, contribute to high 
food prices with much lower levels çf meat consumption than 
those in A I . These proactive local and regional environmental 
measures and policies also lead to relatively low G H G 
emissions, even in the absence of explicit interventions to 
mitigate cHmate change. 
4 . 3 . 4 . B 2 Storyline and Scenario F a m i l y 
The B2 world is one of increased concem for environmental 
and social sustainability compared to the A 2 storyline. 
Increasingly, government policies and business strategies at the 
national and local levels are influenced by environmentally 
aware citizens, with a trend toward local self-reliance and 
stronger communities. Intemational institutions decline in 
importance, with a shift toward local and regional decision-
making stractures and institutions. Human welfare, equality, 
and environmental protection all have high priority, and they 
are addressed through community-based social solutions in 
addition to technical solutions, although implementation rates 
vary across regions. 
Like the other scenario families, the B2 scenario family 
includes futures that can be seen as positive or negative. While 
the B2 storyline is basically neutral. Kinsman (1990) in his 
"Caring Autonomy" scenario clearly paints a positive world 
with emphasis on decentralized govemments and strong 
inteфersonal relationships. In the "New Civics" scenario by 
Wilkerson (1995), values are only shared within small 
competing groups, which resuhs in a decentraHzed world of 
tribes, clans, families, networks, and gangs. The I I A S A - W E C 
"Middle Course" scenario (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998), with 
slow removal of trade barriers, may also be grouped in this 
family. On the positive side, this storyline appears to be 
consistent with current institutional frameworks in the world 
and with the current technology dynamics. On the negative side 
is the relatively slow rate of development in general, but 
particularly in the currentiy developing parts of the world. 
Education and welfare programs are pursued widely, which 
reduces mortality and, to a lesser extent, fertility. The 
population reaches about 10 bilHon people by 2100, consistent 
with both the U N and IIASA median projections. Income per 
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capita grows at an intermediate rate to reach about US$12,000 
by 2050. By 2100 the global economy might expand to reach 
some US$250 trillion. International income differences 
decrease, although not as rapidly as in storylines of higher 
global convergence. Local inequity is reduced considerably 
through the development of stronger community-support 
networks. 
Generally, high educational levels promote both development 
and environmental protection. Indeed, environmental 
protection is one of the few truly intemational common 
priorities that remain iit B2. However, strategies to address 
global environmental challenges are not of a central priority 
and are thus less successful compared to local and regional 
environmental response strategies. The govemments have 
difficulty designing and implementing agreements that 
combine global environmental protection, even when this 
could be associated with mutual economic benefits. 
The B2 storyline presents a particularly favorable climate for 
community initiative and social innovation, especially in view 
of the high educational levels. Technological frontiers are 
pushed less than they are in A l and B l , and innovations are 
also regionally more heterogeneous. Globally, investment in 
energy R & D continues its curtent declining trend (EIA, 1997, 
1999), and mechanisms for international diffusion of 
technology and know-how remain weaker than in scenarios A l 
and B l (but higher than in A2). Some regions with rapid 
economic development and limited natural resources place 
particular emphasis on technology development and bilateral 
cooperation. Technical change is therefore uneven. The energy 
intensity of GDP declines at about 1% per year, in line with the 
average historical experience since 1800. 
Land-use management becomes better integrated at the local 
level in the B2 world. Urban and transport infrastmcture is a 
particular focus of community innovation, and contributes to a 
low level of car dependence and less urban sprawl. A n 
emphasis on food self-reliance contributes to a shift in dietary 
pattems toward local products, with relatively low meat 
consumption in countries with high population densities. 
Energy systems differ from region to region, depending on the 
availability of natural resources. The need to use energy and 
other resources more efficiently spurs the development of less 
carbon-intensive technology in some regions. Environment 
policy cooperation at the regional level leads to success in the 
management of some transboundary environmental problems, 
such as acidification caused by sulfur dioxide (SOj), especially 
to sustain regional self-reliance in agricultural production. 
Regional cooperation also results in lower emissions of 
nitrogen oxides (N0^^) and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), which reduce the incidence of elevated tropospheric 
ozone levels. Although globally the energy system remains 
predominantly hydrocarbon-based to 2100, a gradual transition 
occurs away from the current share of fossil resources in world 
energy supply, with a corresponding reduction in carbon 
uitensity. 
4.4. Scenario Quantiñcation and Overview 
4 . 4 . 1 . Scenario Terminology 
In this section representative quantifications of the four 
scenario storylines described in Section 4.3 are summarized, 
and the evolution of the main scenario driving forces and 
associated quantitative scenario characteristics are described. 
Their resultant G H G and other emissions are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
To elucidate differences in uncertainties that stem both from 
adopting alternative (exogenous) scenario driving-force 
assumptions and from the uncertainties that arise from 
different model representations, alternative scenario 
quantifications are differentiated into harmonized and 
unharmonized scenarios (see Section 4.2, Tables 4-1 and 4-2, 
and Box 1-1 for terminology description). 
To achieve harmonization across six different modeling 
approaches is not a tiivial task. For example, most of the 
models have different regional disaggregations, so that 
harmonization at the level of the four SRES regions required 
some "inverse" solutions, often achieved through iterative 
model mns and adjustments of input assumptions. Also, in 
some modeling frameworks the harmonized "input" 
parameters are actually outputs of components of the modeling 
framework (e.g., GDP as an output of economic general 
equilibrium models, or final energy as an output variable after 
considering endogenous energy prices and exogenously pre-
specified energy-intensity improvement rates). Therefore, 
harmonization of important scenario driving-force inputs was 
neither possible for all scenarios and for all participating 
modeling teams, and nor was it judged desirable, as the 
adoption of any harmonization criterion somewhat artificially 
compresses uncertainty. This is also why simpler 
harmonization criteria were adopted (see Section 4.2. above) 
that focused on global population and GDP growth profiles. 
These are referred to as "globally harmonized" scenarios in 
the subsequent Subsections. 
From the 40 SRES scenarios, 26 are classified as "globally 
harmonized" scenarios and 14 are classified as "other" 
scenarios. (The latter category includes three scenarios that 
only deviate slightly from the harmonization criteria.) 
Harmonized scenarios are thus comparable in that they 
describe similar global development pattems with respect to 
demographics and economic growth. In the subsequent 
discussion of scenario driving forces a three-tiered structure is 
adopted. First, for each scenario family (and where applicable 
for each scenario group in the A l scenario family), the 
discussion starts with a presentation of the respective marker 
and "fully harmonized" scenarios. Subsequentiy, "globally 
harmonized" scenarios and "other" scenarios are discussed. 
"Globally harmonized" scenarios shed additional light into 
uncertainties that stem from adopting different regional 
assumptions (see above). Finally, "other" scenarios are 
presented that offer a different quantitative interpretation of a 
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particular scenario storyline compared to the previous scenario 
categories. In some cases, differences in interpretation relate to 
uncertainties in rates of change - "other" scenarios yield 
similar global demographic and economic outcomes by 2100 
(e.g. the B2-ASF scenario compared to the B2 marker), but 
illustrate different dynamics of how these could unfold. In 
other cases, the "other" scenario category comprises scenario 
quantifications that deliberately explore alternative 
interpretations of a scenario storyline in terms of global 
population and GDP growth altogether (e.g. in the A2-A1-
M i n i C A M scenario). The reason is to indicate that quantitative 
scenario descriptions entail a high degree of uncertainty (and 
subjectivity from different modeling teams) when it comes to 
interpret the four different qualitative SRES scenario storylines 
and to translate them into the quantitative assumptions that 
drive emission models. When comparing G H G emissions 
results for the four SRES marker scenarios (see Chapter 5) 
with those of the other SRES scenarios, it is illustrative to 
distinguish the effects of different model methodologies and 
parametrizations from variations of important scenario drivers 
that often serve as exogenous input to models. 
Of the total of 40 SRES scenarios, 29 (including the marker 
scenarios) satisfy the harmonization criteria for population on 
the world level a n d for all four SRES regions, 12 scenarios are 
harmonized for population and GDP, and U (13 including the 
A I T scenario group) scenarios are harmonized for population, 
GDP a n d final energy (see Table 4-1). Also, 35 scenarios are 
harmonized for population on the world level and 26 scenarios 
are harmonized for global population and GDP (see Table 4-1). 
The status of harmonization is also relatively stable to changes 
in the harmonization criteria. For example, if the above 
harmonization criteria were increased by 50% (i.e. GDP for the 
four SRES regions may differ by up to ±38% from the 
respective GDP of the marker scenario), the sample of 11 
h a r m o n i z e d scenarios does not change; however, the number of 
scenarios harmonized on the g l o b a l level increases from 15 to 
20. 
Thus, as mentioned above not all scenario quantifications 
comply with the adopted harmonization criteria differences in 
regional coverage and definition among models. In some 
instances modeling teams also deliberately chose not to follow 
harmonized input assumptions, but instead explored scenario 
sensitivities by emphasizing alternative developments than 
suggested in the marker scenario quantification. The writing 
team recognizes that this increases the number of scenarios as 
well as complexity in the interpretation of resuhs. These 
additional scenarios are the result of the SRES terms of 
reference of proceeding via an open process soliciting as wide 
participation and viewpoints as possible and also serve the 
purpose of highlighting important uncertainties of the future 
that are necessarily compressed by limiting scenario 
quantification to four illustrative marker scenarios. Thus, while 
unharmonized scenarios illustrate the impact on G H G 
emissions of expanding the uncertainty range of main scenario 
drivers within any particular scenario family, the "globally 
harmonized" scenarios indicate the range of G H G emissions 
uncertainty that remains after most important global driving 
force assumptions (population and GDP) have been 
harmonized. (Finally, the range of G H G emissions resulting 
from comparing "fully harmonized" scenarios is indicative of 
the uncertainty of internal model parametrizations such as 
energy technology change, dietary patterns, and agricultural 
productivity changes that influence structural changes in energy 
supply and end-use and land-use changes, see Table 4-1.) 
Harmonization of input assumptions increases the 
comparability across scenarios and can serve as an additional 
guide for choosing a particular SRES scenaiio subset, and to 
illustrate different degrees of scenario uncertainty. The latter is 
an important aspect, considering the different user 
communities of SRES scenarios. Given the comparatively 
naiTow variation as defined by the harmonization criteria, 
differences in population, GDP, and final energy use between 
harmonized scenarios of the same scenario family need not to 
be considered in subsequent analyses and are also not 
discussed separately below. 
In the A I scenario family, the scenarios within one group were 
also harmonized. In one A l scenario group the transition away 
from conventional oil and gas either leads to a massive 
development of unconventional oil and gas resources (AIG) or 
to a large-scale synfuel economy based on coal (A lC) . Please 
note that A l C and A I G were combined into one fossil 
intensive group A l F I in the Summary for Policymakers during 
its approval process (see also footnote I). G H G emissions in 
these scenarios approach emissions characteristic of the A2 
scenario family (i.e. are much higher than in the case of the A l 
marker scenario). In another A l scenario group, dwindling 
conventional oil and gas resources lead to fast development of 
post-fossil alternatives and enhanced energy conservation. In 
this technology-intensive scenario group (AIT) , energy 
demands are lower than in the other A l scenario groups and, 
because of radical technological change in energy systems, 
G H G emissions are much lower than in the other A l scenario 
groups (including the A I B marker scenario), approaching 
those of the В1 scenario family. 
The six modeling teams also produced other scenarios as part 
of the SRES open process. These modeling runs were generally 
not harmonized and are presented as appropriate later in the 
report. 
Table 4-3 gives an overview of the 40 SRES scenario 
quantifications as they were developed to describe the four 
scenario famities and the seven different scenario groups. 
4.4.2. T r a n s l a t i o n of Storylines into Scenario D r i v e r s 
Table 4-4 gives a summary overview of the main scenario 
assumptions and characteristics (see also Table 4-2 above). To 
facilitate comparability, the summary format adopted is similar 
to the previous IS92 scenario series (Pepper et a l . , 1992). 
Specific assumptions about the quantification of particular 
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scenario drivers, sucii as population and economic growtti, 
technological change, resource availability, land-use changes, 
and local and regional environmental policies, are summarized 
in this Section (GHG emissions are reported in detail in 
Chapter 5). The assumptions are based on the range of driving 
forces identified in Chapter 2 and their relationships as 
summarized in Chapter 3. For simplicity these drivers are 
presented separately, but it is important to keep in mind that the 
evolution of these scenario drivers is to a large extent 
interrelated, as reflected in the SRES scenarios. 
As discussed above, the SRES scenarios were designed to 
reflect inherent uncertainties of future developments by 
adopting a range of salient input assumptions, but without 
attempting to cover the extremes from the scenario literature. 
Given the nature of the SRES open process and its multi-model 
approach, as well as the need for documented input 
assumptions, pubHshed scenario extremes are difficult to 
reproduce using altemative model approaches or insufficiently 
documented input data. (For instance, many long-term 
emission scenarios do not report their underlying population 
assumptions (see Chapters 2 and 3), which is especially true for 
extreme scenarios that are usually performed within the 
context of model sensitivity analysis.) 
Compared to the previous IS92 scenario series there are 
important similarities, but also important differences. For 
instance, three different future population scenarios were 
adopted, albeit that the future population levels are somewhat 
lower and the range more compressed than those in IS92 this 
reflects advances in demographic modeling and population 
projections. Conversely, the range of assumptions that concern 
resource availability and future technological change is much 
wider compared to earlier scenarios, reflecting in particular the 
results of the IPCC WGII Second Assessment Report (SAR; 
Watson et a l . , 1996). Another distinguishing characteristic of 
the SRES scenarios is an attempt to reflect the most recent 
understanding on the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between important scenario 
driving-force variables. For instance, no scenario combines 
low fertility with high mortality assumptions, which reflects 
the consensus view from demographers (see Chapter 3). 
Equally, all SRES scenarios assume a qualitative relationship 
between demographics and social and economic development 
trends, which reflects both the literature (see Chapter 3) and the 
results of the evaluation of the IS92 scenario series (Alcamo et 
a l . , 1995). A l l else being equal, fertility and mortafity trends 
are thus lower in scenarios with high-income growth 
assumptions, but the multidimensionality of the causal 
linkages must be recognized and so no particular cause-effect 
model is postulated here. Finally, the scenarios also attempt to 
reflect recent advances (as reviewed in Chapter 3) in 
understanding of the evolution of macro-economic and 
material productivity (e.g., their coupling via capital turnover 
rates), uncertainties in future levels of "dematerialization" 
(reflected in the difference between the B l and A l scenarios), 
and the likely evolution of local and regional environmental 
policies (e.g., all scenarios assume various degrees of sulfur-
control policies). 
The main aspects of translating the storylines into scenario 
drivers are summarized below. For each scenario family an 
overview of all scenario quantifications is given. Scenarios that 
share harmonized input assumptions with the respective 
scenario marker in terms of global population and GDP 
profiles (see Tables 4-1 and 4-3) are indicated in i t a l i c s in the 
subsequent discussion. Altogether, 26 scenarios in the four 
scenario families share similar assumptions about population 
and GDP at the global level. The other 14 scenarios either do 
not fully comply with the agreed common input assumptions 
concerning global population and GDP or explore important 
sensitivities of future demographic and economic developments 
beyond that described in the 24 scenarios. These sensitivities 
include resource availability, technology development, or land-
use changes and describe similar demographic and economic 
development pattems as other scenarios within a family, even 
if they do not fall within the range suggested by the 
harmonization criteria (see Table 4-1). Combined, the SRES 
scenario set comprises 40 scenarios grouped into four scenario 
families and different scenario groups (see Table 4-3). 
Each scenario family is illustrated by a designated marker 
scenario. A marker is not necessarily the mean or mode of 
comparable scenario quantifications, nor would it be possible 
to construct an internally consistent scenario reflecting 
medians/modes of all salient scenario characteristics (both in 
terms of scenario input assumptions as well as scenario 
outcomes, i.e. emissions). Marker scenarios should also not be 
inteфreted as being the more likely altemative scenario 
quantifications. However, only the four marker scenarios were 
subjected to the SRES open process through the SRES website 
and they have also received closest scrutiny by the entire 
writing team. 
4 . 4 . 2 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
The A l marker scenario (Jiang et a l , 2000) was created with 
the A I M model, an integrated assessment model developed by 
NIES, Japan (see Appendix IV). The A l scenario family is 
characterized by; 
• A n affluent world, with a rapid demographic transition 
(declining mortality and fertility rates) and an 
increasing degree of intemational development equity. 
• Very high productivity and economic growth in all 
regions, with a considerable catch-up of developing 
countries. 
• Comparatively high energy and materials demands, 
moderated however by continuous structural change 
and the diffusion of more efficient technologies, 
consistent with the high productivity growth and capital 
tumover rates of the scenario. 
The first group of A l scenarios, which includes the A l B 
marker, assumes "balanced"^ progress across all resources and 
technologies from energy supply to end use, as well as 
"balanced" land-use changes. Three other groups of A l 
scenarios were identified which describe three altemative 
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pathways according to different resource and technology 
development assumptions: 
• A l C : "clean coal" technologies that are generally 
environmentally friendly with the exception of G H G 
emissions. 
• A I G : an "oil- and gas-rich" future, with a swift 
transition from conventional resources to abundant 
unconventional resources including methane clathrates. 
• AIT: a "non-fossil" future, with rapid development of 
solar and nuclear technologies on the supply side and 
mini-turbines and fuel cells used in energy end-use 
applications. 
The divergence between the various scenario groups (in terms 
of resource availability and the direction of technological 
change) results in a wide range of G H G emissions. The two 
fossil-fuel dominated alternatives, A l C and A I G (combined 
into the fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group in the SPM, see 
Footnote 1), have higher, and the A I T altematives have lower, 
G H G emissions than the A l marker scenario (see Chapter 5). 
"Balanced" A l scenarios quantifications were also calculated 
by the models^ A l B - A S F , A l B - l M A G E , A I B - M A R I A , A l B -
MESSAGE, and A l B - M i n i C A M . Additional scenarios 
representing A l scenario groups were developed using the 
A I M i A l C - A l M , A I G - A I M , A l T - A l M ^ ) , M A R I A (AIT-
M A R I A ) , M E S S A G E { A l C - M E S S A G E , A I G - M E S S A G E , A I T -
M E S S A G E ) , and M i n i C A M ( A l C - M i n i C A M , A l G - M i n i C A M ) 
models. The M i n i C A M modeling team also evaluated 
alternative interpretations of the A l scenario storyline with 
different demographic, economic, and energy development 
patterns ( A l v l - M i n i C A M and A l v 2 - M i n i C A M ) on top of tlie 
altemative technology-resource developments examined in the 
other A1 scenarios. 
* Different modeling teams provided different interprétations of what 
such a "balanced" resource-technology portfolio could be in the 21" 
century. The assumed rapid techtiology dynamics that underlie the A l 
scenario storyline necessitate that technologies and resource 
exploitation profiles change significantly. Hence, the concept of 
"balanced" development does not necessarily apply to atiy particular 
future date, but rather to the entirety of the scenario's development 
path throughout the 2 P ' century. As a consequence of the slow 
turnover rates in the capital stock of the energy sector, all scenarios 
necessarily rely more heavily on currently dominant resources and 
technologies in the near-term and project more radical departures only 
in the long-term. 
'' Scenarios denoted by italics indicate scenario quantifications that 
share harmonized global population and GDP trajectories with the 
respective marker scenario (i.e. "globally harmonized" scenarios). 
* By design, the A I T scenario group explores the possibility of 
technological change in energy end-use technologies and hence lower 
eitergy demand compared to the A l marker scenario. Considering that 
these scenarios provide similar levels of energy service, albeit at lower 
levels of final energy use, they are classified as "hannonized" based 
on population and GDP profiles only. 
4 . 4 . 2 . 2 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The A2 marker scenario (A2-ASF) was developed using ASF 
(see Appendix IV), an integrated set of modeling tools that was 
also used to generate the first and the second sets of IPCC 
emission scenarios (SA90 and IS92). Overall, the A2-ASF 
quantification is based on the following assumptions 
(Sankovski et a l , 2000): 
• Relatively slow demographic transition and relatively 
slow convergence in regional fertility pattems. 
• Relatively slow convergence in inter-regional GDP per 
capita differences. 
• Relatively slow end-use and supply-side energy 
efficiency improvements (compared to other 
storylines). 
• Delayed development of renewable energy. 
• No baixiers to the use of nuclear energy. 
Additional scenario quantifications of A2 were developed 
using the A I M (A2-AIM)9, I M A G E (A2-IMAGE),io 
M E S S A G E { A 2 - M E S S A G E ) , and M i n i C A M (A2-MiniCAM)i i 
models. An alternative inteipretation of the A2 scenario 
storyline in the form of a "delayed development" or 
"transitional" scenario between the A2 and A l scenario 
families was developed by the M i n i C A M modeling team (A2-
A l - M i n i C A M ) . 
4 . 4 . 2 . 3 . B l S c e n a r i o s 
The B l marker scenario (de Vries et a l . , 2000) was developed 
using the I M A G E 2.1 model (see Appendix IV). Earlier 
versions of the model were used in the first IPCC scenario 
development effort (SA90). B l illustrates the possible 
emissions implications of a scenario in which the world 
chooses consistentiy and effectively a development path diat 
favors efficiency of resource use and "dematerialization" of 
economic activities. The scenario entails in particular: 
• Rapid demographic transition driven by rapid social 
development, including education. 
The scenario deviates only slightly from the global population and 
GDP assumptions of other "harmonized" scenarios within this 
scenario family. 
The I M A G E resuhs for the A2 and B2 scenarios are based on 
preliminary model experiments carried out in Maj-ch 1998. As a result 
of limited resources it has not been possible to redo these experiments. 
Hence, the I M A G E team is not able to provide background data and 
details for these scenario calculations and the population and 
economic growth assumptions are not fully harmonized, as is the case 
for the I M A G E A l and В1 scenarios. 
" The scenario deviates only slightly from the global population and 
GDP assumptions of other "harmonized" scenarios within this 
scenario family. 
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• High economic growth in all regions, with significant 
catch-up in tlie presently less-developed regions that 
leads to a substantial reduction in present income 
disparities. 
• Comparatively small increase in energy demand 
because of dematerialization of economic activities, 
saturation of material- and energy-intensive activities 
(e.g., car ownership), and effective innovation and 
implementation of measures to improve energy 
efficiency. 
• Timely and effective development of non-fossil energy 
supply options in response to the desire for a clean local 
and regional environment and to the gradual depletion 
of conventional oil and gas supplies. 
Additional scenaiios of В1 were developed using the A I M ( B l -
A I M ) , ASF ( B l - A S F ) , M A R I A ( B l - M A R I A ) , M E S S A G E (57-
M E S S A G E ) , and M i n i C A M ( B I - M i n i C A M ) models. Some of 
these scenarios explore altemative technological developments 
(akin to the A l scenario, e.g. B I T - M E S S A G E ) or alternative 
interpretations on rates and potentials of future 
dematerialization and energy-intensity improvements (e.g., 
B l H i g h - M E S S A G E and B l H i g h - M i n i C A M explore scenario 
sensitivities of higher energy demand compared to the B l 
marker). 
4.4.2.4. B2 Scenarios 
The B2 marker scenario (Riahi and Roehrl, 2000) was 
developed using the M E S S A G E model (see Appendix IV), an 
integrated set of energy-sector simulation and optimization 
models used to generate the I IASA-WEC long-term energy 
and emission scenarios ( I IASA-WEC, 1995; Nakicenovic et 
a l . , 1998). Compared to the other storylines ( A l and B l ) , the 
B2 future unfolds with more gradual changes and less extreme 
developments in all respects, including geopolitics, 
demographics, productivity growth, technological dynamics, 
and other salient scenario characteristics. A more fragmented 
pattem of future development (not that different from present 
trends) precludes any particularly strong convergence 
tendencies in the scenario quantification: 
• Model parameter values for projections to 2100 were 
derived typically from long-term historical data series 
where applicable (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979; 
Nakicenovic, 1987; Grübler, 1990; Nakicenovic et a l . , 
1996; Grübler, 1998a; Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998), or 
adopted from the medians of the analysis of the 
scenario literature (see Chapter 2). 
• The scenario quantification assumes effective policies 
in solving local and regional problems such as traffic 
congestion, local air pollution, and acid rain impacts. 
Additional B2 scenarios were developed using the A I M ( B 2 -
A I M ) , ASF (B2-ASF)^^ I M A G E (B2-IMAGE),'0 ¡yjARlA (B2-
M A R I A ; Mori , 2000), and M i n i C A M (B2-Min iCAM ) i 3 
models. Again, more than one B2 scenario inteipretation was 
generated. Some models (e.g., B 2 - M A R 1 A or B2High-
Min iCAM) offered additional perspectives of both inter- and 
intra-model variability in the interpretation of the B2 storyline, 
particularly with respect to resource availability and 
technology development assumptions (see Section 4.4.7) and 
their resultant impact on G H G emissions (see Chapter 5). 
Figure 4-4 summarizes the main global scenario indicators of 
the four SRES marker scenarios by 2100, including population 
and global GDP levels, final energy intensities, final energy 
use, corresponding carbon intensities, land-use changes,and 
energy-related CO2 emissions. It illustrates that the range of the 
most important scenario characteristics spanned by the four 
SRES marker scenarios and the entire SRES scenario set 
covers the uncertainty range well, as reflected in the scenario 
literature. The scenario space defined by the lines "SRES-max" 
and "SRES-min" lies well within the range spanned by the 
scenario literature contained in the SRES scenario database 
and analyzed in Chapter 2. The two exceptions are: 
• The low range of future CO2 emissions from the 
literature is not reflected in the SRES scenarios, 
consistent with the SRES Terms of Reference to 
consider only scenarios that assume no "additional 
climate policy initiatives" (see Appendix I). 
• The low end of the range of global GDP and energy use 
from the literature is equally not reflected in the SRES 
scenarios. Very low global GDP values arise from a 
combination of rapid demographic transition with low 
per capita productivity growth, a combination for 
which there is littie theoretic or empii'ic support in the 
available literature on demographic and economic 
growth reviewed in Chapter 3. Low GDP scenarios can 
also reflect a combination of average population growth 
and low economic growth; this type of future usually 
depicts low-income, inequitable, and possibly unstable 
worlds that are not analyzed in this report (see Box 
4-2). 
Equally, while the SRES scenarios cover the range from the 
literature, the four marker scenarios cannot and do not replicate 
the frequency distributions of individual scenario variables as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Nor can their quantitative 
characteristics segment the relevant distributions in 
'2 The B2-ASF shares global population and GDP assumptions with 
the B2 marker by 2100, but explores different dynamics of growth in 
the intervening time period. 
'3 The scenario deviates only slightiy frotn the global population and 
GDP assumptions of other "harmonized" scenarios within this 
scenario family. 
The dynamic profiles of land-use changes mean that scenario 
comparisons for any given year, such as 2100, are somewhat 
misleading. Hence, cumulative carbon emissions that result from 
land-use changes over the 1990 to 2100 period are used as a proxy 
indicator in Figure 4-4 (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion). 
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Figure 4-4: Global cumulative C O ^ emissions in the scenarios and their main driving forces. The minimum, maximum, and 
median (50* percentile) values shown on the six axes of each hexagon, for the cumulative energy and land-use CO2 emissions 
from 1990 to 2100 and 2100 values for the four driving forces, are based on the distribution of scenarios in the literature (see 
Chapter 2). The four hexagons show the ranges across the four scenario families ( A l , A2, B l , and B2), cumulative COj emissions 
in GtC, population (POP) in billions, gross world product (GDP) in trilUon US dollars (T$) at 1990 prices, final energy intensity 
of the gross world product (FE/GDP) in M J per US dollar at 1990 prices (MJ/$), and COj emissions intensity of primary energy 
(PE) (tC/TJ). 
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approximately equal intervals. Two distinguishing features 
characterize the SRES scenarios. First, probabilities or 
likelihood are not assigned to any quantitative scenario 
characteristics (inputs or outputs). Thus, that two of the SRES 
marker scenarios deploy the same (low) demographic 
projection does not imply that such a scenario is considered 
more likely. It only indicates that such a demographic scenario 
was judged by the SRES writing team to be consistent with two 
of the four SRES storylines, as opposed to arbitrarily assigning 
different population projections to other "high" or "low" 
scenario characteristics. Second, the SRES scenarios 
incorporate current understanding of important interrelations 
between various scenario-driving forces (see Chapter 3). Thus, 
a "free," or "modeler's choice," numeric combination of 
scenario indicators is simply not possible. For instance, 
intermediary levels of global GDP or energy use could result 
both from a medium population projection combined with 
intermediate per capita GDP or energy use growth, or 
alternatively from low or high population projections 
combined with high or low GDP and energy per capita values, 
respectively. The fact that for some quantitative scenario 
characteristics a number of SRES marker scenarios cluster 
more toward the upper or lower range spanned by the scenario 
literature merely indicates the existence of important 
relationships between scenario characteristics. It also indicates 
that a limited number of scenarios (four markers) cannot 
replicate the distribution of individual scenario values arising 
out of an analysis of more than 400 scenarios published in the 
literature^^. Hence, it is important to consider always the entire 
range across all 40 SRES scenarios when analyzing 
uncertainties in all driving-force variables and the resultant 
emission categories. 
4 . 4 . 3 . Population Prospects 
For the SRES scenario quantification three different population 
trajectories were chosen to reflect future demographic 
unceitainties based on published population projections (Lutz, 
1996; U N , 1998; see Chapter 3). Global population ranges 
between 7 and 15 billion people by 2100 (Figure 4-5) 
depending on the speed and extent of the demographic 
transition. Fertility rates were assumed to converge to 
replacement levels (UN, 1998 medium scenario) in the B2 
scenario or to below replacement levels in the A l and B l 
scenario families that adopt a variant of the low population 
scenario of Lutz (1996). The A2 scenario family is based on the 
high population projection described in Lutz (1996), which is 
characterized by heterogeneous fertility patterns that remain 
above replacement levels in many regions but nonetheless 
decline compared to cuiTcnt levels. 
To address this issue, during the approval process of the Summary 
for Policymakers at the 5th Session of WGIII of the IPCC from 8-11 
March 2000 in Katmandu, Nepal, it was decided to select two 
illustrative scenarios in the S P M from two additional A l groups, in 
addition to the marker scenarios. 
Across all scenarios, the concentration of future population 
growth and its uncertainty lies primarily in the developing 
countries. A n equally pervasive trend across all scenarios is 
urbanization (see Chapter 3). Since the population trajectories 
are exogenous input to all the models used for this report, and 
are subject to a stringent harmonization criterion across 
different models, no further demographic variants to these are 
reported here, with exception of the A2 scenario family. 
4 . 4 . 3 . 1 . A l a n d В1 S c e n a r i o s 
The population trajectory assumed for the A l and B l scenario 
families is based on a variant of the low population projection 
reported in Lutz (1996), which combines low fertility with low 
mortality and central migration rate assumptions. As is the case 
for other population scenarios used in this report, it is well 
within the uncertainty ranges as discussed in the demographic 
literature and the U N (1998)" long-range population 
projections. After peaking at 8.7 billion in the middle of the 
2P ' century, world population declines to 7.1 billion in the year 
2100 (for comparison, the lowest U N Long Range projection 
indicates 5.6 billion by 2100; U N , 1998). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the scenario population is somewhat higher than the 
previous low population scenario used in the IS92 scenario 
series, as only a combination of low fertility with h i g l i 
mortality rates could result in a global population as low as six 
billion people by 2100. Such a development is judged to be 
inconsistent with demographic theory (see Chapter 3) and to be 
inconsistent with the scenario storylines (see Section 4.2). 
The pace of demographic transition in developing countries is 
fastest among all the SRES scenarios, reflecting the emphasis 
on social and educational development (scenario B l ) and 
economic development (Al ) . The use of the same population 
projection for two SRES scenario families thus reflects 
different views of the driving forces of the demographic 
transition (with causality links in both directions), but it does 
not imply that such a demographic scenario is considered more 
likely compared to that of other projections. Better education 
and unproved social development, in particular concerning the 
role of women in society, lead the demographic transition (and 
consequentiy also economic development) in scenario B l . 
Accelerated rates of economic development and its required 
favorable social environment (education, reduction of income 
disparities, etc.) in tum lead the demographic transition in 
scenario A l . In both scenarios, low (infant) mortality rates are 
a necessary precondition to lower fertility rates (consistent 
with the Cairo targets of the U N Conference on Population and 
Development, discussed in Chapter 2). A distinguishing feature 
of the IIASA low population projection is the assumption of 
below replacement fertility levels, on the basis of the actual 
experience of industrial countries.The implications of this 
trend are visible in both the absolute decline of global 
population (from its peak at 8.7 billion people in the middle of 
The different population projection that underlies the "delayed 
development" scenario A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M is described in Box 4-6. 
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Figure 4-5: Population projections 
- historical data from 1900 to 1990 
(based on Durand, 1967; Demeny, 
1990; U N , 1998) and in SRES 
scenarios for 1990 to 2100 (based 
on Lutz, 1996 high and low; UN, 
1998 medium). 
the 21" century) and the significant population aging. In the 
long-term this trend affects not only the industrialized 
countries but also the currently developing countries (see the 
discussion in Chapter 3). 
For A l and B l scenarios, regional population trajectories are 
(almost for all years) within the proposed 5% interval of their 
respective marker scenarios, except for two of the scenarios.'^ 
" The S R E S writmg team gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Anne 
Goujon of l l A S A ' s Population Project in providing a numeric 
interpretation of the I I A S A low population scenario that is consistent with 
the assumption of convergence of social and economic development 
underlying the B l and A l scenario stoiyhnes. Numeiic scenario values 
and documentation is given in w w w . i i a s a . a c . a t / R e s e a r c h / Р О Р Д Р С С -
special-report/. 
Scenarios A l v l - M i n i C A M and A l v 2 - M i n i C A M adopt a slightly 
different population projection, generated endogenously in the M i n i C A M 
model. Its main differences are an asymptotic fertility rate of 1.75 
compared to the 1.5 of Lutz et a l . (1996) and a slightly different temporal 
pattern of the demographic transition. The resultant demographic 
projection is about 5% lower in the first half of the 2 P ' century and about 
10% higher toward 2100 compared to those of the other A l family 
scenarios. A s such, the demographic scenario is well within the 
uncertainty range characterisnc of any long-term demographic projection. 
" Foi a detailed description and the scenario's underlying assumptions 
and numeric values see www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POPAPCC-special-
report. 
It was noted in the government review process that A2's population 
projection by 2050 is 11.3 billion people, higher than the highest U N 
projection (10.7 billion) pubhshed in the report The Stale o f W o r l d 
P o p u l a t i o n ¡999 ( U N F P A , 1999). As this U N projection extends only to 
4 . 4 . 3 . 2 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
For the A2 scenario family, future population levels are based 
on the high scenario (15 billion) reported in Lutz (1996),^^ 
which is somewhat lower than the high population projection 
used in the previous IS92 scenarios (17.6 billion by 2100) for 
the reasons outiined in Chapter 3. The A2 population trajectory 
is the highest among the SRES scenarios, but well within the 
range of the U N long-range population projections^'' and 
2050, it IS necessary to consider the coiTesponding U N long-range 
population projections that extend to 2150 ( U N , 1998). In these, the 
corresponding high/medium scenario is projected to have 10.8 billion 
people by 2050, which increases to 14.6 billion by 2100. The U N piesents 
two additional scenarios that result in yet higher population levels: the U N 
high scenario piojects 11.2 billion people by 2050 and 17.5 bilUon by 
2100, and the U N constant fertility scenario projects 14.9 and 57.2 billion 
people by 2050 and 2100, lespectively. For companson, the A2 population 
scenario adopted from Lutz c t a l ( 1996) indicates population levels of 
11.3 billion by 2050 and 15.1 billion by 2100. Thus, A 2 population levels 
by 2050 aie comparable to those of the U N high scenario but lemain 
significantly below the U N constant fertility scenario. By 2100, A2's 
population assumption is comparable to that of the U N high/medium 
scenario (14,6 billion) and significantiy below that of the other two U N 
scenarios (high and constant fertility, with 17.5 and 57.2 billion, 
respectively). Hence, the adopted values for the A 2 scenario are well 
within the range of the U N long-range populaUon projections. A s 
discussed in Chapter 3, the reason for the comparatively higher 2050 
population in the Lutz et a l (1996) scenario is lower assumed mortality 
rates compared to the U N projections in the medium/high scenario. The 
lower mortality rates characteristic of A2's demographic scenario are 
judged to be more consistent with the A 2 scenatio storyline than 
alternative U N projections, such as the U N high/medium variant, that 
results in lower population by 2050, albeit at the expense of higher 
mortality. Yet by 2100 the differences in global population between the 
two scenarios is rather small (15.1 veisus 14.6 billion, or 3%). 
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corresponding uncertainties estimated by demographers (see 
Chapter 3). For instance, Lutz et a l . (1997) attach a probability 
of about 90% that actual world population will be lower (and 
10% that it wil l be higher) than the value adopted for the A2 
scenario family. Thus, the scenario represents well an upper 
bound of population growth scenarios found in the current 
scenario literature, although higher population scenarios exist 
in the demographic literature (see Chapter 3). As mentioned 
above, the SRES writing team is n o t m a p o s i t i o n t o a t t a c h any 
judgment concerning probability or likelihood to this or to any 
other demographic scenario. Population growth in the A2 
world remains uninterrupted across all the SRES regions 
(Figure 4-5). The average global population growth rate over 
the 2P ' century is 0.96% per year, half that observed during the 
period between 1950 and 1990 (1.86%; U N , 1998). In the A2 
marker, fertility rates vary considerably from one region to 
another; this reflects the regional orientation toward specific 
values, lifestyles, etc. described in the A2 scenario storyline 
(see Secfion 4.3). In the A2 world, in the year 2100 less than 
one-tenth of the world population lives in OECD90 countries, 
and toward the end of the 2 P ' century a pronounced shift 
occurs in the population distribution, from ASIA to the A L M 
region (specificaUy Africa). 
4 . 4 . 3 . 3 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The A2 scenarios share, with one exception, the same global 
population trajectory, but some of them show variation in 
population across the four SRES regions because of differences 
in the regional breakdown of the underlying models. For 
example, the A 2 - I M A G E scenario has a smaller population in 
the REF region as compared with the marker, 405 milUon 
versus 706 million in the marker. An altemative demographic 
interpretation at the global level was attempted in the 
"transitional" A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M scenario, in which the 
implications of delayed development pattems are explored. In 
this scenario global population is assumed to reach 10 billion 
by 2050, and 12 billion by 2100 (see Box 4-6). 
4 . 4 . 3 . 4 . B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The B2 marker scenario adopted the U N median 1998 
population projection (UN, 1998), wherein global population 
increases to about 9.4 billion people by 2050 and to about 10.4 
billion by 2100^^. The scenario is characteristic of recent 
median global population projections (see discussion in 
Chapter 3), and describes a continuation of historical trends 
toward a completion of the demographic transition in the 2P ' 
century. The projection is consistent with recent demographic 
data and scenarios; it reflects faster declines in world fertiUty 
together with declining mortality rates. Hence, the scenario is 
somewhat lower than previous U N median projections, as used 
^' The SRES writing team gratefully acknowledges the assistance of 
Thomas Büttner of the U N Population Division, New York, in 
developing more detailed regional population projections based on 
the U N 1998 medium projection, and in making these data available 
to the SRES writing team in electronic form. 
in the previous IS92 scenario series. A distinguishing feature of 
the U N population projections is the assumption that, in the 
long-term, fertility levels converge toward replacement levels 
globally (see Chapter 3). Future population growth is assumed 
to be slow in today's industiialized countries. In Asia, 
population size stabilizes in the second half of the 2U ' century, 
and in the rest of the world population growth slows down 
toward the end of that century. 
The U N median population projection is shared across all B2 
scenaiio quantifications, although differences remain at the 
regional level. The different regional aggregations used across 
various models did not coincide with the regional aggregation 
of the original U N projection, which suggests that a more 
detailed regional breakdown of demographic projections is 
highly desirable for long-term global scenario studies. 
4 . 4 . 4 . Economic Development 
The SRES scenarios span a wide range of future economic 
growth rates (Table 4-5) and resultant levels of economic 
output. The A l scenario family, with a global GDP of US$520 
to 550 trillion in 2100, defineates the SRES upper bound, 
whereas the A2 and B2 scenarios, with a range of US$230 to 
250 trillion in 2100, represent its lower bound. The ВI scenario 
family is intermediary. Although the SRES scenarios span a 
wide range, both lower and higher global GDP levels can be 
found in the literature (see Chapter 2). 
Uncertainties in future GDP levels are governed by the rates of 
future productivity growth and population growth, especially 
those in developing countries. Different assumptions on 
conditions and possibilities for development "catch-up" and 
for naiTower per capita income gaps in particular explain the 
wide range in projected future economic growth rates. Given 
the weak inverse relationship between population growth and 
per capita income growth discussed in Chapter 2, uncertainties 
in future population growth rates tend to restrict the range of 
associated GDP projections. High population growth, all else 
being equal, lowers per capita income growth, whereas low 
population growth tends to increase this growth. This 
relationship is evident in empiric data - high per capita income 
countries are generally also those that have completed their 
demographic transition. The affluent live long and generally 
have few children. Notable exceptions are countries with small 
populations and significant income from commodity exports. 
Yet even assuming this relationship holds for an extended time 
into the future, its quantification is subject to considerable 
theoretic and empiric uncertainties (Alcamo et a l . , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
As outUned above, two of the SRES scenarios explicitly 
explore alternative pathways of the gradually closure of 
existing income gaps. As a reflection of uncertainty, the 
development "catch-up" diverges in terms of geographically 
distinct economic growth pattems across the four SRES 
scenario families, as summarized in Tables 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7. 
The scenarios of rapid development and "catch-up" remain in 
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T a b l e 4-5: H i s t o r i c a l e c o n o m i c g r o w t h r a t e s (% per a n n u m ) f r o m 1 9 5 0 ( M a d d i s o n , 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 5 ; UN, 1 9 9 3 a , 1 9 9 3 b ) , a n d SRES 
s c e n a r i o s f o r 1 9 9 0 t o 2 1 0 0 . G r o w t h r a t e s w e r e c a l c u l a t e d o n t h e basis of G D P a t 1 9 9 0 p r i c e s a n d m a r k e t exchange r a t e s " . 
L o n g - t e r m g r o w t h r a t e s a r e l o w e r t h a n those f r o m 1 9 5 0 t o 1 9 9 0 (e.g., t h e a v e r a g e a n n u a l g r o w t h r a t e f o r O E C D 9 0 c o u n t r i e s 
f r o m 1 8 5 0 t o 1 9 9 0 was a b o u t 2.8%, a n d f o r t h e r e f o r m i n g economies i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n d t h e F o r m e r Soviet U n i o n i t was 
a b o u t 1 % ; M a d d i s o n , 1 9 8 9 ) . N u m b e r s i n b r a c k e t s g i v e t h e m i n i m u m a n d m a x i m u m values of a l l SRES s c e n a r i o s . 
Economic Growth Rates (% per annum) 
1990-2050 1990-2100 
Region 1950-1990 A l A2 Bl B2 A l A2 Bl B2 
OECD90 3.9 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.1 
(1.2-2.2) (1.0-2.1) (1.7-2.0) (1.3-1.6) (0.9-1.9) (0.9-1.7) (1.4-1.5) (1.0-1.3) 
REF 4.8 4.1 2.3 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.7 2.3 
(2.8-4.6) (0.6-2.3) (2.7-3.7) (1.9-3.3) (2.2-3.5) (1.6-2.5) (2.4-2.7) (1.6-2.5) 
IND 3.9 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.3 
(1.4-2.4) (i.0-2.1) (1.8-2.0) (1.4-1.8) (1.1-2.1) (1.0-1.7) (1.5-1.6) (1.1-1.4) 
ASIA 6.4 6.2 3.9 5.5 5.5 4.5 3.3 3.9 3.8 
(5.8-6.6) (3.8-4.8) (5.3-6.2) (4.2-5.7) (4.2-4.7) (3.3-3.7) (3.8-4.2) (3.6-3.9) 
A L M 4.0 5.5 3.8 5.0 4.1 4.1 3.2 3.7 3.2 
(4.8-5.8) (3.3-4.1) (4.5-5.3) (3.3-4.4) (3.9-4.2) (3.1-3.4) (3.5-3.9) (3.0-3.6) 
DEV 4.8 5.9 3.8 5.2 4.9 4.3 3.3 3.8 3.5 
(5.3-6.2) (3.5-4.4) (4.9-5.7) (3.7-5.0) (4.1-4.4) (3.3-3.6) (3.7-4.1) (3.3-3.7) 
WORLD 4.0 3.6 2,3 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.5 2.2 
(2.9-3.7) (1.7-2.8) (2.9-3.5) (2.1-2.9) (2.5-3.0) (2.0-2.3) (2.5-2.6) (2.0-2.3) 
Note: independent rounding. 
" In the calculations the concept of logarithmic growth rates is used. 
Table 4-6: I n c o m e per c a p i t a ( 1 0 0 0 US d o l l a r s a t 1 9 9 0 p r i c e s a n d exchange r a t e s ) i n t h e w o r l d a n d by SRES r e g i o n . N u m b e r s 
i n b r a c k e t s g i v e m i n i m u m a n d m a x i m u m values of t h e SRES s c e n a r i o s . The r a n g e f o r 1 9 9 0 i l l u s t r a t e s differences i n base-year 
c a l i b r a t i o n across models. 
Income per Capita by World and Regions (10' 1990US$ per capita) 
2050 2100 
Region 1990 A l A2 Bl B2 A l A2 B l B2 
OECD90 17.8-20.6 50.1 34.6 49.8 39.2 109.2 58.5 79.7 61.0 
(39.4-62.3) (32.3-54.0) (40.3 -52.0) (35.1-42.2) (69.8-115.7) (48.0-78.7) (70.6-84.7) (50.1-73.2) 
REF 2.2-2.7 29.3 7.1 14.3 16.3 100.9 20.2 52.2 38.3 
(13.5-32.5) (3.3-9.0) (12.4-23.4) (7.8-16.8) (39.9-119.3) (13.5-20.2) (41.2-56.4) (14.0-38.3) 
IND 
12.8-14.4 44.2 26.1 39.1 32.5 107.3 46.2 72.8 54.4 
(30.7-50.0) (22.4-41.9) (32.5-40.8) (27.0-34.7) (60.3-113.5) (37.1-64.5) (65.3-77.7) (42.4-61.1) 
ASIA 0.4-0.6 14.9 2.6 9.0 8.9 71.9 7.8 35.7 19.5 
(10.8-15.7) (2.5-4.5) (7.2-14.3) (3.6-9.5) (38.8-76.8) (7.4-12.9) (35.7-46.1) (14.8-20.6) 
A L M 1.3-2.1 17.5 6.0 13.6 6.9 60.9 15.2 44.9 16.1 
(12.2-18.0) (4.2-6.0) (8.0-15.3) (4.4-7.7) (44.2-69.5) (11.3-15.2) (41.3-45.8) (13.6-22.6) 
DEV 0.7-1.1 15.9 3.9 10.9 8.1 66.5 11.0 40.2 18.0 
(11.4-16.7) (3.3-5.1) (7.5-14.8) (3.9-8.4) (41.4-69.8) (10.3-13.7) (40.2-45.2) (14.2-21.5) 
WORLD 3.7-4.0 20.8 7.2 15.6 11.7 74.9 16.1 46.6 22.6 
(14.3-21.5) (6.0-9.9) (I2.7-19.I) (7.7-11.9) (43.7-77.9) (15.9-16.9) (46.3-49.6) (19.2-24.5) 
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T a b l e 4-7: G r o w t h r a t e s (% per y e a r ) of i n c o m e per c a p i t a ( u s i n g G D P a t 1 9 9 0 p r i c e s a n d exchange r a t e s ) i n t h e w o r l d a n d by 
r e g i o n . H i s t o r i c a l d a t a f r o m 1 9 5 0 t o 1 9 9 0 f r o m M a d d i s o n ( 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 5 ) , UN ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 9 9 3 b ) , a n d K l e i n G o l d e w i j k a n d B a t t j e s 
( 1 9 9 5 ) . N u m b e r s i n b r a c k e t s g i v e m i n i m u m a n d m a x i m u m values of a l l SRES s c e n a r i o s . 
Growth Rates of Income Per Capita (%) 
1990-2050 1990-2100 
Region 1950-1990 A l A2 B l B2 A l A2 B l B2 
OECD90 2.8 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.1 
(1.2-1.8) (0.8- -1.6) (1.2-1.6) (1 .0-1.4) (1.2-1.7) (0. ,8-1.2) (1.2-1.3) (0.9-1.3) 
REF 3.7 4.0 1.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 2.0 2.8 2.4 
(2.8-4.5) (0.5- -2.2) (2.7-3.6) (1 .9-3.3) (2.5-3.4) (1. ,5-2.0) (2.6-2.8) (1.6-2.6) 
IND 2.9 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.2 
(1.3-2.1) (0.8- -1.8) (1.5-1.8) (1 .1-1.6) (1.3-2.0) (0, ,9-1.4) (1.4-1.5) (1.0-1.4) 
ASIA 4.4 5.5 2.7 4.8 4.7 4.4 2.5 3.9 3.3 
(5.1-5.9) (2.7- -3.6) (4.6-5.5) (3 .3-4.8) (3.9-4.7) (2, ,4-2.9) (3.8-4.2) (3.1-3.4) 
A L M L6 4.0 1.9 3.5 2.4 3.3 1.9 3.0 2.1 
(3.5-4.4) (1.7- -2.2) (3.1-3.9) (1 .7-2.7) (3.1-3.5) (1. ,8-2.1) (2.8-3.2) (1.9-2.5) 
D E V 2.7 4.9 2.4 4.2 3.8 4.0 2.2 3.5 2.8 
(4.4-5.2) (2.3- -3.0) (3.9-4.8) (2 .5-3.9) (3.6-4.1) (2. ,2-2.6) (3.4-3.7) (2.6-3.0) 
W O R L D 2.2 2.8 1.1 2.3 1.8 2.7 1.3 2.2 1.6 
(2.2-2.9) (0.7- -1.5) (2.1-2.6) (1 .1-1.9) (2.2-2.8) (1. ,3-1.5) (2.2-2.4) (1.4-1.7) 
dispute within the SRES writing team because they imply high 
productivity growth (see Box 4-5 and, for a contrasting 
viewpoint and scenario 1п1ефге1а11оп, Box 4-6). However, it is 
agreed that such scenarios of high productivity growth and 
smaller income-per-capita disparities cannot be ruled out, even 
if they certainly are very challenging from the perspective of 
recent growth experiences in a number of regions, most notably 
Africa. There is also agreement that the assumptions deployed 
for the SRES scenarios are within the range suggested by the 
literature (see Chapter 2). In this the highest GDP growth is up 
to US$700 trillion by 2100 compared to US$550 trillion in the 
highest SRES scenario. For scenarios developed within the 
context of sustainability analyses, reductions in per capita 
income gaps also occur faster than for any of the scenarios 
presented here. 
Important differences remain between models in terms of 1990 
base-year data on economic activity levels. Even after 
differences in regional definitions are accounted for, 1990 
regional GDP differences between models range up to ±32% in 
a few cases. Such differences are particularly pronounced for 
developing countries, where in many cases national currencies 
are not freely convertible and thus important uncertainties on 
the applicable conversion rates remain (World Bank, 1999). 
Differences for OECD countries are much smaller (+3% across 
the models) and because of their current dominance in global 
economic activity (and counterbalancing effects), 1990 global 
GDP numbers agree well across the models (±5%). Scenario 
comparisons, especially at the regional level, ai'e therefore best 
based on a comparison of growth rates (see Chapter 2), and the 
SRES scenarios are no exception. 
Historical data indicate that, even though the process of 
economic growth is heterogeneous across countries and over 
time, the patterns of growth show certain similarities. 
Economic "catch-up" follows a general dynamic pattern, 
characterized by initially accelerating economic growth rates 
that pass through a maximum, and decline once the industrial 
base of an economy becomes established. This overall feature 
of growth dynamics is reflected in all the SRES scenarios, 
albeit timing and magnitude vary across the four scenario 
families. This variation reflects the scenario-specific storylines, 
as well as particular relationships to other driving-force 
variables, such as demographics, described in the scenario. 
4 . 4 . 4 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
By design (see Section 4.3) the "High Growth" scenario family 
A l explores a world in which future economic development 
follows the pattems of the most successful historical examples 
of economic development catch-up. Free trade, continued 
innovation, and a stable political and social climate enable 
developing regions to access knowledge, technology, and 
capital. Combined with a rapid demographic transition, this is 
assumed to lead to acceleration in time and space of economic 
growth compared to the historical OECD experience since the 
19* century. The global economy is projected to expand at an 
average annual rate of 2.9% to 2100 (see Table 4-5), roughly in 
line with historical experience over the past 100 years (of 2.7% 
per year, see Chapter 3). Such growth rates are considered high 
by the current scenario literature (see Chapter 2). Compared to 
historical experience, however, the broad-based nature of 
economic development catch-up (i.e., no region "is left 
behind") is without precedent. The 2.9% per year economic 
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growth rate translates into a 25-fold expansion of global GDP 
that would reach US$529 trillion by 2100. 
As a byproduct of rapid economic development and fast 
demographic transition, income inequities between industrial 
and developing countries are virtually eradicated. Per capita 
income ratios are 1:1.6 in 2100, compared to a ratio of 1:16 in 
1990 in terms of the GDP/capita difference between cunent 
developed (IND) and developing (DEV) regions across the four 
SRES regions. However, even if relative income differences are 
reduced drastically, absolute differences remain large, not least 
because of the high incomes characteristic of the A l scenario 
family (per capita income differences are also larger when 
considered at a more disaggregated level). When measured 
across the four SRES regions in 1990, income per capita 
differences are nearly 1:40 (between ASIA and OECD90). Per 
capita income differences are yet higher for differences across 
countries or between different social strata. The poorest 20% of 
Bangladesh's population, for instance, earn per capita incomes 
that are a factor of 700 lower than that of the 20% richest Swiss 
population (UNDP, 1993). A distinguishing feature of the A l 
scenarios is to explore pathways of reductions in present 
disparities. In A I , per capita income in industrial countries 
(IND) increases to about US$107,300 and in now developing 
countries (DEV) to US$66,500. Non-OECD GDP growth rates 
rise to a peak of about 8% between 2010 to 2030 in scenario 
A l , and decline once the industrial and infrastructural bases of 
their economies are established. By and lai'ge, the A l scenario 
implies a rephcation across all developing regions of the post-
World War II experience of Japan and Korea or the recent 
economic development of China. 
4 . 4 . 4 . 2 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A l S c e n a r i o s 
The high economic growth characteristics of the A I B marker 
scenario reproduce well in the scenarios calculated with 
different models. The A I B - M E S S A G E scenario tracks the A I B 
marker scenario closely at the global and regional levels ("fully 
harmonized" input assumptions). At the global GDP level, most 
growth trajectories agree within a range up to 15%, except the 
A l v 2 - M i n i C A M scenario (see Box 4-5).^^ Differences at the 
regional level are larger. A l l models with comparable regional 
aggregation levels agree well for A S I A (except A l v 2 -
MiniCAM). Differences in economic growth prospects also 
agree well for OECD90 (except A l v 2 - M i m C A M ) . For REF 
the A I B scenarios group into two clusters - one group 
reproduces the GDP growth scenario of the A I B marker, while 
the other group suggests a GDP level by 2100 about one-third 
lower than that of the A I B marker. Mostly this reflects 
different assumptions used in the models on future labor 
productivity growth that have not been harmonized with the 
values adopted for the A I B marker scenario. For A L M , again 
one group of scenarios tracks closely the A I B marker, whereas 
other groups indicate either higher ( A l B - A S F , A l B -
" The A l v 2 - M i n C A M scenario reaches only about 64% of the A I B 
marker global GDP in 2100. 
Min iCAM) or lower ( A l v 2 - M i n i C A M , AIT-MARIA) GDP 
growth. The reasons are similar to those discussed above. For 
the SRES region REF, the different regional aggregations 
across the models required complicated "inverse" calculations 
on regional growth rates for harmonization with the respective 
marker scenario at the level of the aggregated SRES region. For 
A L M , such calculations were neither possible for all models 
nor considered desirable by various modeling teams, which 
prefeired to emphasize the inherent uncertainties in regional 
economic growth perspectives even for an otherwise shared 
vision of rapid global economic growth and development 
catch-up. 
4 . 4 . 4 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
As compared to the other SRES scenario families, the A2 
world is characterized by relatively slower productivity growth 
rates and resultant lower per capita incomes (see Table 4-6). 
Yet, the global average (1990-2100) growth rate in per capita 
income of 1.3% is still somewhat higher than that observed 
from 1970 to 1995 (1.2%; World Bank, 1998). The 
comparatively conservative assumptions on per-capita-income 
growth reflect both the more fragmented economic outlook of 
the A2 storyline (see Section 4.3) and the slow pace of the 
demographic transition that underlies A2's high population 
growth trajectory. The fastest growth in per capita incomes (on 
average over 2.3% per year) occurs in the ASIA region, while 
the slowest growth is observed in the OECD90 region (on 
average 1.0% per year). In a reversal of current short-term 
trends, the REF and A L M regions experience a stable increase 
of their per capita income levels over the 2P ' century at a rate 
that is almost twice as high as in the OECD90 region (see Table 
4-7). The A2 world is also characterized by a slow convergence 
of incomes among regions. Nonetheless, present income 
disparities become nairower, from a factor of 40 difference in 
1990 per capita income levels between the richest and the 
poorest of the four SRES regions, to a factor of seven or eight 
by 2100. The increase of global population from 6 to 15 billion 
by 2100 translates into an increase of global GDP by a factor 
of 12 over a century. The average (1990 to 2100) annual growth 
rate of total GDP is 2.2%, which is lower than the 2.9% 
average annual growth rate observed between 1970 and 1995 
(World Bank, 1998) and the 4% rate observed from 1950 to 
1990 (see Table 4-5). 
4 . 4 . 4 . 4 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Four non-marker A2 scenarios (A2-AIM, A 2 - I M A G E with the 
exception of 2050, A 2 - M i n i C A M , and A2-MESSAGE) have 
global GDPs within 5% of the A2 marker. The A2-A1-
M i n i C A M scenario has much lower global GDP than the A2 
marker, reflecting a different viewpoint on future labor 
productivity growth (see Box 4-5) and a different interpretation 
of the A2 scenario storyline altogether (see Box 4-6). While 
this particular scenario illustrates important uncertainties with 
respect to economic growth and development catch-up for 
developing countries, it remains controversial within the 
writing team, especially as to whether it reflects the overall 
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Box 4-5: Labor Productivity Growtli Rates in the SRES Scenarios 
The high income growths assumed in the scenarios, especially in the A l and Bl scenario families, imply large labor productivity 
increases. Accordmg to one member of the writmg team such increases might not be plausible, but the other members find the 
assumpfions plausible, especially in view of historical precedents. In line with IPCC practice, the dissenting view is elaborated 
here. Its corresponding impUcations on scenario quantifications are discussed with one example in Box 4-6. 
Long-term economic growth rates can be expressed as the sum of the labor force growth rate and the growth rate of labor 
productivity. This framework can be used to understand more clearly the kind of technological and demographic assumptions 
present in the SRES scenarios. A simplified measure of labor productivity, the average economic output per member of the labor 
force, is used to examine the SRES scenarios. 
Productivity assumptions are not comparable across the different models used to quantify the SRES emissions scenarios, so 
these issues were examined by mnning quantifications of the SRES scenarios with the MiniCAM model. Population projections 
were taken as exogenous inputs and regional GDP growth paths were taken to be similar to those in the SRES marker scenarios. 
From these, the implied labor force productivity growth rates are determined using assumptions about labor force participation 
rates. In these calculations, total labor force participation rates were assumed to be asymptotic to a participation rate of 80% for 
a working age population of all persons aged 15 to 65. 
The resuh of this exercise is that increases in labor force productivity range between 0.79% and 5.85% per year (calculated for 
the periods 1990 to 2020, 2020 to 2050, and 2050 to 2100) for the four scenario families and four SRES macro-regions 
considered separately. This compares with historical experience between 1970 and 1995 of growth in regional labor force 
productivity of 0.69 to 4.13% per year and the longer-term productivity growth rates of between 1.1 and 7.7% per year. The 
impUed future growth i n global labor productivity for the MmiCAM scenario calculations ranges between 1.12% and 3.49% 
per year for the four scenarios (agam from 1990 to 2020,2020 to 2050, and 2050 to 2100). The historical growth in global labor 
force productivity between 1970 and 1995 was 1.04% per year. Historical rates of GDP per capita growth (a macro-economic 
proxy for labor productivity; see Table 3-2 and Table 4-7) were 1.1% per year between 1980 and 1992 and 2.5% per year 
between 1950 and 1980. 
At the upper end of the these ranges, the SRES scenarios exhibit a growth in global labor force productivity that is higher than 
recent historical global experience, particularly for the SRES regions REF and ALM. This indicates that none of the four SRES 
scenario families envisions a recurrence of the current economic crisis in Eastem Europe and Russia or a recurrence of the "lost 
decade" of negative GDP per capita growth in Africa or Latin America. In addition, the period over which some developing 
regions exhibit high growth rates in these scenarios is longer than any historical record of high growth rates. However, there is 
limited analogous historical experience, as Japan is the ordy country that can be said to have completed such an economic 
"catch-up." 
The assumptions on labor force participation used in the calculations reported in this box result in a decline in the growth of 
the labor force through the 2P' century. The total labor force actually declines m all regions for the last simulation period. This 
reflects the demographic pattern of an overall decline in the population and the assumed stability in labor force participation 
rates. However, the scenarios describe generally affluent worlds in which people live longer. Thus, the labor participation 
pattems are likely to change with respect to current practices. People may work much longer over their lifetime, but this trend 
is countered by the probable need for an mercase in education levels, which act to delay entry into the labor force. Pushing the 
asymptotic labor participation rates upward from the value assumed here results ui only a small increase in total productivity, 
on the order of 0.2% per year. 
The high economic growth branches (Al and B l families) of the SRES scenarios may represent upper bounds for future 
Ulereases in labor productivity. Different assumptions about futttre rates of labor force participation do not appear to change this 
conclusion substantially. These scenarios essentially assume that, within the next few decades, most developmg regions will 
experience an extended period of successful economic development analogous to the historical experience of Japan and the 
"Asian Tigers." An altemative view on future labor productivity growth is provided m a number of scenarios developed with the 
MiniCAM model, most notably Alv2-MiniCAM and the "transitional" scenario A2-Al-MiniCAM (see Box 4-6). In these 
scenarios global economic output is between 20% (A2-A1-MiniCAM) and 36% (Alv2-MiniCAM) lower than m the other 
scenarios of their respective scenario families. 
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Box 4-6: Possible IVansitions between Scenario Families: The A2-Al-MiniCAM Scenario 
The four scenario storyhnes have been stylized as global socio-economic developments that evolve in different directions, but 
globally and continuously. In reality, different regions may follow the developments pictured in the scenarios in different time 
periods. For example, the world may in reality develop according to one of the storylines and after some time move toward 
another. As an illustration of this, one scenario (A2-A1-MiniCAM) was elaborated by a member of the writing team. This 
scenario is described here even though some members of the writing team considered its inclusion undesirable and possibly 
confusing as it was submitted too late to have the team thoroughly discuss its consistency- '^* and to clarify its relationship to the 
four storylines. However, the point that in reality transitions between scenarios are possible is a valid one and the contrasting 
viewpoint is presented here for consideration of the reader, following IPCC practice. 
The A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M transition scenario explores a world m which the prerequisites for development, such as education, 
effective institutions, and high saving rates, take some time to develop, so that rapid development does not begin to occur until 
between 2020 and 2050 depending on the region. In this scenario, total GDP by 2100 is below the median of the historical 
scenario data base and, with the population 20% higher than the current median U N forecast, average per capita income is at 
the lower end of the historical data base range. In such a relatively poor world the economic structure is more sensitive to 
environmental change than in the marker scenario, and the institutional stmcture is less capable. Thus, the impacts of climate 
change are larger and the ability to adapt less than those in the A l world. The primary driving forces for the A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M 
transition scenario follow the logic of this story line, as detailed below. 
Population is lower in the A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M scenario variant than in the A2 marker, since its total completed fertility early in 
the 2 P ' century is lower. This reflects the continued rapid historical declines and leads to slower population growth rates than 
in the population scenario adopted for the A2 scenario family. Total completed fertility declines slowly in the forecast period 
with a long-term asymptotic level of 2.25 for all regions, which results in a global population that is still growing by over 100 
million per year m 2100. The values for migration and death rates used to generate the population trajectory follow those of the 
U N median forecast. The population scenario of A 2 - A I - M i n i C A M is quite close to the U N medium population projection (see 
the discussion of the B2 scenario family below) until about 2060. Thereafter, however, A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M ' s population scenario 
continues to grow luiearly to about 12 billion, whereas the U N median projection stabilizes at about 10 biUion by 2080 and 
slightly declines thereafter. 
The regionally heterogeneous ("delayed") pattem of development of the precursors to rapid economic growth (e.g. education) 
means that some developing regions experience stagnant or very slowly growth in per capita incomes well into the 2U ' century. 
As regions begin rapid development they approach and follow the average OECD labor productivity pattem, so GDP growth 
rates accelerate post-2050 and average nearly 2.5% per year over the second half of the 21" century. G D P thus rises more slowly 
eariy m the 21st cenmry in this scenario, reaching just over US$50 trillion by 2050. After 2050, GDP rises more rapidly to reach 
just under US$200 trillion in 2100. 
Per capita final energy demands are lünited by per capita income, and rise only as economic growth occurs. After growmg 
slowly until 2050, per capita energy demands grow by more than 1.5% annually to reach 120 GJ per capita by 2100. With 
increases in the efficiency with which services are provided, this results in a global average level of energy services similar to 
that currently seen in Western Europe. Global per capita income and energy use by 2100 approach that of Westem Europe in 
1990. Therefore global energy intensities m 2100 approach those of Westem Europe in 1990, a value lower than in other 
scenarios but in line with current observations. 
Natural gas and oil dominate the primary energy system, and contribute slightly more than half of the primary energy. Non-fossil 
sources contribute about 30% of total primary energy, with coal providing the remainder. Total fossil energy carbon emissions reach 
22 GtC by 2100. Sulfur controls are delayed in this implementation until economic growth takes off after 2050. With high levels of 
fossil fuel use, and relatively low rates of control, sulfur emissions are about ten million tons higher m 2100 than they are today. 
The relatively slow growth m output and productivity i n the economy in general is mirrored in the agricultural sector, with lower 
growth in agricultural productivity until post 2050. The large population complicates this problem, leadmg to large-scale 
expansion of agricultural lands and a resultant decrease in forested and unmanaged lands, especially in developing regions. 
Land-use changes do not offset any of these emissions, since the relatively high population, the rapid growth in income, and the 
growth in modem biomass result in essentially zero carbon emissions from land use and agriculture, rather than the substantial 
uptake seen in many other scenarios. 
In particular, the consistency of a continued fast demographic income growth for as much as five decades is questioned by a number 
transition to 2050 combined with a scenario of stagnating per capita of members from the writing team. 
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development tendencies captured in the A2 scenario storyline. 
Nonetheless, in view of the spirit of the SRES open process 
this contrasting scenario is presented in Box 4-6. Regional 
GDP growth differs more than global values across the 
different model interpretations of the A2 scenario storyline. 
A2-MESSAGE and A2-A1M scenarios are harmonized, based 
on the marker scenario, at the regional level also, while the A2-
IMAGE and A2-MiniCAM scenarios have significant regional 
deviations from the A2 (ASF) marker. In particular, these 
scenarios assume stronger GDP/capita growth in the ASIA 
region and slower growth in the A L M and REF regions. 
4.4.4.5. B l Scenarios 
The B l scenario storyline assumes high levels of social 
consciousness and successful governance that resuh in strong 
reductions in income inequalities and social inequity. Growth 
in GDP, while being substantial, is qualitatively different 
compared to that of other scenarios, as social activities and 
environmental conservation are emphasized. Concepts of 
"green" GDP. including socially desirable activities such as 
childcare, apply in particular in the B l scenario and qualify its 
similarity to other scenarios in terms of monetary value of 
GDP In contrast to the worid of scenario A l , the reduction of 
income inequalities is not a byproduct, but rather the result of 
constant domestic and international efforts. Global GDP 
reaches US$328 trillion, which corresponds to an average 
annual growth rate of 2.5%, shghtly less than the long-term 
historical average. Per capita income differences between the 
IND and DEV regions are reduced from 1:16 in 1990 to 1:1.8 
by 2100; income disparities within particular regions are 
assumed to be even further reduced, consistent with the thread 
of the B l storyline described in Section 4.3. For the IMAGE 
model simulation, convergence assumptions were applied in 
the foiiowiiig domúns: 
• Technology convergence was toward the level of the 
productivity frontier region (either Japan or the US). 
• Economic structure convergence was toward long-term 
sectoral shares of OECD economies (e.g., the US), 
which over the long-term implies a decline of the share 
of manufacturing sectors, and hence convergence to a 
service-oriented econotny. 
• Education convergence was to the OECD ratio of 
highly skilled workers within the total workforce. 
4.4.4.6. Harmonized and Other B l Scenarios 
The global GDP trajectories are all within the proposed 
hannonization intervals, except for the Б1 High-MiniCAM (see 
Box 4-5) and the Bl-MARIA scenarios in the middle period of 
the 21*' century. On the regional level, differences in GDP 
trajectories from different models are larger because of the 
differences in regional aggregations outiined above in the 
discussion of the A l scenario family. 
4.4.4.7. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Global GDP in B2 is assumed to increase by more than a factor 
of 10 during the 2P' century, or at an average annual growth 
rate of 2.2%. This growth rate of GDP is similar to the median 
GDP growth in the scenario database reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Stabilization of global population at less than double cun'ent 
levels, as projected in the U N median scenario adopted for B2, 
combined with a sustained pace of development implies that a 
B2 world generally achieves high levels of affluence. Average 
per capita income reaches about US$18,000 by 2100 in the 
developing countries, which exceeds the current O E C D 
averages. In comparison, average per capita GDP reaches 
US$54,400 by 2100 in the developed regions, which 
corresponds to an income ratio of about 3:1 between industrial 
(IND) and now developing (DEV) regions, a considerable 
improvement in interregional equity by 2100 (Riahi and 
Roehrl, 2000). Noitetheless, given thé nature of the B2 scenario 
storyline (Section 4.3), per capita income differences among 
the world regions are higher than those in the A l and B l 
scenarios, but much smaller than those in A2. 
4 . 4 . 4 . 8 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The economic growth paths described by the B2-MESSAGE 
marker scenario are closely tracked by the B2 quantifications 
derived from alternative models at the global level, with the 
exception of the B2-IMAGE scenario, which is sfightly 
below.^ "* Differences at the regional level are larger. For B2-
ASF and B2-MiniCAM, GDP is higher in the A L M and lower 
in the ASIA regions, respectively, compared to the B2 marker 
scenario and its "fully harmonized" companion B2-AIM. The 
latter - like all A I M scenarios - was developed by an 
interdisciplinary group of researchers from different countries 
in the ASIA region and therefore helps to guide readers as to 
which scenario better reflects regional perspectives. 
4.4.5. Energy Intensities, Energy Demand, and Structure 
of Energy Use 
Population and GDP assumptions, along with structural change 
and technological change that affect energy efficiency and 
energy costs (and prices), drive the demand for energy 
services. Given the different model representations of energy 
service demands, in this section final energy use is discussed as 
a common measurement point across all SRES models and 
scenarios. Final energy use per unit economic activity, that is, 
energy intensity, is a frequentiy used measure of comparative 
efficiency of resource use, and reflects a whole range of 
structural, technological, and lifestyle factors (Schipper and 
Meyers, 1992). 
2^ In B2-IMAGE, economic output is higher in OECD90 and lower in 
the other regions compared to the В 2 marker. 
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Figure 4-6 illustrates the evolution of final energy intensities 
for the four SRES marker scenarios. Instead of time, per capita 
income is shown on the horizontal axis, to illustrate a 
conditional convergence of regional final energy intensities. 
Invariably, intensities are projected to decline with increasing 
income levels. As discussed in Chapter 3, the main reason for 
this trettd stems from the common source of economic growth 
and energy intensity improvements - technological change. 
A l l else being equal, the faster intensity improvements are, the 
faster aggregate productivity (per capita income) grows. An 
important méthodologie improvement over previous studies is 
the explicit inclusion of non-commercial energy forms in 
some SRES models, drawing on estimates as reported in IPCC 
WGII SAR (Watson et a l . , 1996) and in Nakicenovic et a l . 
(1998). 
In the A l and ВI scenarios, per capita income differences are 
substantially narrowed and convergent because of increased 
economic integration and rapid technological change. 
Therefore, differences in energy intensities are also narrowed 
significantly and are convergent, as shown in Figure 4.6. The 
B l storyline describes a development path to a less material-
intensive economy. Hence, the final energy intensities in the В1 
marker are lowest among the four SRES marker scenarios for 
a given per capita income level. The A2 storyline reflects a 
world with less rapid technological change, as shown by the 
smallest rate of energy intensity improvement among the four 
marker scenarios.Different interpretations of the four 
scenario storylines, as well as alternative rates of energy 
intensity improvement to the four marker scenarios, are 
discussed below. 
Owing to méthodologie differences across the six models (see 
Box 4-7) it is not possible to disaggregate energy intensity 
improvements into various components, such as structural 
change, price effects, technological change, etc., in a consistent 
way. In some models (macro-economic) price effects are 
differentiated from "everything else" (frequently labeled AEEI, 
or autonomous energy intensity improvements). As a rule, the 
importance of non-price factors is an inverse function of the 
time horizon considered. Over the short-term, the impacts of 
economic structural change and technology diffusion are 
necessarily low. Hence, prices assume a paramount importance 
2 ' Note that this statement only indicates the relative position of the 
A2 scenario compared to other SRES scenario families. In absolute 
tenus the scenario's decline in energy intensity is very substantial - on 
average, energy use per unit of GDP declines by a factor of more than 
two as a result of the compounding effect of an improvement rate of 
final energy intensity of 0.8% per year. Comparison of this 
improvement rate with the SRES scenario range calculated by the 
ASF model indicates that A2's energy intensity improvement rates are 
one-third lower compared to the B2 scenaiio and less than half 
compared to the B l scenario. By 2100, A2's final energy intensity is 
calculated by the ASF model at 5.9 MJ/$, which compai-e.s to the 
literature range of up to 7 MJ/$, and a value of 7.3 MJ/$ in the Л2-А1-
Min iCAM scenario, which contains the highest energy-intensity 
in driving altemative energy demand patterns in short-term (to 
2010-2020) scenario studies (e.g., l E A , 1998; EIA, 1997, 
1999). Over the longer term (i.e., the time horizon considered 
by the SRES scenarios), economic stmctural and technological 
changes become more pronounced, as does their influence on 
energy intensity improvements and energy demand. This does 
not imply that prices do not matter over the long term, but 
simply that "everything else" (e.g., AEEI) is likely to outweigh 
the impacts of prices, as indeed suggested by quantitative 
scenario analyses performed within the Energy Modeling 
Forum EMF-14 (Weyant, 1995). 
Important feedback mechanisms between technological 
change and costs (and thus also prices) exist over the long term. 
These are as a rule treated endogenously in the models, for 
instance when modeling long-mn resource extraction costs or 
structural changes in energy supply options (see Sections 4.4.6 
and 4.4.7). Energy prices are also strongly affected by policies 
(e.g., taxation), but to project these far into the future is both 
outside the capability of currently available methodologies and 
outside the general "policy neutral" stance of the SRES 
scenarios. Therefore, most models treat dynamic changes in 
(average and marginal) costs as the driving force for energy 
intensity improvements and for technology choice (see 
Sections 4.4.6 and 4.4.7). 
4 . 4 . 5 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
Improvements in energy efficiency on the demand side are 
assumed to be relatively low in the A I B marker scenario, 
because of low energy prices caused by rapid technological 
progress in resource availability and energy supply technologies 
(see Sections 4.4.6 and 4.4.7). These low energy prices provide 
littie incentive to improve end-use-energy efficiencies and high 
income levels encourage comfortable and convenient(and often 
energy intensive) lifestyles (especially in the household, service, 
and transport sectors). Efficient technologies are not fully 
introduced into the end-use side, dematerialization processes in 
the industrial sector are not well promoted, lifestyles become 
energy intensive, and private motor vehicles are used more in 
developing countries as per capita GDP increases. Conversely, 
fast rates of economic growth and capital turnover and rising 
incomes also enable the diffusion of more efficient technologies 
trajectory within the 40 SRES scenarios. Thus, the A2 scenario's 
energy-intensity improvement rates are well within the uncertainty 
range as indicated by the scenario literature and are not considered 
overly pessimistic by the writing team. During the government review 
process, comment was made on the fact that energy intensities in A2 
are one-third higher than those in B2. This figure is classified as 
"reasonable" for an inter-family scenario variation by the writing team 
because it is consistent both with the underlying differences in per 
capita GDP (i.e. productivity) growth between the two scenario 
families and with the relationship between energy intensity 
improvements and шасго-economic producUvity giowth identified in 
the literature assessment in Chapters 2 and 3. 
202 A n O v e r v i e w of S c e n a r i o s 
Box 4-7: The Role of Prices in SRES Scenarios 
The price of energy comprises many components: 
• Costs to establish and maintain the production, conversion, transport, and distribution infrastructure of energy supply. 
• Profit margins. 
• A whole host of levies such as royalties and taxes raised at the points of energy production or use. 
• Consumers' willingness to pay for quality and convenience of energy services. 
Fiuthermore, given the importance of energy and the vast volumes traded, prices are influenced by a whole range of additional 
factors, from inevitable elements of speculation to geopolitical considerations, all of which can decouple energy price trends 
from any underlying physical balance between supply and demand. Taxes are especially significant. In a number of OECD 
countries, up to 80% of the consumer price of gasoline is taxes (OECD, 1998), and the differences between countries are 
enormous. In 1997, 27% of the price of gasofine ui the U S A was taxes, compared with 78% in France. Taxes vary substantially 
even between large oil producers (and exporters). In Mexico taxes are 13% of gasoline prices, but in Norway they are 75% 
(OECD, 1998). 
Currently, no methodologies exist to project future energy prices taking all of above mentioned facti)rs into account, nor were 
the SRES scenarios intended to make explicit assumptions on such factors such as future energy taxation. Price information 
enters long-term emission models either in the form of exogenous scenario assumptions, or it is derived internally m models 
based on simplified representations of price formation mechanisms usually based on (marginal) cost information. 
The six models used for SRES range from detailed "bottom-up" models (e.g., A I M , IMAGE), through macro-economic (partial 
equiübrium) models (e.g., M A R I A , Min iCAM), to hybrid approaches (successive iteration between the engineering model 
M E S S A G E with a macro-economic model, or using the Worldscan model with IMAGE). Each has different representations of 
price formation mechanisms and their relationship to macro-economic or sectoral energy demand. These are summarized in 
Appendix IV. As a rule, "bottom-up" (optimization) models calculate only (average and marginal) costs endogenously. As a 
result of their sectoral perspective (energy, agriculture, etc.), these models cannot determine macro-economic feedbacks on other 
sectors or the entire economy and thus are unable to represent a consistent picture of p r i c e formation. Conversely, price 
formation is endogenized in "top-down" models; however, these rely on the stringent assumption that demand and supply must 
be in equilibrium and in addition provide little sectoral detail. Over recent years this simplified modeling dichotomy has 
progressively weakened because of further advances in methodology and the development of "hybrid" modeling approaches. To 
illusti-ate the methodologies deployed in the six SRES models, two (MARIA and MESSAGE) are discussed here, but (for space 
limitations) only in terms of one scenario (B2). (Table 4-9 gives additional details of an mter-scenario comparison of energy 
prices for the M i i t i C A M and A S F models. Owing to méthodologie differences, a comparison of prices across scenarios is only 
possible within a consistent approach (i.e. be comparing scenarios quantified with the same model).) 
The energy prices represented in M A R I A (see also Mori , 2000) consist of energy production and energy utiUzation costs. Market 
prices are determined endogenously by model-calculated shadow prices (for further model details see Appendix IV and Mori 
and Takahashi, 1999). Among various parameters, the extraction costs of fossil fuel resources and the coefficients of utilization 
costs and their evolution over time are the most important determinants. For the M A R I A runs, the resource estimates of Rogner 
(1997) were used as input. For the sake of simplicity, all fossil resource categories of Rogner (1997) were aggregated mto two 
classes and a quadratic production function was used to interpolate the extiaction costs of reserves and all other occurrences. 
For coal, long-term extraction costs range up to US$6.3 per GJ in I990US$ prices, for gas up to US$25 per GJ, and for oil up 
to US$28 per GJ (see Appendix IV for further details). The energy cost coefficients (representing 16 different energy conversion 
technologies) are based on Manne and Richels (1992). For the B2 scenario quantification, the Manne and Richels (1992) 
estimates were largely retained. For instance, electricity generation costs range between 14 mills^^/kWh for gas to 51 mills/kWh 
for coal. (For the other scenario quantifications these cost values were modified to conform lo the different interpretations of a 
particular scenario storyline.) Together these assumptions determined long-ran costs and shadow prices that were set equal to 
energy prices in the macro-economic production function of M A R I A . The energy prices were combined with assumed (low) 
A E E I values and potential GDP growth rates (the latter from the B2 marker) to calculate the resultant aggregate energy demand 
in the model. The resultant primary energy demand was (with exception of the REF region) within 15% of the respective B2 
marker quantification at the regional level and within 5% of global energy demand. As a result of different model structures, 
comparable price data for the M E S S A G E model are only available for internationally traded primary energy forms (these are 
given in Table 4-8). 
26 1 mill is 0.1 USCents (US$0.001). 
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The bottom-up, systems engineering (optimization) model MESSAGE does not compute energy prices. Instead, the model is 
entirely based on cost information, but such costs are treated as dynamic. Their overall treatment follows the lines outlined 
above for the MARIA model, except that greater technology-specific detail is contained m the model. Altogether 19 different 
fossil resource grades are differentiated, based on the estimates of Rogner (1997). The resultant (levelized) extraction costs for 
the B2 marker are in the range US$1.1 to US$5.4 per GJ for coal, US$1.2 to US$5.3 per GJ for oil, and US$1.2 to US$5.7 per 
GJ for gas (range indicates costs variations between lowest and highest costs of the four SRES regions for 2020,2050, and 2100 
respectively, see Appendix IV). Technology-specific cost assumptions cannot be summarized here as MESSAGE contains 
literally hundreds of energy supply and end-use technologies. Examples of cost assumptions are given in Section 4.4.7 and more 
detail is reported in Riahi and Roehrl (2000). However, as in MARIA, MESSAGE also calculates shadow prices for 
mtemationally traded primary energy forms and therefore these two indicators can be compared (Table 4-8). 
Table 4-8: I n t e r n a t i o n a l price (MARIA) and calculated shadow price (MESSAGE) of internationally traded energy 
( I 9 9 0 U S $ I G J ) by 2020,2050, 2100for the SRES B2 scenario. 
Coal Oil Gas Biofuels Synfuels 
MARIA MESSAGE» MARIA MESSAGE" MARIA MESSAGE-^ MARIA MESSAGE" 
2020 0.5 3.4 3.5 3.9-4.4 2.9 2.8-4.4 4.8 n.a. 
2050 0.8 2.5 4.9 7.5-8.2 4.3 5.1-6.4 6.5 10.4-16.2 
2100 1.4 8.1 6.3 17.3-18.2 5.4 5.2-11.4 6.3 17.1-20.7 
" Costs include export and/or import infrastructure and transport. 
Range between crude oil and light and heavy oil products. 
Range between liquid natural gas and direct pipeline imports to North America, Europe, Japan, and North Africa. 
Range between methanol, ethanol, and liquid hydrogen. 
To achieve consistency between model-calculated energy cost dynamics and energy demand assumptions an iterative modeling 
procedure between MESSAGE and MACRO (a macro-economic production function model based on Manne and Richels, 
1992) was used, on the basis of model-calculated shadow prices as indicators of fuhjre price dynamics. The methodology is 
described in more detail in Wene (1996). This approach requires time-intensive model iterations, but has the advantage that the 
impact of price increases can be separated from efficiency improvements through fuel substitution (e.g., a gas-fired cook stove 
energy end-use efficiency is up to 10 times higher than a traditional cook stove fired with fuelwood) as well as from "everything 
else," i.e., the AEEI in the traditional sense). Aggregated, the impact of (shadow) price increases in MESSAGE'S B2 scenario 
accounts for 8% of global primary energy demand by 2020, 23% by 2050, and 30% by 2100. This impact is calculated as a 
reduction in energy demand compared to a hypothetical scenario with constant 1990 prices (and correspondingly higher energy 
demand). The impact of price increases on future energy demand in the B2 scenario is thus relatively small compared to that of 
other factors, although far from negligible. This also explains why the two B2 scenario quantifications by MARIA and 
MESSAGE have quite similar energy demand figures, even if intemational trade prices may differ. First, trade prices are only 
one compœient of the cost-price mechanism treated in the models (which also includes domestic energy production, 
conversion, and end-use costs). Second, models differ in their parametrizations of the "everything else" (AEEI) model 
parameters, for which a wide range of views on applicable ranges exists. Therefore it is one of the model calibration parameters 
frequently used to replicate existing scenarios or to standardize inter-model comparison projects such as EMF-14 (Weyant, 
1995). 
(Box 4.7 commues) 
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Box 4.7 (continued) 
T a b l e 4 - 9 : E n e r g y p r i c e s ( 1 9 9 0 U S $ I G J ) across SRES s c e n a r i o s as c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e A S F (top) a n d M i n i C A M models f o r t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e A l , A 2 , B l , a n d B2 (cf. T a b l e 4 - 8 ) s c e n a r i o s . N o t e i n p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n t base-year differences i n f u e l p r i c e s 
because of different cost a c c o u n t i n g d e f i n i t i o n s used i n models (c.i.f. versus f . o . b . ^ ^ ) , i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h respect t o 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n costs ( i n c l u d e d i n t h e p r i c e f i g u r e s g i v e n f o r ASF, h u t e x c l u d e d i n t h e numbers g i v e n f o r M i n i C A M ) . 
A l A2 B l B2 
ASF" 
Coal 2000 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2020 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 
2050 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 
2100 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7 
Oi l 2000 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
2020 5.3 4.7 5.1 4.7 
2050 7.1 6.2 6.3 6.1 
2100 7.7 7.5 6.1 7.1 
Gas 2000 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
2020 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 
2050 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.9 
2100 7.9 6.1 4.9 5.8 
M i n i C A M ^ 
Coal 1990 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2020 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 
2050 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.7 
2100 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.0 
Oi l 1990 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
2020 8.6 10.2 6.4 7.3 
2050 10.4 13.3 9.9 10.4 
2100 9.6 15.2 8.5 10.2 
Gas 1990 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
2020 2.8 3.2 2.0 2.4 
2050 3.8 5.7 2.5 3.0 
2100 6.8 8.7 1.9 2.3 
Biofuels 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2020 2.1 2.2 2.0 2 
2050 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.1 
2100 2.3 3.2 1.5 2.0 
^ASF; global average supply price, including transportation. 
' ' M i n i C A M : as determined by solution to a partial equilibrium supply and demand model. 
and economic structural changes, with consequent 
improvements in energy intensity. As a result, the rate of energy 
intensity improvement in Annex I countries is around 1.16% per 
year, and in non-Annex I countries 1.44% over the 100 years to 
2100. Thus, final energy use for A l is much higher than those in 
the A2, B l , and B2 scénarios, with a substantial long-term 
convergence in final energy use per capita between Annex 1 
countries and non-Annex 1 countries. 
2^  c.i.f., cost, insurance, freight (included in price); f.o.b., free on 
board (i.e. insurance and transport costs not iticluded in fuel price 
delivered "free on board" transport vessel only). These different 
cost-accounting methods for international energy trade are 
particular important for transport and infrastructure intensive fuels 
such as natural gas. 
4 . 4 . 5 . 2 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A l S c e n a r i o s 
The various A l scenarios indicate a wide range in energy 
intensity improvements and resultant energy demand. A l B -
M E S S A G E tracks closely the global and regional energy 
demand patterns of the A l B marker and so satisfies the 
criteria of a "fully harmonized" scenario, albeit that ASIA 
deviafions from the A l B marker amount to about 20% during 
the period 2030 to 2060. Other scenaiios indicate, for 
example, higher energy demand in 2050 (e.g., A l - A S F ) 
and/or lower energy demand in 2100 (e.g., A l B - I M A G E , 
A I B - A S F , and A I B - M A R I A ) . Differences are regionally 
heterogeneous and result from: 
• Higher GDP growth rates assumptions compared to those 
of the A l B marker (e.g., A l - M i n i C A M for OECD90). 
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Figure 4-6: Relationship between final energy intensity and per capita income in the four marker scenarios. The data points 
represent values in 1990, 2020, 2050, and 2100. The 1990 value is at the top of each curve and the 2100 value at the bottom. 
• Higher or lower (non-price induced) assumptions in 
energy intensity improvement rates in the various 
scenarios. 
• Differences in technology assumptions that lead to 
differences in projected energy prices 
• Combination of all three above factors. 
The differences in model representation of these factors along 
with the available time and resources have not allowed a 
detailed analysis of the numerous underlying differences in 
energy intensities across the scenarios. For instance, final 
energy use in the A l v l - M i n i C A M and A l v 2 - M i n i C A M 
scenarios reaches about 60% only of the final energy use 
described in the A l marker. However, both scenarios describe 
very different worlds with respect to economic growth but 
share the assumption of saturating per capita energy use at 
levels of 150 GJ/capita. A l l else being equal, scenarios of lower 
GDP per capita growth (e.g. A l v 2 - M i n i C A M ) generally also 
assume lower improvement rates in energy intensity, consistent 
with the literature (as discussed in Chapter 3). Generally, the 
range between energy intensity across scenarios is larger in the 
1990 base year than toward the end of the simulation horizon. 
This results from alternative estimates and model 
specifications of non-commercial energy use (excluded in 
some models), which yield large differences in 1990 energy 
intensities. Over time - and consistent with the high-income 
characteristics of an A l world - the use of non-commercial 
energy declines and is ultimately phased out altogether. Thus, 
by 2100 differences in energy intensities across models 
become much smaller. An interesting set of scenarios was 
explored in the A I T group. In these the diffusion of a whole 
host of new energy end-use technologies (e.g., microturbines, 
fuel cells) results in substantial additional gains in efficiency 
and hence higher energy intensity improvements and lower 
final energy demand at equal or lower energy costs compared 
to the other A1 scenarios. 
4 . 4 . 5 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Final energy intensities in the A2 (ASF) marker scenario 
improve steadily, with the exception of the ALM-region 
between 1990 and 2020 because of material and energy 
intensive infrastructure build-up. The fastest reduction occurs 
in the R E F region as its energy-intensive economy 
progressively restructures. The slowest improvements are 
projected for the OECD90 region, because of slow capital 
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turnover rates (GDP growth of 1.6% per year between 1990 
and 2100). The final energy demand across regions is 
determined by the product of regional GDP growth and energy 
intensity improvements. For example, the higher energy 
intenshies in ASIA compared to the A L M region lead to a 
higher absolute final energy demand in the former in spite of a 
lower GDP. This is explained by differences in initial 
conditions and by delayed diffusion of more efficient energy 
end-use technologies, because of lower GDP per capita growth. 
4 . 4 . 5 . 4 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The global primary energy use and final energy use in the A2 
scenarios created with the A I M , MESSAGE, and M i n i C A M 
models are quite close to those of the marker scenario, while 
A2-IMAGE scenario projects lower primary and final energy 
use compared to the A2 marker. As mentioned above, the A 2 -
A l - M i n i C A M scenario explores a very different unfolding of 
driving forces in terms of population and GDP growth, 
combined with an assumption about saturating energy demand 
at current Western European levels. Combined, these 
assumptions translate into the lowest energy intensity 
improvement rates across the SRES scenario set. Global 
primary energy use per unit of GDP (intensities) improves 
from 14.7 MJ/US$90 in 1990 to 8.9 MJ/US$90 in 2100. This 
reflects mainly the low per capita GDP (productivity) growth 
of this scenario which (other factors being equal) translates 
into low rates of energy intensity improvement. Nonetheless, 
the resultant energy intensities are comparable to current 
Westem European levels, as are income and energy use per 
capita. In other words, the scenario describes a global picture 
by 2100 quite similar to that of Westem Europe of today, 100 
years earlier. 
4.4.5.5. B l S c e n a r i o s 
Energy intensity improvements in the В1 marker result from 
energy efficiency investments brought about by increases in 
fuel and electricity prices and technological innovations 
(including assumptions on taxes and perceived premium values 
for clean fuels). The rather high rates in energy intensity 
reduction in В1 stem also from the explicit assumption that less 
industrialized regions catch-up. Another factor is the 
assumption that monetary economic growth in less developed 
regions initially largely replaces activities in the informal 
economy, which leads to a replacement of traditional non­
commercial energy forms by high-efficiency modern 
applications and fuels - and hence substantial energy intensity 
improvements. In the developed regions the high economic 
growth in the В1 scenario may, for instance, be in the form of 
increasing monetization of human activities previously not 
included in GDP accounts (e.g., childcare, household work). 
Such monetary GDP growth does not result in additional 
demands for energy services, and hence again results in 
significant energy intensity improvements. The demand for 
electricity is assumed to rise faster than that for non-electricity 
energy, and may pose one of the capital availability constraints 
in this scenario. 
4.4.5.6. H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B l S c e n a r i o s 
Various altemative scenario quantifications were developed for 
В1 by the modeling teams. For the fhst four to five decades 
most model runs show a global final energy use within the 
proposed bounds of the B l marker, except B l - A S F which is 
higher. By 2100 most scenarios assume higher final energy use 
than the marker run, except ВI-MESSAGE which reproduces 
closely the final energy use of the B l marker (and is 
correspondingly classified as a "fully harmonized" scenario). 
In parficular, B I - M A R l A , B l H i g h - M i n i C A M , and BlHigh-
M E S S A G E show a global final energy use in 2100 nearly twice 
that of the marker. These scenarios explored the implications 
for energy demand of less rapid "dematerialization" tendencies 
of the economy, especially for developing countries, with 
trends in line with historical energy intensity experiences in the 
OECD countries. Regional trends differ most dramatically for 
the M i n i C A M and M A R I A runs for ASIA and A L M , with the 
M i n i C A M simulations assuming a saturating (converging) 
energy use on a per capita basis at 125 GJ/capita. However, 
current knowledge about rates and direction of demateriali­
zation of economic activities is limited. Therefore, both 
historical OECD trends and their applicability to the future 
economies of currently developing countries may not 
necessarily reflect future developments. The use of altemative 
modeling approaches in the quantification of the B l scenario 
storyline has helped to shed light on this important area of 
uncertainty of the future. 
4.4.5.7. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Final energy demand for the B2 marker was derived by 
applying efficiencies of end-use technologies to the demand of 
electric and non-electric energy services. These in tum depend 
on the economic development rates, income levels, and 
sectoral economic stmcture of each region. The evolution of 
the final energy demand levels and structure in the developing 
regions follows patterns that are similar to the historical 
development in the now-industriafized regions of the world. 
This again is consistent with the "dynamics-as-usual" 
interpretation of the B2 storyline. By successive iterations with 
a macro-economic model, marginal cost increases are taken 
into account in the energy demand projections of the 
M E S S A G E model for the B2 marker (see Appendix IV). The 
resuh is an aggregate energy-intensity improvement rate at the 
global level of about 1% per year until 2100, about the same as 
has prevailed over the past 100 years in countries for which 
such long-term time series data are available (see Chapter 3). 
This aggregate global improvement rate masks important 
differences in the temporal and spatial evolution of energy 
intensities. Improvements are generally higher in regions far 
away from the energy-intensity frontier and also faster in those 
for which the capital turnover rate (i.e., GDP growth) is higher. 
Consistent with the more imperfect realization of future trends 
characteristic of the B2 scenario, energy intensity 
improvements are slower than in the A l or ВI scenario 
families, but higher than in the A2 scenario family. 
A n O v e r v i e w of S c e n a r i o s 2 0 7 
100 
Sí 
Oí 
и 
<a 
S 
S 
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 
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(%) by fonn of delivery. Direct use 
of solids, direct use of liquids, and 
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four SRES marker scenarios. 
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variation across the four marker 
scenarios. Liquids include oil 
products, methanol, and ethanol. 
Solids include coal and biomass. 
4 . 4 . 5 . 8 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The energy intensity and resultant global growth in final 
energy demand of the В 2 marker is matched reasonably well 
by other scenario quantifications until about 2050; the B2-AIM 
scenario shares "fully harmonized" input assumptions at the 
global and regional levels alike over the entire time horizon. By 
2100, however, differences become larger, and in particular the 
two M i n i C A M scenarios show lower final energy intensity 
improvements compared to the B2 marker and other B2 
scenarios. The M i n i C A M scenarios were developed to explore 
high-end sensitivities for G H G emissions in the B2 scenario 
family by assuming higher energy demand, combined with a 
high reliance on coal in the B2High-MiniCAM scenario. 
Different scenarios at the regional level illustrate altemative 
interpretations, with particularly large variations in the REF 
and A L M regions. Altemative scenarios indicate up to 50% 
lower energy use in REF (e.g., B2-IMAGE) and up to 50% 
higher energy use in A L M ( B 2 - M i n i C A M , B2High-
MiniCAM) compared to the В 2 marker. The alternative 
scenarios illustrate that uncertainties in future energy 
intensities and resultant final energy demand are generally 
larger for developing and transition economies compared to the 
OECD90 region. Among other reasons, this is a function of the 
much higher uncertainties with respect to future economic 
growth rates in these regions. 
An interesting observation (considering the SRES multi-model 
approach) is that the changes in stmcture of final energy are 
similar in the four markers of the SRES scenario families, even 
though these are derived from four different modeling 
approaches and describe very different futures in terms of 
demographic, socio-economic, and energy development 
(Figure 4-7).^ ** The trend is toward energy reaching the 
consumer in more flexible, more convenient, and cleaner 
forms. This reflects that people with higher income are willing 
to pay more for more convenient energy forms (e.g., even if 
coal were cheaper than gas, everybody would rather heat with 
gas than coal). Therefore, the final energy mix is characterized 
by growing importance and dominance of grid-dependent 
fuels, such as electricity, district heat, and gas. Consistent with 
the storylines and the higher income levels of A l and B l , this 
change in final energy structure is faster in these scenario 
families than in the other two scenario families. The structural 
shift is slowest in scenario A2, with scenario B2 taking an 
intermediate position. These scenario differences mainly 
reflect differences in per capita income levels. 
4.4,6. Resource A v a i l a b i l i t y 
Section 3.4 in Chapter 3 reviews energy resources and 
technologies. Here existing reserves (identified quantities 
recoverable at today's prices and with today's technologies), 
r e s o t i r c e s that have yet to be discovered or that need 
foreseeable techno-economic progress to become available in 
the future, and other o c c u r r e n c e s of hydrocarbons in the 
Earth's crust are considered. Oil , gas, and uranium occur in 
deposits that need to be located, and the exploration for new 
resources is related to the needs for production over the next 
few decades rather than to a need to define what might 
ultimately be available for exploitation. Thus the ultimate 
resource base is uncertain. Coal, on the other hand, occurs in 
seams over wide areas and very little exploration is needed to 
give an estimate of potentially available resources. Wbether or 
not they could be mined with given technologies and 
economics remains the most important uncertainty. Finally, 
2^  Correspondmg data were not available foi all scenarios developed 
with other models, and hence a detailed comparison across the entire 
SRES scenario set was not possible. 
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new renewable sources of energy are dependent on ongoing 
technological development and cost reductions. 
The conventional oil industry is relatively mature and the 
question is at what point in the 2P ' century will the current 
reserves start to run out. However, unconventional resources 
are also available - shale oil, bitumen, and heavy oil. These are 
starting to be exploited and they wi l l extend current 
conventional oil i-eserves. The gas industry is less mature and 
much more remains to be discovered, particularly in areas that 
do not currently have the infrastructure to utilize gas and 
consequently exploration has been unattractive. Additionally, 
large amounts of unconventional gas have been identified, 
some of which are already in commercial production (e.g., in 
the US). Also, huge quantities of natural gas are believed to 
exist as methane hydrates on the ocean floor (see Chapter 3) 
and it is possible that technology to exploit these will be 
developed at some stage. For uranium and thorium, the 
amount of exploration to date has been very limited, and hence 
the possibilities of discovering new deposits are enormous. It 
is likely that even a major expansion of the nuclear industry 
will not be limited by the amount of available uranium or 
thorium. With coal, the question is not one of discovery but 
one of economics, accessibility, and environmental 
acceptability. 
To consider future resource availability as a dynamic process, 
however, does not resolve the inherent uncertainties in terms of 
future success rates of hydrocarbon exploration, technology 
development for either non-conventional fossil resources or 
non-fossil alternatives, or future energy prices. Therefore, these 
uncertainties are explored by adopting different scenario 
assumptions that range from low to (very) high resource 
availability (see Table 4-4), consistent with the interpretation of 
the various scenario storylines presented in Section 4.3. This 
scenario approach is especially important given that 
hydrocarbon occurrences are the largest storage of carbon. 
IPCC WGII SAR (Watson et a l . , 1996) estimates the size of the 
total carbon "pool" in the form of hydrocarbon occurrences to 
be up to 25,000 GtC. How much of this eventually could 
become atmospheric emissions is at present unknown, and 
depends on the future evolution of technology, prices, and 
other incentives for future hydrocarbon use and their 
alternatives. 
Given that long-term emission scenarios invariably rely on 
quantification by formal models, an important distinction 
needs to be made between assumptions concerning the ultimate 
resource base and projected actual resource use. Typically, 
assumptions on the ultimate resource base enter models as 
exogenously specified c o n s t r a i n t s - cumulative future 
production simply cannot exceed values specified as the 
resource base. Actual resource use, or what is frequently 
termed the "call on resources" conversely depends on 
numerous other factors represented in models, such as: 
• Future price levels (either assumed as exogenous inputs 
or determined endogenously in the model). 
• Assumptions on future technology improvements that 
either enable unconventional hydrocarbons to be 
"mined" economically or, conversely, that draw on non-
fossil alternatives and/or non-climate environmental 
and social constraints (e.g., limits on particulates and 
sulfur emissions or on land degradation and mining 
accidents). 
Their complex interplay results in scenarios of future 
cumulative resource use being the most appropriate indicator, 
as opposed to exogenously pre-specified resource-base 
constraints, especially in view of the multi-model approach 
adopted to develop the SRES scenarios. Table 4-10 and Figures 
4-8 to 4-10 summarize the results for the four SRES marker 
scenarios and of the ensemble of SRES scenarios for their 
respective scenario families and scenario groups (in the case of 
the A l scenario family). It is evident that, in the absence of 
climate policies, none of the SRES scenarios depicts a 
premature end to the fossil-fuel age. Invariably, cumulative 
fossil-fuel use to 2050 (not to mention 2100) exceeds the 
quantities of fossil fuels extiacted since the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution, even though the "call on" fossil 
resources differs significantiy across the four marker scenarios. 
This increase is higher in the scenarios that explore a wider 
domain of uncertainty on future fossil-resource availability. 
For n o n - f o s s i l r e s o u r c e s , like uranium and renewable energies, 
future resource potentials are primarily a function of the 
assumed rates of technological change, energy prices, and 
other factors such as safety and risk considerations for nuclear 
power generation. Generally, absolute resource constraints do 
not become binding in the marker scenarios or other scenarios. 
The contribution of these resources is substantially below the 
physical flows identified in Section 3.4, and therefore resuhs 
mainly from scenario-specific assumptions concerning 
technology availability, performance, and costs. These are 
summarized in Section 4.4.7. 
4 . 4 . 6 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
Energy resources are taken to be plentiful by assuming a large 
future availability of coal, unconventional oil, and gas as well 
as high levels of improvement in the efficiency of energy 
exploitation technologies, energy conversion technologies, and 
transport technologies. The grades of energy resources used in 
the model differ on the basis of extraction costs. When 
combined witl; the level of improvement in efficiency of 
exploitation technology (expressed as the rate of improvement 
in marginal production costs), the graded costs of energy-
resource exploitation determine the energy production costs 
(prices) and hence the ultimate resource extraction quantities. 
For A I , large amounts of unconventional oil and natural gas 
availability were assumed. Cumulative (1990 to 2100) 
extraction of oil ranges between 15 and 30 ZJ in the A l 
scenarios (AIB marker, 17 ZJ); for gas the range is between 23 
and 48 ZJ (AIB marker, 36 ZJ) and for coal the range is 
between 8 and 50 ZJ (AIB marker, 12 ZJ). Resource 
availability and reliance uncertainties are also explored through 
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a n d r a n g e f o r SRES s c e n a r i o s ( m a r k e r s a n d r a n g e across a l l s c e n a r i o s ) f o r t h e f o u r s c e n a r i o f a m i l i e s a n d t h e i r s c e n a r i o 
g r o u p s . The numbers i n b r a c k e t s g i v e m i n i m u m a n d m a x i m u m values of s c e n a r i o v a r i a n t s . N o t e i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e l a r g e 
v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e A l s c e n a r i o f a m i l y as a r e s u l t of i t s b r a n c h i n g o u t i n t o f o u r s c e n a r i o g r o u p s , each w i t h a different r e l i a n c e 
o n p a r t i c u l a r r e s o u r c e c a t e g o r i e s a n d t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t r a n g e f r o m c a r b o n - i n t e n s i v e developments t o d e c a r b o n i z a t i o n . A l C 
a n d A I G have been c o m b i n e d i n t o one f o s s i l - i n t e n s i v e g r o u p A l F I i n t h e S P M (see a l s o f o o t n o t e 1 ) . 
World Cumulative Hydrocarbon Use, in ZJ (1,000 EJ) 
1800-1994 1990-2100 
AlB A l C AIG AIT A2 B l B2 
Oil 4.6 20.8 17.2 19.6 19.5 
(17.0-29.9) (11.5-20.4) (29.6-50.8) (16.6-20.8) (11.0-22.5) (15.7-19.6) (11.2-22.7) 
Gas 2.0 42.2 24.6 14.7 26.9 
(22.8-45.2) (19.7-22.4) (40.9-54.9) (23.9-29.9) (18.4-35.5) (14.7-31.8) (17.9-26.9) 
Coal 5.6 15.9 46.8 13.2 12.6 
(8.5-51.5) (48.4-68.3) (18.8-37.9) (4.4-12.4) (20.1-47.7) (3.3-27.2) (12.6-44.4) 
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Figure 4-8: Cumulative oil resource use 1990 to 2100 in the 
SRES scenario families, including the four scenario groups 
within the A l scenario family. The bars show the spread of 
total oil extraction over all scenarios in the respective scenario 
family; the resultant medians and the values of the respective 
marlier scenarios are also shown. A l C and A I G have been 
combined into one fossil-intensive group A l F I in the SPM (see 
also footnote 1). 
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Figure 4-9: Cumulative gas resource use 1990 to 2100 in the 
SRES scenario families, including the four scenario groups 
within the A l scenario family. The bars show the spread of 
total gas extraction over all scenarios in the respective scenario 
family; the resultant medians and the values of the respective 
marker scenarios are also shown. A l C and A I G have been 
combined into one fossil-intensive group A l F I in the S P M (see 
also footnote 1). 
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Figure 4-10: Cumulative coal resource use 1990 to 2100 in the 
SRES scenario families, including the four scenario groups 
within the A l scenario family. The bars show the spread of 
total coal extraction over all scenarios in the respective 
scenario family; the resultant medians and the values of the 
respective marker scenarios are also shown. A l C and A I G 
have been combined into one fossil-intensive group A1 F l in the 
S P M (see also footnote 1). 
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additional scenario groups. Three of these ( A l C , A I G , and 
AIT) explore more extreme pattems of reliance on particular 
resources and technologies compared to the more "balanced" 
tendencies described in the A I B scenarios, including the A I B 
marker. As discussed in Chapter 3 and Section 4.3.1, this 
characteristic of the A l scenario family stems from the 
interpretation of technological change and resource availability 
as being cumulative and path dependent. 
4 . 4 . 6 . 2 . A l S c e n a r i o G r o u p s 
Besides the A I B marker scenario group, altemative pathways 
unfold within the A l family, according to diverging technology 
and resource assumptions (Figures 4-8 to 4-10). Two of these 
groups ( A l C and AIG) were merged into one fossil-intensive 
group (AlFI) in the SPM. The more detailed information on 
these two groups is presented here, in Chapter 5 and Appendix 
V l l (see also footnote 1). 
The coal-intensive scenario group A l C is restricted mainly to 
conventional oil and gas, which results in the lowest 
cumulative oil and gas use (15 to 19 ZJ) of all scenarios; it is 
even slightly lower than in the B2 scenario, which has much 
lower energy demand. As such, the scenario illustrates the 
long-term G H G emission implications of quickly "running out 
of conventional oil and gas" combined with rapid technological 
progress in developing coal resources and clean coal winning 
and conversion technologies. As a result, cumulative coal use is 
very high - between 48 and 62 ZJ (median, 60 ZJ) between 
1990 and 2100. 
Conversely, oil and gas resources are assumed to be plentiful in 
the world of scenario group A I G because of the assumed 
development of economic extraction methods for 
unconventional oil and gas, including methane clathrates. 
Cumulative oil and gas extraction amounts to 76 to 88 ZJ, 
about twice as high as in the A l C scenario group. Mainly this 
reflects current perceptions that radical technological change 
needs to оссш' to translate a more significant portion of the 
resource base of unconventional oil and gas into potentially 
recoverable reserves, a development evidentiy also cross­
checked by possible developments in non-fossil alternatives. 
Cumulative coal extraction in A I G is relatively low at 15 to 38 
ZJ (median, 19 ZJ) across the scenarios of this scenario group. 
As a result of fast technological progress in post-fossil 
altematives in the technology-dynamic AIT scenario group, the 
call on oil and gas resources is comparatively modest -
cumulative extraction to 2100 ranges between 36 and 46 ZJ, 
quite similar to the A l C scenario group. The main difference is 
that because of the improvements in non-fossil alternatives the 
call on coal resources remains modest - cumulative coal use of 4 
to 12 ZJ (median: 10 ZJ) in A I T is the lowest of all the scenarios. 
4 . 4 . 6 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Resource availability assumptions for the A2-ASF world are 
generally rather conservative, essentially that current 
conventional estimates of petroleum resource availability are 
not expanded.^^ Unconventional hydrocarbons, such as 
methane clathrates and heavy oils, do not come into large-scale 
use. As a result, coal resource use is the highest among the 
SRES marker scenarios. The A S F marker scenario 
quantification of oil, natural gas, and coal resource availability 
reflects the Rogner (1997) estimates for conventional oil and 
coal resource availability and the recent IGU (1997) estimates 
for conventional gas reserves (optimistic scenario, see Chapter 
3). Resource extraction costs in the ASF depend on the 
resource "grade" and vary from US$2.6 to 5.2 per GJ for oil (in 
1990 dollars), from US$1.2 to 4.6 per GJ for gas, and US$0.7 
to 6.0 per GJ for coal. 
4 . 4 . 6 . 4 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The primary energy structure of the A2 family scenaiios is also 
reflected in the cumulative fossil fuel resource use, 
characterized by an increasing reliance on coal resources (see 
Figures 4-8 to 4-10). The cumulative oil use varies by a factor 
of two across the A2-family, between 11 and 24 ZJ (median, 18 
ZJ; A2 marker, 17 ZJ). Cumulative gas use ranges between 20 
and ZJ 36 (median, 23 ZJ; A2 marker, 25 ZJ). The higher end 
of the range of gas resource use occurs in the A2G-1MAGE 
scenarios, which explored the scenario sensitivity to assuming 
that a significant fraction of methane hydrate occurrences 
become technically and economically recoverable in an A2 
world. Given the regional orientation of the A2 scenario 
storyline and the resultant quest for energy independence, the 
possibihty of tapping even currently "exotic" fossil resources 
certainly merits such a scenario sensitivity analysis. The 
opposite end of the resource availability spectmm is explored 
in the M i n i C A M scenarios of the A2 scenario family. First, 
methane clathrates are assumed not to become available. As a 
result, the call on resources focuses on coal (A2-MiniCAM) or, 
in a scenario sensitivity analysis, more on unconventional oil 
and gas (A2-A1-MiniCAM). The range of reliance on coal 
resources is thus an inverse image of the range of oil and gas 
resource availability. Cumulative coal extraction varies 
between 22 and 53 ZJ (median, 35 ZJ; A2 marker, 47 ZJ) 
across the scenarios of the A2 scenario family. This picture 
mainly represents what used to be termed "conventional 
wisdom" in much of the scenario literature (including the 
previous IS92 scenario series). Importantly, while the 
probabilities of alternative developments of fossil and non-
fossil resource availability cannot be assessed at present, the 
multi-model, multi-scenario approach described here 
demonstrates that the uncertainties in fossil resource 
Even with this "conservative" assumption cumulative oil extraction 
in the A2 marker scenario totals 16 ZJ, or 2.7 times currently 
identified, recoverable oil reserves (6 ZJ or 143.3 billion tons; BP, 
1999). Thus, the A 2 scenario also assumes that in future it will be 
possible to continue the historical trend in which large quantities of 
(undiscovered or presently uneconomic) oil r e s o u r c e s are transferred 
into recoverable r e s e r v e s . Some analysts consider such a future trend 
as definitely optimistic (see the literature review in Chapter 3). 
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availability might be much larger than assumed a decade ago. 
This finding also reflects the results of IPCC WGII SAR 
(Watson e t a l . , 1996). 
4.4.6.5. B l S c e n a r i o s 
Assumpfions on the fossil fuel resource-base used in the B l 
marker scenario quantification are based on the estimates of 
ultimately recoverable conventional and unconventional fossil 
resources described in Rogner (1997). The capital output ratio 
of resource exploitation is assumed to rise with progressive 
resource depletion, but this is counteracted by learning curve 
effects in the marker scenario quantification provided by the 
IMAGE model. Regional estimates of the exploitation costs of 
conventional and unconventional resources of Rogner (1997) 
were used to construct long-term supply cost curves as of 1971. 
These values, rather than absolute upper bounds on resource 
base availability, define future resource availability in the 
IMAGE model. The supposed availability of huge non-
conventional occurrences of oil and natural gas, with a 
geographic distribution markedly different from the distribution 
of conventional oil and gas, has significant implications for fuel 
supply and trade patterns in the long term. For coal resources, 
Rogner's (1997) estimates were also adopted; of the total of 262 
ZJ, 58 ZJ belong to the categories of proved recoverable, 
additional recoverable, and additional identified coal resources. 
The production costs of coal were assumed to rise with 
increasing depth and rising labor wages, but these costs are 
largely offset by mechanization (in underground mining) and 
economies of scale (in surface mining). 
4.4.6.6. H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B l S c e n a r i o s 
The call on oil resources in the scenarios that comprise the В1 
scenario family ranges between 11 and 20 ZJ, with a median of 
17 ZJ (B l marker, 20 ZJ). For gas the range is 15 to 33 ZJ 
(median, 20 ZJ; B l marker, 15 ZJ), and for coal the 
corresponding range is between 3 and 27 ZJ (median, 11 ZJ; 
B l marker, 13 ZJ). An overview is given in Figures 4-8 to 4-
10. 
4.4.6.7. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The availability of fossil energy resources in the B2 marker 
scenario is assumed to be conservative, in line with the gradual, 
incremental change philosophy of the B2 scenario storyline. 
Consequentiy, oil and gas availability expands only gradually 
while coal continues to be abundant. Assumed oil and gas 
resource availability does not extend much beyond current 
conventional and unconventional reserves. Through gradual 
improvements in technology, a larger share of unconventional 
resei-ves and some additional resource categories are assumed 
to become available at improved costs over the 21" century. 
The availability of oil and gas, in particular, is Umited 
compared to the estimated magnitude of global fossil resources 
and occurrences (Watson et a i , 1996). This translates into 
relatively limited energy options in general and extends also to 
non-fossil energy options. 
4 . 4 . 6 . 8 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Altemative B2 scenario implementations assumed similar order 
of magnitudes of resource availability as the B2-marker scenario, 
except for B2High-MiniCAM. The resultant cumulative resource 
use (1990-2100) ranged between 9 and 23 ZJ (median, 17 ZJ; B2 
marker, 19 ZJ) for oil, between 18 and 27 ZJ (median, 21 ZJ; B2 
marker, 27 ZJ) for gas, and between 12 and 55 ZJ (median, 21 
ZJ; B2 marker, 13 ZJ) for coal (see Figures 4-8 to 4-10). The 
largest uncertainties relate to different inteipretations of the more 
gradual changes under a "dynamics-as-usual" philosophy that 
characterizes the B2 scenario storyline. One group of scenarios 
(including the B2 marker) assumed a gradual expansion in the 
availability of conventional and unconventional oil and gas, 
whereas another group of scenarios adopted more conservative 
assumptions (akin to the A2 and В1 scenario families).^'' A l l else 
being equal, lower resource-availability assumptions for oil and 
natural gas lead to a higher reliance on coal and non-fossil 
altematives and explain, together with technology assumptions, 
the differences in emissions between altemative В 2 scenario 
quantifications discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.4.7. Technological Change 
Chapter 3 highlights the importance of technological change in 
long-run productivity growth, but also for the historical 
transformations of energy end-use and supply systems. The 
importance of technological change in explaining wide-ranging 
outcomes in future emissions has been highlighted by Alcamo 
et a l . , (1995) and Grübler and Nakicenovic (1996), among 
others. The latter reference also provides a critical assessment 
of the previous IS92 scenario series and its comparison to the 
literature. Prominent scenario studies of possible technological 
change in future energy systems in the absence of climate 
policies include Ausubel et a l . (1988), Edmonds et a l . (1994, 
1996a), I IASA-WEC (1995), and Nakicenovic et a l . (1998). 
Future technology characteristics must therefore be treated as 
dynamic, with future improvement rates subject to considerable 
uncertainty. This is reflected in the SRES scenarios that adopt a 
wide range of improvement rates for energy extraction, 
conversion, and end-use technologies (Table 4-11). The actual 
representation of technological change in the six SRES models 
ranges from exogenously prescribed availability, through cost 
and performance profiles (which in some cases also include 
consumer or end-use costs for technology use), to stylized 
representation of leaming processes.^' Yet, as summarized in 
Chapter 3, model representations of technological change are 
poorly developed, although evolving rapidly. 
^" Resource availability assumptions also appear to be rather model 
specific in this scenario family. For instance, in many scenarios 
pattems of resource availability resemble the hypotheses retained by 
a particular model used for quantification of a marker scenario in one 
of the other three scenario families. 
'^ Roehrl and Riahi (2000) provide a description of the methodology 
of representing technological change in M E S S A G E as used here in 
the SRES scenarios. 
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Table 4 - 1 1 : Summary of t e c h n o l o g y i m p r o v e m e n t s f o r e x t r a c t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d c o n v e r s i o n t e c h n o l o g i e s assumed f o r t h e 
SRES s c e n a r i o s . The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r e v i e w s t e c h n o l o g y d y n a m i c s across t h e f o u r m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s a n d t h e f o u r A l s c e n a r i o 
g r o u p s r e l a t i v e t o each o t h e r I l l u s t r a t i v e , s c e n a r i o - s p e c i f i c t e c h n o l o g y assumptions a r e discussed i n t h e text. A l C a n d A I G 
have been c o m b i n e d i n t o one f o s s i l - i n t e n s i v e g r o u p A l F I i n t h e S P M (see a l s o f o o t n o t e 1 ) . 
Technology Improvement Rates 
Scenario Coal Oil Gas Non-fossil 
A I B High High High High 
A2^ Medium Low Low Low 
Bib Medium Medium Medium Moderate-high 
B2'= Low Low-medium Moderate-high Medium 
A I G Low Very high Very high Medium 
A l C High Low Low Low 
A I T Low High High Very high 
" Technology improvement rates in the A2 scenario are heterogeneous among the world regions. 
B l : The assumed time-dependent leaming coefficients range from 0.9 (i.e. a 10% reduction in the capitahoutput ratío on a doubling of 
cumulated production) for oil, 0.9-0.95 for gas, and 0.9-0.95 for surface coal mining to about 0.94-0.96 for non-fossil electric power 
generation options and 0.9-0.95 for commercial biofuels. 
In the specific model implementations, "inconvenience costs" of energy-end use, including social externalities costs, are expected to be 
particularly important for tradhional coal technologies (e.g., underground mining, cooking with coal stoves). 
4 . 4 . 7 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
The A I B marker scenario represents the "balanced" 
technology development group of A l scenarios; it assumes 
significant innovations in energy technologies, which improve 
energy efficiency and reduce the cost of energy supply. 
Consistent with the A1 scenario storyline, such improvements 
occur across the board and neither favor nor penalize particular 
groups of technologies. A l assumes, in particular, drastic 
reductions in power-generation costs, through the use of solar, 
wind, and other modem renewable energies, and significant 
progress in gas exploration, production, and transport. For a 
different view, altemative scenario groups embedded within 
the overall A l scenario family explore pathways of cumulative 
technological change; that is, path-dependent scenarios in 
which technologies evolve on mutually largely exclusive 
development paths. In general this has been the historical 
experience, in which the success of particular energy 
technologies (the steam engine in the 19"' century, or intemal 
combustion in the 20'*') have "locked out" other technological 
altematives. These scenario groups explore altemative spectra 
of technology dynamics in the domains of unconventional oil 
and gas, coal, as well as post-fossil technologies. Salient 
technology assumptions are described below. 
Keeping in mind the very different degrees of technological 
detail and the mechanisms for technology improvements 
represented in the different models, a consistent inter-scenario 
comparison of technology assumptions is best achieved within 
the framework of one particular model. A n overview of 
different technology developments for the scenario groups of 
the A l scenario is given in Box 4-8 for the A I M model, which 
was also used to develop the A I B marker scenario. (A 
comparison with die M A R I A model indicated that technology 
cost assumptions and their dynamics are quite congruent.) To 
illustrate differences in technology chai-acteristics that drive the 
four different SRES scenario families, conesponding scenario-
specific data based on M E S S A G E data are presented at the end 
of this Section. 
4 . 4 . 7 . 2 . A l S c e n a r i o G r o u p s 
As outlined above, besides the marker, three different groups 
of A l scenarios were developed by the different modeling 
groups (combined into two in the SPM, see also footnote 1). hi 
total, nine altemative runs are clustered in thi'ee scenario 
groups based on the A I M , M A R I A , M E S S A G E , and 
M i n i C A M models. 
In the A I G scenario group, technological change enables a 
larger fraction of the large occurrences of unconventional oil 
and gas, including oil shales, tar sands, and especially methane 
hydrates (clathrates) to be tapped. High technological leaming 
and cost reduction effects could lower unconventional oil and 
gas extraction costs by approximately 1% per year and 
conversion technology costs by about factor of two (AIG-
M E S S A G E , see Roehrl and Riahi, 2000). As mentioned in 
Section 4.4.6, ahhough these assumptions yield higher 
extractions of unconventional oil and gas resources, they are 
not sufficient to tap significant fractions of unconventional 
resources such as gas clathrates. Future scenario studies might 
reassess the current state of knowledge on possible technology 
development of these "exotic" fossil-fuel occurrences and the 
conditions under which they could become a major future 
source of unconventional hydrocarbon supply (and a massive 
source of carbon emissions). For the A I G scenario group, 
substantial improvements and extensions of the present 
pipeline grids and entirely new natural gas pipelines systems 
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Box 4-8: Technological Change in the AIM-based Quantifications for the A l Scenario Family 
The A l storyline describes a world with rapid economic development. High economic growth results in pressures on resource 
availability, counterbalanced by technological progress, which is assumed to be highest among the four scenario families. In the 
A I M quantifications of the A l storyline, rates of technological change are high both with respect to "supply push" factors (most 
notably RD&D) as well as with respect to "demand pull" factors (most notably high capital tumover rates). Since large resource 
availability and high incomes stimulate demand growth, technological change in energy supply receives a higher emphasis 
compared to changes in energy end-use technologies. Common technology assumptions in the A l scenarios can be summarized 
as follows. 
The supply of oil, gas, and biomass in the A l scenario family is assumed to be very high and results from high rates of 
technological progress for fossil fuel and biomass exploitation technologies. Unconventional oil and gas, such as deep-sea 
methane hydrates, oil shale, etc., become available at relatively low cost. Also, large amounts of biomass are utilized through 
well-developed biomass farm plantations and harvest technologies, and biomass utilization technologies, such as biomass power 
generation and biofuel conversion technologies, become available at low costs through R D & D and other mechanisms of 
technology improvements (leammg by doing and leaming by using). High levels in the use of other renewable energy are 
reached when technologies for solar photovohaics and thermal utilization, wind farms, geothermal energy utilization, and ocean 
energy are introduced at low cost. Energy end-use technologies are assumed to progress at medium rates compared with the fast 
rates of technological change in energy supply technologies. 
The A l B marker and A I T scenarios assume drastic reductions in cost for solar, wind, and other renewable energies. A l C 
assumes lower coal costs and emphasizes coal exploitation technology progress and the introduction of advanced coal-fired 
power generation technology, such as integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC). A I G assumes lower oil and gas costs than 
other A l scenarios. The cost of nuclear power is assumed to be the lowest in A I G and AIT, and highest in A l C . The different 
cost assumptions that drive and result from technological change in the A l scenario family are summarized in Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12: T e c h n o l o g y costs ( 1 9 9 0 U S $ I G J afid 1 9 9 0 U S C e n t s l k W h } i n A I M - b a s e d A l s c e n a r i o s . 
Scenarios 2020 2050 2100 
Coal (1990US$/GJ) A l B 2.6 3.2 3.1 
A l C 1.5 1.5 1.1 
A I G 3.5 3.8 3.7 
A I T 2.6 2.8 2.8 
Natural Gas, ConventionalAlB 2.0 1.9 1.4 
& Unconventional (1990US$/GJ) A l C 3.5 5.0 4.6 
A I G 1.8 1.6 1.6 
A I T 1.5 1.5 1.4 
Grade OU, Conventional A l B 7.3 10.1 14.9 
& Unconventional (í990m$/GJ) A l C 9.4 13.1 14.0 
A I G 7.3 8.2 8.4 
A I T 7.9 8.4 15.7 
Nuclear (1990UScent/kWh) A l 5.4 3.9 2.3 
A l C 5.7 4.4 2.8 
A I G 5.9 4.7 3.1 
A I T 5.6 4.1 2.5 
Solar, wind, geothermal A l B 12.2 5.9 2.0 
electricity (1990UScent/kWh) A l C 13.1 6.9 3.3 
A I G 15.2 9.3 5.2 
A I T 12.4 6.2 2.7 
As mentioned above, improvements in energy efficiency on the demand side are assumed to be comparatively lower in the A l 
scenario family, except for the A I T scenario, because the low energy prices give very little incentive to improve end-use energy 
efficiencies. Efficient technologies are not fully introduced into the end-use side, dematerialization processes in the industiial 
(Box 4.8 continues) 
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Box 4.8 (continued) 
sector are not promoted, lifestyles become energy intensive, and private motor vehicles are used more in developing countries 
as per capita incomes increase. As a result, energy efficiency improvement m the industrialized countries (IND) is around 0.8% 
per year, and in developing countries (DEV) it is 1.0% per year over the next 100 years to 2100. Only AIT assumes greater 
efficiency improvements (1.1% per year for IND and 1.5% per year for DEV), as a result of the diffusion of new highly efficient 
energy end-use devices such as fiiel cell vehicles. 
Technology progress is also assumed for land-use changes and suffur emissions. Higher productivity increases in biomass and 
crop land (1.5% per year) in comparison to 0.5-1.0%) are assumed for the A l world in the AIM quantification compared to 
those in the A2 and B2 scenario families. Desulfurization technologies could be introduced because of concems of economic 
damage caused by acid rain and there would be strong financial support to install these technologies with the rapid income 
growth associated with the A l world. 
from Siberia and the Caspian to South East Asia, China, Korea, 
and Japan after 2010/2020 would be needed. Since 
unconventional oil and gas resources are distributed unevenly 
geographically, the scenario implies both capital-intensive 
infrastructure investments and unprecedented large-scale gas 
and oil trade flows. There is also little pressure to develop non-
fossil altematives in such scenarios, so costs of non-fossil 
altematives remain comparatively high, even after significant 
technological improvements. For instance, solar electricity 
costs could drop to US$0.05 per kWh (AIG-AIM). 
The high-growth coal-intensive scenario group A l C assumes 
relatively large cost improvements in new and clean coal 
technologies, such as coal high-temperature fuel ceils, IGCC 
power plants, and coal liquefaction. More modest assumptions 
are made for all the other technologies, except for nuclear 
technologies in A l C - M E S S A G E , as this requires zero-carbon 
options to ease resource and environmental constraints. The 
relative costs between coal and oil- or gas-related technologies 
also shift in A l C - A I M . Progress in renewables is also assumed 
to be substantial. For instance, solar photovoltaic costs would 
decline to USCents3/kWh ( A l C - A I M ) . 
In the dynamic technology scenario group AIT, technological 
change, driven by market mechanisms and policies to promote 
innovation, favors non-fossil technologies and synfuels, 
especially hydrogen from non-fossil sources. Liquid fuels from 
coal, unconventional oil and gas sources, and renewables 
become available at less than US$30 per barrel, with costs that 
fall further, by about 1% per year, through exploitation of 
learning-curve effects (AIT-MESSAGE). A I T - M A R I A also 
projects declining costs for biofuels, from about US$30 to 
US$20, after the 2020 period (and in comparison to the A l -
M A R I A scenario biofuels substitute coal-derived synfuels). 
Non-fossil electricity (e.g., photovoltaics) begin massive 
market penetration at costs of about USCents 1 to 3 per kWh 
( A I T - M A R I A , A I T - M E S S A G E , A I T - A I M ) , and could 
continue to improve further (perhaps as low as 
USCentsO.l/kWh in AIT-MESSAGE) as a resuh of learning-
curve effects. A n important difference between the marker 
scenario A l B and the A I T group is that in A I T additional end-
use efficiency improvements are assumed to take place with the 
diffusion of new end-use devices for decentralized production 
of electricity (fuel cells, microturbines). As a result, final 
energy demand in the A I T scenario group is between 30% 
(AIT-AIM, AIT-MESSAGE) and 40% (AIT-MARIA) lower 
compared to the A l B marker scenario. 
4 . 4 . 7 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The A2 scenario family includes slow improvements in the 
energy supply efficiency and a relatively slow convergence of 
end-use energy efficiency in the industrial, commercial, 
residential, and transportation sectors between regions. A 
combination of slow technological progress, more limited 
environmental concems, and low land availability because of 
high population growth means that the energy needs of the A2 
world are satisfied primarily by fossil (mostly coal) and nuclear 
energy. However, in some cases regional energy shortages 
force investments into renewable alternatives, such as solar and 
biomass. For instance, intermittent renewable electricity 
supply options, such as solar and wind, are assumed to decline 
in costs to about USCents4/kWh and (because of storage 
requirements) to about twice that value when these intermittent 
sources are used for medium load applications (50% of 
electricity supply). 
4 . 4 . 7 . 4 . B l S c e n a r i o s 
Consistent with the general environmentally conscious and 
resource-conservation thrust of the B l scenario storyline, 
technological change is largely directed at improving 
conversion efficiency rather than costs for fossil technologies. 
Within the SRES Teims of Reference, no additional climate 
initiatives are assumed that could bar the application of certain 
technologies or yield forced diffusion of others. The theimal 
efficiency of centrally generated electricity is assumed to rise 
to 45% (conventional coal) or to 65% (gas combined cycles) by 
2100, while specific investment costs decline sfightly from 
1990 levels. It is assumed that subsidies on coal for electricity 
generation are removed entirely. A specific feature of the 
I M A G E model used to generate the В1 marker scenario is that 
it treats non-fossil electricity generation technologies as highly 
generic; for instance, it does not distinguish between nuclear, 
solar, or wind-power generation technologies. The specific 
investment costs of generation options for non-fossil electricity 
and of the production and conversion of commercial biofuels 
are assumed to fall by 5-10% for every doubling of cumulated 
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production. Cost decreases down to USCents2.5^Wh are 
anticipated once non-fossil options penetrate on a large scale. 
The costs of gaseous biofuels in the major producing regions 
(Latin America, Africa, NIS) are assumed to be in the order of 
US$3 to 5 per GJ from 2020 to 2030 onward. Liquid biofuels 
are produced in small amounts in almost all regions at costs in 
the order of US$3 to 6 per GJ. In all regions a gradual transition 
occurs from fossil fuels to non-fossil options in electric-power 
generation, because of rising fuel prices and declining specific 
investment costs for fossil alternatives. Learning rates were 
assumed, conservatively, to yield 2 to 6% cost reductions for 
every doubling of cumulative production. The shift would start 
in resource-poor industrialized regions such as Japan and 
Western Europe, but is somewhat tempered by rising 
conversion efficiencies of fossil-fueled power plants. One of 
the factors that constrains the use of natural gas in the scenario 
is the assumption that only a limited part of the transport 
market is open to competition from non-liquid fuels (between 
50% around 2050 to 80% around 2100). Also, the market share 
of coal in industry is fixed exogenously at 10 to 15% in some 
regions, to reflect the decreasing environmental and social 
attractiveness of the more "dirty" coal. 
4.4.7.5. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The approach that underlies the B2 scenario storyline translates 
into important future improvements of technologies, albeit at 
more conservative rates than in scenarios A l or B l , but with 
higher rates than in scenario A2. Compared to A I and В1, cost 
improvements are more modest, because of the regionally 
fragmented technology policies assumed to characterize a B2 
world. Hence, technology-spillover effects and benefits from 
shared development expenditures are more limited in the 
scenario. The high emphasis of environmental protection at the 
local and regional levels is reflected in faster development and 
diffusion of energy technologies with lower emissions, 
including advanced coal technologies, nuclear, and renewables. 
For instance, solar and wind electricity-generating costs are 
assumed to decline to USCents3/kWh, that is, a similar level as 
assumed for the long-term costs of advanced, clean coal 
technologies (such as IGCCs). As conventional oil supplies 
dwindle, initially high-cost synfuels from coal and also 
biofuels are introduced as substitutes. With increasing 
production volume, costs are assumed to decline from initial 
levels of some US$7/GJ to US$2.6/GJ. Conventional coal 
technologies undergo the lowest aggregate rates of 
improvement in the scenario and are also subject to increasing 
controls of social and envnonmental extemalities (mining 
safety, particulates, and sulfur emissions). Increasingly, 
therefore, only advanced coal technologies are deployed. 
Nonetheless, extraction and conversion costs increase, 
especially in regions with a large share of deep-mined coal and 
in high population density agglomerations. In regions with 
abundant surface minable coal reserves (e.g.. North America 
and Australia), coal extraction costs remain relatively low. 
4.4.7.6. H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r S c e n a r i o s 
As a consequence of the "multi-model approach" used in 
SRES, detailed improvement assumptions and scenario 
implementations for individual technologies vary greatiy from 
one model to another, although the same storyline 
characteristics were used as guiding principles and many 
scenarios share similar assumptions on improvement potentials 
for different technologies. Detailed quantitative comparisons 
are difficult because of different time profiles of technology 
improvements assumed in the different models, different 
representations of regional technology, and the modeling of the 
intemational diffusion of technology. For instance, many 
models assume aggregate regional rates of technological 
change (e.g., M A R I A , M i n i C A M , ASF), whereas others 
attempt to represent spatial and temporal diffusion pattems 
more explicitly (e.g., M E S S A G E , AIM). 
It is difficult to quantify the influence of varying technology-
specific scenario assumptions on scenario outcomes, because 
in most model simulations the technology assumptions were 
varied in conjunction with other salient scenario 
characteristics, such as economic growth and resource 
availability (e.g. in the M i n i C A M simulations). Therefore, the 
impact of ahemative assumptions with respect to technological 
change can be best quantified within a particular scenario 
family and with "fully harmonized" scenario quantifications 
(i.e. with comparable energy demand), as discussed for the A l 
scenario groups above. In some scenarios within other scenario 
families, technology-specific sensitivity analyses were 
performed, such as in the B2C-MARIA scenario vaiiant of the 
B2-MARIA quantification. The main differences between the 
two scenarios are the respective costs of coal and nuclear 
power. In B2C-MARIA, the price of coal was assumed to be 
US$1.4/GJ, while that in B 2 - M A R I A is US$1.8/GJ. In 
contrast, the capital costs of nuclear power stations are 
US$1400/kW in B2-MARIA, while those in B2C-MARIA are 
assumed to remain at US$1800/kW. Thus, even comparatively 
small variations in relative technology characteristics such as 
costs and efficiencies can lead to wide differences in scenario 
outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 5, for instance, changing 
the relative economics between coal and nuclear in the two 
M A R I A scenarios results in a difference of more than 200 GtC 
cumulative emissions^^ over the 2P ' century 
An illustration of inter-scenario variability in technology costs 
and diffusion is given in Box 4-9 for the M E S S A G E model 
simulations for one representative scenario of each scenario 
family and scenario group. As stated above, differences in 
technology diffusion across scenarios are influenced by many 
more factors than just altemative technology characteristics 
and cost assumptions. Growth of energy demand, resource 
availability and costs, and local circumstances (local air-
quality regulations that require desulfurization of fuels or stack 
Cumulative carbon emissions (all sources) are 1359 GtC for B2-
M A R I A and 1573 GtC for B 2 C - M A R I A (see Chapter 5). 
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gases, or land availability and prices that influence biomass 
costs) are also important determinants of speed and potentials 
for the diffusion of new energy technologies. 
4 . 4 . 8 . Prospects for F u t u r e Energy Systems 
In the energy systems models used to generate the scenarios 
reported here, the entire energy systems structure is 
represented from primary energy extraction, through 
conversion, transport, and distribution, all the way to the 
provision of energy services. Primary energy harnessed from 
nature (e.g., coal from a mine, hydropower, biomass, solar 
radiation, produced crude oil, or natural gas) is converted in 
refineries, power plants, and other conversion facilities to give 
secondary energy in the form of fuels and electricity. This 
secondary energy is transported and distributed (including 
trade between regions) to the point of final energy use. Final 
energy is transformed into useful energy (i.e., work or heat) in 
appliances, machines, and vehicles. Finally, application of 
useful energy results in delivered energy services (e.g., the 
light from a light bulb, mobility). 
Important differences exist in accounting conventions on how 
to calculate the primary energy equivalent of particularly 
renewable and nuclear energy (see Watson et a l . , 1996). To 
assure comparability of model results, the SRES writing team 
agreed to adopt as a common accounting methodology the 
Box 4-9: Dynamics of Teclinological Change in the MESSAGE-Based Quantifications for the Four SRES Marker 
Scenarios. 
Technological change in energy supply and end-use technologies has historically been a main driver of structural changes in 
energy systems, efficiency improvements, and improved environmental compatibility. Yet, despite its crucial role, the 
mechanisms that underlie technological innovation and diffusion of new technologies remain poorly understood, so modeling 
technological change as an endogenous process to the economy and society is still in its infancy. Historically, the track record 
of technology forecasts has at best been mixed, with a number of notable failures particularly in the energy sector. In the 1960s, 
for mstance, R & D in the US attempted to develop nuclear-propelled aircraft, and nuclear electricity was anticipated to become 
"too cheap to meter." Conversely, the dynamic technological changes in microprocessors, information technologies, and 
aeroderivative turbines (and their combination with the steam cycle in the form of combined cycle gas turbines) were largely 
underestimated. This is similar to the pessimistic market outlook for gasoline-powered cars at the end of the 19"' and start of the 
20* centuries. 
In recognition of the considerable uncertainty in describing future technological tiends, a scenario approach was adopted to vary 
technology-.specific assumptions in the M E S S A G E model runs of the SRES scenarios. Depending on the specific interpretation 
of the four SRES scenario storylines, altemative technologies and altemative ranges of their future characteristics were assumed 
as model inputs. 
Two guiding principles determined the choice of particular technology assumptions in MESSAGE. 
First, technologies not yet demonstrated to function on a prototype scale were excluded. Therefore, for instance, nuclear fusion 
is excluded from the technology portfolio of all SRES scenarios calculated with the M E S S A G E model. However, production of 
hydrogen- or biomass-based synfuels (e.g. ethanol) or advanced nuclear and solar electricity generation technologies are 
included, as they have demonstrated their physical feasibility at least on a laboratory or prototype scale, or m some specific niche 
markets (even if they are uneconomic at currently prevailing energy prices). Second, the range of technology-specific 
assumptions is empnically derived. Statistical distributions of technology characteristics based on a large technology mventory 
(consisting of 1600 technologies) and developed at IIASA (Messner and Strubegger, 1991; Strubegger and Reitgmber, 1995) 
were used. Means, maxima, and nunima from these distributions (e.g. of estimated future technology costs) guided which 
particular values to adopt across scenarios on the basis of the scenario taxonomy suggested by the scenario storylines (ranging 
from conservative to optimistic). 
Tables 4-13a to 4-13e summarize the technology characteristics and resultant dilfusion rates across the four SRES scenario 
families and their scenario groups. Table 4-13a presents a brief overview of a selection of major energy technologies represented 
in the M E S S A G E model. (Being a detailed "bottom-up" model, M E S S A G E Hterally contams hundreds of individual 
technologies, too many to summarize here; mstead, only the most hnportant technology groups, aggregated across many 
individual technologies, are presented.) Table 4-13b summarizes salient technology characteristics hi terms of levelized costs 
(investment and operating costs levelized per unit energy output, excluding fuel costs) and Table 4-13c summarizes the resultant 
marker deployment (diffusion) of these technologies by 2050 and 2100 for the B2-MESSAGE marker scenario. This scenario 
is characterized by intermediate levels of growth in energy demand and conservative assumptions as to future technological 
change. The latter were adopted based on a literature survey (Strubegger and Reitgruber, 1995) as well as an expert opinion poll. 
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In particular, the B2-MESSAGE scenario adopted technology characteiistics of the equally conservative I I A S A - W E C Scenario 
В (Nakicenovic et a l . , 1998), which was based on the Strubegger and Reitgruber (1995) analysis, complemented by a review 
of some 100 energy experts assembled by WEC. Table 4-13d indicates how technology costs in the other M E S S A G E scenarios 
differ from those of the B2 scenario. (The prevalence of negative values in Table 4-13d indicates that most scenarios are more 
optimistic concerning cost improvements of future technology than the M E S S A G E B2 scenario.) Finally, Table 4-13e indicates 
the difference in market deployment (diffusion) of the other M E S S A G E SRES scenarios compared to that of the B2 scenario. 
Positive values indicate higher market deployment, and negative ones show lower diffusion. However, differences across 
scenarios in terms of technology diffusion are not governed by technology costs alone. Other technology characteristics (such 
as efficiency and infrastructure availability) and market (demand) growth are also important in determining market deployment 
rates and diffusion potentials of energy technologies. 
Simplifymg the complex dynamic patterns of technological change across the scenario groups, one conclusion is that perhaps 
the single most important dichotomy of energy technologies of relevance for future G H G emissions is between advancements 
in "clean coal" and other fossil (e.g. methane hydrate) technologies (delivermg electricity, gas, or syrüiquids) and those of 
decentralized hydrogen-powered fuel cells, combined with nuclear and renewable energy (for hydrogen production). The first, 
GHG-intensive technology cluster largely follows traditional centralized technological configurations of the energy sector The 
latter represents both radical organizational and technological changes. The revolutionary change may well be less the 
hydrogen-powered fuel cell car itself, but rather that it could generate electricity when parked, dispensing entirely the need for 
centralized power plants and utilities. 
T a b l e 4 - 1 3 a : O v e r v i e w of selected energy t e c h n o l o g i e s r e p r e s e n t e d i n MESSAGE. 
Technology Aggregates Including: 
Centralized Electricity G e n e r a t i o n : 
Coal conventional 
IGCC 
Coal fuel cell 
Oil 
Gas standard 
NGCC 
NGFC 
Bio 
Nuclear 
Advanced nuclear/other 
Hydro 
Wind 
Other renewables 
Decentralized Electricity G e n e r a t i o n : 
Hydrogen fuel cell 
Photo-voltaics 
Synfuels: 
Coal synliquids 
Biomass synliquids 
Gas synliquids 
Syngases 
Hydrogen, H2(l) 
Hydrogen, H2(2),(3), 
Conventional coal power plants with DESOX (flue-gas desulfurization, FGD) and 
DENOX (flue-gas denitrification) 
Integrated coal Gasification Combined Cycle 
Coal-based high-temperature fuel cell (intemal reforming) 
New standard oil power plant (Rankine cycle, low NO^^  and with FGD); existmg 
crude oil and light oil engine-plants; light oil combined cycle power plants 
Standard gas power plant (Rankine cycle, potential for cogeneration) 
Natural Gas-fued Combmed Cycle power plant with DENOX 
Natural Gas-powered high-temperature Fuel Cell, cogeneration possibilities 
New biomass-fned power plant (Rankine cycle, cogeneration possibilities); advanced 
biomass power plants (gasified biomass is burned in combined cycle gas turbines) 
Conventional, existing nuclear power plants 
Nuclear high-temperature reactors for electricity and hydrogen coproduction, future 
inherentiy safe nuclear reactor designs, and other future zero-carbon electricity-
generating technologies for base load 
Hydropower plants (low and high cost) 
Wind power plant 
Geothermal power plant (cogeneration potential); grid-connected solar photo-voltaic 
power plant (no storage); solar thermal power plants with storage, and solar thermal 
power plant for hydrogen production 
Decentralized stationary and mobile hydrogen fuel cells (cogeneration systems or 
off-hours electricity generation) 
On-site solar photo-voltaic power plant in the residential and/or commercial sectors, and 
in the indu.strial sector 
Light oil and methanol production from coal 
Ethanol production from biomass 
Methanol production from natural gas 
Syngases from various sources, including biomass and coal gasification 
Hydrogen production from fossil fuels (coal or gas) 
Non-fossil hydrogen production: H2(2): from biomass and electticity, H2(3): from 
nuclear and solar 
(Box 4.9 continues) 
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Box 4.9 (continued) 
T a b l e 4-13b: Levelized costs (I990US$IGJ) of selected energy technologies (excluding f u e l costs) i n B2-MESSAGE ( m i n i m a 
and m a x i m a for eleven world regions). 
1990 2050 2100 
min max min max min max 
Coal conversion 3.6 7.5 4.4 7.8 4.4 7.8 
IGCC 9.4 9.4 8.3 8.6 6.9 8.6 
Coal fuel cell 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 
Oil 3.9 28.9 3.3 5.3 3.3 5.3 
Gas standard 3.6 8.3 3.9 4.7 3.9 4.7 
NGCC 4.9 5.0 3.3 3.3 2.8 2.8 
NGFC 8.4 8.4 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Biofuel 5.8 9.2 5.8 8.3 5.8 8.3 
Nuclear 6.7 9.7 7.2 9.7 7.2 9.7 
Advanced nuclear/other 10.8 10.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Hydro 2.5 15.8 2.5 22.2 ' 2 . 5 22.2 
Wind 15.8 15.8 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 
other renewables 6.4 29.8 7.2 10.8 7.2 10.8 
Hydrogen fuel cell 8.4 8.4 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.3 
Photo-voltaic 20.4 29.8 8.1 11.7 8.1 11.7 
Coal synliquids 6.9 6.9 6.4 7.0 6.4 7.0 
Biomass synliquids 7.1 7.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Gas synliquids 3.7 3.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Syngases 4.6 4.6 3.4 4.1 3.4 4.1 
Hydrogen H2(l) 5.6 5.6 1.7 3.9 1.7 3.9 
Hydrogen H2(2) 4.9 4.9 1.5 3.2 1.5 3.2 
Hydrogen H2(3) 11.9 11.9 8.4 12.6 8.4 12.6 
T a b l e 4-13c: Energy output (EJ) of selected energy technologies i n B2-MESSAGE. 
1990 2050 2100 
Coal conversion 16.2 9.7 0.0 
IGCC 0.0 15.9 65.1 
Coal fuel cell 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Oil 4.8 0.1 0.0 
Gas standard 5.7 0.4 0.0 
NGCC 0.6 45.0 72.7 
NGFC 0.0 5.1 0.0 
Biofuel 0.5 2.8 22.3 
Nuclear 5.7 18.9 50.6 
Advanced nuclear/other 1.3 27.9 88.7 
Hydro 7.9 19.7 28.4 
Wind 0.011 11.5 17.2 
Other renewables 0.11 18.4 50.4 
Hydrogen fuel cell 0.000 10.5 11.4 
Photo-voltaic 0.001 25.2 57.3 
Coal synliquids 0.0 4.2 71.8 
Biomass synliquids 1.5 31.8 34.9 
Gas synliquids 0.0 13.0 39.5 
Syngases 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Hydrogen H2(l) 0.0 36.4 0.0 
Hydrogen H2(2) 0.0 10.4 0.0 
Hydrogen H2(3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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T a b l e 4 - 1 4 : P r i m a r y energy use (EJ)for t h e f o u r SRES m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s a n d a l l SRES s c e n a r i o s i n 1 9 9 0 , 2 0 2 0 , 2 0 5 0 , a n d 
2 1 0 0 . The r a n g e f o r 1 9 9 0 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e differences i n base-year c a l i b r a t i o n across t h e models a n d u n c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t stem 
f r o m t h e i n c l u s i o n o r e x c l u s i o n of n o n - c o m m e r c i a l energy use, w h i c h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t f o r d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
Primary Energy (EJ) by World and Regions 
2050 2100 
Region 1990 A l A2 B l B2 A l A2 B l B2 
OECD90 151-182 267 266 166 236 397 418 126 274 
(184-315) (207-300) (134-233) (189-236) (181-607) (267-496) (126-274) (197-274) 
REF 69-95 103 93 64 97 139 155 39 125 
(83-267) (57-116) (50-79) (53-117) (70-290) (61-457) (25-80) (40-328) 
IND 227-252 370 359 230 334 536 573 164 399 
(303-532) (264-406) (203-303) (255-339) (275-896) (385-847) (164-345) (237-593) 
ASIA 49-79 440 335 272 319 838 581 154 521 
(293-789) (249-449) (204-537) (284-411) (308-965) (477-753) (154-434) (309-562) 
A L M 35-49 538 278 312 217 852 563 196 437 
(235-634) (166-354) (176-312) (137-254) (391-1109) (437-662) (196-446) (300-538) 
D E V 84-123 977 612 583 536 1639 1144 350 959 
(606-1278) (415-740) (406-837) (421-660) (700-2074) (914-1375) (350-880) (609-1096) 
W O R L D 326-368 1347 971 813 869 2226 1717 514 1357 
(913-1611) (679-1059) (642-1090) (679-966) (1002-2737) (1304-2040) (515-1157) (846-1625) 
direct equivalent method for all non-thermal uses of 
renewables and nuclear. The primary energy equivalence of 
these energy forms is accounted for at the level of secondary 
energy, that is, the first usable energy form or "currency" 
available to the energy system. For instance, the primary 
energy equivalence of electricity generated from solar photo-
voltaics or nuclear power plants is set equal to their respective 
gross electricity output, not to the heat equivalent of radiation 
energy from fissile reaction, the solar radiance that falls onto a 
photo-voltaic panel and is converted into electricity with 
efficiencies that range from 10% to 15%, or the heat that would 
have to be generated by buming fossil fuels to produce the 
same amount of electricity as generated in a photo-voltaic cell 
or a nuclear reactor (as used in the so-called "substitution" 
accounting method). This common^^ SRES accounting 
convention must be bome in mind when comparing the 
primary energy-use figures of this report with those of other 
studies, which invariably use different accounting methods 
depending on the organization that produces the scenario. A n 
illustration of the sensitivity of different accounting methods 
on estimates of primary energy use in long-term energy 
scenarios is given in Nakicenovic et a l . (1998). (See also the 
discussion in Chapter 2, in which scenario comparisons are 
based on index numbers rather than absolute figures to account 
for these definitional differences.) 
Adopting a common accounting convention avoids 
misrepresentation of the contribution of renewable and other new 
energy forms, which can be both under- or over-represented by 
inconsistent accounting conventions, as continues to be the case in 
energy statistics and scenario studies. 
Table 4-14 gives an overview of primary energy use in the four 
SRES marker scenarios and the range of all SRES scenarios. 
Figure 4-11 illustrates both the historical change of world 
primary energy structure over time and future changes as given 
in the SRES scenarios. Each comer of the triangle coiTesponds 
to a hypothetical situation in which all primary energy is 
supplied by a single source - oil and gas at the top, coal at the 
left, and non-fossil sources, renewables (including wood), and 
nuclear at the right. The historical change reflects major 
technology shifts from the traditional use of renewable energy 
flows to the coal and steam age of the 19* century, and 
subsequently to the dominance of oil and internal combustion 
engines in the 20* century. In around 1850 (lower right of 
Figure 4-11), only about 20% of world primary energy was 
provided by coal; the other 80% was provided by traditional 
renewable energies (biomass, hydropower, and animal energy). 
With the rise of industrialization, coal substituted for 
traditional renewable energy forms, and by 1910 (lower left of 
Figure 4-11) around three-quarters of world primary energy 
use relied on coal. The second major transition was the 
replacement of coal by oil and later by gas. By the early 1970s 
(see 1970 point labeled on Figure 4-11), 56% of global primary 
energy use was based on oil and gas. From the early 1970s to 
1990, the global primary energy structure has changed little, 
although efforts to substitute for oil imports have led to an 
increase in the absolute amount of coal used and to the 
introduction of non-fossil altematives in the O E C D countries 
(e.g., nuclear energy in France). Rapid growths in energy 
demand and coal use, particularly in Asia, have outweighed 
structural changes in the OECD countries. 
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Figure 4-11 also gives an overview of the evolution of the 
global energy system between 1990 and 2100 as reflected in 
the SRES scenarios. The four marker scenarios are shown as 
thick lines. In addition, for each scenario family the area 
sparmed by all the SRES scenarios in that family is marked in 
the same color as the trajectory for the respective marker. The 
SRES scenarios cover a wider range of energy structures than 
the previous IS92 scenario series, reflecting advances in 
knowledge on the uncertainty ranges of future fossil resource 
availability and technological change. Scenarios B l , B2, AIT, 
and to some extent A I B follow a trend toward increasing 
shares of zero-carbon options in the long term. A I G more or 
less follows an oil-gas isoshare line that perpetuates the current 
dominance of oil and gas in the global energy balance far into 
the 2V^ century. Scenarios in group A l C indicate a near 
doubling of coal's share in primary energy use. Also of interest 
is the trajectory of the A2 marker scenario, which returns in its 
energy stracture by 2100 (over 50% coal share) to the situation 
that prevailed almost 200 years before (i.e., around 1900). 
However, even with similar fuel shares, the technologies, end-
use fuels, and applications projected in the A2 scenario are 
radically different from those of the past. 
4 . 4 . 8 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
The most significant change in the long-term primary energy 
mix in the A l B - A I M marker scenario is the fast market 
penetration of (new) renewable energy. Its share increases from 
Renewables/Nuclear 
Figure 4-11: Global primary energy structure, shares (%) of oil and gas, coal, and non-fossil (zero-carbon) energy sources -
historical development from 1850 to 1990 and in SRES scenarios. Each comer of the triangle corresponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which all primary energy is supplied by a single source - oil and gas, coal at the left, and non-fossil sources 
(renewables and nuclear) to the right. Constant market shares of these energies are denoted by their respective isoshare lines. 
Historical data from 1850 to 1990 are based on Nakicenovic et a l . (1998). For 1990 to 2100, altemative trajectories show the 
changes in the energy systems structures across SRES scenarios. They are grouped by shaded areas for the scenaiio families 
A l , A2, B l , and B2 with respective markers shown as lines. In addition, the four scenario groups within the A l family (AI , 
A i e , A I G , and AIT) that explore different technological developments in the energy systems are shaded individually. The 
A l C and A I G scenario groups have been merged into one fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group in the SPM (see footnote 1). 
For comparison the IS92 scenario series are also shown, clustering along two trajectories (lS92c,d and IS92a,b,e,f). For model 
results that do not include non-commercial energies, the corresponding estimates from the emulations of the various marker 
scenarios by the M E S S A G E model were added to the original model outputs. 
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a current 3% (excluding traditional non-commercial biomass 
use) to some 66% by 2100. Given the assumption of rapid 
technology progress, the costs of modem renewable energy 
technologies (solar, wind, commercial biomass, etc.) decline 
significantly in the long-term (see Section 4.4.7). Such low 
costs could make solar energy the largest primary energy 
source by 2100. Commercial, "high-tech" biomass also 
increases substantially, and contributes 18% of primary energy 
supply by 2100 globally. In the meantime, the shares of coal 
and oil decrease from 25% and 36% in 1990 to 12% and 15%, 
respectively, by 2050, and decline thereafter either because of 
depletion of conventional oil resources or because of fast 
market penetration of post-fossil technologies (in the case of 
coal). Gas increases its market share initially (from 20% in 
1990 to 33% by 2050) and declines thereafter, but still 
maintains an important market share (24%) by the end of the 
2P ' century. Nuclear is mainly a transient "backstop" 
technology - its share increases from 2% in 1990 to some 10% 
by 2050, and declines to 4% by 2100 because its economics 
increasingly fall behind those of new renewables. Overall, 
consistent with the high-income characteristics of the A l 
scenario family, the share of traditional, non-commercial 
biomass use declines. By 2100 its use has virtually 
disappeared. 
4 . 4 . 8 . 2 . A l S c e n a r i o G r o u p s 
Embedded in the overall storyline of the A l scenario famiiy arc 
the possible widely ranging technological bifurcations, each of 
which spans a "coiridor" of the future evolution of primary 
energy shares (see Figure 4-11). The A l C scenario group spans 
a range of structural change in future energy supply between 
the extremes of the A2 marker scenario and of the previous 
coal-intensive IS92 scenarios (IS92a,b,e,f). Conversely, the 
AIT scenario group spans a range of structural change in 
future energy systems delineated by the A l B and B l marker 
scenarios, respectively. In all of these the global energy system 
completes a structural shift initiated with the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution. This could draw to a close more than 
100 years from now, around 2100, with an energy system that 
predominantly relies on non-fossil energy sources, but 
evidently with a radically different technology portfolio of 
"high-tech" non-fossil energy compared to the "low-tech" non-
fossil energy of 1800. The second major difference is that even 
with somewhat similar primary energy structures, a b s o l u t e 
levels of demand would have increased by a factor 200 - 2000 
EJ by 2100 in the A I T scenario, compared to a mere 10 EJ in 
1800. Compared to all other scenarios, the A I G scenario group 
represents a distinct cluster in which the cuirent dominance of 
oil and gas is peфetuated throughout much of the 2P ' century. 
This scenario cluster is somewhat difñcult to discern in Figure 
4-11, because of the absence of structural change as a result of 
which the scenario cluster in terms of primary energy shaies 
moves horizontally along the top part of the energy triangle. 
The only long-term fuel substitution that takes place is between 
coal and non-fossil altematives. 
4 . 4 . 8 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Major global trends in the A2 (ASF) marker scenario include 
an increase in the coal share (from 29% in 1990, through 30% 
by 2050, to 53% in 2100) and a reduction in the share of 
conventional oil (from 43% in 1990 to 23% by 2050, from 
where it declines asymptotically toward zero at the end of the 
2P ' century). The progressive depletion of oil resources in the 
scenario reflects the prevailing view as to the finiteness of 
conventional oil resources,^* a picture also confirmed by other 
quantifications of the storyline (see discussion below). 
Nonetheless, the decline in oil market share should not be 
interpreted as a physical "running out," but rather as a gradual 
replacement process via price competition with synfuels and 
other altematives as oil prices rise, along with the need to 
access ever more remote and expensive petroleum deposits. 
Once oil becomes increasingly expensive (starting from 2030) 
a substantial proportion of coal is converted into synthetic 
liquid fuels. Nuclear and renewable energy sources gradually 
increase in importance from 1990 to 2100, while the share of 
natural gas remains almost constant. Substantial changes in the 
primary energy mix also occur at the regional level. Coal shifts 
from a currently dominant primai-y energy source only in ASIA 
and becomes the most important fuel in all the SRES regions. 
Natural gas remains the second or the third major fuel. Nuclear 
energy becomes important in OECD90 and ASIA regions, and 
biomass and other renewables in the A L M region. 
4 . 4 . 8 . 4 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The shares of different fuel types in all the A2 scenarios, except 
A2- IMAGE, are close to that of the marker scenario. As in the 
A2 marker, and with the exception of A2- IMAGE, coal 
becomes a major fuel by 2100 (45 to 50% of primary energy) 
in all the scenarios, followed by renewables (19 to 31%) and 
natural gas (9 to 18%). A higher share of renewables (biomass 
plus other) and a lower share of nuclear is the major difference 
between the scenarios (e.g., A2-MESSAGE shows the lowest 
nuclear share in primary energy of 7% in 2100). The A2G-
I M A G E scenaiio has a quite different energy supply structure 
in which natural gas is the most important source, followed by 
renewables and coal, as it was designed to explore the 
implications of larger gas availability in an A2 world. Table 4-
15 presents the primary energy structure of different A2 
scenarios. 
4.4.8.5. B l S c e n a r i o s 
The B l marker scenario in the I M A G E model describes a 
structural transition in energy systems toward increasing shares 
of non-fossil energy. This long-term transition features an 
interim reliance on fossil fuels, in paiticular with natural gas as 
the preferred transitional fuel. Structural changes in energy 
^* Nonetheless, cumulative oil extraction to 2100 equals 2.7 times the 
currently identified reserves of conventional oil in the scenario. 
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Table 4-15: G l o b a l p r i m a r y energy supply s t r u c t u r e (%) i n t h e A2 s c e n a r i o s f o r t h e y e a r 2 1 0 0 . (See a l s o F i g u r e s 4-8 t o 4-10 
f o r c u m u l a t i v e f o s s i l r e s o u r c e use.) 
ASF AIM MiniCAM IMAGE " MESSAGE 
Coal 53 50 50 18 45 
Oil <1 3 3 14 2 
Gas 19 18 9 35 15 
Nuclear 14 11 11 7 
Biomass 9 11 8 6 16 
Other renewables 5 8 18 26 15 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note that columns may not add due to independent rounding. 
" A 2 - I M A G E "Other renewables" category includes nuclear and renewable sources except for biomass. 
supply are comparatively fast because of both the dynamic 
outlook on energy-efficiency improvements and structural 
change and the "dematerialization" of economic activities, 
characteristic of the B l world. With lower energy demand 
than in the other scenarios, technological innovation and 
diffusion initially translate into slower rates of structural 
change in primary energy supply (lower demand growth leads 
to lower investment in capacity expansion and hence fewer 
opportunities for technological learning). However, once 
underway, structural change translates into radical systems 
restructuring in the long term (i.e. post-2050). A persistent 
long-term trend of В1 is also the continuously declining share 
of coal in the global primary energy mix, caused by local and 
regional environmental considerations (airborne emissions, 
social and environmental impacts from large-scale mining 
activities, etc.). Until 2050, the global energy system remains 
fossil-fuel dominated (with an important shift away from coal 
to gas use within fossil fuels). By 2020, fossils still account 
for some 79% of global primary energy (23% coal, and 56% 
oil and gas combined). By 2050, fossils account for 69% 
(20% coal and 49% oil and gas). By 2100, however, the 
transition away from fossil fuels is well underway; they only 
account for some 47% of primary energy use, mostly natural 
gas. The non-fossil share mirrors in its growth the declining 
trajectory of fossil fuels. Generally, even this scenario of 
significant structural change illustrates the long lead times 
needed for an "orderly" transition away from the current 
dominance of fossil fuels. Energy efficiency and 
"dematerialization" of the economy are integral parts of this 
transition in the B l scenario. 
A distinguishing feature of the I M A G E model used to develop 
the B l marker scenario is the generic treatment of non-fossil 
fuel alternatives, which recognizes that the technology 
portfolio is particularly diverse and that numerous 
combinations are possible because of regional resource 
endowments, economics, technology policies, etc. A second 
important characteristic of the I M A G E modeling approach is 
the link between energy sector investments with future 
improvements in the form of a learning-curve approach. The 
model structure and methodology is described in more detail in 
Alcamo et a l . (1998) and de Vries et a l . (1994, 1999, 2000), 
(see also Appendix IV). 
4.4.8.6. H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B l S c e n a r i o s 
Other models have (in most instances-^ ^ with harmonized input 
assumptions) examined the uncertainties associated with the 
structural shift patterns described by the B l scenario family. 
Whereas long-term trends all point in similar directions, 
considerable scenario variability remains, a function of 
differences in energy demand, resource availability, and 
technology assumpfions (Table 4-16 and see Sections 4.4.6 and 
4.4.7). Relatively robust pattems across all B l scenarios 
include the continued importance of oil until about 2050 (15 to 
28%) and a subsequent decline thereafter. Three scenarios ( B l -
ASF, ВI-AIM, and В1-MESS AGE) indicate a more rapid 
decline to less than 10% market share by 2100, and three 
scenarios (the B l - I M A G E marker, B l - M A R I A , and B l -
Min iCAM) depict higher oil shares between 16% and 20% by 
2100, largely as a function of higher oil resource availability 
assumptions (see Section 4.4.6). For gas, all scenarios suggest 
a relatively robust market share range of between 21% and 
39% by 2050 and between 17% and 39% by 2100. Coal, 
biomass, and other non-fossil sources are largely substitutes for 
each other, depending on the specific cost assumptions used m 
the models. Whenever nuclear, renewable, and biomass costs 
are low, the share of coal declines (e.g., B l - A I M , B l - M A R I A , 
B l - M E S S A G E ) and that of other sources increases, the degree 
of interfuel substitution being scenario (i.e. model) specific. 
Drastic shifts, however, are not anticipated before 2050. In 
most scenarios (except B l - M A R I A and B l - M E S S A G E ) coal's 
share is around 20% by 2050, and declines to below 10% by 
2100 as biomass and other non-fossil sources gain respective 
market shares. Their diffusion is described more conservatively 
in the B l - A S F scenario, in which coal maintains a market 
share of about 22% until 2100. 
Except B l - M A R I A and B l H i g h - M i n i C A M . 
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4.4.8.7. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
The B2 (MESSAGE) marker scenario first follows a trend 
toward increasing shares of gas, followed by renewables, and 
finally - as oil and gas start to become scarce - increasingly 
returns to coal. By 2100, the B2 scenario ends up somewhere 
in the middle of the triangle in Figure 4-11 (i.e., it relies on a 
broad, diversified mixture of different primaiy energy sources). 
This global diversification results from heterogeneous trends at 
the regional level and is largely a function of the more modest 
assumpfions concerning technology improvements and oil and 
gas resource availability (compared to other scenario families, 
in particular A l and B l ) that are characteristic of the B2 
scenario family. By 2100, the main primary energy carriers are 
biomass (23%), coal (22%), oil and gas (29%), and other 
renewables and nuclear (26%). Countries with low income and 
high resource availability continue to rely on fossil fuels up to 
the end of the 2P* century, such as China (mainly coal), Fonner 
Soviet Union (mainly gas), and Middle East (first oil and later 
gas). Regions with low resource availability, such as Africa and 
South America, rely on renewables and nuclear. The decreasing 
share of coal and oil in the primary energy structure of OECD 
countries is substituted by the growing share of renewables, 
gas, and nuclear. A major characteristic of the B2 scenario is 
the increasing importance of synthetic liquid fuels in the 
second half of the 2P ' century, because of a continuous phase 
out of conventional oil in all regions. 
4 . 4 . 8 . 8 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Altemative B2 scenarios show a great diversity in changes in 
energy systems structures compared to the B2 marker. 
Common to all scenarios is their gradual transition away from 
conventional oil and gas, which are assumed to be 
comparatively scarce in the B2 scenario storyline. However 
alternative scenarios depict very different trends for this 
structural change, ranging from increased reliance on coal and 
coal-derived synfuels (B2-ASF, B2High-MiniCAM) to more 
biomass- and nuclear-intensive scenarios (B2-AIM, B2-
M A R I A , and B2- IMAGE) . Generally, this reflects the 
considerable uncertainty as to direction and pace of 
technological change in the technologically more fragmented 
worid described in the B2 scenario storyline. B 2 - M i n i C A M 
anticipates a strong reliance on oil and natural gas as 
transitional fuels, with a share in primary energy of about 50% 
over the next 100 years to 2100 (i.e., gas shares in B2-
M i n i C A M are as high as in the A I G scenario group). In tum, 
B2-ASF suggests an increasing reliance on coal and coal-
derived synfuels. A third group of scenarios tends to follow 
similar directions of structural change as those of the B2-
marker - a gradual introduction of post-fossil alternatives (with 
different weights for nuclear and renewables as a function of 
technological progress), along with gas (or in some scenarios 
coal-derived synfuels) as transitional technology options. 
Structural changes in energy systems of the various B2 
scenarios largely follow the main directions of the marker 
scenario developed with a particular model. That is, differences 
in alternative B2 scenarios appear to relate strongly to 
differences in model parametrizations derived from the 
respective marker scenario rans, most notably in the domains 
of resource availability and technology (see Sections 4.4.6 and 
4.4.7). Thus, B2-ASF depicts structural changes in energy 
technologies and systems akin to the trends of the A2 marker 
scenario, whereas B2-AIM and B2-IMAGE largely follow the 
pattems of change of their marker scenarios ( A l and B l , 
respectively). Altemative pattems of change are illustrated by 
the B 2 - M i n i C A M and B2-MARIA scenarios, which have also 
explored scenario sensitivities by developing altemative B2 
scenario quantifications (B2C-MARIA, B2High-MiniCAM) 
that show a higher reliance on coal (and hence higher G H G 
emissions). 
4 . 4 . 9 . Land-Use Changes 
The main driving forces for land-use changes are related to 
increasing demands for food because of a growing population 
and changing diets. In addition, numerous other social, 
economic, and institutional factors govern land-use changes, 
such as deforestation, expansion of cropland areas, or their re-
conversion back to forest cover (see Chapter 3). Global food 
production can be increased, either thi-ough intensification 
(e.g., using multi-cropping, raising cropping intensity, 
applying fertilizers, new seeds, improved farming technology) 
or through land expansion (e.g., cultivating land, converting 
forests). Especially in less developed countries, many 
examples show the potentials for intensification of food 
production in a more or less ecological way that may not lead 
to higher G H G emissions (e.g., multi-cropping; agro-forestry). 
Different assumptions on these processes translate into 
altemative scenarios of future land-use changes and G H G 
emissions, most notably C O ^ , methane (CH^), and nitrous 
oxide (N2O). A distinguishing characteristic of several models 
(e.g., A I M , I M A G E , M A R I A , and Min iCAM) used in SRES is 
the explicit modeling of land-use changes from expanding 
biomass uses, and hence exploration of possible land-use 
conflicts between the energy and agricultural sectors. The 
con"e.sponding scenarios of land-use changes are summarized 
in Table 4-17 and Figure 4-12 for the four SRES marker 
scenarios and all SRES scenarios. The distinction in scenario 
groups is related to the energy system and is thus not relevant 
in this section. 
As discussed further in Chapter 5, model treatment of land-use 
change and base-year parameterization differ substantially. 
Therefore, comparisons between different models can yield 
substantial differences. Land-use change assumptions for each 
of the marker scenarios are described below. More detailed 
inter-model comparisons of land-use change and emissions 
models, as well as a deeper analysis of potentials and rates of 
change of main driving force variables, such as agricultural 
productivity growth and dietary changes, remain an important 
area for future research. 
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Figure 4-12: Global land-use patterns, shares (%) of croplands and energy biomass, forests, and other categories including 
grasslands - historical development from 1970 to 1990 (based on B l - I M A G E ) and in SRES scenarios. As for the energy 
triangle in Figure 6-3, each comer corresponds to a hypothetical situation in which land use is dedicated to a much greater 
extent than today to one category - 60% to cropland and energy biomass at the top, 80% to forests to the left, and 80% to 
other categories (including grasslands) to the right. Constant shares in total land area of cropland and energy biomass, forests, 
and other categories are denoted by their respective isoshare lines. For 1990 to 2100, altemative trajectories are shown for the 
SRES scenarios. The three marker scenarios A l B , B l , and B2 are shown as thick colored lines, and other SRES scenarios as 
thin colored lines. The ASF model used to develop the A2 marker scenario projects only land-use change related G H G 
emissions. Comparable data on land cover changes are therefore not available.The trajectories appear to be largely model 
specific and illustrate the different views and inteфretations of future land-use pattems across the scenarios (e.g. the scenario 
trajectories on the right that illustrate larger increases in grasslands and decreases in cropland are M i n i C A M results). 
4 . 4 . 9 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
In the A I M model, land-use changes at the beginning of the 2P ' 
century follow largely historical trends. Over longer time 
horizons, the assumption is that land-use changes are driven 
primarily by economic forces, consistent with the A l scenario 
storyline. Expected land rents and agricultural prices determine 
long-run land-use changes, based on an equilibrium approach 
of intemational agricultural markets. The A I M land-use model 
IS linked to the A I M energy module via biomass energy 
demand. In the A l scenario, the rapid increase in the demand 
for biomass energy raises the expected rent of biomass 
farmland. Reduction in forest area occurs until 2020 because of 
population growth and rapid increases of meat demand in the 
developing countries. Rising meat demands also result in a 
substantial expansion of grasslands and pasture. However, high 
incomes in scenario A l also increase the demand for 
environmental amenities. Hence, "demand" for forests also 
increases with economic growth, and the expected rent of 
forestiand is assumed to increase after 2020. These rising rents 
reduce the rate of deforestation and increase the area of 
managed tree-covered land in the latter half of the 2P ' century. 
Rising food productivity also counterbalances the pressure on 
cropland and pastureland in the latter half of the 2P ' century. 
For instance, crop productivity is assumed to grow on average 
by about 1.5% per year in the A l scenario family.^^ However, 
despite these counterbalances the demand for pastureland 
continues to increase throughout the 2P ' century because of the 
high income growth and associated changes in diets. The 
resultant land-use changes for the A l marker scenario between 
1990 and 2100 are: 
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• Largely stationary trend of global cropland areas (-39 
million ha between 1990 and 2100, i.e., 3% of 1990 
cropland areas). 
• Decline in global forest cover by some 92 million ha. 
• Increase of grasslands and biomass land-use of 188 and 
552 million ha, respectively. 
Land-use change patterns are more dynamic in the 
intermediate time periods, and also display a wide variation 
across different regions. 
4 . 4 . 9 . 2 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A l S c e n a r i o s 
By and large, land-use changes in other A l scenarios show a 
very wide range, being mostly model specific. As a rule, the A l 
land-use change scenarios take an intermediate position 
between the more extreme tendencies described by the 
respective storylines of the A2 and В1 scenario families (see 
Figure 4-12), which both result in large land-use changes 
(albeit of an entirely different qualitative nature). 
Corresponding scenario (model) differences are thus discussed 
below for these two scenario families where they are largest. 
4 . 4 . 9 . 3 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
The A S F model used to produce the A2 marker scenario does 
not generate estimates of the area covered by different 
ecosystem types (e.g., forests, grasslands, etc.). However, the 
A S F deforestation module estimates the area of different 
tropical-forest types cleared annually for agricultural and other 
puфoses (Lashof and Tiipak, 1990). This information is 
subsequently used to estimate G H G emissions from 
deforestation. The A2-ASF scenario also includes estimates of 
natural carbon sinks and additional sinks attributable to re­
forestation and afforestation activities. These estimates are 
based on an extensive survey of available literature (Pepper et. 
a l . , 1998). 
By and large the land-use changes in the A2 marker scenario 
reflect conventional wisdom - in a high-population and low-
income world, natural land cover becomes progressively 
depleted, which is only partially counterbalanced by re- and 
afforestation activities. The size of the natural terrestrial carbon 
For comparison, the corresponding productivity growth rates in the 
other scenarios range from 1 % per year (B2-AIM) to 2% per year (B1 -
AIM) , consistent with their respective storylines. This emphasizes 
productivity and efficiency (Bl) and more fragmented technology and 
productivity growth (B2). For A 2 - A I M , crop productivity growth rates 
range between 1% and 1.5 % per year in the D E V and IND regions, 
respectively; the difference is explained by only slowly closing 
productivity gaps (approximated by GDP/capita), characteristic of this 
scenario storyline. Similar differences also characterize other salient 
scenario assumptions of importance to land-use changes (like biomass 
yields, animal productivity, or the distribution of grain- versus range-
fed cattle). For instance, feed and protein yields from pasture land are 
assumed to grow at 1.5 % per year and biomass yields at 0.5 % per 
year in the A l scenario. 
sink (including forests, grasslands, wetlands, and other 
ecosystem types) in 1990 is estimated in ASF-A2 to amount to 
1.8 GtC (1800 IVItC). By 2050 this sink reduces to 0.8 GtC and 
by the end of the 2P ' century terrestrial ecosystems become a 
net source of carbon. On the other side of the natural carbon 
balance is carbon sequestered by re- and afforestation. In A2-
A S F the respective (negative) carbon fluxes are estimated to 
increase from 0.003 GtC in 1990, to 0.171 GtC by 2050, and 
0.205 GtC by 2100. 
4 . 4 . 9 . 4 . H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Out of the five A2 non-marker scenarios, A 2 - A I M and A2-
M i n i C A M (and A2-A1-MINICAM) include explicit land-use 
patterns. Table 4-18 illustrates that the major difference 
between these quantifications is a higher energy biomass area 
assumption in A 2 - A I M . Among other differences is a higher 
percentage of cropland and grasslands in A 2 - M i n i C A M and of 
forestiand in A 2 - A I M . 
4.4.9.5. B l S c e n a r i o s 
The most important indicators and assumptions made in the 
I M A G E land-use model relate to agricultural yields and diets 
that influence meat production, cattle population, and, in tum, 
grasslands land cover. Cereal yields (to 2100) for REF, ASIA, 
A L M , and the world average are assumed to increase by about 
a factor of four, while cereal yields for OECD90 start from a 
higher initial value and increase by only a factor of two. The 
total cattle population in the I M A G E model includes dairy and 
non-dairy cattle. Dairy cattle populations change as a result of 
milk production per animal and the demand for milk. Non-
dairy cattle populations change as a result of meat demand, 
slaughter weight, and off-take rate. The number of slaughtered 
animals (beef) increases in the period 1995 to 2060, the net 
result of increasing animal productivity and increasing human 
consumption of meat. The total number of cattie (dairy and 
beef) shows a decreasing trend beyond the year 2000, with the 
near-term increase in beef cattle more than offset by a decrease 
in the number of dairy cattle. The forest area reflects the result 
of increasing agricultural production and increasing 
productivity. The major increase in demand for food in the 
initial period 1995 to 2030 is nearly compensated by increasing 
productivity, with a resultant slow decline in forest area, while 
beyond 2030 forest areas start expand over abandoned 
agricultural land. Overall, the net balance of land-use changes 
in scenario B l between 1990 and 2100 suggests a considerable 
"greening" of the planet - a net increase in forest cover by 
some 1260 million ha, a decrease in cropland of 390 million 
ha, and an increase of about 200 million ha devoted to biomass 
production. Grasslands decline by 1540 million ha, partly 
because of the afforested areas mentioned above, but also 
because they are converted to other land uses. Thus, while the 
В1 scenario family is characterized by "high" rates of land-use 
changes, the quality of these changes ("greening") is entirely 
different compared to those of other scenario families (e.g. 
A2). 
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T a b l e 4 - 1 8 : G l o b a l l a n d use p a t t e r n s (% g l o b a l l a n d c o v e r ) i n A 2 - A 1 M a n d A 2 - M i n i C A M s c e n a r i o s . The c o l u m n s may n o t 
t o t a l t o 1 0 0 % because of i n d e p e n d e n t r o u n d i n g e r r o r s . 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Land Use Type AIM MiniCAM AIM MiniCAM AIM MiniCAM AIM MiniCAM 
Cropland 11 11 12 12 13 13 15 12 
Grasslands 26 24 27 29 28 34 29 34 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 3 
Forest 33 32 33 30 33 26 33 27 
Other 29 33 28 29 24 26 22 24 
4.4.9.6. B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Since the M E S S A G E model does not include a land-use-
change module, an external scenario for land-use change 
consistent with the underlying socio-economic assumptions of 
the B2 scenario was adopted. This scenario was developed by 
the A I M model in an iterative process between the two 
respective modeling teams to ensure consistency and 
harmonization in assumptions of driving-force variables (see 
A I M land-use model description above). In B2, population 
growth adds pressure on cropland expansion. Changing diets 
(higher meat demand) with rising incomes cause an expansion 
of pastureland. Land productivity increases were assumed to be 
more modest (e.g. compared to the A l scenarios), consistent 
with the more cautious expectations of the B2 scenario 
storyline and the intermediate values adopted for productivity 
increases of energy use. As a result, land-use changes are 
substantial. Stabilization of population growth combined with 
continued gradual increases in agricultural productivity 
relieves some of the land-use-change pressure, particularly for 
forests. As a result, post-2050 forest cover expands through 
reforestation and afforestation activities, consistent with the 
local environmental orientation of the B2 scenario storyline. 
Emission patterns related to land-use change closely follow 
these trends in land-cover changes. By 2100, global forest 
cover in B2 shows a net increase of 230 million ha, croplands 
by 330 million ha, and grasslands and biomass plantations by 
300 million ha each. This "greening" of long-term land-use 
patterns is at the expense of "other" land uses, and primarily 
involve reclamation of degraded lands, consistent with the 
emphasis on improving local and regional environmental 
quality and food and energy security outlined in the B2 
scenario storyline. 
4.4.9.7. H a r m o n i z e d a n d O t h e r B2 S c e n a r i o s 
Compared to the B2 marker scenario, alternative scenarios 
project a very wide range of possible future pattems of land-
use change. In fact, the range of resultant emissions for the B2 
scenarios is as large as the entire range spanned by the four 
SRES marker scenarios altogether. Similarly, as observed 
above for structural changes in energy systems, different B2 
scenarios are rather model specific and follow the general 
trends indicated by the respective marker scenario developed 
with a particular model. Overall, land-use related emissions 
decline, reflecting changes in driving forces such as increases 
in agricultural productivity. B2-MARIA and, of course, B2-
A I M are structurally similar to the B2 marker - declining 
deforestation and long-term shifts to maintain (B2-MARIA) or 
increase forest cover (B2-AIM) - whereas B 2 - M i n i C A M 
projects a stabilization of deforestation only after 2050. 
Generally, B 2 - M i n i C A M shows a substantial decrease in 
cropland area and an increase of grassland area. 
4 . 4 . 1 0 . E n v i r o n m e n t a l Policies 
The SRES scenarios quantified emissions of COj, CH^, NjO, 
NOj,, carbon monoxide, VOCs, SO^ ,^ chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), hydrofluorochlorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. A detailed 
discussion of the trajectories and the most relevant driving 
forces is presented in Chapter 5. In all cases herein, future 
emissions of these gases are affected by environmental policies 
not related to climate-change concems, as in the SRES Terms 
of Reference (see Appendix I). Efforts to protect the ozone 
layer will result in a significant decline in CFCs and some of 
their substitutes. Urban air quality concerns will have a 
significant influence on future emissions of indirect GHGs and 
of sulfate aerosols. As discussed in Chapter 3, for sulfur 
emissions the SRES scenarios reflect the evaluation of the IS92 
scenario series (Alcamo et a l . , 1995), the recent sulfur scenario 
literature (for a review see Grübler, 1998b), and sulfur control 
policies in the OECD countries and the beginning of similar 
developments in many developing countries (see Chapter 3). 
Thus, a range of environmental measures is assumed in all four 
SRES scenario families, although the magnitude and timing 
differ as a function of the four different scenario storylines. 
4 . 4 . 1 0 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o s 
I n the A l scenario family, environmental policies are 
implemented as incomes rise and societies choose to protect 
environmental amenities. This first of all would concern water 
and air quality (health concems), but also traffic congestion 
and noise, as well as land-use policies (preservation of 
recreational spaces). Economic instruments are assumed to be 
the preferred policy instrument in an A1 world. In some of the 
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more "technology intensive" A l scenario groups, cleaner 
energy systems and lower G H G emissions are achieved as a 
by-product of high economic growth coupled with rapid 
technological change. 
4 . 4 . 1 0 . 2 . A2 S c e n a r i o s 
Environmental concems in their own right are perhaps the least 
important in the A2 world and they are mostly local in nature. 
For instance, no environmentally related barriers to nuclear 
energy development or environmental costs of fossil energy 
use are assumed. However, A2 scenarios include indirect 
control options for several GHGs that adversely effect local air 
quality. They also require vigorous environmental controls on 
pollutants that affect the availability of water, quality of soils, 
and productivity of agricultural crops to ensure food security is 
not jeopardized in a 15 billion person world. Hence, in terms of 
a number of traditional pollutants, A2 is far from an 
environmental "worst case" scenario, even if it generally has 
the highest G H G emissions. 
4 . 4 . 1 0 . 3 . B l S c e n a r i o s 
The B l scenario family assumes the most comprehensive 
environmental measures (see Section 4.3). Sulfur and nitrogen 
oxide emissions decline with vigorous efficiency 
improvements and "dematerialization" of the economy. 
Economic structural change (towai-d services) and cleaner 
energy systems (electricity, gas, district heat) to improve urban 
air quality also result in lower emissions levels compared to 
other scenarios. Finally, additional "add-on" technologies, 
such as flue-gas desulfurization and de-nitrification 
equipment, catalytic converters, etc., bridge the transition gap 
before inherentiy clean energy systems (e.g. IGCC based on 
coal or biomass, hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles) come 
into use on a global scale. Environmental consciousness would 
also lead less-developed regions to take such measures earlier 
and at lower income levels than occurred in the history of 
presentiy industrialized regions (as indeed already actually 
occurs; see Chapter 5) . 
4 . 4 . 1 0 . 4 . B2 S c e n a r i o s 
In B2 scenarios, environmental concems are prominent, but in 
contrast to the ВI world it is assumed that measures are 
implemented effectively only at local and regional scales. For 
instance, it is assumed that sulfur emissions would be 
progressively controlled and other local and regional problems 
conceming, for example, air quality, human health, and food 
supply would also be the focus of policies. 
4.5. Regional Scenario Patterns 
The scenarios imply different regional patterns of socio­
economic driving forces and resultant emissions. These are 
summarized in Table 4-19. 
Following the définition of the four world regions adopted in 
this report, the industrial region (IND) corresponds to the 
SRES regions OECD90 and REF, and the developing region 
(DEV) corresponds to the SRES regions ASIA and A L M . In 
1990, the base year of the SRES scenarios, driving-force 
variables as well as emissions are distributed unevenly. 
According to the statistics reported in Nakicenovic et a l . 
(1998), D E V countries account for 76% of global population. 
However, they only account for 16% to 36% of global 
economic activity (considering GDP at market exchange rates 
and purchasing power parities, respectively), 34% of primary 
energy use, and 42% of global CO2 emissions (including all 
sources, from energy plus land-use changes). 
Over time, the regional distribution of socio-economic activities 
and emission shifts in the scenarios, albeit because of different 
driving forces. These shifts range from rapid population growth 
(scenario family A2) and rapid economic development and 
catch-up (scenaiio family A l ) in developing countries, to rapid 
"dematerialization" of economic activities in industrial 
countries (scenario family B l ) . Generally, scenario family B2 
depicts the most gradual changes, and hence also the slowest 
rates of change in the global distribution of activities and 
emissions. Of all the SRES scenarios, A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M 
exhibits the slowest dynamics of development catch-up. 
Table 4-19 summarizes the main scenario indicators 
differentiated between industrial and developing countries. 
Two measures are given (following La Rovere, 1998): 
• Date when activities and/or emissions in developing 
countries reach those that prevailed in industrial 
countries in 1990. 
• Date when developing country values equalize those of 
industrial countries. 
In this comparison, developing countries in 1990 already 
accounted for 76% of world population and, because of the 
inevitable demographic momentum, their share is likely to 
increase further over the next few decades before altemative 
demographic projections branch out into different regional 
distributions. However, the basic pattern of dominance of 
developing countries in global population remains unchanged 
across all demographic projections. The share of developing 
countries in global population ranges between 80% ( A l , B l ) 
and 86% (A2, B2) by 2100 for demographic projections 
between 7 and 15 billion people. From the distribution of 
global population, the scenarios indicate an increasing 
importance of developing countries in the future, albeit at 
different rates. 
In consequence, as shown in Table 4-19, total GDP expressed 
at purchasing power parities in developing countries could 
reach 1990 levels in industrial regions between 2000 and 2010 
and equalize future industrial country levels between 2010 and 
2030. For GDP expressed at market exchange rates, the 1990 
"parity date" is reached between 2015 and 2030 and 
equalization in absolute terms even later, between 2030 and 
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T a b l e 4 - 1 9 : D a t e ( r o u n d e d t o nearest 5 y e a r s ) w i i e n D E V c o u n t r i e s r e a c h 1 9 9 0 l e v e l s of IND c o u n t r i e s (top p a n e l ) , a n d d a t e 
when they r e a c h p a r i t y ( a n d o v e r t a k e ) p r o j e c t e d IND c o u n t r y l e v e l s ( b o t t o m p a n e l ) . D a t e s a r e g i v e n f o r t h e f o u r SRES m a r k e r 
s c e n a r i o s . 
Reaching 1990 IND levels A2 B2 A l B B l 
GDP (тех) -2030 -2020 -2015 -2020 
GDP (PPP) (IIASA runs) -2010 - 2005 -2000 -2000 
GDP (тех) per capita >2100 - 2080 -2050 -2060 
Primary energy -2010 -2010 -2005 -2005 
Primary energy per capita - - -2070 -
Annual COj - 2000 >2000 -2000 -2005 
Cumulative CO^ since 1800 -2020 -2030 -2015 -2020 
C O T per capita - - - -
Overtaking IND A2 B2 A l B B l 
GDP (тех) -2060 -2035 -2030 -2035 
GDP (ppp) (IIASA runs) - 2030 - 2020 -2015 -2010 
GDP (тех) per capita - - - — 
Primary energy -2015 -2020 -2010 -2005 
Primary energy per capita - - >2100 _ 
Annual CO2 -2000 -2005 -2000 -2005 
Cumulative CO^ since 1800 -2050 -2110 -2040 -2050 
CO2 per capita - - - -
т е х . marlcet exchange rate; ppp, purchasing power parities. 
- Denotes that no date can be given within the time horizon of the S R E S scenarios (to 2100) or short-term trend extrapolations after that date. 
2060. Total primary energy use in developing countries could 
reach 1990 industrial levels between 2005 and 2010, and parity 
in absolute terms between 2005 and 2020. Possible spatial 
distributions of economic activities based on satellite night 
imagery data that coiTelate highly with, for example, GDP and 
electricity use are discussed in Box 4-10. 
Conversely, scenario per capita indicators converge only 
slowly, sometimes well after 2100. Per capita GDP (expressed 
at market exchange rates) of developing countries reaches the 
1990 level of industrial countries at the earliest around 2050 
(scenario family A l ) and well after 2100 in scenario family A2. 
None of the four marker scenarios projects a situation in which 
per capita income in developing countries surpasses future 
levels of per capita incomes of Annex I countries. Energy use 
per capita shows a similar pattern. Only scenario family A l 
depicts a development in which per capita energy use in 
developing countries could approach that prevailing in 
industrial countries in 1990 (by 2070) and in which it could 
reach parity with industrial countries in the very long-term 
(after 2100). In all other scenarios energy use per capita 
remains below 1990 or future per capita energy use levels of 
industrial countries. By and large, these scenario features 
reflect the very large differences in present per capita levels of 
economic activity and energy use, which require many 
decades, even a century, to narrow. The scenarios thus portray 
a feature Jmown as '"slow conditional convergence only" in the 
development literature (see, e.g.. Shin, 1996). 
Conceming G H G emissions, discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5, trends reflect the evolution of scenario-driving 
forces discussed above. CO2 emissions of developing countries 
reach levels in industrial countries around or shortiy after the 
year 2000. This reflects the continued growth in energy use 
(and emissions), slow recovery of economies in transition (and 
thus modest growth in aggregate emission from industrial 
countries), and a continuation of current trends in land-use 
changes (deforestation); these only diverge in the medium- to 
long-tenn across the SRES scenarios. 
Yet, even with equalizing total emission levels, regional 
differences in cumulative and per capita emissions remain 
pronounced. Based on the estimates of cumulative CO^ (all 
sources) emissions since 1800 given in Grübler and 
Nakicenovic (1994), developing countries reach 1990 levels of 
industrial countries only between 2015 and 2030. They reach 
parity (historical data from 1800 to 1990, and scenario values 
from 1990 onward) at earliest by 2040 (scenario family A l ) , 
and between 2050 (A2 and B l ) and post-2100 (scenario family 
B2) in the other scenarios. None of the SRES scenarios reaches 
the 1990 per capita CO2 emissions levels of industrial countries 
in the developing countries. 
In scenarios with vigorous climate policies (not in the SRES 
terms of reference) per capita emissions levels in industrial 
countries may approach levels as projected for developing 
countries. However, no scenario without climate policies could 
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be found in the literature in which per capita emissions in 
industrialized and developing countries reached similar levels. 
Thus the absence of such convergence in the SRES scenarios 
reflects the current literature, and resuhs from the nature of the 
SRES scenarios as "no climate policy" scenarios. 
SRES scenarios do follow the recommendation to explore 
possible pathways of closing the income gap between the 
industrial and now developing regions (Alcamo et a ! . , 1995). 
For reasons of plausibility and foundation in the reviewed no-
climate-policy literature, the SRES scenarios do not achieve 
full income convergence in the scenario period analyzed. 
However, income levels in developing countries do reach the 
1990 levels of the industrial countries in the second half of the 
next century in three out of four scenario families. 
4.6. A Roadmap to the SRES Scenarios 
In the preceding sections the characteristics of the SRES 
scenarios are summaiized in terms of scenario driving forces 
such as population, economic development, resources, 
technology, land-use changes, and other factors. The scenarios 
were designed in such a way as to deliberately span a wide 
range, reflecting uncertainties of the future, but not cover the 
very extremes from the scenario literature conceming driving 
forces. A distinguishing feature of the SRES scenarios is that 
various driving-force variables are not combined numerically 
(or arbitrarily), but instead try to reflect current understanding 
of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between important scenario driving 
forces. For instance, according to the literature review of 
Chapter 3 it would be rather inconsistent to develop scenarios 
of rapid technological change in a macro-economic and social 
context of low labor productivity and stagnant income per 
capita. Scenario s t o r y l i n e s were the method developed within 
SRES to help guide the scenario quantifications and to assure 
scenario consistency in terms of the main relationships 
between scenario driving forces. 
The different quantifications discussed in the previous sections 
demonstrate that even if scenarios share important main input 
assumptions in terms of population and GDP growth. 
Box 4-10: Spatial Distributions of Economic Activities Based on Nighttime Satellite Imagery Data. 
Spatially explicit data on socio-economic activity is sparse. The reason aiises mainly in that Systems of National Accounts and 
similar socio-economic statistics are available only at high levels of spatial aggregations defined by administrative boundaries 
(countries, provinces, or regions). As a result, gridded emission inventories largely rely on estimations of current population 
density distributions (e.g. Olivier et a l . , 1996) and modeling approaches to date have also relied exclusively on rescaling/wíMre 
socio-economic activities (economic output, energy use, etc.) based on current or future population density distribution pattems 
(see e.g., S0rensen and Meibom, 1998; S0rensen et a l . , 1999). Population density is, however, not necessarily a good indicator 
for spatial pattems of socio-economic activities (Sutton et a i , 1997). At higher levels of spatial aggregation, it is estimated that 
about two billion people remain outside the formal economy, most of them in rural areas of developing countries (UNDP, 1997). 
At lower levels of spatial aggregations, locations such as airports, industrial zones, and commercial centers have low resident 
population densities, but high levels of economic activity. Also, with increasing urbanization future population distribution will 
be markedly different from present ones (HABITAT, 1996). 
Night satelUte hnagery from the US Air Force Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Lmescan System 
(OLS) offers an interesting altemative based on direct observations. Early nighttune lights data were analyzed from analog film 
strips (Croft, 1978, 1979; Foster, 1983; Sullivan, 1989). Digital DMSP-OLS data have recentiy become available with global 
coverage (Elvidge e t a l . , 1997a, 1997b, 1999). Nocturnal lighting can be regarded as one of the defining features of concentrated 
human activity, such as flaring of nahiral gas m ou fields (Croft, 1973), fishing fleets, or urban settiements (Tobler, 1969; Lo 
and Welch, 1977; Foster, 1983; Gallo et a l . , 1995; Elvidge et a l , 1997c). Consequentiy, extent and brightness of nocturnal 
lighting correlate highly with mdicators of city size and socio-economic activities such as GDP, and energy and electricity use 
(Welch, 1980; Gallo et a i ; 1995; Elvidge et a l . , 1997a). 
Figure 4-13 (bottom panel) shows a 1995/1996 night-luminosity map of the world developed by National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administi-ation's National Geophysical Data Center. The map was derived from composites of cloud-free visible 
band observations made by the DMSP-OLS (see Elvidge et a l . , 1997b; Imhoff et a l . , 1997). The DMSP-OLS is an oscillating 
scan radiometer that generates images with a swath width of 3000 km. The DMSP-OLS is uiüque in its capability to perform 
low-light imaging of the entire earth on a nighfly basis. With 14 orbits per day, the polar orbiting DMSP-OLS is able to generate 
global daytime and nighttime coverage of the Earth every 24 hours. The "visible" bandpass straddles the visible and near-
infrared (VNIR) portion of the spectram. The thermal infrared channel has a bandpass that covers lO^i^ jj^ g spectrum. 
SateUite altitude is stabilized using four gyroscopes (three-axis stabilization), a starmapper, Earth limb sensor, and a solar 
detector. Image time series analysis is used to distinguish lights produced by cities, towns, and industrial facifities from sensor 
noise and ephemeral lights that arise from frres and lightning. The time series approach is required to ensure that each land area 
is covered with sufficient cloud-free observations to determine the presence or absence of VNIR emission sources. 
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Dietz et a l . (2000) performed illustrative simulations of possible future light pattems. Considering the high correlation between 
observed radiance-calibrated night satelhte imagery data and economic activity variables like GDP, these simulations mdicate 
future spatial pattems of economic activity. As a basis of the simulation, Dietz et a l . (2000) rescaled present night luminosity 
pattems using global and regional GDP growth pattems of the preliminary A I B marker scenario reported in the SRES open-
process web site combined with a simple stochastic model of spatial evolution and interaction. A n illustrative simulation for the 
year 2070 is given in Figure 4-13 (top panel). The resultant changes in spatial light pattems indicate socio-economic activities 
and provide useful information for infrastmcmre planning, such as expansion of gas and electricity networks. When combined 
with topographical information, like latitude, the data can also be used as mput to climate impact and vulnerability assessments 
(e.g., extent of socio-economic activities that may be affected by sea-level rise). 
T 1 ^ — - I r 1 r 
Figure 4-13: Radiance calibrated lights obtained from night satellite imagery. Simation in 1995/1996 (bottom panel) and 
illustrative simulation for the SRES A l scenario's implied GDP growth for 2070 (top panel). Color codes refer to radiance 
units (DN), where radiance = DN3/2 x IQ-io W/cm^ per sr/|am (Watts per square centimeter per steradian per micrometer, the 
brightness units to which the US A i r Force Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Linescan System 
(OLS) is calibrated; it normalizes for the bandpass (|Д.т) and solid angle of the optics (cm^/sr)). 
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considerable uncertainty and scenario variability remains. For 
instance, features of technological and land-use changes can be 
interpreted quite differently within the framework of different 
models, even if they conform to the overall conceptual 
description and "scenario logic" described in a particular 
scenario family. In some instances the broad outlines of 
scenario driving forces were not followed entirely in particular 
scenario quantifications, but alternative scenario 
interpretations were submitted. These highlight important 
scenario uncertainties or express scientific disagreements 
within the writing team, as for future labor productivity growth 
and economic "catch-up" possibilities of currently developing 
countries. These alternative scenario interpretations and 
different model quantifications are presented here to reflect the 
SRES Terms of Reference for an open process and the use of 
multiple modeling approaches, even if this necessarily 
increases complexity and reduces simplicity and transparency 
in discussion of a large number of scenario quantifications. 
To guide readers through the different driving-force 
assumptions that characterize the various scenarios. Tables 4-2 
and 4-3 give an overview of the SRES scenario set. They 
classify scenarios that share important input assumptions 
(hannonized scenarios share global population and GDP 
assumptions) from scenarios that offer alternative 
quantifications. Table 4-4 summarizes the main quantitative 
scenario descriptors for each of the four SRES scenario 
families of the "harmonized" scenario category. Here an 
attempt is made to link this information with the resultant 
scenario outcomes (emissions) that are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 5, an additional, complementary scenario 
classification scheme to that used in this chapter is presented 
and focuses on driving forces. Scenarios are classified 
according to their cumulative carbon emissions (1990 to 2100, 
all sources), the best single quantitative indicator available to 
compare emission scenarios that portray widely different 
dynamics and different combinations and magnitude of a 
variety of emission categories. Four categories of cumulative 
emissions, Low (<I000 GtC), Medium-Low (1100 to 1450 
GtC), Medium-High (1450 to 1800 GtC), and High (>1800 
GtC) are presented. Table 4-20 links the scenario overview 
from Tables 4-2 and 4-3 with this information to guide readers 
through the differences in scenarios. 
Table 4-20 indicates that in most cases there is an easily 
discernable direct connection between main scenario 
characteristics of a paiticular scenario family or scenario group 
and the resultant outcomes in terms of cumulative emissions. 
For instance, in the high GDP, high energy demand scenario 
family A I , all scenarios within the two scenaiio groups that are 
fossil fuel and technologies intensive (AIC and A I G combined 
into A l F I in the SPM) result in high cumulative carbon 
emissions. Conversely, cumulative emissions of the "efficiency 
and dematerialization" (without additional climate initiatives) 
scenario family B l are generally in the "low" emissions 
category, but two model quantifications indicate medium-low 
emissions. For the scenario family B2, outcomes in tenns of 
cumulative carbon emissions can also be related clearly to 
scenario characteristics. One group of scenarios (which 
includes the B2 marker) adopts an incrementalist perspective 
of technological change ("dynamics as usual") applied to 
medium levels of population and GDP (and resultant energy 
demand) and results in medium-low cumulative carbon 
emissions. Another group of scenarios explored the sensitivity 
of a gradual retum to coal-based technologies (B2C-MARIA, 
B2-ASF), in one case combined with higher energy demand 
than in the other scenarios (B2High-MiniCAM); and results in 
higher cumulative emissions (Medium-High category in Table 
4-20). 
Equally discernable in Table 4-20 is the wide range in 
cumulative carbon emissions that characterize the various 
scenario groups within the A l scenario family. By design, the 
different scenario groups within this family explored the 
implications of different directions of technological change, 
ranging from carbon-intensive developments (AIC and A I G , 
combined into A l F I in the SPM) to decarbonization (AIT), 
with the "balanced" technology development scenario group 
taking an intermediary position. Different developments 
concerning fossil or non-fossil resource and technology 
availability in a less populated but affluent and thus high 
energy demand world (such as A l ) can lead to widely different 
outcomes in terms of cumulative emissions, with a range as 
wide as that spanned by all four scenario families together. 
Technology can thus be as important a driving force as 
population and GDP growth combined. In other words, very 
different emissions outcomes are possible for future worlds 
that otherwise share similar developments of main driving 
forces such as population and economic growth and high rates 
of technological change. 
However, areas of overlap and uncertainties of scenario 
outcomes (cumulative emissions) occur even for scenario 
quantifications that share otherwise similar assumptions for the 
main scenario drivers. Not surprisingly, differences in 
quantifications are largest within the A l "balanced" 
technological progress scenario group, which includes the A I B 
marker scenario. Most model interpretaflons result in 
cumulative carbon emissions within the Medium-High 
category (1450-1800 GtC). However, there are also scenario 
quantifications in which technological change tilts more in the 
direction of the A I C (AI-ASF) or A I T ( A l - M A R I A ) scenario 
groups that favor fossil (coal) or post-fossil (nuclear, 
renewables, and biomass) technologies, respectively. This 
leads to very wide differences in cumulative emissions, from 
the Medium-Low through to the High categories. A similar 
range of scenario outcomes between Medium-High to High 
categories also characterizes the A2 scenario family that 
otherwise describes an entirely different world (high 
population and comparatively low per capita income compared 
to low population with high per capita income for the A l 
scenario family; see Table 4-4). Departing from the main 
scenario characteristics of the A2 scenario family in terms of 
population and income in direction of lower values (such as in 
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the A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M scenario) could even yield emissions in 
the Medium-Low category. Thus, the A2 scenario family also 
indicates that a wide range of emissions outcomes is possible 
for any given development path of main scenario driving 
forces, such as population and income per capita. 
Finally, the categorization of scenarios in terms of their 
(cumulative carbon) emission outcomes illustrates that similar 
emission outcomes could arise from very different 
developments of main scenario drivers. For instance. High 
category cumulative emissions could arise from scenarios of 
low population growth, combined with high incomes (and 
energy use) and globalized technological developments that 
favor accessibility and economics of fossil fuels (coal, 
unconventional oil and gas; e.g., A l C and A I G scenario 
groups). Alternatively, similar High category cumulative 
emissions could also arise from scenarios of high population 
growth combined with slower per capita income growth and 
more regionally oriented technology development trends 
(scenario family A2). A comparison of the B l and A I T 
scenario groups (see Table 4-20) also confirms this conclusion. 
Both scenarios explore pathways that reduce current income 
disparities between regions. They indicate that such a tendency 
does not necessarily lead to high emissions, but could be 
achieved with Low to Medium-Low category cumulative 
emissions (as scenario groups A l C and A I G also indicate that 
High category emission pathways are possible). 
Perhaps the most important conclusion from the S R E S multi-
model, open process, and the large number of scenarios it has 
generated is the recognition that there is no simple, linear 
relationship between scenario driving forces and outcomes or 
between emission outcomes and scenario driving forces. High 
or low population scenarios need not automatically lead to high 
or low emissions; similar statements also hold for economic 
growth and for closing regional income gaps. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter emission estimates for radiatively important 
gases generated in 40 Special Report on Emission Scenarios 
(SRES) scenarios are present. These gases are carbon dioxide 
(COj), methane (CH^), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitrogen oxides 
(NOj,), carbon monoxide (CO), non-methane volatile organic 
compounds (NMVOCs), sulfur dioxide (SO,), chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs),^ 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SFg) (see Table 5-1). Emission estimates 
presented here span the interval from 1990 to 2100 at the 
global level and at the level of four SRES macro-regions 
(OECD90, REF, ASIA, and A L M ; see Appendix IV). In 
addition, sulfur emission estimates are presented in the 
regional gridded format to assist in quantifying the effects at 
the local level. Links between emissions and the underlying 
driving forces presented in Chapter 4 are illustrated also. 
As a result of differences in modeling and estimation 
approaches, base-year (1990) emission values in SRES 
scenarios developed using different models show substantial 
variation. To facilitate both use of the scenarios and 
comparisons across scenarios and families, base-year 
emissions in all 40 SRES scenarios were standardized using 
one common set of values (see Box 5-1). With a few clearly 
indicated exceptions, only standardized emission values are 
discussed in this chapter. A complete set of standardized 
emissions, along with other quantitative scenario information, 
is provided in Appendix VII. 
The first section in this chapter presents a "roadmap" that 
serves as an orientation to the 40 SRES scenarios. The 
roadmap gives a simple taxonomy that compares input 
parameters, as represented by the four scenario families, and 
emission outputs, as represented by the 1990 to 2100 
cumulative CO^ emissions. The subsequent sections discuss in 
detail emissions of each gas over the next 100 years to 2100. 
5.2. Roadmap to the Scenarios 
A classification scheme is presented here to assist the reader in 
understanding the links between driving forces and scenario 
outputs. This scheme can also be used to help select 
appropriate scenarios for further analysis (see Chapter 6). 
The SRES scenarios were developed as quantitative 
interpretations of the four alternative storylines that represent 
possible futures with different combinations of driving forces. 
These broad scenario families are broken down further into 
seven scenario groups,- used here to classify the input driving 
forces (see also Table 4-20 in Chapter 4). 
' Emission trajectories of these ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) 
are not developed by the SRES team, but adopted from W M O / U N E P 
(1998). 
The scenario outputs of most interest are emissions of GHGs, 
SOj, and other radiatively important gases. However, the 
categorization of scenarios based on emissions of multiple 
gases is quite difficult. A l l gases that contribute to radiative 
forcing should be considered, but methods of combining gases 
such as the use of global warming potentials (GWP) are 
appropriate only for near-term G H G inventories.-' In addition, 
emission trajectories may display different dynamics, from 
monotonie increases to non-Unear trajectories in which a 
subsequent decline from a maximum occurs. This particularly 
diminishes the significance of a focus on any given year, such 
as 2100. In light of these difficulties, the classification 
approach presented here uses cumulative COj emissions 
between 1990 and 2100. COj is the dominant G H G and 
cumulative CO2 emissions are expected to be roughly 
proportional to CO2 radiative forcing over the time scale 
considered (Houghton et a l . 1996). 
Total cumulative COj emissions from the 40 SRES scenarios 
fall into the range from 773 to 2538 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) 
with a median of 1509 GtC. To represent this range, the 
scenario classification uses four intervals: 
• Less than 1100 GtC (low). 
• Between 1100 and 1450 GtC (medium-low). 
• Between 1450 and 1800 GtC (medium-high). 
• Greater than 1800 GtC (high). 
Each CO2 interval contains multiple scenarios and scenarios 
from more than one family. Each category also includes one of 
the four marker scenarios. Figure 5-1 shows how cumulative 
CO2 emissions from the 40 SRES scenarios fit within the 
selected emission intervals. 
Table 5-2 provides an overview of this scenario classification 
and links the scenario outcomes with factors that drive them, 
organized by family and scenario group (see also Table 4-20). 
The rows in Table 5-2 represent the emission categories, while 
the columns represent the scenario families. The analysis of 
Table 5-2 reveals two key resuhs: 
^ During the approval process of the Summary for Policymakers at the 
5th Session of Working Group III (WGIII) of the IPCC from 8 to 11 
March 2000 in Katmandu, Nepal, h was decided to combine the A l C 
and A I G groups into one "fossil intensive" group A l F I in contrast to 
the non-fossil group AIT , and to select two illustrative scenarios from 
these two A l groups to facilitate use by modelers and policy makers. 
This leads to six scenario gi-oups that constitute the four scenario 
families, three of which are in the A l family. A l l scenarios are equally 
sound. 
In particular, the IPCC Working Group 1 (WGI) Second Assessment 
Report (SAR) GWPs are calculated for constant concentrations. In 
long-tei-m scenarios, concentrations may change significantly, as do 
GWP values. It is unclear how to apply GWPs to long-tetm scenarios 
in a meaningful manner. In addition, the GWP approach is not 
applicable to gases such as SO^ and ozone precursors. 
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Box 5-1: Scenario Standardization 
One of the primary reasons for developing emissions scenarios is to enable coordinated studies of climate change, climate 
impacts, and mitigation options and strategies. With the multi-model approach used in the SRES process, 1990 and 2000 
emissions do not agree in scenarios developed usmg different models. In addition, even with agreed reference values, it is time 
consuming and often impractical to fine-tune most mtegrated assessment models to reproduce a particular desned result. 
Nevertheless, differences in the base year and 2000 emissions may lead to confusion among the scenario users. Therefore, the 
1990 and 2000 emission estimates were standardized in all the SRES scenarios, with emissions diverging after the year 2000. 
The procedure for selectmg 1990 and 2000 emission values and the subsequent adjustments to scenario emissions are described 
in this box. 
The standardized scenarios share the same values for emissions in both 1990 and 2000. Emissions for the year 2000 are, of 
course, not yet known and 1990 emissions are also uncertain. The 1990 and 2000 emission estimates for all gases, except SOj, 
were set to be equal to the averages of initial values in the unadjusted four marker scenarios. This was carried out at the four-
region level, and summed to obtahi the standardized global totals. The resultant estimates are within relevant uncertainty ranges 
for each substance, but should not be interpreted as "endorsed" by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to 
represent values for either global or regional emissions. Rather, they are the standardized base-year estimates used for the 
emissions scenarios. 
From 2000 to 2100, emissions in all the scenarios (except CO2 emissions from land-use and SO2 emissions) were adjusted by 
applying a constant offset equal to the difference between the standardized 2000 value and the scenario-speciñc 2000 value. 
The puфose was to smooth scenario trajectories between 2000 and 2010. 
This procedure results in small distortions for those emissions that rise with time, or at least that do not ultimately decrease by 
a large amount as compared to the base year. However, for emissions that fall significantly over time, such as those from 
deforestation or of SOj, this procedure can cause more significant distortions and can even change the sign of the emission 
estimates at later times (i.e., change positive emission estimates into negative ones and vice versa). To avoid these distortions, 
for the aforementioned emissions, the year 2000 offset was reduced by 10% per decade, cumulatively, to make the offset zero 
by the year 2100. This allows preservation of the shape of emission trajectories and still ensures the 2000 standardization. 
The non-standardized scenario values are available from the modeling teams upon request, although the standardized values 
should be used for most purposes. 
• Similar future cumulative COj emissions may emerge 
from different sets of driving forces; 
• Conversely, similar future states of the world with 
respect to socio-economic development may yield 
different outcomes in terms of cumulative CO^ 
emissions. 
Similar cumulative CO2 emissions can be attained in very 
different social, economic, and technological circumstances. 
H i g h emission levels of the A2 marker scenario (A2-ASF) are 
also attained in all the A l family scenarios with high fossil-fuel 
use (AIC and A I G groups), for example in A I G - M i n i C A M . 
M e d i u m - h i g h emissions are attained in most of the A l group 
scenarios (including the A I B marker, A l B - A I M ) , but also in 
scenarios from the B2 scenario family with high fossil-fuel use 
(e.g., B2-ASF). M e d i u m - l o w emissions, which are 
characteristic of the B2 family, including the B2 marker (B2-
MESSAGE), are also attained in the A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M 
scenario, which illustrates the transition between the A 2 and 
A l families. Finally, l o w emission levels resuh from almost all 
the B l family scenarios (including the ВI marker, B l - I M A G E ) 
as well as from scenarios that belong to the A I T high-
technology scenario group (e.g., AIT-MARIA) . In Table 5-2, 
italics are used for examples of scenarios within each emission 
category that illustrate altemative ways to achieve cumulative 
COj emissions similar to those of the marker scenarios. 
5.3. Carbon Dioxide 
C O T is the largest contributor to anthropogenic radiative 
forcing of the atmosphere. As described in more detail in 
Chapter 3, the main sources of anthropogenic COj emissions 
are fossil fuel combustion and the net release of carbon from 
changes in teirestrial ecosystems, commonly refen-ed to as 
land-use changes. To a lesser extent, CO^ is emitted by 
industrial activities, in particular by cement production (Table 
5-3). 
5 . 3 . 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions f r o m Fossil F u e l s and 
Industry 
As shown in Table 5-3, fossil fuels were the main source of 
C O , emissions in 1990. Therefore, it is expected that future 
CO2 emission levels will depend primarily on the total energy 
consumption and the structure of energy supply. The total 
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Figure 5-1: Global cumulative C O , emissions in the 40 SRES scenarios, classified into four scenario families (each denoted by 
a different color code: A l , red; A2, brown; B l , green; B2, blue). Marker scenarios are shown with thick lines without ticks, 
globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines. Black lines show 
percentiles, means, and medians for the 40 SRES scenarios. For numbers on the two additional illustrative scenarios A l F I and 
A I T see Appendix VII. 
energy consumption is driven by population size, level of 
affluence, technological development, environmental concerns, 
and other factors. The composition of energy supply is 
determined by estimated reserves of fossil fuel and the 
availability, relative efficiency, and cost of supply technologies. 
Emissions from gas flaring and industrial emissions are much 
lower in comparison with energy-related emissions; for 
simplification, in this discussion they are added to the latter In 
1990, the global emissions from cement made up about 2.5% 
of the total global COj emissions (Houghton et a l . , 1995). 
Figure 5-2 shows standardized carbon emissions from fossil 
energy and industry for the 40 SRES scenarios. Sample statistics 
(in terms of percentiles, means, and medians) are indicated 
against the background of 40 individual scenarios that make up 
the SRES scenario set. The figure also presents emissions ranges 
spanned by each of the four scenario famiUes in 2100. 
SRES scenarios cover a wide range of annual emissions, and 
the uncertainties in future emission levels increase with time. 
Up to about the 2040s and the 2050s, emissions tend to rise in 
all scenarios, albeit at different rates. Across scenarios this 
reflects changes in the underlying driving forces, such as 
population, economic output, energy demand, and the share of 
fossil fuels in energy supply. By 2050, the emissions range 
covered by the 40 SRES scenarios is from about 9 to 27 GtC, 
with the mean and median values equal to about 15 GtC. The 
range between the 25* and 75* percentiles of emissions (the 
"central tendencies") extends from 12 to 18 GtC (i.e. from 
twice to thrice that in 1990). Within this interval lie three of the 
four marker scenarios. However, a fair number of scenarios 
(eight out of 40) also indicate the possibility of much higher 
emissions (in the 18 to 27 GtC range) that reflect an increase 
by a factor of up to 4.5 over 60 years (1990 to 2050). Another 
eight SRES scenarios have 2050 emissions below the 25* 
percentile (Figure 5-2). 
Beyond 2050, the uncertainties in energy and industrial COj 
emissions continue to increase. By 2100, the range of 
emissions across the 40 SRES scenarios is between 3 and 37 
GtC, which reflects either a decrease to half the 1990 levels or 
an increase by a factor of six. Emissions between the 25* and 
75* percentiles range from 9 to 24 GtC, while the range of the 
four marker scenarios is even wider, 5 to 29 GtC. The 2100 
median and mean of all 40 scenarios are 15.5 and 17 GtC, 
respectively. 
As time passes in the scenarios, uncertainties not only increase 
with respect to absolute levels of COj emissions, but also with 
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Table 5-3: G l o b a l C O ^ , CH^, Л'^О, a n d СО emissions i n t h e base y e a r ( 1 9 9 0 ) by s o u r c e . 
CO2 [ G t C ] 
S A R SRES 
Range Standardized 
T o t a l a n t h r o p o g e n i c 
Fossil fuel and cement production' 
Land-use change 
6.0-8.2 
5.0-6.0 
0.6-2.6 
7.0-7.5 
5.8-6.5 
1.0-1.4 
7.1 
6.0 
1.1 
СЩ (Mt C H ^ 
T o t a l a n t h r o p o g e n i c 
F o s s i l f u e l r e l a t e d 
T o t a l b i o s p h e r i c 
Enteric fermentation 
Animal waste 
Rice paddies 
Biomass buming 
Landfills 
Domestic sewage 
T o t a l n a t u r a l 
T o t a l identified 
3 0 0 - 4 5 0 
70-120 
2 0 0 - 3 5 0 
65-100 
20-30 
20-100 
20-80 
20-70 
15-80 
1 1 0 - 2 1 0 
4 1 0 - 6 6 0 
2 9 8 - 3 3 7 
68-94 
2 0 4 - 2 5 0 
) 80-97 
29-61 
27-46 
)51-62 
3 1 0 
N f l (MtN) 
Total a n t h r o p o g e n i c 
Cultivated soils 
Cattle and feed lots 
Biomass buming 
Industrial sources 
T o t a l n a t u r a l 
T o t a l identified 
3.7- 7.7 
1.8- 5.3 
0.2-0.5 
0.2-1.0 
0.7-1.8 
6-12 
1 0 - 1 7 
6.0-6.9 
¡4.2-4.8 
0.4-1.3 
0.9-1.2 
6.7 
C O (Mt C O ) 
Technological 
Biomass buming 
Biogenics 
Oceans 
Methane oxidation 
N M V O C oxidation 
Total 
300-500 
300-700 
60-160 
20-200 
400-1000 
200-600 
1 8 0 0 - 2 7 0 0 
] 7 5 2 - l O 0 0 ¡879 
*0f which around 0.16 GtC are from cement production. 
respect to their trajectories. Scenarios portray different 
emission pattems that range from continuous increases up to 
2100, through emissions that gradually level off by 2100, to 
trend reversals in which emissions begin to decline in the 
second half of the 2P ' century. These dynamic emission 
pattems diminish the significance of emission levels in any 
particular year, such as 2100. 
Over a long time horizon, it also becomes increasingly difficult 
to perceive the future in terms of "central tendencies." For 
instance, between 2050 to 2100, up to eight different scenarios 
from all four SRES scenario families have COj emission levels 
within 10% of the median of all 40 SRES scenarios. Thus, 
there is no single scenario family or individual scenario that 
has "median" emissions with respect to the entire uncertainty 
space described by the 40 SRES scenarios. Similar emission 
levels can arise from very different combinations of driving-
force variables that are embedded in the SRES scenario 
families and groups. 
The wide ranges of energy and industry-related C O ^ emissions 
in the SRES scenarios reflect the fact that the "best" or the 
"most likely" quantifications are nearly impossible to identify. 
The following discussion suggests that even scenarios with 
very similar input parameters (e.g., population and GDP) may 
produce a large variation in resultant COj emissions. 
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Figure 5-2: Standardized global energy-related and industrial COj emissions for 40 SRES scenarios, classified into four 
scenario families (each denoted by a different color code: A l , red; A2, brown; B l , green; B2, blue). Marker scenarios are 
shown with thick lines without ticks, globally hannonized scenarios with thin fines, and non-harmonized scenarios with thin, 
dotted lines (see Table 4-3). Black lines show percentiles, means, and medians for the 40 SRES scenarios. For numbers on the 
two additional illustrative scenarios A l F I and A I T see Appendix VII. 
5 3 . 1 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
Rapid economic growth in the A l family scenario leads to high 
energy demand and hence to a steep increase in COj emissions 
in the first decades of the 2P ' century. Structural changes in the 
energy supply become effective only in the longer term 
because of the inertia caused by long periods of capital 
turnover. With respect to alternative energy supply 
technologies, the A l B scenario group assumes a "balanced" 
approach, in which none of these technologies gain an 
overwhelming advantage. This scenario group includes the 
A l B marker scenario developed using the A I M model (Jiang et 
o l ; 2000). In addition to the A I scenario group, variations that 
assumed fast advancements in specific energy supply sectors 
were explored (renewables, AIT; oil and gas, A I G ; coal, A l C ) 
(see Chapter 4). 
In the A l B - A I M marker scenario, the global average per capita 
final energy demand grows from 54 GJ in 1990 to 115 GJ in 
2050 and to 247 GJ in 2100. Meanwhile, the final energy 
carbon intensity decUnes relatively slowly until 2050 (from the 
current 21 tC per TJ of final energy to 16 tC per TJ), which 
results in a steep increase in COj emissions in the first decades 
of the 2P' centuiy. After 2050, when structural changes in the 
^"crgy sector take effect, carbon intensity declines rapidly to 
reach 7.5 tC per TJ. This more than offsets growing energy 
demand from a contracting but increasingly prosperous 
population, so that carbon emissions decline between the years 
2050 and 2100. Emissions peak around 2050 at a level 2.7 
times (16 GtC) that of 1990 and fall to around 13 GtC by 2100, 
which is about twice the current level (Figure 5-3a). The total, 
cumulative 1990 to 2100 carbon emissions'* in the A l B - A I M 
scenario equal 1499 GtC (cumulative emissions from energy 
and industry only amount to 1437 GtC). 
Energy-related carbon emissions vary widely across altemative 
A l group scenarios. The smallest differences with respect to 
the A l B marker scenario ( A l B - A I M ) are in the A l B -
M E S S A G E (Roehrl and Riahi, 2000) scenario, which used 
harmonized input assumptions for population, GDP, and final 
energy use at the level of the four regions (see Chapter 4). 
Resultant energy-related carbon emissions in A l B - M E S S A G E 
closely match those of the A l B - A I M scenario, reaching 13.8 
GtC by 2100, which indicates that energy supply technologies 
agree well between the A I M and M E S S A G E models. 
Note that unless stated otherwise cumulative emissions reported in 
this chapter always refer to total carbon, while annual emissions in 
this section refer to energy and industry emissions only. 
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Figure 5-3a: Global emissions from fossil fuels and industry in the SRES A l scenario family (standardized). The marker 
scenario is shown with a thick line without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized 
scenaiios with thin, dotted lines (see Table 4-3). In the SPM, A l C and A I G scenarios are merged into one fossil-intensive A l F I 
scenario group (see also footnote 2). 
While still adhering to the "balanced" supply-mix assumption 
(see Section 4.3.1), other scenarios within the A l balanced 
group span a larger range of future emissions around the A l B -
A I M scenario. In part this results from different assumptions 
on global and regional GDP growth and energy-intensity 
improvements, but also from altemative 1п1ефге1а11оп5 of how 
to translate the concept of a "balanced" pathway of 
technological change (as described in the A l scenario 
storyline) into model-specific technology assumpfions. 
The A l B - A S F and A l B - I M A G E scenarios depict futures with a 
stronger reliance on fossil fuels (especially coal) than that m 
A l B - A I M . In 2050 this results in higher emissions (19 to 26 
GtC versus 16 GtC for the A l B - A I M ; see statisfical tables in 
Appendix VII for more details). The emission pattem in the 
A I B - M A R I A scenario (Mori, 2000) is quite different. This 
scenario does not reproduce an initial rapid growth in emissions, 
which reach a maximum around 2050 and subsequently decline. 
Instead, emissions grow more slowly and then level off. By 
2050, the emissions in A I B - M A R I A are well below those in 
A l B - A I M (13 versus 16 GtC). Two out of three A l scenarios 
developed using the M i n i C A M model ( A l V l - M i n i C A M and 
A l V 2 - M i n i C A M ) were based on somewhat different 
assumptions with respect to key scenario driving forces, which 
included lower energy intensity, less rapid decline in population 
after 2050, and lower incomes per capita (see Chapter 4 for more 
details). Emissions in these scenarios increase continuously 
during the 2P ' century to reach about 18 MtC by 2100 (see 
statistical tables in Appendix VII for more details). 
The emissions range spanned by all the A l balanced scenario 
group in 2100 is from 13 to 18 GtC. Total, cumulative carbon 
emissions range from 1301 to 2073 GtC by 2100. This 
illustrates the importance of different assumptions on rates and 
direction of technological change in the energy sector for long-
term emissions scenarios, which is further explored in the three 
additional scenario groups discussed below. 
Two altemative A l scenario groups, A I G (oil and gas) and 
A l C (coal), explore high-fossil futures and one group, AIT, 
explores advanced technology futures. A I G and A l C have 
been combined into one fossil intensive scenaiio group A l F I m 
the S P M (see also footnote 2). Energy-related carbon 
emissions vary widely across these scenario groups in 
conjunction with the scenario assumptions as to roles of 
different energy sources (Figure 5-3a). The high fossd 
scenarios explore worlds that consume vast amounts of coal, or 
oil and gas, while with the advanced technology assumptions 
the role of fossil fuel declines strongly as nuclear and/or 
renewable sources are favored to supply the reduced fmal 
energy demand. 
The A l fossil scenarios have essentially the same population, 
GDP, and final energy demand as the A l B marker, but have a 
primary eneigy system that relies mainly on fossil fuels. Based 
on cumulative CO2 emissions, scenarios from the A l fossil 
groups ( A I G and A l C ) fall within the high emissions category, 
with A l G - M i n i C A M falling roughly in the middle of the range 
spanned by the six A l fossil scenarios (Table 5-2). The primary 
energy system in the A l G - M i n i C A M scenario emerges as a 
result of rapid increases in the efficiency with which fossil 
resources can be recovered, especially in the most expensive 
grades of these resources; unconventional resources play an 
increasingly important role toward the end of the 2P ' century. 
E m i s s i o n S c e n a r i o s 2 4 9 
P. 
.2 
•a 
в 
40 
35 
30 
|Energy & Industry 
A2 Family 
0 I 
1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 
- A l \Sr 
A2 \1M 
о A2GIMAGE 
-A2 MESSAGE 
- o- A2 MINICAM 
« tí A2 A! 
MINICAM 
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These rapid teclinical changes, as well as relatively low rates of 
growth in the productivity of biomass and other non-fossil 
sources, imply a world that is heavily reliant on oil and gas. 
The three coal-based scenarios in this group (AIC-MESSAGE, 
A l C - M i n i C A M , and A I C - A I M ) assume rapid increases in the 
efficiency of synthetic fuel production, as well as relatively 
limited oil and gas resources. 
Three advanced technology or A I T scenarios fall in either the 
"low" or the "medium-low" cumulative emissions categories 
(Table 5-2). The A I T - M A R I A scenario (Mori, 2000) achieves 
very low carbon emissions tln'ough the combination of a low 
final energy use (54% of that in A IB-AIM) and a rapid 
increase in the importance of non-fossil energy technologies in 
the primary energy system (81% by 2100). 
The resultant CO2 emissions range of all the A I family 
scenarios is so wide that most of the remaining SRES scenarios 
fall within its bandwidth, h o r n 4.3 to 37 GtC in 2100. The total 
cumulative carbon emissions of the A I family scenarios also 
span a very wide range, from around 1000 GtC to more than 
2500 GtC (Figure 5-1, Table 5-2). 
5 3 . 1 . 2 . A2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
In the A2 scenario family, altemative energy technologies 
develop relatively slowly and fossil fuels maintain their 
dominant position in the energy supply mix. As oil and gas 
resources become scarcer and non-fossil alternatives remain 
underdeveloped, coal gains the leading role. Its share in the 
energy mix ranges from 45% to 52% in the harmonized 
scenarios (A2-ASF, A2-MESSAGE) and in other scenarios 
with similar input assumptions (A2-Min iCAM and A2-AIM). 
Global CO2 emissions in the A2 marker scenario implemented 
using the A S F model (Sankovski et a l , 2000) increase by more 
than fourfold over their 1990 level, to reach 29 GtC by 2100 
(Figure 5.3b). Total cumulative carbon emissions from the A 2 -
ASF scenario amount to 1860 GtC by 2100. 
In other A2 scenarios, CO2 emissions range from 17 GtC 
(A2G-IMAGE5) to 33 GtC (A2-AIM) by 2100. The 
harmonized A2-MESSAGE scenario and the A 2 - M i n i C A M 
scenario have very similar global COj emissions as compared 
to the marker. Slightly higher emissions, primarily caused by 
higher primary energy use, are generated in the A 2 - A I M 
scenario. Unlike the rest of the A2 family scenarios, the A2G-
I M A G E scenario yields constant emissions after 2050. This 
emission trajectory is explained by the combination of a lower 
energy demand and a larger share of natural gas in the energy 
supply mix (see Chapter 4 for more details). Total cumulative 
carbon emissions in the A2 scenario group range between I7I0 
and 1860 GtC by 2100. 
A variant of the A2 storyline, developed with the M i n i C A M 
model ( A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M ) , explores a world in which 
economic growth and population follow a "hybrid" trajectory, 
which have traits of both the A2 and A l storylines. As 
' The I M A G E results for the A2 and B2 scenarios are based on 
preliminary model experiments camed out in March 1998. As a result 
of limited resources it has not been possible to re-run these 
experiments. Hence, unlike for the I M A G E A l and B l scenarios, the 
I M A G E team has not been able to provide background data and 
details for these scenario calculations and the population and 
economic growth assumptions are not harmonized fully. 
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described in Box 4-6, A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M has a lower 
population than other scenarios of the A2 family, and a slower 
rate of economic growth in the first half of the 2V^ century. 
These in turn limit the growth in final energy demand until 
after the onset of rapid economic growth around 2050. 
Emissions also rise rapidly during the post-2050 period, as the 
large growth in energy consumpfion results mostly from coal, 
oil, and gas. 
Two out of the six A2-family scenarios, A2-ASF and A 2 - A I M , 
fall into the "high" cumulative CO2 emissions category. Three 
scenarios, A2-MESSAGE, A2- IMAGE, and A 2 - M i n i C A M , 
belong to the "medium-high" category, and only the A2-A1-
M i n i C A M scenario with its drastically different assumptions 
about key driving forces falls in the "medium-low" category. 
5 . 3 . 1 . 3 . В1 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The strong trend toward ecologically more compatible 
consumption and production patterns in the B l family is 
reflected by structural changes toward less energy- and 
material-intensive activities, which lead to a partial de­
coupling of welfare and energy demands. In the B l marker 
scenario ( B l - I M A G E ; de Vries et a l . , 2000) the rapid 
technological change toward resource saving and ecologically 
sound solutions is assumed to spread very quickly, facilitated 
by high capital stock turnover rates in currentiy less developed 
regions. As a result, energy requirements in B l - I M A G E 
increase slowly and a shift away from fossil fuels eventually 
breaks the already slow upward trend in carbon emissions 
(Figure 5-3c). Emissions peak around 2040 at 12 GtC, twice 
the 1990 level, and by 2100 the emissions fall below the base-
year level to 5 GtC. Total cumulative carbon emissions in the 
B l - I M A G E scenario amount to 983 GtC by 2100. As for A l , 
the population projection adopted for this scenario family 
declines after 2050. 
Rates of energy-intensity improvement in the first half of the 
2P ' century range quite widely in ВI family scenarios, and 
lead to emission levels from 8.5 (BIT-MESSAGE) to 17.5 (Bl -
ASF) GtC in 2050. By 2100 the gap in annual emissions 
naiTOws again, with final emissions between 3 and 8 GtC in all 
the B l scenarios (except В1-High-MiniCAM). 
The B l family also includes one scenario in which energy-
related emissions continue to increase throughout the modeling 
period, В1-High-MiniCAM. In this scenario the final energy 
demand is assumed to rise more rapidly witli increasing 
income than in the rest of the B l scenarios. (The total carbon 
emissions in B l H i g h - M i n i C A M decline slightly later in the 
modeling period because of reduced land under management 
and associated carbon sequestration.) 
Total cumulative carbon emissions in the B l scenario group 
ranges between 770 and 1390 GtC by 2100. A l l but two B l 
scenarios fall in the low cumulative emissions category (Table 
5-2). 
5 . 3 . 1 . 4 . B2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
In the B2 world, dynamics of technological change continue 
along historical trends ("dynamics as usual"). The exploitation 
of comparative regional advantages in energy resources and 
technologies leads to regionally different mixes of clean fossil 
and non-fossil supply. With the continued growth of population 
and of income per capita, a steady increase of CO^ emissions 
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emerges in the B2 marker (Riahi and Roehrl, 2000), developed 
using the M E S S A G E model (B2-MESSAGE). By 2050 
emissions reach 11 GtC and by 2100 they reach 14 GtC (Figure 
5-3d). Total cumulative COj emissions in the B2 marker 
scenario amount to 1160 GtC by 2100. 
Emissions in the B2 scenarios with harmonized global input 
assumptions (population, GDP, final energy; B2-MESSAGE, 
Б2-А1М, B2-MARIA) are very close in 2100. Differences in 
emissions are largest around 2050, which reflects the different 
patterns of structural change in the energy systems in 
anticipation of depletion of conventional oil and gas. The 
emissions range for non-harmonized scenarios in the B2 
scenario group is larger - between 11.2 (B2-IMAGE'') and 15.4 
(B2-ASF) GtC by 2050. Relatively high emissions in the B2-
ASF scenario are explained by a large share of coal in the fuel 
mix, because of high oil and gas prices. In this scenario, coal is 
also widely used for synthetic liquid and gaseous fuel 
production. In 2100, B2- IMAGE emissions (9 GtC) drop 
below the B2 marker level, while in B2-ASF emissions 
continue to grow and reach 19 GtC by 2100. The B2 high 
scenario variant developed using M i n i C A M assumes far less 
efficiency gains, smaller available resources of oil and gas, and 
less favorable development of solar power costs than in the В 2 
^ The I M A G E results for the A2 and 32 scenarios are based on 
preliminary model experiments earned out in March 1998. As a result 
of limited resources it has not been possible to re-run these 
experiments. Hence, unlike for the I M A G E A l and B l scenarios, the 
IMAGE team has not been able to provide background data and 
details for these scenario calculations and the population and 
economic growth assumptions are not harmonized fully. 
marker. As in B2-ASF, the near exhaustion of oil supplies in 
B2High-MiniCAM leads to a heavy reliance on synthetic fuels 
to supply the needs of the transportation sector. Emissions in 
this scenario increase to 23 GtC by 2100. An additional 
altemative with more coal use (B2C-MARIA) was explored 
using the M A R I A model. Emissions in this scenario are 
considerably higher than in the original B2-MARIA case, but 
are very close to those of B2-ASF (19 GtC). 
Total cumulative carbon emissions across the B2 scenario 
group range between 1164 and 1686 GtC by 2100. Three of the 
eight B2 family scenarios fall into the "medium-high" 
cumulative emissions category, and the five others fall into the 
"medium-low" category (Table 5-2). 
5.3.1.5. I n t e r - f a m i l y C o m p a r i s o n 
Table 5-2 suggests fairly strong contrasts in the level of 
cumulative emissions across the four scenario families (note 
that estimates in Table 5-2 also include emissions from land 
use). A variety of available energy supply and demand options 
means that cumulative emissions in the A l family span the 
entire set of emission categories. The A2 family scenarios, 
characterized by a large population and a relatively carbon-
intensive energy system, fall into either the "high" scenario 
category or in the upper part of the "medium-high" category. 
Only the A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M scenario falls in the "medium-low" 
category, because of low cumulative emissions prior to 2050. 
As a consequence of the low energy consumption and non-
fossil energy systems associated with its sustainable 
development theme, the В1 family scenarios are concentrated in 
the "low" emissions category. Finally, representatives of the B2 
family are present in the two middle categories. 
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In addition to their cumulative emissions, the scenario families 
are characterized by very different emissions trajectories. The 
A I fossil fuel scenarios have continuously increasing 
emissions, with rapid growth before 2050 and slower growth 
thereafter. The A I scenarios with the "balanced" energy mix 
(e.g. the marker A l B - A I M ) typically have emissions that 
decline after 2050, while the A I T technology scenarios have 
slower growth prior to 2050, and a steeper decline after 2050. 
As for the A l fossil fuel scenarios, A2 family scenarios are 
characterized by high rates of growth in emissions prior to 2050 
and subsequently continued growth but at lower rates. Unlike 
the rest of the A2 scenarios, the A 2 - A I - M i n i C A M has more 
rapid growth in emissions after 2050 than before 2050, because 
per capita incomes in a number of developing regions do not 
reach a level at which per capita energy demands rise rapidly 
until the middle of the 2 Г ' century. The B l family is 
characterized by lower growth in emissions prior to 2050, 
mostly because of lower rates of growth in energy demand, 
followed by declining emissions after 2050. Finally, the B2 
family is characterized by relatively stable emissions post-2050, 
after roughly doubling emissions between 1990 and 2050. 
5.3.2. Land-Use C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
Most changes in land use are induced by the demand for 
cropland and grassland, which is driven by the demand for 
food products, the extent of biomass energy use, and policies 
and practices associated with forest management. The 1990 
land-use COj emissions remain fairly uncertain, estimated at 
1.6 ± 1.0 GtC (Watson et a ! . , 1996a); a similar level of 
uncertainty is attached to current land-use emissions. This 
uncertainty is reflected by the quantification of the SRES 
storylines - the 1990 emission estimates from different models 
range between 1.0 and 1.6 GtC, while the spread of estimates 
at the four-region level is even larger. For the sake of 
comparabifity, common, standardized (see Box 5-1 on 
standardization) emissions are established at 1.1 GtC in 1990 
and 1.0 GtC in 2000, to reflect the net carbon flux from 
contemporary changes in forest cover. 
Generally, the SRES models use different approaches to 
estimate land-use change emissions - in some cases the only 
source of emissions is tropical deforestation, while in other 
cases more sources and sinks (including natural) are included.'' 
Moreover, méthodologie differences and uncertainties in 
carbon content, carbon cycling, and land classification result in 
seemingly inconsistent results between models that cover the 
same land-use sources. These features complicate a 
straightforward comparison between land-use emissions in 
scenarios generated by different SRES models. 
' The most comprehensive treatment is embedded in the I M A G E 
model. For the sake of comparison the I M A G E team has made a 
tentative estimate of those (net) emissions that are reasonably 
consistent with what other models reported. These derived values are 
used in this report. 
Future trajectories of land-use COj emissions are shown in 
Figure 5-4. Emissions in the 40 SRES scenarios range widely 
in the same year and change significantly over time. In 
scenarios with continued deforestation, emissions rise initially, 
then reach a maximum, and finally decline with depletion of 
forestland that can be cleared. At the other end of the scenario 
spectrum, emissions turn negative and land-use changes 
become an increasing CO2 sink through afforestation. By 2020, 
the resultant uncertainty ranges between 0 and 3 GtC across all 
40 SRES scenarios with a median of I . l GtC. By 2050, the 
s c e n a r i o r a n g e shifts to between -0.7 and 1.2 GtC (median, 0.5 
GtC). By 2100 the scenario range lies between -2.8 and 2.2 
GtC, with a median of 0.0 GtC. Interestingly, in specific years 
(e.g., in 2050) scenarios from аИ four SRES families fall within 
a relatively narrow emissions corridor (i.e. at least one scenario 
from each of the four SRES scenario families falls within the 
25"' and 75* percentiles of the emission range). This indicates 
that similar levels of carbon fluxes related to land use could 
arise from widely different socio-economic driving forces, 
depending on future trends in food demand and dietary 
pattems, agricultural productivity growth, forest practices, etc. 
In general, the SRES COj land-use emissions follow the same 
pattern as found in the literature (see Chapter 3) - initially 
emissions increase because of continuing deforestation in 
developing regions and subsequentiy they decrease following a 
drop in population growth and increases in agricultural 
productivity. The main difference between the SRES scenarios 
and the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 lies in the maximum 
emission values, which are significantly lower in the SRES 
scenarios. Possibly this arises because the SRES models 
explicitly simulate land-use change as a function of pressure on 
the land (itself a function of agricultural productivity), while in 
the literature land-use СО, emission scenarios are often based 
on trend extrapolation or statistical relationships (e.g. with 
population growth). The rapid economic development and 
technological advances assumed in the SRES storylines thus 
tend to mitigate C O , emissions from deforestation, and in 
some cases lead to their reversal (e.g., tuming deforested lands 
into carbon sinks). 
As suggested by Figure 5-4, no simple relation exists between 
the scenario families and land-use emissions. As in the case of 
energy-related emissions, the A I family scenarios cover the 
widest range of emissions and trajectories. In most cases, 
emissions in these scenarios decline after 2030 to zero or 
negative (carbon sinks) values. However, in two scenarios 
( A I B - I M A G E and A l B - M A R l A ) , emissions increase later in 
the 2P ' century, reflecting assumptions on additional land 
pressures. As a rale, scenarios of the A2 family follow the same 
convex trajectory as A I scenarios, also with two exceptions 
(A2- IMAGE and A2-AIM) . In accordance with the 
sustainability emphasis of the ВI family storyline, scenarios 
from this family have the lowest initial emissions, which by 
2080 or earlier drop to zero or negative levels. The В1 family 
marker scenario (BI-IMAGE) has negative land-use emissions 
for most of the modeling period, a property directiy related to 
B l ' s "envhonmental conservation" emphasis. 
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Figure 5-4: Standardized global COj emissions from land-use changes (net balance between anthropogenic changes in sources 
and sinks) for 40 SRES scenaiios, classified into the four scenario families (each denoted by a different color code - A l , red; 
A2, brown; B l , green; B2, blue). Marker scenarios are shown with thick lines without ticks, globally harmonized scenarios 
with thin lines, and non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see Table 4-3). Black lines show percentiles, means, and 
medians for the 40 SRES scenarios. For numbers on the two additional illustrative scenarios A l F I and A I T see Appendix VII. 
5.3.3. Overview of Sectoral C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
As a result of different model specifications and detail, it is not 
possible to draw up consistent comparisons between sectoral 
emissions across different models. A n overview of sectoral 
CO, emissions by sector and source category is summarized in 
Box 5-2 on the basis of the results of the M E S S A G E (for 
energy and industrial sources) and A I M (for land-use change 
sources) models. 
5.4. Other Greenhouse Gases 
Non-CO^ GHGs (CH^, N2O, and halocarbons) account for 
about 40% of the total induced additional radiative forcing 
compared to pre-industrial times (Houghton et a l . , 1996). 
Whereas COj emissions are largely attributable to two major 
sources (energy and land use), other gases arise from many 
different sectors and applications as shown in Table 5-3. 
Consequently, their emission levels are more uncertain. Also 
Box 5-2: C O 2 Emissions by Sector and Source for MESSAGE Scenarios 
Table 5-4 gives an overview of COj emissions by sector and source category according to the IPCC reporting format given in 
Watson et al. (1996b). The dilïerences m sectoral detail across models mean a consistent comparison and sectoral COj emission 
balances are only possible withm one particular modeUng framework. Table 5-4 presents the scenario results as calculated with 
the M E S S A G E model for 1990, 2050, and 2100 and for the four scenario famiUes and their scenario groups. Emissions related 
to land-use change were derived from consistent model runs with the A I M model. 
As in Watson et al. (1996b), emissions are presented by sector, and emission categories adopt both supply and demand 
perspectives for energy-related COj emissions. The supply side COj balance accounts emissions at the pomt of energy 
combustion, that is at a coal-fu:ed power plant (electric generation) or by buming coal in industrial boilers (direct fuel use by 
industry). Conversely, the demand side COj balance accounts emissions per end-use category, irrespective of whether emissions 
originate directiy at the pomt of end-use or upstream in the energy conversion sector. For example, for residential and 
commercial energy uses, COj emissions mclude those from direct fuel combustion as well as those emissions that originate from 
the generation of electiicity consumed by the residential and commercial sectors. Finally, an emissions balance by source 
category is given, m which emissions are accounted for at the level of prunary energy (solids, liquids, and gases), again after 
Watson et al. (1996b). Non-energy emissions are included in a separate "others" category. Combined, these different emission 
balances can serve as data input for subsequent mitigation analyses at the sectoral level or at that of the entire economy. 
Box 5.2 continues 
2 5 4 E m i s s i o n Scénarios 
1Л 
< 1 
00 
oo 
a \ 
CN 
VO CN 
о 
< 00 00 
a \ 
со 
CN 
00 
un OO о со 
CN 
PQ 
< 
U 
< 
О 
r—I 
< 
< 
CN 
PQ 
(N CN 00 
ЧО OO os 
CN CN 
OS СО CN 00 
со ov «Л1 oo Os Os о со 00 CN 
T—I со 
со 
T-H 
H 
< 
со os oo 
Ю со r- 00 m о r ~ ^ 
VO VI Ю 
<N 0 \ VO 00 CN Os OO 
CN со CN OO CN , - H 
t kn oo VD СО VO i n О СО 
T-H T*H T-H CN T-H 
CQ со CN О СО CN oo VO OO rl- CN T-H 
T-H С4 r - 00 Ov 
T-H CN CN T-H со 
Os 
I < л 
CN Cï\ Ov Г-- СО OO 
r—< 7 I r 
I VO 
со en со 00 
VO 
T-H 8 CN C3S 00 со VO 
со о о 
00 
V O 
r-
o oo oo 
о СО О CN U-1 'S- СО О CN 
T-H о т-Н а\ 00 CN т-Н т-Н СО со о СО О ГО 
T-H т-Н т-Н tN Т-Н Т-Н f -
oo о 
со г- VO Os о ^ VO CN о Ov OO os CN Ov СО f-- oo о ^ со 
00 cvl со VO Ov oo os VO 00 
Т Ч lO Ov r -CN ^ 
ro 00 rl- со VO i n oo - H о OV VO Ov 3 : 
PQ CN Ov VO Os 00 о со со о Ov о со VO СО со СО 00 СО Ov oo со чо 00 со VO t-- О T-H со чо CN I—Í T-H 1 со m со 1 со t-~- T—( i n со T-H т-Н 
>n VO VO VO VO oo T-H VO О СО T-H 
CQ о со VO со VO со Ov о Ov VO T-H 00 T-H CN о r - со T-H T-H VO чо «O C3S CN CN 5 CN n- со T 5 
со со Tl- CO ov T-H CO i -H CO VO CO c^ CO oo Tf OS CN о CN VO t ^ oo Ov CN VO CN 00 c^ 00 CO T-H c^ CN CN со Ov V£> W-) OS Tl- Tl- 00 T-H Tl- Tl- Ov v-> Tf OS <N Tf T-H OO Ov T-H oo (N Tf 00 CN r -4 CN CN <N 
т-Н О CN CO ^ VD CN t-- VO CN VO T-H CN 00 Tt- о О oo Ov CO Ov o T-H Ov VO U-1 Tf CO OV Ю T-H Ov 2; CN 00 T-H CO Tf Tf CO T-H CO T-H CO CN T-H OV T-H CO Tf VO CN m ^ T-H 
n- oo c^ 00 lO r- oo OS CJv VO CN Ti­ CÎV OS VO T-H i n О о VO CN T—t lO VO 00 VO Tl- CO 00 CO co CO 00 00 CN OO Os Ov Ti­ CN T-H О о Tt- T-H О Tf T-H ГО T-H О со es T-H IT) 1 Tl- ov 1 CN Tf Tf T-H CN CN T—f CN 
Ov 
T-H 
Tf 
OS 
CN 
T-H S 00 CO VO VO VO О Ov CO CN О 00 00 CN VO C3V CN CO о 
CO о i n ^ 2 (N О VO Ov i n t-- CN T-H 00 CN CN T-H 00 i n CO oo 00 VO CN CO CO Tf 1 T-H CN О T-H Tf t-- 1 —< (N t - VO T-H CN 
CN 00 VD CN <n i n CN T-H Os T-» VO t— OS ^ co Ov CO T-H OV t - О VO Tf ^ f t> Tf CO Tf CJv CO о Tf О CN CO OO Ov T-H T—( VO OO 00 ^ VO CJv VO CN CN CO 1 Tf CN Tf 1 ГЧ CN i n r f CN 
T-H 
О Tf r-4 t-- S VO CO OV CN 00 VO CO о CN CN CO CN C3v О 00 Ov CO 00 i n T^ Т-Ч CO OO CO Tf CO oo Ov T-H 
T-H 
Tf 
T—1 
Tf i n 
(N 
OO T-H t s 
T-H 
CO 
CO t s 
T-H 
CN i n CN Tf 
T-H 
CO as T-H CO ov 1 i n S Г- VO m oo rsi O VO - H (N CN t~-ЧО о as VO VO VO CN VO CO CO CO VO CN Ov CO 
°> 
CO T—t ov T-H <îv CO 00 00 m CO CN cs 1 oo CO T-H Tf oo CO Tf oo 
VO О О oo T f 
о о i n 00 
CO 
VO 00 (N CO Ov i n T-H oo CO 00 CO ЧО t-~ i n i n i n VO 
VO CN 00 CN Tf 00 о t-^ T-H 
CO t-- —< о CO (N CN " Т-Ч t~-
E m i s s i o n Scenanos 255 
the base-year emissions of ПОП-СО2 GHGs are subject to 
considerable uncertainty, in particular when it comes to 
regional and sectoral breakdowns. 
Emissions of ПОП-СО2 radiatively important gases are subject 
to considerable and unresolved uncertainties and are driven by 
a more complex set of forces than C O , emissions. Therefore, 
the types of models employed for the SRES analyses are not 
expected to produce unambiguous and widely approved 
estimates of emissions of these gases for a period of over a 
century. Despite the limited knowledge, at some point in time 
causal relationships between driving forces and non-COj 
emissions need to be crafted mto the models for the sake of 
completeness. Even if new insights are generated by specialist 
researchers m certain fields of environmental science, and 
these become accepted as the mainstream view, their adoption 
in the models is often far from straightforward, as appropriate 
links to drivers may not be readily available in the underlying 
structure. Limited manpower and resources imply that 
priorities must be assigned when deciding on further model 
development, and as a consequence the models lag behind 
"common wisdom" in certain areas. Of course, this does not 
necessarily limit their abilities to capture major trends at a 
more aggregate level, the mam purpose of these models. 
In the following sections emission trajectories generated in the 
SRES scenarios are presented and discussed. However, model 
structures and properties, and exogenous assumptions made by 
the modelers involved, may give rise to systematic deviations 
within scenario families that may prove very significant 
compared to average inter-family differences. Further 
investigation and analysis is required to understand these issues 
more fully. 
5 . 4 . 1 . M e t h a n e 
In the IPCC WGI SAR, anthropogenic CH^ emissions in the 
year 1990 were estimated at 375 ± 75 MtCH^ (Houghton et a l . , 
1996) and are shown in Table 5-3. These emissions arise from 
a variety of activities, dominated by biogenic processes that are 
often subject to considerable uncertainties (see Chapter 3). 
CH4 emissions across the six models used to generate the 
SRES scenarios for 1990 range between 298 and 337 MtCH^. 
After standardization (see Box 5-1), the base-year emissions in 
the SRES scenarios were set to 310 MtCH4, within the range 
mentioned above. About one-quarter of the total emissions are 
related to fossil fuel extraction (CH^ emissions from coal 
mines, C H 4 venting from oil extracrion), transport and 
distribution (e.g., leakage from pipelines), and consumption 
(incomplete combustion). The biogenic sources include 
agricuUure (enteric fermentation, rice paddies, and animal 
waste), biomass buming, and waste management (landfills, 
sewage). Based on this source list, future CH^ emission 
trajectories depend upon such variables as volumes of fossil 
fuels used in the scenarios, regional demographic and affluence 
developments, and assumptions on preferred diets and 
agricultural practices. 
Results from the 40 SRES scenarios indicate that uncertainties 
surrounding future CH^ emission levels are likely to increase 
over time (Figure 5-5). By 2050 the range across all scenarios 
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Figure 5-5: Standardized global СН^ emissions for SRES scenarios, classified into four scenario families (each denoted by a 
dilïerent color code - A I , red; A2, brown; B l , green; B2, blue). Marker scenarios are shown with thick lines without ticks, 
globally hannonized scenarios with thin lines, and non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see Table 4-3). Black 
lines show percentiles, means, and medians for the SRES scenarios. For numbers on the two additional illustrative scenarios 
AlFI and A I T see Appendix VII. 
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T a b l e 5-5: CH^ emissions ( M l C H J by r e g i o n a n d emissions sector f o r t h e f o u r m a r l c e r s c e n a r i o s ( A l B - A J M , A2-ASF, B l -
I M A G E , a n d B 2 - M E S S A G E ) . C a t e g o r i e s a r e a g r i c u l t u r a l a n i m a l s ( e n t e r i c f e r m e n t a t i o n a n d a n i m a l w a s t e ) , r i c e p r o d u c t i o n , 
biomass b u r n i n g , landfills a n d sewage t r e a t m e n t , a n d f o s s i l f u e l use ( e x t r a c t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d c o n s u m p t i o n ) . E m i s s i o n s a r e 
p r o v i d e d i n n o n - s t a n d a r d i z e d o r " r a w " f o r m a t a n d a r e n o t c o m p a r a b l e w i t h s t a n d a r d i z e d e m i s s i o n estimates used i n t h e figures 
a n d o t h e r t a b l e s . 
1990 2050 2100 
Source Region A l B A2 B l B2 AlB A2 B l B2 AlB A2 B l B2 
Agricultural Animals 
OECD90 18 27 21 18 19 38 18 19 20 42 14 20 
REF 12 14 U 12 13 18 9 13 13 22 6 13 
ASIA 23 25 23 23 23 75 34 23 23 102 26 24 
A L M 27 30 30 27 28 92 41 28 28 151 33 29 
Sub-total 80 97 84 82 83 223 104 84 84 317 81 87 
Rice 
OECD90 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 
REF 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
ASIA 52 53 25 54 51 80 21 58 51 80 15 64 
A L M 5 5 2 5 5 8 3 6 5 11 3 6 
Sub-total 60 60 29 61 59 91 25 66 58 93 19 73 
Biomass Burning 
OECD90 7 1 2 7 7 2 1 8 7 2 1 9 
REF 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 
ASIA 16 7 7 16 8 10 1 9 8 11 1 10 
A L M 20 18 19 20 4 23 7 5 5 23 7 5 
Sub-total 45 27 30 46 21 35 10 24 21 36 9 26 
Landfíll + Sewage 
OECD90 23 22 23 23 9 32 22 10 5 44 18 7 
REF 7 5 6 7 6 6 6 14 1 8 4 4 
ASIA 19 16 20 19 110 32 49 131 17 41 32 111 
A L M 12 10 13 12 66 30 42 67 18 44 33 97 
Sub-total 61 51 61 62 191 99 119 222 42 137 85 218 
Fossil Fuels 
OECD90 31 22 28 19 23 33 21 20 17 77 13 31 
REF 37 21 35 24 34 51 17 27 30 110 9 30 
ASIA 14 13 14 14 25 36 28 27 22 81 8 78 
A L M 10 12 17 11 27 42 41 29 26 51 16 47 
Sub-total 91 69 94 68 110 162 104 104 95 319 46 187 
Total 
OECD90 81 74 76 70 60 106 63 60 51 166 47 69 
REF 57 42 53 47 55 76 32 56 47 141 19 50 
ASIA 123 113 89 127 218 233 132 249 121 314 80 287 
A L M 75 75 81 76 131 195 134 135 82 280 92 185 
Total 337 304 298 318 464 611 361 500 300 902 239 592 
Per-capita Methane Emissions (kg/person) 
Total (MtCH^) 1990 2050 2100 
Region AlB A2 B l B2 A l B A2 B l B2 A l B A2 B l B2 
OECD90 95 87 95 83 56 92 63 61 46 111 46 74 
REF 139 100 128 110 131 147 74 139 139 200 55 133 
ASIA 44 41 32 46 52 40 31 53 42 43 28 58 
A L M 63 61 63 61 44 51 44 41 30 51 33 4 
Total 64 58 56 60 53 54 41 53 43 60 34 57 
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is between 359 and 671 MtCH^, and the range increases further 
to levels between 236 and 1069 MtCH^ by 2100. This wide 
range in the SRES emissions reflects new information and 
additional uncertainties conceming certain source categories 
such as sewage systems. As for COj emissions related to land 
use (see Section 5.3.2), at least one scenario from all four 
SRES scenario families falls within the 25* and 75* 
percentiles of the emission range. Thus, very different future 
developments in energy and agricultural systems could lead to 
similar outcomes in terms of global CH^ emissions, even if the 
source categories and regional pattems of these emissions are 
very different. At the same time, the uncertainty range for any 
given scenario family is also substantial, as indicated by the 
range of 2100 emissions for the A l , A2, and B l scenario 
families in Figure 5-5. 
The subsequent sections discuss CH^ emission trajectories for 
individual scenario families, with sectoral and regional patterns 
described on the basis of the output of marker scenarios. 
5 . 4 . 1 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The A l family of scenarios covers close to the full range of 
C H 4 emissions in all the SRES scenarios (Figure 5-5). A l C -
A I M shows the highest emissions before 2050 and A I G -
MiniCam scenario shows them after 2050 (Figure 5-6a). In 
three A l fossil scenarios ( A l G - M i n i C A M , A l C - M i n i C A M , 
and A l C - M E S S A G E ) and in both alternative M i n i C A M 
scenarios ( A l V l - M i n i C A M and A I V 2 - M i n i C A M ) emissions 
increase continuously through the 2U ' century, while in the rest 
of the A l scenarios emissions peak between 2030 and 2050 
and decline thereafter. 
In the A l B marker scenario ( A l B - A I M ) emissions increase 
through 2030 and subsequently decline to levels similar to 
those in 1990 (Figure 5-6a). Almost all of the emissions 
dynamics in A l B - A I M are explained by a rise in emissions 
from landfills, sewage, and fossil fuel production. At the same 
time emissions from agriculture are relatively flat because 
better management of animal wastes and high productivity are 
assumed to offset the effect of increased food requirements 
(Table 5-5). Growing population and per capita income 
combined with increased use of landfills generates increasing 
emissions from landfills and sewage in developing countries 
through 2030. After 2030, declining population levels, the 
introduction of modem management techniques, and increased 
recycling reduces waste sent to landfills and thus emissions 
from these wastes. Emissions from biomass buming in A l B -
AIM are assumed to decline steadily through the adoption of 
bio-recycling and other "no-waste" agricultural practices. 
Similarly, CH^ emissions from fossil fuel production and use 
grow thi'ough 2030 and subsequently decline as fossil fuel 
production falls. 
5.4.1.2. A2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The A2 family of scenarios contributes the upper half of the 
full range of CH^ emissions in the SRES scenarios (Figure 5-
5). The global CH^ emissions in the A2 family scenarios grow 
continuously thioughout the 2P ' century and range from 550 to 
1070 MtCH4 in 2100 (Figure 5-6b). The rate of growth 
depends on the scenario-specific dynamics of major CH^ 
emission drivers. Emissions in the A2-ASF scenario, which are 
close to the upper end of the range, are driven mainly by 
increases in coal production, livestock population, and waste 
management capacity to satisfy the needs of an expanding 
population (Table 5-5). At the lower end of the emission range 
are the two M i n i C A M scenarios and A 2 - A I M . Relatively slow 
emission growth in the M i n i C A M scenarios is attributed 
primarily to an increase in rice productivity (which offsets an 
increase in the area of rice fields) and a shift in livestock 
production from cattie to animal groups that have notably 
lower emission factors per animal (e.g. poultry and swine). In 
the A 2 - A I M scenario low CH^ emissions are caused by 
relatively low CH^ emission factors for coal production and a 
relatively slow increase in livestock production. 
5 . 4 . 1 . 3 . B l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The В1 family of scenarios covers the lower half of the full 
range of CH4 emissions in the SRES scenarios, with the B l -
I M A G E marker scenario positioned at the low end of this range 
(Figure 5-5). Global emissions in B l - I M A G E grow through to 
2030, driven primarily by increased emissions from landfills 
and sewage (Figure 5-6c). This growth is partially offset by 
declines in emissions from biomass burning (Table 5-5). After 
2030, emissions level off and subsequently decline from 2050, 
a reflection of reductions in fossil fuel production and use. 
Emissions from other sources, which include enteric 
femientation and rice production, also decline, primarily from 
the combination of stabilizing and declining populations with 
continued improvements in slaughter weight and off-take rate. 
The В I - A I M scenario lies in the middle of the range for the B l 
family. C H 4 emissions in this scenario increase through to 
2050, with most of the increase associated with landfills and 
sewage systems. After 2050, emissions from landfills decline 
because of a combination of factors that include recycling and 
a declining population. Emissions from sewage decrease after 
2050 through the decline in population. Emissions from rice 
production stay relatively flat because of increases in rice 
productivity. Emissions from fossil fuel production increase 
through to 2030 and subsequentiy decline, which mirrors the 
increase in production of fossil fuels through to 2030 and the 
increased use of renewable energy after 2030. Unlike other В1 
scenarios, both M i n i C A M cases have emissions that 
continuously increase (Figure 5-6c). The reason is a slow rise 
in non-energy system emissions for the В1-MiniCAM 
scenario, which offsets the decrease in energy system 
emissions and the nearly constant emissions in the agriculture 
sector. In the B l H i g h - M i n i C A M scenario, the additional 
energy demand designed into this scenario is met largely by an 
increased use of natural gas, which thus explains the faster rise 
in CH^ emissions in this scenario as compared to the base B l 
M i n i C A M scenario. 
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Figure 5-6a: Standardized global C H 4 emissions in the A l family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). In the SPM, A l C and A I G scenarios are merged into one fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group (see also footnote 2). 
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Figure 5-6b: Standardized global C H 4 emissions in the A2 family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). 
5 . 4 . 1 . 4 . B2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
C H 4 emission trajectories of the В 2 family of scenarios are 
located in the middle of the SRES range and (except for the 
B2-AIM scenario) follow very similar paths (Figure 5-6d). 
Similar emission profiles in B2 scenarios may have different 
explanations. The increase in emissions from 1990 to 2100 in 
the B2-MESSAGE scenario is predominantiy from landfills 
and sewage, with fossil-fuel energy production as the second 
major source. However, in the B2-ASF scenario increasing 
volumes of CH^ are generated mostiy in the energy and 
agricultural sectors. Unlike the rest of the B2 family, the B2-
A I M scenario emissions after 2070 decline because of an 
increase in the C H ^ recovery rate from energy and waste 
management systems. 
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Figure 5-6d: Standardized global CH^ emissions in the B2 family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). 
5.4.1.5. I n t e r - F a m i l y C o m p a r i s o n 
Global CH4 emissions in all the four markers increase at about 
the same rate up to 2020 (Figure 5-5). After the early and rapid 
increase in agricultural productivity and a shift away from 
fossil fuels, emissions in the B l marker (B l - IMAGE) level off 
and subsequently decline. Emissions in the other three markers 
continue to increase. Emissions in the A l B marker ( A l B - A I M ) 
grow to 2030 because of an increasing and much more affluent 
population in developing regions. The emissions subsequently 
decline until 2100 as the population growth slows and 
eventually reverses. Increases in efficiency and productivity, 
through rapid technological change, offset increases in 
consumption (AI global GDP is the largest among the SRES 
storylines), so that by 2100 global emissions per person are 
lower than in 1990 even though average incomes grow very 
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significantly (Table 5-5). In the A2 (A2-ASF) and B2 (B2-
MESSAGE) markers, emissions increase throughout the whole 
time horizon to the year 2100. This increase is most 
pronounced in the A2 marker scenario, in which emissions 
reach about 900 MtCH^ by 2100 (about a three-fold increase of 
1990 levels). The emission level by 2100 for the B2 marker, 
600 MtCH^, is about twice as high as in 1990. 
The four SRES marker scenarios illustrate a complexity of 
relative impacts of technology, GDP, and population on CH^ 
emissions. In 2050 and 2100 the A2 and B2 markers have very 
similar per capita emissions, which indicates a certain 
similarity between the cumulative impact of economic, 
technological, and structural changes on emissions in both of 
these scenarios (in spite of significant differences in the global 
average per capita incomes). Hence, differences in the absolute 
emission levels in these scenarios can be explained primarily 
by differences in population trajectories, with the A2 
population in 2100 being 1.5 times larger than the B2 
population. At the same time, differences in the absolute 
emissions between the A l B and B l markers cannot be 
explained by population size (both markers have the same 
population trajectory), but instead result from the greater 
emphasis on "dematerialization" and "sustainability" in the В1 
storyline. The two illustrative scenarios A l G - M i n i C A M and 
A I T - M E S S A G E display similar pattems of methane emissions 
as the A2 and B l marker scenarios respectively and are 
therefore not discussed separately here. 
At the sectoral level, CH^ emissions in the A l B marker 
originate primarily from landfills and sewage followed by 
fossil fuel production and agricultural animals (Table 5-5). 
Agricultural animals are the major source of emissions in the 
A2 marker, with fossil fuels being second, and landfills and 
sewage third in importance. In the B l marker, fossil fuels 
produce the largest volumes of CH^, followed by agricultural 
sources (Table 5-5). Finally, the B2 marker emissions originate 
primarily from landfills and sewage, followed by fossil fuels 
5.4.2. N i t r o u s Oxide 
Uncertainties in the estimates of current N , 0 emissions (Table 
5-3) are also reflected in base-year 1990 differences, between 
4.8 and 6.9 M t N across the six models used to develop the 
SRES scenarios. The range across the four markers (Table 5-3) 
is not as wide, between 6.0 and 6.9 MtN, and leans more toward 
the higher end of the uncertainty range reported in Houghton et 
a l . (1995). After standardization, 1990 N^O emissions in the 
SRES scenarios were set to 6.7 MtN, well within the IPCC 
WGI SAR range (Table 5-3). Even more so than for CH^, food 
supply is assumed to be a key determinant of future N2O 
emissions. Size, age structure, and regional spread of the global 
population are likely to affect future emission trajectories, 
together with diets and rates of improvement in agricultural 
productivity. The representation of how these driving forces 
translate into NjO emissions varies across the models because 
of differences in both sectoral coverage and emission factors. 
As a result, differences in emission trajectories are not only 
scenario dependent, but also model dependent, which illustrates 
additional uncertainties in our understanding and representation 
of driving forces and their influence on N2O emissions. 
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Figure 5-7: Standardized global NjO emissions for SRES scenarios, classified into four scenario families (each denoted by a 
difterent color code - A l , red; A2, brown; B l , green; B2, blue). Marker scenarios are shown with thick lines without ticks, 
globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted tines (see Table 4-3). Black lines 
show percentiles, means, and medians for SRES scenarios. For numbers on the two additional illustrative scenarios A l F I and 
A I T see Appendix VII. 
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The range of emissions across all 40 SRES scenarios increases 
continuously over the 2P ' century (Figure 5-7). By 2100, Щ0 
emissions range between 5 and 20 MtN. Emission ranges also 
tend to be comparable across the four scenario storylines, an 
indication of the decisive impact of uncertainty in the modeling 
(mentioned above). Future N2O emissions in the SRES 
scenarios tend to cluster into two broad groups - those that 
project relatively flat, even slightly declining, emissions and 
those that indicate continuously rising trends toward high 
emission levels. Some other scenarios (e.g. A l B - A S F , B l - A S F , 
and B l - I M A G E ) indicate the possibility of transitional 
emission pattems in which N2O emissions peak around 2050 
and decline thereafter, more or less in step with the population 
size. As a result of differences in modeling approaches, no 
individual scenario tracks the mean or median across all 40 
scenarios of the SRES set. 
5 . 4 . 2 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The A l family of scenarios covers close to the full range of 
N , 0 emissions from the SRES scenarios (Figure 5-7). The 
A l G - M i n i C A M scenario is at the high end of the A l range 
(Figure 5-8a). Most of the emissions increase in this scenario 
is associated with the agriculture sector, primarily with animal 
manure management. Emissions are driven by a rapid increase 
in income that induces steep increases in meat and dairy 
consumption. The A l B - A I M marker scenario has emissions 
near the low end of the range. This scenario assumes that 
fertilizer use in developing countries is nearly saturated and 
that increased productivity comes from better management. A 
portion of nitrogen from fertitizers is also assumed to be stored 
indefinitely in underground water. However, the emissions 
from energy use in A l B - A I M increase until the third quarter of 
the 2V century, and reach a level about three times the 1990 
volume. In the middle of the A l family range lie emissions 
from the A l B - A S F and A l B - I M A G E scenarios (Figure 5-8a). 
In these scenarios, emissions growth to the 2050s is driven by 
growth in the agricultural and transportation sectors. 
Thereafter, emissions decline, primarily because of declining 
population levels and increases in agricultural productivity 
(lower production factor input per unit of output). 
As suggested by Figure 5-8a, differences in the energy supply 
system reflected by the four A l scenario groups (AIG, A l C , 
AIT, and A l or "balance") are only partially translated into 
differences in N^O emissions. For example, scenarios that rely 
on coal as the primary energy source span the range from 6 
M t N ( A l C - M E S S A G E ) to 16 M t N ( A l C - M i n i C A M ) . At the 
same time, trajectories of A I T "technology" scenarios are 
located in the lower end of the emissions range. 
5.4.2.2. A2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
N , 0 emission trajectories of the A2 scenario family fall into 
two major groups. The first group includes the A 2 - A I M and 
A2-MESSAGE scenarios, and the rest of scenarios fomi the 
second group. The A 2 - A I M NjO emissions increase at a 
relatively low rate and do not exceed 10 M t N in 2100 (Figure 
5-8b), because of a relatively slow increase in nitrogen 
fertilizer input and omission of N , 0 sources associated with 
animal wastes. N2O emissions in the second group of scenarios 
(which includes the family marker A2-ASF) grow steadily 
throughout the 2U ' century, driven by an increased demand for 
food and associated increases in the animal waste and nitrogen 
fertilizer use (Table 5-6). In 2100 the emissions from this group 
of scenarios range from 15 to 20 MtN. 
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Figure 5-8a: Standardized global emissions in the A l family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). In the SPM, A l C and A I G scenarios are merged into one fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group (see also footnote 2). 
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T a b l e 5-6: N f i emissions (MtN) by s o u r c e f o r t h e m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s ( A l B - A I M , A2-ASF, B l - I M A G E , a n d B 2 - M E S S A G E ) . 
C a t e g o r i e s a r e f e r t i h z e d s o i l s a n d m a n w e , f o s s i l f u e l use a n d i n d u s t r i a l processes ( a d i p i c a n d n i t r i c a c i d p r o d u c t i o n ) , a n d 
o t h e r emissions. The " o t h e r " c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s biomass b u r n i n g , l a r t d - u s e c h a n g e , a n d sewage t r e a t m e n t ( i n some m o d e l s ) . 
E m i s s i o n s a r e p r o v i d e d i n a n o n - s t a n d a r d i z e d o r " r a w " f o r m a t a n d a r e n o t c o m p a r a b l e w i t h s t a n d a r d i z e d e m i s s i o n estimates 
used i n t h e f i g u r e s a n d o t h e r t a b l e s . 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Fertilized Soils 
-1- Manure A I B 4.41 4.32 4.30 4.29 4.28 4.26 4.23 4.20 4.17 4.15 4.15 4.14 
A2 4.83 6.20 7.19 8.44 9.33 10.20 10.48 11.37 12.26 13.04 13.61 14.39 
B l 4.70 5.10 5.60 6.10 6.30 6.30 6.10 5.90 5.60 5.20 4.90 4.50 
B2 4.15 5.03 4.45 4.54 4.63 4.70 4.78 4.86 4.95 5.03 5.12 5.21 
Industry 
+ Fossil Fuels A I B 1.22 1.29 1.46 1.80 2.05 2.13 2.21 2.11 2.02 1.95 1.92 1.89 
A2 0.99 0.73 0.70 0.85 0.95 1.02 1.04 1.07 l.IO 1.13 1.19 1.22 
B l 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.90 
B2 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.03 1.06 1.08 
Other 
A I B 1.32 0.64 0.52 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 
A2 0.75 0.86 0.95 1.42 1.16 1.22 1.24 1.28 1.33 1.42 1.60 1.69 
B l 0.40 0.60 0.70 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
B2 I.2I 0.68 0.48 0.30 0.24 0.25 0.26 0,26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 
Total 
A I B 6.95 6.25 6.28 6.42 6.59 6.63 6.67 6.54 6.43 6.35 6.32 6.28 
A2 6.57 7.79 8.84 10.71 11.44 12.44 12.76 13.72 14.69 15.59 16.40 17.30 
B l 6.00 6.60 7.30 7.80 8.10 8.10 7.90 7.60 7.10 6.60 6.20 5.70 
B2 6.31 6.65 5.83 5.69 5.77 5.85 5.93 6.06 6.19 6.33 6.45 6.57 
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Figure S-8c: Standardized global NjO emissions in the B l family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). 
5 . 4 . 2 . 3 . B l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The spread of emissions in the В1 family is quite large. 
The high-end reflects the agricultural assumptions used in the 
M i n i C A M model, in which continued growth in meat 
production is driven by increases in per capita consumption 
that more than offset the reduction in population size (Figure 5-
8c). The B l - A I M scenario has emissions near the low end of 
the range, because fertilizer use in developing countries is 
assumed to level off and better management increases 
productivity. Emissions from animal waste, mobile sources, 
and other sources in B l - A I M are nearly constant. The B l -
IMAGE scenario ( B l family marker) has slowly increasing 
emissions through to 2050, which predominately originate 
from increases in livestock and the use of synthetic fertilizer 
(Table 5-6). After 2050, these emissions decline as the 
population size and associated demand for animal products 
declines (Figure 5-8c). The B l - A S F scenario has an 
intermediate emission trajectory with a maximum of 11.5 M t N 
in 2050 and a subsequent decline to 9.3 MtN by 2100 (Figure 
5-8c). The two illustrative scenarios A l G - M i n i C A M and AIT­
MESSAGE display similar patterns of methane emissions as 
the A2 and В1 marker scenarios, respectively, and are therefore 
not discussed separately here. 
5 . 4 . 2 . 4 . B2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The B2 family of scenarios covers a large range of N2O 
emissions, similar to that found for the A l family (see Figure 
5-7). In the B2-MESSAGE scenario (B2 family marker), which 
has the lowest emissions in the family, improvements in 
agricultural productivity exceed increases in the demand for 
agricultural products and signiñcantly slow emission growth in 
the sector (Table 5-6). Slow growth in agriculture and energy-
related emissions and declines of emissions from other sectors 
result in a relatively flat emissions proñle (Figure 5-8d). 
Emissions in the B2-ASF scenario are between the middle of 
the family range and its high end. The continuous increase in 
emissions in the B2-ASF scenario (which lie between the 
middle and high end of the family range) occurs through 
growth in nitrogen fertilizer use, in animal wastes, and in 
mobile sources. It is driven by increases in population and, to 
a smaller extent, by per capita increases in consumption of 
meat and dairy products. 
5.4.2.5. I n t e r - F a m i l y C o m p a r i s o n 
The allocation of N2O emissions into source categories for the 
SRES marker scenarios is shown in Table 5-6. Separate 
emissions estimates for fertilized soils and manure were not 
available for all scenarios. As the emissions in Table 5-6 have 
not been standardized (see Box 5-1), base-year 1990 (and 
2000) emissions are not the same for the different scenarios. In 
general, base-year emissions are likely to have greater 
differences at finer levels of detail. These differences result 
from different model calibrations, different model 
methodologies, and different classification schemes. 
Emissions from fertilized soils and manure from agricultural 
animals dominate N2O emissions in all the SRES markers. The 
fraction of total emissions from these two sources increases to 
about 80% in the A2, B l , and B2 marker scenarios, while the 
agricultural fraction remains roughly the same over the 2P ' 
century in the A l B marker. As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the 
range of future emissions is similar across each scenario family 
when all storyline inteфretations are considered. Therefore, 
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Figure 5-8d: Standardized global emissions in the B2 family scenarios. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
without ticks, the globally harmonized scenarios with thin lines, and the non-harmonized scenarios with thin, dotted lines (see 
Table 4-3). 
while it is useful to discuss emissions from the marker 
scenarios individually, clearly differences in modeling 
approaches and model assumptions have a particularly strong 
effect on future emissions. 
Agricultural emissions in the A l B - A I M marker scenario 
decrease over the 21'^ ' century, with increased productivity 
offsetting additional food demand. Agricultural emissions in 
the A2-ASF marker scenario increase substantially because of 
the food demands of a large population, coupled with less 
technological change. Emissions in the B l - I M A G E marker 
scenario increase and subsequently fall. In the B 2 - M E S S A G E 
marker, agricultural emissions of N-,0 increase steadily 
throughout most of the 2P ' century, with a decrease between 
2000 and 2010. These patterns differ because of the different 
driving forces (population and demand), model assumptions, 
and modehng approaches. 
Emissions from the categories "Industry/Fossil Fuels" and 
"Other" show a monotonie rise in the A2-ASF marker, while 
emissions in the B l - I M A G E marker rise and subsequently fall. 
Industry and fossil fuel emissions fall and then increase 
slightly in the B2-MESSAGE marker scenario, while "Other" 
emissions, which largely arise from land-use changes, fall. 
Industry and fossil fuel emissions in the A l B - A I M marker 
scenario increase through the 21" century, but are countered by 
a decrease in emissions from the "Other" category. 
The combined dynamics of NjO emissions in the A l , В1 , and 
B2 markers leads to nearly stable or declining emissions 
during most of the 2 P ' century (Figure 5-7). The B2 marker 
shows the lowest emission level (from the year 2010 to 2080), 
despite a larger population than in A I and B l . One possible 
reason is inter-model differences in treatment of land-use 
changes. Unlike the other markers, the A2-ASF scenario 
yields a continuous growth in emissions, which corresponds to 
its assumptions of high population and slow technological 
change. 
5.4.3. Halocarbons and Other Halogenated Compounds 
Emissions of halocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs, halons, PFCs, and 
HFCs) and other halogenated compounds (SFg) on a substance-
by-substance basis are described in detail in Fenhann (2000). A 
list of the substances covered, together with their GWPs and 
lifetimes (as in IPCC SAR; Houghton, et a l . 1996), is given in 
Table 5-7. 
Importantly, future emissions of halocarbons and other 
halogenated compounds strongly depend on the technologies 
involved in their production and use. New uses for these 
substances may arise or new products or technologies may 
replace current uses. It is assumed here that the current mix of 
products continues to exist for the next 100 years to 2100, with 
some generic technological improvements as described below. 
This assumption, however, means that emissions projections 
for industrial gases discussed in this section carry a substantial 
uncertainty. 
Halocarbons are carbon compounds that contain fluorine, 
chlorine, bromine, and iodine. Halocarbons that contain 
chlorine (CFCs and HCFCs) and bromine (halons) cause ozone 
depletion, and their emissions are controlled under the 
Montreal Protocol and its Adjustment and Amendments. 
According to the 1987 Montreal Protocol and its subsequent 
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T a b l e 5-7: GWPs a n d a t m o s p h e r i c l i f e t i m e s of h a l o c a r b o n s a n d o t h e r h a l o g e n a t e d c o m p o u n d s . 
Species Chemical 100 Years Atm. Lifetime 
Formula GWP Years 
CFC-11 CCI3F 4000 50 
CFC-12 CCI2F2 8500 102 
CFC-113 CCI2FCCIF2 5000 85 
CFC-114 CCIF2CCIF2 9300 300 
CFC-115 CF3CCIF2 9300 1700 
Carbon tetrachloride CCI4 1400 42 
Methyl chloroform CH3CCI3 110 4.9 
Halon-1211 CBrClF , No data 20 
Halon-1301 CBrFj ' 5600 65 
Halon-2402 CBrFjCBrFj No data 20 
HCFC-22 CHCIF2 1700 12.1 
HCFC-141b CH3CFCU 630 9.4 
HCFC-142b СНзСР,С1 2000 18.4 
HCFC-123 CF3CHCI2 93 1.4 
HFC-23 CHF3 11700 264 
HFC-32 CH2F2 650 5.6 
HFC-43-10 1300 17.1 
HFC-125 C2HF5 2800 32.6 
HFC-134a CH2FCF3 1300 14.6 
HFC-143a C2H3F3 3800 48.3 
HFC-152a C2H4F2 140 1.5 
HFC-227ea C3HF, 2900 36.5 
HFC-236fa C3H2F, 6300 209 
HFC-245ca C3H3F5 560 6.6 
Perfluoromethane CF4 6500 50000 
Perfluoroethane C2F, 9200 10000 
Perfluorobutane C4Fio 7000 2600 
Sulfur hexafluoride SF, 23900 3200 
amendments, consumption (the balance of production plus 
imports minus exports) of CFCs is largely banned in developed 
countries after January 1996 (and developing countries after 
2010), although some countries have failed to meet the 
deadline. Furthermore, H C F C consumption will be subjected 
to a gradual phase-out, with cuts from the 1986 base-year 
values of 35%, 65%, and 90% in 2004, 2010, and 2015, 
respectively. Final HCFC consumption phase-out will occur in 
2020 (2040 for developing countries). 
The six modeling teams participating in the SRES process did 
not develop their own projections for emissions of ODS and 
their subsritutes. Hence, a different approach for the 
development of long-range estimates for halocarbons and other 
halogenated compounds was adopted. First, for ODSs the 
external Montreal Protocol A3 maximum production scenario 
was used as a direct input to all SRES scenarios (WMO/UNEP, 
1998), since most measures in this A3 scenario have been 
implemented already or are well established and under way 
(and so no large scenario variation is expected). For other gas 
species, a simple methodology to develop different emission 
trajectories consistent with aggregate SRES scenario driving-
force assumptions (population, GDP, etc.) was developed. 
Also, the assumed future control rates have been adopted to 
conform to the SRES storylines presented in Chapter 4. The 
underlying literature, scenario methodology, and data are 
documented in more detail in Fenhann (2000) and are 
summarized in this section. 
The resultant emissions of Montreal gases, HFCs, PFCs, and 
SFg are summarized in Table 5-8. The effect on climate of each 
of the substances listed in Table 5-9 varies greatiy because of 
differences in both the atmospheric lifetime and the radiative 
effect per molecule of each gas, A good measure of the net 
climate effect of halocarbons and other halogenated 
compounds is provided by their radiative forcing. Radiative 
forcing will be addressed in IPCC's Third Assessment Report, 
but is not discussed in this report. 
Emissions of individual groups of halocarbons and other 
halogenated compounds in the four families of SRES scenarios 
are presented below. 
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T a b l e 5-8: G l o b a l a n t h r o p o g e n i c emissions (kt) p r o j e c t i o n s f o r O D S , H F C , P E C , a n d SF^ emissions i n t h e f o u r m a r k e r 
s c e n a r i o s . 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Marker Scenario A l A2 B l B2 A l A2 B l B2 A l A2 B l B2 
ODS 1864 253 21 1 
HFC-23 6.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
HFC-32 0.0 8.3 6.4 6.0 6.2 24.3 14.0 13.9 14.1 30.3 32.8 12.9 25.9 
HFC-43-10 0.0 8.8 7.6 6.9 7.2 18.1 10.7 10.7 11.1 30.3 21.8 10.4 17.9 
HFC-125 0.0 27.1 20.7 20.6 21.5 80.4 45.6 47.9 48.7 100.8 106.5 44.3 89.1 
HFC-134a 0.0 325.5 252.2 248.8 261.9 931.0 506.4 547.4 561.2 980.3 1259.8 486.0 1079.3 
HFC-143a 0.0 20.6 16.0 15.0 15.6 60.9 35.1 34.8 35.4 75.7 82.1 32.2 64.7 
HFC-227ea 0.0 22.2 16.6 18.5 19.7 62.1 31.5 39.4 40.7 60.6 80.4 34.4 80.0 
HFC-245ca 0.0 100.5 78.7 80.3 85.4 292.3 149.2 172.6 178.5 288.5 388.0 150.2 352.7 
HFCs-total 6.4 517.9 403.0 401.0 422.4 1470.2 793.5 867.8 890.8 1567.3 1972.4 771.4 1710.5 
15.8 21.1 25.2 15.7 27.1 43.8 45.6 20.9 52.7 57.0 88.2 22.2 59.9 
C2F6 1.6 2.1 2.5 1.6 2.7 4.4 4.6 2.1 5.5 5.7 8.8 2.2 6.0 
PFCs, total 17.4 23.2 27.7 17.3 29.8 48.2 50.2 23.0 58.2 62.7 97.0 24.4 65.9 
5.8 7.3 9.7 5.7 8.4 18.3 16.0 10.4 12.1 14.5 25.2 6.5 10.6 
Notes: ODS emissions are from scenario A3 in the UNEP/WMO Scientific A s s e s s m e n t of O z o n e D e p l e t i o n (UNEP/WMO, 1998). 
5 . 4 . 3 . 1 . H y d r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s 
HFCs are beginning to be produced as replacements for CFCs 
and HCFCs. Unlike the CFCs and the HCFCs, HFCs do not 
convey chlorine to the stratosphere and thus do not contribute 
to ozone depletion. 
For the development of future H F C emissions, Fenhann (2000) 
used a procedure based on the work by Kroeze (1995) that 
includes two steps: 
• "Virtual" future C F C emissions are first calculated 
assuming a situation without the Montreal Protocol. 
• CFCs are substituted with HFCs according to 
substitution percentages adopted from the literature 
(Table 5-9) and also the various degrees of emission 
reduction potentials from better housekeeping 
measures and technological change. 
Conceming the first step of the methodology used in Fenhaim 
(2000), 1990 CFC emissions were taken from the S c i e n t i f i c 
Assessment of t h e Ozone D e p l e t i o n (WMO/UNEP, 1998). Pre-
Montreal 1986 emissions were obtained from McCulloch et a l . 
(1994). Future "virtual" (assuming no Montreal protocol) 
emissions of CFCs were assumed to be proportional to their 
consumption, for which GDP numbers in the four marker 
scenarios were used as a driver (see Chapter 4). The saturation 
level of per capita demands was assumed to be the same in all 
four SRES scenario families. 
The projection of CFC emissions in the absence of the 
Montreal Protocol shows how emissions would change under 
conditions of unrestricted production. However, with the 
Montreal Protocol in place, other chemical compounds will be 
used to replace the Montreal gases. To compute the amount of 
CFCs replaced with these other compounds, future CFC 
emissions with the Montreal Protocol in place (according to the 
W M O / U N E P A3 ODS scenario) were first subtracted from the 
"virtual" C F C emissions. 
Different assumptions about CFC applications as well as 
substitute candidates were developed (Fenhann, 2000). These 
were initially based on Kroeze and Reijnders (1992) and 
Midgley and McCulloch (1999), and subsequentiy updated 
using the latest information from the J o i n t I P C C I T E A P Expert 
M e e t i n g o n O p t i o n s f o r t h e L i m i t a t i o n of E m i s s i o n s of H F C s 
a n d P F C s (WMO/UNEP, 1999). 
An important assumption (based on the latest infonnation from 
the industry) used in the current analysis is that relatively few 
Montreal gases wi l l be replaced completely by HFCs. 
Currentiy, HFC-134a is favored, and it is the only HFC with 
sufficiently large sales to be included in the current production 
and sales statistics (AFEAS, 1998). The global emissions of 
this gas are estimated to be 0.1 kt HFC-134a in 1990 and 42.7 
kt HFC-134a in 1997. Current data indicate that substitution 
rates of CFCs by HFCs will be less than 50%. It was shown 
recentiy that in the European Union the substitution rate of 
CFCs by HCFCs was 26%, and the HFC share was 6% or a 
total of 32% (McCulloch and Midgley, 1998). Time series data 
for the global sales from A F E A S (1998) confirm a 763 kt per 
year reduction in CFC production and use from the peak 
production year of 1987 through 1996. An increase in the total 
HFC and H C F C production and use was 340 kt per year, or a 
E m i s s i o n Scénarios 2 6 7 
T a b l e 5-9: S u b s t i t u t i o n of C F C s by H F C s a n d P F C s . 
Application From HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- HFC- C^Fjj Total 
23 32 43-10 125 134a 143a 152a 227ea 236fa 245fa 
Aerosols CFC 4.0% 4.0% 8.0% 
Cleaning/drying CFC 0.5% 0.5% 
Open cell foams CFC 0.0% 
Closed cell foams CFC 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
Stationary cooling CFC 2.0% 5.0% 25.0% 5.0% 37,0% 
Stationary cooling HCFC 
-22 2.0% 5.0% 25.0% 5.0% 37.0% 
Mobile cooling CFC 25.0% 25.0% 
Fire extinguisher Halon- 1.0% 1.0% 
(portable) 1211 
Fire extinguisher Halon- 25.0% 25.0% 
(fixed) 1301 
Other uses CFC 5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 
44% substitution up to 1996. In Fenhann (2000) future 
technological developments are assumed to result in about 25% 
of the CFCs ultimately being substituted by HFCs (Table 5-9). 
This low percentage not only reflects the introduction of non-
HFC substitutes, but also the notion that smaller amounts of 
halocarbons are used in many applications when changing to 
HFCs and that emissions are reduced by increased containment 
and recycling. A general assumption is that the present trend to 
not substitute CFCs with high GWP substances, including PFCs 
and SFg, will continue. The substitution rates shown in Table 5-
9 were used in all four scenarios; the technological options 
adopted are those known at present. Further substitution away 
from HFCs is assumed to require a climate policy. 
Hydrocarbons are expected to be the substitutes used in the 
a e r o s o l s l p r o p e l l a n t sector, except for situations in which the 
flammability of hydrocai-bons would be a problem and also in 
metered dose inhalers (to avoid possible adverse clinical 
effects). HFC-227ea and HFC-134a, and possibly HFC-152a 
are expected to replace hydrocarbons (Table 5-9; WMO/UNEP, 
1999). 
CFC-113 was used extensively as a c l e a n i n g solvent for metal, 
electronics, and textiles. The general trend in this area now is 
toward water-based systems. However, as suggested by Table 
5-9 a small fraction (0.5%) of the C F C in this sector is 
substituted by HFC-43-10 (Kroeze, 1995). 
The WMO/UNEP (1998) report states that no fluorocarbons 
are now used for open c e l l foams, an assumption also adopted 
in the scenarios. 
It is expected that closed c e l l foams and r e f r i g e r a t i o n will be 
the largest demand sectors for HFCs in the future. For c l o s e d 
cell foams, the substitution is expected to be 50%, one-half as 
HFC-134a and the other half as the liquid HFC-245fa 
(expected to be commercially available by 2002; Table 5-9) 
(Ashford, 1999). In some cases, HFC-365mfc will be used 
instead of HFC-245fa. However, all the calculations in Table 5-
9 were caiTied out for HFC245fa, since these two substances 
have almost the same climate effect. 
Prior to 1986, the main refrigerants in use were CFCs, HCFCs, 
and ammonia. In response to the Montreal Protocol, HFC and 
hydrocarbon refrigerants have been promoted as the primary 
altematives (WMO/UNEP, 1999). The main HFC assumed to be 
used for s t a t i o n a r y c o o l i n g is HFC-134a, with 5% of the demand 
substituted by HFC-125 and another 5% by HFC-143a (Kroeze, 
1995). This would agree with the reported measurements of 
these two substances in the atmosphere. According to Kroeze 
(1995) about 2% might be substituted by HFC-32. 
Before 1993, all air-conditioned cars were equipped with 
systems using CFC-12 as a refrigerant. Over the lifetime of a 
car, 0.4 kg of this halocarbon was emitted every year. In 1994, 
two years after the new refrigerant HFC-134a had become 
available globally in sufficient quantities, almost all major 
vehicle manufacturers began to use HFC-134a. This 
conversion was accompanied by a significant reduction in 
annual losses of refrigerants per car, down to 0.096 kg of 
halocarbon (Preisegger, 1999). Therefore the substitution rate 
in Table 5-9 for m o b i l e c o o l i n g is assumed to be 25%. 
In Xhe f i x e d f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s sector, only about 25% of the 
systems that formerly used halons now use HFCs, mainly 
HFC-227ea. The rest use COj, inert gas mixtures, water-based 
systems, foam, dry powder, etc. (WMO/UNEP, 1999). 
Increased environmental awareness in the industry is assumed 
to have resulted in the reduction of HFC emissions by a factor 
of three, compared to fonner practice. 
For p o r t a b l e fire e x t i n g u i s h e r s the substitution rate is assumed to 
be only 1%, even less than the 2% assumed by Kroeze (1995). 
CFCs have also been used for other puiposes, such as 
sterilants, tobacco expansion, and others. Kroeze (1995) 
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assumes a 30% substkution by HFCs. However, in the SRES 
scénarios this value is reduced to 10% to remain consistent 
with the above assumption that HFCs ultimately will substitute 
for about 25% of the CFCs. 
As well as using non-halocarbon substitutes, HFC emissions 
can be avoided by better housekeeping, for instance by reduced 
spilling of cooling agents. Leakage control equipment can also 
serve this purpose. Finally, halocarbons can be recovered for 
recycling or destruction when equipment is discarded. Some of 
this emission reduction potential is likely to be implemented as 
a result of technological changes introduced to control ODSs. 
In the SRES scenarios, reduction rates were varied over time 
and between industrialized and developing countries to reflect 
the definitive features of the underlying storylines (Chapter 4). 
Generally, the reduction rates are assumed highest in scenarios 
that emphasize sustainability and environmental policies ( B l 
family). These reductions, however, were not associated with 
any explicit G H G reduction policies, as required by the SRES 
Terms of Reference (see Appendix I). In one scenario family, 
A2, no reductions were assumed, whereas in the A l and B2 
families reduction rates were set at intermediate levels. 
In addition to consumption-related emissions of HFCs, HFC-
23 is emitted as an undesired by-product from the HCFC-22 
production process. As a result of the Montreal Protocol, the 
direct use of HCFC-22, and hence the related HFC-23 
emissions, will come to a halt in 2050. To calculate the HFC-
23 emissions, information from Oram et a l . (1998) was used 
(estimated emissions of HFC-23 at 6.4 kt in 1990). By relating 
this value to 178.1 kt HCFC-22 emitted in 1990 (WMO/UNEP, 
1999), an emissions factor of 0.036 tons of HFC-23 per ton of 
HCFC-22 was calculated and applied to estimate future 
emissions. Since this estimation procedure does not take into 
account any pollution control regulations (that are not driven 
by climate considerations), it may result in an overestimation 
of HFC-23 during the early decades of the 2P ' century, until 
H C F C production is phased out under the Montreal Protocol. 
After the phase-out of HCFC-22 consumption, some HFC-23 
emissions will still occur because of the continued HCFC-22 
feedstock production allowed under the Montreal Protocol. 
The resultant projections are shown by individual HFC in Table 
5-8. 
In general, the SRES scenaiios might underestimate HFC 
emissions if the substitution of CFCs with altematives that 
have no radiative forcing effect and with more efficient HFCs-
based technologies does not penetrate as quickly as is assumed, 
especially in developing countries. However, more effective 
technologies and/or suitable non-HFC altematives may be 
developed, which would lead t o even lower emissions. 
5.4.3.2. P e r f l u o r o c a r b o n s 
PFCs, fully fluorinated hydrocarbons, have extremely long 
atmospheric lifetimes (2600 to 50,000 years) and particularly 
high radiative forcing (Table 5-7). The production of aluminum 
is thought to be the largest source of PFCs (CF^, and CoFg ) 
emissions. These emissions are generated, primarily, by the 
anode effect, which occurs during the reduction of alumina 
(aluminum oxide) in the primary smelting process as alumina 
concentrations become too low in the smelter. Under these 
conditions, the electrolysis cell voltage increases sharply to a 
level sufficient for bath electrolysis to replace alumina 
electrolysis. This causes substantial energy loss and the release 
of fluorine, which reacts with carbon to form CF^ and CjFg. 
In 1990, the total annual global primary aluminum production 
was 19.4 Mt. Secondary aluminum production from recycling 
accounted for 21.5% of the total consumption in 1990. The 
production statistics from the World Bureau of Metal Statistics 
(1997) show that the total aluminum production was 27.5 Mt, 
and recycling has increased to 25.6%, or by about 3.5 
percentage points, in 10 years. 
The scenarios developed by Fenhann (2000) adopt a 
methodology of projecting future aluminum demand based on: 
• Aluminum consumption elasticity with respect to GDP. 
• Use of altemative assumptions conceming recycling 
rates. 
• Varying emission factors to reflect future technological 
change. 
These assumptions are altered to be in consistent with the four 
SRES scenario storylines described in Chapter 4. 
For instance, in Fenhann (2000) the aluminum consumption 
elasticity varies between 0.8 and 0.96, and the range of 
increases in aluminum recycling rates varies between 1.5 and 
3.5 percentage points per decade. The RFC emission factor 
varies according to the aluminum production technology used. 
The default emission factor from the Revised IPCC Guidelines 
(IPCC, 1997) is 1.4 k g C F / aluminum. However, Hamisch 
(1999) gives evidence that the average specific emissions of 
CF4 per ton of aluminum has decreased from about 1.0 kg to 
0.5 kg between 1985 and 1995. Accordingly, an emissions 
factor of 0.8 kgCF^/t was used for 1990 and this was assumed 
to decrease to 0.5 kg CFyt in the future. This is also in 
agreement with the value of 0.51 kgCF^/t recommended by the 
IPCC Expert Meeting on Good Practices in Inventory 
Preparation for Industrial Processes and the New Gases 
(January 1999, Washington, DC). The same sources also agree 
on an emission factor for C^Fg that is 10 times lower than that 
for CF4. This assumption was also used in the calculations 
presented here (Table 5-8). 
Aluminum production is being upgraded from highly 
inefficient smelters and practices to reduce the frequency and 
duration of the anode effect. Since aluminum smelters are large 
consumers of energy, the costs of these modifications are offset 
by savings in energy costs and are therefore assumed to occur 
in all scenarios. The ultimate reduction of the anode eiïect 
frequency and duration was assumed to reach the same level in 
all the SRES scenarios. However, scenarios vary with respect 
to the rate of introducing the underlying modifications. It is 
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technically possible to reduce the anode emissions by a factor 
of 10 (EU, 1997). This technically feasible reduction can be 
achieved by changing from the Soderberg cells currently in use 
to more modern pre-bake cells. It is assumed that this will 
happen in the A l and B l family scenarios, in which specific 
emissions of 0.15 kgCF^/t are achieved by 2040 in the 
OECD90 region and by 2090 in the other regions. In the A2 
and B2 family scenarios the same specific emissions are 
achieved later in the century in the OECD90 region and not 
until after 2100 in the other regions. 
PFCs are consumed in small amounts in such sectors as 
electronics (tracers), cosmetics, and medical applications. 
However, the only emissions included in Fenhann (2000) 
beyond aluminum production were PFCs (as CF^) from 
semiconductor production. In all SRES scenarios the emission 
estimates used are those given by Hamisch et a l . (1999) of 0.3 
kt CF4 per year in 1990, 1.1 ktCF^ in 2000, 1.0 ktCF^ in 2010, 
and constant thereafter. The use of these estimates reflects the 
voluntary agreement, in Apri l 1999, of the World 
Semiconductor Council, which represent manufacturers from 
Europe, Japan, Korea, and the US, among others. According to 
this agreement, manufacturers have adopted the emission 
reduction target for PFCs of 10% absolute reduction from 1995 
emission levels by 2010. This target encompasses over 90% of 
the total semiconductor production (WMO/UNEP, 1999). The 
total PEC emissions in the four SRES scenario families cover 
a range from 24 to 97 kt PFC in 2100 (Table 5-8; Fenhann, 
2000). 
5 . 4 . 3 . 3 . Sulfur h e x a f l u o r i d e 
SFg is an extremely stable atmospheric trace gas. A l l studies 
concur that this gas is entirely anthropogenic. Its unique 
physico-chemical properties make SFg ideally suited for many 
specialized industrial applications. Its 100-year G W P of 
23,900 is the highest of any atmospheric trace gas. In 1994, 
atmospheric concentrations of SFg were reported to rise by 
6.9% per year, which is equivalent to annual emissions of 
5,800 tSFg (Maiss et a l , 1996). 
According to several sources (Kroeze, 1995; Maiss et a l , 
1996; Victor and MacDonald, 1998), about 80% of SFg 
emissions originate from its use as an insulator in high-voltage 
electrical equipment. The remaining 20% of the present global 
SFg emissions (1200 tons per year) are emitted from 
magnesium foundries, in which SFg is used to prevent 
oxidation of molten magnesium. The global annual production 
of magnesium is about 350,000 tons (US Geological Survey, 
1998), and developing countries account for about 15% of the 
total. SFg is also used to de-gas aluminum, but since SFg reacts 
with aluminum, little or no atmospheric emissions result from 
this process. 
Major manufacturers of SFg agreed voluntarily to co-operate 
on the compilation of worldwide SFg sales data by end-use 
markets. Six companies from the US (three), Japan, Italy, and 
Germany participated in the data survey. The companies do not 
expect the total sales for magnesium foundries to increase 
before 2000 (Science & Policy Services Inc., 1997). Based on 
this information, the 1996 statistical production values were 
used for the year 2000 in the fomiulation of the scenarios 
reported in Fenhann (2000). Future production was projected 
assuming the same consumption elasticity to GDP as for 
aluminum (see discussion above). In 1996, about 41% of the 
world magnesium was produced in the US; of this, only 16% 
was processed in foundries for casting that resulted in 
emissions of SFg (Victor and MacDonald, 1998). Since the 
distribution of world foundry capacity appears to be roughly 
similar to that of world magnesium production, Fenhann 
(2000) assumes that, presently, 16% of the produced 
magnesium is processed in foundries across all regions. 
Relating this amount of the processed magnesium to the 
aforementioned emission of 1200 tSFg per year yields an 
emission factor of 21 kgSFg per ton of magnesium processed in 
foundries. The demand for magnesium in automotive 
applications as a strong lightweight replacement for steel is 
growing quickly. Hence, it is expected that the fraction of total 
magnesium production processed in foundries by 2050 will 
grow to between two to three times the present level. 
As mentioned above, no less than 80% of SFg emissions (or 
4600 tons of SFg per year at present) originate from the use of 
SFg as a gaseous insulator in high-voltage electrical equipment. 
The unique ability of SFg to quench electric arcs has enabled 
the development of safe, reliable gas-insulated high-voltage 
breakers, substations, transformers, and transmission lines. The 
demand for such electrical equipment is assumed to grow 
proportionally to electricity demand (Victor and MacDonald, 
1998; Fenhann, 2000) with an emission factor of 132.6 tSFg/EJ 
electricity. Fenhann (2000) used preliminary electricity 
generation projections from the four SRES marker scenarios 
and assumed additional various other potentials for emission 
reductions that result from more careful handling, recovery, 
recycling, and substitution of SFg. Reduction rates vary in the 
different SRES scenario storylines; the detailed assumptions 
are reported in Fenhann (2000). The SFg emissions for the four 
scenarios given in Fenhann (2000) range from 7 to 25 ktSFg in 
2100. The main driver is electricity consumption, since the 
bulk of emissions originate from electric power transmission 
(for transformers). 
SFg is also emitted from other minor sources, but for the 
purposes of this report it is assumed that uncertainty ranges 
factored into the alternative scenario formulations cover the 
emissions from these sources. 
5.5. Aerosols and Ozone Precursors 
In addition to the GHGs discussed above, aerosol particles and 
tropospheric ozone also change the radiative balance of the 
atmosphere, albeit in a spatially heterogeneous manner. Sulfate 
aerosol particles, which form as a consequence of SOj 
emissions, act as a cooling agent. Their net effect is quite 
uncertain, but is thought to offset the forcing from all ПОП-СО2 
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GHGs to date (Houghton et a l . , 1996). As interest in the role of 
sulfur has increased the since the previous IPCC assessment, 
and to encapsulate recent trends and expectations, sulfur 
emissions are discussed here in substantial detail. Nitrates, 
ammonia, organic compounds, and black carbon also 
contribute to the formation of atmospheric aerosols. 
Carbonaceous aerosols exert a small positive forcing effect, 
while the effects of other compounds and aerosols are less 
clear. Tropospheric ozone is a G H G also, with a small net 
positive forcing effect. Future tropospheric ozone levels will be 
determined by emissions of CH^, CO, N0^,, and NMVOCs . 
The last three groups are repotted and discussed here in a more 
aggregated and stylized form only, because these gases are 
short lived, their potential to form ozone is highly non-linear; 
N M V O C s are not distinguished by their reactivity, and data 
problems associated with including key sources in aggregated 
long-term models are large. 
5 . 5 . 1 . Ozone Precursors: N i t r o g e n Oxides, N o n - M e t h a n e 
Volatile O r g a n i c Compounds, and C a r b o n 
M o n o x i d e 
5 . 5 . 1 . 1 . N i t r o g e n O x i d e s 
Emissions of NO^, primarily result from the combustion of 
fossil fuels. The N0^^ concentration in exhaust gases depends 
on combustion conditions (temperature, residence time, air-to-
fuel ratio, mixing) and varies widely across different 
applications. In particular, internal combustion engines used in 
road vehicles and ships have very high emissions, although 
new designs and exhaust-gas treatment offer much lower 
specific emission levels. Recent research (Davidson and 
Kingerlee, 1997; Delmas et a l . , 1997; Mosier et a i , 1998) 
indicates that soil may be a significant source of N0^^ emissions 
also. This source, however, is not included in the models used 
in the current report. 
The 1990 NOjj emissions in the six SRES models range 
between 26.5 and 34.2 MtN, but not all the models provide a 
comprehensive description of N0^^ emissions. Some models do 
not estimate N0^ emissions at all (MARIA, MiniCAM^) , 
whereas others only include energy-related sources 
(MESSAGE) and have adopted other source categories from 
corresponding model runs derived from other models (i.e. 
AIM). Standardized (see Box 5-1 on Standardization) 1990 
N O ^ emissions in the SRES scenarios, measured as nitrogen, 
amount to 31 M t N (Figure 5-9). 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the volume of fossil fuels used for 
various energy purposes varies widely in the SRES scenario 
families. In addition, the level and timing of emission controls, 
inspired by local air quality concems, is assumed to differ. As 
a result the spread is largest within the A l scenario family, in 
* For the A l G - M i n i C A M scenario emissions from congruent model 
runs derived from other models have been estimated. 
which it is almost as large as the range across all 40 SRES 
scenarios. Up to the 2020s, all scenarios project rising N0^ 
emissions (Figure 5-9). The 25* and 75"^  percentile emissions 
corridor spans between 40 and 60 M t N by the 2020s, which 
can be inteipreted as a "central tendency" among the entire 
spectrum of the 40 SRES scenarios. Beyond 2030, 
uncertainties in emission levels increase significantly. By 2100, 
the SRES range is between 16 and 150 MtN (i.e. emissions 
decrease by a factor of two or increase by a factor of five 
compaied with 1990 levels). The median and mean emissions 
are tracked by a number of scenarios, most notably by B2-
M E S S A G E (B2 family marker) and A l B - I M A G E . In these 
scenarios, N0^^ emissions tend to increase up to 2050 and 
stabilize thereafter, the result of a gradual substitution of fossil 
fuels by altematives as well as by the increasing diffusion of 
NOj^ control technologies. Low emission futures are described 
by various B l family scenarios, whereas the upper bound for 
future NOj^ emissions is represented by scenarios of the fossil 
fuel intensive A l scenario groups (e.g. A l C - and A I G -
MESSAGE) and the high population, high fossil energy A2 
scenario family (A2-ASF, A2-MESSAGE, or A2G-IMAGE) 
(Figure 5-9). 
The fossil fuel dominated A2-ASF (A2 family marker) with 
limited environmental concern has a rapidly increasing N0^, 
üajectory (Figure 5-9). Emissions in other A2 scenarios also 
continue to grow, except in A 2 - A I M for which emissions level 
off by the last decades of the 2Г^ century. In the A l B marker 
( A l B - A I M ) , the emissions growth is initially about as strong 
as in A2-ASF, but emissions peak in 2030, and decline as the 
fossil fuel share of total primary energy falls and the remaining 
fossil fuel technologies become more advanced (Figure 5-9). 
Scenarios from other A l family groups that assume a much 
larger and continued role of fossil fuels yield much higher N0^, 
emissions, which reach 150 MtN by 2100 in the coal-based 
A l C - M E S S A G E scenario. Emission growth in the B2 family 
scenarios is less steep than in the A l family, but persists 
throughout the entire period, albeit at a declining rate. By 2100, 
emissions in the B2-MESSAGE scenario (B2 family marker) 
are about twice as large as in 1990 (Figure 5-9). B2-ASF has a 
similar trajectory, while the B2-AIM scenario has essentially 
constant NO^ emissions over the entire period. Emissions in 
the В1 marker (B1-IMAGE) are among the lowest of all the 40 
scenarios (Figure 5-9). In this scenario, emissions increase 
stops around 2050 and subsequently declines toward the end of 
the 2U' century to 60% of the current level. Other scenarios 
withm the ВI group coincide well with the В1 marker in 2100, 
although the maximum emission levels in these scenarios are 
much higher than in B l - I M A G E (Figure 5-9). 
5.5.1.2. N o n - M e t h a n e V o l a t i l e O r g a n i c C o m p o u n d s 
NMVOCs arise from fossil fuel combustion (as with N0^, 
wide ranges of emission factors are typical for internal 
combustion engines), and also from industrial processes, fuel 
storage (fugitive emissions), use of solvents (e.g., in paint and 
cleaners), and a variety of other activities. As the chemical 
reactivities of the various substances grouped under the 
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NMVOCs category are very different, so are their roles in 
ozone formation and the (potential) health hazards associated 
with NMVOCs. In this report NMVOCs are reported as one 
group. In 1990, the estimated N M V O C emissions range 
between 83 and 178 Mt, which after standardization (see Box 
5-1) translates into 140 Mt (Figure 5-10). As discussed above 
for NOjj emissions, not all models include this emissions 
category or all of its sources; the most detailed treatment of 
NMVOC emissions is given in the ASF model. 
A relatively robust trend across all 40 scenarios (see Figure 5-
10) is a gradual increase in N M V O C emissions up to about 
2050, as indicated by the 25* and 75"' percentile corridor, with 
the range between 190 and 260 Mt by that year. Beyond 2050, 
uncertainties increase with respect to both emission levels and 
hends. As for N0^ emissions discussed above, the upper 
bounds of N M V O C emissions are formed by fossil fuel 
intensive scenarios within the A l scenario family (e.g. A l B -
'^SF), and the lower bounds by the scenarios within the ВI 
family (with an impoitant altemative higher scenario B l -ASF) . 
Characteristic ranges are between 60 and 90 Mt by 2100 in the 
•ow emissions cluster and between 370 and 550 Mt in the high 
emissions cluster. A l l other scenario families and individual 
scenarios fall between these two emissions clusters, with the B2 
marker scenario (B2-MESSAGE) closely tracking the median 
of global N M V O C emissions from all the SRES scenarios. 
In the B l family marker (BI-IMAGE) emissions gradually 
decline to 60% of the 1990 level by 2100 (Figure 5-10). The 
B l - A I M and B l - M E S S A G E trajectories are similai', but differ 
somewhat from the В1 marker. They increase until the 2020s 
(AIM) or even the 2050s (MESSAGE) at modest rates, but 
subsequently decline to around or even below the В1 marker in 
2100. The B l - A S F profile, however, is radically different, 
growing faster and continuously throughout the 2P ' century. 
By 2100, the N M V O C emissions in B l - A S F increase to 350 
Mt, or 2.5 times the 1990 level. This indicates the adoption in 
this scenario of fairly different assumptions with respect to 
technological development and emission controls as compared 
to the rest of В1 scenarios. In the A2 family marker (A2-ASF) 
and B2 family marker (B2-MESSAGE), emissions grow 
steadily until 2050, by which time they are around 50% higher 
than today. Thereafter, emissions in B 2 - M E S S A G E decline 
gradually, while in the A2 marker the growth continues to reach 
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2.5 times the cuirent level by 2100 (similar to B l - A S F ) . 
Emissions in A2-MESSAGE are fairly similar to those of the 
A2 marker, while emissions in A 2 - A I M decline to 170 Mt by 
2100, only half of the A2 marker level. The trajectory in the 
A I B marker (AIB-AIM) is very distinct - up to 2060 a fast 
growth is observed to more than twice the 1990 level, after 
which emissions decline to the B2 family marker level (Figure 
5-10). A decrease of N M V O C emissions in A I B - A I M after 
2060 is explained mainly by the substitution of fossil fuels with 
renewables, especially in the transport sector. A very similar 
trajectory emerges in the A I B - M E S S A G E scenario, while the 
A l B - A S F scenario emissions grow continuously up to 2100, 
by when they are the highest of the set at 550 Mt, almost four 
times the 1990 level. 
5 . 5 . 1 . 3 . C a r b o n M o n o x i d e 
C O emissions in 1990 are estimated to range between 752 and 
984 MtCO across the models used to derive the SRES 
scenarios. The same caveats as for N0^^ and N M V O C 
emissions (see above) also apply to CO emissions - the number 
of models that represent all the emission source categories is 
limited and modeling and data uncertainties, such as emission 
factors, are considerable. As a resuh, CO emission estimates 
across the scenarios are highly model specific, as indicated by 
the overlapping ranges of the four scenario families (Figure 5-
11). From a standardized (see Box 5-1) 1990 level of 880 
MtCO the range of future emissions is rather wide for both 
medium-term and long-term time horizons. By 2020, 
emissions range from 630 to 1550 MtCO, by 2050 they range 
between 470 and 2300 MtCO, and by 2100 the range is 
between 360 and 3760 MtCO (i.e. one order of magnitude 
difference between the highest and the lowest projections). 
Focusing on the 25* and 75* percentile intervals reduces 
uncertainty ranges somewhat, but nonetheless they remain 
substantial - between 1260 and 2300 MtCO by 2100. The 
median of all 40 scenarios is tracked quite closely by the B2-
A S F scenario at the global level. 
Emissions of CO follow rather different trajectories in the SRES 
markers than emissions of NMVOCs, except the A2 marker 
(A2-ASF). Starting from the standardized (see Box 5-1) level of 
880 MtCO in 1990, emissions in the A I B marker (AlB-AlM) 
grow continuously and almost double between 1990 and 2100 
(Figure 5-11). Emissions in A I B - M E S S A G E (Roehrl and Riahi, 
2000) increase at a higher rate than in the marker and reach 
thrice the curtent level by 2100. Emissions in A l B - A S F grow as 
fast as in A I B - M E S S A G E until 2040 (1700 MtCO versus 1650 
MtCO for A I B - M E S S A G E ) , when the growth stops and 
emissions more or less stabilize. Emissions in the B 1 - I M A G E 
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Figure 5-11: Standardized global emissions of CO for SRES scenarios, classified into four scenario families (each denoted by 
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and A I T see Appendix VII. 
(B1 family marker) gradually decline to 40% of the current level 
by 2100 (Figure 5-11). Again, other B l family scenarios have 
quite different trajectories and the pattems generated by A I M , 
ASF, and MESSAGE models for the B l scenario family are 
similar to those derived by the same models for other storylines. 
The shape of the A2 family marker (A2-ASF) trajectory is very 
similar to that for NMVOCs, which suggests that these two 
substances are governed mainly by the same drivers and that 
similar assumptions with regard to improved emissions factors 
are adopted. The emission trajectory in the B2 marker (B2-
M E S S A G E ) is just below the A2 marker trajectory and is about 
2000 MtCO by 2100, more than twice the 1990 level. An 
increase of biomass energy use after 2050 becomes an important 
factor that affects emissions in this scenario. Otiier B2 family 
scenarios produced using the A I M and ASF models closely track 
the B2 marker, although emissions in these scenarios are 
somewhat lower, with those of B2-ASF at 1700 MtCO by 2100 
and of B2-AIM falling just below 1500 MtCO. 
^•^•2. Sulfur 
'aerosols result from complex atmospheric processes in which 
"^ilfur emissions play an important role. Besides sulfur, other 
substances, like NO^, ammonia, and small particles from the 
buming of fossil fuels and biomass, are involved in these 
processes. 
Global anthropogenic sulfur emissions are estimated to range 
between 65 and 90 MtS in 1990 (Houghton et a l . , 1995; 
Benkovitz et a i , 1996; Olivier et a l . , 1996; W M O , 1997). 
Reviews of most recent inventories, given in Smith et a l . 
(2000) and Grübler (1998), indicate a most likely value of 75 + 
10 MtS. These reviews draw on a large body of literature 
sources and sulfur inventories (in particular the E M E P and 
CORINAIR inventories for Europe, N A P A P for North 
America, and the most recent inventories available for Asia, 
including Akimoto and Narita (1994), Foell et a l . (1995), and 
Kato (1996)). Anthropogenic emissions add to natural sulfur 
flows, which are estimated to range between 4 and 45 MtS 
(Houghton et a l . , 1995). Pepper et a l . (1992) adopted an 
intermediary, constant natural sulfur flux of 22 MtS for the 
IS92 scenario series. 
Even with a comparatively good agreement on global sulfur 
emission levels, important uncertainties remain at the sector 
and regional levels (discussed in more detail in Alcamo et a l . 
(1997) and Grübler (1998)). The main sources of uncertainties 
are a lack of detailed inventory data (especially for developing 
countries outside Asia, but also for the non-European part of 
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A I T see Appendix VII. 
Russia), uncertainties in sulfur contents of fuels (especially 
coal) in many regions, and the use of different base years for 
development of sulfur inventories. For instance, inventories 
and scenario studies for China and Centrally Planned Asia give 
a range of sulfur emissions that differ by more than a factor of 
two (8.4 to 18 MtS) for the year 1990 (Grübler, 1998). 
Base-year differences in the available data sources are 
especially important because regional sulfur emissions trends 
have changed drastically in the past decade. Although they 
decreased strongly in Europe and North America as a result of 
sulfur control policies, they increased rapidly in Asia with 
growing energy demand and coal use. For instance, between 
1980 and 1995 sulfur emissions declined by 59% in Western 
Europe and Russia (albeit for entirely different reasons -
environmental policy limiting sulfur emissions in Westem 
Europe versus a massive economic depression in Russia), by 
37% in Eastern Europe, and by 36% in North America (ECE, 
1997). Conversely, emissions in China rose rapidly, from an 
estimated 6.6 MtS in 1985 to 9.1 MtS in 1994, or by 38% 
(Sinton, 1996; Dadi et a l . , 1998). These diverging emission 
trends and their rapid changes also require a continuous 
updating of available gridded sulfur emission inventories (e.g., 
Dignon and Hameed, 1989; Spiro et a l . , 1992; Benkovitz et a l . , 
1996; Olivier et a l . , 1996) that in, some instances, still rely on 
outdated 1980 emissions data. 
Global base-year (1990) sulfur emission values from the SRES 
models range from 63 to 77 MtS, with the addition of 3 MtS 
from international shipping.^ This difference reflects the 
existing uncertainty in sulfur emission estimates, particularly 
at the regional level. The range is within the range of values 
given by global inventories. 
Model differences at the regional level are even larger, which 
reflects the greater uncertainty of emission inventories at this 
level, particularly outside the OECD countries. To standardize 
sulfur emissions, the number of SRES reporting regions was 
increased to six regions, by splitting Latin America from the 
A L M region and Centrally Planned Asia and China from ASIA. 
Important differences in economic development status and 
resource endowments lead to different patterns of sulfur 
emissions across all SRES scenarios. Regional emissions were 
standardized (see Box 5-1) and then aggregated to the global 
level. Global standardized base-year emissions for 1990 for the 
SRES scenarios are equal to 70.9 MtS, in line with the literature 
range of global emission inventories given above. The regional 
sulfur emission profiles were also used to generate spatially 
gridded emission patterns (see Section 5.6.2 below). 
Concerning future emissions of sulfur, the SRES scenarios 
reflect recent literature and trends of sulfur control scenarios, as 
well as the conclusions from the 1994 evaluation of the IS92 
scenarios (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). Despite considerable scenario 
variability, all scenarios portray similar emission dynamics - at 
various future dates (between 2020-2030 and 2070, depending 
^ FoUowing U N energy statistics and IPCC inventory practices, 
intemational bunker fuels are included in global totals, but not in 
national/regional subtotals (and thek aggregates to global totals). 
Hence, bunker fuels are reported separately here. 
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Table 4-3). In the SPM, A l C and A I G scenarios are merged into one fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group (see also footnote 2). 
on the scenario and its underlying storyline), global SO^ 
emissions reach a maximum level and decline thereafter (Figure 
5-12). By 2030 sulfur emissions range between 40 and 160 
MtS,10 by 2070 between 20 and 165 MtS, and by 2100 between 
10 and 95 MtS. Emission trajectories of the SRES scenarios 
reflect a combined impact of different scenario driving forces 
To convert mto SO2, a unit frequently used in the sulfur scenario 
literatuie, multiply tlie MtS numbeis by 2. 
(local air quality concerns, structural change in energy supply 
and end-use, etc.), which lead to a gradual decline in sulfur 
emissions in the second half of the 2P ' century. 
Importantly, all SRES scenarios are sulfur-control scenarios 
o n l y and do not assume any additional climate policy 
measures. There is, however, an indirect effect of G H G 
emission reduction from sulfur-control policies that result in 
energy conservation and inter-fuel substitution from high 
sulfur to low sulfur fuels (e.g., from coal to gas). 
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5 . 5 . 2 . 1 . A l S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
The A l family of scenarios covers most of the range of the 40 
SRES scenarios (Figure 5-13a). The A l B - A I M marker is in the 
middle of the range and its trajectory is similar to those of 
many other scenarios - a rapid increase in the near term 
followed by a decline. Increasing fossil fuel use in developing 
countries combined with low levels of SO^ controls produces 
the near-term increase in emissions. After 2025, per capita 
incomes reach levels at which countries place more emphasis 
on the environment, resulting in emission controls on SOj (see 
Section 4.4.10). These controls, combined with a transition 
from fossil fuels to non-fossil energy, result in declining 
emissions. More detailed information as to how SO, emissions 
ше treated in the A l B - A I M scenario is provided in Box 5-3 . 
Another A l family scenario, A l G - M i n i C A M , shows similar 
behavior for the same reasons, although the increase and 
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F'igure 5-13d: Standardized global SO^ emissions in the B2 scenario family. The marker scenario is shown with a thick line 
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Table 4-3). 
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Box 5-3: Sulfur Emissions in Ше AIB-AIM Mariier Scenario 
In the A I B - A I M marker scenario, global SO2 emissions increase rapidly from 70.6 MtS m 1990 to reach a peak around 2020 
at 101 MtS, and subsequently decline to around 30 MtS after 2050. The global SOj emission trajectory follows that of the 
developing countries, for which emissions mercase because of the rapid growth of fossil fuel use driven by rapid economic 
development, combined with a lack of sulfur controls that reflect investment and infrastracture limitations. With an increase m 
personal incomes in developing countries and associated concems about local air pollution, SO2 becomes controlled in a similar 
way to that in developed countries, for which SOj emissions have declined in the past two decades. 
The sources of SOj emissions tracked by the A I M model include energy use, industrial production processes (steel and cement 
production), and biomass buming. 
The major factors of SOj emission reduction are changes in the fuel mix, use of advanced energy technology, and 
implementation of desulfurization technology. In the A I B - A I M scenario, the volume and share in total primary energy of coal 
and crade oil changes drastically over time (Table 5-10). 
T a b l e 5-10: C o a l a n d c r u d e o i l i n t h e A l - A I M s c e n a r i o i n terms of p r i m a r y energy r e q u i r e m e n t s (EJ) a n d as shares of t o t a l 
p r i m a r y energy ( % ) . 
1990 2050 2100 
Coal 85 EJ 2 4 . 6 % 140 EJ 77.7% 41 EJ 2.0% 
Crade oil 126 EJ 3 6 . 5 % 181 EJ 1 5 . 0 % 107 EJ 5.0% 
Before 2050, both advanced energy technology and desulfurization play a key role in the SO2 emissions reduction. In the power 
generation sector, integrated gasiñcation combined cycle (IGCC), fluidized bed combustion (FBC), and flue-gas desulfurization 
(FGD) technologies are adopted. In the industry and commercial sectors, F B C boilers, fuel desulfurization and F G D are 
adopted. SOj emission reductions are also achieved in the transport sector. Table 5-11 summarizes the SO2 abatement effect of 
these technologies. 
Table 5 - 1 1 : SO., e m i s s i o n r e d u c t i o n s (%>) by t e c h n o l o g y a n d sector i n t h e A l - A I M s c e n a r i o . 
Technologies SO, Emission reduction rate Note 
Power generation 
IGCC 96% Introduced after 2015 
FBC 95% 
FGD 98% 
Industry and commercial sector 
FBC 92% 
FGD 95% 
Fuel desulfurization 70% 
TVansport sector 
SO2 emission confrol 75% 
Income levels determine the time at which these technologies are introduced in the A I B - A I M scenario. According to the 
experience of SO2 emission controls in developed countries, low-income developing countries will start to introduce SOj 
emission control technologies when GDP reaches around US$3500 per capita in 1990 dollars. In A I B - A I M this threshold level 
is reached in a period of about 30 years. 
278 E m i s s i o n Scénarios 
subsequent decline in emissions is less pronounced. The 
M i n i C A M model has a higher level of controls, but also a 
greater fossil fuel use, resulting in slightly higher SO, 
emissions in 2100. 
The AIT, A I G , and A l C scenario groups assume various roles 
for the development of energy resources and technologies (the 
coal-intensive A I C scenario group, the oil- and gas-intensive 
A I G group, and the A I T scenaiio group with accelerated non-
fossil technology diffusion). Consequently, they span a very 
wide range of future sulfur emissions, ranging from 20 MtS by 
2100 in the AIT-MESSAGE scenario to 83 MtS in the A l C -
A I M scenario. 
5.5.2.2. A2 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
Sulfur emission trajectories in all the A2 family scenarios, 
except A 2 - A I - M i n i C A M with its much lower energy 
consumption, have the same general convex shape (Figure 5-
13b). However, the rime when maximum emissions are 
attained varies quite widely across the scenarios. Emissions 
peak in the A2-ASF marker scenario in 2030, in A2-
M E S S A G E in 2040, in A 2 G - I M A G E in 2050, in A2-
M i n i C A M in 2060, and in A 2 - A I M not until 2070. These 
differences are explained primarily by different assumptions 
about the mechanisms of SOj reduction adopted in different 
models. For example, the SOj reduction in A2-MESSAGE is 
explained by fundamental structural changes in the electricity 
generation technologies, while the A2-ASF scenario assumes a 
rapid introduction of inexpensive end-of-the-pipe sulfur 
scrubbers and shifts to low-sulfur fuel qualities. 
The A 2 - A 1 - M i n i C A M scenario yields a nearly flat sulfur 
emission profile, explained by a relatively slow growth in 
population and GDP in the first half of the 2P ' century 
(compared to other scenarios of the A2 family) and by 
expedited technological progress in the second half 
Numeric estimates of SOj emissions developed by different 
models ушу substantially, especially in the middle of the 
modeling period (Figure 5-13b). Emissions are largest in the 
A 2 - A I M scenario, exceeding 160 MiS in 2070. From 2020 to 
2060 the lowest emissions are produced by the A2-A1-
M i n i C A M scenario, while after 2070 the lowest emissions are 
achieved in the A2-ASF scenaiio. 
5 . 5 . 2 . 3 . ВI S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
Sulfur emissions in the ВI family scenarios fall within the 
lower third of the full range of emissions from the SRES 
scenarios (Figure 5-12). The B I - I M A G E trajectory is generally 
posifioned in the middle of the B l family range in the first 
decades of the 2P ' century, which corresponds to a 75% 
reducüon of emissions in industrialized countries between 
2000 and 2050. The near-term increase in emissions in B l -
I M A G E occurs predominantly in developing countries and is 
associated with increases in fossil fuel use in those regions, 
combined with relafively low levels of emission controls. After 
2040, increased emission controls and declines in fossil fuel 
use result in decreasing SQ2 emissions. 
Emissions in other В1 family scenarios decline even faster than 
in B l - I M A G E . In B l - A I M , a decline in emissions is directiy 
related to per capita incomes. As developing countries reach 
levels of US$3500 per capita in 1990 dollars, they start to apply 
more stringent SO, controls that lead to quickly dropping 
emission levels (Figure 5-13c). 
5 . 5 . 2 . 4 . 82 S c e n a r i o F a m i l y 
Emissions in the B2 family scenarios cover close to the full 
range of SO2 emissions (Figure 5-12). The B2-MESSAGE 
scenario yields steadily declining global emissions from 1990. 
This overall trajectory includes a tripling of emissions from 
non-energy sources by 2050, with subsequent stabilization and 
eventual decline after that (Figure 5-13d). The increase in 
emissions from non-energy sources is more than offset by very 
rapid reductions in emissions from energy sources between 
2015 and 2050. Developing countries have rising emissions 
through to 2025, which stabilize by 2050, and decfine 
thereafter. This increase in emissions in developing countries is 
offset by reductions in developed countries. These results are 
explained largely by regional measures and technological 
changes to minimize critical loads of acidic deposition (see 
Box 5-4). The B2-ASF scenario projects very rapid growth in 
emissions from energy use through 2025, primarily from 
increases in fossil fuel use in developing countries. After 2025, 
the growth in fossil fuel declines and developing countries 
become wealthier and are more aggressive on SOj emission 
controls, which in the ASF model are directiy linked to 
GDP/capita levels. Emissions from other industrial sources 
increase steadily throughout the period as economic activity 
increases. 
5.5.2.5. I n t e r - F a m i l y C o m p a r i s o n 
The relatively rapid desulfurization in the A l B - A I M marker 
compared to the other SRES markers mainly results from high 
capital turnover rates and, therefore, rapid diffusion of new and 
clean technologies combined with high income levels in the 
developing world by the middle of the 2P ' century (Figure 5-
12). The structure and pattems of sulfur emissions for the two 
illustrative scenarios in the two scenario groups A l F I and AIT 
are similar to those of the A I B and B l marker scenarios, 
respectively, and are therefore not discussed separately here. 
As technological progress and income growth are the slowest 
in A2 among all the SRES scenario families, the primary 
energy mix in the A2-ASF marker by 2100 is still dominated 
by fossil fuels, with about 50% of the primary energy supplied 
by coal. Although measures are adopted to limit local and 
regional environmental damages, sulfur-mitigation measures in 
the A2 world are less pronounced than in the other SRES 
scenarios. Therefore, global sulfur emissions in the A2 marker 
are highest as compared to the other markers (Figure 5-12). 
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Box 5-4: Future Sulfur Dioxide Emissions in tlie B2 Marker Scenario 
Future global emissions of SOj are generally lower across the SRES emissions scenarios compared to most earlier projections, 
because of three factors: 
• Switch to cleaner fuels, such as natural gas and renewable sources. 
• Transition to cleaner, more efficient coal technologies, such as IGCC generation and pressurized F B C . 
• Utilization of direct emissions-reduction technologies, such as FGD. 
The scope of reductions from fuel switching is illustrated by the following. At present, 60% of anthropogenic SO, emissions in 
developing regions are from the direct use of fossil fuels in buildings and industry (Smith et a l . , 2000). Reductions in these 
emissions will be realized by shifting from an energy stmcture that relies on the direct use of solid fuels to one that increasingly 
relies on distributed energy grids (electricity, natural gas, etc.). This shift, and a resultant decrease in SO^ emissions, has already 
occurred m Europe and North America. Further reductions are expected m the future as more efficient, and inherently low 
emission, fossil fuel technologies (such as IGCC) become commercialized. Explicit policies for sulfur emissions reductions, 
such as the use of FGD devices, will be needed to meet emissions targets in the near term, but are likely to be less necessary in 
the longer term. 
To illustrate these trends and the resultant decrease in SOj emissions over the 2P ' century, emissions in the B2-MESSAGE 
scenario (Riahi and Roehil, 2000) are analyzed. Global energy-related SO^ emissions m this B2 scenario decline from 59 MtS 
in 1990 to about 12 MtS in 2100. The primaiy causes for this reduction are the transition to more advanced coal technologies 
and desulfurization. Consistent with the characteristics of gradual change in the B2 storyline, the aggregated emissions 
coefficient'^ for power production from coal declmes from about 5.3 kgS/MWh in 1990 to 0.04 kgS/MWh in the year 2100. 
The latter emissions intensity is similar to that of the most advanced current technologies, for example, the Siemens IGCC98 
power plant featuring 0.032 kgS/MWh (Baumann et a l . , 1998). In the second half of the 2P ' century, desulfurization of the 
energy system also takes place because of the production of methanol from coal. Sulfur removal is a process-inherent featare. 
Methanol is mainly used in the transport sector as a substitute for оП products that become scarce after 2050. 
The percentage reductions m energy-related SO2 emissions in the B2 scenaiio are shown in Table 5-12 as a function of time for 
five technologies. These percentages were obtained by re-calculating the B2-MESSAGE emissions scenario with the energy 
structure and emissions coefficients held constant in time at those of 1990. In this hypothetical case, SOj emissions in 2100 
would be 227 MtS. Accordingly, energy-related SO^ emissions in 2100 are reduced by about 215 MtS in the B2 scenario, 68% 
of which results from technological change and 32% from fuel switchmg. By the year 2100 the contribution to these emissions 
reductions by flue-gas scrubbing (FGD) is negligible by the year 2100, because more-advanced coal technologies eliminate any 
need for it. Furthermore, a shift m refining technology to lighter oil products, currently underway worldwide, contributes to a 
reduction m SO, emissions, particularly in the early part of the 2P ' century. 
Table 5-12: Sources of e n e r g y - r e l a t e d SO2 emissions r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e B2 m a r k e r s c e n a r i o . 
Year Scrubbing IGCC Synfuel Light oil shift Fuel switching Total reduction 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (MtS) 
1990 100 0 0 0 0 5.1 
2020 26 16 0 24 33 58.6 
2050 11 15 2 17 54 128.9 
Following the B l storyline, in the B l - I M A G E marker the 
emphasis is on global solutions to environmental sustainability 
and improved welfare and development equity. High 
technological development rates in the renewable energy sector 
result in a continued structural shift away from fossil fuels. 
A l l emissions coefficients were calculated with the M E S S A G E 
model. 
Combined with dematerialization of the economy and with the 
most pronounced sulfur mitigation measures assumed among the 
SRES scenarios, this results in emissions that peak around 2020 
and subsequentiy decline continuously to 2100 (Figure 5-12). 
In the B2 scenario family, and thus in the B2-MESSAGE 
marker, strong emphasis is placed on regional environmental 
protection. Dynamics of technological change continue along 
historical trends ("dynamics as usual"), which are slower than 
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in tlie A l or B l familles, but faster than in the A2 family. Sulfur 
emission projections for the В 2 marker scenario were 
generated on the basis of minimization of critical loads of 
acidic deposition using the methodology described in Amann 
et a l . (1996). No explicit link between income levels and sulfur 
control regime was made in this scenario. The resultant sulfur 
emissions are 61 IVltS in 2020, 56 MtS in 2050, and 48 MtS in 
2100 (see Figure 5-12). 
A l l the SRES marker scenarios anticipate increasing levels of 
sulfur control, with rates and timing ranging from rapid 
introduction of stringent controls in B l - I M A G E to more 
gradual, later, and less stringent controls in A2-ASF. To 
illustrate the impacts of sulfur controls in the scenarios, an 
"uncontrolled sulfur" variant of the B2 marker scenario was 
calculated at the Intemational Association for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA; for details see Box 5-4). In this hypothetical 
scenario, sulfur emissions amount to 182 MtS in 2050 and 227 
MtS in 2100 (compared to 57 and 47 MtS, respectively, in the 
B2 marker scenario). These emission levels are much higher 
even than those in the A2 marker scenario (105 MtS in 2050 
and 60 MtS in 2100). 
5.6. Regional Distribution and Gridding 
Regional information on emissions serves at least two major 
purposes - to identify the contribution of world regions to the 
global total and to track shifts in the relative weight of different 
regions. This information is especially relevant for the 
development of mitigation scenarios. For climate modeling, the 
regional distribution of emissions for well-mixed GHGs (COj, 
CH^, N^O, and halocarbons) may not be that important. 
However, short-lived gases such as SO2 are radiatively 
important close to the point of origin only; their local and 
regional concentrations may significantly change the future 
climate outlook. The same is true for the group of ozone 
precursors (CO, N0^, and NMVOCs) . To be able to estimate 
tropospheric ozone concentration levels, regionalized 
information is indispensable. 
The initial evaluation showed that the 40 SRES scenarios have 
a very substantial regional variability in emissions of all 
radiatively important substances. The detailed and rigorous 
analysis of this variability falls outside the scope of the cuiTent 
report. Therefore, this section merely illustrates possible 
regional pattems based on standardized regional emissions in 
the four SRES marker scenarios (see also Kjam et a l . , 2000). 
Standardized regional outputs from the 40 SRES scenarios are 
provided in Appendix VII. 
Subsection 5.6.1 describes emissions of GHGs and SO2 in the 
four SRES macro-regions, followed by the description of 
"gridded" SOj emissions (distributed over a ГхГ grid) in 5.6.2. 
In this report represented by four macro-regions - OECD90, 
REF, ASIA, and A L M . 
5 . 6 . 1 . R e g i o n a l D i s t r i b u t i o n 
As Tables 5-13a to 5-13d clearly illustrate, the distribution of 
emissions over the four regions in the base year (1990) is very 
uneven. For example, while in industrialized regions (OECD90 
and REF) fossil and industrial COj emissions are dominant, in 
the developing regions (ASIA and A L M ) the contribution of 
land-use emissions (deforestation) is also very important. In 
1990, developing regions produced much lower volumes of 
C O , and high-GWP gases than the industrialized world, while 
their relative share of NjO, CH4, and NO^, emissions was much 
more substantial (see Figures 5-13a to 5-13d). 
5 . 6 . 1 . 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e E m i s s i o n s f r o m F o s s i l F u e l s a n d 
I n d u s t r y 
As suggested by Figure 5-14, in all the SRES scenario famihes 
the share of industriaUzed regions (OECD90 and REF) in global 
total becomes progressively smaller and by 2100 these regions 
emit from 23% to 32% of the total (Table 5-14, Figure 5-14). 
In the OECD90 region, standardized fossil fuel and industrial 
CO2 emissions in the A l B marker scenario ( A l B - A I M ) 
increase from 2.8 GtC in 1990 to 3.4 GtC in 2050, and 
subsequently decline to 2.2 GtC in 2100 (Figure 5-14). 
Compared to other scenarios, the growth in primary energy use 
in this region is relatively high, spuixed by rapid economic 
development (see also Chapter 4). However, after 2050 the 
increases in the use of primary energy are accompanied by 
declining emissions through the combination of a lower use of 
fossil fuels and a switch from coal to gas. The share of non-
fossil fuels in the OECD90 region of the A l B marker scenario 
also increases drastically. In 2100, the contribution of non-
fossil energy amounts to 68% of the total primary energy use 
of the OECD90 countries, the largest non-fossil fuel share for 
this region of all the SRES marker scenarios. 
The fossil fuel and industrial COj emission trajectory of the 
REF region is even less linear than in the OECD90 region. 
Initially, emissions decline from the base year level of 1.3 GtC 
to 1.1 GtC in 2020 because of economic restructuring. After 
2020, emissions increase, driven by an increased energy 
demand to support renewed economic growth (Figure 5-14). 
However, after 2050 emissions decline again primarily through 
a decrease in population and improved energy efficiency. By 
2100, non-fossil fuels in REF contribute 58% of the total 
primary energy use and the share of natural gas reaches almost 
40%. 
The energy and industry C O , emission growth in the ASIA 
region of the A l B marker scenario is very high, reflecting rapid 
economic growth and high energy demand. By 2100 the total 
primary energy use in this region exceeds the 1990 level more 
than 10 fold. Standardized COj emissions increase from 1.15 
GtC in 1990 to 5.73 GtC in 2050 and then drop to 5.27 GtC in 
2100 (Figure 5-14, Table 5-13c). By 2100 contributions from 
the two major energy sources, non-fossil fuels and natural gas, 
are 69% and 25%, respectively. 
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Table 5-14: R e g i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n of CO2 emissions i n t h e SRES m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s (IND r e g i o n i n c l u d e s O E C D 9 0 a n d R E F 
r e g i o n s ; a n d D E V i n c l u d e s r e g i o n A S I A a n d A L M , see A p p e n d i x IV). 
World emissions (GtC) IND (%) D E V (%) 
1990 Fossil fuel & industry 6.0 69 31 
Total 7.1 58 42 
2020 Fossil fuel & industry 9.0-12.1 38-50 50-62 
Total 9.1-12.6 37-47 53-63 
2050 Fossil fuel & industry 11.2-16.5 25-40 60-75 
Total 11.0-17.4 22-40 60-78 
2100 Fossil fuel & industry 5.2-28.9 23-32 68-77 
Total 4.2-29.1 23-32 68-77 
In the A I B marker scenario, the increase in energy demand in 
the A L M region is even higher than in the ASIA region. The 
primary energy use of 47 EJ in the base year increases to a level 
of 802 EJ in 2100, with 72% of energy from non-fossil sources. 
The emission path in this region is in line with trends observed 
in ASIA. Emissions grow from 0.72 GtC in 1990 to 5.72 GtC 
in 2050. After this peak they decline to 4.81 GtC in 2100 
(Figure 5-14, Tables 5-I3d). 
In the A2 marker scenario (A2-ASF), technological 
development is relatively slow and fossil fuels maintain their 
dominant position to supply the rapidly expanding population. 
By 2100, the contributions of coal to the total primary energy 
mix in the OECD90, R E F ASIA, and A L M regions are 52%, 
38%, 61%, and 48%, respectively, the largest shares across all 
the SRES marker scenarios. Relatively slow rates of 
technological improvements in the A2 scenai-io family result in 
the lowest contribution of non-fossil fuels compared to the 
other scenarios. In the A2 marker, COj emissions grow 
continuously in all SRES regions (except R E F from 1990 to 
2020; Figure 5-14, Tables 5-13a-d). The fastest growth occurs 
in the ASIA and A L M regions as a result of the fast population 
growth in these regions. The contribution of COj emissions by 
ASIA increases from 19% to 38% of the global total, and that 
by A L M from 12% to 31%. 
The strong trend toward more ecologically compatible 
consumption and production in the В1 storyline is reflected by 
structural changes that lead to fewer energy- and material-
intensive activities and result in a relatively limited growth of 
energy requirements in the B l marker scenario (B l - IMAGE) . 
In all the regions the shift is away from fossil fuels. In 2100, 
non-fossil sources supply more than 50% of the global energy 
requirements, with regional shares ranging from 41% (REF) to 
64% (ASIA). Drastic changes in energy systems lead to an 
eventual decline in OECD90 emissions starting from 2020; this 
30 
1990 2020 2020 2020 2020 2050 2050 2050 2050 2100 2100 2100 2100 
AIB A2 B l B2 AIB A2 Bl B2 AIB A2 Bl B2 
Figure 5-14: Regional COj emissions from fossil fuels and industrial sources in the four SRES marker scenarios. The numbers 
for the additional two illustrative scenarios for the A l F I and A I T scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can 
be found in Appendix VII. 
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staits from 2050 in other regions (Figure 5-14, Tables 5-13a-d). 
By 2100 emissions in all regions but A L M are smaller than 
they were in 1990. A decline in emissions is less pronounced in 
the developing regions - ASIA and A L M combine to produce 
around 70% of C O , emissions by in 2100. 
In the B2 world (illustrated by the B2-MESSAGE marker), the 
regions exploit comparative resource and technology 
advantages to structure their energy systems. Combined 
emissions in the OECD90 and REF regions remain more or less 
stable, changing from 4.1 GtC in 1990 to 4.3 GtC in 2100. The 
relative share of these two regions decreases from 69% in the 
base yeai- to 31% in 2100 (Figure 5-14, Tables 5-13a-d). In the 
B2 marker scenario, fossil fuel and industrial CO^ emissions in 
the OECD90 region increase to 3.71 GtC by 2020. Thereafter, 
emissions decline to 3.3 GtC in 2050 and to 3.1 GtC in 2100. 
This dynamic is caused by a decHne in the use of fossil fuels 
and by the replacement of oil with natural gas, as pressure on 
the oil resource base increases considerably after 2050. In the 
REF region, standardized fossil CO2 emissions decline to 0.8 
GtC in 2020, after which they retum to the 1990 level by 2100 
(1.2 GtC). Toward the end of the 2P ' century, primary energy 
use in this region decreases while emissions increase because of 
a switch to coal (mainly to produce liquid substitutes for oil). In 
ASIA, both primary energy use and carbon emissions increase 
during the 2P ' century. Although the use of non-fossil fuels 
becomes more important, the contribution of fossil fuels to 
emissions remains high. The use of coal, oil, and gas increases 
until 2050, after which tlie use of oil and gas decreases, while 
the use of coal grows rapidly. Population, energy use, and 
emissions in the A L M region constantly increase during the 21'" 
century. Again, the fossil fuels retain a dominant role and 
supply 47% of the energy requirements in 2100. Gas use 
increases until 2100, while the use of coal is rather stable until 
2050 and shows a rapid increase afterward. Oil use drops 
sharply after 2050 as resources become depleted. 
5.6.1.2. L a n d - U s e C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
Changes in land use are influenced primarily by the demand 
for cropland and grassland (to supply plant and animal food to 
the world population) and by the role of biomass energy. The 
uncertainty of emission estimates is reflected in the models 
used to quantify the SRES scenarios - in 1990 they range 
between 1.0 and 1.6 GtC and the spread at the regional level is 
even larger. In all the SRES marker scenarios, most emissions 
related to land use originate from the ASIA and A L M regions 
(Tables 5-13a-d). In the industrialized regions, the land-use 
change emissions in 2100 vary from -0.40 to 4-0.04 GtC. In the 
developing regions emissions from land-use change span a 
larger range (from -0.56 to -1-0.35 GtC). 
5.6.1.3. T o t a l C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
Adding land-use C O , emissions to the energy- and industry-
related emissions does not make significant changes to the 
distribution of emissions across regions (Figures 5-14 and 5-
15). Table 5-14 provides an overview of the relative shares of 
the industrialized and developing regions within global COj 
emissions. On average, the SRES marker scenarios project a 
shift in relative contribution in both energy- and industry-
related and total COj emissions from the industrialized to 
developing regions. In general, the relative contribution of 
industrialized regions is the lowest in A l and the highest in 
B2. 
Shifts in the regional emission shares (Table 5-13a-d) result 
from different developments in regional emission trajectories. 
To illustrate this, the trajectories were normalized to the base 
year (1990 = 100 for each region) and are presented in Figure 
5-16. 
Figure 5-16 confirms that C O , emissions in the ASIA and 
A L M regions in all the SRES markers grow much faster than 
30 
1990 020 2020 2020 2020 2050 2050 2050 2050 2100 2100 2100 2100 
A l B A2 B l B2 AlB A2 Bl B2 AlB A2 Bl B2 
Figure 5-15: Total CO2 emissions in the SRES marker scenarios by region. The numbers for the additional two illustrative 
scenarios for the A l F I and A I T scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can be found in Appendix VII. 
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Figure 5-16: Regional and global C O , 
emissions in the four SRES markers 
scenarios A I B , A2, B l , and B2, shown 
as an index (1990 = 100). The numbers 
for the additional two illustrative 
scenarios for the A l F I and A I T 
scenario groups noted in the Summary 
for Policymakers can be found in 
Appendix VII. 
in the industrialized regions. It also illustrates that the global 
pattern IS strongly influenced by the developing region 
trajectories. Furthermore, reflecting different development 
perspectives in the four SRES families, C O ^ emissions grow 
differently in ASIA and A L M . In the A I B marker, emission 
trajectories in A L M and ASIA are roughly parallel over the 
entire time horizon. In the В1 marker, this is only true in the 
earlier years. As the emission of A L M peaks and then declines 
later than that of ASIA, emission trajectories diverge strongly 
in the second half of the 2P ' century. In the A2 marker, 
emissions in A L M start to grow at a lower rate than in ASIA, 
but subsequently catch up and later the two are again fairly 
close. Finally, in the B2 marker, A L M emissions initially grow 
at a modest rate, close to those for the OECD90 region and the 
world average. In later years, the growth in A L M exceeds the 
global rate, but total carbon emissions remain far below those 
in the ASIA region (Figures 5-15, 5-16). 
5 . 6 . 1 . 4 . M e t h a n e 
The resultant CH^ emission trajectories in the four SRES 
markers are displayed in Figure 5-17. By 2020, regional 
differences between the four markers are minimal. In 2050, the 
largest difference is the relative share of the REF region in the 
A2 marker, attributable primarily to an increased coal and gas 
production in this region. By 2100, the A2 marker has the 
largest CH^ emissions in all the regions as compared to the 
other markers (Tables I3a-d, Figure 5-17). This arises from the 
"heterogeneous" nature of the A2 storyline, in which each 
region has to rely primarily on its own resources and progress 
in the renewable energy sector is quite limited. The second 
highest methane emissions are attained in the B2 marker, 
which also has a "regional" orientation, but with a more 
environmentally sustainable emphasis as compared to the A2 
marker. Starting from 2100, both A I B and B l markers have 
notably lower CH^ emissions in all the regions in comparison 
with the A2 and B2 markers (Figure 5-17). The regional 
emission allocation changes considerably from 1990 to 2100; 
all four markers project much greater percentages of emissions 
in the developing regions (ASIA and A L M ) . 
5.6.1.5. N i t r o u s O x i d e 
The relative shares of the OECD90, REF, ASIA, and A L M 
regions in the base year NjO emissions are 39%, 9%. 34%, and 
18%, respectively (Figure 5-18). The OECD90 emissions 
remain quite stable over the 2 F ' century in all the markers, 
except A2 in which emissions increase from 2.6 MtN in 1990 
to almost 4 MtN in 2100. Emissions in the ASIA and REF 
regions increase in the A2 marker, decline in the В1 marker 
(after an initial increase in ASIA), and do not change 
significantly in the A I and B2 markers. Finally, the A L M NjO 
emissions grow quickly in the A2 marker and remain relatively 
flat in the other markers. The relatively small changes in the 
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Figure 5-17: Anthropogenic CH^ emissions in the SRES marker scenarios by region. The numbers for the additional two 
illustrative scenarios for the A l F I and AIT scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can be found in Appendix V l l . 
NjO emissions across regions and scenarios are explained, in 
part, by a limited capacity of the SRES models to capture 
drastic shifts in technologies and practices (e.g., new catalytic 
converters or new manure management systems) that directly 
impact emission levels. 
in ASIA and A L M are increasing at much higher rates. The 
continued growth of the production and use of halocarbons and 
other halogenated compounds in the developing regions after 
2020 makes them primary eminers of these substances in all 
the markers, except the B l marker, in 2100 (Figure 5-19). 
5.6.1.6. H a l o c a r b o n s a n d O t h e r H a l o g e n a t e d C o m p o u n d s 
In 1990, emissions of halocarbons and other halogenated 
compounds occurred almost exclusively in the OECD90 
region, which contributed 95% to the world total (Figure 5-19). 
By 2020, OECD90 still remains a major emitter, but emissions 
The A l B marker has the largest emissions in all the regions in 
2050, while in 2100 the largest emissions across all the regions 
are produced in the A2 marker. Emissions in all the regions are 
smallest in the B l marker, which reflects its sustainability 
features (e.g., increased recycling and "dematerialization"). 
.¡2 
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Figure 5-18: Anthropogenic N , 0 emissions in the SRES marker scenarios by region. The numbers for the additional two 
illustrative scenarios for the A l F I and A I T scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can be found in Appendix VIL 
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Figure 5-19: Halocarbons and other halogenated compounds emissions in the SRES marker scenarios by region. The numbers 
for the additional two illustrative scenarios for the A l F I and A I T scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can 
be found in Appendix V l l . 
5.6.1.7. Sulfur 
As noted in Section 5.5.2.1, even with a comparatively good 
agreement on global sulfur emission levels, important 
uncertainties remain at the sectoral and regional levels. The 
base-year uncertainties are especially important because 
regional sulfur emissions trends have changed drastically 
during the past decade. While declining strongly in the 
industrialized regions as a result of sulfur control policies in 
Europe and North America, and because of economic reforms 
in Russia and Eastem Europe, emissions increase rapidly in 
Asia with an increase in the energy demand and coal use. 
As a general rule, in the SRES scenarios an increasing 
affluence causes energy use per capita to rise and leads to the 
substhution of solid fuels, such as coal and fuelwood, with 
energy forms of higher quality. This relationship determines 
the sulfur emission dynamics across the SRES markers and 
regions (Figure 5-20). 
)20 
1990 2020 2020 2020 2020 2050 2050 2050 2050 2100 2100 2100 2100 
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Figure 5-20: Anthropogenic SO, emissions in the SRES marker scenarios by region. The numbers for the additional two 
illustrative scenarios for the A l F I and A I T scenario groups noted in the Summary for Policymakers can be found in Appendix 
VII. 
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Figure 5-21: Distribution of emissions in 1990 (top), 
2020, 2050, 2080 and in 2100 (bottom) in the A l B mariner 
scenario. Low emission levels are indicated by shades of 
(bright) green; higher levels are indicated by shades of red 
and pink. 
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Box 5-5: Gridding of Emission Data 
The cHmate effects of SO^ are intrinsically regional and emissions on a latitude-longitude grid are required as input to climate 
models. Emissions of SOj were first standardized for four world regions as described above. Then, emissions from the marker 
scenarios for six regions (OECD90, REF, Centrally Planned Asia, Rest of Asia, Latin America, and Africa/Middle East, scaled 
to match the standardized emissions) were used for gridding purposes. For the Aimex П countries, a value of 23 MtS was taken 
for 1990 emissions, a figure derived from a compilafion of country-level emissions inventories (Smith et al., 2000). 
These emissions were mapped to a global 1° x 1° emissions grid. For each region, the pattern of total SO^ emissions from the 
EDGAR database (Olivier et ai, 1996) was scaled by the total emissions for that region and a time period. Emissions for 
OECD90 countries were first scaled individually to their country-specific values. The value of 3 MtS was added to reflect 
intemational shipping, with the pattern and magnitude of these emissions held constant. 
Emissions of other short-lived gases (CO, N0^^, NMVOCs , and CH^) also needed to be mapped to a global grid for use in 
atmospheric chemistry models. The approach taken was essentially the same, with the E D G A R database used to establish the 
spatial pattern. Standardization and subsequent gridding were carried out at the level of the origmal four world regions, and no 
specific adjustments were made for intemational shipping. 
In "high income regions" (OECD90, REF) sulfur emissions 
have already passed their peaks and are actually declining at 
present. This trend is expected to continue in all the markers, 
except A2 in which an increased use of coal "counters" a 
decline in specific emissions in OECD90 (Figure 5-20). 
Emissions in ASIA grow in all the markers by 2020, and then 
decline by 2050, and further decline by 2100. The most 
dramatic decline is registered in the A I B marker; this is related 
to its aggressive assumptions on the introduction of low-sulfur 
technologies and fuel switching in the ASIA region (see Box 5-
3 for more details). Unlike ASIA, the A L M region sees 
increases in emissions in all four markers from 2020 to 2050, 
because of the somewhat "mixed" nature of this region, which 
combines countries with substantially different affluence levels 
and development trends. However, by 2100, when low-sulfur 
technology becomes widely available everywhere, emissions in 
the A L M decline in all markers (Figure 5-20). 
5.6.2. Gridded Sulfur Emissions 
As discussed above, global sulfur emissions eventually decline 
in all SRES scenario families and associated groups. In 
addition, the regional distribution of emissions changes 
drastically over time. While in previous decades major sulfur 
emitters were located primarily in industrialized regions of the 
world, presently emissions for these sources are declining 
because of the introduction of cleaner fuels and the conversion 
to low-sulfur technologies to comply with environmental 
regulations. In the majority of SRES scenarios, this trend is 
expected to continue. Meanwhile, less-developed regions are 
anticipated to experience strong economic growth associated 
with an increased demand for energy. Especially in the short 
term, fossil fuels are likely to satisfy the major share of this 
new demand, which may lead to a steep initial growth in sulfur 
emissions. As mentioned eariier (see Section 5.5.2), at some 
point in time sulfur emissions will be controlled in all the 
scenarios and, together with shifts to essentially sulfur-free 
energy resources, they will decrease in the developing regions 
as they are decreasing now in the industrialized world. As a 
consequence of these complex dynamics, different countries 
and regions are bound to experience very different levels of 
sulfur emissions over the 2P ' century. To illustrate this. Figure 
5-21 shows gridded sulfur emissions in 1990 and 2050 in the 
A I B marker (see Box 5-5). 
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6.1. Introduction and Baclcground 
The set of 40 emissions scenarios in this Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) is based on an extensive 
assessment of the literature, six alternative modeling 
approaches, and an "open process" that solicited wide 
participation and feedback from many groups and individuals. 
The set of scenarios includes all relevant species of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs)^. This chapter provides a summary of the SRES 
emissions scenarios and compares them with the previous set 
of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) IS92 
scenarios and the underlying literature. 
The first step in the formulation of the scenarios was the review 
and analysis of the published literature and the development of 
the database with more than 400 emissions scenarios 
(accessible on the web site, www-cger.nies.go.jp/ cger-
e/db/ipcc.html). One of the recommendations of the writing 
team is that IPCC or a similar intemational institution should 
maintain such a database to ensure continuity of knowledge 
and scientific progress in any future assessments of G H G 
scenarios. A n equivalent database to document narrative and 
other quaUtative scenarios would also be very useful for future 
climate-change assessments. One difficulty encountered in the 
analysis of the emissions scenarios is that the distinction 
between climate policy scenarios, non-climate policy 
scenarios, and other scenarios appeared to be to a degree 
arbitrary and was often impossible to make. Therefore, the 
writing team recommends that an effort should be made in the 
future to develop an appropriate emissions scenario 
classification scheme. Chapters 2 and 3 give a more detailed 
description of the very wide range of future emissions paths, 
their driving forces, and their relationships as reflected in the 
literature; the wide rage indicates that their possible 
developments are highly uncertain. The sources of inherent 
uncertainties range from data and modeling uncertainties 
through to inadequate scientific understanding of the 
underlying problems. 
Scenarios are appropriate tools for dealing with such 
uncertainty. Scenarios are images of the future, or altemative 
futures. As an integration tool in the assessment of climate 
change they allow a role for intuition, analysis, and synthesis; 
thus we tum to scenarios in this report to take advantage of 
these features to aid the assessment of future climate change, 
impacts, vulnerabilities, adoption, and mitigation. Scenarios 
are not predictions. A set of scenarios can assist in the 
understanding of possible future developments, and hence the 
development of a set of altemative scenarios (see Chapters 1 
and 4 for more detail). 
' Included are anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (CO^), 
methane (CH^), nitrous oxide (NjO), hydrofluorcarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SFg), 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
sulfur dioxide (80^), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NO,,), 
and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs). 
The SRES approach involved the development of a set of four 
alternative scenario "families" that encompass the 40 
scenarios. Each family of SRES scenarios includes a 
descriptive part called a "storyline," and a number of 
altemative interpretations and quantifications of each storyline 
developed by six different modeling approaches. A l l the 
interpretations and quantifications of one storyline together are 
called a scenario family (see Chapter 1 for terminology). Each 
storyline describes a demographic, social, economic, 
technological, and policy future for one of these scenario 
families. Within each family different scenarios explore 
variations of global and regional developments and their 
implications for G H G and sulfur emissions. Each of these 
scenarios is consistent with the broad framework of that 
scenario family as specified by the storyline. Chapters 4 and 5 
give a more detailed description of the storylines, their 
quantifications, and the resultant 40 emissions scenarios. 
The SRES writing team reached a broad consensus that there 
could be no "best guess" scenarios; that the future is inherentiy 
unpredictable and that views will differ as to which storylines 
could be more likely. There is no "business-as-usual" scenario. 
The storylines represent the playing out of certain social, 
economic, technological and environmental paradigms that will 
be viewed positively by some people and negatively by others. 
The writing team decided on four storylines - an even number 
helps to avoid the impression that there is a "central" or "most 
likely" case. The team wanted more than two storylines to help 
illustrate that the future depends on many different underlying 
dynamics, but no more than four, as they wanted to avoid 
compficating the process with too many altematives. The 
scenarios cover a wide range, but not all possible futures. In 
particular, it was decided that possible "surprises" would not be 
considered and that there would be no "disaster" scenarios. 
The storylines describe developments in many different social, 
economic, technological, environmental, and policy 
dimensions. The tities of the storylines have been kept simple 
- A l , A2, B l , and B2. There is no particular order among the 
storylines, which are listed in Box 6-1 in alphabetic order. The 
team decided to carry out sensitivity tests within some of the 
storylines by considering altemative scenarios with different 
fossil-fuel reserves, rates of economic growth, or rates of 
technological change within a given scenario family. 
A l l four storylines and scenario families describe future worlds 
that are generally more affluent compared to the current 
situation. They range from very rapid economic growth and 
technological change to high levels of environmental 
protection, from low to high global populations, and from high 
to low G H G emissions. What is perhaps even more important 
is that all the storylines describe dynamic changes and 
transitions in generally different directions. Although they do 
not include additional climate initiatives, none of them are 
policy free. As time progresses, the storylines diverge from 
each other in many of their characteristic features. In this way 
they span the relevant range of G H G emissions and different 
combinations of their main sources. 
2 9 6 Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 
Box 6-1: The Main Characteristics of the Four SRES Storylines and Scenario Families. 
By 2100 the world will have changed in ways that are hard to imagine - as hard as it would have been at the end of the 19th 
century to imagine the changes of the 100 years since. Each storyline assumes a distinctly different direction for future 
developments, such that the four storylines differ in increasingly irreversible ways. Together they describe divergent futures that 
encompass a significant portion of the underlying uncertamties in the main driving forces. They cover a wide range of key 
"future" characteristics such as population growth, economic development, and technological change. For this reason, their 
plausibility or feasibiUty should not be considered solely on the basis of an extrapolation of c u r r e n t economic, technological, 
and social trends. 
• The A l storylme and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth, and 
the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlymg themes are convergence among regions, 
capacity buildmg and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per 
capita income. The A l scenario family develops into four groups that describe altemative dnections of technological 
change in the energy system. Please note that m the Summary for Policymakers, two of these groups were merged into 
one? 
• The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and 
preservation of local identities. Fertility pattems across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population 
growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita econontic growth and technological change 
are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
• The B l storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same low population growth as in the A l 
storylme, but with rapid changes in economic stmcUares toward a service and information economy, with reductions in 
material intensity, and the mtroduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions 
to economic, social, and envkonmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate 
initiatives. 
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, 
and environmental sustainability. It is a world with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic 
development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the В1 and A l storylines. While the scenario 
is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels. 
After determining the basic features and driving forces for each of the four storylines, the team began modeling and quantifying 
the storyUnes. This resulted in 40 scenarios, each of which constitutes an alteinative hlteфretation and quantification of a 
storyfine. A l l the hiterpretations and quantifications associated with a single storyline are called a scenario "family" (see Chapter 
1 for terminology and Chapter 4 for further details). 
After detennining the basic features and driving forces for each 
of the four storylines, the team quantified the storylines into 
individual scenarios with the help of formal (computer) 
models. The six modeling groups that quantified the storylines 
are listed in Box 6-2. The six models are representative of 
different approaches to modeling emissions scenarios and 
different integrated assessment (lA) frameworks in the 
literature and include so-called top-down and bottom-up 
models. The writing team recommends that IPCC or a similar 
international institution should ensure participation of 
^ During the approval process of the Summary for Policymakers at 
the 5* Session of Working Group III of the IPCC from 8-11 March 
2000 in Katmandu, Nepal, it was decided to combine the A I C and 
A I G groups into one "fossil intensive" group A l F I in contrast to the 
non-fossil group AIT, and select two illustrative scenarios from these 
two A l groups to facilitate use by modelers and poHcy makers. This 
leads to six scenario groups that constitute the four scenario families, 
three of which are in the A l family. The six groups all have " 
illustrative scenarios", four of which are marker scenarios. A l l 
scenarios are equally sound. See also Figure SPM-1. 
modeling groups around the world, and especially those from 
developing countries, in future scenario development and 
assessment efforts. Clearly, this would also require resources 
specifically to assist modeling groups from developing 
countries. Indeed, a concerted effort was made to engage 
modeling groups and experts from developing countries in 
SRES as a direct response to recommendations of the IPCC 
scenario evaluation (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). 
The six models have different regional aggregations. The 
writing team decided to group the various global regions into 
four "macro-regions" common to all different regional 
aggregations across the six models. The four macro-regions 
(see Appendix III) are broadly consistent with the allocation of 
countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1997) although the 
correspondence is not exact because of changes in the 
countries fisted in Annex I of U N F C C C . 
A l l the qualitative and quanthative features of scenarios that 
belong to the same family were set to conform to the 
corresponding features of the underlying storyline. Together, 
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Box 6-2: SRES Modeling Teams 
In all, six models were used to generate the 40 scenarios: 
• Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan (Morita et a l . , 1994); 
• Atmospheric Stabilization Framework Model (ASF) from ICF Consulting in the U S A (Lashof and Tirpak, 1990; Pepper 
et a i , 1992, 1998; Sankovski et a l . , 2000); 
• Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE) from the National Institute for Public Health and 
Environmental Hygiene (RIVM) (Alcamo et a i , 1998; de Vries et a l . , 1994, 1999, 2000), used in connection with the 
Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (СРВ) WorldScan model (de Jong and Zalm, 1991), the Netherlands; 
• Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of Tokyo in Japan 
(Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori, 2000); 
• Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from the 
Intemational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Stmbegger, 1995; Riahi and Roehrl, 
2000); and the 
• Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the USA 
(Edmonds e t a l . , 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
For a more detailed description of the modeling approaches see Appendix IV. 
26 scenarios were "harmonized" to share agreed common 
assumptions about population and gross domestic product 
(GDP) developments (a few that also share common final 
energy trajectories are called "fully harmonized," see Section 
4.1. in Chapter 4). Thus, the harmonized scenarios are not 
independent of each other within each family, but they are 
independent across the four families. However, scenarios 
within each family vary quite substantially in characteristics 
such as the assumptions about availability of fossil-fuel 
resources, the rate of energy-efficiency improvements, the 
extent of renewable-energy development, and, hence, the 
resultant G H G emissions. Thus, after the modeling teams had 
quantified the key driving forces and made an effort to 
harmonize them with the storylines by adjusting control 
parameters, there still remained diversity in the assumptions 
about the driving forces and in the resultant emissions (see 
Chapter 4). 
The remaining 14 scenarios adopted altemative interpretations 
of the four scenario storylines to explore additional scenario 
uncertainties beyond differences in méthodologie approaches, 
such as different rates of economic growth and variations in 
population projections. These variations reflect the "modeling 
teams' choice" of alternative but plausible global and regional 
developments compared to those of the "harmonized" 
scenarios; they also stem from the differences in the underlying 
modeling approaches. This approach generated a large 
variation and richness in different scenario quantifications, 
often with overlapping ranges of main driving forces and G H G 
emissions across the four families. 
In addition, the A l scenario family branched out into different 
distinct scenario groups, based on altemative technological 
developments in future energy systems, from carbon-intensive 
development to decarbonization. Similar- storyline variations 
were considered for other scenario families, but they did not 
result in genuine scenario groupings within the respective 
families. However, if future energy systems variations were 
applied fully to other storylines, they may evolve differently 
from those in A l . They have been introduced into the A l 
storyline because of its "high growth with high technology" 
nature, for which differences in alternative technology 
developments translate into large differences in future G H G 
emission levels. The A1 groups further increased the richness 
in different G H G and SO^ emissions paths. Indeed, this 
variation in the structure of future energy systems in itself 
resulted in a range of emissions almost as large as that 
generated through the variation of other main driving forces, 
such as population and economic development. Altogether the 
40 SRES scenarios fall into seven groups: the three scenario 
families A2, B l , and B2, plus four groups within the A l 
scenario (see footnote 2). 
As in the case of the storylines, no single scenario - whether it 
represents a modeler's choice or harmonized assumptions -
was treated as being more or less "probable" than others 
belonging to the same family. However, one preliminary 
harmonized scenario from each family, referred to as a 
"marker," was used in 1998 to solicit comments during the 
"open process" and as input for climate modelers in 
accordance with a decision of the IPCC Bureau. The four 
marker scenarios were posted on the IPCC web site 
(sres.ciesin.org) in June 1998, and the open scenario review 
process through the IPCC web site lasted until January 1999. 
The choice of markers was based on extensive discussion of: 
• Range of emissions across all of marker scenarios. 
• Which of the initial quantifications (by the modelers) 
reflected the storyline. 
• Preference of some of the modeling teams and features 
of specific models. 
• Use of different models for the four markers. 
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Markers were not intended to be the median or mean scenarios 
from their respective families. Indeed, in general it proved 
impossible to develop scenarios in which all relevant 
characteristics matched mean or median values. Thus, marker 
scenarios are no more or less likely than any other scenarios, 
but are those scenarios considered by the SRES writing team as 
illustrative of a particular storyline. These scenarios have 
received much closer scrutiny, not only from the entire writing 
team, but also via the SRES open process, than other scenario 
quantifications. The marker scenarios are also the SRES 
scenarios that have been most intensively tested in terms of 
reproducibility. As a rule, different modeling teams have 
attempted to replicate the model quantification of marker 
scenarios. Available time and resources have not allowed a 
similar exercise to be conducted for all SRES scenarios, 
although some effort was devoted to reproduce the scenario 
groups that constitute different interpretations of the A I 
storyline with different models. 
Additional scenarios using the same harmonized assumptions 
as the marker scenarios developed by different modeling teams 
and other scenarios that give alternative quantitative 
interpretations of the four storylines constitute the final set of 
40 SRES scenarios. However, differences in modeling 
approaches mean that not all the scenarios provide estimates 
for all the direct and indirect G H G emissions for all the sources 
and sectors. The four SRES marker scenarios cover аИ the 
relevant gas species and emission categories comprehensively 
and thus constitute the smallest set of independent and fully 
documented SRES scenarios. 
The scenario groups and cumulative emissions categories were 
developed as the smallest subsets of SRES scenarios that 
capture the range of uncertainties associated with driving 
forces and emissions. Together, the scenario groups constitute 
the set of SRES scenarios that reflects the uncertainty ranges in 
the emissions and their driving forces. Furthermore, the writing 
team recommends that, to the extent possible, these scenarios, 
but at least the four markers, be used to capture the range of 
uncertainties of driving forces and in addition, the two 
additional illustrative scenarios in A l be used to capture the 
range of G H G emissions, and these should always be used 
together, and that no individual scenario s h o u l d be singled out 
for any purpose. Multiple baselines and overlapping emissions 
ranges have important implications for making policy analysis 
(e.g., similar policies might have different impacts in different 
scenarios). Combinations of policies might shape the future 
development in the direction of certain scenarios. Box 6-4 (see 
later) summarizes the recommendations of the writing team for 
consideration by the user communities within and outside the 
IPCC. 
Thus, there are three different types of scenarios within each 
family - one marker (and two illustrative scenarios in the A l 
family), a set of harmonized scenarios, and a set of other (non-
harmonized) scenarios. In addition, the A l family of scenarios 
is subdivided into groups that describe alternative 
technological developments in the energy system. Together 
with the other three scenario families the SRES scenarios build 
seven distinct scenario groups (see footnote 2). Figure 
6-1 illustrates this scenario terminology schematically. The 
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Figure 6-1; Schematic illustration of SRES scenarios. The set of scenarios consists of the four scenario families A l , A2, B l , and 
B2. Each family consists of a number of scenarios, some of which have "harmonized" driving forces and share the same 
prespecified population and gross world product (a few that also share common final energy trajectories are called "fully 
harmonized"). These are marked as "HS" for harmonized scenarios. One of the harmonized scenarios, originally posted on the 
open-process web site, is called a "marker scenario." A l l other scenarios of the same family based on the quantification of the 
storyline chosen by the modeling team are marked as "OS." Six modeling groups developed the set of 40 emissions scenarios. 
The G H G and SO, emissions of the scenarios were standardized to share the same data for 1990 and 2000 on request of the user 
communities. The time-dependent standardized emissions were also translated into geographic distributions. See also footnote 2. 
Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 2 9 9 
detailed descriptions of inputs and outputs (other than G H G 
emissions) of the SRES marker scenarios, other harmonized 
scenarios, and all other scenarios are presented in Chapter 4 
and the Appendices, while the emissions of GHGs and other 
radiatively important species of gases are described in Chapter 
5 and Appendices. 
The writing team considers that the SRES scenario set (in all 
the richness of scenario families, groups, markers, and 
illustrative and harmonized scenarios) is based on a "neutral" 
choice of scenario drivers; no driver is unduly emphasized as 
being more important than others. The scenarios do not suggest 
that future population growth alone is t h e driver of future 
emissions, nor do they suggest that technological change a l o n e 
in any one sector could drive future emissions in one way or the 
other. While recognizing the importance of any of these driving 
forces per se, this report illustrates the critical role of 
relationships and interdependencies between scenario driving 
forces. To an extent it is the nature of these relationships that 
drives the future more than the possible evolution of any 
individual driving forces by itself. In other words, the 
uncertainty of the future is not simply parametric, but deeply 
functional; uncertainties and incomplete understanding exist 
for both. Qualitative scenario storylines add transparency and 
consistency to the relationships assumed in any particular 
scenario. The storylines also allow for additional interpretation 
of scenario results by different user communities. 
6.2. Scenario Driving Forces 
The scenarios cover a wide range of driving forces, from 
demographic to social and economic developments. This 
section summarizes the assumptions on impoitant scenario 
drivers. For simplicity, only three important driving forces are 
presented separately following the exposition in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the 
future evolution of these and other main driving forces is 
interrelated in the SRES scenarios (see Table 6.2a for a 
summary of the ranges of the main driving forces across the 
scenario groups in 2020, 2050, and 2100). 
The SRES scenarios span a wide range of assumptions for the 
most salient scenario drivers, and thus reflect the uncertainty of 
the future. Evidently, views of the future are a time-specific 
phenomenon, and this report and its scenarios are no exception. 
However, it is important to emphasize that this is an explicit 
part of the Terms of Reference for the SRES writing team - to 
reflect a range of views, based on current knowledge and the 
most recenfly available literature (see Appendix I). The 
scenario quantification results reflect well the literature range, 
except for extreme scenarios. 
6 . 2 . 1 . Population Projections 
Three different population trajectories were chosen for SRES 
scenarios to reflect future demographic uncertainties based on 
published population projections (Lutz, 1996; U N , 1998; see 
Chapter 3). The population projections are exogenous input to 
all the models used to develop the SRES scenarios. The models 
used do not develop population from other assumptions within 
the model. Figure 6-2 shows the three population projections in 
comparison with the three population projections used in the 
IS92 scenarios. Global population ranges between 7 and 15 
billion people by 2100 across the scenarios, depending on the 
rate and extent of the demographic transition. The insert in 
Figure 6.2 shows population development in the industrialized 
(i.e., developed) regions. The range of future populations is 
smaller than in the IS92 scenarios, particularly in the 
industrialized regions, for which the lowest scenario indicates 
a very modest population decline compared to IS92 scenarios. 
The greatest uncertainty about future growth lies in the 
developing regions across all scenarios in the literature. An 
equally pervasive trend across all scenarios is urbanization (see 
Chapter 3). Altogether three different population projections 
were used in the 26 harmonized scenarios. Other scenarios 
explored altemative population projections consistent with the 
storylines. 
The lowest population trajectory is assumed for the A l and B l 
scenario families and is based on the low population projection 
in Lutz (1996), which combines low fertility with low 
mortality and central migration rate assumptions. After 
peaking at 8.7 bilHon in the middle of the 2P ' century, world 
population declines to 7.1 billion by the year 2100. As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, this population development is 
somewhat higher than the previous low population used in the 
IS92 scenarios. The B2 scenario family is based on the U N 
median 1998 population projection (UN, 1998). The global 
population increases to about 9.4 billion people by 2050 and to 
about 10.4 billion by 2100. This population scenario is 
characteristic of recent median global population projections, 
which describe a continuation of historical trends towards a 
completion of the demographic transition that would lead to a 
level global population, and is consistent with recent faster 
fertility declines in the world together with declining mortality 
rates. Hence, the population is somewhat lower than previous 
U N median projections, as used in the IS92 scenarios. This 
median scenario projects very low population growth in 
today's industrialized countries, with stabilization of growth in 
Asia in the second half of the 2P ' century and in the rest of the 
world towards the end of the 2P ' century. The A2 scenario 
family is based on the high population growth of 15 billion by 
2100 reported in Lutz (1996), which assumes a significant 
decline in fertility for most regions and a stabilization at above 
replacement levels. It falls below the long-term 1998 U N high 
projection of 18 billion. It is also lower than in the highest IS92 
scenario (17.6 billion by 2100). Nevertheless, this scenario 
represents very high population growth compared with that in 
current demographic literature. Demographers attach a 
probability of more than 90% that actual population will be 
lower than the trajectory adopted in the A2 scenario family 
(Lutz et a l . , 1997). A more detailed discussion of the 
population projections used to quantify the four scenario 
families is given in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Figure 6-2rPopulation projections -
historical data from 1900 to 1990 (based 
on Durand, 1967; Demeny; 1990; U N , 
1998), SRES scenarios (based on Lutz, 
1996, for high and low, and U N , 1998, 
for medium), and IPCC IS92 scenarios 
(Leggett et a l . , 1992; Pepper et a l . , 
1992) from 1990 to 2100. 
6.2.2. Economie Development 
The SRES scénarios span a wide range of future levels of 
economic activity (expressed in gross world product). The A l 
scenario family with a ("hannonized") gross world product of 
US$529 trillion (all values in 1990 US dollars unless otherwise 
indicated) in 2100 delineates the SRES upper bound, whereas 
B2 with ("harmonized") US$235 trillion in 2100 represents its 
lower bound. The range of gross world product across all 
scenarios is even higher, from US$197 to US$550 by 2100. 
Although the SRES scenarios span a wide range, still lower 
and higher gross world product levels can be found in the 
literature (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Uncertainties in future 
gross world product levels are governed by the pace of future 
productivity growth and population growth, especially in 
developing regions. Different assumptions on conditions and 
possibilities for development "catch-up" and for narrowing per 
capita income gaps in particular explain the wide range in 
projected future gross world product levels. Given a 
qualitatively negative relationship between population growth 
and per capita income growth discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
uncertainties in future population growth rates tend to narrow 
the range of associated gross world product projections. High 
population growth would, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , lower per capita 
income growth, whereas low population growth would tend to 
increase it. This relationship is evident in empiric data - high 
per capita income countries are generally also those that have 
completed then demographic transition. The affluent live long 
and generally have few children. (Exceptions are some 
countries with small populations, high birth rates, and 
significant income from commodity exports.) This relationship 
between affluence and longevity again identities development 
as one of the most important indicators of human well being. 
Yet even assuming this relationship holds for an extended time 
into the future, its quantification is subject to considerable 
theoretic and empiric uncertainties (Alcamo et a l . , 1995). 
Two of the SRES scenario families, A l and B l , explicitly 
explore alternative pathways to gradually close existing 
income gaps. As a reflection of uncertainty, development 
"catch-up" diverges in terms of geographically distinct 
economic growth patterns across the four SRES scenario 
families. Table 6-1 summarizes per capita income for SRES 
and IS92 scenarios for the four SRES world regions. SRES 
scenarios indicate a smaller difference between the now 
industrialized and developing countries compared with the 
IS92 scenarios. This tendency toward a substantially narrower 
income "gap" compared with the IS92 scenarios overcomes 
one of the major shortcomings of the previous IPCC scenarios 
cited in the literature (Parikli, 1992). 
6.2.3. S t r u c t u r a l and Technological Change 
In this brief summary of the SRES scenarios, structural and 
technological changes are illustrated by using energy and land 
use as examples. These examples are characteristic for the 
driving forces of emissions because the energy system and land 
use are the major sources of G H G and sulfur emission. 
Chapter 4 gives a more detailed treatment of the full range of 
emissions driving forces across the SRES scenarios. 
Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 301 
Table 6 - 1 : I n c o m e per c a p i t a i n t h e w o r l d a n d by SRES r e g i o n f o r t h e IS92 ( L e g g e t t et a l . , 1 9 9 2 ) a n d f o u r m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s b 
2 0 5 0 a n d 2 1 0 0 , m e a s u r e d by G D P per c a p i t a i n 1 0 0 0 US d o l l a r s (at 1 9 9 0 p r i c e s a n d exchange r a t e s ) . The a d d i t i o n a l 
i l l u s t r a t i v e s c e n a r i o s A l F I a n d A l T have G D P assumptions s i m i l a r t o t h e A I B m a r k e r , s h a r e d w i t h a l l h a r m o n i z e d s c e n a r i o s 
in t h e A l f a m i l y . 
Income per Capita by World and Regions (103 1990US$ per capita) 
Regions 
Year Scenario OECD90 REF IND ASIA A L M DEV WORLD 
1990 SRES M E S S A G E 19.1 2.7 13.7 0.5 1.6 0.9 4.0 
2050 lS92a,b 49.0 23.2 39.7 3.7 4.8 4.1 9.2 
lS92c 35.2 14.6 27.4 2.2 2.9 2.5 6.3 
IS92d 54.4 25.5 43.4 4.1 5.4 4.6 10.5 
IS92e 67.4 38.3 56.9 5.9 7.7 6.6 13.8 
lS92f 43.9 21.5 35.8 3.3 4.1 3.6 8.1 
A I B 50.1 29.3 44.2 14.9 17.5 15.9 20.8 
A2 34.6 7.1 26.1 2.6 6.0 3.9 7.2 
B l 49.8 14.3 39.1 9.0 13.6 10.9 15.6 
B2 39.2 16.3 32.5 8.9 6.9 8.1 11.7 
2100 lS92a,b 85.9 40.6 69.5 15.0 14.2 14.6 21.5 
IS92c 49.2 17.6 36.5 6.4 5.8 6.1 10.1 
lS92d 113.9 51.3 88.8 20.3 17.7 19.1 28.2 
IS92e 150.6 96.6 131.0 34.6 33.0 33.8 46.0 
lS92f 69.7 31.3 54.9 11.9 10.7 11.4 16.8 
A I B 109.^ 100.9 107.3 71.9 60.9 66.5 74.9 
A2 58.5 20.2 46.6 7.8 15.2 11.0 16.1 
B l 79.7 52.2 72.8 35.7 44.9 40.2 46.6 
B2 61.0 38.3 54.4 19.5 16.1 18.0 22.6 
6 . 2 . 3 . 1 . E n e r g y Systems 
Figure 6-3 illustrates that the change of world primary energy 
stmcture diverges over time. It shows the contributions of 
individual primary energy sources - the percentage supplied by 
coal, that by oil and gas, and that by all non-fossil sources taken 
together (for simplicity of presentation and because not all 
models distinguish between renewables and nuclear energy). 
Each comer of the triangle corresponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which all primary energy is supplied by a single 
source - oil and gas, coal at the left, and non-fossil sources 
(renewables and nuclear) to the right. Historically, the primary 
energy structure has evolved clockwise according to the two 
"grand transitions" (discussed in Chapter 3) that are shown by 
the two segments of the "thick black" curve. From 1850 to 
1920 the first transition can be characterized as the substitution 
of traditional (non-fossil) energy sources by coal. The share of 
coal increased from 20% to about 70%, while the share of non-
fossils declined from 80% to about 20%. The second transition, 
from 1920 to 1990, can be characterized as the replacement of 
coal by oil and gas (while the share of non-fossils remained 
essentially constant). The share of oil and gas increased to 
about 50% and the share of coal declined to about 30%. 
Figure 6-3 gives an overview of the divergent evolution of 
global primary energy structures between 1990 and 2100, 
regrouped into their respective scenario families and four A l 
scenarios groups that explore different technological 
developments in the energy systems. The SRES scenarios 
cover a wider range of energy stractures than the previous IS92 
scenario series, which reflects advances in knowledge on the 
uncertainty ranges of future fossil resource availability and 
technological change. 
In a clockwise direction, A l and ВI scenario groups map the 
structural transitions toward higher shares of non-fossil energy 
in the future, which almost closes the historical "loop" that 
started in 1850. The B2 scenarios indicate a more "moderate" 
direction of change with about half of the energy coming from 
non-fossil sources and the other half shared by coal on one 
side and oil and gas on the other. Finally, the A2 scenario 
group marks a stark transition back to coal. Shares of oil and 
gas decline while non-fossils increase moderately. What is 
perhaps more significant than the diverging developments in 
these three marker scenarios is that the whole set of 40 
scenarios covers virtually all possible directions of change, 
from high shares of oil and gas to high shares of coal and non-
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Figure 6-3: Global primary energy structure, shares (%) of oil and gas, coal, and non-fossil (zero-carbon) energy sources -
historical development from 1850 to 1990 and in SRES scenarios. Each comer of the triangle conesponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which all primary energy is supplied by a single source - oil and gas on the top, coal to the left, and non-fossil 
sources (renewables and nuclear) to the right. Constant market shares of these energies are denoted by their respective isoshare 
lines. Historical data from 1850 to 1990 are based on Nakicenovié et a l . (1998). For 1990 to 2100, altemative trajectories show 
the changes in the energy systems stmctures across SRES scenarios. They are grouped by shaded areas for the scenario 
families A l , A2, B l , and B2 with respective markers shown as lines. In addition, the four scenario groups within the A I family, 
A I , A i e , A I G , and AIT, that explore different technological developments in the energy systems, are shaded individually. In 
the SPM, the A I C and A I G scenario groups are combined into the fossil-intensive A l F I scenario group. For comparison the 
IS92 scenario series are also shown, clustering along two trajectories (IS92c,d and IS92a,b,e,f). For model results that do not 
include non-commercial energies, the corresponding estimates from the emulations of the various marker scenarios by the 
M E S S A G E model were added to the original model outputs. 
fossils. In particular, the A I scenario family covers basically 
the same range of structural change as all other scenarios 
together. In contrast, the IS92 scenarios cluster into two 
groups; one contains IS92c and IS92d and the other the four 
others. In all of these the share of oil and gas declines, and the 
main structural change occurs between coal on the one hand 
and non-fossils on the other. This divergent nature in the 
structural change of the energy system and in the underlying 
technological base of the SRES results in a wide span of future 
G H G and sulfur emissions. 
6.2.3.2. L a n d - u s e P a t t e r n s 
Figure 6-4 illustrates that the land-use pattems diverge over 
time. It shows the main land-use categories - the percentages 
of total land area use that constitute the forests, the joint shares 
of cropland and energy biomass, and all other categories 
including grasslands. As for the energy triangle in Figure 6-3, 
in Figure 6-4 each comer corresponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which land use is dedicated to a much greater 
extent than today to two of the three land-use categories: 40% 
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to cropland and energy biomass and 20% to forests at the top, 
60% to forests and 40% to other categories (including 
grasslands) to the left, and 80% to other categories (including 
grasslands) to the right. 
In most scenarios, the current trend of shrinking forests is 
eventually reversed because of slower population growth and 
increased agricultural productivity. Reversals of deforestation 
trends are strongest in the В1 and A1 families. In the В1 family 
pasture lands decrease significantly because of increased 
productivity in livestock management and dietary shifts away 
from meat, thus illustrating the importance of both 
technological and social developments. 
The main driving forces for land-use changes are related to 
increasing demands for food because of a growing population 
and changing diets. In addition, numerous other social, 
economic, and institutional factors govem land-use changes 
such as deforestation, expansion of cropland areas, or their 
reconversion back to forest cover (see Chapter 3). Global food 
production can be increased, either through intensification (by 
multi-cropping, raising cropping intensity, applying fertilizers, 
new seeds, improved fanning technology) or through land 
expansion (cultivafing land, converting forests). Especially in 
developing countries, there are many examples of the potential 
to intensify food production in a more or less écologie way 
(e.g. multi-cropping; agroforestry) that may not lead to higher 
G H G emissions. 
Different assumptions on these processes translate into 
altemative scenarios of future land-use changes and G H G 
emissions, most notably COj, CH^, and NjO. A distinguishing 
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Other (ind. grasslands) 
Figure 6-4: Global land-use pattems, shares (%) of croplands and energy biomass, forests, and other categories including 
grasslands - historical development from 1970 to 1990 (based on B l - I M A G E ) and in SRES scenarios. As for the energy 
triangle in Figure 6-3, each comer corresponds to a hypothetical situation in which land use is dedicated to a much greater 
extent than today to one category - 60% to cropland and energy biomass at the top, 80% to forests to the left, and 80% to 
other categories (including grasslands) to the right. Constant shares in total land area of cropland and energy biomass, forests, 
and other categories are denoted by then respective isoshare lines. For 1990 to 2100, altemative trajectories are shown for the 
SRES scenarios. The three marker scenaj-ios A l B , B l , and B2 are shown as thick colored lines, and other SRES scenarios as 
thin colored lines. The A S F model used to develop the A2 marker scenario projects only land-use change related G H G 
emissions. Comparable data on land cover changes are therefore not available.The trajectories appear to be largely model 
specific and illustrate the different views and interpretations of future land-use patterns across the scenarios (e.g. the scenario 
trajectories on the right that illustrate larger increases in grasslands and decreases in cropland are M i n i C A M results). 
3 0 4 Summaiy D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 
characteristic of several models (e.g., A I M , I M A G E , M A R I A , 
and Min iCAM) used in SRES is the explicit modeling of land-
use changes caused by expanding biomass uses and hence 
exploration of possible land-use conflicts between energy and 
agricultural sectors. The corresponding scenarios of land-use 
changes are illustrated in Figure 6-4 for all SRES scenarios. In 
some contrast to the structural changes in energy systems 
shown in Figure 6-3, different land-use scenarios in Figure 6-4 
appear to be rather model specific, following the general trends 
as indicated by the respective marker scenario developed with 
a particular model. 
6.3. Greenhouse Gases and Sulfur Emissions 
The SRES scenarios generally cover the full range of G H G and 
sulfur emissions consistent with the storylines and the 
underlying range of driving forces from studies in the 
literature, as documented in the SRES database. This section 
summarizes the emissions of C O , , C H 4 , and SO,. For 
simplicity, only these three important gases are presented 
separately, following the more detailed exposition in Chapter 5 
(see Table 6.2b for a summary of the ranges of emissions 
across the scenario groups in 2020, 2050, and 2100). 
N = 40 Scenarios 
0 I 1 1 I I 1— 
1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 
6 . 3 . 1 . C a r b o n D i o x i d e Emissions 
6 . 3 . 1 . 1 . E m i s s i o n s f r o m E n e r g y , I n d u s t r y , a n d L a n d Use 
Figure 6-5 illustrates the range of C O , emissions for the 40 
SRES scenarios against the background of all the emissions 
scenarios in the SRES scenario database shown in Figure 1-3. 
For simplicity, only energy-related and industrial sources of 
C O , emissions are shown. 
Figure 6-5 shows that the marker scenarios by themselves 
cover a large portion of the overall scenario distribution. This 
is one reason why the SRES writing team recommends the use 
of at least the four marker scenarios. Together, they cover a 
large range of future emissions, both with respect to the 
scenarios in the literature and the full SRES scenario set. 
The SRES scenarios cover rather evenly the range of future 
emissions found in the literature, from high to low levels over 
the whole time horizon. In contrast, the distribution for 
emissions by 2100 of scenarios in the literature is very 
asymmetric. It has a structure that resembles a tri-inodal 
frequency distribution - those showing emissions of more than 
30 gigatons of carbon (GtC; 20 scenarios), those with 
emissions between 12 and 30 GtC (88 scenarios), and those 
Relative Frequency (%) 
Figure 6-5: Global energy-related and industrial CO2 emissions for the 40 SRES scenarios. The individual scenarios are shown 
grouped into four scenario families. Marker scenarios are shown as bold continuous lines and the other 36 scenarios as dashed 
lines. The emissions profiles are dynamic, ranging from continuous increases to those that curve through a maximum and then 
decline. The relative positions of the scenarios change in time, with numerous cross-overs among the individual emissions 
trajectories. The histogram on the right shows, for comparison, the frequency distribution of energy-related and industrial COj 
emissions based on the scenario database. The histogram indicates the relative position of the four marker scenarios and the six 
IS92 scenarios compared to the emissions in the literature. Jointly, the SRES scenarios span most of the range of scenarios in 
the literature. 
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showing emissions of less than 12 GtC (82 scenarios). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the lowest cluster appears to include 
many of the intervention scenarios; the second and third 
clusters aie most likely the non-intervention cases. The lowest 
cluster may have been influenced by many analyses of 
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations. The middle cluster 
echoes the many analyses that took IS92a as a reference and is 
testament to the enormous influence of the IS 92 series on 
emissions assessments in general. 
The range of C O , and other G H G emissions for the four 
marker scenarios is generally somewhat lower than that of the 
six 1S92 scenarios.^ However, the IS92 scenarios do not cover 
the "middle" range of emissions where the median and the 
average of all scenarios in the literature are situated. Adding 
the other 36 scenarios to the four SRES markers increases the 
covered emissions range beyond the IS92 series at the high end 
of the distribution but not at the low end. SRES scenarios stop 
short of the lower literature emissions because they are 
scenarios without additional climate initiatives (as per the 
Terms of References, see Appendix I). 
Figure 6-6 illustrates the range of CO2 emissions of the SRES 
scenarios against the background of all the IS92 scenarios and 
other emissions scenarios from the literature documented in the 
SRES scenario database. The shaded areas depict the range of 
the scenarios in the database that exceeds the SRES emissions 
range. The range of future emissions is very large so that the 
highest scenarios envisage more than a sevenfold increase of 
global emissions by 2100, while the lowest have emissions 
lower than today. 
The literature includes scenarios with additional climate 
initiatives and policies, which are also referred to as mitigation 
or intervention scenarios. As shown in Chapter 2, many 
ambiguities are associated with the classification of emissions 
scenarios into those that include additional climate initiatives 
and those that do not. Many cannot be classified in this way on 
basis of the information available from the SRES scenario 
database and the published literature. 
Figure 6-6a indicates the ranges of emissions from energy and 
industry in 2100 from scenarios that apparently include 
additional climate inifiatives (designated as intervenfion 
emissions range), those that do not (non-intervention), and 
those that cannot be assigned to either of these two categories 
(non-classified). This classificafion is based on the subjective 
evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the members of 
the writing team and is explained in Chapter 2. The range of the 
whole sample of scenarios has significant overlap with the 
range of those that caimot be classified and they shai-e virtually 
the same median (15.7 and 15.2 GtC in 2100, respectively), but 
the non-classified scenarios do not cover the high part of the 
' This is still true when the two illustrative cases in the A l family -
as selected for the Summary for Policymakers, see footnote 2 - are 
added. 
range. Also, the range of the scenarios that apparenfly do not 
include climate polices (non-intervention) has considerable 
overlap with the other two ranges (lower bound is slightly 
higher), but with a significantly higher median (of 21.3 GtC in 
2100). 
The median of all energy and industry emissions scenarios 
from the literature is 15.7 GtC by 2100. This is lower than the 
median of the IS92 set and is lower than the IS92a scenario 
often (inappropriately) considered as the "central" scenario. 
Again, the distribution of emissions is asymmetric (see the 
emissions histogram in Figure 6-5) and the thin tail that 
extends above 30 GtC includes only a few scenarios. 
Figure 6-6 shows the range of emissions of the four families 
(verfical bars next to each of the four marker scenarios), which 
illustrate that the scenarios groups by themselves cover a large 
portion of the overall scenario distribution. Together, they 
cover much of the range of future etnissions, both with respect 
to the scenarios in the literature and all SRES scenarios. 
Adding all other scenarios increases the covered range. For 
example, the SRES scenarios span jointly from the 95"' 
percentile to just above the 5"' percentile of the distribution of 
energy and industry emissions scenarios from the literature. 
This illustrates again that they only exclude the most extreme 
emissions scenarios found in the literatme, which are situated 
out in the tails of the distribution. What is perhaps more 
important is that each of the four scenario families covers a 
substantial part of this distribution. This leads to a substantial 
overlap in the emissions ranges of the four scenario families. In 
other words, a similar quantification of driving forces can lead 
to a wide range of future emissions and a given level of future 
emissions can result from different combinations of driving 
forces. This result is of fundamental importance for the 
assessments of cfimate change impacts and possible mitigation 
and adaptation strategies. Thus, it warrants some further 
discussion. 
Another 1пГефге1а11оп is that a given combination of the main 
driving forces, such as population and economic growth, is not 
sufficient to determine the future emissions paths. Different 
modeling approaches and different specifications of other 
scenaiio assumptions overshadow the influence of the main 
driving forces. A particular combination of driving forces, such 
as specified in the A l scenario family, is associated with a 
whole range of possible emission paths for energy and 
industry. The nature of climate change impacts and adaptation 
and mitigation strategies would be fundamentally different 
depending on whether emissions are high or low, given a 
particular combination of scenario driving forces. Thus, the 
implication is that the whole range needs to be considered in 
the assessments of climate change, from high emissions and 
driving forces to low ones. 
The A l scenario family explored variations in energy systems 
most explicitly and hence covers the largest part of the scenario 
distribution shown in Figures 6-5 and 6-6a, from the 95* to just 
above the 10* percentile. The A l scenario family includes 
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Figure 6-6: Global COj emissions from energy and industry in Figure 6-6a and from land-use change in Figure 6-6b -
historical development from 1900 to 1990 and in 40 SRES scenarios from 1990 to 2100, shown as an index (1990 = 1). The 
range is large in the base year 1990, as indicated by an "error" bar, but is excluded from the indexed future emissions paths. 
The dashed time-paths depict individual SRES scenarios and the shaded area the range of scenarios from the literature (as 
documented in the SRES database). The median (50*), 5"', and 95* percentiles of the frequency distribution are shown. The 
statistics associated with the distribution of scenarios do not imply probability of occurrence (e.g., the frequency distribution о 
the scenarios in the literature may be influenced by the use of IS92a as a reference for many subsequent studies). The 40 SREI 
scenarios are classified into seven groups that constitute four scenario families. Jointly the scenarios span most of the range of 
the scenarios in the literature. The emissions profiles are dynamic, ranging from continuous increases to those that curve 
through a maximum and then decline. The colored vertical bars indicate the range of the four SRES scenario families in 2100, 
Also shown as vertical bars on the right of Figure 6-6a are the ranges of emissions in 2100 of IS92 scenarios and of scenarios 
from the literature that apparently include additional climate initiatives (designated as "intervention" scenarios emissions 
range), those that do not ("non-intervention"), and those that caimot be assigned to either of these two categories ("non­
classified"). This classification is based on a subjective evaluation of the scenarios in the database by the members of the 
writing team and is explained in Chapter 2. It was not possible to develop an equivalent classification for land-use emissions 
scenarios. Three vertical bars in Figure 6-6b indicate the range of IS92 land-use emissions in 2025, 2050 and 2100. 
Classification of land-use change emission scenarios similar to that for energy and industry emissions was not possible. 
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different groups of scenarios tliat explore different structures of 
future energy systems, from carbon-intensive development 
paths to high rates of decarbonization. A l l groups otherwise 
share the same assumptions about the main driving forces (see 
Section 6.2.3 and, for further detail, Chapters 4 and 5). This 
indicates that different su-uctures of the energy system can lead 
to basically the same variation in future emissions as generated 
by different combinations of the other main driving forces -
population, economic activities, and energy consumption 
levels. The implication is that decarbonization of energy 
systems - the shift from carbon-intensive to less carbon-
intensive and carbon-free sources of energy - is of similar 
importance in determining the future emissions paths as other 
driving forces. Sustained decarbonization requires the 
development and successful diffusion of new technologies. 
Thus investments in new technologies during the coming 
decades might have the same order of influence on future 
emissions as population growth, economic development, and 
levels of energy consumption taken together. 
Figure 6-6b shows that C O ^ emissions from deforestation peak 
in many SRES scenarios after several decades and 
subsequently gradually decline. This pattem is consistent with 
many scenarios in the literature and can be associated with 
slowing population growth and increasing agricultural 
productivity. These allow a reversal of cuiTcnt deforestation 
trends, leading to eventual C O ^ sequestration. Emissions 
decline fastest in the B l family. Only in the A2 family do net 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions from land use remain positive 
thiough to 2100. As was the case for energy-related emissions, 
CO2 emissions related to land-use in the A l family cover the 
widest range. The range of land-use emissions across the IS92 
scenarios is narrower in comparison. 
6 3 . 1 . 2 . F o u r C a t e g o r i e s of C u m u l a t i v e E m i s s i o n s 
This comparison of some of the SRES scenario characteristics 
implies that similar future emissions can result from very 
different socio-economic developments, and similar 
developments of driving forces can result in different future 
emissions. Uncertainties in the future development of key 
emission driving forces create large uncertainties in future 
emissions, even within the same socio-economic development 
paths. Therefore, emissions from each scenario family overlap 
substantially with emissions from other scenario families. 
Figure 6-6 shows this for CO2 emissions. For example, 
comparison of the A l B and B2 marker scenarios indicates that 
they have similar emissions of about 13.5 and 13.7 GtC by 
2100, respectively. The dynamics of the paths, however, are 
different so that they have different cumulative C O ^ emissions 
and different emissions of other G H G gases and SOj. 
To facilitate comparisons of emissions and their driving forces 
across the scenarios, the writing team grouped them into four 
categories of cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2100. 
However, any categorization of scenarios based on emissions 
of multiple gases is quite difficult. Figure 6-7 shows total C O j 
emissions from all sources (from Figures 6-6a and b). Most of 
the scenarios are shown aggregated into seven groups, the four 
A l groups and the other three families. The scenarios that 
remain outside the seven groups adopted alternative 
inteфretations of the four scenario storylines. The emission 
trajectories ("bands") of the seven groups display different 
dynamics, from monotonie increases to non-linear trajectories 
in which there is a subsequent decline from a maximum. The 
dynamics of the individual scenarios are also different across 
gasses, sectors, or world regions. This particularly diminishes 
the significance of focusing scenario categorization on any 
given year, such as 2100. In addition, all gases that contribute 
to radiative forcing should be considered, but methods of 
combining gases such as the use of global warming potentials 
(GWP) are appropriate only for neai-term G H G inventories.* 
In light of these difficulties, the classification approach 
presented here uses cumulative COj emissions between 1990 
and 2100. CO2 is the dominant G H G and cumulative CO2 
emissions are expected to be roughly proportional to CO2 
radiative forcing over the time scale of a century. According to 
the IPCC SAR, "any eventual stabilised concentration is 
governed more by the accumulated anthropogenic C O , 
emissions from now until the time of stabilisation than by the 
way emissions change over the period" (Houghton et a i , 
1996). Therefore, the writing team also grouped the scenarios 
according to their cumulative emissions (see Figure 6.8). 
This categorization can guide comparisons using either 
scenarios with different driving forces yet similar emissions, or 
scenarios with similar driving forces but different emissions. 
This characteristic of SRES scenarios also has very important 
implications for the assessment of climate-change impacts, 
mitigation, and adaptation strategies. Two future worlds with 
fundamentally different characteristic features, such as the A I 
and B2 marker scenarios, also have different cumulative CO2 
emissions, but very similar CO2 emissions in 2100. In contrast, 
scenarios that are in the same category of cumulative emissions 
can have fundamentally different driving forces and different 
CO2 emissions in 2100, but very similar cumulative emissions. 
Presumably, adverse impacts and effective adaptation measures 
would vary among the scenarios from different families that 
share similar cumulative emissions, but have different 
demographic, socio-economic, and technological driving 
forces. This is another reason for considering the entire range 
of emissions in future assessments of climate change. 
Figure 6-9 shows the histogram of cumulative COj emissions 
from 1990 to 2100 for the SRES scenarios subdivided into the 
four emissions categories. Relative positions of the four marker 
scenarios, and the ranges of the four families and the six IS92 
scenarios, are marked. The SRES scenarios have a bimodal 
In particular, the IPCC WGI Second Assessment Report (SAR) 
GWPs are calculated for constant concentrations (Houghton et a l . , 
1996). In long-term scenanos, concentrations may change 
significantly, as do GWP values. It is unclear how to apply GWPs to 
long-term scenarios in a meaningful manner. In addition, the GWP 
approach is not applicable to gases such as SO^ and ozone precursors. 
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Figure 6-7: Global CO2 emissions (GtC, standardized) from all sources for the four scenario families from 1990 to 2100. 
Scenarios are also presented for the four constituent groups of the A l family (high-coal A I C , high oil and gas A I G , high non-
fossil fuel AIT, and the balanced A I B ) and for the other three families (A2, B l , and B2), forming seven scenario groups 
altogether. The emissions of A I C and A I G scenario groups are combined into A l F I (see footnote 2). Each colored emission 
band shows the range of the harmonized scenarios within one group that share common global input assumptions for 
population and GDP. The scenarios remaining outside the seven groups adopted altemative interpretations of the four scenario 
storylines. 
structure similar to the distribution of cumulative emissions 
from the scenarios in the literature. The groups of SRES 
scenarios span the whole range of cumulative emissions from 
the scenarios in the literature. The range of the four markers is 
from 1000 to 1900 GtC. In comparison, the IS92 cumulative 
emissions range from 700 GtC for IS92c to 2140 GtC for 
IS92e. 
The SRES emissions scenarios encompass emissions of other 
GHGs and chemically active species such as carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds. The emissions of other gases follow dynamic 
patterns much like those shown in Figures 6-5 and 6-6 for 
CO2 emissions. Further details of G H G emissions are given in 
Chapter 5. 
6.3.2. Other Greenhouse Gases 
Of the GHGs, CO2 is the main contributor to anthropogenic 
radiative forcing because of changes in concentrations from 
pre-industrial times. According to Houghton et a l . (1996) well-
mixed GHGs (COj, CH4, NjO, and the halocarbons) induced 
additional radiative forcing of around 2.5 W/m^ on a global and 
annually averaged basis. COj accounted for 60% of the total, 
which indicates that the other GHGs are significant as well. 
Whereas COj emissions are by-and-large attributable to two 
major sources, energy consumption and land-use change, other 
emissions arise from many different sources and a large 
number of sectors and applications (e.g. see Table 5-3 in 
Chapter 5). 
The SRES emissions scenarios also have different emissions 
for other GHGs and chemically active species such as carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and non-methane volatile organic 
compounds. The uncertainties that surround the emissions 
sources of these gases, and the more complex set of driving 
forces behind them aie considerable and unresolved. Hence, 
model projections of these gases are particularly uncertain and 
the scenarios presented here are no exception. Improved 
inventories and studies linking driving forces to changing 
emissions in order to improve the representation of these gases 
in global and regional emission models remain an important 
future research task. Therefore, the models and approaches 
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Figure 6-8: Global cumulative emissions (GtC, standardized). The ranges of cumulative emissions for the SRES 
scenarios are shown. Scenarios are grouped into four categories: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high emissions. Each 
category contains one marker scenario plus alternatives that lead to comparable cumulative emissions, although often through 
different driving forces. The ranges of cumulative emissions of the SRES scenario groups are shown as colored vertical bars 
and the range of the IS92 scenarios as a black vertical bar. (See also footnote 2). 
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Figure 6-9: Global cumulative CO2 emissions of the SRES scenarios. Relative positions of the marker scenarios and the A l 
scenario groups are shown on the histogram. The 40 SRES scenarios have median cumulative emissions of about 1500 GtC. 
(See also footnote 2). 
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employed for the SRES analyses cannot produce unambiguous 
and generally approved estimates for different sources and 
world regions over a century. Despite the limited knowledge, at 
some point in time causal relationships between driving forces 
and emissions need to be crafted into the models for the sake 
of completeness. Even if new insights are generated by 
research specialists in certain fields of environmental science, 
and these become accepted as mainstream view, adopting them 
in the models is often far from straightforward as appropriate 
links to drivers may not be readily available in the underlying 
model structures. Limited personnel and resources imply that 
priorities must be assigned when deciding on further model 
development, and as a consequence the models lag behind 
"common wisdom" in certain areas. Of course, this does not 
necessarily limit their capabilities to capture major trends at a 
more aggregate level, which is the main purpose of these 
models. 
Keeping the caveats above in mind. Table 6-2b (see later) 
shows the emissions in 2100 of all relevant direct and indirect 
GHGs for the four marker scenarios and, in brackets, the range 
of the other scenarios in the same family (or scenario groups 
for the A l family). Chapter 5 gives further detail about the full 
range of G H G emissions across the SRES scenarios. Table 6-
2b also compares the SRES scenarios emissions range to that 
of the IS92 scenario series (Pepper et a l . . 1992). 
6 . 3 . 2 . 1 . M e t h a n e E m i s s i o n s 
Anthropogenic CH^ emissions in the year 1990 are estimated 
at 375 ± 75 Mt CH^ in the second IPCC assessment (Prather et 
a i , 1995). They arise from a variety of activities, dominated by 
biologic processes, each associated with considerable 
uncertainty. Future CH^ emissions in the scenarios depend in 
part on the consumption of fossil fuels, adjusted for assumed 
changes in technology and operational practices, but more 
strongly on scenario-specific, regional demographic and 
affluence developments, together with assumptions on 
prefeiTcd diets and agricultural practices. For example, it is 
noted in Chapter 5 that the observed slowing of the rate of 
increase of CH^ concentrations in recent years might indicate 
that the emission factors that link emissions to changes in their 
drivers could be changing. The writing team recommends 
further research into the sources and modeling approaches to 
capture large uncertainties surrounding future CH^ emissions. 
The resultant CH^ emissions trajectories for the four SRES 
markers and other scenarios in the four families portray 
complex patterns (as displayed in Figure 5-5 in Chapter 5). For 
example, the emissions in A2 and B2 marker scenarios increase 
throughout the whole time horizon to the year 2100. This 
increase is most pronounced in the A2 marker scenario, in 
which emissions reach about 900 Mt CH^ by 2100 (about a 
three-fold increase since 1990). The range for other scenarios 
in the A2 scenario family is between 549 and 1069 Mt CH^ by 
2100. The emissions level by 2100 for the B2 marker (600 Mt 
СЩ) is about twice as high as in 1990 (310 Mt CH^) and 
ranges between 465 and 613 Mt C H , for the other scenarios of 
the B2 family. In the A l B and B l marker scenarios, the CH4 
emissions level off and subsequently decline sooner or later in 
the 2V^ century. This phenomenon is most pronounced in the 
A l B marker, in which the fastest growth in the first few 
decades is followed by the steepest decline; the 2100 level ends 
up slightly below the current emission of 310 Mt CH^. The 
range of emissions in Table 6-2b indicate that alternative 
developments in energy technologies and resources could yield 
a higher range in CH^ emissions compared to the "balanced" 
technology A l scenario group. In the two fossil fuel intensive 
scenario groups ( A l C and A I G , combined into the non-fossil 
A l F I group in the Summary for Policymakers of this report), 
CH4 emissions could reach some 735 Mt CH^ by 2100, 
whereas in the post-fossil A I T scenario group emissions are 
correspondingly lower (some 300 Mt CH^ by 2100). 
Interestingly, the A l scenarios generally have comparadvely 
low CH4 emissions from non-energy sources because of a 
combination of low population gfowth and rapid advances in 
agricultural productivity. Hence the SRES scenarios extend the 
uncertainty range of the IS92 scenario series somewhat toward 
lower emissions. However, both scenario sets indicate an upper 
bound of emissions of some 1000 Mt CH^ by 2100. 
6.3.2.2. N i t r o u s O x i d e E m i s s i o n s 
Even more than for CH^, the assumed future food supply will 
be a key determinant of future N , 0 emissions. Size, age 
structure, and regional spread of the global population will be 
reflected in the emissions trajectories, together with 
assumptions on diets and improvements in agricultural 
practices. Again, as for CH^ in the SRES scenarios (see Section 
5.4.1 in Chapter 5), continued growth of NjO emissions 
emerges only in the A2 scenario, largely because of high 
population growth. In the other three marker scenarios, 
emissions peak and then decline sooner or later in the course of 
the 2P ' century. Importantiy, as the largest anthropogenic 
source of NjO (cultivated soils) is already very uncertain in the 
base year, all future emissions trajectories are affected by large 
uncertainties, especially if calculated with different models, as 
is the case in this SRES report. Therefore, the writing team 
recommends further research into the souices and modeling of 
long-term N , 0 emissions. Uncertainty ranges are 
correspondingly large, and are sometimes asymmetric. For 
example, while the range in 2100 reported in all A l scenarios 
is between 5 and 10 MtN (7 M t N in the A l B marker), the A2 
marker reports 17 MtN in 2100. Other A2 scenarios report 
emissions that fall within the range reported for A l (from 8 to 
19 MtN in 2100). Thus, different model representations of 
processes that lead to NjO emissions and uncertainties in 
source strength can outweigh easily any underlying differences 
between individual scenarios in terms of population growth, 
economic development, etc. Different assumptions with 
respect to future crop productivity, agricultural practices, and 
associated emission factors, especially in the very populous 
regions of the world, explain the very different global emission 
levels even for otherwise shared main scenario drivers. Hence, 
the SRES scenarios extend the uncertainty range of future 
emissions significantly toward higher emissions (4.8 to 20,2 
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MtN by 2100 in SRES compared to 5.4 to 10.8 M t N in the IS92 
scenarios. (Note that natm-al sources are excluded in this 
comparison.) 
6.3.2.3. H a l o c a r b o n s a n d H a l o g e n a t e d C o m p o u n d s 
The emissions of halocarbons (chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), halons, methylbromide, 
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)) and other halogenated 
compounds (polyfluorocaitons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride 
(SFg)) across the SRES scenarios are described in detail on a 
substance-by-substance basis in Chapter 5 and Fenhaim (2000). 
However, none of the six SRES models has its own projections 
for emissions of ozone depleting substances (ODSs), their 
detailed driving forces, and their substitutes. Hence, a different 
approach for scenario generation was adopted. 
First, for ODSs, an external scenario, the Montreal Protocol 
scenario (A3, maximum allowed production) from 
WMO/UNEP (1998) is used as direct input to SRES. In this 
scenario corresponding emissions decline to zero by 2100 as a 
result of international environmental agreements, a 
development not yet anticipated in some of the IS92 scenarios 
(Pepper et a i , 1992). For the other gas species, most notably 
for CFC and H C F C substitutes, a simple methodology of 
developing different emissions trajectories consistent with the 
aggregate SRES scenario driving force assumptions 
(population, GDP, etc.) was developed. Scenarios are equally 
further differentiated as to assumed future technological 
change and control rates for these gases, varied across the 
scenarios consistently within the interpretation of the SRES 
storylines presented in Chapter 4. The literature, as well as the 
scenario methodology and data, are documented in more detail 
in Fenhann (2000) and are summarized in Chapter 5. 
Second, different assumptions about CFC applications as well 
as substitute candidates were developed. These were initially 
based on Kroeze and Reijnders (1992) and information given 
in Midgley and McCulloch (1999), but updated with the most 
recent information from the Joint IPCC/TEAP Expert Meeting 
on Options for the Limitation of Emissions of HFCs and PFCs 
(WMO/UNEP, 1999) as described below. A n important 
assumption, on the basis of the latest information from the 
industry, is that relatively few Montreal gases will be replaced 
fully by HFCs. Current indications are that substitution rates of 
CFCs by HFCs will be less than 50% (McCulloch and 
Midgley, 1998). In Fenhann (2000) a further technological 
development is assumed that would result in about 25% of the 
CFCs ultimately being substituted by HFCs (see Table 5-9 in 
Chapter 5). This low percentage not only reflects the 
introduction of non-HFC substitutes, but also the notion that 
smaller amounts of halocarbons will be used in many 
applications when changing to HFCs (efficiency gains with 
technological change). A general assumption is that the present 
trend, not to substitute with high GWP substances (including 
PFCs and SFg), will continue. As a result of this assumption, 
the emissions reported here may be underestimates. This 
substitution approach is used in all four scenarios, and the 
technological options adopted are those known at present. 
Further substhution away from HFCs is assumed to require a 
climate policy and is therefore not considered in SRES 
scenarios. Policy measures that may indirectly induce lower 
halocai-bon emissions in the scenarios are adopted for reasons 
other than climate change. For one scenario (A2) no 
reductions were assumed, whereas in the other scenarios 
intermediary reduction rates and levels were assumed. 
Expressed in HFC-134a equivalents (based on SAR 
equivalents), HFCs in the SRES scenarios range between 843 
and 2123 kt HFC-134a equivalent by 2100, compared to 1188 
to 2375 kt HFC-134a equivalent in IS92. The range of 
emissions of HFCs in the SRES scenario is initiaUy generally 
lower than in earlier IPCC scenarios because of new insights 
about the availability of alternatives to HFCs as replacements 
for substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol. In two of 
the four scenarios in the report, HFC emissions increase 
rapidly in the second half of the 2P ' century, while in two 
others the growth of emissions is significantly slowed down or 
reversed in that period. 
Aggregating all the different halocarbons (CFCs, HCFCs, 
HFCs) as well as halogenated compounds (PFCs and SFg) into 
MtC-equivalents (using SAR GWPs) indicates a range between 
386 and 1096 MtC-equivalent by 2100 for the SRES scenarios. 
This compares (see Table 6-2b) with a range of 746 to 875 
MtC-equivalent for IS92 (which, however, does not include 
PFCs and SFg). (The comparable SRES range, excluding PFCs 
and SFg, is between 299 and 753 MtC-equivalent by 2100.) 
The scenarios presented here indicate a wider range of 
uncertainty compared to IS92, particularly toward lower 
emissions (because of the technological and substitution 
reasons discussed above). 
The effect on climate of each of the substances aggregated to 
MtC-equivalents given in Table 6-2b varies greatly, because of 
differences in both atmospheric lifetime and the radiative effect 
per molecule of each gas. The net effect on climate of these 
substances is best determined by a calculation of their radiative 
forcing - which is the amount by which these gases enhance 
the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. The net radiative effect of 
all halocarbons, PFCs, and SFg from 1990 to 2100, including a 
current estimate of the radiative effect of stratospheric ozone 
depletion and subsequent recovery, ranges from 6% to 9% of 
the total radiative forcing from all GHGs and SO^. Preliminary 
calculations indicate that the net radiafive effect of PFCs and 
SFg in SRES scenarios will be no greater, relative to total 
anthropogenic forcing, by 2100 than it is at present. 
6.3.3. Sulfur D i o x i d e Emissions 
Emissions of sulfur portray even more dynamic pattems in 
time and space than the COj emissions shown in Figures 6-5 
and 6-6. Factors other than climate change (namely regional 
and local air quality, and transformations in the structure of the 
energy system and end use) intervene to limit future emissions. 
Figure 6-10 shows the range of global sulfur emissions for all 
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Figure 6-10: Global anthropogenic SOj emissions (MtS) - historical development from 1930 to 1990 and (standardized) in the 
SRES scenarios. The dashed colored time-paths depict individual SRES scenarios, the solid colored lines the four marker 
scenarios, the solid thin curves the six IS92 scenarios, the shaded areas the range of 81 scenarios from the literature, the gray 
shaded area the sulfur-control and the blue shaded area the range of sulfui-non-control scenarios or "non-classified" scenarios 
from the literature that exceeds the range of sulfur control scenarios. The colored veitical bars indicate the range of the SRES 
scenario families in 2100. Database source: Grübler (1998). 
SRES scenarios and the four markers against the emissions 
range of the IS92 scenarios, more than 80 scenarios from the 
literature, and the historical development. 
A detailed review of long-term global and regional sulfur 
emission scenarios is given in Grübler (1998) and summarized 
in Chapter 3. The most important new finding from the 
scenario literature is recognition of the significant adverse 
impacts of sulfur emissions on human health, food production, 
and ecosystems. As a result, scenarios published since 1995 
generally assume various degrees of sulfur controls to be 
implemented in the future, and thus have projections 
substantially lower than previous ones, including the IS92 
scenario series. Of these, only the two low-demand scenarios 
IS92c and IS92d fall within the range of more recent long-
term sulfur emission scenarios. A related reason for lower 
sulfur emission projections is the recent tightening of sulfur-
control policies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, such as the Amendments 
of the Clean Air Act in the U S A and the implementation of the 
Second European Sulfur Protocol. Such legislative changes 
were not reflected in previous long-term emission scenarios, 
as noted in Alcamo et a l . (1995) and Houghton et a l . (1995). 
Similar sulfur control initiatives due to local air quality 
concems are beginning to impact sulfur emissions also in a 
number of developing countries in Asia and Latin America 
(see l E A , 1999; La Rovere and Americano, 1998; Streets and 
Waldhoff, 2000; for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 3). 
As a result, the median from recent sulfur scenarios (see 
Chapter 3) is consequently significantly lower compared to 
IS92, indicating a continual decline in global sulfur emissions 
in the long-term. The median and mean of sulfur control 
scenarios are almost identical. As mentioned above, even the 
highest range of recent sulfur-control scenarios is significantly 
below that of comparable, high-demand IS92 scenarios 
(IS92a, IS92b, IS92e, and IS92f). The scenarios with the 
lowest ranges project stringent sulfur-control levels that lead 
to a substantial decline in long-term emissions and a retum to 
emission levels that prevailed at the beginning of the 20* 
century. 
Reflecting recent developments and the literature (reviewed in 
Chapter 3), it is assumed that sulfur emissions in the SRES 
scenarios will also be controlled increasingly outside the 
OECD. As a result, both long-term trends and regional patterns 
of sulfur emissions evolve differently from carbon emissions m 
the SRES scenarios. As a general pattern, global sulfur 
emissions do not rise substantially, and eventually decline, 
even in absolute terms, during the second half of the 21' 
century (see also Chapters 2 and 3). The spatial distribution of 
emissions changes markedly. Emissions in the OECD 
countries continue their recent declining trend (reflecting the 
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tightening of control measures). Emissions outside the OECD 
rise initially, most notably in Asia, which compensates for the 
declining OECD emissions. Over the long tenn, however, 
sulfur emissions decline throughout the world, but the timing 
and magnitude vary across the scenarios 
The SRES scenario set brackets global anthropogenic sulfur 
emissions between 27 and 169 MtS by 2050 and between 11 
and 93 MtS by 2100 (see Table 6-2b). The range of emissions 
for the four markers is smaller. In contrast, the range of the 
IS92 scenarios (Pepper et a l . , 1992; Alcamo et a l . , 1995) is 
substantially higher, starting at 80 MtS and extending all the 
way to 200 MtS by 2050 and from 55 to 230 MtS by 2100. The 
two lowest scenarios, IS92c and IS92d, approach the higher 
end estimates of the SRES scenarios in 2100, while others are 
above the SRES range. As mentioned, this difference reflects 
the expected future consequences of recent policies that aim to 
achieve a drastic reduction in sulfur emissions in OECD 
countries, as well as an anticipated gradual introduction of 
sulfur controls in developing regions in the long-term, as 
reported in the underlying literature (see Chapter 3). In other 
words, all SRES scenarios assume sulfur control measures, 
although the uncertainty in timing and magnitude of 
implementation is reflected in the variation across difterent 
scenarios. Importantly, SRES scenarios assume sulfur controls 
only and do not assume any additional climate policy 
measures. Nevertheless, one important implication of this 
varying pattem of sulfur emissions is that the historically 
important, but uncertain, negative radiative forcing of sulfate 
aerosols may decline in the very long run. This view is also 
confinned by model calculations reported in Subak et a l . 
(1997) and Nakicenovic et a l . (1998), on the basis of recent 
long-term G H G and sulfur emission scenarios. 
6.3.4. N i t r o g e n Oxides and V o l a t i l e O r g a n i c Compounds 
6 . 3 . 4 . 1 . N i t r o g e n O x i d e s E m i s s i o n s 
The 1990 NOj^ emissions in the six SRES models range 
between 26.5 and 34.2 MtN, but not all the models provide a 
comprehensive description of NO^ emissions. Some models do 
not estimate N0^^ emissions at all (MARIA, M i n i C A M ) , 
whereas others only include energy-related sources 
(MESSAGE) and have adopted other sources of emissions 
from corresponding scenarios derived from other models (i.e. 
MESSAGE uses conesponding A I M scenarios). Standardized 
(see Box 5-1 on Standardization) 1990 NO^^ emissions in the 
SRES scenarios, measured as nitrogen, amount to 31 MtN 
(Figure 5-9 in Chapter 5). 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the volume of fossil fuels used for 
various energy purposes varies widely in the SRES scenario 
families. In addition, the level and timing of emission controls, 
insphed by local air quality concems, is assumed to differ. As 
a result the spread of NO^^  emissions is largest within the A l 
scenano family (28-151 M t N by 2100), almost as large as the 
range across all 40 SRES scenarios (see Table 6-2b). Only in 
the highest emission scenarios (the fossil fuel intensive A I C 
and A I G scenario groups within the A l scenario family and the 
high population, coal intensive A2 scenario family) do 
emissions rise continuously throughout the 2 P ' century. In the 
A l ("balanced") scenario group and in the B2 scenario family, 
NOjj emission levels rise less. NO^, emissions tend to increase 
up to 2050 and stabilize thereafter, the result of a gradual 
substitution of fossil fuels by altematives as well as of the 
increasing diffusion of N 0 ^ control technologies. Low 
emission futures are described by various В1 family scenarios, 
as well as in the A I T scenario group that describe futures in 
which NOjj emissions are controlled because of either local air 
quality concerns or rapid technological change away from 
conventional fossil technologies. Overall, the SRES scenarios 
describe a similar upper range of NO^ emissions as the 
previous IS92 scenarios (151 M t N versus 134 M t N , 
respectively, by 2100), but extend the IS92 uncertainty range 
toward lower emission levels (16 versus 54 M t N by 2100 in the 
SRES and IS92 scenarios, respectively). 
6.3.4.2. V o l a t i l e O r g a n i c C o m p o u n d s , E x c l u d i n g M e t h a n e 
Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) arise 
from fossil fuel combustion (as with N0^, wide ranges of 
emission factors ai^ e typical for intemal combustion engines), 
and also from industrial processes, fuel storage (fugitive 
emissions), use of solvents (e.g., in paint and cleaners), and a 
variety of other activities. As chemical reactivities of the 
various substances grouped under the NMVOCs category are 
very different, so are their roles in ozone foimation and the 
(potential) health hazai^ ds associated with them. In this report, 
NMVOCs are discussed as one group. In 1990, the estimated 
emissions range was between 83 and 178 Mt N M V O C , which 
after standardization (see Box 5-1) translates into 140 Mt 
N M V O C . As for NOj^ emissions, not all models include this 
emissions category or all of its sources; the most detailed 
treatment of N M V O C emissions is given in the ASF model. 
A relatively robust trend across all 40 scenarios (see Figure 5-
10 in Chapter 5) is a gradual increase in N M V O C emissions 
up to about 2050, with a range of between 190 and 260 Mt. 
Beyond 2050, uncertainties increase with respect to both 
emission levels and trends. By 2100, the range is between 58 
and 552 Mt, which extends the IS92 scenario range of 136 to 
403 Mt by 2100 toward both higher and lower emissions (see 
Table 6-2b). As for NO^^ emissions, the upper bounds of 
N M V O C emissions are formed by fossil fuel intensive 
scenario groups within the A l scenario family (AIC, A I G , 
combined into one fossil intensive scenario group A l F I in the 
Summary for Policymakers, see also footnote 2), and the 
lower bounds by the scenarios within the В1 scenario family. 
Characteristic ranges are between 60 and 90 Mt N M V O C by 
2100 in the low emissions cluster and between 370 and 550 Mt 
N M V O C in the high emissions cluster. A l l other scenario 
families and individual scenarios fall between these two 
emissions clusters; the B2 marker scenario (B2-MESSAGE) 
closely tracks the median of global N M V O C emissions from 
all the SRES scenarios (see Figure 5-10 in Chapter 5). 
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6.3.4.3. C a r b o n M o n o x i d e 
CO emissions in 1990 are estimated to range between 752 and 
984 Mt CO (880 Mt CO after standardization) across the 
models used to derive the SRES scenarios. The same caveats as 
for NOj^ and N M V O C emissions also apply to CO emissions -
the number of models that represent all the emission source 
categories is limited and modeling and data uncertainties, such 
as emission factors, are considerable. As a result, CO emission 
estimates across scenarios are highly model specific and future 
emission levels overlap considerably between the four SRES 
scenario families (see Table 6-2b). By 2100, emissions range 
between 363 and 3766 Mt CO, a considerably larger 
uncertainty range, particulaiiy toward higher emissions, than in 
IS92, for which the 2100 emission range was between 450 and 
929 Mt CO (see Table 6-2b). 
As for the N0^ and N M V O C emissions discussed above, the 
highest CO emission levels are associated with the high-growth 
fossil fuel intensive scenarios (AIC and A I G scenario groups, 
combined into one fossil intensive scenario group A l F I in the 
Summary for Policymakers; see also footnote 2) within the A l 
scenario family, and the lowest emission levels are generally 
associated with the B l and B2 scenario families. However, 
inter-model variability is considerable, which indicates that 
uncertainties are equally large with respect to scenario driving 
forces (such as energy demand and supply growth) and other 
factors that influence CO emissions (such as local air quality 
concems or technological change). 
6.4. Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, the SRES scenarios lead to the following findings: 
• Alternative combinations of driving forces can lead to 
similar levels and structure of energy and land-use 
pattems, as illustrated by different scenarios and groups. 
Hence, even for a given scenario outcome (e.g. in terms 
of G H G emissions) diere are altemative combinations 
of driving forces and pathways that could lead to that 
outcome. For instance, significant global changes could 
result from a scenario of high population growth, even 
if per capita incomes rise only modestly, as well as from 
a scenario in which a rapid demographic transition (to 
low population levels) coincides with high rates of 
income growth and affluence. 
• Important possibilities for further bifurcations in future 
development trends exist within one scenario family, 
even when particular values are adopted for the 
important scenario driving force variables to illustrate a 
particular development path. The four technology 
scenario groups in A l family (combined into three in 
the Summary for Policymakers) illustrate such 
alternative development paths with similar 
quanfifications of the main driving forces. 
• Emissions profiles are dynamic across the range of 
SRES scenarios. They portray trend reversals and 
indicate possible emissions crossover among different 
scenarios. They do not represent mere extensions of 
confinuous increase of GHGs and SO, emissions into 
the future. This more complex pattern of future 
emissions across the range of SRES scenarios, time 
periods, world regions, and sectors reflects recent 
scenario literature. 
• Describing potential future developments involves 
inherent ambiguities and uncertainties. One and only 
one possible development path (as alluded to, for 
instance, in concepts such as "business-as-usual 
scenario") simply does not exist alone. And even for 
each alternative development path described by any 
given scenario, there are numerous combinations of 
driving forces and numeric values that can be consistent 
with a particular scenario description. The numeric 
precision of any model result should not distract from 
the basic fact that uncertainty abounds. However, the 
multi-model approach increases the value of the SRES 
scenaiio set, since uncertainties in the choice of model 
input assumptions can be separated more explicitly 
from the specific model behavior and related modeling 
uncertainties. 
• Any scenario has subjective elements and is open to 
various interpretations. While the writing team as a 
whole has no preference for any of the scenarios, and 
has no judgment as to the probability or desirability of 
different scenarios, the open process and initial 
reactions to draft versions of this report show that 
individuals and interest groups do have such 
judgments. The writing team hopes that this will 
stimulate an open discussion in the policy making arena 
about potential futures and choices that can be made in 
the context of climate change response. For the 
scientific community, the SRES scenario exercise has 
led to the identification of a number of recom-
mendations for future research that can further increase 
the understanding of potential developments of socio-
economic driving forces and their interactions, and the 
associated G H G emissions. A summary of main 
findings and recommendations for potential users of the 
SRES scenarios is given in Box 6-3 and Box 6-4. The 
writing teams' suggestions for consideration by the 
IPCC are summarized in Box 6-5. 
• Finally, the writing team believes that the SRES 
scenarios largely fulfifi all the specifications set out in 
Chapter 1. To support reproducibility, more detailed 
information than can be included in this report will be 
made available by individual modeling groups and 
members of the writing team through other means, such 
as web sites, peer-reviewed literature, or background 
documentation if additional resources can be made 
available. 
In conclusion, Tables 6-2a and 6-2b summarize the main 
characteristics of the seven scenario groups that constitute the 
four families (combined into six groups in the Summary for 
Policymakers). The tables give the global ranges of driving 
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Box 6-3 Main Findings and Implications of SRES Scenarios 
• The four scenario families each have a narrative storyline and consist of 40 scenarios developed by six modeling groups. 
• The 40 scenarios cover the full range of GHGs and S O 2 emissions consistent with the underlying range of driving forces 
from scenario literature. 
• The 40 SRES scenarios fall into different groups - the three scenario families A2, B l , and B2, plus four groups within 
the A l scenario family, two of which ( A l C and A I G ) have been combined into one fossil-intensive group A l F I m the 
Summary for Policymakers; see also footnote 2. The four A l groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis -
on coal ( A l C ) , oil and gas (AIG), non-fossil energy sources (AIT), or a balance across all sources (Al ) . 
• Tire scenarios are grouped into four categories of cumulative CO^ emissions, which indicate that scenarios with different 
driving forces can lead to similar cumulative emissions and those with similar driving forces can branch out into different 
categories of cumulative emissions. 
• Four from 40 scenaiios are designated as marker scenarios that are characteristic of the four scenarios families. Together 
with the two additional illustrative scenarios selected from the scenario groups in the A1 family, they capture most of the 
emissions and driving forces spanned by the full set of the scenarios. 
• There is no single central or "best guess" scenario, and probabilities or likelihood are not assigned to individual scenarios. 
Instead, the writing team recommends that the smallest set of scenarios used should include the four designated marker 
scenarios and the two additional illustrative scenarios selected from the scenario groups in the A l family. 
• Distinction between scenarios that envisage stringent environmental policies and those that include direct climate policies 
was very difficult to make, a difficulty associated with many definitional and other ambiguities. 
• A l l scenarios describe futures that are generally more affluent than today. Many of the scenarios envisage a more rapid 
convergence in per capita income ratios in the world compared to the IS 92 scenarios while, at the same time, they jointly 
cover a wide range of G H G and SO, emissions. 
• Emissions profiles are more dynamic than the IS92 scenarios, which reflects changes in future emissions trends for some 
scenarios and G H G species. 
• The levels of G H G emissions are generally lower than the IS92 levels, especially toward the end of the 2P ' century, while 
emissions of SOj, which have a cooling effect on the atmosphere, are significantly lower than in IS92. 
• Altemative combinations of main scenario driving forces can lead to similar levels of G H G emissions by the end of the 
2P' century. Scenarios with different underlying assumptions can result in very similar climate changes. 
• Technology is at least as important a driving force of G H G emissions as population and economic development across 
the set of 40 SRES scenarios. 
Box 6-4: Recommendations for Consideration by the User Communities 
The writing team recommends that the SRES scenarios be the mani basis for the assessment of future emissions and their 
driving forces in the Third Assessment Report (TAR). Accordingly, the SRES writing team makes the following 
recommendations regarding the emissions scenarios to be used in the atmosphere/ocean general circulation models (A/O 
GCMs) simulations for Working Group I (WGI), for the models that will be used in the assessment of climate change impacts 
by Working Group II (WGII), and for the mitigation and stabilization assessments by WGIII: 
• I t i s r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t a r a n g e of SRES s c e n a r i o s f r o m m o r e t h a n one f a m i l y be used i n any a n a l y s i s . The scenario groups 
- the scenario families A2, B l , and B2, plus the groups within the A l scenario family, and four cumulative emissions 
categories were developed as the smallest subsets of SïŒS scenarios that capture the range of uncertahities associated 
with driving forces and emissions. 
• The i m p o r t a n t u n c e r t a i n t i e s may be different i n different a p p l i c a t i o n s - f o r e x a m p l e c l i m a t e m o d e l i n g ; assessment of 
i m p a c t s , v u l n e r a b i l i t y , m i t i g a t i o n , a n d a d a p t a t i o n o p t i o n s ; a n d p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . Climate modelers may want to cover the 
range reflected by the cumulative emissions categories. To assess the robustness of options in terms of impacts, 
vulnerability, and adaptation may require scenarios with similar emissions but different socio-economic characteristics, 
as reflected by the scenario groups. For mitigation analysis, variation ui both emissions and socio-economic 
characteristics may be necessary. For analysis at the national or regional scale, the most appropriate scenarios may be 
those that best reflect specific circumstances and perspectives. 
• T h e r e i s no s i n g l e most l i k e l y , " c e n t r a l " , o r "best-guess" s c e n a r i o , e i t h e r w i t h respect t o o t h e r SRES s c e n a r i o s o r t o t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g s c e n a r i o l i t e r a t u r e . Probabilities or likelihoods are not assigned to individual SRES scenarios. None of the 
SRES scenarios represents an estimate of a central tendency for all driving forces and emissions, such as the mean or 
(Box 6.4 continues) 
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(Box 6.4 continued) 
median, and none should be interpreted as such. The statistics associated with the frequency distributions of SRES 
scenarios do not represent the likelihood of their occurrence. The writing team cautions against constructing a central, 
"best-estimate" scenario from the SRES scenarios; instead it recommends use of the SRES scenarios as they are. 
• C o n c e r n i n g l a r g e - s c a l e c l i m a t e models, t h e w r i t i n g team recommends t h a t t h e m i n i m u m set of SRES s c e n a r i o s s h o u l d 
i n c l u d e t h e f o u r d e s i g n a t e d m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s a n d t h e tvi'O a d d i t i o n a l i l l u s t r a t i v e s c e n a r i o s selected f r o m t h e s c e n a r i o 
g r o u p s i n t h e A l f a m i l y . At the minimum (a) a simulation for one and the same SRES marker or illustrative scenario 
should be performed by every TAR clmiate model for a given stabilization ceilmg, and (b) the set of simulations 
performed by the TAR climate models and stabilization mns for a given ceiling should mclude all four of the SRES 
marker scenarios. 
• The d r i v i n g f o r c e s a n d emissions of each SRES s c e n a r i o s h o i d d be used t o g e t h e r . To avoid internal inconsistencies, 
components of SRES scenarios should not be mixed. For example, the G H G emissions from one scenario and the SOj 
emissions from another scenario, or the population from one and economic development path from another, should not 
be combined. 
• The SRES s c e n a r i o s c a n p r o v i d e p o l i c y makers w i t h a l o n g - t e r m c o n t e x t f o r n e a r - t e r m d e c i s i o n s . This imphes that they 
are not necessarily well suited for the analysis of near-term developments. When analyzing mitigation and adaptation 
options, the user should be aware that although no additional climate initiatives are included in the SRES scenarios, 
various changes have been assumed to occur that would require other policy interventions. 
• M o r e d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n o n a s s u m p t i o n s , i n p u t s , a n d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 4 0 SRES s c e n a r i o s s h o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e a t 
a web s i t e a n d o n a C D - R O M . Regular maintenance of the SRES web site is 
Box 6-5: Recommendations for Consideration by the IPCC 
• Extend the SRES web site and C D - R O M to provide, if appropriate, time-dependent geographic distributions of driving 
forces and emissions, and concentrations of GHGs and sulfate aerosols. 
• Development of a classification scheme for classifying scenarios as intervention or non-intervention scenarios. 
• Establish a programme for on-going evaluations and comparisons of long-term emissions scenarios, including a regularly 
updated scenario database. 
• A n effort should be made m the future to develop an appropriate emissions scenario classification scheme. 
• Identify resources for capacity building in the area of emissions scenarios for future IPCC assessments, with a particular 
emphasis to involve strong participation from developmg countries. 
• Promote activities within and outside the IPCC to extend the SRES multi-baseline and multi-model approach in future 
assessments of climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. 
• Initiate new programs to assess G H G emissions from land use and sources of emissions other than energy-related CO2 
emissions, to go beyond the effort of SRES, which was limited by time and resoiffces. 
• Initiate new programs to assess future developments of driving forces and G H G emissions for different regions and for 
different sectors (taking the set of SRES scenarios as reference for overall global and regional developments) to provide 
more regional and sectorial detau than time and resources allowed SRES to achieve. 
forces and emissions in 2020, 2050, and 2100. Table 6-2a 
summarizes the ranges of the main scenario driving forces: 
global population, economic development, per capita income 
levels and income ratios, energy intensity, primary energy use, 
and stmcture of energy supply. Table 6-2b summarizes the 
emissions of GHGs, SO2, and ozone precursors emissions for 
the years 2020, 2050, and 2100 as well as cumulative 1990-
2100 C O , emissions broken down into energy- and land-use 
related sources. Together, the two tables provide a concise 
summary of the new SRES scenarios. 
Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 3 1 7 
II 
ce o\ 
18 
•s о 
g 5 
•S 
^ I • 
1 1 1 
•~ ^ g-
§ I -1 
§ •§ •g ^ ^  
5 !u « 
s; 
•a 
s: 
!" -S 
^ « a, 
-S 
.s; 
1 
.•Il 
г с ^ 
S; 
a я Л 
и 
a 
I 
ТЗ 
S 
я 
is 
й 
е 
и 
я 
.1 
'С 
5 
"5, 
S 
а 
я g 
го 
сл 
-а 
о с 
я! 
со 
о 
о 
Ó О 
O N 
ON 
• J m 
С 
•в g 
а. M 
£ 5 
с 
<u 
3 
о 
> 
0 0 
d 
0 0 
.s? 
G . J 
S . . 
S ^ О 
W ) О (N 
tq 
oo 
4D 
r i 
fN О 
о 
J3 
Ой 
JE 2 
О ^ 
о 
0 0 
4D 
U ^ 
C N (N 
Ou 00 
, 1 
о (M 
1 
os 
r o 
о о оо 
OS 
in 
¡¿ <Л Q «л (iO 
•S D . £ 
so q 
(Г) (ri 
x; oó O N 
ci oi oi 
£ so O N О <^ (Г) (N 
и -С О <N о in 8 
g g M О о Ф S ( N ( N C N Ó O Ó 
я о O S O S O N M О ;^ O S ON O N 
SO 
ON 
O N i Q > 
3 Z Й 
- S !=i Q 
e 
<u 
2 
s 
о 
с 
(D -o с 
T 3 
О 
i с ш о 
е 
о 
I 
сл 
О -
Q 
<Ù 
m 3 
r -
2 
> -. u . 
о °° s я bJ с "Л Ci 
и Ю 13 OO 
о и ^ 
W 
о 
S 
S 
o 
с 
с ^ ON 
ад _ C N 
S "^ î 
о о г-
о о 
Г<~1 
о о 
(N 
Г О 
о" 
ю > 
^ Щ -
сл СЛ 
Р .S D 
с 5 
D - ей 
2 S 
i , 0 0 >n 
a; 2 ^ + 
Oí) , 
J3 "ад 
I ^ N л N O R 
.a С ю 
Й ;^ С 2 - С 
g ^ Ю jg -3 <N 
Й О 2 Ü 2 a ^ 
Q 
r ô 
N ¿ 
•л -S -я ^ 
i n > 
N D 
о о 
Г-" 
N D 
о 
CN 
. . 0 0 • • r-l 
Q r i > o" 
ç r - Й 
£ • (ae- Q ~ (/2 „ 00 
.s p £ p 
ND 0 0 i l 
( N r i ГЛ ci 
о ó O N O N 
r i ¿ ci r i ci 
m — ^ 
c-i (N r i c r i r<-i r i 
О 
C N О 
О 
о 
о о 
C N 
О 
n о 
C N 
о 
g 
C N cÑ 
о 
ON 
O N 
о 
CTN 
0 \ 
О 
O N 
O N 
a a О O N 
O N O N 
о 
1 
E 
'•5 
(Ú 
ND с 
O N О > 2 S Q W 
^ S Z Q 
К i r i ^ 
< 
V D 
2 -2 Q 
J2 — " 
p-, ^ r-
г —<• Ю 
•о 
G 
1^ 
о g 23 щ 
S — + + + 
о о 
Е 
.2 N 
о 
В 
Е 
3 
••в 
-а 
0 0 
ON 
ON С 
P S 
SQ 
л .Si 
о о 
r J 
>1 
l O M O N 
б о 
cl ND 
ND -9 c i 
ГЧ u —< 
сл 
V S 
^ S o 
0 0 g 
3 
1Г) 
r- -Э •§ 
S .S S 
8 
un 
C N Ó О 
C N 
N O Ó О 
О 
û Щ ¿¡ <^ о m сл ~^  00 
.£ P £ P 
O N 
en r i C N 
f i ~: P 
C N C N rj 
P 0 0 Гч| 
r<-í C N Í CNÍ 
О О О 
^ ) Q o o —' 
C N ( N C N 
Ó Ó Ó 
O N O N O N 
O N C>\ ON 
о 
> 
Ш 
Q 
V 
" § 
Ë 
E p 
^. 
Si 
« 
I 
ta 
. g 
ад с 
3 
-a 
ад л с о Я 
, , со 
Sí 
! ^ W ) 
m о 
^1 
СП (U 
cu ^ 
03 сл 
§ 2 
i l 
•ад I, ^ .2 
с и 
w .s 
СО .л 
2 1 
2 
о 
•§ 
X I с 
H О 
.Е <D 
С 3 
I •о 
с 
— 
о s 
<u < й s 
сл О 
.а ci: 
о с 
Ой s 
03 <^  
u Й сл -й 
о 
• I 
3 й 
с 1^ i у ai 
2 
•а 
( Л 
3 
•а 7 3 
Я с 
3 1 8 Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 
S 
8 
C l , C l , 
0 0 Oc 
о .g 
p 
o c 
^1 
2 
со 
'S? 
S 
s: 
s 
О 
•S 
.s 
s 
S 
,5 t 3 
s: I 
s 
Si 
0^ 
fis 
5 
T 3 
s; 
5U 
со 
O c 
s e 
5b 
3 
^1 
г: о 
"С 
-с 
й-s 
<з е 
-о > 
•S '^ '^  
« 
1 е 
й --S, -а -s 
о '5 
о 5 
и 
О > 
z 
о 
и о 
и 
u о y 
и X * e 
X 
и 
и e 
e 
3 
1 
S D 
OO 
Г-1 
о 
(N 
О 
<N 
á 
s 2 
i l 
oo 
.2 ° 
1^ 
00 6 
.2 Ю 
u о 
2 r-^  
о 
O N 
00 
(N 
О 
•O 
ON 
OO 
(M 
00 
ou f-.. 
r<-) 
< 
i s 
s 
3 
S D 
á 
ON 
t 
o 
E 
3 
ro 
ro e 
3 
ro 
r -
rO 
s 
3 
s i •3 2 '•3 OJ 
ro 
ON 
ON 
ro 
s: ^ 
WJ О 
00 
O v 
4D 
СО 
é 
ro 
J: О 
e 
3 '•3 
ON 
s 
3 
O N " oo 
r-' d со 
CN 
со со 00 
l O 
ro 
OV 
X CL 
oc 
X 
(N 
oo 
rs 
ON 
O N 
ro 
00 
oo 
О 
t--
ó 
(N 
"S r -o 
Г 4 
oo 
-a 
X 
^ ON 
UO ,—1 4 D 
ro ON о r - (N 
ON 4 ON 00 
CM CN 
lO 4 3 ^ 0Й ON 
ro О Г- —3 oo 
J (N X 00 
о 
< 
ro 
O N 
О 
о 
d 
O N 
JS d 
OD r -
o< ;> 2 
СО 
4: 
NO 
"oil (N 
X ^ 
NC 
(N 
I 
4D 
OB (M 
Л со 
Ч-1 
О 
X fS 
со 
OÑ 
со 
Я" N¿ со ON 
л 
со 
4 X OÑ (N 
о tn —I (N 
IT) 
CO 
о 
NO 
О 
о 
I 
CO 
00 
tn 
00 
oo 
CO 
ND 
CO 
CO 
ND 
CO 
N O 
00 
CO 
2^ 
d 
CN 
CO 
rn 
O N 
r -i n 
4D 
CO 
CO 
(N 
d 
I 
CN 
в 
^ 3 
^ 00 
, 3 ^ 
NO 
r-^  
CO 
£ 3 
1 
•о 
го 
ó 
со 
2 Î:; 
о 
(N 
ND 
CNl О о 
s 
3 
'•В 
s 
O N 
со oo 
00 
s s 
.2 N O •a --^  
O N 
2 N ¿ 
E 
3 •3 
N O 
O N 
(N 
00 
s 2 
3 cl-
S 2 
f4 
QS 
CN 
со CO 
<N 
uo 
CO 
U-1 
CO о lO 
in NO 
OO CO 
UO 
ND 
ND ON 
r- (N 
СО ON 
со Ó 
NO UO 
CO 
ND 
ON uo О 
00 
ND sb 
00 
ro 
ON 
d 
(N 1 
00 CO 
ON 00 
ND NO о 
NO 
CO 
(N uo 
oo 
NO u-¡ 
CO CO 
NO 
t/3 Ы 
к ON t/5 
00 
Cu 
W 
Ж 
§ 
о 
I 
o n 
с 
и 
( Л 
и 
^ 9 
D. с 
зд 
О X 
• i -
M с 
g ° 
ü g 
с: 
Й -s 
ça < 
e 
о 
с о 
УЗ 
О 
й 
i 
с 
о 
с 
о 
•а 
3 
Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 3 1 9 
References; 
Alcamo, J. (ed.), 1994: I M A G E 2 0 I n t e g i a t e d M o d e l l i n g o f G l o b a l C h a n g e . 
Kluwer Academic Publisheis, Dordrecht, the Netheilands 
.•Vlcamo, J., A . Bouwman, J. Edmonds, A Grubler, T. Monta, and A . 
Sugandhy, 1995: A n evaluation of the IPCC IS92 emission scenarios In 
C l i m a t e C h a n g e 1 9 9 4 , R a d i a t i v e F o i c i n g o f C l i m a t e C h a n g e and A n 
E v a l u a t i o n o f t h e I P C C /592 E m i s s i o n S c e n a r i o s , J.T. Houghton, L . G . 
Meira Filho, J. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, B . A Callander, E . Haites, N . Harris 
and K . Maskell (eds.), Cambndge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 233-
304. 
Alcamo, J , E KieilemAii and R Leemans (eds.l, 1998. G l o b a l C h a n g e 
S c e n a r i o s o f t h e 2 1 " C e n t u r y R e s u l t s f r o m t h e I M A G E 2 1 m o d e l . Elsevier 
Science, London 
De Jong, A . and G . Zalm. 1991' Scanning the Future: A long-term Scenano 
Study of the Woild Economy 1990-2015 In- L o n g - t e i m P i o s p e c t s o f t h e 
WOI I d E c o n o m y O E C D , Pans, France, pp. 27-74. 
Denieny.P, 1990 Population l a T h e E a i t h A s T r a n s f o r m e d b y H u m a n A c t i o n 
В L . Turner II et a l , (éd.) , Cambridge Univeisity Press, Cambndge. 
De Vries, H S M . , J .G J. Olivier, R . A van den Wijngaart, G.J J Kieileman, and 
A M . C . Toet, 1994: Model foi calculating regional energy use, industrial 
production and greenhouse gas emissions for evaluating global climate 
scenarios. W a t e r , A i r S o i l P o l l u t i o n . 76, 79-131. 
De Vries, В , M . Janssen, and A Beusen, 1999: Perspectives on global energy 
futures - simulations with the T I M E model. E n e r g y P o l i c y . 27, 477-494. 
De Vries, В , J Bollen. L . Bouwinan, M den Elzen, M Janssen, and E . 
Kreileman, 2000: Greenhouse gas emissions in an equity-, environment-
ami service-ouented world. A n IMAGB-based scenario foi the next 
century T e c h n o l o g i c a l F o r e c a s t i n g & S o c i a l C h a n g e , 63(2-3). (In press) 
Durand, J.D , 1967 The modem expansion of world population. P i o c e e d i n g s 
o f t h e A m e r i c a n P h i l o s o p h i c a l S o c i e t y , 111(3), 136-(59 
Edmonds, J , M . Wise, and С MacCracken, 1994' A d v a n c e d E n e i g y 
T e c h n o l o g i e s a n d C l i m a t e C h a n g e A n A n a l y s i s U s i n g t h e G l o b a l C h a n g e 
Assessment M o d e l ( G C A M ) . PNL-9798, UC-402, Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, Richland, WA, U S A 
Edmonds, J. , M . Wise, H Pitcher, R. Richels, T Wigley, and C. MacCracken, 
1996a. A n mtegrated assessment of climate change and the accelerated 
introduction of advanced energy technologies: A n application of M m i C A M 
1 0 M i t i g a t i o n a n d A i l a p t a t i o n S t i a t e g i e s f o i G l o b a l C h a n g e , 1(4), 311-
339 
Edmonds, J , M . Wise, R. Sands, R. Blown, and H . Kheshgi, 1996b-
A g r i c u l t u r e , L a n d - U s e , a n d C o m m e r c i a l B i o m a s s E n e r g y A P r e l i m i n a r y 
i n t e g r a t e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e p o t e n t i a l r o l e o f b i o m a s s e n e r g y f o r i e d u c i n g 
f u t u r e g r e e n h o u s e r e l a t e d e m i s s i o n s PNNL-11155, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratories, Washington, D C . 
Fenhann, J., 2000: Industtial non-energy, non-СО-, greenhouse gas emissions 
T e c h n o l o g i c a l F o i e c a s t i n g & S o c i a l C h a n g e , 63(2-3) (In press) 
Grubler, A . , 1998: A review of global and regional sulfur emission scenarios. 
M i u g a t i o n a n d A d a p t a t i o n S t r a t e g i e s f o r G l o b a l C h a n g e , 3(2-4). 383-418. 
Houghton, J T., L . G . Meira Filho, J Bruce, Hoesung Lee, В A . Callander, E . 
Haites, N Harris, and K. Maskell (eds), 1995: C l i m a t e C h a n g e 1 9 9 4 
R a d i a t i v e F o r c i n g o f C l i m a t e C h a n g e a n d a n E v a l u a t i o n o f t h e I P C C I S 9 2 
E m i s s i o n s S c e n a r i o s . Cambndge University Press, Cambndge, 339 pp 
Houghton, J.T., L . G . Meira Filho, B . A . Callandei, N. Harns, A . Kattenberg, 
and K. Maskell (eds.), 1996: C l i m a t e C h a n g e 1 9 9 5 T h e S c i e n c e of C l i m a t e 
C h a n g e . Contnbution of Working Group I lo the Second Assessment 
Report of the Imergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Piess, Cambridge. 
l E A (International Energy Agency), 1999. N o n - O E C D C o a l - F i r e d P o w e r 
G e n e r a t i o n - t r e n d s i n t h e 1 9 9 0 s IE A Coal Research, London. 
Kroeze, С and Reijnders, L , 1992: Halocarbons and global warming III, T h e 
S c i e n c e o f T o t a l E n v i r o n m e n t , 112, 291-314. 
La Rovere, E . L . , and B. Americano, 1998: E n v i r o n m e n t a l I m p a c t s o f 
P r i v a t i z i n g t h e B r a z i l i a n P o w e r S e c l o i Pioceedings of the International 
Association of Impact Assessment Annual Meeting, Christchuich, New 
Zealand, Apnl 1998. 
Lashof, D , and Tirpak, D . A , 1990. P o l i c y O p t i o n s f o r S t a b i l i z i n g G l o b a l 
C l i m a t e 21P-2003. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, 
DC 
Leggett, J. , W.J. Pepper, and R.J. Swart, 1992: Emissions scenanos for IPCC: 
A n update. In C l i m a t e C h a n g e 1 9 9 2 Supplementary Report to the IPCC 
Scientific Assessment, J.T. Houghton, B . A . Callander, S.K.Vamey (eds.), 
Cambndge University Piess, Cambndge, pp. 69-95. 
Lutz, W. (ed.), 1996: T h e F u t u r e P o p u l a t i o n o f t h e W o r l d W h a t c a n w e assume 
t o d a y ' 2"'' Edition. Earthscan, London. 
Lutz, W , W. Sanderson, and S Scherbov, 1997: Doubling of world population 
unhkely. N a t u r e , 387(6635), 803-805. 
McCulloch, A . , P.M. Midgley. 1998: Estimated historic emissions of 
fluorocarbons from the European Union, A t m o s p h e r i c E n v i r o n m e n t , 32(9), 
1571-1580. 
Messner. S., and M Strubegger, 1995' U s e i ' s G u i d e f o i M E S S A G E 111. WP-
95-69, International InsMute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austna, 155 pp. 
Midgley, P . M , and A . McCulloch, 1999: Properties and applications of 
industrial halocarbons. In R e a c t i v e H a l o g e n C o m p o u n d s i n t h e 
A t m o s p h e r e , 4, P a r t E . P. Fabian, and O.N Singh (eds ), T h e H a n d b o o k o f 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l C h e m i s t i y , Springei-Verlag, Beilm/Heidelberg. 
M o r i , S , and M . Takahashi, 1999- A n integrated assessment model for the 
evaluation of new energy technologies and food productivity I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
J o u r n a l o f G l o b a l E n e r g v issues, 11(1-4), 1-18 
Mori, S., 2000. The development of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios using 
an extension of the M A R I A model for the assessment of resource and 
energy technologies. T e c h n o l o g i c a l F o r e c a s t i n g & S o c i a l C h a n g e , 63(2-3) 
(In press). 
Morita, T , Y. Matsuoka, I Penna, and M . Kainuma, 1994: G l o b a l C a i b o n 
D i o x i d e E m i s s i o n S c e n a r i o s a n d t h e i r B a s i c A s s u m p t i o n s 1 9 9 4 S u r v e y . 
CGER-1011-94. Center for Global Environmental Research, National 
Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba, Japan. 
Nakicenovic, N , N Victor, and T Monta, 1998 Emissions scenarios database 
and review of scenarios. M i t i g a t i o n a n d A d a p t a t i o n S t i a t e g i e s f o r G l o b a l 
C h a n g e , 3(2-4), 95-120. 
Parikh, J К , 1992: IPCC strategies unfair to the south N a t u r e . 360, 507-508 
Pepper, W.J., J. Leggett, R. Swart, J. Wasson, J. Edmonds, and I. Mintzer, 
1992' Emissions scenaiios for the IPCC A n update Assumptions, 
methodology, and results: Support Document for Chapter A3. In C l i m a t e 
C h a n g e 1 9 9 2 S u p p l e m e n t a i y R e p o i t t o t h e I P C C S c i e n t i f i c Assessment, 
J.T. Houghton, B . A . Callandar, S.K. Varney (eds.), Cambridge University 
Piess, Cambndge. 
Pepper, W.J., Barbour, W., Sankovski, A „ and Braaz, В , 1998: No-policy 
gieenhouse gas emission scenaiios- revisiting IPCC 1992 E n v i r o n m e n t a l 
S c i e n c e & P o l i c y , 1. 289-312. 
Prather, M . , R Derwent, D. Erhalt, P Fraser, E Sanhueza. and X Zhou, 
1995- Other trace gases and atmospheric chemistry In C l i m a t e C h a n g e 
1 9 9 4 , R a d i a t i v e F o r c i n g of C l i m a t e C h a n g e a n d A n E v a l u a t i o n o f t h e I P C C 
1S92 E m i s s i o n S c e n a i l o s , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 77-
119. 
Riahi, K. , and R.A. Roehrl, 2000- Greenhouse gas emissions in a dynamics-
as-usual scenano of economic and energy development. T e c h n o l o g i c a l 
F o r e c a s t i n g & S o c i a l C h a n g e , 63(2-3). (In press). 
Sankovski, A . , W Barbour, and W. Pepper, 2000: Quantification of the 1S99 
emission scenano storylines using the atmospheric stabilization framework 
(ASF). T e c h n o l o g i c a l F o r e c a s t i n g & S o c i a l C h a n g e , 63(2-3) (In piess). 
Streets, D G . , and S T. Waldhoff, 2000- Present and future emissions of air 
pollutants Ш China: SO^, NO^, and CO. A t m o s p h e r i c E n v i r o n m e n t , 34(3), 
363-374 
Subak, S., M . Hulme and L . Bohn, 1997: T h e I m p l i c a t i o n s o f F C C C P r o t o c o l 
P i o p o s a l s f o r F u t u r e G l o b a l T e m p e r a t u r e R e s u l t s C o n s i d e r i n g A l t e i n a t i v e 
S u l f u r F o r c i n g . C S E R G E Working Paper GEC-97-19, C S E R G E University 
of East Anglia, Norwich, U K . 
U N (United Nations), 1998: W o r l d P o p u l a t i o n P r o j e c t i o n s t o 2 1 5 0 . U N 
Department of Economics and Social Affau-s (Population Division), United 
Nations, New York, NY. 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 1997. 
K y o t o P r o t o c o l t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s F r a m e w o r k C o n v e n t i o n o n C l i m a t e 
C/ia«ge, F C C C / C P / L 7 / A d d . 1, lODecembei 1997 U N , New York , NY. 
3 2 0 Summary D i s c u s s i o n s a n d Recommendations 
W M O / U N E P (World Meteorological Organisation and United Nations 
Environment Programme), 1998: S c i e n t i f i c Assessment o f Ozone 
D e p l e t i o n . - ¡998. W M O Global Ozone Research & Monitoring Project, 
December 1998, W M O , Geneva. 
W M O / U N E P (World Meteorological Organisation and United Nations 
Environment Programme). 1999: C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t , Joint I P C C / T E A P 
Expert Meeting on Options for the Limitation of Emissions of H F C s and 
PFCs, 26-28 May 1999. Petten, the Netherlands. 
World Bank, 1999: ¡999 W o r l d D e v e l o p m e n t ¡ndicators. World Bank, 
SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS: 
APPENDICES 

I 
SRES Terms of Reference: 
New IPCC Emission Scenarios 
3 2 4 SRES Terms of Reference: New I P C C E m i s s i o n s S c e n a r i o s 
SRES Terms of Reference 
New IPCC Emissions Scenarios 
It is proposed that Working Group III coordinate the 
development of new emissions scenarios that assume no 
additional climate policy initiatives. 
I.l. Baciiground 
In 1992 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) released six emissions scenarios (Leggett et a l . , 1992) 
providing alternative emissions trajectories spanning the years 
1990 through 2100 for greenhouse-related gases, Carbon 
dioxide (COj), carbon monoxide (CO), methane (СЩ), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), nitrogen oxyde (NO^), and sulfur dioxide (SOj). 
These scenarios were intended for use by atmospheric and 
climate scientists in the preparation of scenarios of 
atmospheric composition and climate change. The work 
updated and extended earlier work prepared for the IPCC first 
assessment report. These six scenarios are referred to as the 
IS92 scenarios. 
In many ways the IS92 scenarios were pathbreaking. They 
were the first global scenarios to provide estimates of the full 
suite of greenhouse gases. At the time, they were the only 
scenarios to provide emission trajectories for SO2. Alcamo et 
a l . (1995) reviewed the scenarios and found that the fossil fuel 
carbon emissions trajectories spanned more than half of the 
open literature emissions scenarios reviewed. Other emissions 
trajectories had received less scrutiny in the open literature and, 
while the IS92 cases were not dissimilar to those in the open 
Hterature, the open literature was extremely sparse in many 
instances. 
Much has changed in the period following the creation of the 
IS92 scenarios. Sulfur emissions have been recognized as a 
more important radiative forcing factor than other ПОП-СО2 
greenhouse-related gases, and some regional control policies 
have been adopted. Restructuring in the states of Eastem 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union has had far more 
powerful effects on economic activity and emissions than were 
foreseen in the IS92 scenarios. For some regions these 
scenarios are not representative of those found in the literature. 
The advent of integrated assessment (lA) models has made it 
possible to construct self-consistent emissions scenarios that 
jointly consider the interactions between energy, economy, and 
land-use changes. 
Alcamo et a l . (1995) found that for the purposes of driving 
atmospheric climate models, the CO^ emissions trajectories of 
the IS92 scenarios provided a reasonable reflection of 
variations found in the open literature. However, scenarios are 
also required for other purposes, and the IS92 scenarios are not 
suitable for purposes for which they were not developed. It was 
concluded that, if the scenarios were intended to have broader 
uses than simply a set of emissions trajectories to drive climate 
models, new scenarios should be developed. Further, a new 
approach should be adopted. The new approach should open 
the process to the broader research community. 
1.2. Approach 
It is proposed that new scenarios should be developed through 
a coordinated effort that draws upon the expertise of all 
researchers in the relevant community. A three-step process is 
envisaged. First, key input assumptions would be reviewed 
and provided to modelers. Second, modelers would be asked 
to construct emissions scenarios based on the input 
assumptions provided. Finally, the model results will be used 
to develop new emissions scenarios in the form of average 
results for participating models or results from a 
representative model. 
A writing team would be established to consider key input 
assumptions (such as population projections and technologic 
change) and emissions from speciflc sources (such as SO^ 
emissions and CO2 emissions due to land-use change), 
possibly with the assistance of specialized task groups. The 
writing team will also stipulate a set of geographical reporting 
regions, reporting yeai's, units of measure, etc., designed to 
provide climate modelers, impact assessment analysts, and 
other users with the detail they need for their work. Finally, the 
writing team would ensure that the range of results reflects the 
underlying uncertainty and, to the extent possible, that the 
assumptions for specific scenarios are internally consistent. 
Scenario development will be an open process. There will be 
no "ofticial" model. There will be no "expert teams." Any 
research group with the capability of preparing scenarios for 
any region can participate. This means that, while modeling 
teams which employ global coverage wi l l be able to 
participate, so too wil l regional modelers. By opening the 
process in this way, developing and developed region 
researchers with local expertise can participate even if they do 
not have global coverage. Modeling teams will be provided 
with information on the input assumptions and other necessary 
information such as, for example, the world oil price, to 
regional modeling teams. 
Once the modeling teams have completed their work, a set of 
scenarios will be chosen. This will likely be the inputs and 
outputs of a "representative" model, but it could also be the 
average of the participating models or some other 
representation of the model results. 
1.3. Reporting and Distribution of Results 
To maximize the usefulness of the new scenarios, two steps 
should be taken. First, arrangements should be made with an 
organization whose mission it is to disseminate information to 
provide a means by which users can access scenario results. All 
results from research institutions will be included in the 
database along with associated assumptions. In addition, for 
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research teams wiUing to participate, the associated models 
will also be made available so that users can not only have 
access to scenario assumptions and outputs, but have the 
capability of independently creating derivative scenarios. 
1.4. Timing and Coordination 
It is proposed that the writing team begin work before the end 
of 1996. The team should establish the parameters -
geographic reporting regions, reporting years, time horizon, 
units, etc. - by the end of the first quarter of 1997. Reports of 
the expert groups on the range of values for each of the input 
assumptions should be available by the end of the third quarter 
of 1997. The scenario resuhs con-esponding to these input 
assumptions should be available from participafing modeling 
groups during the first quarter of 1998. Peer and government 
review should be complete by the end of 1998. 
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Definition of SRES World Regions 
OECD90 REGION ASIA REGION 
N o r t h A m e r i c a (NAM) C e n t r a l l y planned Asia and C h i n a (CPA) 
Canada United States of America Cambodia Laos (PDR) 
Guam Virgin Islands China Mongolia 
Puerto Rico Hong Kong Viet Nam 
Korea (DPR) 
Western E u r o p e (WEU) 
Andorra Ireland South Asia (SAS) 
Austria Isle of Man Afghanistan Maldives 
Azores Italy Bangladesh Nepal 
Belgium Liechtenstein Bhutan Pakistan 
Canary Islands Luxembourg India Sri Lanka 
Channel Islands Madeira 
Cyprus Malta Other Pacific Asia (PAS) 
Denmark Monaco American Samoa Philippines 
Faeroe Islands Netherlands Bmnei Darussalam Republic of Korea 
Finland Norway Fiji Singapore 
France Portugal French Polynesia Solomon Islands 
Germany Spain Gilbert-Kiribati Taiwan, province of China 
Gibraltar Sweden Indonesia Thailand 
Greece Switzerland Malaysia Tonga 
Greenland Turkey Myanmar Vanuatu 
Iceland New Caledonia Westem Samoa 
Papua New Guinea 
Pacific O E C D (PAO) 
Australia New Zealand 
Japan A L M REGION (Africa and Latin America) 
M i d d l e East and N o r t h A f r i c a (MEA) 
REF REGION (countries undergoing economic reform) Algeria Morocco 
Bahi'ain Oman 
C e n t r a l and Eastern E u r o p e (EEU) Egypt (Arab Republic) Qatar 
Albania Hungai-y Iraq Saudi Arabia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Poland Iran (Islamic Republic) Sudan 
Bulgaria Romania Israel Syria (Arab Republic) 
Croatia Slovak Republic Jordan Tunisia 
Czech Republic Slovenia Kuwait United Arab Emirates 
The former Yugoslav Yugoslavia Lebanon Yemen 
Republic of Macedonia Libya/SPLAJ 
Newly independent states L a t i n A m e r i c a and the C a r i b b e a n (LAM) 
(NIS) of the former Soviet U n i o n (FSU) Antigua and Barbuda Dominica 
Armenia Lithuania Argentina Dominican Republic 
Azerbaijan Republic of Moldova Bahamas Ecuador 
Belarus Russian Federation Barbados E l Salvador 
Estonia Tajikistan Belize French Guyana 
Georgia Turkmenistan Bermuda Grenada 
Kazakhstan Ukraine Bolivia Guadeloupe 
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Brazil Guatemala 
Latvia Chile Guyana 
Colombia Haiti 
Costa Rica Honduras 
Cuba Jamaica 
D e f i n i t i o n of SRES World Regions 
Mexico Santa Lucia Eritrea Nigeria 
Netiieriands Antilles Saint Vincent and the Ethiopia Reunion 
Nicaragua Grenadines Gabon Rwanda 
Panama Suriname Gambia Sao Tome and Principe 
Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago Ghana Senegal 
Peru Uruguay Guinea Seychelles 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Venezuela Guinea-Bissau SieiTa Leone 
Kenya Somalia 
Lesotho South Africa 
Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ( A F R ) Liberia Saint Helena 
Angola Cape Verde Madagascar Swaziland 
Benin Central African Republic Malawi Tanzania 
Botswana Chad Mali Togo 
British Indian Ocean Temtory Comoros Mauritania Uganda 
Burkina Faso Cote dlvoire Congo Mauritius Zaire 
Burundi Djibouti Mozambique Zambia 
Cameroon Equatorial Guinea Namibia Zimbabwe 
Niger 
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Six Modeling Approaches 
The SRES Terms of Reference call for a multi-model approach 
for developing emissions scenarios (see Appendix I). In all, six 
different modeling approaches were used to generate the 40 
SRES scenarios. These six models are representative of the 
approaches to emissions scenario modeling and the different 
integrated assessment frameworks used in the scenario 
literature and include both macro-economic (so-called top-
down) and systems-engineering (so-called bottom-up) models. 
Some modeling teams developed scenarios to reflect all four 
storylines, while some presented scenarios for fewer storylines. 
Chapter 4 lists all the SRES scenarios, by modeling group and 
by scenario family. The six modeling approaches include: 
• Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) from the 
National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan 
(Morita e t a l . , 1994); 
Atmospheric Stabilization Framework Model (ASF) 
from ICF Consulting in the USA (Lashof and Tirpak, 
1990; Pepper et a l . , 1992, 1998; Sankovski et a l . , 
2000); 
Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect 
(IMAGE) from the National Institute for Pubtic Health 
and Environmental Hygiene (RIVM) (Alcamo et a l , 
1998; de Vries et a i , 1994, 1999, 2000), used in 
connection with the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (СРВ) WorldScan model (de Jong and Zalm, 
1991), the Netherlands; 
Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry 
Allocation (MARIA) from the Science University of 
Tokyo in Japan (Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori, 2000); 
Model for Energy Supply Strategy Altematives and 
their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) from 
the Intemational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Austria (Messner and Stmbegger, 1995; 
Riahi and Roehrl, 2000); and the 
Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) from the 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 
U S A (Edmonds et a l , 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
IV.l. Asian Pacific Integrated Model 
The Asian Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) is a large-scale 
computer simulation model for scenario analyses of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the impacts of global 
warming in the Asian-Pacific region. This model is being 
developed mainly to examine global warming response 
measures in the region, but it is Unked to a world model so that 
it is possible to make global estimates. A I M comprises three 
main models - the G H G emission model (AIM/emission), the 
global cUmate change model (AIM/climate), and the climate 
change impact model (AIM/impact). 
The AIM-based quantification was conducted as an Asian 
collaborative project using a new lirdicd version of the 
AIM/emission model, which covers the world but has a more 
detailed structure for the Asian-Pacific region than for other 
regions. The new linked version couples bottom-up models and 
top-down models (Figure IV-1). 
The bottom-up models were prepared using the original A I M 
bottom-up components, which can reproduce detailed 
processes of energy consumption, industrial production, land-
use changes, and waste management as well as technology 
development and social demand changes. However, two kinds 
of top-down models were prepared for this quantification: 
A n energy-economic model based on the revised 
Edmonds-Reilly-Barns (ERB) Model, which can 
estimate interactions between energy sectors and 
economic sectors. 
• A n original land equilibrium model that can reproduce 
interactions between land-use changes and economic 
sectors. 
The original A I M bottom-up components were integrated with 
these two top-down models through a newly developed linkage 
module. This new stracture maximizes the ability to simulate a 
variety of inputs at a variety of levels, and to calculate future 
G H G emissions in a relatively full-range analysis. 
The A I M model has nine regions for the energy-economic 
model and 17 regions for the bottom-up and land equilibrium 
models (see Table IV-1). Its time horizon is from 1990 to 
2100. Before 2030, h uses 5-year time steps, but then jumps 
to 2050, 2075, and 2100. The GHGs and related gases 
include: 
• Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH^), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), carbon monoxide (CO), non-methane volatile 
organic compounds (NMVOCs) , nitrogen oxides 
(N0,^), and sulfur dioxide (SOj) etnissions from energy 
combustion-production processes. 
C O , from deforestation. 
CH^ and N2O from agricultural production. 
• N M V O C s and SOj from biomass combustion. 
• CO2, CH4, N2O, N0^ , CO, N M V O C s . and SOj 
emissions from industrial processes, waste 
management, and land-use changes. 
More detailed information can be obtained by referring to the 
web site: www-cger.nies.go.jp/ipcc/aim/ 
The ASF energy model consists of four end-use sectors 
(residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation). These 
sectors consume liquid fuels, solid fuels, gaseous fuels, and 
electricity. A n electricity generation sector converts liquid 
fuels, solid fuels, gaseous fuels, nuclear energy, hydro energy, 
and solar energy into electricity. A synfuels sector converts 
coal and/or biomass into either a liquid or gaseous fuel. There 
is no direct consumption of solar energy or biomass by the end-
use sectors. 
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Socio-Economie Scenarios 
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Figure IV-1: Outline of AIM/emission linkages. 
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T a b l e I V - 2 : A S F r e g i o n s . 
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Region Countries 
Africa (AFRICA) 
Centrally Planned Asia (CPASIA) 
Eastern Europe and newly independent 
states (EENIS) 
Latin America (LAMER) 
Middle East (MEAST) 
OECD-East (OECDA) 
OECD-West (OECDW) 
South East Asia and Oceania (SEASIA) 
A l l African countries 
China, Laos, Mongolia, Korea (DPR), Vietnam 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, former USSR, 
former Yugoslavia 
A l l Latin American countries (including Mexico, Central and South America) 
A l l Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and U A E 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg. Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of 
Korea, Burma, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and other countries 
of the region 
USA (USA) USA, Puerto Rico, and other US terrhories 
IV.2. The Atmospheric Stabilization Frameworli (ASF) 
Model 
The current version of A S F includes energy, agricultural, and 
deforestation G H G emissions and atmospheric models and 
provides emission estimates for nine world regions (Tables IV-
1 and IV-2). 
In the ASF model balancing the supply and demand for energy 
is achieved ultimately by adjusting energy prices. Energy 
prices differ by region to reflect regional market conditions, 
and by type of energy to reflect supply constraints, conversion 
costs, and the value of the energy to end users. ASF estimates 
the supply-demand balance by an iterative search technique to 
determine supply prices. These supply prices, which energy 
producers charge for the fuel at the wellhead or at the mine, are 
used to estimate the secondary energy prices in each region. 
These secondary prices are based on the supply price for the 
marginal export region, the inteiregional transportation cost, 
refming and distribution costs, and regional tax policies. For 
electricity, the secondary prices reflect the relative proportions 
of each fuel used to produce the electricity, the secondary 
prices of those fuels, the non-fossil costs of converting the fuels 
into electricity, and the conversion efficiency. 
The agricultural ASF model estimates the production of major 
agricultural products, such as meat, milk, and grain, which is 
driven by population and gross national product (GNP) growth. 
This model is linked with the ASF deforestation model, which 
estimates the area of land deforested aimually as a function of 
population growth and demand for agricultural products. 
The A S F G H G emissions model uses outputs of the energy, 
agricultural, and deforestation models to estimate G H G 
emissions in each ASF region. These emissions are estimated 
by mapping G H G emission sources to the corresponding 
emission drivers and changing them according to changes in 
these drivers. For example, CH^ emissions from landfills are 
mapped to population, while CO2 emissions from cement 
production are mapped to GNP. 
Finally, the ASF atmospheric model uses G H G emission 
esfimates to calculate G H G concentrations, and corresponding 
radiative forcing and temperature effects. A detailed 
description of the ASF is provided in the ASF 1990 Report to 
Congress (Lashof and Т1фак, 1990), and recent applications of 
the model are reported in Pepper et a l . (1998) and Sankovski et 
a l . (2000). 
IV.3. Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect 
The Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE 
2) consists of three fully linked systems of models: 
The Energy-Industry System (EIS). 
• The Terrestrial Environment System (TES). 
• The Atmosphere-Ocean System (AOS). 
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Population 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
Industrial Value Added 
Service Value Added 
Consumer Expenditures 
Energy Demand Module 
* Useful Energy Demand (electric and non-electric 
* Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI) 
* Price Induced Energy Efficiency Improvement (PIEEI)| 
* Secundary Fuel Substitution 
Electricity Generation Module 
* Thermal Electric (TE) inputs and efficiency 
* Non-Thermal Electric (NTE) technological innovation 
* Exogenous Hydropower 
Cost of [fuels 
for] electricity 
Demand for Solid (coal). Liquid 
(oil, BLF) and Gaseous (gas, 
BGF) fuels leads to investment in 
production 
Cost of 
secondary fuels 
Fuel Supply Module 
* Exploration for and exploitation of coal,crude oil and natural gas 
* Changing costs of fossil fuels due to innovation, depletion and wages 
* Investment in commercial Liquid and/or Gaseous Biofuel (NLF, B G F 
* Interregional trade in fuels based on relative producer plus transport 
cost 
Figure IV-2: Overview of the M A G E EIS/TIMER model. 
A t m o s p h e r e - O c e a n System 
A t m o s p h e r i c 
C o m p o s i t i o n Z o n a l A t m o s p h e r i c 
C l i m a t e 
P r i m a r y d r i v i n g f o r c e s 
• Population growth 
• Economic growth 
• Tectmological improvements 
• Animal husbandry 
L a n d Use E m i s s i o n s 
• All major greenhouse gases 
• Land cover conversions 
• Land use emissions 
• Natural emissions 
T e r r e s t r i a l C a r b o n 
' Land cover conversions 
• Adaptation of vegetation 
• Regroeth of vegetation 
• Feedback processes 
A g r i c u l t u r a l Economy 
• Demand for food 
• Number of animals 
• Demand for biofuels 
• Demand for timber 
L a n d C o v e r 
Adaptation of vegetation 
Unsuitable land 
Extensive grassland 
Land use rales 
Crop Allocation 
Expanding agricultural land 
Abandoning agricultural land 
Timber extraction 
Land quality indicators 
T e r r e s t r i a l V e g e t a t i o n 
' Climate Indicators 
• Potential vegetation 
• Crop productivity 
• Soil conditions 
Figure IV-3: The structure of the TES of I M A G E 2 (including links to other modules). 
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T a b l e I V - 3 : I M A G E 2 r e g i o n s (see a l s o T a b l e I V - l ) . 
Canada 
USA 
Latin America (Central and South) 
Africa 
OECD Europe 
Eastem Europe 
CIS (former Soviet Union) 
Middle East 
India (including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
China (including China, Korea (DPR), Kampuchea, Laos, 
Mongolia, Vietnam) 
East Asia South (Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand) 
Oceania 
Japan 
EIS computes the emissions of GHGs in 13 world regions 
(Tables IV-l and IV-3). The energy-related emissions are based 
on the Targets Image Energy Regional (TIMER) simulation 
model (Figure IV-2). T IMER is a systems dynamics model 
with investment decisions in energy efficiency, electricity 
generation, and energy supply based on anticipated demand, 
relative costs or prices, and institutional and informational 
delays. The model uses five economic sectors. Technological 
change and fuel price dynamics influence energy intensity, fuel 
substitution, and the penetration of non-fossil options such as 
solar electricity and biomass-based fuels. 
The objective of TES is to simulate global land-use and land-
cover changes and then effect on emissions of GHGs and ozone 
precursors, and on carbon fluxes between the biosphere and the 
atmosphere (Figure IV-3). This subsystem can be used to: 
• Evaluate the effectiveness of land-use policies to 
control the build-up of GHGs. 
• Assess the land consequences of large-scale use of 
biofuels. 
• Evaluate the impact of climate change on global 
ecosystems and agriculture. 
Investigate the effects of population, economic, and 
technological trends on changing global land cover. 
More detailed information can be obtained by referring to the 
following web site: http://sedac.ciesin.org/mva/. 
IV.4. Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives 
and their General Environmental Impact 
(MESSAGE) 
A set of integrated models was used to formulate the SRES 
scenaiios at IIASA (Nakicenovic, et a l . , 1998). Model for 
Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General 
Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) is one of the six models 
3 4 1 
that constitute l IASA's integrated modeling framework 
(Messner and Strubegger, 1995; Riahi and Roehrl, 2000; 
Roehrl and Riahi, 2000). 
The scenario formulation process starts with exogenous 
assumptions about population and per capita economic growth 
by region. Energy demand (defined at the useful energy level) 
is derived using the Scenario Generator (SG) model, a dynamic 
model of future economic and energy development. It 
combines extensive historical data about economic 
development and energy systems with empirically estimated 
equations of trends to determine future stmctural change. For 
each scenario, SG generates future paths of energy use 
consistent with historical dynamics and with the specific 
scenario features (e.g., high or moderate economic growth, 
rapid or more gradual energy intensity improvements). 
The economic and energy development profiles serve as inputs 
for the energy systems engineering model M E S S A G E 
(Messner and Strubegger, 1995; Riahi and Roehrl, 2000; 
Roehrl and Riahi, 2000) and the macro-economic model 
M A C R O (Manne and Richels, 1992). M E S S A G E is a dynamic 
linear programming model that calculates cost-minimal supply 
stractures under the constraints of resource availability, the 
menu of given technologies, and the demand for useful energy. 
If estimates detailed energy system structures, including energy 
demand, supply, and emissions pattems, consistent with the 
evolution of the energy demand produced by SG. M A C R O is a 
modified version of the Global 2100 model, originafiy 
published in 1992 (Manne and Richels, 1992) and 
subsequently used widely in many energy studies around the 
world. M A C R O maximizes the inter-temporal utility function 
of a single representative producer-consumer in each world 
region and estimates the relationships between macro-
economic development and energy use. M E S S A G E and 
M A C R O are linked and used in tandem to test scenario 
consistency because they correspond to the two different 
perspectives from which energy modeling is usually carried out 
- top-down (MACRO) and bottom-up (MESSAGE). 
The impacts of energy price changes on energy demand and 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth are estimated by iterating 
shadow prices from MESSAGE and energy demands from the 
M A C R O model. The iteration is repeated until energy 
intensities and GDP growth rates are consistent with the output 
of the SG model adopted as exogenous input assumptions at the 
beginning of the scenario formulation process. The demand 
reductions caused by increasing energy prices in the B2 marker 
compared to a hypothetical case with constant energy prices 
were calculated with MACRO. Compared to this hypothetical 
case the price-induced energy demand savings in the B2 marker 
are 8% by 2020, 23% by 2050, and 30% by 2100. Table IV-4 
gives the shadow prices for intemational trade for gas, oil, and 
coal in the B2 marker. Table IV-5 summarizes the regional 
ranges for extraction costs of gas, oil, and coal in the B2 marker. 
The atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and the resultant 
warming potentials can be estimated by the Model for the 
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T a b l e I V - 4 : Shadow p r i c e s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e i n t h e B2 
m a r k e r ( 1 9 9 0 U S $ / G J ) . 
Year Gas Coal Oil 
2020 0.4 0.3 0.5 
2050 0.7 0.4 1.1 
2100 0.7 1.1 2.3 
Table I V - 5 : Ranges of e x t r a c t i o n costs f o r t h e f o u r SRES 
r e g i o n s i n t h e B2 m a r k e r ( I 9 9 0 U S $ / G J ) . 
Year Gas Coal Oil 
2020 (0.2-0.3) (0.2-0.3) (0.1-0.4) 
2050 (0.3-0.6) (0.2-0.3) (0.4-0.6) 
2100 (0.5-0.8) (0.4-0.7) (0.5-0.7) 
Assessment of Greenhouse Gas-Induced Climate Change 
(MAGICC) , a carbon cycle and climate change model 
developed by Wigley et a l . (1994). 
Figure IV-4 illustrates the IIASA integrated modeling 
framework and shows how the models are linked (Nakicenovic, 
et a l , 1998). Of the six models shown in Figure IV-4, four (SG, 
M E S S A G E , M A C R O , and MAGICC) were used for the 
fonnulation and analysis of SRES scenarios, including the B2 
marker scenario. In addition the M E S S A G E model was used to 
quantify all four scenario groups of the A l storyline and 
scenario family and a number of scenarios of the В1 storyline 
and scenario family. Altogether, the IIASA team formulated 
nine SRES scenarios, including the B2 marker. 
The other two models shown in Figure IV-4, RAINS and BLS, 
were not used to model the SRES scenarios. RAINS (Alcamo 
et a l , 1990) is a simulation model of sulfur and NO^, emissions, 
their subsequent atmospheric transport, chemical 
transformations of those emissions, deposition, and ecological 
impacts. BLS (Fischer et a l , 1988, 1994) is a sectorial macro-
economic model that accounts for all major inputs (such as 
land, fertilizer, capital, and labor) required for the production 
of 11 agricultural commodities. 
The IIASA model set covers energy sector and industrial 
emission sources only. Agricultural and land-use related 
emissions for the B2 marker scenario and other SRES 
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Figure IV-4: IIASA integrated modeling framework (Nakicenovic, et a l , 1998). 
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Table I V - 6 : Assumptions o n c u m u l a t i v e resources a n d e x t r a c t i o n costs as used i n MARIA ( s o u r c e : based o n Rogner, 1 9 9 7 ) . 
Coal Oil Natural Gas 
Grade A - C Grade D-E Grade I-III Grade IV-VIII Grade I-III Grade IV-VIII 
World occurrences 53 205 12 98 16 820 
Cost 0.2-2.8 2.8-6.3 <4.4 4.4-28.0 <4.4 4.4-25.4 
(1) Resources are in Z J and extraction costs are in I990US$/GJ (in tlie model itself costs are given m 1990US$/barrel oil equivalent). 
( 2 ) Coal resources include brown coal. 
0 ) Grade I-Itl and Grade A - C , conventional resources; Grade I and A , proved recoverable reserves; Grade II and B, additional recoverable resources; Grade III 
and C , additional speculative (identified) reserves. 
(4) Grade IV, enhanced recovery, Grade V-VIII , unconventional resources and reserves; Grade VII-VIII, additional occunences; Grade D - E , additional resources. 
scenarios were derived from corresponding quantifications by 
the A I M model. They are consistent with the energy-related 
emissions because they are based on assumptions about the 
main driving forces that are in line with those in the 
quantifications with the M E S S A G E model. 
More detailed information can be obtained by referring to the 
web site: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ECS/. 
IV.5. The Multiregional Approach for Resource and 
Industry Allocation Model (MARIA) 
The Multiregional Approach for Resource and Industry 
Allocation Model (MARIA) is a compact integrated 
assessment model to assess the inteirelationships among the 
economy, energy, resources, land use, and global climate 
change (Mori and Takahashi, 1999; Mori 2000). The origin of 
the model is the Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the 
Economy (DICE) model, developed by Nordhaus (1994). 
Involving energy flows and dividing the world into regions, 
MARIA has been developed to assess technology and policy 
options to address global warming. Like Global 2100 
developed by Manne and Richels (1992), M A R I A is currenfly 
an intertemporal non-linear optimization model that deals with 
international trading among eight regions - N A M (USA and 
Canada), Japan, Other O E C D countries, China, A S E A N 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Republic of Korea, Thaüand), SAS (India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Sri-Lanka), E E F S U (Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union), and A L M (Africa and Latin America). It also 
encompasses energy flows and simplified food production and 
land use changes to show the potential contribution of 
biomass. 
Economic activities are represented by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function with caphal stock, 
labor, electricity, and non-electric energy set for the above 
eight world regions. Future GDP growth is projected by 
considering potential GDP growth rates (the product of two 
exogenous assumptions - population and potential per capita 
GDP growth) as well as endogenously determined energy costs 
and prices. The energy module in M A R I A involves three fossil 
primary energy resources (i.e., coal, natural gas, and oil), 
biomass, nuclear power, and renewable energy technologies 
(e.g., hydropower. solar, wind, and geothermal). Energy 
demand consists of industry, transportation, and other public 
uses. Nuclear fuel recycling technologies are simply but 
explicitly formulated. Carbon sequestration technologies are 
also taken into account. Typically, M A R I A basically generates 
resource extraction profiles in which gas is mainly used in the 
first half of the 2P ' century, and subsequently carbon-free 
sources (e.g., solar, nuclear, and biomass) and coal assume the 
main roles in the second half of the 2P* century. 
Energy costs in the model consist of energy production and 
utilization costs. Market prices are determined endogenously 
on the basis of model-calculated shadow prices. Among 
various parameters, the extraction costs of fossil fuel resources 
and energy conversion cost coefficients contribute 
substantially to detennining the model's energy mix and 
emissions. The latest model version, M A R I A - 8 , applied 
Rogner's estimates on fossil resource availability (Rogner, 
1997). For the sake of simplicity, the fossil resource and 
reserve categories are aggregated into two classes, assuming a 
quadratic production function to inteipolate the relationships 
between resource occurrences and extraction costs. 
Corresponding model parameters are summarized in Table IV-
6. The cost coefficients of energy conversion technologies are 
basically extracted from the G L O B A L 2100 model (Manne 
and Richels, 1992). The basic values used in the case of the B2 
scenario are illustrated in Table IV-7, and important model 
parameters deployed for M A R I A ' s other SRES scenario 
quantifications are shown in Table IV-8. Other energy-related 
cost parameters correspond to renewable energy sources, 
methanol and ethanol processes, nuclear fuel recycle, carbon 
sequestration, etc. They are described in more detail in Mori 
and Takahashi (1999). 
Intemational trade prices are generated by the Lagrange 
multipliers of the corresponding constraints as a feature of 
optimization models. The Negishi weight technique was 
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T a b l e I V - 7 : I l l u s t r a t i o n of b a s i c energy c o n v e r s i o n cost 
coefficients i n M A R I A used f o r c a l c u l a t i n g t h e SRES B2 
S c e n a r i o . 
COAL OIL GAS BIO 
IND 6.00 2.50 3.25 4.15 
T R N 8.58 3.43 4.56 5.02 
PUB 6.00 2.50 3.25 4.15 
E L C 51.00 12.20 13.70 15.76 
IND, T R N , P U B , and E L C denote industry, transportation, public and other 
services, and electric power generation sectors. The values in the first three 
rows (non-electricity) are millions per M J . Those in the last row ai'e millions 
per kWh. 
employed to assess the intemational equilibrium prices of 
tradable goods under the budget constraints (Negishi, 1972). 
Illustrative intemational energy trade prices for scenario B2 are 
summarized in Chapter 4 and are not repeated here. 
The Global Warming Subsystem in M A R I A is based on 
Wigley's five-time constant model for the emission-
concentration mechanism. A two-level thennal reservoir model 
is also employed following the DICE model (Wigley, 1994; 
Nordhaus, 1994). Only global carbon emissions are cun-ently 
treated in this model component. 
MARIA'S Food and Land Use module serves to assess the 
potential contributions of biomass. A simplified food demand 
and land-use subsystem was included. Nutrition, calorie, and 
protein demand is a function of per capita income. Either directiy 
or via meat, crop and pasture supply these demands. Forests are 
a source of biomass and wood products, but also their function as 
a carbon sink is evaluated. The relationships among the above-
mentioned subsystems are shown in Figure IV-5. 
Since M A R I A is designed for macro-level evaluation of 
various options consistently, detailed information, such as 
gridded SO^ emissions, industrial structure change, and 
urbanization issues, is not generated. However, M A R I A can 
provide long-term profiles of fuel mix changes and possible 
trade premiums under various scenarios. 
More detailed information can be obtained by referring to the 
following web site: http://shun-sea.ia.noda.sut.ac.jp/indexj.html. 
IV.6. The Mini Climate Assessment Model 
The Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) is a small 
rapidly running Integrated Assessment Model that estimates 
global G H G emissions with the ERB model (Edmonds et a l . , 
1994, 1996a) and the agriculture, forestry and land-use model 
(Edmonds et a l . , 1996b). M i n i C A M uses the Wigley and Raper 
M A G I C C (Wigley and Raper, 1993) model to estimate climate 
changes, the Hulme et a l . (1995) SCENGEN tool to estimate 
regional climate changes, and the Manne et a l . (1995) damage 
functions to examine the impacts of climate change. M i n i C A M , 
developed by the Global Change Group at Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, undergoes regular enhancements. Recent changes 
include the addition of an agriculture land-use module and the 
capability to estimate emissions of all the Kyoto gases. 
At present the model consists of 11 regions (USA, Canada, 
Western Europe, Japan, Australia, Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, Centrally Planned Asia, the Mid-East, 
Africa, Latin America, and South and East Asia) that provide 
complete world coverage (see Table IV-1), A 14-region version 
is nearing completion. 
M i n i C A M uses a straightforward population times labor 
productivity process to estimate aggregate labor productivity 
levels. The resultant estimate of GNP is corrected for the 
impact of changes in energy prices using GNP/energy 
elasticity. For the scenario exercise, an extended economic 
activity level process was developed to allow a clearer 
understanding of the potential impacts of the new population 
scenarios. First, a detailed age breakdown was included so 
working age populations could be computed. Second, a labor 
force participation rate was added to estimate the labor force, 
and third an external process was created to estimate the long-
term evolution of the rate of labor productivity increase. 
ERB is a partial equilibrium model that uses prices to balance 
energy supply and demand for the seven major primary energy 
categories (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, hydro, solar, and biomass) in 
the eleven regions in the model. 
The energy demand module initially estimates demands for 
three categories of energy services (residential/commercial, 
industrial, and transportation) as a function of price and 
income. Energy services are provided by four secondary fuels 
(solids, liquids, gases, and electricity). Demand for the 
secondary fuels depends upon their relative costs and the 
T a b l e I V - 8 : P a r a m e t e r a d j u s t m e n t s t o meet t h e key d r i v i n g f o r c e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e SRES s c e n a r i o s t o r y l i n e s . 
Storylines Potential economic Autonomous Potential Energy cost 
growth rates energy efficiency cropland coefficients of coal 
A l High Middle High 260% of gas 
B l Middle High High 250% of gas 
B2 Low Low Low 185% of gas 
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Figure IV-5: Structure of the M A R I A model of one region. 
evolution of the end-use technologies, represented by the 
improvement in end-use energy efficiency. Demand for 
primary fuels is determined by the relative costs of 
transfoiming them into the secondary fuels. Nuclear, solar, and 
hydro are directly consumed by the electricity sector, while 
coal and biomass can be transformed into gas and liquids if the 
fossil oil and gas become too expensive or run out. Hydrogen 
has recently been added to the model, and it, like refined gas 
and oil, can be used to generate electricity or as a secondary 
fuel for the three final demand sectors. 
The energy supply sector provides both renewable (hydro, 
solar, and biomass) and non-renewable (coal, oil, gas, and 
nuclear) resources. The cost of the fossil resources relates to 
the resource base by grade, the cost of production (both 
technical and environmental), and to historical production 
capacity. The introduction of a graded resource base for fossil 
fuel allows the model to test explicitly the importance of fossil 
fuel resource constraints as well as to represent unconventional 
fuels such as shale oil and methane hydrates. For 
unconventional fuels only small amounts are available at low 
costs, but large amounts are potentially available at high cost, 
or after extensive technology development. Fuel-specific rates 
of technical change are available for primary fuel production 
and conversion, as are technical change coefficients for each 
category of electricity production. 
Biomass is supplied by the agriculture sector, and provides the 
link between the agriculture, forestry, and land-use module and 
the energy module. The former module estimates die allocation 
of land to one of five activities (crops, pasture, forestty, modern 
biomass, and other) in each region. This allocation reflects the 
relative profitability of each of these uses. Profitability is 
determined by the prices for crops, livestock, forest products, 
and biomass, which reflect regional demand and supply 
functions for each product. There are separate technical change 
coefficients for crops, livestock/pasture, forestry, and modem 
biomass production. 
Once the model has reached equilibrium for a period, 
emissions of GHGs are computed. For energy, emissions of 
CO, , CH4, and N2O reflect fossil fuel use by type of fuel, while 
agriculture emissions of these gases reflect land-use change, 
the use of fertilizer, and the amount and type of livestock 
produced. The high global warming gases (chlorofluoro-
carbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and 
perfluorocarbons) are esfimated only for each category and not 
by their individual components. Sulfur emissions are estimated 
as a function of fossil fuel use and reflect sulfur controls, the 
effectiveness of which is determined by a Kuznets curve that 
relates control levels to per capita income. 
The emissions estimates are aggregated to a global level and 
used as inputs to M A G I C C to produce estimates of G H G 
concentrations, changes in radiative forcing, and consequent 
changes in global mean temperature. The global mean 
temperature change is used to drive SCENGEN-derived 
changes in climate pattems and to produce estimates of 
regional change in temperature, precipitation, and cloud cover. 
Finally, the regional changes in temperature are used to 
estimate market and non-market based damages. Developing-
region damage functions produce higher damages than those 
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for developed regions, reflecting the higher vulnerability of 
regions with low per capita income. 
More detailed infomiation can be obtained by referring to the 
following web site: http://sedac.ciesin.org/mva/. 
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Database Description 
The SRES Emission Scenario Database (ESD) was developed 
to manage and access a large number of data sets and emissions 
scenarios documented in the literature. The SRES Terms of 
Reference call for the assessment of emissions scenarios in the 
literature (see Appendix I). The database was developed for 
SRES by the National Institute for Environmental Studies 
(NIES) of Japan and can be accessed via the ftp site www-
cger.nies.go.jp/cger-e/db/ipcc.html. This section summarizes 
the database structure and the data collection for the database. 
Chapter 2 gives further detail about the quantitative assessment 
of the scenarios in the database. At the time of writing the 
database included 416 scenarios from 171 sources. 
V.l . Database Structure 
The main purpose behind the development of the new database 
is to make it easier to manage and utilize the vast amounts of 
data related to emission scenarios of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), which include carbon dioxide (CO,), nitrous oxide 
(NjO), methane (CH^), sulfur oxides (SO^ )^, and related gases, 
(such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (N0^), and 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The need for such a database is a 
function of both the increasing number of emission scenarios 
(because of increasing political and research interests in this 
topic) and the necessity to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of current scenarios (to allow research to be 
focused on the most crucial or under-investigated areas). 
These emission scenarios have been quantified mainly using 
computer simulation models, which in tum utilize many 
assumptions on factors such as population growth, gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, technology efficiency 
improvements, land-use changes, and the energy resource base. 
The assumptions used in incorporating these factors often 
differ between simulations, as do the actual factors represented 
in the simulations. As a result, the database was designed to 
organize and store the input assumptions behind the scenarios 
as well as G H G emissions and other output. 
Given the diversity of data types that must be accommodated, 
the database was designed with a relational database structure 
(using MS Access '97). The data represent large samples, and 
it is important that they be stored according to a stracture that 
also allows the relationships between different data types to be 
represented and stored. A detailed description of the database 
stracture is given in Morita and Lee (1998). 
Each individual data entry is stored in the D A T A M O M . Using 
the relational stracture, it is possible to call data from within 
any of four main fields (Source ID, Scenario ID, Region ID, or 
Variable) using a number of subcategories specific to the 
individual fields. For example, the Source ID data entry field 
has the following subcategories: 
• Source ID (an abbreviated model or organization name 
with multiple data sets distinguished by the year of 
publication). 
• Authors (individual name or organization name). 
• Reference (publication in which the data are found). 
• Model (main simulation models). 
Category (of simulation model, such as bottom-up or 
top-down, dynamic optimization of general 
equilibrium, etc.). 
Update date (of the most recent publication). 
Notes (if any). 
Table V-1 briefly summarizes the subdivisions in the other key 
fields. 
The database has the primary function of acting as a data 
storage tool, and as an interface that will allow the user easy 
access to the data sets contained therein. Thus, it only provides 
data, and analyses are conducted using other tools such as 
spreadsheets. However, the relational structure of the database 
makes it possible to call up comparable data sets across the key 
fields, giving maximum flexibility in manipulation, extraction, 
and presentation of all the data in the database. Similarly, there 
is great flexibility in importing new data, or making a data set 
from the database using combinations of specific sources, 
specific scenarios (or categories), specific regions, and specific 
variables. The extraction screen in Figure V-1, for example, 
shows the settings used to extract all information on all 
scenarios that are generated with the A I M Japan source model 
and to examine global sea level rise. 
The writing team recommends that this database or a new 
revised one should also be maintained by some institution in 
the future to facilitate comparisons and assessments of 
emissions scenarios. However, this would require additional 
resources. 
V.2. Data Collection 
The main sources of data used in ESD were Intemational 
Energy Workshop PoUs (Manne and Schrattenholzer, 1995, 
1996, 1997), Energy Modeling Foram (EMF-14 comparison 
studies) data, the previous database compiled for the IPCC 
Supplement Report, "Climate Change 1994" (Alcamo et a l , 
1995), which examined emission scenarios produced prior to 
1994, and individual emission scenarios collected by the SRES 
writing team. The current database used in this report includes 
the results of a total of 416 scenarios from 171 sources. Most 
of these scenarios date after 1994. 
Most of the total of 416 scenarios focus on energy-related CO2 
emissions (256). Only three models estimated land-use related 
emissions - the A S F model, the I M A G E 2 model, and the AIM 
model. Very few scenarios considered global SO2 emissions. 
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T a b l e V-2. L i s t of D a t a C a t e g o r i e s i n the 4 1 6 S c e n a r i o 
Variable No. of Scenarios Variable No. of Scénarios 
CO2 emissions 372 Reduction in macro-economic consumption 29 
Total primary energy consumption 243 Oil primary energy consumption 26 
GDP or GNP 228 CH^ emissions 25 
Electricity generation 164 Coal 29 
CO2 concentration 161 Nuclear energy primary energy consumption 24 
Temperature change 140 Biomass energy production 21 
Coal consumption 107 Natural gas electricity generation 20 
Oil consumption 101 Global mean temperature increase 20 
Control costs 100 COj emissions from deforestation 19 
Natural gas consumption 99 CO2 emissions in industrial sector" 19 
CH4 concentration 97 N^O emissions 19 
Climate change costs 97 CH4 emissions from animal wastes 18 
Carbon tax 96 CH4 emissions from biomass burning 18 
Nuclear energy 93 CH^ emissions from domestic sewage 18 
Coal production 93 CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation 18 
Oil production 92 CH4 emissions from landfills 18 
Renewables, electric 90 Coal primary energy consumption 18 
Oil exports-imports 88 NjO emissions from biomass burning 18 
Renewables, nonelectric 87 NjO emissions from land clearing 18 
Natural gas production 86 Total electricity generation 16 
Natural gas exports-imports 79 Other electricity generation 14 
Coal exports-imports 78 Final energy consumption in industry 13 
Crude oil price, international 77 Final energy consumption in residential and commercial 13 
Coal/shale consumption 70 Final energy consumption in transport 13 
Total primary energy production 66 N0^ emissions 13 
Sea level rise 63 Autonomous Energy Efficiency Index 13 
Sulfur emissions 61 Biomass commercial production 13 
Total fossil fuel consumption 61 Electricity generation primary energy consumption 13 
Population 52 N.,0 concentration 13 
Carbon intensity 33 CH4 emissions from agricultural waste buming 12 
Natural gas primary energy consumption 32 CH4 emissions from deforestation 12 
Energy intensity 31 CH^ emissions from energy production 12 
Carbon permits 29 CH4 emissions from energy/industry 12 
CO2 emissions fossil fuel 29 CH^ emissions from industry 12 
Incremental value of carbon permit/carbon tax 29 CH^ emissions from nature 12 
Natural gas 29 CH4 emissions from savanna buming 12 
Oil 29 CH4 emissions from wet rice field 12 
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Figure V-1: Example of an extraction screen, showing the settings used to extract all infomiation on all scenarios that are 
generated with the A I M Japan source model and to examine global sea level rise. 
The variables considered while collating scenario data, and the 
frequency with which such they are found in the 416 scenarios 
(and thus stored in the SRES database), are listed in Table V-2. 
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Open Process 
The Terms of Reference of this Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios (SRES) include a so-called "open process" to 
stimulate input from a community of experts much broader 
than the writing team (see Appendices I and П). IPCC 
documents should take into account as many scientific 
perspectives as possible. This is particularly important in the 
area of scenarios, for which views on the plausibility of various 
aspects of the described futures and their interactions can differ 
between regions, between different sectors of society, and 
between individual experts. The SRES web site 
(sres.ciesin.org) was created to facilitate the open process and 
to help gain input from a community of expeits much broader 
than the writing team. 
The web site: 
Includes a description of SRES acdvhies and the 
scenaiio development process. 
Provides detailed information on the four marker 
scenarios and their storylines. 
• Offers facilities to view and plot scenario driving forces 
and emissions. 
• Offers facilities to receive feedback from the open 
process. 
The open process lasted from June 1998 to January 1999. As a 
result of the interest in SRES scenarios, the web site is 
accessible to acquire updated information about SRES marker 
scenarios. For other reasons and the input received so far, the 
information on the web site has been improved and updated 
considerably. The writing team recommends that the web site 
also be maintained in the future so that it is available to access 
updated infonnation on SRES scenarios. However, this will 
require additional resources. 
The four marker scenarios were posted on the IPCC web site 
(sres.ciesin.org) in June 1998. The submissions invited through 
the open process and web site fell into three categories: 
Additional scenarios published in the reviewed 
literature that had not been included in the scenario 
database (see Appendix V). 
New scenarios based on the SRES marker scenarios. 
General suggestions to improve the work of the SRES 
writing team as posted on the web site (preferably 
based on referenced literature). 
The submissions were used to revise the marker scenarios and 
to develop additional alternatives within each of the four 
scenario families. The result is a more complete, refined set of 
new scenarios that reflects the broad spectrum of modeling 
approaches and regional perspectives. The preliminary 
scenarios posted on the web site were provided to climate 
modelers also, with the approval of the IPCC Bureau. 
T a b l e V I - 1 : SRES web s i t e access summary by m o n t h , f r o m 
M y 1 9 9 8 t o M a r c h 1 9 9 9 . 
Month Unique non-CIESIN Total non-CIESIN 
hosts connected www accesses 
July 1998 (20-31) 17 65 
August 1998 143 2,214 
September 1998 610 6,217 
October 1998 425 4,083 
November 1998 313 3,696 
December 1998 455 5,170 
January 1999 497 5,946 
February 1999 468 5,764 
March 1999(1-5) 103 1,064 
Total 3,031 34,219 
Most of the submissions received fall into the first two 
categories above. Altogether, more than 34,000 accesses to the 
SRES web site were registered by April 1999 from some 3,000 
unique hosts that were connected. Tables VI-1 and VI-2 and 
Figure VI-1 give more detail about the number of monthly 
accesses between July 1998 and March 1999 and about 
accesses from different countries and temtories during the 
same period. Tables VI-3 and VI-4 give details of the 
preliminary marker scenarios. 
The web site is managed by the Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN) in the US, in 
collaboration with the Energy Research Foundation (ECN) in 
the Netherlands, the Technical Support Unit (TSU) of Working 
Group III on Mitigation of IPCC at the National Institute of 
Public Health and Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands, 
and the Intemational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Austria. 
O p e n Process 
T a b l e V I ' 2 : SRES web s i t e access summary by c o u n t r i e s a n d t e r r i t o r i e s , f r o m July 1 9 9 8 t o M a r c h 1 9 9 9 . 
355 
Accesses Internet domain Country/Territory Accesses Internet domain Country/Territory 
36 ar Argentina 6 lb Lebanon 
676 at Austria 8 lu Luxembourg 
373 au Australia 3 my Malaysia 
26 ba Bosnia and Herzegovina 17 mx Mexico 
333 be Belgium 22 Ik Sri Lanka 
81 br Brazil 3424 nl Netherlands 
715 ca Canada 803 no Norway 
301 ch Switzerland 154 nz New Zealand 
14 cn China 206 pi Poland 
10 cl Chile 94 pt Portugal 
16 cr Costa Rica 47 ru Russian Federation 
11 cz Czech Republic 3 sa Saudi Arabia 
1085 de Germany 155 se Sweden 
203 dk Denmark 13 sg Singapore 
3 ec Ecuador 10 si Slovenia 
9 ее Estonia 49 za Soutli Africa 
204 es Spain 23 th Thailand 
297 fi Finland 15 tw Taiwan, province of China 
3 ÍJ Fiji 4 tt Trinidad and Tobago 
262 fr France 12 tz Tanzania 
13 gb Great Britain (UK) 3 ua Ukraine 
12 gr Greece 1921 uk United Kingdom 
7 hr Croatia 74 us United States 
23 hk Hong Kong 3 uy Uruguay 
36 bu Hungary 2894 com US Commercial 
20 id Indonesia 2948 edu US Educational 
11 ie Ireland 1736 gov US Government 
34 il Israel 9 int Intemational 
35 in India 78 mil US Military 
6 is Iceland 1723 net Network 
320 it Italy 806 org Non-Profit Organization 
1991 jp Japan 8613 unresolved IP addresses only 
20 kr Republic of Korea (South) 
Figure V M : SRES web site access summary by countries and territories, from August 1998 to February 1999. 
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3 5 8 O p e n Process 
T a b l e V I - 4 a : S t a n d a r d i z e d G H G emissions f o r t h e p r e l i m i n a r y A l m a r k e r (AIM) as p o s t e d o n t h e CIESIN web page 
( s r e s . c i e s i n . o r g ) d u r i n g t h e open process. These d a t a a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e final m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s . 
P r e l i m i n a r y A l M a r k e r Scenano - W O R L D (Open process version, date of submission: 12/10/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 5262 7493 8704 7056 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 20.9 56.5 181.3 528.5 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 49.8 35.6 0 0 
Solids 36 62 74.5 24.6 
Liquids 110.7 196.9 301.8 386.5 
Gas 50.5 134 295.1 431.7 
Electricity 38.3 103.7 330.7 898.1 
Others 
Total 285.3 532.2 1002 1741 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 85 144.5 140.3 41.1 
Oil 125.8 200.5 181 107 
Gas 67.6 186.5 400.3 490.4 
Nuclear 6.5 30.4 122.7 77.9 
Biomass 49.8 62.8 192.8 375.9 
Other Renewables 10.3 23 167.1 986.9 
Total 345 647.8 1204 2079 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.1 3.4 7.9 12.2 
Oil 0.1 5 10.8 17.7 
Gas 0.1 3.5 12.2 36.1 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 7.1 309.5 768.7 1517 
Land Use in Mill ion ha 
Cropland 1437 1553 1325 858 
Grasslands 3290 3750 4065 3551 
Energy Biomass 0 200 793 1208 
Forest 4249 3811 3874 4326 
Others 3966 3628 2885 2999 
Total 12942 12942 12942 12942 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in GtC 6 12.1 16 13.1 
Other C O 2 (as C) in GtC 1.2 1.9 0.2 -0.2 
Total C O 2 (as C) in GtC 7.1 14 16.2 12.9 
C H 4 total (as C H 4 ) in Mt C H 4 341.7 499.3 529.7 316.2 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt N 2 O - N 6.6 7.7 6.8 4.8 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 69.1 101.8 63.8 24.4 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 751.7 1328 1787 2268 
VOCs in Mt 
NOx (as N) in M t N 27.6 46.9 47.2 38.3 
* at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 3 5 9 
P r e l i m i n a r y A l M a r k e r Scenario - O E C D 9 0 (Open process version, date of submission: 12110198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 858.5 1002 1081 1110 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 16.4 31 54.1 121 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 6.1 0 0 0 
Solids 10 8.5 6.1 1.4 
Liquids 64.1 81.8 74.5 66.5 
Gas 24.8 50.4 68.1 78.1 
Electricity 21.8 39.5 69.7 175 
Others 
Total 126.8 180 218 321 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 37.7 32.5 26 6.2 
Oil 70 80.8 50.6 29.3 
Gas 31.4 65.2 88.4 89.4 
Nuclear 5.2 16.5 24.3 15 
Bioma.ss 6.1 4.1 29.1 56.8 
Other Renewables 5.5 10.8 35.3 192 
Total 155.9 210 254 389 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0 1.2 2 2.7 
Oil 0.1 2.5 4.5 6.3 
Gas 0 1.5 3.9 8.5 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 2.9 103 207 344 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 410 381 300 198 
Grasslands 787 788 815 730 
Energy Biomass 0 15 95 179 
Forest 1056 1105 1243 1370 
Others 886 851 686 663 
Total 3140 3140 3140 3140 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in GtC 2.9 3.6 3.5 2.3 
Other C O 2 (as C) in GtC 0 0 -0.2 0 
Total C O 2 (as C) in GtC 2.9 3.6 3.2 2.3 
C H 4 total (as C H 4 ) in Mt C H 4 81.1 78.9 61.7 47.5 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt N 2 O - N 2.7 2.8 2.3 1.5 
SOx total (as S) in MtS 22.0 6.1 5.8 4.6 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 173.5 225 247 261 
VOCs in Mt 
N 0 ^ (as N) in MtN 12.9 12.8 7.3 5.9 
' at maitet exchange rate 
3 6 0 O p e n Process 
P r e l i m i n a r y A l M a r k e r Scenario - R E F (Open process version, date of submission: 12/10/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 413 430 423 339 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 1.1 2.9 12.4 34.2 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 2 0 0 0 
Solids 9.4 5.5 4 1.2 
Liquids 18.9 8.9 7 6.2 
Gas 19.3 22.9 45.5 49.9 
Electricity 8.1 12.7 27.7 55.4 
Others 
Total 57.7 50 84.2 113 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 18.4 14.1 11 2.7 
Oil 22.2 11.6 6.7 2.2 
Gas 26.3 32.7 55.3 53.5 
Nuclear 1.1 3.9 8.4 4.8 
Biomass 2 1.1 7.6 14.8 
Other Renewables 1.3 1.7 15 60.7 
Total 71.3 65 104 139 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0 0.4 0.8 1.1 
Oil 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 
Gas 0 0.8 2.1 4.9 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 1.2 30.3 62.6 102 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 279 299 287 180 
Grasslands 346 454 566 478 
Energy Biomass 0 0 31 49 
Forest 960 970 973 1114 
Others 720 582 447 485 
Total 2305 2305 2305 2305 
Antliropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in GtC 1.2 1 1.1 0.7 
Other C O 2 (as C) in GtC 0 0 0 -0.1 
Total C O 2 (as C) in GtC 1.2 1 1.1 0.6 
C H 4 total (as C H 4 ) in Mt C H 4 58.7 79.1 64.5 51.9 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt N 2 O - N 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 
SOx total (as S) in MtS 16.5 11.7 2.9 1.6 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 69.8 51.1 54.5 47.4 
VOCs in Mt 
N 0 ^ (as N) in M t N 4 3.1 2.1 1 
* at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 3 6 1 
P r e l i m i n a r y A l M a r k e r Scenario - A S I A (Open process version, date of submission: 12/10/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
2798.2 
1.5 
27.8 
15.4 
10.8 
2 
4.6 
60.6 
3851 
12.3 
14.1 
44 
48.3 
17.3 
27.1 
151 
4220 
62.7 
0 
57.3 
86.9 
70 
117 
331 
2882 
207 
0 
20.1 
112 
160 
363 
655 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
25.8 
13.1 
3 
0.1 
27.8 
1.3 
71.3 
80.4 
48.3 
26.9 
5.7 
20.5 
4.2 
186 
77.5 
40.4 
108 
45.3 
45.7 
57.6 
374 
25.1 
20.9 
184 
31.8 
89 
400 
750 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in GtC 
Other C O 2 (as C) in GtC 
Total C O 2 (as C) in GtC 
C H 4 total (as C H 4 ) in Mt C H 4 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt N 2 O - N 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
N 0 „ (as N) in M t N 
0 
0 
0 
1.5 
390 
521 
0 
527 
576 
2014 
1.1 
0.3 
1.5 
126.6 
2.3 
19.2 
265.5 
1.5 
0.9 
0.3 
87.8 
437 
586 
44 
411 
536 
2014 
4 
0.6 
4.6 
211 
2.8 
56.2 
583 
16.4 
4.1 
2.3 
2.3 
253 
367 
621 
197 
405 
424 
2014 
5.6 
0.2 
5.9 
249 
2.7 
9.5 
847 
18.6 
6.6 
3.8 
10.3 
546 
246 
584 
257 
472 
456 
2014 
5.2 
0.1 
5.2 
127 
2 
6.3 
979 
12.3 
" at market exchange rate 
362 O p e n Process 
P r e l i m i n a r y A l M a r k e r Scenario - A L M (Open process version, date of submission: 12/10/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 1192.1 2211 2980 2727 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 1.9 10.3 52 166 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 13.9 21.5 0 0 
Solids 1.2 4 7.1 1.9 
Liquids 16.9 57.9 133 202 
Gas 4.4 43.4 112 144 
Electricity 3.8 24.4 117 304 
Others 
Total 40.2 151 369 652 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 3.1 17.5 25.8 7.1 
Oil 20.5 59.9 83.4 54.5 
Gas 6.9 61.7 149 164 
Nuclear 0 4.3 44.7 26.3 
Biomass 13.9 37.1 110 215 
Other Renewables 2.1 6.4 59.2 335 
Total 46.5 187 472 802 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0 0.3 0.9 1.7 
Oil 0 1.1 3.3 6.7 
Gas 0 0.9 4 12.5 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 1.6 88.7 246 525 
Land Use in Mill ion ha 
Cropland 357 436 371 234 
Grasslands 1636 1921 2062 1759 
Energy Biomass 0 141 470 724 
Forest 1706 1326 1253 1371 
Others 1784 1659 1328 1396 
Total 5483 5483 5483 5483 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in GtC 0.8 3.5 5.8 4.9 
Other C O 2 (as C) in GtC 0.8 1.3 0.2 -0.2 
Total C O 2 (as C) in GtC 1.6 4.8 6 4.8 
C H 4 total (as C H 4 ) in Mt C H 4 75.3 130 154 90.1 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt N 2 O - N 1 1.5 1.2 0.9 
SOx total (as S) in MtS 11.4 27.7 45.5 11.9 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 242.9 469 639 981 
VOCs in Mt 
NOx (as N) in M t N 4.6 14.6 19.3 19 
* at marliet excliange rate 
Open Process 363 
Table V I - 4 b : S t a n d a r d i z e d G H G emissions f o r the p r e l i m i n a r y A2 m a r k e r (ASF) as posted on the CIESIN web page 
( s r e s . c i e s i n . o r g ) d u r i n g the open process. These d a t a a r e not necessarily i d e n t i c a l w i t h the final m a r k e r s c e n a r i o . 
Preliminary A2 M a r k e r Scenario - W O R L D (Open process version, date of submission: 12I14II98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Other (e.g. HO 
Total 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative COj Emissions in GtC 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
5263 
20.9 
55.6 
123.1 
51.1 
43.0 
272.8 
96.6 
140.8 
74.0 
8.3 
0.0 
9.6 
329.3 
0 
0 
0 
8191 
40.5 
64.7 
245.9 
92.4 
85.4 
.4 
129.3 
291.0 
125.8 
16.8 
12.2 
19.9 
594.9 
3.2 
6.2 
2.7 
291 
11296 
81.6 
54.9 
333.5 
186.7 
203.6 
778.7 
293.8 
227.7 
274.9 
61.8 
71.5 
41.6 
971.4 
9.2 
13.8 
8.4 
738 
15068 
242.8 
66.5 
635.0 
261.8 
46^.0 
1431.3 
903.7 
0.5 
331.2 
234.2 
161.6 
86.0 
1717.1 
38.6 
16.1 
24.2 
1862 
COj (as C) in MtC 6137 10498 15731 27823 
Other CO2 (as C) in MtC 1584 2010 1802 1128 
Total C O , (as C) in MtC 7721 12508 17533 28950 
CH4 totar(as CH^) in Mt C H ^ 307 437 611 902 
N^O total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 7 10 13 17 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 77 102 106 57 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 428 565 716 1101 
VOCs in Mt 118 166 212 330 
NO^ (as N) in MtN 35 56 77 115 
Total CO2 - Sinks, in MtC 7719 12438 17361 28745 
* at market exchange rate 
364 Open Process 
Preliminary A2 M a r k e r Scenario - O E C D 9 0 (Open process version, date of submission: 12I14II98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 848 1030 1151 1496 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 15.7 26.0 39.9 87.6 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12.7 12.7 14.2 16.3 
Liquids 68.6 99.0 92.1 146.0 
Gas 27.7 32.9 45.6 59.6 
Electricity 23.9 39.0 58.8 130.4 
Other (e.g. Hj) 
Total 132.9 183.6 210.7 352.3 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 32.2 37.0 92.0 217.7 
Oil 77.4 116.4 49.4 0.0 
Gas 34.9 43.3 69.3 77.0 
Nuclear 6.9 10.8 20.2 72.0 
Biomass 0.0 3.6 22.8 28.5 
Other Renewables 5.5 8.4 12.0 22.6 
Total 156.9 219.5 265.7 417.8 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0 0.99 2.8 10.4 
Oil 0 3.06 5.4 5.7 
Gas 0 1.17 2.8 6.5 
Cumulative C O ^ Emissions in GtC 0 102 229 500 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as C) in MtC 2758 3721 4272 6659 
Other CO2 (as C) in MtC 78.6 139 373 156 
Total CO2 (as C) in MtC 2837 3860 4644 6815 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 73.9 84.4 106 166 
Щ0 total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 2.67 3.2 3.24 4.13 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 29.2 14.5 13.4 11.8 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 78 98 83 127 
VOCs in Mt 43 58 56 80 
NO^ (as N) in M t N 12 17 18 23 
* at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 365 
P r e l i m i n a r y A2 M a r k e r Scenario - R E F (Open process version, date of submission: 121141198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in IVIillion 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90^ 
420 
1.0 
455 
1.4 
519 
3.7 
706 
14.2 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Other (e.g. 
Total 
17.9 
16.3 
15.8 
8.3 
58.3 
10.7 
12.8 
17.1 
11.2 
51.8 
10.8 
17.1 
32.0 
18.6 
78.5 
11.2 
36.5 
46.3 
42.5 
136.5 
Primaiy Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
23.4 
18.3 
26.5 
1.0 
0.0 
1.1 
70.3 
16.5 
15.3 
29.4 
1.6 
-0.1 
1.7 
64.4 
22.7 
20.7 
40.4 
5.9 
0.4 
3.2 
93.4 
59.1 
0.2 
52.3 
21.6 
15.0 
7.0 
155.1 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
0 
0 
0 
0.46 
0.42 
0.71 
1.0 
1.0 
1.8 
2.8 
1.3 
4.1 
Cumulative C O 2 Emissions in GtC 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
31 69 160 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O 2 (as C) in MtC 
Other C O 2 (as C) in MtC 
Total C O 2 (as C) in MtC 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 
N 2 O total (as N) in Mt ЩО-П 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
NO^ (as N) in M t N 
1325 
32 
1357 
43.2 
0.64 
15.3 
25 
11 
6 
1139 
-3.41 
1136 
43.92 
0.852 
9.637 
17 
15 
5 
1560 
-120 
1440 
76.07 
0.982 
8.8 
24 
27 
6 
2281 
45.6 
2327 
141 
1.15 
3.24 
51 
34 
" at market exchange rate 
3 6 6 Open Process 
Preliminary A2 M a r k e r Scenario - A S I A (Open process version, date of submission: 12I14II98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 2779 4308 5764 7340 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 1.7 5.3 15.0 57.1 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 23.7 38.1 21.5 23.2 
Liquids 15.3 63.8 103.0 214.7 
Gas 2.6 18.8 45.2 60.2 
Electricity 6.2 20.2 86.3 180.6 
Other (e.g. H^) 
Total 47.8 140.9 256.0 478.7 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 36.3 62.2 134.0 355.0 
Oil 19.1 76.9 57.1 0.0 
Gas 4.0 23.8 78.6 84.2 
Nuclear 0.4 3.1 26.5 90.3 
Biomass 0.0 3.4 22.9 19.8 
Other Renewables 1.3 4.9 15.6 31.9 
Total 61.0 174.2 334.8 581.2 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0 1.46 4.3 16.5 
Oil 0 1.28 3.2 3.6 
Gas 0 0.33 1.7 6.1 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions in GtC 0 82 239 666 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as C) in MtC 1328 3340 5615 10238 
Other CO2 (as C) in MtC 400 706 956 522.6 
Total CO2 (as C) in MtC 1728 4045 6572 10761 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 115 170 233 314.3 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 2.31 4.44 5.81 7.67 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 19.4 51.6 49 20.51 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 97 155 224 389 
VOCs in Mt 21 32 42 69 
N 0 ^ (as N) in M t N 9 18 28 42 
at market exchange rate 
O p e n P r o c e s s 3 6 7 
P r e l i m i n a r y A 2 M a r k e r Scenario - A L M (Open process version, date of submission: 121141198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90' 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Other (e.g. H,) 
Total 
1217 
2.6 
1.3 
22.9 
5.0 
4.6 
33.8 
2398 
7.8 
3.2 
70.3 
23.6 
15.0 
112.1 
3862 
23.0 
8.4 
121.3 
63.9 
39.9 
233.5 
5526 
83.8 
15.8 
237.8 
95.7 
114.5 
463.8 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
4.7 
26.0 
8.6 
0.1 
0.0 
1.7 
41.1 
13.7 
82.5 
29.3 
1.3 
5.3 
4.8 
136.8 
45.1 
100.5 
86.6 
9.2 
25.4 
10.8 
277.6 
271.9 
0.3 
117.7 
50.4 
98.3 
24.6 
563.0 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
0 
0 
0 
0.25 
1.45 
0.48 
1.1 
4.2 
2.1 
5.4 
7.5 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions in GtC 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O , (as C) in MtC 
Other C O , (as C) in MtC 
Total C02"(as C) in MtC 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N , 0 - N 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
NO,, (as N) in MtN 
76 200 536 
725 
1074 
1799 
74.9 
0.97 
13.2 
229 
43 
2299 
1169 
3467 
139 
1.85 
25.8 
294 
61 
16 
4284 
593 
4877 
195 
2.73 
34.4 
384 
87 
26 
8644 
403 
9048 
280 
4.37 
21.8 
534 
147 
42 
' at market exchange rate 
368 Open Process 
Table V I - 4 c : S t a n d a r d i z e d G H G emissions f o r the p r e l i m i n a r y B l m a r k e r (IMAGE) as posted on the CIESIN web page 
( s r e s . c i e s i n . o r g ) d u r i n g the open process. These d a t a a r e not necessarily i d e n t i c a l w i t h the f i n a l m a r k e r scenarios. 
Preliminary B l M a r k e r Scenario - W O R L D (Open process version, date of submission: 1017198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 5297 7767 8933 7239 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 21 48.21 113.94 338.29 
GNP/GDP (US$/cap) 3965 6208 12755 46729 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 49.34 34.04 15.74 9.65 
Solids 35.76 24.07 24.7 35.2 
Liquids 96.8 124.14 149.2 106.1 
Gas 45.06 76.35 123.7 174.5 
Electricity 39.76 106.28 '233.2 425.6 
Others 
Total 266.7 364.9 546.5 751.1 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 93.71 68.26 87 62.1 
Oil (excluding feedstocks) 115.9 157.1 187.1 62.2 
Gas (excluding feedstocks) 70.27 145.06 157.4 127 
Non-Fossil Electricity (Nuclear/Solar) 8.56 43.85 144 413.4 
Biomass 1.98 13.62 76.3 118.2 
Other Renewables (Hydro/Fuelwood) 57.26 46.75 37.3 44.3 
Total 347.7 474.6 689.1 827.2 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 5.55 7.83 10.06 14.94 
Oil 2.8 6.75 11.85 18.27 
Gas J.65 4.73 9.25 16.45 
Cumulative C O , Emissions in GtC 100 296 537 947 
Carbon Sequestration in GtC 2.0 3.7 3.3 2.9 
Land Use in Mill ion ha 
Cropland 1436.3 1268.5 1362.4 1119.1 
Grasslands 3435.6 3934.8 3428.1 1914.8 
Energy Biomass 6.4 32.8 201.9 373.4 
Forest 4277.0 4095.0 4207.7 5075.5 
Others 3915.7 3739.9 3870.8 4588.2 
Total 13071.0 13071.0 13071.0 13071.0 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as C) in GtC 6.1 7.5 9 5.7 
Other CO2 (as C) in GtC 0.9 1.9 0.9 1.4 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 7.0 9.4 9.9 7.1 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH4 429 495 543 478 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 10.5 12.4 13.2 12.3 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 70.6 42.7 41.8 25.6 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 865 1098 1055 1063 
VOCs in Mt 77 94 93 97 
N 0 ^ (as N) in M t N 27.5 32.9 42.5 27.2 
'• at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 3 6 9 
P r e l i m i n a r y B l M a r k e r Scenario - O E C D 9 0 (Open process version, date of submission: 1017198} 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 
GNP/GDP (US$/cap) 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
801 
16.51 
20613 
5.3 
8.2 
49.7 
28.6 
24.1 
115.9 
950 
32.22 
33917 
3 
5.7 
57.9 
38.3 
53.1 
158 
1023 
52.32 
51144 
1.2 
5.5 
53.5 
47.3 
63.6 
171.1 
1055 
78.19 
74114 
0.8 
8.4 
39 
69.4 
72.3 
189.9 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil (excluding feedstocks) 
Gas (excluding feedstocks) 
Non-Fossil Electricity (Nuclear/Solar) 
Biomass 
Other Renewables (Hydro/Fuelwood) 
Total 
36.9 
53.2 
39.9 
6.7 
1.5 
9.4 
147.6 
15 
64.2 
68.4 
30.4 
4.4 
8.8 
191.2 
9.8 
52.9 
55.7 
51.9 
13.5 
7.9 
183.8 
11.6 
23.4 
65.1 
63.9 
22.4 
8.1 
186.4 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
2.42 
0.95 
0.94 
3.17 
1.8 
2.38 
3.66 
2.56 
3.94 
4.69 
3.33 
6.78 
Cumulative COj Emissions in GtC 
Carbon Sequestration in GtC 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
COj (as C) in GtC 
Other COj (as C) in GtC 
Total C02"(as C) in GtC 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 
N p total (as N) in Mt N p - N 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
N0^ (as N) in M t N 
49 
0.4 
379.3 
785.7 
2.0 
1114.8 
956.4 
3238 
2.7 
0.2 
2.9 
102 
1.9 
25.0 
158 
27 
9.8 
139 
0.6 
415.4 
687.0 
3.1 
1160.2 
972.5 
3238 
2.9 
0.3 
3.1 
114 
2.2 
6.1 
137 
30 
7.4 
215 
0.8 
501.8 
513.2 
22.9 
1198.7 
1001.7 
3238 
2.4 
0.4 
2.7 
115 
2.2 
4.5 
146 
29 
6.7 
325 
0.8 
437.7 
439.1 
73.0 
1199.8 
1088.6 
3238 
2.1 
0.5 
2.5 
117 
2.2 
4.4 
141 
28 
6.5 
* at market exchange rate 
370 Open Process 
Preliminary B l M a r k e r Scenario - R E F (Open process version, date of submission: 1 0 / 7 / 9 8 ) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 413 442 437 352 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90' 
GNP/GDP (US$/cap) 
0.97 
2353 
1.78 
4029 
5.12 
11727 
15.4 
43750 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
2.1 
9.5 
19.1 
11.8 
8.5 
50.9 
0.7 
2.3 
10.6 
5.8 
9.6 
29 
0.2 
1.3 
9.7 
6.3 
17.3 
34.8 
0.1 
1.5 
5.6 
8.6 
21.2 
37 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil (excluding feedstocks) 
Gas (excluding feedstocks) 
Non-Fossil Electricity (Nuclear/Solar) 
Biomass 
Other Renewables (Hydro/Fuelwood) 
Total 
27.1 
28.4 
23.2 
1.4 
0.2 
3.1 
83.4 
7.2 
16.6 
13.4 
3.1 
0.7 
2.1 
43.1 
5.6 
15.3 
11.1 
10.6 
2.7 
2.3 
47.6 
4 
5.8 
8.3 
17.1 
6.8 
2.7 
44.7 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
1.83 
0.55 
0.45 
2.2 
0.99 
0.87 
2.46 
1.33 
1.3 
2.97 
2.25 
2.17 
Cumulative CO^ Emissions in GtC 
Carbon Sequestration in GtC 
28 
0.4 
54 
0.7 
74 
1.2 
107 
1.2 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
278.3 
391.2 
0.1 
1147.0 
461.1 
2278 
147.1 
306.1 
1.0 
1326.2 
497.3 
2278 
98.7 
198.7 
15.6 
1414.9 
549.8 
2278 
62.4 
122.6 
65.2 
1450.9 
576.6 
2278 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as C) in GtC 
Other C O , (as C) in GtC 
Total COj^as C) in GtC 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
N O , (as N) in M t N 
1.7 
0.1 
1.8 
99 
0.8 
22.8 
109 
11 
8.2 
0.8 
0.1 
0.9 
68 
0.8 
1.9 
69 
6 
4.1 
0.7 
0.2 
0.9 
64 
0.8 
1.6 
73 
5 
3.9 
0.5 
0.4 
0.8 
59 
0.7 
0.8 
65 
4 
2.5 
* at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 3 7 1 
P r e l i m i n a r y B l M a r k e r Scenario - A S I A (Open process version, date of submission: 10/7/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 2790 3924 4209 2875 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 1.42 6.57 29.92 119.6 
GNP/GDP (US$/cap) 508 1675 7108 41615 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 28.4 21.3 6.1 2.7 
Solids 16.4 12.9 12.9 11.9 
Liquids 13.9 28.9 41.3 23.3 
Gas 2 20.5 42.9 45 
Electricity 4.6 29.5 82.1 157.4 
Others 
Total 65.3 113.1 185.3 240.3 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 26.1 36.7 46.6 18.3 
Oil (excluding feedstocks) 17 39.3 48.8 13 
Gas (excluding feedstocks) 3.9 45.4 56.8 26 
Non-Fossil Electricity (Nuclear/Solar) 0.4 5.6 40.3 157.4 
Biomass 0.1 6 41.1 37.5 
Other Renewables (Hydro/Fuelwood) 29.4 23.6 10 7.5 
Total 76.9 156.5 243.6 259.7 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 1.09 2.01 3.01 4.56 
Oil 0.2 0.84 1.58 2.03 
Gas 0.07 0.86 2.38 3.82 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions in GtC 13 66 151 273 
Carbon Sequestration in GtC 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 382.3 316.8 336.7 237.0 
Grasslands 560.5 777.7 768.3 366.2 
Energy Biomass 1.0 11.9 104.7 134.8 
Forest 487.7 375.6 318.5 571.6 
Others 544.5 493.8 447.7 666.3 
Total 1976 1976 1976 1976 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
C O , (as C) in GtC 1.1 2.5 3.1 1.3 
Other CO2 (as C) in GtC 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 1.4 2.6 3.4 1.6 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH4 122 149 179 137 
N , 0 total (as N) in Mt NjO-N 2.6 3.2 3.7 2.9 
SÓ^ total (as S) in MtS 15.3 20.9 16.5 5.2 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 204 260 365 264 
VOCs in Mt 14 18 24 18 
N0^ (as N) in MtN 5.4 12.3 16.6 7.0 
* at market exchange rate 
372 O p e n Process 
P r e l i m i n a r y B l M a r k e r Scenario - A L M (Open process version, date of submission: 10/7/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 1293 2450 3265 2958 
GNP/GDP in Trillion US$90* 2.1 7.64 26.58 125.1 
GNP/GDP (US$/cap) 1625 3118 8142 42286 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 13.6 9 8.2 6.1 
Solids 1.7 3.2 5 13.4 
Liquids 14.1 26.8 44.7 38.2 
Gas 2.7 11.7 27.2 51.5 
Electricity 2.6 14.1 70.2 174.7 
Others 
Total 34.7 64.7 155.3 283.9 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 3.6 9.3 25 28.2 
Oil (excluding feedstocks) 17.3 37 70.1 20 
Gas (excluding feedstocks) 3.2 17.9 33.8 27.6 
Non-Fossil Electricity (Nuclear/Solar) 0.1 4.8 41.2 175 
Biomass 0.2 2.6 19 51.5 
Other Renewables (Hydro/Fuelwood) 15.4 12.3 11.5 11.7 
Total 39.8 83.9 200.6 314 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.21 0.45 0.93 2.72 
Oil 1.1 3.12 6.38 10.66 
Gas 0.19 0.62 1.63 3.68 
Cumulative COj Emissions in GtC 10 37 97 242 
Carbon Sequestration in GtC 1.1 2.2 1.0 0.7 
Land Use in Million ha 
Cropland 396.4 389.3 425.3 382.0 
Grasslands 1698.2 2163.9 1947.9 987.0 
Energy Biomass 3.2 16.8 58.7 100.4 
Forest 1527.6 1232.9 1275.6 1853.2 
Others 1953.7 1776.3 1871.6 2256.7 
Total 5579 5579 5579 5579 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as C) in GtC 0.5 1.4 2.8 1.8 
Other C O , (as C) in GtC 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.2 
Total C02'(as C) in GtC 0.9 2.8 2.9 2.1 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 105 164 184 166 
N2O total (as N) in Mt NjO-N 5.2 6.3 6.5 6.5 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 7.5 13.8 19.2 15.2 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 394 631 470 593 
VOCs in Mt 25 40 35 47 
N0^ (as N) in M t N 4.1 9.1 15.3 11.1 
* at market exchange rate 
O p e n Process 373 
Table VI-4d: S t a n d a r d i z e d G H G emissions f o r t h e p r e l i m i n a r y B2 m a r k e r (MESSAGE) as p o s t e d o n t h e CIESIN web page 
( s r e s . c i e s i n . o r g ) d u r i n g t h e open process. These d a t a a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e final m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s . 
P r e l i m i n a r y 82 M a r k e r Scenario - W O R L D (Open process version, date of submission: 11/2/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 5262 7672 9367 10414 
GNP/GDP (тех) in Trillion US$90 ' 20.9 50.7 109.5 234.9 
GNP/GDP (ppp) in Trillion (1990 prices) ^  25.7 60.2 113.9 231.8 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 38.4 23.9 10.7 6.8 
Solids 42.2 35.8 19.4 7.0 
Liquids 110.9 200.1 267.9 294.0 
Gas 40.9 58.7 104.9 111.2 
Electricity 34.7 85.1 188.2 409.0 
Other (e.g. H2) 7.8 25.4 63.2 123.2 
Total 274.9 429.0 654.3 951.2 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 91.1 98.3 85.6 300.2 
Oil 128.3 214.3 227.1 51.9 
Gas 70.5 150.3 297.4 336.6 
Nuclear 7.3 15.6 47.6 142.0 
Biomass 46.0 52.6 104.7 316.0 
Other Renewables 8.1 34.4 107.2 211.8 
Total 351.3 565.5 869.6 1358.5 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.0 2.8 5.7 12.6 
Oil 0.0 5.1 12.0 19.5 
Gas 0.0 2.7 8.6 26.9 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions in GtC ^ 0.0 215.1 519.6 1129.2 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 4249.5 3775.9 3906.7 4121.7 
Grasslands 3289.8 3766.0 4014.4 3988.9 
Cropland 1436.6 1583.4 1403.5 1113.2 
Energy Biomass 0.0 15.5 497.9 717.7 
Other 3966.4 3801.4 3119.7 3000.7 
Total 12942.2 12942.2 12942.2 12942.2 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized)'' 
CO2 (as C)b in GtC 6.5 9.4 11.6 14.2 
Other CO2 (as in GtC 1.0 1.4 -0.4 -0.2 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 7.5 10.7 11.2 14.0 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 318.3 447.6 538.1 508.6 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N , 0 - N 6.3 6.8 5.6 4.7 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 69.0 59.0 51.9 43.0 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 974.4 Í216.8 1356.0 2072.2 
VOCs in Mt 177.5 233.9 259.1 212.4 
NO^ (as N) in M t N 31.0 46.3 56.6 63.4 
" т е х = market exchange rate; ppp= purchasing power parity 
'' CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
^ Land-use data taken from A I M B2 emulation run. 
Other non-energy emissions categories were calculated based on A I M 82 land-use change estimates and/or A I M B2 non-energy emissions. 
" C O j emissions from land-use changes (AIM B2 emulation ran) 
Note: Subtotals may not add due to independent rounding. 
374 Open Process 
Preliminary B2 M a r k e r Scenario - O E C D 9 0 (Open process version, date of submission: 1112198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 859 982 976 928 
GNP/GDP (тех) in Trillion US$90 16.4 30.3 38.3 56.6 
GNP/GDP (ppp) in Trillion (1990 prices) •> 14.1 26.3 33.5 50.4 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Solids 13.1 3.2 0.2 0.0 
Liquids 65.9 86.4 76.0 57.5 
Gas 22.4 24.8 35.4 17.3 
Electricity 21.5 43.7 60.5 89.1 
Other (e.g. H,) 0.7 3.7 10.3 17.9 
Total 123.6 161.8 182.4 181.8 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 38.0 38.9 18.9 46.8 
Oil 72.1 90.4 65.0 16.7 
Gas 32.9 60.6 92.7 127.9 
Nuclear 5.9 10.8 16.5 29.3 
Biomass 5.6 7.2 10.3 43.3 
Other Renewables 4.2 11.2 24.7 40.8 
Synfuel Trade 0 0 8.2 -30.7 
Total 158.7 219.1 236.3 274.1 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.1 2.0 3.3 
Oil 0.0 2.6 5.2 7.3 
Gas 0.0 1.3 3.4 9.2 
Cumulative CO2 Emissions in GtC C) ^ 0.0 98.6 209.4 371.2 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 1056.3 1107.3 1181.0 1290.3 
Grasslands 787.2 775.9 793.0 753.4 
Cropland 410.2 377.3 324.0 238.3 
Energy Biomass 0.0 0.0 100.0 150.3 
Other 886.2 879.5 742.0 707.6 
Total 3140.0 3140.0 3140.0 3140.0 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized)'' 
CO2 (as in GtC 3.1 3.8 3.3 3.2 
Other CO2 (as C)^ in GtC 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.1 
CH4 total (as CH4) in Mt CH^ 68.9 62.7 59.0 62.0 
NjO total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.3 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 26.2 9.3 5.7 3.5 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 192.1 211.6 221.4 231.7 
VOCs in Mt 46.6 49.6 52.5 39.5 
N0^ (as N) in M t N 13.2 16.5 16.1 12.0 
" т е х = market exchange rate; ppp= purchasing power parity 
C O j emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
Land-use data taken from A I M B2 emulation run. 
<• Other non-energy emissions categories were calculated based on A I M B2 land-use change estimates and/or A I M B2 non-energy emissions. 
•= C O j emissions from land-use changes (AIM B2 emulation run) 
Note: Subtotals inay not add due to independent rounding. 
Open Process 375 
Preliminary B2 M a r k e r Scenario - R E F (Open process version, date of submission: 1112198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Mill ion 413 418 406 379 
GNP/GDP (тех) in Trillion US$90 ^  1.1 1.8 6.6 14.5 
GNP/GDP (ppp) in Trillion (1990 prices) 2.6 3.3 7.2 16.2 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Solids 9.3 2.2 O.I 0.0 
Liquids 15.4 17.2 19.2 21.6 
Gas 13.5 15.4 19.2 9.5 
Electricity 5.7 6.8 17.9 32.1 
Other (e.g. H,) 6.5 7.2 11.5 15.4 
Total 50.4 48.8 67.9 78.6 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 18.6 7.3 12.4 32.4 
Oil 20.4 18.9 19.6 0.1 
Gas 26.7 31.4 54.8 44.8 
Nuclear 1.0 0.7 2.4 9.3 
Biomass 1.8 0.8 4.8 36.2 
Other Renewables 1.1 2.6 8.2 21.2 
Synfuel Trade 0 0 -5 -19.4 
Total 69.6 61.7 97.2 124.6 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.5 
Oil 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.6 
Gas 0.0 0.8 2.0 5.2 
Cumulative C O , Emissions in GtC 0.0 34.6 70.7 144.4 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 960.0 940.3 967.2 1004.4 
Grasslands 345.7 453.4 531.4 561.3 
Cropland 279.1 300.2 283.4 238.1 
Energy Biomass 0.0 0.0 43.4 35.0 
Other 719.9 610.7 479.3 465.9 
Total 2304.7 2304.7 2304.7 2304.7 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized)'' 
CO2 (as C)'' in GtC 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.4 
Other CO2 (as C)"^  in GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.4 
СЩ total (as CH^) in Mt CH^ 46.5 48.3 59.8 58.2 
N , 0 total (as N) in Mt N2O-N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 16.8 6.1 4.5 3.6 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 82.0 86.9 1U.3 114.8 
VOCs in Mt 20.2 23.3 38.4 32.2 
N0^ (as N) in M t N 4.1 3.8 5.5 3.9 
" т е х = market exchange rate; ppp= purchasing power parity 
^ CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
' Land-use data taken from A I M B2 emulation run. 
Other non-energy emissions categories were calculated based on A I M B2 land-use change estimates and/or A I M B2 non-energy ( 
' COj emissions from land-use changes ( A I M B2 emulation run) 
Note: Subtotals may not add due to independent rounding. 
3 7 6 O p e n Process 
P r e l i m i n a r y B 2 M a r k e r Scenario - A S I A (Open process version, date of submission: 1112198) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 2798 4008 4696 4968 
GNP/GDP (тех) in Trillion US$90 " 1.5 13.2 41.8 97.1 
GNP/GDP (ppp) in Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 22.4 49.3 100.4 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
4.1 Non-commercial 24.2 13.2 6.7 
Solids 18.5 27.8 16.7 2.4 
Liquids 12.6 59.8 112.0 121.6 
Gas 1.5 8.7 22.0 32.9 
Electricity 4.1 24.1 69.8 168.6 
Other (e.g. Щ 0.6 10.2 24.8 55.4 
Total 61.5 143.8 252.0 385.0 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 29.8 47.4 47.7 178.1 
Oil 15.3 62,6 92.8 21.4 
Gas 2.8 30.9 55.4 38.1 
Nuclear 0.3 3.7 20.9 64.7 
Biomass 24.3 28.0 46.1 84.7 
Other Renewables 1.1 12.3 42.6 87.7 
Synfuel Trade 0 0 13.5 46.6 
Total 73.6 184.9 319.0 521.3 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.2 2.7 6.7 
Oil 0.0 1.0 3.3 6.3 
Gas 0.0 0.3 1.5 4.5 
Cumulative C O ^ Emissions in GtC 0.0 53.6 158.5 378.0 
Land Use in Million ha 
Forests 527.1 411.7 439.5 482.7 
Grasslands 521.2 578.2 614.2 606.0 
Cropland 389.9 457.5 401.4 325.7 
Energy Biomass 0.0 0.5 96.0 153.6 
Other 576.1 566.6 463.3 446.3 
Total 2014.4 2014.4 2014.4 2014.4 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized) 
CO2 (as 0" in GtC 1.2 3.1 4.2 5.8 Other CO2 (as C) ' in GtC 0.3 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 1.5 3.4 4.1 5.8 
CH4 total (as СЩ in Mt CH^ 127.1 222.6 265.9 234.9 
N2O total (as N) in Mt NjO-N 2.3 2.7 2.4 2.1 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
17.3 31.3 24.4 19.0 
276.5 422.3 550.9 706.0 
VOCs in Mt 47.8 75.3 92.2 80.3 
N0^ (as N) in M l N 6.2 15.6 23.0 31.2 
' т е х = market exchange rate; ppp= purchasing power parity 
C O 2 emissions froin fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
Land-use data taken from A I M B2 emulation run. 
Other non-energy emissions categories were calculated based on A I M B2 land-use change estimates and/or A I M B2 non-energy emissions. 
" C O j emissions from land-use changes ( A I M B2 emulation run) 
Note: Subtotals may not add due to independent rounding. 
O p e n Process 3 7 7 
P r e l i m i n a r y B 2 M a r k e r S c e n a r i o - A L M (Open process version, date of submission: 11/2/98) 
1990 2020 2050 2100 
Population in Million 
GNP/GDP (тех) in Trillion US$90 " 
GNP/GDP (ppp) in Trillion (1990 prices) " 
Final Energy by Fuel in EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Other (e.g. H-,) 
Total 
Primary Energy by Fuel 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Synfuel Trade 
Total 
Cumulative Resource Use in ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative COj Emissions in GtC 
1192 
1.9 
3.8 
14.2 
1.3 
17.0 
3.5 
3.4 
0.0 
39.4 
4.7 
20.5 
8.1 
0.1 
14.3 
1.7 
0 
49.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
2263 
5.5 
8.2 
10.7 
2.6 
36.7 
9.8 
10.5 
4.3 
74.6 
4.7 
42.4 
27.4 
0.4 
16.6 
8.3 
0 
99.8 
0.1 
1.0 
0.4 
28.3 
3289 
22.8 
23.9 
4.0 
2.4 
60.7 
28.3 
40.0 
16.6 
152.0 
6.6 
49.7 
94.5 
7.8 
43.5 
31.7 
-17.1 
216.7 
0.3 
2.4 
1.7 
81.0 
4139 
66.8 
64.9 
2.7 
4.6 
93.3 
51.5 
119.2 
34.5 
305.8 
42.9 
13.7 
125.8 
38.7 
151.8 
62.1 
2.4 
437.4 
1.1 
4.2 
8.1 
235.6 
Land Use in Million ha ^ 
Forests 
Grasslands 
Cropland 
Energy Biomass 
Other 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (not standardized)'' 
CO2 (as C f in GtC 
Other CO2 (as 0*= in GtC 
Total CO2 (as C) in GtC 
CH4 total (as СЩ in Mt СЩ 
N2O total (as N) in Mt N , 0 - N 
SO^ total (as S) in MtS 
CO (as CO) in Mt CO 
VOCs in Mt 
NO^ (as N) in MtN 
1706.0 
1635.6 
357.4 
0.0 
1784.2 
5483.2 
1316.6 
1958.5 
448.4 
15.0 
1744.7 
5483.2 
1319.0 
2075.9 
394.8 
258.5 
1435.0 
5483.2 
" т е х = market exchange rate; ppp= purchasing power parity 
COj emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
Land-use data taken from A I M B2 emulation run. 
Other non-energy emissions categories were calculated based on A I M B2 land-use change estimates and/or A I M B2 non-energy emissions 
^ COj emissions from land-use changes (AIM B2 emulation run) 
Note: Subtotals may not add due to independent rounding. 
1344.3 
2068.2 
311.1 
378.7 
1380.9 
5483.2 
0.8 1.5 2.5 3.7 
0.8 1.2 -0.2 -0.1 
1.6 2.6 2.3 3.7 
75.9 114.1 153.4 153.6 
1.0 1.3 0.8 0.8 
8.7 12.3 17.4 16,8 
423.7 495.9 472.5 1019.7 
62.8 85.7 76.0 60.4 
7.4 10.3 12.0 16.3 

VII 
Statistical tables 
3 8 0 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
T a b l e V I I . l : O v e r v i e w t a b l e s of t h e 4 0 SRES s c e i t a r i o s . M a i n d r i v i n g f o r c e s a n d emissions a r e g i v e n i n t h e same f o r m a t f o r 
a l l s c e n a r i o s d e v e l o p e d by t h e six m o d e l i n g teams f o r t h e W o r l d a n d t h e f o u r SRES r e g i o n s O E C D 9 0 , R E F , A S I A , a n d A L M i n 
1 0 - y e a r t i m e steps. ( E x c e p t f o r t h e A 2 G - I M A G E ' a n d B 2 - I M A G E s c e n a r i o s , f o r w h i c h emissions a r e i n 1 0 - y e a r t i m e steps, a n d 
t h e d r i v i n g f o r c e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e years 1 9 9 0 , 2 0 2 0 , 2 0 5 0 , a n d 2 1 0 0 ) . 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t : 
• S u b t o t a l s may n o t a d d due t o i n d e p e n d e n t r o u n d i n g . 
• The emissions a r e a l l s t a n d a r d i z e d t o c o m m o n 1 9 9 0 a n d 2 0 0 0 values (see Box 5 - 1 ) . 
The c h l o r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s ( C F C s ) a n d h y d r o c h l o r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s ( H C F C s ) a r e o n l y a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e World as t o t a l . A t t h e 
r e g i o n a l l e v e l o n l y h y d r o f l u o r o c a r b o n s (HFCs) emissions w e r e estimated. A t t h e World l e v e l t h e r o w C F C I H F C I H C F C 
represents a n a g g r e g a t i o n of a l l C F C s , H C F C s , a n d H F C s ( u s i n g SAR G W P s ) . 
• T a b l e f o o t n o t e s g i v e a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r v a r i o u s s c e n a r i o s . 
D u r i n g t h e a p p r o v a l process of t h e Summary f o r P o l i c y m a k e r s a t t h e 5 t h Session of W o r k i n g G r o u p III of t h e I P C C f r o m 
8-11 M a r c h 2 0 0 0 i n K a t m a n d u , N e p a l , i t was d e c i d e d t o c o m b i n e t h e A l C a n d A I G g r o u p s i n t o one "fossil i n t e n s i v e " 
g r o u p A l F I i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e n o n - f o s s i l g r o u p A I T , a n d select t w o i l l u s t r a t i v e s c e n a r i o s f r o m these t w o A l g r o u p s t o 
f a c i l i t a t e use by m o d e l l e r s a n d p o l i c y m a k e r s . T o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s c e n a r i o g r o u p s A l B , A 2 , B l , B 2 , t h i s leads t o six 
s c e n a r i o g r o u p s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e f o u r s c e n a r i o f a m i l i e s . The m a r k e r s c e n a r i o s A l B - A I M , A 2 . B l a n d B2 as w e l l as t h e 
i l l u s t r a t i v e s c e n a r i o s A l F I - M i n i C A M a n d A I T - M E S S A G E a r e i n d i c a t e d i n t h e T a b l e s . AIL s c e n a r i o s a r e e q u a l l y sound. 
' The IMAGE-results for the A2 and B2 scenarios are based on prehtninary model experiments carried out in March 1998. As a consequence 
of limited resources it has not been possible to rerun these experiments. Hence, the I M A G E team is not able to provide background data and 
details for these scenario calculations and the population and economic growth assumptions are not fully harmonized, as they have been for 
the I M A G E A l and B l scenarios. 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 3 8 1 
Marker Scenario AIB-AIM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6117 6805 7493 8182 8439 8704 8538 8375 8030 7528 7056 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion USS 20.9 26.7 37.9 56.5 89.1 127.1 181.3 235.1 304.7 377.4 446.6 528.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 50 50 38 36 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 36 38 50 62 75 75 75 60 49 39 31 25 
Liquids 111 124 155 197 231 264 302 334 369 388 387 387 
Gas 51 53 89 134 194 239 295 335 380 410 421 432 
Electricity 38 49 73 104 143 218 331 438 581 709 798 898 
Others 
Total 285 314 405 532 669 819 1002 1180 1388 1550 1643 1741 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 93 99 134 163 179 182 186 165 148 126 103 84 
Oi l 143 167 209 238 239 226 214 188 166 149 136 125 
Gas 73 91 147 196 298 372 465 519 578 604 590 576 
Nuclear 6 8 16 30 53 81 123 125 127 116 95 78 
Biomass 50 48 38 61 85 128 193 247 315 360 368 376 
Other Renewables 10 12 15 23 40 82 167 278 464 662 808 987 
Total 376 424 559 711 895 1098 1347 1574 1840 2034 2128 2226 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal O.I 1.1 2.2 3.7 5.4 7.0 9.1 10.5 12.2 13.6 14.7 15.9 
Oi l 0.1 1.7 3.6 5.8 8.2 10.2 12.7 14.4 16.3 18.0 19.4 20.8 
Gas 0.1 0.9 2.1 3.8 6.3 9.3 13.9 18.2 23.9 29.8 35.5 42.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 176.7 294.3 429.8 579.0 737.7 899.6 1058.2 1212.8 1360.2 1499.2 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use MilHon ha 
Cropland 1459 1466 1462 1457 1454 1448 1442 1436 1429 1424 1422 1420 
Grasslands 3389 3404 3429 3446 3458 3478 3498 3525 3552 3568 3572 3576 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 74 158 257 418 484 560 580 536 495 
Forest 4296 4237 4173 4164 4164 4177 4190 4194 4199 4202 4203 4204 
Others 3805 3842 3886 3807 3715 3554 3400 3299 3201 3173 3213 3253 
Total 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6,90 9.68 12.12 14.01 14.95 16.01 15.70 15.43 14.83 13.94 13.10 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.20 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.39 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 10.88 12.64 14.48 15.35 16.38 16.00 15.73 15.18 14.30 13.49 
CH4 total MtCH4 310 323 373 421 466 458 452 410 373 341 314 289 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 87.1 100.2 91.0 68.9 64.1 46.9 35.7 30.7 29.1 27.6 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C MtC eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 1002 1032 1109 1160 1214 1245 1276 1357 1499 1663 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 178 222 266 272 279 284 289 269 228 193 
NOx M t N 31 32 39 46 50 49 48 46 44 43 41 40 
Table V I I . 1 : O v e r v i e w t a b l e s of t h e 4 0 SRES s c e n a r i o s . M a i n d r i v i n g f o r c e s a n d emissions a r e g i v e n i n t h e same f o r m a t f o r 
all s c e n a r i o s d e v e l o p e d by t h e six m o d e l i n g teams f o r t h e World a n d t h e f o u r SRES r e g i o n s O E C D 9 0 , R E F , A S I A , a n d A L M i n 
lO-year t i m e steps. ( E x c e p t f o r t h e A 2 G - I M A G E ^ a n d B 2 - I M A G E s c e n a r i o s , f o r w h i c h emissions a r e i n 1 0 - y e a r t i m e steps, a n d 
the driving f o r c e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e years 1 9 9 0 , 2 0 2 0 , 2 0 5 0 , a n d 2 1 0 0 ) . 
h should be n o t e d t h a t : 
• S u b t o t a l s may n o t a d d due t o i n d e p e n d e n t r o u n d i n g . 
3S2 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Marker Scenario AlB-AIM 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 960 1002 1043 1062 1081 1086 1091 1097 1103 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.5 25.3 31.0 38.0 45.4 54.1 64.1 75.9 89.2 103.9 121.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 9 9 9 8 7 6 5 3 3 2 1 
Liquids 64 74 77 82 80 77 75 74 73 71 69 67 
Gas 25 30 40 50 63 66 68 72 76 78 78 78 
Electricity 22 27 33 40 48 58 70 87 108 129 151 175 
Others 
Total 127 142 158 180 199 209 218 239 261 282 301 321 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 41 41 41 35 30 29 28 22 17 12 9 7 
Oil 76 90 92 89 78 65 54 46 39 34 32 30 
Gas 34 47 58 70 83 89 95 99 . 102 102 99 96 
Nuclear 5 6 10 16 23 24 24 23 23 20 18 15 
Biomass 6 1 0 4 9 17 29 37 48 54 56 57 
Other Renewables 6 6 8 11 16 24 35 55 86 120 152 192 
Total 167 191 209 226 239 253 267 293 321 348 372 397 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 
Oil 0.1 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.5 6.8 
Gas 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.1 4.2 5.0 6.0 7.1 8.0 9.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.2 101.2 136.4 171.0 204.8 236.9 266.4 294.0 319.7 343.7 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
381 380 377 376 375 372 368 364 359 356 
849 
356 355 
760 763 771 774 776 787 797 818 839 847 846 
0 0 0 11 24 39 63 73 85 88 81 75 
1048 
1050 1053 1052 1053 1056 1062 1068 1061 1054 1050 1049 
838 833 828 814 798 765 733 711 690 685 695 705 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 
CH4 total MtCH4 73 74 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 
C O M t C O 179 161 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 
NOx M t N 13 12 
3.41 
0.05 
3.45 
71 
2.5 
9.9 
110 
13 
14 
190 
39 
12 
3.51 
0.03 
3.54 
69 
2.6 
6.9 
108 
И 
5 
205 
39 
12 
3.48 
0.02 
3.50 
66 
2.5 
6.4 
115 
9 
6 
227 
38 
9 
3.42 
0.00 
3.42 
58 
2.5 
6.3 
118 
8 
7 
234 
33 
7 
3.36 
-0.01 
3.35 
52 
2.4 
6.3 
122 
9 
9 
241 
28 
6 
3.06 
0.01 
3.06 
49 
2.4 
6.0 
123 
10 
11 
242 
24 
2.78 
0.06 
2.84 
47 
2.3 
5,7 
123 
12 
13 
243 
19 
6 
2.56 
O.II 
2.67 
46 
2.3 
5.3 
124 
13 
16 
247 
17 
5 
2.40 
0.09 
2.48 
44 
2.2 
5.0 
125 
14 
18 
254 
16 
5 
2.24 
0.07 
2.31 
42 
2.2 
4.6 
125 
16 
20 
262 
15 
5 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table 383 
Marker Scenario A l B - A I M 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 424 430 435 429 423 406 391 374 356 339 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1,1 0,8 1.5 2.9 5.3 8.1 12.4 15.6 19.6 24.0 28.6 34.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
0 
1 Solids 9 5 5 6 5 5 4 3 2 2 
Liquids 19 10 9 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
Gas 19 11 18 23 31 38 46 47 49 50 50 50 
Electricity 8 8 10 13 15 20 28 33 40 46 50 55 
Others 
Total 58 38 43 50 59 70 84 91 99 105 109 113 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 18 12 14 14 13 12 n 9 7 5 4 3 
Oil 22 14 12 10 7 7 6 5 4 3 3 2 
Gas 26 18 26 33 41 48 55 56 56 56 55 54 
Nuclear 1 1 2 4 6 7 8 8 8 7 6 5 
Biomass 2 4 0 1 2 4 8 10 12 14 14 15 
Other Renewables 1 I 1 2 3 6 15 22 32 42 51 61 
Total 71 51 56 64 72 86 103 112 122 129 134 139 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0,7 0,8 0.9 1.0 1,1 I.I 1.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0,6 0,7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 2,1 2.6 3.2 3,7 4.3 4.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 23.1 35.0 46.4 57,6 68,4 78,5 87.8 96.5 104,6 112.2 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 268 266 265 265 265 264 263 262 262 261 260 260 
Grasslands 341 361 364 366 367 368 370 371 37! 372 373 374 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 6 10 16 19 22 23 21 20 
Forest 966 950 918 904 894 899 905 909 912 916 922 927 
Others 701 698 728 738 745 733 722 715 708 703 700 696 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.05 1.11 I . Î 3 1,16 1,18 1.08 0.99 0.91 0.84 0.78 
Other C 0 2 G t C 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.03 0.01 -0,06 -0,13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.24 1.14 1.14 1,10 1,05 0.97 0.90 0.84 0.79 0.75 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 58 61 60 51 42 41 39 38 36 34 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0,6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0,6 0,5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 12.2 10.8 7.5 4,3 2.4 2.0 i,7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
PFC M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 41 41 42 42 43 42 42 42 43 44 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 14 15 15 16 17 17 17 18 18 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
384 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario AIB-AIM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population M i ü i o n 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 
Other C 0 2 
Total C 0 2 
C H 4 total 
N 2 0 total 
SOx total 
H F C 
P F C 
SP6 
C O 
N M V O C 
NOx 
GtC 
GtC 
GtC 
MtCH4 
M t N 2 0 - N 
MtS 
MtC eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C O 
Mt 
M t N 
2798 3261 3556 3851 4147 4183 4220 4016 3822 3541 3194 2882 
1.5 2.7 5.8 12.3 26.2 40.5 62.7 85.4 116.2 147.6 174.9 207.3 
28 25 18 14 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 22 34 44 56 56 57 47 39 31 25 20 
11 17 30 48 65 75 87 99 112 118 115 112 
2 3 8 17 37 51 70 90 115 136 147 160 
5 8 15 27 44 72 117 161 223 280 319 363 
61 75 105 151 205 261 331 404 495 567 610 655 
30 39 64 87 108 106 104 94 86 73 59 48 
17 27 45 62 68 59 51 44 38 33 30 27 
4 8 17 35 66 95 137 167 203 228 235 243 
0 0 2 6 15 26 45 47 50 46 38 32 
28 24 19 20 19 29 46 58 75 85 87 89 
I 2 2 4 10 24 58 101 177 261 323 399 
80 100 149 214 285 354 440 533 646 734 784 838 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.6 3.5 4.7 5.6 6.5 7.4 8.0 8.7 
0.0 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.8 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.7 3.0 4.3 6.2 8.4 10.6 13.3 
1.5 19.3 45.8 82.8 130.2 185.0 243.1 303.1 363.7 424.2 482.7 538.6 
438 435 434 433 432 431 431 430 429 428 428 428 
608 606 609 611 613 615 617 618 619 621 622 624 
0 0 0 17 37 61 99 115 133 137 127 117 
535 522 512 524 535 535 535 544 552 556 555 555 
583 60! 609 579 547 514 483 455 429 421 431 441 
2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
1.15 
0.37 
1.53 
113 
2.3 
17.7 
0 
3 
4 
235 
33 
7 
1.78 
0.26 
2.03 
125 
2.6 
25.3 
5 
5 
7 
270 
37 
9 
2.92 
0.33 
3.25 
145 
2.6 
42,1 
18 
8 
12 
358 
49 
13 
4,11 
0.05 
4.16 
171 
2.7 
54.2 
45 
15 
19 
360 
70 
16 
5.21 
0.12 
5.32 
207 
2.8 
45.6 
92 
23 
28 
430 
94 
19 
5.46 
0.17 
5.64 
210 
2.9 
19.8 
153 
30 
42 
460 
99 
19 
5.73 
0.25 
5.98 
214 
3.0 
8.4 
224 
35 
50 
492 
105 
19 
5.86 
0.16 
6.02 
183 
2.9 
7.9 
292 
39 
55 
506 
112 
17 
5.99 
0.11 
6.10 
156 
2.9 
7.5 
292 
43 
48 
520 
119 
16 
5.89 
0.10 
5.99 
138 
2.9 
7.1 
285 
46 
35 
555 
111 
15 
5.57 
0.14 
5.71 
127 
2.9 
6.7 
275 
48 
33 
614 
90 
14 
5.27 
0.19 
5.46 
117 
2.9 
6.4 
262 
46 
37 
678 
73 
13 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 385 
Marker Scenario AlB-AIM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1865 2211 2557 2761 2980 3024 3067 3013 2866 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 5.3 10.3 19.5 31.9 52.0 69.4 92.5 116.6 139.1 165.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commerciaJ 14 20 20 22 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids I 2 2 4 6 7 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Liquids 17 22 38 58 78 102 133 153 176 191 196 202 
Gas 4 9 25 43 64 84 112 125 139 147 145 144 
Electricity 4 6 15 24 36 65 117 156 210 254 278 304 
Others 
Total 40 59 100 151 205 275 369 443 532 596 623 652 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 7 16 26 29 35 42 40 38 35 30 26 
Oil 27 36 60 77 86 94 104 94 85 78 71 65 
Gas 9 18 46 58 108 139 178 196 215 217 200 184 
Nuclear 0 0 1 4 9 20 45 45 46 42 33 26 
Biomass 14 18 19 36 55 78 110 141 181 206 211 215 
Other Renewables 2 3 4 6 12 26 59 100 168 238 282 335 
Total 57 81 146 208 299 401 538 635 750 822 837 852 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1,4 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.8 1.7 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.8 1,5 2.3 3.1 4,2 5.0 6.0 6.9 7.6 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.5 LO 1.8 2.9 4.7 6.3 8.4 10.6 12.5 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 41.6 75,3 116.8 165.4 221,4 281.1 340.3 398.2 453.2 504.6 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 384 383 382 381 381 380 379 379 378 378 
Grasslands 1680 1673 1685 1695 1702 1708 1714 1718 1722 1726 1730 1733 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 42 90 147 240 277 321 332 307 284 
Forest 1745 1711 1690 1683 1680 1681 1682 1681 1680 1678 1676 1674 
Others 1684 1710 1720 1676 1625 1542 1463 1417 1373 1363 1387 14U 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (stai ndardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 2.30 3.40 4.20 4.91 5.73 5.70 5.67 5.47 5.13 4.81 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.63 0.40 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.93 3.80 4.52 5.20 5.99 5.94 5.90 5.68 5.32 4.97 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 99 120 134 139 144 137 130 120 107 95 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 20.0 25.3 28.4 35.5 44.1 28.0 17.8 13.7 12.8 12.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 1 4 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 413 427 410 424 439 455 472 513 588 679 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 75 99 119 124 129 131 134 124 105 88 
NOx M t N 7 8 11 15 19 20 21 21 21 21 21 2i 
3 8 6 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario AlB-ASF 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5264 6117 6827 7537 8039 8526 8704 8527 8444 8022 7282 7056 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.9 28.9 41.3 60.7 87.9 146.0 174.3 225.7 257.3 367.8 484.9 531.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 56 68 87 105 89 74 59 53 48 43 39 35 
Liquids 123 177 243 349 398 447 496 494 492 486 476 465 
Gas 51 63 93 154 196 237 278 268 257 229 183 137 
Electricity 43 57 84 122 225 327 429 533 637 711 755 798 
Others 
Total 273 365 507 730 907 1085 1262 1348 1434 1469 1452 1436 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 97 118 154 212 368 523 679 673 667 669 680 691 
Oil 141 202 283 381 302 223 143 87 31 3 2 1 
Gas 74 87 126 206 278 349 421 391 ' 361 286 166 47 
Nuclear 8 14 18 26 72 117 163 191 218 252 292 332 
Biomass 0 0 2 27 57 88 119 145 171 198 224 250 
Other Renewables 6 9 16 23 44 65 86 173 259 312 329 346 
Total 326 430 600 875 1121 1366 1611 1660 1708 1719 1693 1667 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.2 2.5 4.4 7.3 11.8 17.8 24.6 31.3 37.9 44.7 51.5 
Oi l 0.0 1.8 4.3 7.6 11.0 13.5 15.3 16.4 16.9 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Gas 0.0 0.9 1.9 3.6 6.0 9.2 13.1 17.1 20.8 24.0 26.2 27.0 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 177.9 313.1 495.8 716.8 967.6 1223.9 1461.9 1682.0 1885.3 2072.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 10.01 14.67 19.49 22.60 25.72 24.14 22.55 20.97 19.37 17.78 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.24 1.13 0.98 0.84 0.58 0.32 0.18 0.16 0.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 11.13 15.91 20.62 23.59 26.56 24.72 22.87 21.15 19.53 17.92 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 377 444 518 577 636 616 596 571 540 510 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.1 9.6 10.7 11.2 11.8 11.5 11.2 10.8 10.2 9.7 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 84.7 116.5 110.0 84.7 59.5 54.0 48.6 46.1 46.6 47.0 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 1068 1248 1567 1698 1830 1837 1845 1832 1798 1763 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 165 207 248 274 301 346 392 442 497 552 
NOx M t N 31 32 45 66 83 91 100 94 88 84 80 77 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table 3 8 7 
Scenario AlB-ASF 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TiiUion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Fmal Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Sohds 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electncity 
Others 
Total 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
849 919 961 1003 1035 1069 
15.7 20.1 25.2 31 0 37.8 50.1 
13 13 14 15 13 12 
69 88 95 95 87 80 
28 33 36 40 41 41 
24 29 35 42 52 62 
133 163 179 192 193 195 
32 29 32 39 61 83 
77 97 107 102 72 43 
35 40 44 52 55 59 
7 11 12 13 18 24 
0 0 1 8 12 17 
5 7 9 11 13 15 
157 184 205 224 233 241 
ZJ 
0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 22 
0.0 1 0 2.0 3 0 3.9 4.4 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.4 
2,8 33.0 66.6 103.4 143 0 ¡ 8 3 . 5 
108! 1085 1088 1096 1106 1 И 0 
55.0 65.2 71.0 91.7 118.0 128.4 
11 10 8 8 7 7 
72 68 63 62 65 68 
41 39 36 32 26 20 
72 86 101 115 129 144 
196 202 209 217 227 238 
106 93 80 78 87 96 
13 8 3 0 0 0 
62 57 51 39 21 4 
30 35 39 47 57 68 
21 26 30 35 40 45 
18 29 41 49 55 60 
250 247 244 249 260 272 
3.2 42 5.0 5.8 6 6 76 
4.7 48 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
3.0 3.6 4.2 4 6 4.9 5.0 
223.3 260.2 292.1 320.1 346.6 372.7 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3 53 3.82 4 09 4.02 3.94 3 44 2.93 2.66 2.63 2.60 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0,00 0,00 0.00 ООО 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3,20 3.53 3.82 4.09 4.02 3.94 3.44 2.93 2.66 2.63 2.60 
CH4 total MtCH4 73 74 77 83 92 100 108 114 121 125 126 128 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2,6 2.7 3 0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2,6 2.5 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17,0 7.9 8.5 8.2 7.4 6.7 6.6 6.4 6.8 7.5 8.3 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 169 164 L52 124 97 90 83 81 86 90 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 41 45 45 42 38 41 43 48 55 62 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 15 15 14 13 11 10 9 9 9 
3 8 8 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario AlB-ASF 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 417 419 425 431 432 425 423 406 398 374 347 339 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.2 3.6 5.9 7.0 9.1 10.3 14.8 20.1 22.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 18 12 12 12 10 9 8 6 5 3 3 2 
Liquids 16 12 13 15 16 16 17 16 15 15 15 15 
Gas 16 13 18 24 26 29 31 28 26 22 17 12 
Electricity 8 8 10 14 17 21 24 27 30 32 32 32 
Others 
Total 58 44 53 65 70 74 79 77 76 72 67 61 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 23 13 15 18 18 19 19 17 14 13 12 12 
Oil 18 13 15 17 18 19 19 12 5 1 0 0 
Gas 27 22 29 38 38 39 39 34 30 23 15 6 
Nuclear 1 1 2 2 5 7 9 10 11 11 12 13 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 14 18 21 23 
Other Renewables 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 13 16 18 18 18 
Total 74 56 66 82 87 92 97 93 89 84 78 73 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.3 34.1 47.2 60.1 72.2 83.0 92.0 99.5 105.4 110.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.07 1.29 1.34 1.25 1.16 0.99 0.82 0.67 0.53 0.39 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.07 1.29 1.34 1.25 1.16 0.99 0.82 0.67 0.53 0.39 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 45 59 81 102 124 121 118 108 91 73 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.5 10.1 8.8 6.9 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.2 1.7 1.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 42 41 47 48 49 48 47 47 48 49 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 17 25 29 28 28 28 28 31 35 40 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
3 8 9 
Scenario AlB-ASF 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Tr i l l 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Eneigy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
1 2780 3261 3572 3884 4073 4181 4220 4012 3913 3538 3033 2882 
i U S $ 1.7 3.5 7.2 14,1 24.2 47.5 59.5 79,6 92,2 134,9 175,7 191,9 
24 42 59 73 57 42 26 23 20 17 15 13 
15 37 72 133 161 190 218 219 220 217 210 202 
3 8 21 53 72 92 111 ¡ 0 6 101 88 69 50 
6 13 25 43 110 177 243 290 337 363 368 374 
48 100 177 301 400 500 599 638 677 685 662 638 
36 67 92 129 211 293 375 365 356 348 342 336 
19 46 89 144 110 77 43 26 9 0 0 0 
4 П 28 68 107 145 184 168 152 118 66 13 
0 1 4 9 38 67 96 108 120 133 147 161 
0 0 0 11 21 31 41 44 47 53 63 73 
5 5 8 11 24 38 51 95 139 161 162 163 
64 130 221 371 511 650 789 806 823 814 780 746 
0.0 0.6 1.4 2,5 4.2 6.7 10.1 13.8 17.4 20.9 24,3 27,7 
0.0 0.3 I.Û 2.2 3.4 4.3 4,9 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5,4 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1,6 2.9 4.5 6.3 7.9 9.2 10,1 10,4 
1.5 19.3 48,9 102.4 185.2 292.1 417,3 547,7 669,H 783,7 889,5 987,0 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.15 1.78 3..55 6,41 9.43 11.34 
0.37 0.26 0.34 0,39 0.33 0.26 
¡ ,53 2.03 3,89 6,80 9,76 11.60 
113 125 146 167 190 206 
2.3 2.6 3.2 4.1 4,7 5.0 
17,7 
0 
25.3 47.2 67.9 58.5 38.4 
5 18 45 92 153 
3 5 8 15 23 30 
4 7 12 19 28 42 
235 
33 
270 374 471 629 71! 
37 43 54 66 75 
7 9 16 27 36 42 
13.26 12..50 11,73 10.95 10.15 9,.35 
0,19 0.13 0,07 0.03 0.01 0.00 
13.45 12.62 11,80 10.98 10.16 9,34 
222 208 193 183 179 174 
5.4 5.2 5,0 4.7 4.4 4,0 
18.3 15.6 12.9 11.7 12,0 12,3 
224 292 292 285 275 262 
35 39 43 46 48 46 
50 55 48 35 33 37 
792 802 811 804 778 753 
84 95 105 115 123 132 
47 44 40 37 35 32 
3 9 0 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario AlB-ASF 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1218 1519 1869 2218 2500 2851 2980 3023 3044 3013 2795 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 2.6 4.3 7.4 13.3 22.3 42.5 52,8 71.8 83.8 126.6 171.2 189.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 1 2 3 5 8 11 14 15 15 15 15 14 
Liquids 23 40 63 106 134 161 189 191 193 192 186 180 
Gas 5 9 18 37 56 76 95 95 94 87 71 55 
Electricity 5 8 14 24 46 68 90 130 170 202 225 249 
Others 
Total 34 58 98 172 244 316 388 430 473 495 497 499 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 9 15 26 77 128 179 198 217 230 238 246 
Oil 26 45 72 118 101 85 68 42 15 2 1 1 
Gas 9 14 25 48 78 107 136 132 ' 128 106 65 24 
Nuclear 0 0 1 2 11 19 28 38 48 61 75 90 
Biomass 0 0 1 8 24 40 56 68 81 91 100 110 
Other Renewables 5 5 7 8 13 17 22 49 77 96 108 120 
Total 44 74 121 211 304 396 489 528 566 586 588 590 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1,9 3,5 5.4 7.5 9.7 12.1 14.5 
Oil 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.9 3.0 3.9 4,7 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 2,2 3,5 4.8 6.1 7.3 8.1 8.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 40.1 73.3 120.4 181.1 254,7 333.0 407.9 478.7 543.9 602.8 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.86 3.15 4.63 5,99 7.36 7.21 7.07 6.68 6.06 5.44 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.63 4.00 5.42 6,71 8.00 7.66 7.32 6.83 6.21 5.58 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 109 135 155 168 182 173 164 155 145 135 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2,3 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2,7 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 16.1 27.1 31.5 29,0 26.4 24.9 23.3 22.5 22.4 22.3 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 483 572 738 815 892 898 904 900 886 872 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 64 82 107 129 151 183 216 249 283 317 
NOx M t N 7 8 12 19 27 31 36 36 35 35 34 33 
Statistical Table 
391 
Scenario AlB- IMAGE 
World 
EJ 
Population 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Non-Fossil Electric 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
Cropland <• 
Grasslands " 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Million 
Trillion US$ 
1990 US$/cap > 
E J 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5280 6122 6892 7618 8196 8547 8708 8671 8484 8142 7663 7047 
21.0 26.7 37.9 55.9 81.2 116.2 163.5 219.4 283.2 365,2 446,4 518,8 
971.0 4357.0 5503.0 7342.0 9907.0 13598.0 18772.0 25300.0 33383.0 44853,0 58248.0 73621.0 
54 59 65 63 59 50 40 38 35 32 29 25 
43 44 45 52 59 66 69 65 59 52 47 40 
106 119 146 177 198 213 209 204 200 190 175 161 
46 55 73 84 90 100 119 134 145 154 157 156 
39 55 88 147 220 307 373 410 427 428 408 376 
2 4 11 29 50 68 85 93 93 92 91 85 
289 336 429 551 677 804 895 944 959 950 907 843 
105 111 129 170 245 298 301 271 237 198 163 129 
129 143 187 242 285 300 348 352 340 320 280 237 
62 73 117 163 188 222 259 278 283 278 264 244 
8 14 23 39 61 91 128 162 193 218 230 230 
3 4 !2 35 69 102 129 141 138 133 128 116 
61 69 77 76 74 68 59 58 56 54 51 48 
368 416 544 725 923 1080 1224 1262 1246 1201 1116 1002 
i Z J b 
0.0 1.1 2.3 3,7 5.8 8.5 11.6 14.5 17.0 19.2 21.0 22.4 
0.0 1.3 3.0 5.1 7.8 10.7 14.0 17.5 21.0 24.3 27.3 29.9 
0.0 0.6 1.6 3,0 4.8 6.8 9.2 11.9 14.7 17.5 20.3 22.8 
GtC 7.1 82.4 168.6 275.5 411.1 574.2 755.8 941.6 1123.9 1298.8 1458.9 1601.2 
GtC 2.1 1.7 2.7 4.0 5.3 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.2 5,2 5,2 4.6 
Million ha 
1435 1382 1450 1524 1573 1571 1530 1490 1439 1355 1295 1208 
3435 3295 3313 3362 3381 3271 3064 2849 2705 2597 2505 2347 
8 10 26 82 177 274 374 404 391 384 367 334 
4277 4266 4224 4251 4147 4132 4173 4256 4362 4490 4564 4700 
3916 4119 4058 3853 3793 3824 3931 4072 4174 4246 4340 4483 
13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.50 11.10 14.30 
Other С 0 2 ' GtC 1.11 1.07 0.77 l .Ol 0.71 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.27 12.11 15.00 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 360 423 475 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.5 8.6 9.3 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 77.5 90.9 108.5 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 
C O M t C O 879 877 832 978 1054 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 144 157 163 
NOx M t N 31 32 38 48 57 
17.60 
0.02 
17.61 
499 
9,9 
121.0 
482 
77 
99 
913 
159 
63 
18.70 18.40 
0.02 Û.05 
18.71 
512 
10.3 
18.45 
523 
10.3 
119.5 U4.8 
566 654 
89 97 
127 
1012 
154 
63 
119 
949 
158 
63 
17.80 
0.22 
18.02 
525 
10.2 
106.8 
659 
106 
113 
1089 
152 
61 
16.40 
0..56 
16.96 
513 
9.8 
95.5 
654 
114 
88 
1141 
149 
57 
14.60 
0.47 
15.07 
488 
9,7 
83.0 
639 
119 
84 
1110 
142 
51 
12.90 
0.50 
13.39 
452 
9.1 
71.2 
614 
115 
95 
1080 
133 
45 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production. 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
392 S t a t i s t i c a l Table 
Scenario AIB-IMAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 799 849 890 932 965 990 1001 1005 1009 1020 1029 1032 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.5 20.2 26.9 35.6 44.3 53.0 62.4 71.3 77.9 88.7 101.2 114.6 
1990 USS/cap = 20648.9 23840.3 30131.7 38187.4 45863.7 53609.2 62283.6 70840.8 77152.1 87018.1 98251.1 111071.1 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Solids 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Liquids 57 62 68 71 67 61 53 49 47 46 44 42 
Gas 24 27 30 31 32 35 40 43 45 49 52 55 
Electricity 24 36 52 66 74 76 76 76 75 76 77 78 
Others 2 3 5 10 16 22 26 27 27 26 26 26 
Total 120 141 168 191 203 207 208 207 207 209 212 214 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 37 47 51 51 51 48 46 42 37 35 32 30 
Oil 67 76 84 88 84 67 65 60 57 56 54 50 
Gas 28 36 46 52 51 51 53 55 56 58 61 64 
Non-Fossil Electric 7 12 19 29 36 40 42 45 46 48 51 54 
Biomass 9 3 5 10 16 23 25 28 28 27 28 24 
Other Renewables 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Total 151 183 216 240 248 240 242 240 236 235 237 233 
Cumulative Resources Production Z J *> 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.1 4.8 5.5 6.1 6.7 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.3 3.1 4.3 5.5 6.7 7.9 9.1 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.5 98.2 130.4 162.3 194.4 226.5 258.8 291.4 324.2 357.4 
Cai-bon Sequestration = GtC 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.3 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland <' 379 379 378 385 382 383 391 394 395 395 399 394 
Grasslands " 786 676 584 516 487 479 472 467 462 458 459 453 
Energy Biomass 3 1 3 9 20 32 43 51 55 52 52 43 
Forest 1115 1167 1215 12.59 1273 1272 1263 1256 1250 1252 1245 1262 
Others 955 1016 1059 1070 1076 1073 1070 1071 1076 1081 1083 1087 
Total 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G l C 2.83 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 3.20 
Other C 0 2 f GtC 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.13 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.30 3.26 3.17 3.22 3.20 
88 
3.22 3.24 3.27 3.30 3.33 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 78 81 83 85 89 89 91 91 86 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 13.4 12.5 10.9 10.1 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.9 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 U 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 177 182 180 180 173 172 169 173 179 177 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 37 37 34 33 30 27 26 25 25 23 
NOx M t N 13 12 13 13 12 10 9 9 8 9 9 8 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production. 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 393 
Scenario AlB-IMAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
REF 
Population Million 412 429 437 443 445 443 432 419 401 384 365 347 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.0 0.7 1.0 2.0 3.5 5.9 9.2 13.0 17.2 22.7 28.4 34.3 
l990US$/cap'> 2307.2 1657.3 2378.6 4378.7 7868.6 13380.5 21343.7 30936.4 42882.5 59159.7 7 7 7 4 Í . 4 98993.7 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Solids 14 10 7 6 5 6 5 5 5 4 4 
Liquids 21 12 12 15 16 16 15 15 14 13 12 и 
Gas 15 II 10 12 12 И II 10 10 10 9 с 
Electricity 9 5 7 15 22 30 34 34 32 3! 29 
Others 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Total 62 41 40 50 59 68 71 70 67 63 59 5e 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 36 19 15 16 20 27 28 25 22 18 15 11 
Oil 28 14 16 20 23 26 30 29 27 25 23 20 
Gas 25 15 16 23 27 28 25 22 20 17 17 13 
Non-Fossil Electric J 1 1 3 6 9 И U 12 12 12 12 
Biomass I 1 I 2 3 6 6 6 6 7 7 9 
Other Renewables 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Total 95 52 52 67 82 99 103 98 90 84 77 70 
Cumulative Resources Production ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 Í .0 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.4 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.3 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.3 4.9 5.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.4 31.0 41.3 53.0 66.7 80.8 94.3 107.7 12Û.7 133.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 278 223 229 227 224 218 207 199 189 179 169 164 
Grasslands " 392 307 329 339 333 310 279 258 238 234 226 221 
Energy Biomass 1 0 1 6 19 46 84 87 92 83 83 92 
Forest 1146 1174 1167 1250 1242 1238 1238 1233 1227 1226 1218 1200 
Others 461 574 551 455 460 466 471 501 532 556 
582 600 
Total 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 
2278 2278 2278 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1.41 1.31 1.21 LOI 0.91 Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.91 L U 1.31 1.61 1.61 
Other C 0 2 f GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.27 -0.30 -0.18 -0.03 0.02 
0.15 0.24 0.35 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.90 1.02 1.04 1.31 1.43 i.38 
1..33 1.36 1.25 1.26 
CH4 total MtCH4 47 39 41 51 57 58 52 52 
51 47 43 40 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 9.4 9.7 9.6 10.6 10.6 9.9 
8.9 7.8 6.8 5.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 
33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 
23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 
69 
6 8 10 14 18 21 19 
15 14 10 U 
C O M t C O 41 34 38 45 52 55 56 
56 56 54 52 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 12 12 12 13 
12 12 12 12 U 11 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 
4 4 4 3 3 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production. 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category -'land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
3 9 4 S t a t i s t i c a l Table 
Scenario AIB-IMAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
1990 US$/cap 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Non-Fossil Electric 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Production Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration ' GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands ' 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 f GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
2781 3246 3609 3929 4142 4235 
1.4 2.7 4.7 8.7 16.1 28.8 
337.2 531.9 873.7 1553.2 2837.7 5139.5 
E J 
29 33 33 30 26 20 
20 24 26 29 32 35 
12 21 29 38 49 59 
2 8 17 23 27 30 
4 9 20 42 75 119 
0 1 3 12 23 33 
68 96 127 174 232 295 
EJ 
28 42 53 71 99 126 
16 27 40 59 77 76 
4 12 29 52 76 87 
0 ] 2 6 14 32 
0 1 4 14 31 52 
30 34 36 33 29 24 
79 116 163 235 326 397 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.7 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 
1.5 19.3 43.6 77.7 125.1 185.8 
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
382 386 396 413 428 430 
561 664 692 747 770 778 
1 1 3 15 53 95 
488 397 369 331 286 252 
545 527 515 470 439 421 
1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 
1.15 1.78 2.58 3.68 5.08 6.38 
0.37 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.29 
1.53 2.03 2.82 4.00 5.48 6.66 
113 125 136 157 181 198 
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.1 
17.7 25.3 29.9 33.6 39.5 42.9 
0 5 18 45 92 153 
3 5 8 15 23 30 
4 7 12 19 28 42 
235 270 294 332 406 378 
33 37 40 45 50 51 
7 9 12 16 21 24 
4220 4088 3871 3594 3262 2886 
48.2 73.2 103.0 139.3 173.5 200.7 
8819.4 13804.2 19837.3 27431.3 35626.4 44069.4 
14 13 11 10 8 7 
33 30 27 23 19 15 
58 57 55 51 46 42 
39 45 47 49 47 43 
150 166 173 171 159 139 
40 42 40 38 35 31 
334 352 352 341 314 277 
125 108 91 70 50 36 
96 98 92 84 71 57 
94 110 / 98 88 86 65 
55 75 91 104 107 102 
61 62 55 53 46 36 
18 17 15 14 13 12 
449 468 442 413 373 308 
3.6 4.5 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.4 
1.8 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 
1.5 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.8 
253.3 319.3 380.0 434.2 479.9 517.1 
0.5 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 
409 394 372 327 306 267 
697 626 601 560 539 473 
142 141 117 129 126 97 
244 273 335 403 438 515 
484 543 551 557 566 624 
1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 
6.58 6.18 5.68 4.88 3.98 3.28 
0.27 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.06 
6.85 6.33 5.82 5.02 4.12 3.33 
206 206 202 191 183 166 
4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.1 
39.4 35.8 32.2 27.3 21.9 17.6 
224 292 292 285 275 262 
35 39 43 46 48 46 
50 55 48 35 33 37 
403 418 426 421 420 385 
51 49 47 44 42 39 
23 22 21 18 16 13 
a: N O T ppp-coiTected. 
b: N O T use but production. 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f; Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 395 
Scenario AlB-IMAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1287 1597 1954 2315 2643 2879 3055 3159 3202 3145 3006 2783 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 2.1 3.0 5.4 9.8 17.3 28,5 43.7 62.0 85.2 114.4 143.3 169.2 
1990 US$/cap" 1653.4 1901.8 2738.2 4210.1 6556.0 9905.2 14317.2 19627.9 26606.2 36388.5 47686.9 60795.4 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 16 20 25 26 26 24 20 19 18 17 15 13 
Solids 1 3 5 9 13 17 22 22 20 17 16 14 
Liquids 15 23 37 53 67 77 82 84 85 81 73 65 
Gas 4 9 17 18 19 23 30 36 43 47 48 49 
Electricity 2 4 9 24 50 81 112 133 147 151 144 132 
Others 0 0 1 5 9 11 15 20 22 24 26 24 
Total 39 58 94 135 184 233 281 315 334 336 322 296 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 3 4 10 32 75 97 102 97 87 75 66 52 
Oil 17 27 47 75 101 131 157 165 165 155 132 109 
Gas 6 10 26 37 34 56 88 91 109 115 100 102 
Non-Fossil Electric 0 0 1 2 5 11 20 31 43 54 60 62 
Biomass 0 0 2 9 20 21 36 45 49 45 47 46 
Other Renewables 18 22 28 29 30 29 26 26 25 24 23 21 
Total 43 64 114 183 266 344 429 456 478 469 428 391 
Cumulative Resources Production Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.5 5.9 
Oil 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.8 4.4 6.3 8.1 9.8 11.5 13.0 14.3 15.4 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.8 3.8 4.9 6.2 7.3 8.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.2 68.6 114.4 173.0 241.3 315.0 390.8 465.5 534.1 593.5 
Carbon Sequestration ^ GtC 1.2 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland " 397 394 447 499 540 540 523 503 483 455 421 384 
Grasslands ' 1697 1648 1708 1760 1790 1704 1617 1499 1403 1345 1281 1201 
Energy Biomass 2 8 19 53 85 101 105 125 127 120 106 102 
Forest 1529 1529 1472 1410 1346 1370 1429 1494 1552 1608 1662 1722 
Others 1955 2001 1933 1857 1818 1864 1906 1958 2014 2051 2109 2171 
Total 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.81 3.11 4.71 6.41 7.31 7.61 7.61 7.11 6.41 5.51 
Other C 0 2 f GtC 0.73 0.82 0.44 0.73 0.60 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.02 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.45 1.83 2,25 3.84 5.31 6.42 7.24 7.51 7.63 7.31 6.41 5.48 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 105 134 154 158 166 176 183 184 171 160 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1,5 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 21.8 32.0 45.5 54.4 57.2 57.0 53.9 48.5 42.4 35.9 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 326 425 422 302 317 365 437 490 456 465 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 55 63 67 62 65 66 67 68 64 60 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 15 21 24 26 28 28 26 24 21 
a: NOT ppp-corrected. 
b: NOT use but production. 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
396 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIB-MARIA 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population Million 5262 6117 6888 7617 8048 8207 8704 8536 8372 8028 7527 7056 
GNP/GDP ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 19.4 25.8 35.7 51.9 75.4 114.4 179.7 230.1 287.9 355.9 430.8 535.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solitls 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraüon GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossi! Fue/ C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
48 37 38 27 19 13 
138 165 200 252 293 350 
56 66 98 139 189 243 
35 52 63 79 90 116 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
278 321 399 496 591 723 
90 69 61 45 33 24 
123 144 168 201 220 250 
71 105 142 188 246 305 
22 29 40 61 99 162 
28 39 56 88 103 121 
9 8 7 7 6 21 
343 393 475 589 706 882 
0.0 0.9 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.0 
0.0 1.2 2.7 4.4 6.4 8.6 
0.0 0.7 1.8 3.2 5.1 7.5 
7.1 82.4 166.3 258.4 358.7 468.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1451 1451 1605 2000 2174 2222 
3395 3395 3245 2850 2676 2604 
0 0 0 0 0 39 
4138 4142 4158 4186 4217 4267 
4061 4057 4038 4010 3978 3914 
13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
5.99 6.90 7.77 8.69 9.65 10.93 
L U 1.07 1.03 0.93 0.79 0.58 
7.10 7.97 8.80 9.61 10.44 11.51 
1672 883 791 337 369 482 
32 25 31 43 61 77 
38 40 43 48 66 99 
26 48 84 140 207 145 
403 402 486 481 583 651 
303 345 287 303 213 273 
157 187 218 256 301 363 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
889 984 1075 1180 1303 1432 
34 54 87 142 209 146 
285 229 263 208 208 226 
354 399 ' 344 363 279 345 
240 321 402 505 625 797 
132 184 230 278 380 429 
68 71 73 73 71 67 
1113 1258 1400 1570 1770 2011 
3.2 3.5 4.1 5.0 6.4 8.5 
U . l 13.9 16.2 18.8 20.9 23.0 
10.6 14.1 18.1 21.5 25.2 28.0 
591.1 720.5 852.4 990.3 1139.9 1.301.4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2355 2080 1810 1539 1278 1162 
2601 2593 2597 2597 2597 2597 
43 326 592 872 1572 1932 
4312 4366 4366 4358 3918 3673 
3734 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 
13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
12.66 12.74 13.45 14.07 14.48 14.24 
0.36 0.13 0.05 0.00 1.38 2.20 
13.01 12.87 13.50 14.07 15.86 16.44 
566 654 659 654 639 614 
89 97 106 114 119 115 
119 127 113 88 84 95 
Statistical Table 397 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 Scenario AlB-MARIA 
OECD90 
Population Million 859 919 965 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 15.6 18.9 22.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-comjnercial 
Solids 12 8 6 
Liquids 71 76 71 
Gas 28 32 52 
Electricity 21 28 31 
Others 0 0 0 
Total 132 145 160 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 28 21 
Oil 71 77 71 
Gas 34 55 80 
Nuclear 18 15 18 
Biomass 6 4 3 
Other Renewables 5 5 4 
Total 171 182 198 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 
Oil 0.0 0.7 1.5 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 378 378 378 
Grasslands 756 756 756 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 
Forest 756 756 756 
Others 794 794 794 
Total 2684 2684 2684 
Anthi-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.31 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.33 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1007 1035 1046 1081 1085 1091 1096 1103 1110 
27.0 32.0 38.2 46.0 57.7 71.3 88.4 105.8 123.9 
4 3 2 7 15 28 49 65 46 
68 65 64 59 51 80 73 92 89 
70 82 92 99 111 80 80 56 88 
36 39 42 47 52 59 67 77 87 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
177 188 199 212 230 248 269 290 309 
16 13 10 12 19 31 51 67 47 
68 65 64 59 51 80 73 92 87 
105 121 135 133 147 120 124 106 143 
23 28 35 43 54 68 85 105 131 
2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 
4 3 3 19 23 24 24 23 21 
217 232 247 267 294 323 357 395 431 
0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.4 3.1 
2.2 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.8 5.3 6.1 6.8 7.7 
1.7 2.7 3.9 5.3 6.6 8.1 9.3 10.5 11.6 
100.0 136.0 172.5 208.1 243.2 281.5 324.4 372.2 422.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
378 378 378 378 378 378 357 295 237 
756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
0 0 0 0 0 0 21 82 141 
756 756 778 816 834 834 834 834 834 
794 794 772 734 716 716 716 716 716 
2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
3.49 3.60 3.71 3.64 3.86 4.34 4.77 5.30 5.25 
0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.19 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.23 -0.20 
3.55 3.65 3.67 3.44 3.58 4.07 4.51 5.07 5.05 
108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
3 9 8 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario A I B - M A R I A 
R E F 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
413 419 427 433 432 430 423 406 391 374 356 339 
0.9 1.3 1.8 2.6 4.6 8.1 13.7 18.1 22.4 27.1 32.9 40.4 
13 9 6 4 3 2 3 6 10 17 27 19 
17 14 12 11 12 13 12 8 14 16 26 23 
21 24 27 30 41 53 65 70 61 54 38 53 
7 8 7 7 9 U 13 14 15 16 17 18 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 55 52 53 65 78 93 98 100 102 107 113 
Coal 19 13 9 6 4 3 4 6 10 17 27 19 
Oil 19 14 13 12 12 13 12 8 14 16 26 23 
Gas 27 33 34 38 52 66 80 86^ 77 69 53 69 
Nuclear 3 2 3 4 4 5 7 9 11 13 17 21 
Biomass 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Total 69 64 60 61 74 89 106 113 116 120 128 136 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0,5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.3 4.2 4.9 5.6 6.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 20.9 28.8 37.2 47.3 59.2 71.8 84.6 97,6 111.6 126.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 174 139 111 89 71 
Grasslands 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 78 106 128 146 
Forest 815 815 815 815 815 815 827 862 862 862 862 862 
Others 722 722 722 722 722 722 710 675 675 675 675 675 
Total 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1..30 
0.00 
1.30 
0.91 
0.00 
0.91 
0.79 
0.02 
0.81 
0.75 
0.01 
0.76 
0.93 1.14 
-0.01 -0.03 
0.92 1.11 
1.34 1,43 
-0.07 -0.17 
1.27 1.26 
1.50 1..59 
-0.21 -0.27 
1.29 1.32 
1.82 
-0.34 
1.47 
1.78 
-0.33 
1.45 
0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
Statistical Table 399 
Scenario AlB-MARIA 
ASIA 
Population 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fosstl Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M i C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2642 3080 3425 3728 3861 3895 4008 3814 3632 3368 3040 2744 
1.2 2.6 5.8 12.5 21.1 36.5 62.9 81.9 104.9 132.1 164.8 210.8 
20 18 24 17 12 8 15 25 41 68 104 73 
26 42 65 96 121 154 181 183 203 199 211 252 
2 3 4 10 17 27 40 53 44 49 35 57 
4 9 12 17 18 27 40 51 64 79 97 119 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 71 105 140 168 216 276 312 352 395 446 501 
28 24 28 20 14 10 16 26 42 68 104 73 
14 23 36 48 62 87 111 98 98 70 55 59 
3 5 8 14 22 30 42 54 45 50 35 58 
1 12 19 35 34 64 78 104 132 169 214 269 
13 21 31 51 65 71 73 88 106 130 L57 193 
1 1 1 1 1 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 
61 86 124 168 197 263 340 389 443 507 585 671 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.8 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.8 4.8 5.8 6.5 7.0 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.1 
1.5 19.3 41.5 65.8 91.5 120.9 156.9 197.6 240.3 285.2 332,8 380.3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
366 366 380 380 380 380 380 379 374 335 305 266 
431 431 421 421 421 382 379 371 375 375 375 375 
0 0 0 0 0 39 43 52 54 92 122 162 
365 367 381 390 399 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 
458 456 440 430 421 414 412 412 412 412 412 412 
1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 
1.15 1.78 2.20 2.31 2.55 3.08 3.91 4.08 4.36 4.56 4.96 4.58 
0,37 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
1,53 2.03 2.40 2.46 2.68 3.19 4.00 4.14 4.40 4.57 4.95 4.55 
5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
400 Statistical Table 
Scenario A I B - M A R I A 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1348 1699 2071 2449 2720 2836 3192 3231 3259 3190 3029 2864 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.7 3.0 5.4 9.8 17.6 31.7 57.1 72.4 89.3 108.4 127.4 160.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 7 11 8 
Liquids 24 34 51 77 95 119 151 160 190 ¡ 9 3 253 288 
Gas 5 6 15 29 49 72 99 112 101 120 84 75 
Electricity 3 8 12 19 25 37 57 69 81 95 111 139 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 35 50 81 126 170 229 308 344 376 414 459 510 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 6 4 3 2 1 1 2 2 4 7 11 8 
Oi ! 18 30 48 73 80 86 103 72 72 50 35 57 
Gas 7 12 19 32 51 74 100 И З 102 120 84 75 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 33 58 112 154 192 238 289 377 
Biomass 8 13 21 35 36 49 59 96 123 147 221 232 
Other Renewables 2 2 1 1 1 15 25 25 24 24 24 23 
Total 41 60 93 143 204 282 399 461 517 586 664 772 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Oil 0,0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.5 3.4 4.4 5.1 5.8 6.3 6.7 
Gas 0,0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0,7 1.2 2.0 2,9 4,1 5.1 6.3 7.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G l C 1.4 17.8 38.3 63.8 94.0 127.7 166.9 207.9 246.0 283.1 323.3 372.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 490 490 630 1025 1199 1247 1380 1150 920 736 589 589 
Grasslands 2095 2095 1955 1560 1386 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 13.52 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 231 460 653 1240 1484 
Forest 2202 2204 2207 2226 2248 2268 2263 2263 2263 2255 1815 1571 
Others 2086 2084 2081 2063 2040 2006 1878 1878 1878 1878 1878 1878 
Total 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 0.72 1.01 L47 2.13 2.57 3.01 3.76 3.37 3,24 3.16 2.41 2.63 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.79 0.71 0,62 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.51 1.96 2.77 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.26 2.84 3.19 3.54 4.30 3.89 3.74 3.67 4.37 5.40 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 ¡5 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
4 0 1 
Scenario A I B - M E S S A G E 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standai'dized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
20.9 26.7 37.9 56.5 89.1 135.2 181.3 247.6 313.8 383.3 455.9 528.5 
25.7 33.3 47.1 66.6 96.6 138.9 181.0 240.7 304.2 372.2 443.0 513.9 
.38 28 22 16 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 
42 58 59 67 73 70 48 35 29 26 24 15 
111 125 160 204 254 303 357 396 403 365 308 254 
41 48 67 85 104 135 164 199 210 202 158 96 
35 47 70 107 164 232 311 414 536 647 745 859 
8 
275 
10 20 38 58 84 122 169 234 320 422 525 
316 398 517 662 830 1005 1213 1413 1560 1657 1749 
91 105 120 157 194 227 210 182 192 213 200 192 
128 155 172 198 225 250 281 333 326 253 184 138 
71 85 128 178 250 320 378 445 482 456 398 350 
7 9 12 19 34 55 84 126 185 247 306 358 
46 47 63 87 120 155 204 251 315 394 438 475 
8 13 29 52 78 134 240 371 534 730 945 1172 
352 415 524 689 901 1141 1397 1707 2035 2292 2472 2683 
0.0 0.9 2.0 3.2 4.8 6.7 9.0 11.1 12.9 14.8 17.0 19.0 
0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.7 8.9 11.4 14.2 17.6 20.8 23.4 25.2 
0.0 0.7 1.6 2.9 4.7 7.1 10.3 14.1 18.6 23.4 28.0 31.9 
7.1 82.4 169.1 269,9 390.7 535.1 695.1 866.4 1049.0 1231.7 1398.0 1544.4 
1459 ¡ 4 6 6 1462 1457 1454 1448 1442 1436 1429 1424 1422 1420 
3389 3404 3429 3446 3458 3478 3498 3525 3552 3568 3572 3576 
0 0 0 74 158 288 418 492 566 581 538 495 
4296 4237 4173 4164 4164 4177 4190 4194 4199 4202 4203 4204 
3805 3842 3886 3807 3715 3558 3400 3301 3203 3173 3213 3253 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.31 10.56 13.21 15.51 16.47 17.84 
Other C 0 2 •= GtC 1.11 1.07 1.04 0.26 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.36 10.81 13.33 15.56 16.45 17.81 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 362 418 486 517 531 502 
N 2 0 total •= M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.2 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 65.8 62.2 61.8 59.6 49.4 45.4 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 
C O M t C O 879 877 1022 1218 1412 1659 1925 2173 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 164 194 211 235 259 282 
NOx M t N 31 32 39 50 60 71 80 90 
18.73 17.86 
-0.03 -0.03 
18.70 17.83 
477 451 
6.1 
43.2 
659 
106 
113 
2380 
276 
95 
6.0 
40.4 
654 
114 
88 
2548 
234 
90 
15.46 
-0.01 
15.44 
400 
5.9 
35.9 
639 
119 
84 
2568 
188 
81 
Emis,çions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A I marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
13.83 
0.00 
13.83 
347 
5.8 
31.4 
614 
115 
95 
2532 
137 
74 
402 Statistical Table 
Scenario AlB-MESSAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.5 25.3 31.0 38.0 46,1 54.1 65.5 76.9 90.3 105.7 121.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 17.7 21.8 26.9 33.0 40.1 47.2 57.2 67.3 79.2 92.9 106.6 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 13 7 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 68 73 78 77 75 70 67 55 45 36 27 
Gas 22 28 35 40 44 44 43 41 40 36 24 12 
Electricity 22 28 38 50 62 70 81 97 117 132 150 172 
Others 1 1 4 9 12 17 24 34 50 70 93 109 
Total 124 138 157 180 197 207 218 240 262 282 303 320 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 36 39 42 44 32 20 11 6 5 3 2 
Oi l 72 82 79 80 75 67 58 55 43 35 28 25 
Gas 33 45 60 76 87 96 97 107 '118 118 108 113 
Nuclear 6 7 9 10 14 20 27 38 48 56 60 59 
Biomass 6 9 14 20 27 34 42 44 44 40 41 52 
Other Renewables 4 6 12 16 22 35 59 81 114 156 211 246 
Total 159 184 210 243 269 283 303 335 372 409 450 497 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5 2,0 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Oi l 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 3,9 4.6 5.2 5.7 6.2 6,5 6.8 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.0 4,0 5.0 6.0 7.2 8,4 9.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.3 102.5 140.5 176.8 208.3 236.9 264.6 290.9 314.5 336.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use * Million ha 
Cropland 381 380 377 376 375 372 368 364 359 356 356 355 
Grasslands 760 763 771 774 776 787 797 818 839 849 847 846 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 11 24 44 63 74 86 88 81 75 
Forest 1050 1053 1052 1053 1056 1062 1068 1061 1054 1050 1049 1048 
Others 838 833 828 814 798 765 733 712 691 685 695 705 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 " GtC 2.83 3.20 3.43 3.76 3.84 3.44 2.94 2.82 2.66 2.49 2.!5 2.14 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.46 3.78 3.83 3.41 2.89 2.83 2.71 2.55 2.18 2.15 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 71 71 71 68 65 63 63 63 62 63 
N 2 0 total = M I N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 9.7 3.7 2,3 1.5 1.1 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.1 4.4 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 194 218 217 217 214 206 200 186 149 151 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 39 41 37 33 28 27 25 21 14 9 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 16 16 15 14 13 13 12 11 И 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions froin fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table 
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Scenario A I B - M E S S A G E 
R E F 
Population Million 
O N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
413 419 427 433 435 
1.1 0.8 1.5 2.9 5.3 
2.6 2.2 3.1 4.3 6.0 
0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 4 3 2 
15 10 10 10 11 
14 U 15 17 20 
6 6 7 10 14 
7 6 7 10 12 
50 38 42 50 59 
19 15 12 14 17 
20 15 13 12 12 
27 22 30 32 38 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 0 3 
1 1 2 4 6 
70 54 58 64 77 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 
1.3 12.3 22.3 32.7 43.2 
268 266 265 265 265 
341 361 364 366 367 
0 0 0 3 6 
966 950 918 904 894 
701 698 728 738 745 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 1.30 0.91 0.91 0.96 1.14 
Other C 0 2 <^  GtC 0.00 0.00 0,18 0.01 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.09 0.97 1.14 
CH4 total MtCH4 47 39 44 48 55 
N20 total •^ M1N2O-N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0,6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.5 4.7 3.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 
C O M t C O 69 41 53 61 79 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 16 20 25 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 5 
433 
0 
1 
10 
26 
20 
15 
72 
30 
12 
42 
2 
5 
9 
99 
0.7 
0.7 
1.5 
264 
368 
11 
899 
733 
2276 
1.50 
-0.08 
1.42 
58 
0.6 
.3.9 
31 
20 
18 
112 
33 
7 
2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
423 409 392 374 357 339 
12.4 16.2 20.0 24.4 29.3 34.2 
12.4 16.2 20.0 24.4 29.3 34.2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 10 10 11 15 21 
29 33 32 25 16 7 
27 32 38 45 51 56 
17 17 19 23 26 28 
85 92 99 103 108 112 
32 
12 
50 
3 
8 
26 
13 
67 
4 
10 
13 
13 
81 
5 
14 
9 
79 
6 
21 
17 
7 
63 
7 
32 
263 
370 
16 
905 
722 
2276 
1.67 
-0,15 
1.52 
58 
0.6 
3,9 
32 
21 
21 
151 
41 
262 
371 
19 
909 
715 
2276 
1,79 
-0,12 
1.67 
62 
0.6 
3,2 
33 
22 
19 
157 
47 
9 
262 
371 
22 
912 
709 
2276 
1.65 
-0,09 
1.56 
60 
0.6 
2.6 
33 
23 
15 
152 
10 
261 
372 
23 
916 
703 
2276 
1.49 
-0.07 
1.42 
53 
0.6 
2.7 
34 
24 
14 
128 
42 
9 
260 
373 
21 
922 
700 
2276 
1.41 
-0.06 
1.35 
46 
0.6 
2,7 
33 
25 
10 
97 
34 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
19 
5 
53 
8 
47 
16 19 26 37 49 55 
121 138 151 160 173 187 
1.0 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 2,1 
0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1,4 
1.9 2.4 3.1 3.9 4.7 5,3 
56,0 70.8 86.7 102.9 117.8 131.6 144.6 
260 
374 
20 
927 
696 
2276 
1.31 
-0.05 
1.25 
40 
0.6 
1.8 
31 
24 
11 
65 
23 
404 Statistical Table 
Scenario AlB-MESSAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MilUon 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 5.8 12.3 26.2 44.5 62.7 91.9 121.0 150.0 178.6 207.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 8.2 13.5 21.6 35.2 51.8 67.5 93.3 121.0 150.0 178.6 207.3 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 24 17 13 8 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 36 41 51 59 54 33 26 27 24 22 14 
Liquids 13 20 27 47 69 95 122 140 143 134 114 106 
Gas 2 3 7 10 14 22 39 64 73 75 62 37 
Electricity 4 7 12 24 42 67 97 136 186 231 271 318 
Others 1 2 4 10 16 25 37 54 77 107 144 182 
Total 62 85 105 150 204 266 330 420 505 570 613 655 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 48 57 79 99 120 114 104 120 126 105 87 
Oil 15 24 28 40 57 71 80 93 77 56 43 41 
Gas 3 5 12 22 37 54 81 109 • 116 112 96 74 
Nuclear 0 1 1 4 8 15 26 44 71 102 138 173 
Biomass 24 22 27 35 48 64 82 106 133 156 158 163 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 14 23 42 75 122 179 239 308 391 
Total 74 102 131 193 272 366 459 578 697 791 849 928 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.2 4.4 5.5 6.5 7.7 9.0 10.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 2.4 3.2 4.1 4.9 5.4 5.9 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.2 3.2 4.4 5.5 6.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19,3 41.7 69.4 106.2 154.8 211.8 273.4 338.5 405.0 466.0 518.3 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use ^  Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 434 433 432 431 431 430 429 428 428 428 
Grasslands 608 606 609 611 613 615 617 618 619 621 622 624 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 17 37 68 99 117 134 138 127 117 
Forest 535 522 512 524 535 535 535 544 552 556 555 555 
Others 583 601 609 579 547 515 483 456 429 421 431 441 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standai'dized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.22 3.23 4.39 5.49 5.93 6.38 6.78 6.70 5.63 4.85 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.22 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.44 3.10 4.27 5.44 5.96 6.35 6.69 6.61 5.59 4.86 
C H 4 total <• MtCH4 113 125 148 180 220 230 237 213 194 179 161 143 
N 2 0 total e M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 27.2 29.7 31.4 30.2 20.9 16.8 15.4 14.3 12.9 11.9 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 
46 
275 262 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 316 413 544 660 776 906 960 1001 968 910 N M V O C Mt 33 37 40 51 59 66 73 85 79 73 62 42 
NOx M t N 7 9 11 15 19 24 28 32 34 33 30 26 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A Í M - A ¡ marker run. 
e; Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
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Scenario AIB-MESSAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 5.3 10.3 19.5 35.8 52.0 73.9 95,8 118.6 142.3 165.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 3.8 5.1 8.6 13.8 22.4 38.1 53.9 73.9 95,8 118.6 142.3 165.9 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 11 9 8 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 5 7 10 11 14 14 9 3 2 2 2 
Liquids 17 27 50 68 98 122 153 180 196 175 144 100 
Gas 4 6 11 18 25 43 53 61 66 67 56 40 
Electricity 3 6 12 24 47 75 106 150 195 239 274 314 
Others 0 1 4 9 17 27 45 63 89 121 159 206 
Total 39 55 93 138 203 285 373 463 548 604 634 662 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 7 14 22 35 46 44 41 53 74 76 83 
Oil 21 35 53 67 81 100 131 172 194 154 106 67 
Gas 8 14 26 49 88 128 150 163 168 148 131 110 
Nuclear 0 0 1 4 10 18 28 40 61 83 101 118 
Biomass 14 15 22 30 41 53 72 91 124 176 207 213 
Other Renewables 2 3 10 18 27 48 90 148 215 298 377 480 
Total 49 74 125 190 283 394 514 656 815 932 999 1071 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.7 2,1 2.6 3.3 4.0 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.6 3.6 4.9 6,7 8.6 10.1 11.2 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.9 3.1 4.6 6.3 7.9 9.4 10.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.8 65.4 100.6 147.5 204.2 269.4 343.0 417.9 485,9 545.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use » Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 384 383 382 381 381 380 379 379 378 378 
Grasslands 1680 1673 1685 1695 1702 1708 1714 1718 1722 1726 1730 1733 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 42 90 165 240 282 324 333 308 284 
Forest 1745 1711 1690 1683 1680 1681 1682 1681 1680 1678 1676 1674 
Others 1684 1710 1720 1676 1625 1544 1463 1419 1374 1364 1387 1411 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1,01 1.76 2.61 3.84 5.09 5.93 6.86 7.63 7.18 6,27 5.53 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0,73 0,82 0.60 0.36 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0,06 0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1,83 2.36 2.96 4.09 5.28 6.07 6.98 7.73 7.26 6.32 5.56 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 99 119 141 162 171 165 160 1.55 131 100 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1,3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12,8 18.5 21.1 22.2 21.0 20.6 20.1 20.2 17.7 14.2 10.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 459 526 572 670 785 904 1069 1233 1353 1405 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 68 82 90 102 117 124 124 98 78 63 
NOx MtN 7 8 11 15 20 25 30 36 38 36 33 30 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestadon were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A 1 marker run. 
btC02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
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Scenario AlB-MiniCAM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million .5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.7 27.4 38.1 52.8 80.2 117.3 164.4 226.8 294.5 367.3 445.1 530.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 45 57 71 86 98 103 99 73 54 45 46 47 
Liquids 121 126 134 145 144 161 197 238 279 318 364 411 
Gas 52 63 72 80 81 81 79 90 101 111 73 36 
Electricity 35 53 82 123 199 289 392 511 628 745 856 968 
Others 0 0 20 59 99 156 231 272 308 341 280 220 
Total 253 300 379 493 622 790 998 1184 1371 1559 1620 1682 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 88 116 145 174 224 255 265 216 179 156 190 225 
Oi l 131 136 144 155 141 154 194 244 291 333 387 440 
Gas 70 85 137 226 336 437 527 611 678 728 476 224 
Nuclear 24 25 33 45 60 73 89 100 112 125 218 311 
Biomass 0 5 14 26 55 87 124 148 159 156 187 219 
Other Renewables 24 25 28 35 48 97 181 311 448 589 687 785 
Total 336 392 500 661 865 1104 1380 1630 1866 2087 2145 2204 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.1 1.2 2.5 4.0 6.2 8.6 II. l 13.4 15.4 17.1 18.9 20.8 
O i l 0.1 1.5 2.9 4.4 5.8 7.4 9.0 11.4 14.0 17.1 20.8 24.6 
Gas 0.1 0.9 2.1 3.8 6.9 10.8 15.4 21.4 27.8 34.7 40.0 45.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 170.3 280.0 417.3 579.7 762.4 956.6 1156.0 1362.1 1559.1 1731.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1472 1467 1472 1489 1472 1429 1361 1210 1054 891 769 646 
Grasslands 3209 3349 3604 3974 4359 4663 4885 4731 4480 4134 3872 3609 
Energy Biomass 0 ( 13 35 103 178 261 296 294 255 313 372 
Forest 4173 4215 4141 3952 3606 3309 3060 3318 3704 4217 4435 4654 
Others 4310 4133 3935 3715 3625 3585 3596 3608 3632 3667 3775 3884 
Total 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.51 10.74 13.45 15.88 18.18 19.11 20.07 21.05 19.45 17.93 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.10 1.59 1.68 1.48 1.01 0.53 0.17 -0.07 -1.02 -1.97 
Total C 0 2 G t C 7.10 7.97 9.60 12.33 15.13 17.35 19.19 19.64 20.24 20.98 18.43 15.96 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 356 406 467 528 573 592 604 608 572 535 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.0 9.2 10.6 12.3 13.8 14.4 14.8 15.0 15.3 15.6 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 78.8 80.7 77.3 66.1 47.1 32.2 23.9 22.3 25.7 29.2 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
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Scenario AlB-Min iCAM 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
EJ 
EJ 
Z J 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
Antlu-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 1112 
16.3 20.5 25.6 31.5 34.4 44.7 53.6 63.3 74.4 86.7 102.1 118.7 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 13 12 9 9 7 5 4 3 3 4 5 
72 73 70 61 51 30 28 30 32 35 43 51 
27 36 41 40 38 30 25 27 30 33 24 14 
22 28 33 36 37 40 42 51 63 76 102 128 
0 0 16 47 59 98 129 140 151 164 141 117 
130 151 172 195 195 205 229 252 279 311 313 315 
40 47 45 35 37 42 45 43 38 30 42 54 
76 78 74 64 52 26 22 22 26 35 44 53 
34 47 73 113 120 141 154 169 184 201 143 84 
20 16 13 12 11 9 8 9 10 12 26 39 
0 2 5 10 13 24 33 36 37 37 51 66 
12 11 11 11 11 15 21 32 46 62 82 103 
182 201 222 245 245 258 283 310 342 376 388 400 
0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.6 3,0 3,4 3,8 4.2 4.6 
0.1 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.9 
0.0 0.5 1.1 2.0 2.6 4.6 6.0 7,7 9,5 11.4 12.9 14.4 
2.8 33.0 67.1 104.7 143.5 181.7 220.0 259.2 299.4 340.7 380.2 415,2 
Cropland 408 411 410 408 402 378 352 309 268 229 196 163 
Grasslands 796 821 866 931 963 1044 1076 1048 1007 953 898 843 
Energy Biomass 0 1 9 24 34 67 92 95 93 86 120 154 
Forest 921 931 922 894 867 794 760 825 904 996 1028 1059 
Others 998 959 916 866 857 840 843 846 851 859 882 904 
Total 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2,83 3.20 3.48 3.64 3.58 3.57 3.77 3.95 4.14 4.34 4.00 3.67 
0,00 0.00 0.14 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.16 -0.28 -0.40 
2.83 3.20 3.62 3.90 3.86 3.79 3.87 3.97 4.07 4.18 3.72 3.28 
73 74 83 93 98 117 133 150 160 161 167 173 
2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
22.7 17.0 13.1 2.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.3 4.5 
19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
4 0 8 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario A l B - M i n i C A M 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nucleiir 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
428 425 426 433 434 431 423 408 392 374 357 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.94 1.23 1.56 1.77 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.13 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.97 1.31 1.69 1.90 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 49 68 82 96 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 l . l 1.4 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.1 10.1 10.7 9.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.8S 
0.10 
1.94 
108 
1.6 
6.4 
32 
21 
21 
1.77 
0.10 
1.87 
106 
1.6 
3.4 
33 
22 
19 
1.73 
0.09 
1.83 
108 
1,6 
1.7 
33 
23 
15 
1.73 
0.08 
1.81 
112 
1.5 
1.4 
34 
24 
14 
1.51 
-0.13 
1.38 
99 
1.5 
1.8 
33 
25 
10 
340 
1.1 1.1 1.4 2.1 3.5 5.1 6.9 10.0 13.6 17.8 21.8 26.3 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 10 9 9 8 8 8 6 4 4 4 4 
18 12 9 11 12 14 16 19 21 23 23 24 
19 15 13 15 15 15 15 16 17 18 11 5 
6 8 13 21 33 44 56 68 79 89 94 98 
0 0 0 1 I 2 3 4 4 4 3 1 
56 44 45 57 70 84 98 112 125 137 134 132 
18 17 19 22 30 34 34 24 18 17 19 22 
20 13 11 13 10 9 12 18 22 24 25 27 
26 20 22 34 47 53 54 58 60 60 36 12 
3 4 6 10 11 12 13 13 14 15 23 31 
0 1 2 3 7 10 12 14 13 12 12 12 
3 3 4 5 7 14 26 41 56 70 75 80 
70 58 64 87 111 132 151 169 184 197 191 184 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1,2 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.7 2,2 2.8 3.4 4.0 4.4 4.8 
1.3 12.3 21.7 33.1 48.1 66.0 85.3 104.4 122.9 141.1 157.0 168.8 
284 294 304 317 322 321 312 273 230 183 158 134 
395 410 454 527 609 676 729 684 616 526 488 451 
0 0 1 4 17 26 31 32 28 20 18 16 
1007 1016 996 945 861 792 738 818 928 1066 1109 1151 
691 657 622 584 569 563 567 570 575 582 604 626 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
1.31 
-0.34 
0.97 
86 
1.6 
2.2 
31 
24 
11 
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4 0 9 
Scenario AlB-MiniCAM 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequesttation GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
790 .3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
1.4 3.1 6.5 11.7 23.9 40.4 61.3 86.4 112.3 139.1 166.0 195.3 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 31 45 62 73 78 76 54 40 32 31 31 
14 19 27 36 47 61 78 93 106 118 130 143 
2 5 8 11 14 16 17 20 23 25 16 7 
4 11 25 47 90 141 200 254 305 352 382 412 
0 0 2 7 14 26 45 55 62 67 52 36 
40 67 108 163 238 322 416 476 535 594 611 629 
26 45 71 104 133 147 147 110 86 73 81 90 
16 21 29 40 47 61 81 101 116 126 140 154 
3 9 24 49 102 149 192 219 235 241 149 57 
1 4 9 17 27 37 47 51 55 60 97 135 
0 2 5 10 22 35 48 58 61 59 64 70 
3 4 5 8 14 40 85 149 212 275 304 332 
49 85 144 227 344 468 600 687 765 833 835 838 
0.0 0.4 1.1 1.9 3.1 4.5 6.0 7.2 8.1 9.0 9.8 10.6 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.5 5.7 7.1 8.5 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.5 2.8 4.4 6.5 8.8 11.1 12.8 14.5 
1.5 19.3 44.4 81.5 134.0 201.2 279.3 360.4 439.2 516.5 588.5 651.2 
389 400 410 420 416 405 387 350 312 273 235 198 
508 524 555 603 646 681 708 704 691 670 641 612 
0 0 2 6 28 51 75 85 83 67 73 79 
1168 1144 1102 1041 980 932 896 925 978 1053 1116 1179 
664 633 600 565 .551 545 547 550 555 562 581 600 
2729 2700 2668 2635 2620 2613 2614 2614 2618 2626 2647 2667 
1.15 1.78 2.79 4.16 5.78 7.07 8.03 7.86 7.75 7.70 6.88 6.10 
0.37 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.30 
1.53 2.03 2.99 4.43 6.08 7.36 8.26 7.97 7.78 7.69 6.72 5.80 
113 125 134 146 160 172 180 172 166 163 159 154 
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3,7 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.0 
17.7 25.3 37.9 50.0 47.4 38.3 22.7 14.3 9.5 8.2 9.4 10.6 
0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
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Scenario AlB-MiniCAM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
1236 1541 1876 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 15.4 27.2 42.6 67.0 94.1 123.7 155.2 190.3 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 6 9 10 11 9 7 7 7 8 
17 22 29 37 43 56 75 98 120 142 167 193 
5 7 10 Í3 17 20 22 27 31 35 23 10 
3 6 11 18 38 64 94 137 182 228 279 330 
0 0 1 4 13 30 54 74 91 107 86 65 
27 38 55 78 120 179 256 344 432 518 562 606 
4 6 9 13 23 3! 39 38 38 37 48 59 
20 23 29 38 44 58 80 104 127 149 177 206 
7 10 17 29 61 93 127 165 198 226 148 71 
0 2 4 7 И 16 21 27 32 38 72 105 
0 1 2 3 10 19 31 41 47 49 60 72 
Other Renewables 5 6 8 12 16 28 49 89 134 183 226 269 
Total 35 48 71 102 165 246 346 464 576 681 731 781 
Cumulative Resouices Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 O.l 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.6 5.9 7.7 9.4 
Gas 0,0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.8 4.4 6.2 8.3 9.9 a.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.1 60.7 91.7 130.8 177.9 232.6 294.6 363.9 433.4 496.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 391 363 348 344 338 326 310 278 244 206 179 152 
Grasslands 1510 1594 1728 1913 2109 2262 2372 2295 2166 1985 1845 1704 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 ! 13 34 64 84 90 82 102 123 
Forest 3641 3591 3478 3301 3098 2932 2801 2883 3039 3270 3423 3575 
Others 1957 1884 1798 1699 1657 1637 1639 1642 1651 1663 1709 1754 
Total 7499 7432 7352 7259 7216 7192 7186 7183 7190 7207 7257 7308 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 G t C 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C MtC eq. 
SP6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
0.72 1.01 1.30 1.72 2.54 3.47 4.53 5.53 6.45 7.27 7,05 6.84 
0.73 0.82 0.73 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.58 0.30 0.11 0.03 -0.45 -0.93 
Í .45 1.83 2.03 2.69 3.51 4.31 5.11 5.83 6.56 7.30 6.60 5.91 
77 85 90 100 125 143 152 163 170 171 147 122 
1.2 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.0 
10.5 12.8 14.7 15.4 15.3 15.0 14.5 10.6 8.2 7.4 8.1 8.8 
0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
Statistical Table 411 
Scenario A l C - A I M 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6 U 7 6805 7493 8182 8439 8704 8538 8375 8030 7528 7056 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 20.9 26.7 37.9 56.4 89.1 127.2 181.5 235.2 304.7 377.7 447.8 531.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 50 48 38 34 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 36 42 69 113 164 187 209 192 175 160 146 133 
Liquids 111 118 149 187 230 274 319 3.56 393 430 467 505 
Gas 51 51 74 87 103 122 141 156 172 189 207 224 
Electricity 38 49 74 104 1.50 229 307 429 551 651 731 810 
Others 0 0 0 0 
Total 285 309 404 525 670 823 976 1134 1291 1430 1551 1671 
Primary Ettergy E J 
Coal 93 112 195 308 474 593 750 820 898 976 1051 1134 
Oil 142 155 193 227 244 232 226 193 165 140 118 99 
Gas 72 82 112 124 139 161 191 208 230 252 272 294 
Nuclear 6 9 15 23 36 52 83 98 118 135 145 155 
Biomass 50 48 38 42 55 78 115 147 187 217 228 240 
Other Renewables 10 11 13 17 26 44 78 138 249 372 450 546 
Total 374 418 565 742 973 1161 1442 1605 1848 2092 2264 2468 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.1 1.1 2.6 5.1 9.1 13.9 21.3 28.0 36.9 46.7 56.5 68.3 
Oi l 0.1 1.6 3.4 5.5 7.8 9.9 ¡ 2 . 5 14.2 16.2 17.8 ¡9.1 20.4 
Gas 0.1 0.8 1.8 3.0 4.3 5.7 7.6 9.4 11.6 14.1 16.7 19.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 181.3 320.8 501.7 716.5 965.4 1242.5 1536.3 1848.7 2181.9 2537.7 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1437 1487 1546 1579 1534 1454 1378 1276 1182 1079 971 873 
Grasslands 3290 3287 3477 3874 4235 4271 4307 4231 4157 4056 3930 3808 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 10 227 320 451 535 635 728 807 894 
Forest 4249 4120 3975 3808 3742 3778 3813 3896 3981 4071 4166 4264 
Others 3966 4048 3944 3671 3205 3097 2994 2984 2974 2995 3048 3102 
Total 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 10.32 14.34 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.47 1.78 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 11.79 16.12 
CH4 total MtCH4 310 323 395 479 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.5 8.2 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 99.1 134.2 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 
C O M t C O 879 877 1101 1320 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 179 220 
NOx M t N 31 32 41 51 
19.28 
0.78 
20.06 
564 
8.2 
156.4 
369 
61 
66 
1402 
254 
59 
22.65 
0.23 
22.88 
566 
8.0 
133.1 
482 
77 
99 
1506 
254 
61 
26.79 
0.12 
26.91 
568 
7.8 
139.0 
566 
89 
119 
1619 
256 
63 
28.47 
0.04 
28.51 
517 
7.3 
103.5 
654 
97 
127 
1710 
247 
61 
30.29 
-0.03 
30.26 
474 
6.8 
82.0 
659 
106 
113 
1806 
239 
59 
32.30 
-0.07 
32.23 
442 
6.5 
76.3 
654 
114 
88 
1937 
221 
59 
34.48 
-0.08 
34.41 
416 
6.3 
79.6 
639 
119 
84 
2110 
192 
61 
36.84 
-0.09 
36.75 
392 
6.1 
83.3 
614 
115 
95 
2298 
167 
63 
412 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario A l C - A I M 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 859 919 960 1002 1043 1062 1081 1086 1091 1097 1103 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.5 25.3 31.0 38.0 45.3 54.1 64.0 75.7 89.0 103.9 121.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 6 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 10 14 23 31 31 30 26 23 21 19 17 
Liquids 64 74 80 87 92 94 96 97 97 102 111 121 
Gas 25 31 39 39 37 37 36 36 36 37 39 41 
148 
Electricity 22 27 35 42 49 59 68 85 103 118 133 
Others 0 0 0 0 
327 
Tota! 127 143 168 192 210 220 231 245 259 279 303 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
41 
76 
34 
5 
6 
6 
167 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
410 
787 
0 
1056 
886 
3140 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 
SOx total MtS 22.7 
H F C M t C eq. 19 
P F C M t C eq. 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 
C O M t C O 179 
N M V O C Mt 42 
NOx M t N 13 
42 
89 
45 
8 
1 
191 
0.4 
0.9 
0.4 
2.8 33.0 
404 
758 
0 
1065 
912 
3140 
3.20 
0.00 
3.20 
74 
2.6 
17.0 
58 
13 
23 
161 
36 
12 
60 79 102 118 137 148 161 176 196 218 
94 97 87 70 56 44 35 30 27 24 
54 50 46 45 44 42 .41 41 43 46 
U 15 18 20 21 22 23 24 26 28 
0 2 6 11 22 28 36 42 44 46 
7 9 12 17 24 38 58 78 91 105 
226 251 271 281 304 323 354 391 426 466 
1.0 
1 0 
1.7 2.6 3.6 5.0 6.2 7.8 9.6 11.4 13.6 
1.8 
0.9 
2.8 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.6 6.9 
1.4 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.5 4.9 
)7.8 108.7 155.0 205.1 258.4 312.9 366.6 420.6 477.3 538.0 
389 
751 
0 
1102 
897 
3140 
3.89 
-0.12 
3.78 
71 
2.5 
11.5 
110 
13 
14 
186 
39 
12 
373 
785 
0 
1131 
85! 
3140 
4.44 
-0.04 
4.40 
73 
2.7 
9.0 
108 
И 
5 
213 
40 
13 
345 
817 
47 
1168 
762 
3140 
4.94 
-0.09 
4.85 
76 
2.6 
10.0 
115 
9 
6 
241 
39 
12 
329 
825 
69 
1174 
737 
3140 
5.19 
-0.02 
5.16 
73 
2.5 
10.9 
118 
8 
7 
256 
33 
10 
314 
834 
100 
1179 
713 
3140 
285 
812 
112 
1217 
710 
3140 
5.45 5.42 
0.05 -0.01 
5.50 5.41 
69 68 
2.4 
12.0 
122 
9 
9 
271 
29 
2.2 
12.5 
123 
10 
11 
277 
21 
259 
791 
124 
1257 
706 
3140 
5.39 
-0.06 
5.33 
66 
2.0 
13.1 
123 
12 
13 
284 
14 
9 
227 
757 
137 
1304 
709 
3140 
5.58 
-0.10 
5.47 
65 
1.8 
13.9 
124 
13 
16 
300 
11 
192 
711 
149 
1360 
719 
3140 
6.00 
-0.13 
5.86 
62 
1.7 
15.0 
125 
14 
18 
329 
11 
10 
163 
668 
162 
1418 
729 
3140 
6.44 
-0.16 
6.28 
60 
1.7 
16.1 
125 
16 
20 
359 
10 
1! 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 413 
Scenario A l C - A I M 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 424 430 435 429 423 406 391 374 356 339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 1.5 2.8 5.3 8.1 12.3 15.5 19.4 23.8 28.5 34,1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy g j 
Non-commercial 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 7 10 14 18 18 19 17 14 12 11 10 
Liquids 19 9 8 8 8 10 12 13 14 15 17 18 
Gas 19 11 14 14 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 23 
Electncity 8 9 11 12 15 22 29 36 43 49 53 57 
Others 0 0 0 0 
Total 58 40 43 48 55 65 76 82 89 95 102 109 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 18 16 22 27 39 57 84 98 115 131 145 160 
Oil 22 12 10 8 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 
Gas 26 17 18 17 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 15 
Nuclear 1 1 2 3 5 7 9 10 10 10 11 11 
Biomass 2 4 0 0 1 3 5 7 8 10 10 11 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 2 2 4 10 15 24 32 36 40 
Total 70 52 54 57 68 90 125 146 173 198 216 237 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.2 3.0 4.1 5.3 6.7 8.3 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.5 34.2 47.8 64.4 85.6 110.8 139.2 171.2 207.3 248.2 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 279 284 297 299 305 293 282 267 253 233 210 189 
Grasslands 346 357 401 468 556 571 586 585 584 571 548 525 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 6 11 22 25 29 38 55 80 
Forest 960 961 950 950 944 950 955 966 978 993 1010 1028 
Others 720 703 658 588 494 477 460 460 460 464 474 483 
Total 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.09 1.22 1.45 1.86 2.39 2.69 3.03 3.42 3,88 4.39 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0,04 -0.05 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.12 1.23 1.48 1.86 2.38 2.67 3.00 3.39 3,84 4.34 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 50 62 77 80 84 91 99 103 105 106 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0,5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 14.7 15.6 16.1 12.7 10.0 9.9 9.7 10.6 12,6 14.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 40 42 46 50 54 57 59 63 68 75 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 14 11 11 9 8 7 6 5 5 5 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
414 Statistical Table 
Scenario A l C - A I M 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
2798 3261 3556 3851 4147 4183 
1.5 2.7 5.8 12.3 26.3 40.8 
28 24 19 14 4 0 
15 23 40 62 90 103 
11 15 26 40 55 69 
2 3 6 9 18 25 
5 7 16 29 54 83 
0 0 
61 72 106 154 220 283 
30 44 85 144 234 275 
17 21 34 46 56 51 
4 6 11 13 23 31 
0 0 1 3 7 12 
28 24 19 16 11 17 
1 2 2 2 3 6 
80 98 151 224 334 393 
0.0 0.4 l.O 2.2 4.1 6.3 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.8 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 
1.5 19.3 47.3 92.2 158.9 243.0 
390 407 433 458 447 422 
521 524 547 595 644 650 
0 0 0 0 42 61 
527 490 451 416 404 415 
576 593 583 546 478 461 
2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 
1.15 1.78 3.15 4.99 7.65 8.78 
0.37 0.26 0.40 0.46 0.24 0.15 
1.53 2.03 3.55 5.45 7.89 8.93 
113 125 165 211 262 262 
2.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2 
17.7 25.3 47.2 72.2 80.0 39.4 
0 5 18 45 92 153 
3 5 8 15 23 30 
4 7 12 19 28 42 
235 270 389 509 599 663 
33 37 54 77 93 97 
7 9 13 19 25 26 
4220 4016 3822 3541 3194 2882 
63.1 85.8 116.7 148.3 176.1 209.1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
116 107 97 89 81 73 
84 102 119 135 148 161 
32 41 50 59 67 75 
113 167 220 264 298 333 
0 0 
345 416 487 546 594 642 
324 350 379 407 435 465 
47 40 33 28 22 18 
42 54 . 68 81 91 101 
22 31 43 54 58 64 
27 34 43 50 52 55 
13 30 69 120 159 210 
475 538 636 740 818 913 
9.6 12.6 16.3 20.4 24.5 294 
2.4 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.0 
1.1 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.7 4.8 
338.5 443.9 556.7 677.4 806.0 942.4 
398 368 340 313 288 265 
656 645 633 622 611 600 
89 108 130 149 163 179 
427 446 466 482 493 505 
444 443 442 446 455 465 
2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 
10.08 10.83 11.62 12.41 13.17 13.97 
0.09 0,07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 
10.17 10.89 11.68 12.47 13,24 14.06 
261 220 184 162 149 137 
3.1 2.9 2.8 2.7 2,6 2.5 
19.2 19.7 20.2 21.1 22.4 23.8 
224 292 292 285 275 262 
35 39 43 46 48 46 
50 55 48 35 33 37 
734 777 822 881 956 1036 
102 104 105 98 84 71 
26 25 23 23 23 23 
Statistical Table 415 
Scenario A l C - A I M 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1865 2211 2557 2761 2980 3024 3067 3013 2866 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 5.3 10.2 19.5 31.9 52.0 69.3 92.4 116.6 139.4 166.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Eneigy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 18 19 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 2 6 14 25 35 45 43 41 38 35 32 
Liquids ¡ 7 21 35 52 75 101 127 145 163 179 191 204 
Gas 4 7 15 25 34 45 57 62 68 74 80 85 
Electricity 4 6 12 21 32 64 97 141 185 220 246 273 
Others 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 53 87 132 185 255 325 391 457 510 552 594 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 11 28 58 99 143 205 223 243 261 275 291 
Oil 27 33 55 75 95 107 120 107 95 82 69 57 
Gas 9 14 29 44 55 71 90 98 ¡ 0 7 115 124 132 
Nuclear 0 0 I 3 6 14 31 36 42 47 50 53 
Biomass 14 18 19 25 36 47 61 78 100 116 122 ¡ 2 8 
Other Renewables 2 2 3 5 8 16 31 55 98 142 164 191 
Total 57 78 135 209 300 397 538 598 686 762 803 852 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 O.I 0.3 0.7 1.5 2.6 4.5 6.3 8.7 11.4 13.9 1.7 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.3 3.2 4.4 5.3 6.4 7.4 8.1 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.5 4.5 5.7 6.8 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 43.7 85.6 140.1 204.0 282.9 374.9 473.7 579.5 691.3 809.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 357 391 427 449 437 410 384 356 330 305 280 257 
Grasslands 1636 1648 1778 2027 2217 2224 2231 2190 2149 2106 2060 2015 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 10 132 178 240 290 351 402 436 473 
Forest 1706 1604 1472 1311 1226 ¡ 2 3 9 1253 1266 1279 1292 1303 1314 
Others 1784 1840 ¡ 8 0 6 ¡ 6 8 7 1471 ¡ 4 2 3 1376 1371 1366 1376 1400 1425 
Total 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 2.20 3.69 5.24 6.82 8.87 9.53 10.24 10.89 11.44 12.03 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 1.15 1.36 0.61 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 3.34 5.05 5.85 6.93 8.86 9.53 10.25 10.90 11.47 12.06 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 108 132 148 151 154 139 125 112 99 88 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 22.7 34.4 47.2 67.1 94.8 58.4 36.1 27.7 26.6 25.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 486 556 516 537 560 599 641 693 757 827 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 73 92 111 114 117 115 113 106 93 82 
NOx M t N 7 8 11 16 19 21 24 24 24 25 26 27 
416 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIC-MESSAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 20.9 26.8 36.8 57.0 91.3 135.4 187.1 254.1 322.9 393.2 469.6 550.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 25.7 33.4 45.7 67.2 98.7 139.0 186.4 246.8 313.2 382.0 456.6 535.0 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 38 27 19 16 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 42 56 72 82 89 79 72 68 60 55 44 26 
Liquids 111 126 158 200 265 353 461 569 641 672 704 685 
Gas 41 47 61 76 95 106 110 118 116 119 104 93 
Electricity 35 46 62 93 145 209 292 395 493 588 668 726 
Others 8 U 20 34 53 70 89 118 143 164 187 213 
Total 275 313 393 501 656 824 1031 1268 1453 1.599 1706 1743 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 91 112 146 194 261 353 463 601 750 872 985 1062 
Oi l 128 155 172 190 210 209 209 202 170 112 78 56 
Gas 71 80 107 149 207 247 283 297 254 207 144 118 
Nuclear 7 8 11 21 41 79 127 191 265 348 415 432 
Biomass 46 44 52 68 95 133 178 228 287 330 359 376 
Other Renewables 8 13 23 37 57 82 117 166 205 234 258 281 
Total 352 411 511 659 870 1102 1377 1685 1931 2103 2239 2325 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.0 2.1 3.5 5.5 8.1 11.6 16.2 22.3 29.8 38.5 48.4 
Oi l 0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.6 8.7 10.8 12.9 14.9 1 6 . 6 17.7 18.5 
Gas 0.0 0.7 1.5 2.6 4.1 6.2 8.6 11.5 14.4 17.0 19.0 20.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 170.5 274.9 401.9 558.5 747.4 972.8 1231.9 1513.7 1812.7 2127.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Million ha Land Use ^ 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Etiergy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1459 1466 1462 1457 1454 1448 1442 1436 1429 1424 1422 1420 
3389 3404 3429 3446 3458 3478 3498 3525 3552 3568 3572 3576 
0 0 0 74 158 288 418 492 566 581 538 495 
4296 4237 4173 4164 4164 4177 4190 4194 4199 4202 4203 4204 
3805 3842 3886 3807 3715 -3558 3400 3301 3203 3173 3213 3253 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.61 10.97 
Other C 0 2 ' GtC 1.11 1.07 1.04 0.26 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.65 11.23 
C H 4 total ^  MtCH4 310 323 365 427 
N 2 0 total = M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.1 6.1 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 77.3 102.4 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 
SF6 MtC eq. 38 40 43 48 
C O M t C O 879 877 1005 1165 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 166 194 
N O x M t N 31 32 39 48 
14.04 
0.12 
14.17 
505 
6.2 
121.0 
369 
61 
66 
1415 
221 
62 
17.11 
0.05 
17.16 
552 
6.3 
126.0 
482 
77 
99 
1805 
259 
77 
20.64 
-0.02 
20.62 
606 
6.3 
120.2 
566 
89 
119 
2277 
310 
94 
24.50 
-0.03 
24.47 
628 
6.3 
106.2 
654 
97 
127 
2758 
359 
111 
27.37 
-0.03 
27.33 
639 
6.2 
97.9 
659 
106 
113 
3217 
393 
124 
29.05 
-0.03 
29.03 
652 
6.2 
79.6 
654 
114 
88 
3547 
408 
134 
.30.79 
-0.01 
30.78 
662 
6.2 
67.0 
639 
119 
84 
3772 
405 
142 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A I marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
32.07 
0.00 
32.07 
672 
6.2 
49.8 
614 
115 
95 
3766 
373 
151 
Statistical Table 417 
Scenario AIC-MESSAGE 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ' Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 ¡ 0 8 9 1098 ¡ 1 0 8 ¡ ¡ ¡ 0 
16.4 20.6 25.6 31.6 38.7 46.8 55.7 65.7 77.2 90.8 106.6 ¡ 2 4 . 3 
14.1 17.8 22.1 27.4 33.7 40.8 48.6 57.4 67.6 79.7 93.6 109.4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 U 7 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 70 74 74 75 80 87 93 100 98 102 102 
09 28 34 35 39 37 34 29 30 27 21 15 
99 29 36 44 53 61 75 90 ¡ 0 6 ¡ 2 4 141 ¡ 5 8 
1 1 4 8 11 18 24 30 34 37 42 47 
124 1-38 155 164 181 197 220 242 269 285 306 322 
38 46 57 69 80 91 97 102 ¡ 2 5 ¡ 4 4 183 223 
72 83 81 72 60 46 39 34 29 20 15 12 
33 41 50 60 70 69 75 75 83 75 59 37 
6 7 8 10 13 27 41 56 59 64 65 60 
6 7 6 7 10 14 20 25 28 33 39 44 
4 5 9 12 15 19 26 37 44 48 54 58 
159 188 211 228 249 267 299 329 368 383 414 435 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.1 2.9 3.8 4.9 6.2 7.8 9.6 11.9 
0.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.1 3,7 4,2 4.6 4.9 5.2 5,4 5.6 
0.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.9 2,6 3.3 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.4 7.0 
2.8 33.0 67.0 104.2 143.6 184,0 225,0 267.9 315.8 368.8 427,3 493.4 
381 380 377 376 375 372 368 364 359 3.56 356 
847 
Я 1 
760 763 771 774 776 787 797 818 839 849 
0 0 0 11 24 44 63 74 86 88 
1050 ¡ 0 5 3 1052 1053 1056 1062 1068 1061 1054 1050 
0 I 
1049 
695 
3029 
838 833 828 814 798 765 733 712 691 685 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 >  G t C 2.83 3.20 3.57 3.82 
Other C 0 2 " GtC 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3 . 6 ¡ 3.83 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 73 74 74 76 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 
SOx total MtS 22.7 ¡ 7 . 0 ¡ 4 . 9 22.7 
H F C M t C eq. ¡ 9 58 ¡ ¡ 0 108 
P F C M t C eq. ¡8 13 13 1 ¡ 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 
C O M t C O ¡ 7 9 161 173 ¡ 6 7 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 38 36 
NOx M t N ¡ 3 ¡ 2 14 ¡ 5 
4.05 
0.00 
4.05 
80 
2.4 
25.3 
¡ ¡ 5 
9 
б 
¡ 6 2 
33 
¡ 5 
4.04 
-0.02 
4.02 
85 
2,4 
20,2 
¡ ¡ 8 
8 
7 
¡ 8 8 
34 
15 
4.22 
-0.04 
4.18 
92 
2.4 
¡ 4 . 0 
¡ 2 2 
9 
9 
220 
35 
¡ 6 
4.41 
0.00 
4.41 
101 
2.4 
7.0 
123 
10 
11 
241 
38 
16 
5,¡O 
0.05 
5 . ¡ 5 
¡ ¡ 4 
2.4 
8.2 
123 
¡ 2 
13 
266 
44 
20 
5.39 
0.06 
5.45 
126 
2.4 
2,1 
124 
13 
16 
267 
43 
22 
6,23 
0,04 
6.27 
147 
2.4 
3,9 
125 
14 
18 
2 7 ¡ 
39 
25 
Emissions correiated to Umd-use change and deforestation were calcu¡ated by using A I M A ¡ marker land-use data 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c; C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related CH4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l markei run. 
355 
846 
75 
1048 
705 
3029 
6.94 
0.01 
6.95 
164 
2.4 
5.6 
¡ 2 5 
¡ 6 
20 
28 ¡ 
35 
28 
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Scenario AlC-MESSAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Eneigy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
E J 
E J 
413 
1.1 
2.6 
419 
0.8 
2.2 
427 
1.0 
2.5 
433 435 
2.1 
3.7 
5.4 
6.0 
433 
9.4 
9.4 
423 
12.6 
12.6 
409 
16.2 
16.2 
392 
20.0 
20.0 
374 
24.4 
24.4 
357 
29.2 
29.2 
339 
34.4 
34.4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 ¡ 0 11 15 19 23 25 25 27 32 34 32 
14 10 12 16 19 19 18 20 16 10 4 4 
6 5 6 8 14 19 23 27 32 37 42 45 
7 6 6 8 U 11 13 15 16 15 18 18 
98 
50 36 38 48 65 73 80 87 91 95 98 
19 13 13 15 21 26 31 37 49 70 i 04 ¡ 4 6 
20 14 13 15 17 19 19 12 9 6 5 4 
27 21 22 30 41 45 47 62' 61 48 19 12 
8 
1 1 1 1 1 2 5 6 7 7 8 
2 1 1 1 3 4 6 7 10 14 15 19 
1 1 2 3 5 6 8 10 13 15 17 19 
70 51 51 65 87 101 115 134 149 161 168 208 
ZJ 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.6 3.6 4.9 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.3 
GtC 1.3 12.3 22.3 33.3 46.3 61.8 78.8 98.0 120.6 146.8 177.1 215.4 
GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 268 266 265 265 265 264 263 262 262 261 260 260 
Grasslands 341 361 364 366 367 368 370 371 371 372 373 374 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 6 11 16 19 22 23 21 20 
Forest 966 950 918 904 894 899 905 909 912 916 922 927 
Others 701 698 728 738 745 733 722 715 709 703 700 696 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.90 1,12 1.48 1.70 1.90 2.21 2.52 2,88 3.33 4.44 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.08 1.13 1.47 1.63 1.75 2.10 2.43 2.81 3.27 4.38 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 47 39 43 51 61 61 62 70 74 81 93 121 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 11.3 12.8 14.0 14.3 14.4 12.9 16.9 22.5 20.8 12.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
PFC M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 45 59 82 108 129 150 144 136 134 143 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 19 25 31 36 43 45 44 37 32 
N O x M t N 5 3 3 4 6 8 9 10 II 12 12 13 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker nin. 
b;C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industiial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker nm. 
e: Non-energy related N20 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
Statistical Table 419 
Scenario A I C - M E S S A G E 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Populanon Million 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P (mex) Tnlhon US$ 1.5 2.7 5.8 13.5 27.2 44.9 65 3 95.8 126 9 155.5 186 5 218 2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 pnces) 53 8.3 13.5 22 8 36 2 52.2 70.0 96.8 126.9 155.5 186 5 218.2 
Final Eneigy E J 
Non-commeicial 24 16 12 8 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 36 53 69 75 62 48 42 39 34 29 19 
Liquids 13 23 39 59 93 143 199 259 281 292 295 262 
Gas 2 3 6 10 12 18 26 31 34 34 29 23 
Electncity 4 7 13 25 47 74 104 145 187 223 249 262 
Others 1 3 6 11 18 23 28 37 47 58 67 85 
Total 62 88 128 182 249 323 407 513 588 641 668 651 
Pnmary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 48 68 98 135 191 250 315 377 408 425 386 
Oil 15 26 40 54 72 81 80 86 62 40 25 17 
Gas 3 5 12 20 30 37 41 40 30 21 15 15 
Nuclear 0 1 3 8 20 34 54 83 125 159 175 174 
Biomass 24 22 27 34 44 58 77 97 116 1.34 143 142 
Other Renewables I 3 6 10 18 27 37 54 69 80 89 101 
Total 74 105 156 226 319 427 538 676 778 842 871 834 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0 0 0 3 0.8 1 5 2 5 3 8 5 7 8.2 11.3 15 3 197 24 1 
Oil 0 0 0.2 05 08 1.4 2.1 2.9 3 7 4.6 5 2 5.6 58 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0 1 0.2 0 4 0.7 1 1 1.5 1 9 2.2 2.4 2 6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1 5 19.3 44.3 78.6 125 2 188 5 269.1 367 5 481 4 604 1 729 9 849 7 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Mdlion ha 
Ciopland 438 435 434 433 432 431 431 430 429 428 428 428 
Grasslands 608 606 609 611 613 615 617 618 619 621 622 624 
Eneigy Biomass 0 0 0 17 37 68 99 117 134 138 127 117 
Forest 535 522 512 524 535 535 535 544 552 556 555 555 
Others 583 601 609 579 547 515 483 456 429 421 431 441 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1 15 1 78 2 74 4.03 5.54 7 28 8 87 10.80 12 13 12.59 12.70 11 28 
Other C 0 2 = GtC 0.37 0 26 0 22 -0 13 -0 12 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0 09 -0 10 -0 04 0 01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1 53 2 03 2.96 3.90 5 42 7 23 8.90 10.76 12.03 12.50 12.66 11 30 
CH4 total ^^  MtCH4 113 125 152 186 231 252 275 274 283 278 277 260 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 23 26 2.4 2.4 2.5 26 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 5 
SOx total MtS 17 7 25 3 33.9 47 1 60 9 69 5 66.1 60 7 49.5 33.7 22 4 14.9 
H F C M t C eq 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
P F C M t C e q 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 348 463 621 855 1131 1414 1647 1821 1930 1778 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 49 66 80 101 128 157 180 193 197 168 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 17 24 32 40 48 52 56 60 58 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by usmg A I M A l m,u:ker land-use data, 
a' Land-use taken from A I M - A 1 marker run. 
b-C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
с C 0 2 emissions fiom land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker tun) 
d Non-energy lelated C H 4 emissions were taken fiom A I M - A l marker run. 
e Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken trora A I M - A I marker run. 
420 Statistical Table 
Scenario AlC-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 19 2 7 4 4 98 20 0 34 3 53 5 76 5 98 7 122 5 147 2 173 1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 38 5 1 7 5 13 3 22 8 36 7 55 3 76 5 98 7 122 5 147 2 173 1 
Final Energy EJ 
Non commercial 14 10 7 8 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 5 9 7 11 16 24 26 21 20 15 7 
Liquids 17 23 34 53 78 107 150 193 233 251 274 289 
Gas 4 6 10 15 24 31 32 38 37 48 50 51 
Electnctty 3 5 8 16 31 56 90 133 168 204 236 262 
Othei s 0 2 4 8 12 18 26 36 47 55 60 64 
Total 39 51 72 106 161 231 325 426 505 578 634 672 
Pnmai y Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Otliei Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
0 Ü 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ' Mi î i ion ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
5 5 7 12 24 46 86 147 199 249 273 307 
21 31 39 50 60 63 71 70 71 47 34 23 
8 
0 
13 23 39 66 97 120 121 81 63 52 55 
0 0 2 7 15 27 46 73 118 166 191 
14 14 18 26 38 56 75 99 133 150 162 171 
2 4 7 12 19 30 46 65 79 92 99 102 
49 67 94 Î41 214 307 425 547 636 718 786 849 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 03 0 5 1 0 1 7 28 4 1 56 74 
0 0 03 0 6 10 1 5 2 I 2 7 34 4 1 48 5 3 56 
0 0 0 1 02 05 08 1 5 25 36 4 8 56 6 1 66 
1 4 17 8 37 0 58 8 86 7 124 2 174 5 239 4 314 1 394 1 478 4 568 6 
371 385 384 383 382 381 381 380 379 379 378 378 
1680 1673 1685 1695 1702 1708 1714 1718 1722 1726 1730 1733 
0 0 0 42 90 165 240 282 324 333 308 284 
1745 1711 1690 1683 1680 1681 1682 1681 1680 1678 1676 1674 
1684 1710 1720 1676 1625 1544 1463 1419 1374 1364 1387 1411 
5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 0 72 1 01 1 40 2 01 
Othei C 0 2 ^  GtC 0 73 0 82 0 60 0 36 
Total C 0 2 G t C 145 I 83 2 00 2 37 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 97 114 
N 2 0 total = M t N 2 Û - N 1 2 1 3 0 7 0 7 
SOx total MtS 10 5 12 8 14 1 167 
H F C M t C eq 0 2 15 39 
P F C M t C eq 4 4 5 9 
SF6 M t C eq 3 5 10 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 438 476 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 65 73 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 12 
2 97 
0 25 
3 22 
134 
0 7 
17 9 
81 
14 
19 
550 
83 
16 
4 09 
0 19 
4 28 
155 
0 7 
19 1 
139 
19 
32 
654 
94 
22 
5 65 
0 14 
5 78 
178 
0 7 
22 7 
184 
23 
40 
798 
111 
29 
7 09 
0 12 
7 20 
184 
0 7 
22 6 
205 
26 
42 
953 
120 
37 
7 62 
0 10 
7 72 
169 
0 7 
20 2 
210 
28 
37 
1160 
124 
41 
8 20 
0 08 
8 28 
167 
0 7 
182 
210 
30 
23 
1323 
128 
44 
8 53 
0 06 
8 59 
145 
0 7 
16 8 
206 
31 
24 
1437 
132 
46 
Emissions conelated to land use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data 
a Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run 
b C 0 2 emissions fiom fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data) 
с C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A J M - A l marker run) 
d Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A I marker run 
e Non energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker run 
9 42 
0 03 
945 
126 
07 
139 
196 
30 
26 
1564 
138 
52 
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Scenario A l C - M i n i C A M 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 G t C 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
20.7 27.4 38.1 52.7 79.7 116.4 162.8 224.0 290.2 361.5 437.8 521.8 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 57 73 94 118 140 162 129 105 89 80 72 
121 126 137 157 170 205 260 301 338 370 388 405 
52 63 77 96 92 85 76 76 77 80 68 57 
35 54 86 134 209 299 402 509 608 698 763 829 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 298 374 480 589 729 899 1015 1127 1236 1300 1363 
88 116 152 199 3.53 543 769 805 821 818 888 958 
131 135 146 163 125 94 68 75 83 93 63 34 
70 85 125 190 216 231 238 251 263 274 215 157 
24 25 34 49 82 110 133 154 175 196 204 212 
0 6 12 19 35 54 78 123 159 186 209 232 
24 24 27 32 44 66 99 160 220 281 338 395 
336 391 496 653 854 1098 1384 1567 1721 1847 1918 1988 
0.1 1.2 2.6 4.2 7.5 12.1 18.2 26.2 34.3 42.5 51.2 60.0 
0.1 1.5 2.9 4.4 5.7 6.8 7.7 8.4 9.2 10.1 10.8 11.5 
0.1 0.9 2.0 3.5 5.6 7.8 10.1 12.6 15.2 17.8 20.1 22.4 
7.1 82.4 170.6 281.6 425.0 608.1 837.3 1095.5 1360.0 1625.5 1888.2 2148.1 
1472 1466 1473 1494 1477 1432 1359 1194 1038 891 776 661 
3209 3348 3601 3968 4357 4657 4869 4662 4402 4090 3855 3619 
0 4 10 20 58 115 190 340 445 505 575 646 
4173 4214 4140 3951 3623 3348 3126 3385 3693 4049 4192 4336 
4310 4132 3939 3732 3650 3613 3620 3583 3586 3630 3767 3903 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 ¡ 3 1 6 4 13164 13 ¡ 6 4 13164 ¡ 3 1 6 4 13164 13164 
5.99 6.90 8.58 10.99 14.54 19.10 24.45 25.66 26.42 26.72 27.13 27.70 
1.11 1.07 1,08 1.55 1.60 1.38 0.92 0.61 0,22 -0.27 -1.04 -1.81 
7.10 7.97 9.66 12.54 16.14 20.48 25.37 26.27 26.64 26.46 26.09 25.89 
310 323 359 414 482 563 636 651 663 672 682 693 
6.7 7.0 8.0 9.3 10.9 12.7 14.4 14.8 15.1 15.3 15.8 16.2 
70.9 69.0 81.1 87.8 97.5 92.3 72.1 48.1 33.7 28.9 27.9 26.9 
1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
422 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario AlC-Min iCAM 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 1112 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 16.3 20.5 25.5 31.5 34.3 44.4 53,1 62,6 73.3 85.3 100.4 116.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 12 14 14 15 17 19 16 13 12 12 12 
Liquids 72 73 74 74 69 62 68 70 74 78 82 86 
Gas 27 36 45 54 50 40 33 31 31 32 28 24 
Electricity 22 28 37 48 54 71 85 95 106 118 130 141 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 130 150 170 189 187 190 205 212 224 239 251 263 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 40 47 49 47 59 98 130 163 203 248 344 441 
Oil 76 78 77 75 61 25 11 5 3 2 2 1 
Gas 34 47 67 94 92 83 76 7 3 ' 72 72 51 31 
Nuclear 20 16 14 16 17 19 19 21 23 27 30 32 
Biomass 0 2 4 5 6 10 14 20 26 30 35 40 
Other Renewables 12 11 10 10 11 13 16 23 31 39 50 61 
Total 182 200 222 247 244 249 266 306 357 417 512 607 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 3,0 4,1 5,6 7.5 9.6 12.9 16.1 
Oi l 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.4 2.6 3.3 3,5 .3,5 3.6 3.6 .3.6 3.6 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.8 2.3 3,6 4,4 5.1 5.8 6.6 7.1 7.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 67.4 106.3 147.8 191,6 239,7 292.3 348.9 410.3 480.1 562.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 408 410 412 414 408 383 
Grasslands 796 820 866 934 967 1050 
Energy Biomass 0 4 7 10 16 37 
Forest 921 931 921 894 869 806 
Others 998 959 917 872 863 847 
Total 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
jogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.55 3.86 3.93 4.39 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.18 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.69 4.11 4.18 4.57 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 84 97 104 126 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.7 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 14.0 4.8 4.0 3.9 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
357 
1084 
53 
779 
850 
3123 
4.99 
0.08 
5.07 
145 
4.0 
4.2 
122 
9 
9 
310 
1043 
83 
845 
842 
3123 
5.39 
0.05 
5.44 
159 
4.0 
4.1 
123 
10 
11 
269 
996 
105 
910 
843 
3123 
5.93 
-0.04 
5.88 
178 
4.1 
4.3 
123 
12 
13 
233 
945 
119 
972 
854 
3123 
6.60 
-0.20 
6.39 
201 
4.1 
4.8 
124 
13 
16 
203 
901 
138 
995 
885 
3123 
7.88 
-0.31 
7.57 
236 
4.2 
5.3 
125 
14 
18 
174 
857 
157 
1018 
917 
3123 
9.29 
-0.43 
8.86 
270 
4.3 
5.8 
125 
16 
20 
Statistical Table 423 
Scenario A l C - M i n i C A M 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 425 426 433 434 431 423 408 392 374 357 340 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TriUion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.4 2.1 3.5 5.0 6.9 9.9 13.4 17.4 21.4 25.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 9 9 10 11 11 9 7 6 5 5 
Liquids 18 12 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 18 18 
Gas 19 15 13 15 15 13 11 11 10 10 8 6 
Electricity 6 8 13 21 30 39 48 57 64 71 73 76 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 56 44 44 55 65 75 85 92 99 105 105 104 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 20 25 68 127 201 175 196 264 228 192 
Oi l 20 13 11 12 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 26 20 21 30 33 32 28 29 28 27 21 14 
Nuclear 3 4 6 10 14 16 17 18 19 20 19 19 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 5 7 10 16 20 23 25 27 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 6 8 11 17 23 29 33 38 
Total 70 58 63 84 129 190 267 254 286 362 326 290 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.2 3.7 5.5 7.5 9.7 12.0 14.4 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.7 33.1 50.1 75.8 111.6 151.1 190.0 234.3 279.1 316.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 294 304 316 320 315 303 263 224 186 162 138 
Grasslands 395 410 453 525 604 666 710 655 593 524 491 458 
Energy Biomass 0 0 2 5 16 29 44 70 86 91 97 102 
Forest 1007 1016 996 945 864 800 752 827 912 1005 1031 1057 
Others 691 657 622 586 573 567 569 562 563 571 597 622 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Anthropogenic Emissions (stimdardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1,30 0,91 0.94 1.23 1.97 2.91 4.05 3.67 3.93 4.84 4.20 3.60 
0.00 0,00 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.12 -0.26 
1,30 0,91 0.97 1.31 2.09 3.03 4.14 3.76 4.01 4.87 4.08 3..34 
47 39 49 69 94 123 154 141 149 178 160 143 
0,6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 
17,0 11.0 10.4 10.9 14.4 14.6 11.4 6.0 2,8 2.0 2.0 2.0 
0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
4 2 4 Statistical Table 
Scenario A l C - M i n i C A M 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
EJ 
E J 
ZJ 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil ¥uel C 0 2 G i C 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
1.4 3.1 6.5 11.7 23.7 40.0 60.5 85.0 110.3 136.4 162.6 191.2 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 31 46 64 81 97 110 86 68 56 49 42 
14 19 27 37 49 66 88 102 113 122 124 127 
2 5 9 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 13 11 
4 11 25 47 82 123 170 215 255 288 308 328 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 66 107 160 226 300 381 418 451 482 495 509 
26 45 73 111 177 252 336 362 313 191 193 195 
16 21 29 39 33 27 21 24 28 35 18 2 
3 9 21 40 55 67 78 82 ' 87 92 74 55 
1 4 9 17 32 47 62 70 78 84 85 86 
0 2 5 9 17 26 35 51 64 73 80 86 
3 4 5 6 11 22 37 64 90 115 136 1.57 
49 85 142 223 327 442 568 653 661 590 586 581 
0.0 0.4 1.1 1.9 3.6 5.8 8.5 12.1 15.3 18.0 20.0 21.9 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 
0.0 O.I 0.3 0.5 Î .0 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.9 5.7 6.5 
1.5 19.3 44.5 81.8 136.0 209.6 303.9 410.9 516.5 609.1 690.1 766.4 
Cropland 389 400 4 ¡ 0 420 418 409 392 346 303 263 229 195 
Grasslands 508 524 555 602 648 685 7 ¡ 4 704 687 662 632 603 
Energy Biomass 0 0 2 5 ¡8 32 49 79 99 109 126 ¡43 
Forest ¡ 1 6 8 ¡ ¡ 4 4 ¡ 1 0 2 ¡ 0 4 3 986 942 910 936 976 1032 1079 ¡ ¡ 2 7 
Others 664 632 600 568 555 550 553 547 548 556 579 60 ¡ 
Total 2729 2699 2669 2637 2625 2 6 ¡ 8 2618 2612 2613 2622 2645 2668 
i.15 1.78 2.80 4.20 6.06 8.09 10.29 ¡ 0 . 8 0 10.15 8.36 8.01 7.68 
0.37 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.20 0 . ¡ 2 0.04 -0.03 -0.15 -0.27 
¡.53 2.03 3.00 4.47 6.36 8.36 ¡ 0 . 4 9 ÍO.92 ¡ 0 . 1 9 8.33 7.87 7.41 
И З 125 ¡ 3 5 ¡ 4 8 ¡ 6 4 ¡ 8 3 206 217 197 145 147 149 
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 
17.7 25.3 38.8 52.8 57.3 50.9 33.6 2 ¡ . 4 14.0 11.3 ¡ 0 . 4 9.4 
0 5 ¡ 8 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 2 6 2 
3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
4 7 ¡ 2 i9 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
Statistical Table 425 
Scenario A l C - M i n i C A M 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MiUion 1236 1541 1876 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 15.4 27.0 42.3 66.5 93.2 122.4 153.4 188,0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 2 3 5 7 11 16 21 18 16 15 14 13 
Liquids 17 22 28 36 46 64 90 113 134 153 164 175 
Gas 5 7 10 14 17 19 18 19 20 22 19 16 
Electricity 3 6 11 18 38 65 99 141 182 221 252 283 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 38 54 75 113 164 228 293 353 410 449 487 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 4 6 10 15 37 66 102 105 109 116 123 129 
Oi l 20 23 29 37 41 41 37 46 52 57 43 30 
Gas 7 10 16 26 39 49 57 67 76 84 70 56 
Nuclear 0 2 5 7 17 26 35 45 55 65 70 76 
Biomass 0 1 1 3 6 11 19 35 49 60 70 79 
Other Renewables 5 6 8 11 16 23 34 55 76 98 119 
494 
140 
Total 35 48 69 99 156 218 284 353 418 479 510 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.9 3.0 4.0 5.1 6.4 7.6 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.4 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.4 3.1 3,9 4.6 5.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.0 60.3 91.1 131.2 182.1 241.2 304.7 371.8 439.0 503.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 391 363 348 344 337 324 307 275 243 209 182 154 
Grasslands 1510 1594 1727 1907 2105 2256 2361 2260 2126 1960 1830 1701 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 2 16 44 108 155 185 215 244 
Forest 3641 3591 3480 3307 3114 2957 2834 2900 3020 3192 3321 3450 
Others 1957 1883 1800 1707 1668 1649 1649 1631 1631 1649 1706 1762 
Total 7499 7432 7354 7265 7226 7202 7195 7175 7175 7195 7254 7312 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
0.72 1.01 1.29 1.70 2.57 3.71 5.11 5.80 6.40 6.92 7.03 7.14 
0.73 0.82 0.72 0.95 0.93 0.80 0.55 0.35 0.15 -0,06 -0.46 -0.86 
1.45 1.83 2.01 2.65 3.51 4.51 5.67 6.15 6.55 6.87 6.57 6.28 
77 85 90 101 121 131 132 134 139 147 139 130 
1.2 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.3 4,6 4.7 5.0 5.2 
10.5 12.8 14.9 16.2 18.8 19.9 19.8 13.6 9.6 7.9 7.2 6.6 
0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
426 Statistical Table 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6117 6805 7493 8182 8439 8704 8538 8375 8030 7528 7056 
20.9 26.6 37.9 56.6 89.7 128.2 183.4 237.8 308.4 382.3 453.3 537.3 
50 48 37 35 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 34 47 65 83 88 93 83 74 66 57 48 
111 124 159 206 273 342 412 477 543 589 616 643 
51 60 86 115 150 204 258 303 348 379 396 413 
38 50 71 98 142 220 299 381 464 523 560 596 
0 0 0 0 
285 315 400 519 674 868 1061 1245 1429 1556 1628 1700 
Scenario AIG-AIM 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
93 101 140 179 218 212 
143 167 22 Í 290 385 472 
73 99 146 206 285 397 
6 10 15 26 45 69 
50 48 38 34 35 50 
10 11 13 16 24 37 
376 435 573 752 993 1237 
0.1 1.0 2.3 3.8 5.8 7.7 
0.1 1.7 3.6 6.2 9.6 13.5 
0.1 0.9 2.2 3.9 6.4 9.6 
7.1 82.4 177.9 307.7 472.1 669.4 
1437 1487 1546 1580 1554 1469 
3290 3287 3474 3874 4315 4328 
0 0 0 2 68 1.54 
4249 4120 3979 3816 3767 3812 
3966 4048 3944 3671 3238 3120 
12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 
5.99 6.90 9.67 13.09 17.49 21.11 
!.!( 1.07 1.45 1.78 0.52 0.33 
7.10 7.97 11.11 14.87 18.01 21.44 
310 323 393 470 541 525 
6.7 7.0 7.4 7.9 7.8 7.6 
70.9 69.0 87.4 100.9 91.4 69.3 
1672 883 791 337 369 482 
32 25 31 43 61 77 
38 40 43 48 66 99 
879 877 1226 1552 1747 2008 
139 141 181 230 269 273 
31 32 40 49 52 50 
206 193 180 168 155 144 
582 600 620 640 659 679 
560 659. 778 866 910 956 
117 140 168 192 208 226 
75 126 210 277 286 295 
61 95 150 200 225 253 
1601 1813 2106 2342 2442 2554 
10.1 11.8 13.7 15.6 17.1 18.8 
19.2 24.2 30.6 37.2 43.4 50.8 
14.8 20.2 27.6 36.0 44.4 54.9 
904.7 1168.2 1447.0 1739.1 2039.3 2344.5 
1389 1266 1154 1052 959 874 
4341 4184 4032 3914 3827 3741 
348 502 723 879 901 923 
3858 3952 4049 4140 4224 4310 
3006 2969 2933 2950 3021 3093 
12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 
25.58 27.11 28.77 29.88 30.33 30.80 
0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 
25.62 27.08 28.67 29.76 30.26 30.79 
511 449 396 353 319 289 
7.5 7.0 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.9 
64.4 47.0 35.7 30.7 28.9 27.4 
566 654 659 654 639 614 
89 97 106 114 119 115 
119 127 113 88 84 95 
2307 2546 2812 3086 3364 3666 
279 283 288 268 227 192 
49 47 45 43 41 40 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table 
4 2 7 
Scenario A I G - A I M 
OF:CD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Anthi'opogemc Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
859 919 960 1002 1043 1062 1081 1086 1091 1097 1103 1110 
16.4 20.4 25.2 31.1 38.3 45.7 54.7 64.7 76.7 90.1 105.2 122.8 
6 ] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 7 6 6 5 
64 75 79 85 91 97 104 107 111 П 5 120 125 
25 34 39 43 47 53 59 65 71 76 80 83 
22 28 32 36 42 49 57 67 77 86 96 105 
0 0 0 0 
127 147 159 173 189 209 229 248 266 284 301 318 
41 42 4 3 39 33 34 35 32 29 28 27 27 
76 92 98 106 112 121 131 127 124 125 130 136 
34 51 60 68 75 90 108 120 134 147 158 170 
5 7 10 14 19 20 20 23 26 30 34 38 
6 I 0 0 2 6 14 24 40 53 55 57 
Other Renewables 6 6 7 8 10 12 14 20 27 35 40 46 
Total 167 199 216 233 251 282 322 346 380 416 443 473 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.8 
Oil 0.1 0.9 i.9 2.9 4.0 5.0 6.4 7.5 8.8 10.1 11.4 12.8 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.4 3.2 4.2 5.2 6.5 8.0 9.4 11.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.5 100.6 139.4 182.6 232.5 286.1 340.0 394.3 449.3 505.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 410 404 389 373 350 336 321 286 255 227 202 180 
Grasslands 787 758 7,50 783 834 843 852 817 783 754 728 703 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 7 20 56 78 108 132 142 152 
Forest 1056 1065 1103 1133 1176 1183 1190 I23I 1274 1312 1344 1378 
Others 886 912 897 850 772 746 721 716 711 712 720 728 
Total 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.42 3.78 4.14 4.68 5.30 5.39 5.48 5.56 5.62 5.68 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.30 3.73 4.02 4.63 5.34 5.37 5.41 5.46 5.54 5.61 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 71 71 71 63 56 51 47 43 41 38 
1.8 N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 9.9 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.6 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 175 191 213 231 250 260 270 286 307 330 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 37 39 39 34 30 25 21 18 17 16 
NOx M t N 13 12 12 12 9 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 
428 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIG-AIM 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 424 430 435 429 423 406 391 374 3.56 339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 1.5 2.9 5.3 8.2 12.5 15.7 19.8 24.2 29.0 34.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 4 4 5 6 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 
Liquids 19 11 11 11 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 22 
Gas 19 14 20 23 27 37 46 49 52 53 53 53 
Electricity 8 9 11 13 16 20 25 27 29 30 30 30 
Others 0 0 0 0 
Total 58 43 47 53 61 77 92 97 102 105 106 106 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 12 14 14 14 14 15 13 11 9 8 7 
Oi l 22 16 17 16 18 20 23 22 22 22 23 24 
Gas 26 22 30 35 41 52 65 69 . 73 75 76 76 
Nuclear 1 1 2 4 5 7 9 10 10 10 11 11 
Biomass 2 4 0 0 1 1 3 6 9 12 13 13 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 7 9 11 12 13 
Total 71 57 64 71 80 98 121 126 135 141 142 144 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1 1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.6 4.4 5.1 5.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.3 33.4 45.4 59.2 75.5 92.9 109.5 125.5 141.3 157.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 279 284 296 298 298 287 276 260 245 225 202 181 
Grasslands 346 357 400 466 551 563 575 565 555 540 521 502 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 7 15 31 38 46 46 38 31 
Forest 960 961 951 952 951 957 963 984 1007 1034 1068 1103 
Others 720 703 658 588 497 478 460 455 4.50 456 471 487 
Total 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.06 1.14 1.26 1.50 1.79 1.74 1.69 1.67 1.67 1.68 
Other C 0 2 G t C 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0,06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.09 1.14 1.26 1.49 1.78 1.70 1.63 1.58 1.57 1.56 
C H 4 total M1CH4 47 39 60 66 68 59 51 49 47 44 42 39 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 12.2 10.8 7.5 4.3 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 42 45 50 55 61 64 67 71 76 80 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 13 13 14 15 15 16 16 16 16 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Statistical Table 429 
Scenario AIG-AIM 199O 2OOO 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antluopogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M1N20-N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M l C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2798 3261 3556 3851 4147 4183 
1.5 2.7 5.8 12.3 26.3 40.8 
28 23 19 15 4 0 
15 19 32 45 59 63 
11 15 30 49 77 100 
2 4 9 16 27 42 
5 7 15 27 46 76 
0 0 
61 68 105 153 213 283 
30 38 68 99 128 117 
17 24 45 74 114 144 
4 8 18 35 61 97 
0 1 2 5 13 23 
28 24 19 14 7 11 
1 2 2 3 5 10 
80 96 154 230 327 403 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.7 2.9 3.9 
0.0 0.2 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.3 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.7 
1.5 19.3 46.7 89.0 147.1 218.4 
390 407 433 457 459 429 
521 524 547 593 643 647 
0 0 0 2 21 41 
527 490 452 417 410 423 
576 593 583 545 482 463 
2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 
1.15 1.78 3.04 4.56 6.45 7.53 
0.37 0.26 0.40 0.45 0.17 0.11 
1.53 2.03 3.44 5.02 6.62 7.64 
113 125 156 200 248 246 
2.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.0 
17.7 25.3 42.2 54.5 45.9 20.0 
0 5 18 45 92 153 
3 5 8 15 23 30 
4 7 12 19 28 42 
235 270 487 676 836 977 
33 37 55 79 96 100 
7 9 13 17 20 20 
4220 4016 3822 3541 3194 2882 
63.4 86.3 117.5 149.4 177.4 210.6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 60 54 48 42 35 
124 155 187 210 224 238 
56 75 94 108 119 129 
106 143 180 208 227 246 
0 0 
352 433 514 574 611 648 
107 100 94 86 78 70 
182 199 217 233 245 257 
156 196 247 289 313 340 
43 54 66 78 86 95 
17 29 48 64 66 68 
20 34 56 78 90 103 
525 611 729 827 877 933 
5.2 6.1 7.1 8.1 8.9 9.7 
5.1 6.7 8.8 11.2 13.4 16.2 
3.1 4.7 7.0 9.7 12.6 16.2 
300.9 394.0 496.5 607.6 724.2 844.6 
401 363 327 302 284 268 
650 631 613 601 597 592 
81 116 166 198 200 201 
436 451 467 478 485 492 
445 438 431 434 448 462 
2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 
8.79 9.69 10.69 11.39 11.74 12.09 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 
8.86 9.76 10.75 11.47 11.85 12.23 
244 202 166 144 130 118 
3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 
8.5 8.0 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 
224 292 292 285 275 262 
35 39 43 46 48 46 
50 55 48 35 33 37 
1139 1251 1373 1502 1637 1783 
105 111 117 109 89 71 
19 18 17 15 14 13 
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Scenario AIG-AIM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1865 2211 2557 2761 2980 3024 3067 3013 2866 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 5.3 10.3 19.8 32.3 52.8 70.4 93.9 118.6 141.7 169.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 19 18 20 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids I 2 3 6 9 10 12 11 10 8 7 6 
Liquids 17 22 39 60 93 131 169 198 227 244 251 258 
Gas 4 9 18 33 49 73 96 114 132 142 145 147 
Electricity 4 6 12 21 39 75 111 144 178 199 208 216 
Others 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 57 90 140 211 299 388 467 546 594 611 628 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 8 16 27 44 47 50 48 46 44 42 40 
Oil 27 35 62 94 142 187 247 252 257 260 261 262 
Gas 9 18 38 68 108 158 231 273 323 356 363 371 
Nuclear 0 0 1 3 8 19 44 54 65 74 78 82 
Biomass 14 18 19 20 26 32 40 67 112 148 152 157 
Other Renewables 2 2 3 4 7 12 22 35 57 76 83 92 
Total 57 82 138 217 334 455 634 729 861 957 980 1004 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.5 1.7 
O i l 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.6 2.8 4.3 6.7 8.7 11.4 14.1 16.6 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 1 8 3.1 5.2 7.4 10.5 13.9 17.3 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 43.4 84.7 140.2 209.2 295.8 395.3 -501.0 611.7 724.5 837.9 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 357 391 427 451 446 417 390 357 327 298 271 246 
Grasslands 1636 1648 1776 2032 2287 2275 2264 2171 2081 2019 1981 1944 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 33 77 180 269 402 501 520 539 
Forest 1706 1604 1474 1313 1230 1249 1269 1285 1302 1315 1327 1338 
Others 1784 1840 1806 1687 1487 1433 1380 1361 1341 1348 1382 1416 
Total 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 
Antlu-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 2.15 3.61 5.64 7.40 9.70 10.29 10.92 11.26 11.30 11.35 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 1.14 1.37 0.47 0.28 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 3.29 4.98 6.11 7.68 9.65 10.25 10.89 11.25 11.31 11.39 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 106 134 155 157 160 148 136 122 107 93 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 20.3 25.7 28.7 35.7 44.2 28.0 17.8 13.7 12.8 12.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 522 640 649 745 857 971 1101 1227 1344 1472 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 75 99 121 125 130 132 134 125 106 89 
NOx M t N 7 8 12 17 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
4 3 1 
Scenario AIG-MESSAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 20.9 26.8 36.8 57.0 91.3 135.4 187.1 254.1 322.9 393.2 469.6 SSO П 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Tnllion (1990 prices) 25.7 33.4 45.7 67.2 98.7 139.0 186.4 246.8 313.2 382.0 456.6 
J J U . U 
535.0 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 38 25 20 16 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 42 57 67 75 84 88 74 47 39 25 5 3 
Liquids 111 125 157 190 241 292 374 453 491 525 525 510 
Gas 41 47 62 76 100 132 161 215 235 253 284 300 
Electricity 35 46 64 101 161 242 344 464 573 668 749 800 
Others 8 11 18 29 45 55 67 86 106 124 143 152 
Total 275 311 387 487 640 815 1024 1265 1444 1595 1705 1765 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 91 104 130 167 220 266 272 261 259 214 153 84 
Oil 128 155 172 194 235 279 365 451 479 506 461 391 
Gas 71 85 119 164 236 328 449 649 796 916 1089 1239 
Nuclear 7 8 11 17 30 54 90 128 169 225 282 332 
Biomass 46 44 54 76 107 145 193 243 311 381 409 414 
Other Renewables 8 13 23 38 61 91 125 165 203 237 264 277 
Total 352 ' 409 509 657 889 1163 1495 1898 2217 2479 2658 2737 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.9 2.0 3.3 4.9 7.1 9.8 12.5 15.1 17.7 19.9 21.4 
Oil 0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.7 9.0 11.8 15.4 20.0 24.7 29.8 34.4 
Gas 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.8 4.4 6.8 10.1 14.6 21.1 29.0 38.2 49.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 170.0 272.2 397.4 556.1 751.2 988.8 1264.4 1562.3 1870.7 2178.0 
Carbon Sequestiation GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 1459 1466 1462 1457 1454 1448 1442 1436 1429 1424 1422 1420 
Grasslands 3389 3404 3429 3446 3458 3478 3498 3525 3552 3568 3.572 3576 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 74 158 288 418 492 566 581 538 495 
Forest 4296 4237 4173 4164 4164 4177 4190 4194 4199 4202 4203 4204 
Others 3805 3842 3886 3807 3715 3558 3400 3301 3203 3173 3213 3253 
Total 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 5.99 6.90 8.49 10.66 14.00 17.56 21.45 26.11 29.08 30.58 31.14 30.31 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.04 0.26 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9..54 10.91 14.12 17.61 21.42 26.08 29.04 30.55 31.13 30.31 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 363 419 496 538 566 555 531 497 474 436 
N 2 0 total 0 M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 64.3 60.3 63.9 71.9 69.0 59.1 51.2 45.7 43. î 40.5 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 986 1123 1344 1616 2026 2399 2717 3033 3199 3261 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 160 178 200 237 297 370 416 459 474 484 
NOx M t N 31 32 38 46 59 72 89 108 118 124 129 133 
Emissions coirelated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
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Scenario AIG-MESSAGE I99O 2OOO 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.6 25.6 31.6 38.7 46.8 55.7 65.7 77.2 90.8 106.6 124.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 17.8 22.1 27.4 33.7 40.8 48.6 57.4 67.6 79.7 93.6 109.4 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 11 6 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 69 77 75 73 71 79 86 87 94 100 105 
Gas 22 28 33 34 38 41 38 33 30 25 22 18 
Electricity 22 28 35 45 58 73 89 106 124 139 153 165 
Others 1 1 3 5 8 10 12 16 23 27 31 32 
Total 124 138 153 162 178 195 218 241 264 284 305 321 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 38 38 45 52 57 55 40 26 20 19 17 15 
Oi l 72 84 83 75 67 64 76 80 82 91 99 99 
Gas 33 45 55 66 78 87 101 118 140 139 156 162 
Nuclear 6 7 8 10 15 26 41 53 59 68 68 74 
Biomass 6 7 7 13 19 24 29 32 36 40 43 47 
Other Renewables 4 5 9 12 16 22 28 35 44 49 54 57 
Total 159 186 206 227 252 278 315 345 381 406 437 453 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.4 
Oil 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.9 4.5 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.8 8.8 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.8 3.7 4.7 5.9 7.3 8.7 10.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.6 102.6 140.2 178.6 217.3 256.6 297.5 340.3 385.3 431.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 381 380 377 376 375 372 368 364 359 356 356 355 
Grasslands 760 763 771 774 776 787 797 818 839 849 847 846 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 11 24 44 63 74 86 88 81 75 
Forest 1050 1053 1052 1053 1056 1062 1068 1061 1054 1050 1049 1048 
Others 838 833 828 814 798 765 733 712 691 685 695 705 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 >  GtC 2.83 3.20 3.49 3.67 3.84 3.87 3.93 3.96 4.17 
Other C 0 2 ' GtC 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.05 
Total C 0 2 G t C 2.83 3.20 3.52 3.69 3.84 3.84 3.89 3.97 4.22 
CH4 total MtCH4 73 74 73 73 77 81 79 75 73 
N 2 0 total ' M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 8.9 1.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.5 2.1 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 U 9 8 9 10 12 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 
C O M t C O 179 161 172 176 173 184 205 214 217 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 37 35 30 29 31 33 36 
NOx M t N 13 12 13 14 14 14 13 13 14 
4.28 
0.06 
4.34 
66 
2.3 
3.4 
124 
13 
16 
228 
39 
15 
4.61 
0.04 
4.65 
62 
2.3 
4.9 
125 
14 
18 
236 
43 
17 
Emissions coirelated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from AIM-A1 marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l m a r k e r ran), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken froin A I M - A l marker ran. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
4.58 
0.01 
4.59 
56 
2.3 
5.8 
125 
16 
20 
234 
44 
18 
Statistical Table 433 
Scenario AIG-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
REF 
Population Mill ion 413 419 427 433 435 433 423 409 392 374 357 339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 1.0 2.1 5.4 9.4 12.6 16.2 20.0 24.4 29.2 34.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 2.6 2.2 2.5 3.7 6.0 9.4 12.6 16.2 20.0 24.4 29.2 34.4 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 4 3 3 3 ! 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 15 10 10 12 16 16 22 28 29 28 27 28 
Gas 14 10 12 16 19 20 16 12 9 8 7 5 
Electricity 6 5 6 9 15 21 27 33 38 42 46 49 
Others 7 6 6 8 12 14 13 14 15 16 16 16 
Total 50 35 38 47 64 71 79 86 90 94 97 97 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 19 13 10 14 20 23 22 25 23 21 21 20 
Oil 20 14 13 13 16 16 19 27 30 32 23 19 
Gas 27 21 25 29 36 38 40 45 49 60 71 92 
Nuclear 1 1 1 1 2 4 7 11 16 20 25 24 
Biomass 2 1 1 3 6 10 14 17 28 32 33 33 
Other Renewables 1 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 19 21 23 
Tota! 70 51 51 63 85 98 112 138 162 183 193 211 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 
1.3 12.3 22.0 32.3 44.2 57.9 
1.0 1.2 1.4 !.7 1.9 2.1 
0.9 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 
1.8 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.7 4.4 
71.8 87.4 105.3 124.5 144.4 165.2 
Land Use ' Million ha 
Cropland 268 266 265 265 265 264 263 262 262 261 260 
Grasslands 341 361 364 366 367 368 370 .371 371 372 373 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 6 11 16 19 22 23 21 
Forest 966 950 918 904 894 899 905 909 912 916 922 
Others 701 698 728 738 745 733 722 715 709 703 700 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
pogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ь GtC 1.30 0.91 0.85 1.02 1.35 1.46 1.54 1.86 1.94 2.06 2.05 
Other C 0 2 •= GtC 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.30 0.91 1.03 1.03 1.34 1.39 1.39 1.74 1.85 1.99 1.98 
C H 4 total * MtCH4 47 39 42 50 59 59 53 52 51 51 51 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.2 4.8 3.9 4.5 4.1 4.2 3.3 3.3 3,1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 
C O M t C O 69 41 46 52 82 97 no 115 118 110 99 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 16 20 26 32 38 55 78 96 93 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 4 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial proces.ses ( M E S S A G E data), 
t; C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
260 
374 
20 
927 
696 
2276 
2.24 
-0.05 
2.19 
50 
0.6 
3.3 
31 
24 
11 
81 
99 
5 
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Scenario AIG-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 5.8 13.5 27.2 44.9 65.3 95.8 126.9 155.5 186.5 218.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 8.3 13.5 22.8 36.2 52.2 70.0 96.8 126.9 155.5 186.5 218.2 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 15 П 8 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 37 52 63 71 74 56 37 28 17 3 2 
Liquids 13 22 37 55 83 ¡ 1 6 162 ¡ 8 8 201 213 211 198 
Gas 2 3 6 10 17 29 43 87 105 111 117 119 
Electricity 4 7 14 27 48 79 118 167 212 253 285 298 
Others 1 2 6 10 16 17 22 31 38 43 52 59 
Total 62 87 125 174 239 318 404 510 585 638 668 676 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 48 67 90 124 ¡ 6 5 176 163 145 116 79 42 
Oi l 15 26 38 55 79 108 152 170 169 172 139 103 
Gas 3 5 15 29 49 77 116 212' 287 332 381 429 
Nuclear 0 1 2 4 8 14 23 36 56 87 121 143 
Biomass 24 22 28 37 47 59 80 109 127 142 151 153 
Other Renewables 1 3 5 12 21 30 42 56 69 81 91 96 
Total 74 105 ¡ 5 6 226 327 453 588 746 853 929 962 965 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.5 2.4 3.6 5.3 7.0 8.6 10.0 11.2 12.1 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.3 4.8 6.5 8.2 9.9 ¡1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.9 5.0 7.9 11.2 15.1 
Cumttlative C 0 2 hmissions G t C ).5 ¡ 9 3 44.3 78.0 124.8 191.0 277.7 381.2 496.0 615.6 7.33.8 845.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use » Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 434 433 432 431 431 430 429 428 428 428 
Grasslands 608 606 609 611 613 615 617 618 619 621 622 624 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 17 37 68 99 117 134 138 127 117 
Forest 535 522 512 524 535 535 535 544 552 556 555 555 
Others 583 601 609 579 547 515 483 456 429 421 431 441 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2 ¡ 6 4 2164 2164 2164 2 ¡ 6 4 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 " GtC 1.15 1.78 2.73 3.94 5.65 7.77 9.58 11.13 11.96 12.16 11.61 10.70 
Other C 0 2 = GfC 0.37 0.26 0.22 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.95 3.81 5.54 7.72 9,60 11.09 11.87 12.07 11.57 10.71 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 151 182 226 242 254 238 216 198 183 162 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 31.2 36.0 40.5 47.4 42.2 31.7 24.2 19.7 17.1 15.¡ 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 ¡ 5 3 224 292 292 285 275 262 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 345 425 5.54 701 928 1103 1227 1318 1390 1372 
N M V O C Ml 33 37 46 54 63 77 ¡ 0 7 130 144 155 155 150 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 16 23 31 40 49 53 55 54 54 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industriai processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker ran). 
&. Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
Statistical Table 
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Scenario AIG-MESSAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 4.4 9.8 20.0 34.3 53.5 76.5 98.7 122.5 147.2 173.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Tiillion (1990 prices) 3.8 5.1 7.5 13,3 22.8 36.7 55.3 76.5 98.7 122.5 147.2 173.1 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 10 9 8 5 4 3 0 0 0 
8 
0 0 
Solids 1 5 6 6 9 13 17 10 11 2 1 
Liquids 17 24 33 49 70 90 111 151 174 190 186 179 
Gas 4 6 11 16 26 43 63 83 91 109 138 159 
Electricity 3 5 9 19 40 68 110 158 199 234 266 288 
Others 0 2 3 6 9 14 20 26 31 38 45 46 
Total 39 51 71 104 159 231 324 428 506 579 635 672 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 5 8 12 19 23 35 47 71 59 36 8 
Oil 21 31 39 51 72 91 119 175 197 212 199 170 
Gas 8 14 24 41 73 126 192 273 321 385 482 
68 
555 
Nuclear 0 0 1 2 6 11 18 27 38 51 92 
Biomass 14 14 17 24 36 53 70 86 12! 168 183 182 
Other Renewables 2 4 7 12 21 32 47 62 75 88 98 102 
Total 49 67 96 142 225 335 481 670 822 961 1065 1109 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0,2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.6 2.9 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.6 1,0 1.5 2.2 3.1 4.3 6.0 8.0 10.1 12.1 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0,5 0.9 1.6 2.9 4.8 7.5 10.7 14.5 19.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.1 59,2 88.2 128.5 184.5 263.6 365.5 481.8 607.3 736.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use » Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 384 383 382 381 381 380 379 379 378 378 
Grasslands 1680 1673 1685 1695 1702 1708 1714 1718 1722 1726 1730 1733 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 42 90 165 240 282 324 333 308 284 
Forest 1745 1711 1690 1683 1680 1681 1682 1681 1680 1678 1676 1674 
Others 1684 1710 1720 1676 1625 1544 1463 1419 1374 1364 1387 1411 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 0.72 1.01 1.43 2,03 3.15 4.47 6.41 9.16 11.0! 12.07 12.88 12.78 
Other C 0 2 G t C 0.73 0.82 0.60 0.36 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.03 2,39 3.40 4.66 6.54 9.28 11.11 12.15 12.93 12.82 
168 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 98 114 134 155 180 Î 9 0 192 181 179 
N20 total ' M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.7 0,7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 14.0 14,7 15.8 16.5 18.8 18.6 18.7 16.4 14.9 13.3 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 423 469 535 634 782 967 1154 1378 1473 1573 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 61 70 82 98 122 152 159 169 184 191 
NOx M t N 7 8 9 12 17 22 30 40 45 49 53 56 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a; Land-use taken from A I M - A I marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - A l marker run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
436 Statistical Table 
Illustrative Scenario AlFI-MiniCAM, 
World previously AlG-Min iCAM 
Population Mill ion 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commeicial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
O i l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
E J 
E J 
Z J 
GtC 
G t C 
Million ha 
20.7 27.4 38.1 52.8 80.0 117.1 164.0 226.1 293.3 365.7 441.6 525.0 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 57 73 94 118 140 158 128 108 99 89 79 
121 126 141 165 182 229 306 366 423 476 455 435 
52 63 81 105 126 141 150 182 212 242 232 223 
35 54 86 133 207 301 413 525 630 728 782 837 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 300 381 497 634 810 1027 1201 1373 1546 1559 L572 
88 115 150 193 299 393 475 448 432 429 518 607 
131 136 150 173 165 202 283 353 416 471 359 248 
70 85 129 203 268 333 398 494 '573 634 606 578 
24 26 35 51 79 108 137 155 177 201 217 233 
0 6 12 18 28 40 52 73 85 89 106 123 
24 24 27 32 42 60 86 128 169 208 246 284 
336 392 503 669 882 1135 1431 1650 1850 2032 2052 2073 
0.1 1.2 2.6 4.2 7.0 10.4 14.6 19.1 23.6 27.9 32.9 37.9 
0.1 1.5 2.9 4.5 6.2 8.1 10.4 13.8 17.7 22.0 25.8 29.6 
0.1 0.9 2.1 3.6 6.1 9.2 12.7 17.4 22.8 28.7 34.8 40.9 
7.1 82.4 171.0 283.3 427.9 608.7 828.0 1075.9 1340.8 1620.6 1906.1 2189.4 
Cropland 1472 1466 1474 1495 1481 1439 1369 1208 1053 903 786 669 
Grasslands 3209 3348 3602 3970 4367 4681 4911 4730 4478 4155 3918 3682 
Energy Biomass 0 4 9 16 30 47 6 8 115 ¡ 3 0 ¡ 1 6 ¡ 6 2 208 
Forest 4173 4214 4140 3951 3625 3362 3162 3471 3838 4265 4432 4598 
Others 4310 4132 3940 3733 3662 3636 3655 3641 3664 3725 3867 4008 
Total 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 ¡ 3 ¡ 6 4 ¡ 3 ¡ 6 4 1 3 ¡ 6 4 13164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.65 11.19 14.61 18.66 23.10 25.14 2 7 . ¡ 2 29.04 29.64 30.32 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.08 1.55 1.57 1.31 0.80 0.55 0 . ¡ 6 -0.36 - ¡ . 2 2 -2.08 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.73 12.73 16.19 19.97 23.90 25.69 27.28 28.68 28.42 28.24 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 359 416 489 567 630 655 677 695 715 735 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.0 9.3 10.9 12.8 14.5 15.0 ¡ 5 . 4 ¡ 5 . 7 16.1 16.6 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 80.8 86.9 96.1 94.0 80.5 56.3 42.6 39.4 39.8 40.1 
C F C / t l F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 И 4 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 И З 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 1020 1204 1436 1726 2159 2270 2483 2776 2685 2570 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 166 192 214 256 322 361 405 449 435 420 
N O x M t N 31 32 40 50 63 77 95 102 109 115 111 110 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 4 3 7 
Illustrative Scenario AlFI -Min iCAM, 
OECD90 previously A l G - M i n i C A M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 1112 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.3 20.5 25.6 31.5 34.4 44.6 53.5 63.2 74.2 86.4 101.4 117.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na ita na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 13 14 14 14 15 17 13 12 12 12 12 
Liquids 72 73 75 77 73 70 81 87 94 102 97 93 
Gas 27 36 47 59 60 62 62 70 80 91 90 89 
Electricity 22 28 37 48 53 70 85 95 105 116 126 137 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 130 151 173 197 199 217 245 265 290 320 325 330 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 40 47 48 45 51 70 82 86 93 104 167 231 
Oi l 76 78 79 79 71 59 70 71 72 74 34 -6 
Gas 34 47 69 100 103 112 116 131 146 160 158 157 
Nuclear 20 16 14 16 17 18 18 19 22 25 29 33 
Biomass 0 2 4 5 5 7 9 11 13 13 17 20 
Other Renewables 12 11 10 10 10 12 14 18 23 28 35 42 
Total 182 201 225 254 257 279 310 336 368 404 440 476 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.6 3.4 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.6 9.2 
Oil 0.1 0.9 1.6 2.4 2.8 3.7 4.3 5.1 5.8 6.5 6.9 7.3 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.9 2.4 4.0 5.2 6.4 7.8 9.3 10.9 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 67.5 107.1 149.4 193.9 242.3 294.5 349.7 408.5 472,7 544.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 408 410 412 414 409 385 358 312 272 238 207 177 
Grasslands 796 820 866 935 970 1058 1094 1058 1013 962 918 873 
Energy Biomass 0 4 6 8 10 18 24 34 38 36 50 63 
Forest 921 931 921 894 869 809 787 864 938 1011 1039 1067 
Others 998 959 917 872 865 853 858 856 861 876 909 942 
Total 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.58 3.95 4.03 4.46 5.02 5.34 5.76 6.30 7,14 8.02 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.24 -0,35 -0.47 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.72 4.19 4.27 4.63 5.07 5.36 5.69 6.06 6.78 7.55 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 86 101 108 131 149 172 196 223 246 270 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 
SOx total MtS 22,7 17.0 13.9 4.7 4.0 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.0 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 ¡ 2 3 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 181 199 187 211 250 269 274 304 307 319 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 39 39 32 33 37 41 45 52 55 60 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 16 15 16 16 16 18 20 23 24 
438 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Illustrative Scenario AlFI-MiniCAM, 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
REF previously AlG-MiniCAM 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
428 425 426 433 434 431 
1.1 1.1 1.4 2.1 3.5 5.1 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 10 9 9 9 10 
18 12 9 11 12 14 
19 15 14 17 20 22 
6 8 13 21 29 38 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 44 45 57 70 84 
18 17 19 24 46 60 
20 14 11 13 6 3 
26 20 22 33 41 47 
3 4 6 10 13 16 
0 I 1 2 3 5 
3 3 3 4 5 7 
70 58 63 85 115 138 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 
1.3 12.3 21.7 33.2 49.2 70.0 
284 294 304 316 320 316 
395 410 454 526 608 673 
0 0 1 4 8 13 
1007 1016 996 945 865 804 
691 657 622 587 575 571 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
1.30 0.91 0.94 1.24 1.76 2.17 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.12 
1.30 0.91 0.97 1.32 1.88 2.29 
47 39 49 68 91 109 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 
17.0 11.0 10.3 10.5 13.3 13.4 
0 4 8 19 29 31 
7 4 5 8 14 20 
8 6 8 10 14 18 
69 41 49 63 103 136 
16 13 17 24 32 45 
5 3 3 4 7 8 
423 408 392 374 357 340 
6.9 10.0 13.6 17.7 21.6 26.0 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 8 7 6 5 5 
17 19 21 22 21 19 
22 26 29 32 28 25 
48 58 66 73 73 74 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
97 110 122 133 127 122 
68 60 53 45 61 77 
5 10 15 22 19 15 
50 59. 65 69 61 54 
17 18 19 20 20 20 
6 8 9 9 10 11 
10 14 18 21 24 27 
156 168 178 186 195 205 
2.1 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.4 5.0 
0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 
2.0 2.6 3.2 3.9 4.5 5.1 
94.2 120.1 146.4 172.3 197.7 222.6 
303 263 223 183 159 135 
719 666 601 525 492 458 
18 25 25 19 23 27 
762 850 950 1061 1088 1115 
575 573 578 590 616 642 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
2.47 2.53 2.54 2.53 2.66 2.79 
0.07 0.10 0.09 0.03 -0.14 -0.32 
2.55 2.63 2.63 2.56 2.52 2.48 
122 123 122 120 120 121 
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 
10.7 5.8 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 
32 33 33 34 33 31 
21 22 23 24 25 24 
21 19 15 14 10 11 
166 151 151 130 120 89 
57 72 100 114 113 110 
9 8 7 6 5 5 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table 4 3 9 
Illustrative Scenario AIFI-MiniCAM, 
ASIA previously AlG-MiniCAM 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 3.1 6.5 11.7 23.8 40.3 61.0 86.0 111.7 138.3 164.3 192.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 20 31 46 64 84 99 111 88 73 66 57 48 
Liquids 14 19 28 39 53 74 103 123 141 156 146 136 
Gas 2 5 9 15 20 24 29 37 43 49 46 42 
Electricity 4 11 25 47 84 129 182 232 276 314 328 343 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 67 109 165 240 327 424 480 533 584 576 569 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 26 45 73 110 165 212 251 221 200 188 194 200 
Oil 16 21 30 42 48 66 97 126 148 165 136 107 
Gas 3 9 22 43 71 103 137 174 200 216 200 183 
Nuclear 1 4 9 18 33 49 67 74 82 91 94 98 
Biomass 0 2 5 9 15 20 26 35 41 42 48 54 
Other Renewables 3 4 5 6 11 20 33 52 71 88 102 116 
Total 49 85 145 228 342 470 611 682 742 790 774 758 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.9 3.4 5.3 7.6 9.8 12.0 13.9 15.8 17.8 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.7 3.9 5.2 6.8 8.2 9.6 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 2.1 3.2 4.9 6.7 8.8 10.8 12.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 44.6 82.4 137.4 211.6 305.0 409.2 515.3 623.3 728.8 827.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 389 400 410 420 422 416 403 358 316 275 238 202 
Grasslands 508 524 555 602 650 690 721 712 695 669 640 610 
Energy Biomass 0 0 I 4 8 (3 19 33 37 32 44 55 
Forest 1168 1144 1102 1044 988 948 922 960 1016 1088 1144 1199 
Others 664 632 600 568 557 555 559 557 562 573 596 620 
Total 2729 2699 2669 2637 2627 2622 2624 2621 2625 2637 2662 2686 
Antlu-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.82 4.27 6.17 8.12 10.13 10.42 10.68 10.93 10.42 9.92 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.10 0.03 -0.05 -0.19 -0.33 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 3.02 4.54 6.46 8.38 10.30 10.52 10.71 10.88 10.23 9.59 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 135 148 166 186 208 198 189 179 181 182 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2,6 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 38.8 52.7 57.1 51.9 37.0 24.3 17.0 15.1 14.6 14.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
PFC M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 371 494 639 777 1030 1067 1133 1226 1242 1187 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 50 63 73 86 119 126 Í33 144 139 130 
NOx M t N 7 9 13 19 26 34 44 47 48 51 49 47 
4 4 0 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Illustrative Scenario AlFI -Mln iCAM, 
A L M previously A l G - M i n i C A M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1236 1541 1876 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 15.4 27.1 42.5 66.9 93.9 123.4 154.2 188.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 2 3 5 7 11 15 20 17 16 16 15 14 
Liquids 17 22 29 38 49 71 105 138 168 197 192 187 
Gas 5 7 10 15 25 32 38 49 60 71 69 66 
Electricity 3 6 11 18 37 63 98 141 184 225 254 283 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 38 55 78 121 182 261 346 428 509 530 551 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 4 6 10 14 31 50 73 80 87 92 95 99 
Oil 20 23 30 39 49 73 111 147 180 210 171 132 
Gas 7 10 17 27 49 72 95 131 ' 162 189 187 185 
Nuclear 0 2 5 7 16 25 35 44 54 65 73 81 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 5 8 12 18 22 25 31 38 
Other Renewables 5 6 8 11 15 21 29 44 58 71 85 99 
Total 35 48 70 102 165 249 355 464 563 652 643 634 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.3 3.2 4.0 5.0 5.9 
O i l 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.8 4.2 5.9 7.8 9.5 U.3 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.3 3.5 5.0 6.7 8.6 10.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.1 60.6 91.9 133.2 186.4 252.2 329.4 416.5 506.9 594.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 391 363 348 344 335 322 305 274 242 208 181 154 
Grasslands 1510 1594 1727 1907 2104 2260 2376 2294 2168 1998 1869 1740 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 23 31 29 46 63 
Forest 3641 3591 3480 3307 3118 2968 2857 2949 3100 3309 3451 3593 
Others 1957 1883 1800 1707 1672 1637 1662 1655 1663 1688 1746 1805 
Total 7499 7432 7354 7265 7229 7210 7206 7196 7204 7232 7293 7355 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C M t 
NOx M t N 
0.72 1.01 1.30 1.73 2.66 3.91 5.48 6.86 8.13 9.27 9.43 9.58 
0.73 0.82 0.72 0.95 0.92 0.77 0.50 0.32 0.12 -0.09 -0.53 -0.96 
1.45 1.83 2.02 2.68 3.58 4.68 5.98 7.18 8.25 9.18 8.90 8.62 
77 85 90 100 124 141 150 162 170 173 168 162 
1.2 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.3 
10.5 12.8 14.9 16.1 18.6 21.5 24.7 17.9 13.8 12.4 12.4 12.4 
0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
396 404 420 448 506 601 714 783 925 1117 1016 975 
48 55 60 66 76 91 110 121 127 138 128 119 
7 8 9 It 15 19 25 30 35 38 35 33 
Statistical Table 441 
Scenario AIT-AIM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6117 6805 7493 8182 8439 8704 8538 8375 8030 7528 7056 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.9 26.6 37.7 56.3 89.2 127.4 182.0 235.8 305.5 378.2 447.3 529.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 50 48 34 27 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 36 36 46 59 76 76 76 58 45 35 29 24 
Liquids 11! 118 130 148 177 205 239 260 283 299 305 311 
Gas 51 58 84 113 146 167 191 200 210 219 227 235 
Electricity 38 48 63 82 115 180 282 370 484 573 614 657 
Others 
Total 285 307 356 430 532 647 787 901 1032 1128 1176 1226 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 93 89 116 142 174 159 146 112 86 68 57 48 
Oi l 143 158 176 186 183 168 158 141 126 ¡ 1 6 П О ¡ 0 4 
Gas 73 99 142 190 244 284 336 344 355 366 378 390 
Nuclear 6 11 17 27 43 68 116 114 111 110 111 112 
Biomass 50 48 38 47 81 120 179 215 258 289 302 315 
Other Renewables 10 11 14 20 34 70 151 249 409 550 603 663 
Total 376 416 502 611 758 868 1086 1174 1345 1500 1561 1632 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.1 1.0 2.0 3.3 4.9 6.3 8.1 9.1 10.2 11.1 11.7 12.4 
Oi ! 0.1 1.6 3.3 5.1 7.0 8.5 10.4 11.6 13.0 14.3 15.4 16.6 
Gas 0.1 1.0 2.2 3.8 6.0 8.4 11.8 14.7 18.3 22.1 25.7 29.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 171.3 278.0 396.3 515.4 630.1 738.9 839.5 934.0 1025.3 ¡ ¡ 1 3 . 5 
Caibon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1437 1486 1548 1573 1533 1434 1341 1251 1167 1076 981 895 
Grasslands 3290 3289 3481 3846 4193 4145 4098 4062 4027 3964 3875 3788 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 66 328 494 745 813 888 949 993 ¡ 0 3 9 
Forest 4249 4122 3965 3801 3709 3786 3864 3898 3932 3980 4042 4106 
Others 3966 4046 3948 3655 3179 3033 2894 2908 2922 2966 3039 3114 
Total 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 12942 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.37 9.79 11.28 11.32 11.43 10.49 9.66 9.14 8.85 8.58 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.44 1.73 0.87 0.34 -0.15 0.00 -0.03 0.15 0.12 0.08 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.81 11.52 12.15 11.67 11.28 10.49 9.63 9.29 8.97 8.66 
CH4 total MtCH4 310 323 393 466 528 509 492 442 397 358 323 291 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.1 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.4 5.1 4.8 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 87.4 100.9 91.5 69.3 64.3 46.9 35.7 30.7 29.0 27.4 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 И З 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 1030 1160 1161 1202 1244 1294 1347 1402 1460 1520 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 163 188 213 209 206 195 186 167 138 ¡ ¡ 4 
NOx MtN 31 32 40 49 52 50 49 47 45 43 41 40 
442 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIT-AIM 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 960 1002 1043 1062 1081 1086 1091 1097 1103 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.4 25.2 31 0 38.1 45.5 54.3 64.2 76.0 89.3 104.0 121.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Eneigy EJ 
Non-commercial 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 10 10 10 10 9 8 6 5 4 3 2 
Liquids 64 72 68 69 70 71 72 72 72 73 75 76 
Gas 25 32 38 44 47 45 43 40 38 36 36 35 
Electricity 22 27 30 33 37 46 58 72 90 105 115 126 
Others 
Total 127 142 146 156 165 173 181 194 207 219 229 239 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 41 36 35 31 27 26 24 18 13 10 8 7 
Oil 76 87 82 80 68 52 40 31 24 22 22 23 
Gas 34 51 59 65 68 68 67 62 ' 58 55 54 52 
Nuclear 5 8 11 14 18 20 22 21 20 19 20 20 
Biomass 6 1 0 3 11 19 34 41 49 55 58 60 
Other Renewables 6 6 7 9 13 21 32 50 77 102 114 128 
Total 167 189 194 203 205 205 220 223 242 264 276 291 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 l.I 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Oil 0.1 0.9 1.7 2.6 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.7 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.3 2.9 3.7 4.2 4.8 5.4 6.0 6.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 64.3 94.6 123.2 149.5 173.8 195.6 214.1 230.2 245.0 258.9 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 410 402 394 377 353 327 302 281 261 237 208 183 
Grasslands 787 762 764 792 827 813 799 794 790 775 750 727 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 19 67 102 156 165 174 182 189 195 
Foiest 1056 1066 1079 1099 1127 1156 1185 1196 1208 1229 1261 1294 
Others 886 910 903 853 765 731 697 702 706 715 727 740 
Total 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 3140 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.14 3.05 2.82 2.61 2.41 2.04 1.72 1.55 1.48 1.41 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0 03 -0.04 -0.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.06 3.00 2.72 2.53 2.34 2.01 1.70 1.52 1.44 1.34 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 72 71 70 61 53 50 47 44 41 39 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 9.9 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.6 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
C O M t C O 179 161 170 178 192 199 206 210 215 222 234 245 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 34 33 31 26 21 14 8 5 4 3 
NOx M t N 13 12 12 12 9 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 
Statistical Table 443 
Scenario A IT-AIM 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 424 430 435 429 423 406 391 374 356 3.39 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 1.5 2,9 5.3 8.1 12.4 15.6 19.6 24.0 28.6 34.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
! Solids 9 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 
Liquids 19 10 8 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 
Gas 19 13 18 20 22 25 28 26 24 22 21 20 
Electricity 8 9 10 11 12 18 26 31 37 40 40 39 
Others 
Total 58 40 39 42 46 56 67 70 74 75 73 72 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 8 8 9 10 10 10 7 5 4 4 4 
Oil 22 ¡ 3 10 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 
Gas 26 22 27 29 30 32 34 31 27 26 25 25 
Nuclear 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 9 8 8 9 10 
Biomass 2 4 0 1 3 5 8 10 12 13 13 14 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 2 2 6 14 21 31 37 34 32 
Total 71 51 50 52 57 66 83 83 89 93 91 90 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0,3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0,4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0,5 0,8 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.8 3,1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.6 30,9 40.3 49.7 58.9 67.4 74.4 80.4 86.2 92.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 279 284 295 299 308 300 292 273 255 235 215 196 
Grasslands 346 356 398 462 550 565 581 577 574 566 553 .54! 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 6 11 24 30 38 46 52 59 
Forest 960 961 954 960 953 958 963 974 985 997 1009 1021 
Otheis 720 703 657 585 488 466 445 448 451 459 473 488 
Total 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.92 0,93 0,92 0.93 0.94 0.78 0,66 0.61 0.61 0.60 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0,01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0,03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.76 0,63 0.58 0.58 0.58 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 59 65 68 59 51 49 48 45 43 41 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 12.2 10.8 7.5 4.3 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 39 40 43 46 49 50 51 52 54 55 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 13 11 10 10 9 7 6 5 4 4 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
444 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIT-AIM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Popuiation Million 2798 3261 3556 3851 4147 4183 4220 4016 3822 3541 3194 2882 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 5.7 12.2 26.2 40.6 62.9 85.5 116.4 147.7 174.9 207.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 28 24 17 11 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 15 20 29 39 53 52 51 39 31 24 20 16 
Liquids 11 16 23 29 41 49 59 67 77 83 83 83 
Gas 2 4 8 16 29 36 45 53 63 73 82 91 
Electricity 5 7 13 22 40 67 111 148 197 236 254 272 
Others 
Total 61 70 91 118 166 210 265 315 373 417 439 462 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 38 58 79 108 92 79 62 48 38 31 25 
Oil 17 24 35 40 44 37 32 28 25 22 20 18 
Gas 4 9 18 33 58 76 99 111 - 125 138 151 165 
Nuclear 0 1 3 5 13 25 47 47 46 46 45 45 
Biomass 28 24 19 17 17 26 41 49 59 66 69 73 
Other Renewables 1 2 2 4 9 23 58 98 166 227 251 278 
Total 80 97 135 178 250 281 357 395 469 337 568 604 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.5 3.3 4.3 4.9 5.5 6.0 6.3 6.7 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.3 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.5 3.4 4.6 6.0 7.4 9.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 44.4 78.4 121.3 167.9 212.4 255.0 295.8 334.9 372.5 409.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 390 408 432 448 432 401 372 349 328 307 286 267 
Grasslands 521 523 546 584 620 618 615 611 606 599 589 580 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 21 88 123 172 189 209 224 233 242 
Forest 527 490 453 420 406 419 432 437 442 448 456 464 
Others 576 593 582 540 469 446 423 426 428 435 448 462 
Total 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.59 3.36 4.51 4.40 4.29 4.06 3.85 3.69 3.57 3.45 
Other C 0 2 G t C 0.37 0.26 0.39 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Total C 0 2 GtC i.53 2.03 2.98 3.81 4.78 4.54 4.36 4.16 3.99 3.83 3.70 3.58 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 156 196 238 235 233 197 167 146 131 118 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 42.2 54.5 45.9 20.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.3 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 342 397 421 444 468 484 500 512 522 532 
N M V O C M l 33 37 48 61 73 73 73 74 76 68 55 43 
NOx MtN 7 9 13 17 20 20 19 18 17 15 14 13 
Statistical Table 445 
Scenario AIT-AIM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1865 2211 2557 2761 2980 3024 3067 3013 2866 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 5.3 10.3 19.6 32.1 52.4 69.8 93.0 117.2 139.8 166.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 1 4 18 17 16 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 2 3 5 9 10 12 9 7 6 5 4 
Liquids 17 21 31 43 59 76 99 111 124 133 137 141 
Gas 4 8 19 33 48 60 75 80 84 87 88 89 
Electricity 4 6 11 17 26 47 87 118 159 191 205 220 
Others 
Total 40 55 80 115 156 206 274 321 377 417 435 454 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 7 14 22 29 31 33 26 20 16 14 12 
Oil 27 34 48 58 63 71 79 75 72 67 63 59 
Gas 9 18 38 64 88 109 135 140 145 147 148 148 
Nuclear 0 0 I 3 6 15 37 37 37 37 36 36 
Biomass 14 18 19 27 50 69 96 115 138 154 161 168 
Other Renewables 2 2 3 5 9 21 47 80 135 184 203 225 
Total 57 80 124 179 246 316 427 472 545 606 625 648 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.7 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.3 4.0 4.7 5.5 6.1 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.7 2.6 3.9 5.1 6.6 8.1 9.5 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 41.1 74.1 111.5 148.3 184.9 220.9 255.2 288.5 321.5 353.6 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 357 392 426 449 441 406 374 348 323 297 272 248 
Grasslands 1636 1647 1773 2009 2196 2149 2103 2080 2057 2024 1982 1941 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 26 167 257 393 428 466 497 520 543 
Forest 1706 1605 1478 1322 1223 1253 1284 1291 1297 1305 1316 1327 
Others 1784 1840 1806 1677 1456 1391 1328 1333 1338 1357 1390 1424 
Total 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 5483 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.71 2.45 3.02 3.39 3.80 3.60 3.42 3.29 3.20 3.11 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 1.11 1.35 0.66 0.28 -0.15 -0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.82 3.79 3.69 3.67 3.65 3.55 3.31 3.35 3.25 3.16 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 106 133 152 154 155 145 136 123 108 94 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 20.2 25.7 28.8 35.8 44.2 28.0 17.8 13.7 12.8 12.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
688 
C O M t C O 396 404 479 545 506 513 521 550 582 615 650 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 68 84 99 101 103 100 97 88 75 63 
NOx M t N 7 8 12 17 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
446 Statistical Table 
Illustrative Scenario AIT-MESSAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 20.9 26.8 36.8 57.0 91.3 135.4 187.1 254.1 322.9 393.2 469.6 550.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 25.7 33.4 45.7 67.2 98.7 139.0 186.4 246.8 313.2 382.0 456.6 535.0 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 38 25 20 16 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 42 60 66 71 72 46 31 27 22 15 2 1 
Liquids 111 125 157 193 246 300 344 357 354 346 343 311 
Gas 41 48 66 83 107 135 155 180 177 159 132 100 
Electricity 35 48 66 100 153 209 275 349 424 483 534 589 
Others 8 12 18 33 48 61 83 108 138 179 220 268 
Total 275 317 393 495 634 757 893 1020 1115 1182 1231 1270 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 91 106 125 151 180 153 119 87 60 53 40 25 
Oil 128 155 172 193 223 241 250 236 205 143 113 77 
Gas 71 87 124 166 231 288 324 344 324 291 240 196 
Nuclear 7 8 11 17 40 78 115 145 175 175 153 114 
Biomass 46 46 55 75 104 137 183 235 280 324 353 370 
Other Renewables 8 15 25 48 73 122 222 358 544 756 985 1239 
Total 352 416 513 649 850 1018 1213 1407 1588 1743 1884 2021 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.9 2.0 3.2 4.7 6.5 8.1 9.3 10.1 10.7 11.3 11.7 
Oil 0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.6 8.9 11.3 13.8 16.1 18.2 19.6 20.8 
Gas 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.9 4.5 6.8 9.7 13.0 16.4 19.6 22.6 25.0 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 169.2 267.4 380.5 505.7 630.2 748.4 854.7 944.1 1015.5 1068.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 1459 1466 1462 1457 1454 1448 1442 1436 1429 1424 1422 1420 
Grasslands 3389 3404 3429 3446 3458 3478 3498 3525 3552 3568 3572 3576 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 74 158 288 418 492 566 581 538 495 
Potest 4296 4237 4173 4164 4164 4177 4190 4194 4199 4202 4203 4204 
Others 3805 3842 3886 3807 3715 3558 3400 3301 3203 3173 3213 3253 
Total 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 " GtC 5.99 6.90 8.33 10.00 12.26 12.60 12.29 11.41 9.91 8.05 6.27 4.31 
Other C 0 2 " GtC 1.11 1.07 1.04 0.26 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.38 10.26 12.38 12.65 12.26 11.38 9.87 8.02 6.26 4.32 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 362 415 483 495 500 459 404 359 317 274 
N 2 0 total « M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 64.7 .59.9 59.6 45.9 40.2 34.4 30.1 25.2 23.3 20.2 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
C O M t C O 879 877 1003 1147 1362 1555 1770 1944 2078 2164 2156 2077 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 164 190 212 229 241 242 229 199 167 128 
NOx M t N 31 32 39 46 56 60 61 60 52 43 35 28 
^ . . « . . ç , . . v v , , i 4 ^ v a n - w i a i ^ p u vy 
a; Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM A I T шп) . 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A I T run. 
Statistical Table 447 
Illustrative Scenario AIT-MESSAGE 
OECD90 
Population Million 
GNP/GDP ( т е х ) Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ' Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
16.4 20.6 25,6 31.6 38.7 46,8 55.7 65.7 77.2 90.8 106.6 124.3 
14.1 17,8 22.1 27.4 33.7 40,8 48.6 57.4 67.6 79.7 93.6 109.4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 13 6 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 69 74 73 72 70 66 65 62 6! 60 55 
22 28 33 34 35 35 32 27 21 19 15 12 
22 29 36 44 55 65 74 83 95 104 112 118 
1 1 3 6 7 10 13 17 22 29 38 48 
124 139 152 160 171 180 185 193 201 212 225 233 
38 36 36 32 25 11 4 3 2 1 1 1 
72 83 81 72 63 55 46 39 30 23 20 14 
33 45 57 70 79 78 76 66 59 56 45 34 
6 7 8 10 22 43 56 64 67 58 45 28 
6 9 11 17 21 24 31 37 41 45 52 55 
4 6 10 15 20 27 44 65 98 143 194 245 
159 186 202 214 230 238 257 275 297 325 356 377 
0.0 0,4 0,7 1.1 1.4 1,7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
0.0 0,8 1,6 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.9 
0.0 0,4 0,8 1.4 2.1 2,9 3.6 4.4 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.6 
2.8 33,0 65.7 98,4 129,2 155.8 177.3 195.7 211.4 224.7 235.8 244.1 
381 380 377 376 375 372 368 364 359 356 356 355 
760 763 771 774 776 787 797 818 839 849 847 846 
0 0 0 И 24 44 63 74 86 88 81 75 
1050 1053 1052 1053 1056 1062 1068 1061 1054 1050 1049 1048 
838 833 828 814 798 765 733 712 691 685 695 705 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 2,83 3,20 3.31 3.18 2.96 2.38 
Other C 0 2 ' GtC 0,00 0,00 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2,83 3,20 3.35 3.20 2.96 2.35 
CH4 total MtCH4 73 74 71 68 66 60 
N20 total « M t N 2 0 - N 2,6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
SOx total MtS 22,7 17.0 8.3 2.1 0.6 -0.1 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 110 108 115 118 
PFC M t C eq. 18 13 13 11 9 8 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 5 6 7 
C O M t C O 179 161 183 190 184 186 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 38 38 33 30 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 13 13 11 
2.00 
-0.04 
1.96 
56 
2.3 
0.0 
122 
9 
9 
202 
27 
9 
1.71 
0.00 
1.72 
52 
2.3 
0.4 
123 
10 
11 
210 
26 
7 
1.38 
0.05 
1.43 
48 
2.2 
0.8 
123 
12 
13 
206 
23 
6 
1.17 
0.06 
1.24 
47 
2.2 
1.3 
124 
13 
16 
206 
20 
5 
0.95 
0.04 
0.98 
45 
2.2 
1.9 
125 
14 
18 
208 
16 
4 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker ran. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes (AIM A I T ran), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker ran. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A I T run. 
0.66 
0.01 
0.67 
43 
2.1 
2.3 
125 
16 
20 
190 
10 
448 Statistical Table 
Illustrative Scenario AIT-MESSAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 427 433 435 433 423 409 392 374 357 339 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 J.O 2.1 5.4 9.4 12.6 16.2 20.0 24.4 29-2 34.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 2.6 2.2 2.5 3.7 6.0 9.4 12.6 16.2 20.0 24.4 29.2 34.4 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 5 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 15 11 10 12 14 14 12 13 13 14 16 17 
Gas 14 11 14 17 22 26 27 26 23 19 13 9 
Electricity 6 6 7 10 14 20 23 26 28 32 34 34 
Others 7 6 6 9 13 13 12 12 11 11 12 13 
Total 50 38 41 51 65 72 73 76 76 76 75 73 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 19 14 11 13 17 16 11 4 2 1 8 8 
Oil 20 15 13 14 15 14 12 12 8 6 5 3 
Gas 27 23 29 32 40 44 50 63' 72 70 46 31 
Nuclear- 1 1 1 1 4 9 10 9 5 3 3 2 
Biomass 2 1 1 1 3 4 7 10 12 14 16 19 
Other Renewables 1 1 2 4 6 7 12 14 19 26 42 52 
Total 70 54 56 65 84 95 101 112 117 120 119 116 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 LO 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.8 4.5 5.0 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.2 32.6 43.7 55.7 66.5 77.0 88.0 98.7 108.1 115.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 268 266 265 265 265 264 263 262 262 261 260 260 
Grasslands 341 361 364 366 367 368 370 371 371 372 373 374 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 6 11 16 19 22 23 21 20 
Forest 966 950 918 904 894 899 905 909 912 916 922 927 
Others 701 698 728 738 745 733 722 715 709 703 700 696 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 1.30 0.91 0.88 1.00 1.22 1.24 1.16 1.20 1.20 1.11 0.91 0.66 
Other C 0 2 « G t C 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.06 1.01 1.22 1.17 1.01 1.09 1.11 1.03 0.84 0.61 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 42 49 58 58 54 52 48 43 36 30 
N20 total = M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.5 4.9 5.2 4.5 4.1 1.8 1.2 0.7 3.0 3.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 69 41 49 61 82 98 112 121 118 105 90 75 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 16 20 25 31 34 39 37 33 30 26 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM A I T run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A I T run. 
Statistical Table 449 
Illustrative Scenario AIT-MESSAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 5.8 13.5 27.2 44.9 65.3 95.8 126.9 155.5 186.5 218.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.J 8.3 13.5 22.8 36.2 52.2 70.0 96.8 126.9 155.5 186.5 218.2 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 15 11 8 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 38 51 60 63 38 24 21 21 13 1 0 
Liquids 13 22 38 56 86 120 152 157 156 149 142 131 
Gas 2 3 8 14 22 40 54 73 77 72 62 45 
Electricity 4 8 15 30 51 70 98 128 160 183 201 222 
Others 1 3 5 11 15 18 25 35 46 59 74 89 
Total 62 88 128 178 241 289 356 414 459 476 479 486 
Primiffy Energy EJ 
Coal 30 51 71 96 122 102 79 57 39 40 26 12 
Oil 15 26 39 55 76 91 102 95 90 60 45 31 
Gas 3 5 14 28 48 74 98 108 101 88 81 68 
Nuclear 0 1 2 4 8 15 27 43 65 74 65 48 
Biomass 24 23 27 33 44 59 83 108 123 132 132 142 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 15 26 44 79 130 191 261 343 435 
Total 74 108 160 231 323 385 467 540 609 655 692 736 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.7 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.2 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.0 5.9 6.5 7.0 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.7 3.8 4.8 5.7 6.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 1.5 19.3 44.3 77.8 122.4 174.6 227.3 276.5 319.5 355.3 383.4 403.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 434 433 432 431 431 430 429 428 428 428 
Grasslands 608 606 609 611 613 615 617 618 619 621 622 624 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 17 37 68 99 117 134 138 127 117 
Forest 535 522 512 524 535 535 535 544 552 556 555 555 
Others 583 601 609 579 547 515 483 456 429 421 431 441 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.73 3.90 5.26 5.36 5.19 4.65 4.06 3.29 2.47 1.52 
Other C 0 2 " GtC 0.37 0.26 0.22 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -O.IO -0.04 0.01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.95 3.77 5.14 5.32 5.22 4.62 3.97 3.19 2.43 1.53 
CH4 total <> MtCH4 113 125 152 185 225 226 227 200 167 147 130 110 
N20 total " M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 32.3 35.4 35.8 22.8 16.3 13.4 11.6 8.8 6.6 5.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
PFC M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 235 270 340 422 564 663 784 853 896 914 866 777 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 47 58 70 75 82 82 83 76 63 41 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 17 23 26 28 26 22 18 15 12 
Emissions con-elated to land-use change and defoiestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b-.C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C02 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M A I T run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker run. 
t: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A I T run. 
450 Statistical Table 
Illustrative Scenario AIT-MESSAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 4.4 9.8 20.0 34.3 53.5 76.5 98.7 122.5 147.2 173.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 3.8 5.1 7.5 13.3 22.8 36.7 55.3 76.5 98.7 122.5 147.2 173.1 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 10 9 8 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 4 5 5 6 8 7 6 2 1 1 1 
Liquids 17 24 35 52 75 97 114 122 123 122 125 109 
Gas 4 6 11 18 27 35 43 54 56 49 42 36 
Electricity 3 5 9 17 33 54 81 111 140 165 188 215 
Others 0 2 4 7 12 21 33 44 59 80 96 118 
Total 39 52 73 106 157 217 279 336 379 418 452 478 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 5 8 10 16 24 26 24 18 12 5 4 
Oil 21 31 40 53 69 81 90 89 77 54 43 28 
Gas 8 14 23 37 65 91 101 107 92 78 69 63 
Nuclear 0 0 I 2 6 12 23 30 38 40 40 35 
Biomass 14 13 17 24 36 50 62 81 104 134 153 153 
Other Renewables 2 4 8 14 21 44 87 150 236 326 406 508 
Total 49 68 96 139 213 301 389 480 565 644 717 791 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.2 3.0 3.9 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.5 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.5 2.4 3.4 4.5 5.4 6.2 6.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.0 58.5 85.3 119.6 159.0 199.2 235.8 265.4 288.2 305.8 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use » Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 384 383 382 381 381 380 379 379 378 378 
Grasslands 1680 1673 1685 1695 1702 1708 1714 1718 1722 1726 1730 1733 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 42 90 165 240 282 324 333 308 284 
Forest 1745 1711 1690 1683 1680 1681 1682 1681 1680 1678 1676 1674 
Others 1684 1710 1720 1676 1625 1544 1463 1419 1374 1364 1387 1411 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 b GtC 0.72 1.01 1.41 1.92 2.82 3.62 3.94 3.84 3.26 2.48 1.94 1.48 
Other C 0 2 с GtC 0.73 0.82 0.60 0..36 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.03 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.01 2.28 3.07 3.81 4.07 3.96 3.36 2.56 2.00 1.51 
C H 4 total d MtCH4 77 85 98 114 133 150 162 155 141 123 105 90 
N 2 0 total e M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 13.7 14.6 15.0 15.7 16,8 15.7 13.5 11.3 8.8 6.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
C O M t C O 396 404 431 474 533 608 67! 760 858 938 992 1035 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 63 74 83 92 98 95 87 69 58 50 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 12 15 18 20 21 19 15 13 12 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A l marker land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - A l marker run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM A I T run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M A l marker run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M A I T run. 
Statistical Table 451 
Scenario AIT-MARIA 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6117 6888 7617 8048 8207 8704 8536 8372 8028 7527 7056 
19.4 25,9 35,9 52.0 75.1 113.5 177.4 226.2 282.1 347.5 418.0 518.5 
48 38 39 27 19 13 9 11 17 26 39 27 
138 152 185 234 269 310 357 363 429 416 475 512 
56 65 84 110 156 201 250 278 213 232 177 179 
35 48 56 67 80 96 128 148 160 177 197 215 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
278 302 364 439 525 621 744 800 819 852 888 934 
90 69 61 44 32 23 16 16 21 29 41 29 
123 132 154 187 190 213 239 190 209 152 169 190 
71 101 134 169 222 266 303 331 268 289 235 239 
22 28 33 44 72 117 162 225 252 298 351 404 
28 31 41 64 100 111 128 180 227 270 313 329 
9 8 7 7 6 17 65 67 69 69 67 65 
343 370 431 515 620 747 913 1010 1044 1106 1175 1255 
0.0 0,9 1.6 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.4 
0.0 1,2 2.5 4.1 6.0 7,9 10.0 12.4 14.3 16.4 17,9 19.6 
0.0 0,7 1.7 3.1 4.8 7.0 9.6 12.7 16.0 18.7 21.5 23.9 
7.1 82.4 165.8 256.2 352.3 454.4 563.6 672.1 773.5 868.6 959.2 1049.4 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1451 1451 1613 2001 2170 2213 2344 2069 1802 1545 1287 1182 
3395 3395 3236 2851 2682 2645 2606 2597 2597 2597 2597 2597 
0 0 0 0 0 0 40 324 592 848 1107 1212 
4138 4142 4157 4177 4208 4244 4301 4374 4375 4375 4375 4375 
4061 4057 4039 4017 3985 3944 3754 3681 3681 368! 3681 3681 
13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
5.99 
1.11 
7.10 
6.90 
1.07 
7.97 
7.66 
1.04 
8.70 
8.41 
0.99 
9.39 
8.95 
0.87 
9.82 
9.88 
0.70 
10.58 
10.80 
0.47 
11.26 
10.25 
0.18 
10.43 
9.76 
0.09 
9.85 
9.15 
0.03 
9.18 
8.98 9.14 
-0.04 -0.04 
8.94 9.10 
1672 883 791 337 369 482 566 654 659 654 639 614 
32 25 31 43 61 77 89 97 106 114 119 115 
38 40 43 48 66 99 119 127 113 88 84 95 
452 Statis-tical Table 
Scenario AIT-MARIA 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1035 1046 1081 1085 1091 1096 1103 l U O 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 15.6 18.9 22.8 27.1 32.0 38.1 45.7 57.0 70.0 86.1 102.5 119.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12 8 6 4 3 2 1 5 11 19 30 21 
Liquids 71 64 57 53 51 49 49 47 74 58 76 71 
Gas 28 35 48 57 65 70 75 84 60 78 55 74 
Electricity 21 25 27 29 31 32 36 40 45 51 57 63 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 132 133 139 144 150 154 161 176 190 206 219 229 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 38 28 20 15 12 9 6 9 13 21 32 22 
Oil 71 64 58 53 51 49 49 47 74 58 76 70 
Gas 34 53 73 85 97 105 101 111 91 112 94 114 
Nuclear 18 15 12 15 18 23 29 36 45 56 68 83 
Biomass 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 
Other Renewables 5 5 4 4 3 3 16 20 21 21 20 18 
Total 171 168 170 175 183 190 202 223 245 270 292 313 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 10 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 
Oi l 0.0 0.7 1.4 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.4 5.2 5.8 6.5 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.4 3.4 4.5 5.5 6.6 7.5 8.6 9.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.0 97.2 129.6 162.4 193.6 223.7 255.5 290.1 327.7 367.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Ciopland 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 331 266 213 
Grasslands 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 112 164 
Forest 756 756 756 756 756 756 796 834 834 834 834 834 
Others 794 794 794 794 794 794 754 716 716 716 716 716 
Total 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2.83 
0.00 
2.83 
3.20 
0.00 
3.20 
3.19 3.16 
0.03 0.05 
3.22 3.21 
3.20 
0.08 
3.28 
3.21 
0.05 
3.27 
3.09 3.27 
-0.10 -0.25 
2.99 3.02 
3.62 
-0.27 
3.35 
3.81 
-0.24 
3.57 
4.17 
-0.21 
3.96 
4.12 
-0.19 
3.94 
19 58 no 108 115 118 122 123 123 124 125 125 
18 13 13 11 9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
23 23 14 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 18 20 
Statistical Table 453 
Scenario AIT-MARIA 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 427 433 432 430 423 406 391 374 356 339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.6 4.5 7.9 13.4 17.6 21.7 26.1 31.5 38.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 13 9 6 4 3 2 2 2 3 5 7 5 
Liquids 17 13 12 11 12 13 13 12 15 11 17 28 
Gas 21 23 26 30 41 52 64 69 66 68 61 53 
Electricity 7 8 7 7 9 11 13 14 15 15 16 16 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 58 53 51 53 65 78 92 98 99 99 101 102 
primary Energy EJ 
Coal 19 13 9 6 4 3 2 2 3 6 7 5 
Oi l 19 14 12 11 12 13 14 13 15 11 17 28 
Gas 27 31 34 39 53 68 81 88 85 86 79 70 
Nuclear 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 7 8 10 
1 
13 
1 
Biomass 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Total 69 63 58 60 73 89 105 112 114 115 118 121 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1,1 1.2 1.3 1.5 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.3 4.2 5.1 5.9 6.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.0 29.2 38.3 49.3 62.1 75.6 89,0 102.2 115.0 128.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 174 139 111 89 78 Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
0 
114 
43 
114 
78 
114 
106 
114 
128 
114 
139 
Forest 815 815 815 815 815 815 827 862 862 862 862 862 Others 722 722 722 722 722 722 710 675 675 675 675 675 
Total 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.30 0.91 
0.00 0.00 
1.30 0.91 
0.80 
0.02 
0.82 
0.80 
0.03 
0.83 
0.97 
0.02 
1.00 
1.19 
0.01 
1.20 
1.38 1.46 
-0.03 -0.12 
1.35 1.34 
1.50 
-0.15 
1.35 
1.48 
-0.20 
1.29 
1.54 
-0.25 
1.28 
1.58 
-0.24 
1.34 
8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
8 10 , 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
454 Statistical Table 
Scenario AIT-MARIA 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2642 3080 3425 3728 3861 3895 4008 3814 3632 3368 3040 2744 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.2 2.6 5.8 12.3 20.8 35.9 61.8 80.3 102.5 128.8 159.8 204 1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 20 18 25 17 12 8 6 4 3 2 2 1 
Liquids 26 42 65 97 120 146 168 172 190 200 212 214 
Gas 2 3 4 8 16 25 35 41 29 24 17 22 
Electiicity 4 9 11 16 19 24 34 41 46 52 59 64 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 52 72 106 139 168 203 243 257 267 277 289 301 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 28 24 29 20 14 10 7 5 3 2 2 1 
Oil 14 23 36 51 51 72 92 72 56 39 45 41 
Gas 3 5 8 14 20 28 38 42 30 25 17 22 
Nuclear 1 12 18 26 28 50 55 79 89 103 ¡ 2 2 ¡ 3 3 
Biomass 13 21 31 51 80 81 81 104 137 162 168 174 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Total 61 86 124 163 195 243 293 322 335 352 373 391 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1 2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1 4 
0)1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.1 5.5 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use M i ü i o n ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Othei C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.5 19.3 41.5 66.1 90.9 1173 148.0 179.0 205.0 225.8 244.1 261.9 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
366 366 380 380 380 380 380 377 373 336 305 263 
431 431 421 423 423 423 384 375 375 375 375 375 
0 0 0 0 0 0 40 52 57 93 124 167 
365 367 380 388 397 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 
458 456 440 430 421 414 412 412 412 4 ¡ 2 412 412 
1621 1621 1621 1621 ¡ 6 2 1 1621 ¡ 6 2 1 1621 1 6 2 ¡ ¡ 6 2 1 1621 1621 
1.15 
0.37 
1.53 
1.78 
0.26 
2.03 
2.20 
0.20 
2.40 
2.36 
0 . ¡ 6 
2 53 
2.31 
0.12 
2.44 
2.73 
0.10 
2.83 
321 
0.09 
3.31 
2.82 
0.07 
2.89 
2.27 
0.04 
2.32 
1.83 
0.02 
1.85 
1.81 180 
0.00 -О 03 
1.80 177 
5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
Statistical Table 455 
Scenario AIT-MARIA 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1348 1699 2071 2449 2720 2836 3192 3231 3259 3190 3029 2864 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.7 3.1 5.5 10.0 17.8 31.7 56.5 71.4 87.9 106.5 124.2 155.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 24 33 50 72 86 103 127 132 150 148 171 199 
Gas 5 4 6 14 35 54 75 84 59 63 44 31 
Electricity 3 6 10 15 21 29 45 53 54 59 65 72 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 35 45 68 103 143 186 247 268 263 270 280 302 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Oil 18 30 48 71 75 79 84 59 63 44 31 50 
Gas 7 12 19 32 51 65 83 90 63 65 46 32 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 23 40 74 105 112 130 151 174 
Biomass 8 6 7 11 18 28 46 75 88 105 141 149 
Other Renewables 2 2 I 1 1 12 25 24 25 24 24 24 
Total 41 53 79 117 170 226 313 353 351 369 392 430 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.4 3.2 4.1 4.6 5.3 5.7 6.0 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.9 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.3 63.7 93.4 125.4 159.9 193.9 224.0 250.6 272.4 292.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 490 490 639 1026 1195 1238 1370 1141 913 767 627 627 
Grasslands 2095 2095 1946 1.559 1390 1352 1352 1352 ¡ 3 5 2 ¡ 3 5 2 ¡ 3 5 2 ¡ 3 5 2 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 229 457 603 742 742 
Forest 2202 2204 2207 2218 2241 2268 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 
Others 2086 2084 2081 2070 2047 2014 1878 1878 ¡ 8 7 8 1878 1878 1878 
Total 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
0.72 1.0¡ 
0.73 0.82 
1.45 1.83 
1.47 
0.79 
2.26 
2.09 
0.74 
2.83 
2.47 
0.64 
3.11 
2.74 
0.54 
3.28 
3.12 
0.50 
3.62 
2.70 
0.48 
3.19 
2.37 
0.47 
2.84 
2.03 
0.45 
2.48 
1.46 
0.43 
¡ .89 
¡ .64 
0.42 
2.05 
0 2 ¡ 5 39 8 ¡ ¡ 3 9 ¡ 8 4 205 210 210 206 196 
4 4 5 9 ¡ 4 ¡ 9 23 26 28 30 31 30 
3 5 ¡ 0 ¡ 4 ¡ 9 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
456 Statistical Table 
Scenario A l v l - M i n i C A M 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
20.7 27.4 38.1 52.8 80.2 117.3 164.2 226.6 294.1 366.9 445.1 531.2 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 54 64 75 87 96 101 78 63 55 50 46 
121 121 129 146 152 177 221 256 289 318 334 350 
52 61 75 96 110 117 116 136 156 175 176 177 
35 51 76 112 161 218 283 338 387 429 459 488 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 286 344 429 510 607 721 808 894 978 1019 1061 
88 108 130 153 206 250 284 249 223 205 192 179 
131 130 137 152 147 167 214 259 299 333 351 369 
70 82 118 179 223 259 287 343,- 387 417 408 399 
24 24 30 41 60 81 102 101 105 116 126 135 
0 5 11 16 23 30 37 48 54 54 52 50 
24 24 27 31 39 51 68 91 112 131 146 162 
336 374 453 573 698 838 992 1091 1179 1255 1274 1293 
0.1 1.1 2.3 3.7 5.7 7.9 10.5 13.1 15.5 17.6 19.6 21.5 
0.1 1.4 2.8 4.2 5.7 7.3 9.2 11.7 14.5 17.5 21.0 24.5 
0.1 0.9 1.9 3.3 5.4 7.9 10.5 13.8 17.5 21.4 25.5 29.6 
7.1 82.4 168.1 270.7 393.9 535.2 692.8 861.1 1034.4 1210,5 1383.2 1547.3 
1472 1466 1474 1495 1483 1442 1373 1212 1055 903 791 679 
3209 3348 3603 3974 4374 4690 4923 4749 4493 4155 3951 3748 
0 3 6 8 10 11 12 22 21 10 6 3 
4173 4214 4140 3952 3628 3372 3184 3515 3904 4349 4496 4643 
4310 4132 3941 3735 3669 3648 3673 3666 3690 3747 3920 4093 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 
Other C 0 2 G t C 1.11 1.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
8.08 
1.08 
9.16 
355 
8.0 
74.2 
791 
31 
43 
9.81 
1.54 
11.35 
405 
9.3 
79.5 
337 
43 
48 
11.74 
1.56 
13.29 
462 
10.8 
79.6 
369 
61 
66 
13.70 
1.27 
14.97 
523 
12.6 
72.7 
482 
77 
99 
15.80 
0.74 
16.53 
567 
14.3 
58.9 
566 
89 
119 
16.62 
0.52 
17.14 
585 
14.8 
41.5 
654 
97 
127 
17.37 
0.16 
17.53 
599 
15.2 
31.4 
659 
106 
113 
18.06 
-0.36 
17.70 
611 
15.3 
28.6 
654 
114 
18.20 
-1.37 
16.83 
625 
16.0 
28.5 
639 
119 
84 
18.36 
-2.37 
15.98 
640 
16.7 
28.5 
614 
115 
95 
Statistical Table 457 
Scenario A l v l - M i n i C A M 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 ¡ 1 1 2 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.3 20.5 25.6 31.6 34.5 44.7 53.6 63.3 74.4 86.7 102.2 119.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 12 12 U 11 11 12 9 7 7 7 7 
Liquids 72 70 69 69 63 55 59 61 64 68 72 75 
Gas 27 35 44 54 54 53 49 54 60 67 69 71 
Electricity 22 27 33 41 44 53 61 64 67 70 74 79 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 130 144 159 175 173 173 181 ¡ 8 8 ¡ 9 8 211 221 231 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 40 44 43 36 39 48 54 51 48 42 37 32 
Oi l 76 75 73 70 63 50 52 52 56 62 68 74 
Gas 34 45 63 90 91 92 88 95 103 109 110 111 
Nuclear 20 15 13 13 14 14 15 13 14 ¡5 17 19 
Biomass 0 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 8 7 7 
Other Renewables 12 11 10 10 10 11 12 14 16 18 21 24 
Total 182 192 206 223 221 219 226 234 243 254 261 268 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.9 
Oil 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.4 3.9 4.4 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.9 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.2 3.6 4.5 5.4 6.4 7.5 8.5 9.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.7 103.5 141.5 179.0 216.3 254.0 291.9 329.4 365.9 401.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 408 410 412 414 409 386 359 313 273 240 211 182 
Grasslands 796 820 867 937 972 1062 1100 ¡ 0 6 4 1019 967 932 896 
Energy Biomass 0 3 5 5 6 8 9 13 12 9 6 3 
Forest 921 931 922 894 870 812 792 873 951 ¡ 0 2 6 1053 ¡ 0 8 0 
Others 998 959 917 872 866 856 862 861 867 880 921 962 
Total 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 
SOx total MtS 22.7 
H F C M t C eq. 19 
P F C MtC eq. 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
3.20 
0.00 
3.20 
74 
2.6 
17.0 
58 
13 
23 
3.41 
0.13 
3.54 
84 
2.8 
12.5 
110 
13 
14 
3.58 
0.24 
3.82 
97 
3.0 
6.2 
108 
11 
5 
3.55 
0.24 
3.79 
104 
3.2 
5.4 
115 
9 
6 
3.56 
0.15 
3.71 
127 
3.7 
5.0 
¡ 1 8 
3.72 
0.03 
3.75 
145 
4.0 
5.2 
¡ 2 2 
9 
9 
3.78 
0.01 
3.79 
¡ 6 3 
4.1 
5 . ¡ 
¡ 2 3 
10 
¡1 
3.86 
-0.08 
3.78 
174 
4.1 
5.2 
¡ 2 3 
12 
13 
3.94 
-0.23 
3.71 
179 
4.2 
5.5 
124 
13 
16 
3.99 
-0.39 
3.60 
182 
4.4 
5.9 
125 
14 
18 
4.04 
-0.55 
3.49 
185 
4.5 
6.2 
125 
16 
20 
458 Statistical Table 
Scenario A l v l - M i n i C A M 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 20S0 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 425 426 433 434 431 423 408 392 374 357 340 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.4 2.1 3.5 5.1 6.9 10.0 13.6 17.7 21.8 26.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Soiids ¡ 3 ¡ 0 8 7 7 6 6 4 3 3 3 2 
Liquids 18 11 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 
Gas 19 14 13 15 17 16 14 15 16 17 16 15 
Electricity 6 8 11 17 21 25 28 30 31 33 33 34 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 56 44 41 49 54 57 58 59 61 64 63 62 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 18 17 17 19 27 32 34 26 21 18 18 17 
Oi l 20 13 10 11 7 6 8 10 12 13 13 13 
Gas 26 20 2Î 29 32 33 31 32 . 34 34 32 29 
Nucleiir 3 4 6 8 10 10 11 9 8 9 9 9 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 
Total 70 57 58 73 83 90 93 91 89 90 87 85 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G l C 1.3 12.3 21.4 31.6 44.0 57.9 72.3 86.2 99.5 112.0 123.0 131.9 
Carbon Sequestradon GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 294 305 317 321 317 304 263 221 180 157 134 
Grasslands 395 410 454 527 612 678 725 671 602 517 491 465 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forest 1007 1016 996 945 866 808 769 865 970 1086 1104 1122 
Others 691 657 623 587 577 574 579 579 584 594 625 657 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G l C 1.30 0.91 0.87 1.05 1.22 1.33 1,36 1,26 1.20 1.18 1,16 1,15 
Outer C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.12 0,07 0,11 0.09 0.03 -0.16 -0.35 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.91 1.13 1.34 1.44 1.43 1,37 1.29 1.20 1,00 0.80 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 48 64 78 89 98 99 101 106 113 120 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.4 1,6 1,6 1.5 1,5 1,5 1.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.2 10.4 11.8 11,2 8,6 4.6 2.3 1,8 1.9 2.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 19 29 31 32 33 33 34 33 31 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 5 8 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 8 10 14 18 21 19 15 14 10 11 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
Statistical Table 459 
Scenario Mvl-MiniCAIH 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MilUon 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
EJ 
EJ 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
2790 3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
1.4 3.1 6.5 11.7 23.9 40.4 61.1 86.2 112.1 138.8 165.9 195.4 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 29 39 51 60 66 68 52 41 35 31 27 
14 19 25 35 44 57 74 86 96 104 106 108 
2 5 9 13 18 21 23 29 33 37 36 35 
4 10 22 39 64 93 124 149 169 184 192 200 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 62 95 138 186 237 290 316 339 359 364 370 
26 42 62 87 116 137 149 122 102 92 85 77 
16 20 27 37 42 54 73 92 105 112 114 115 
3 8 20 38 59 79 99 121 135 141 132 124 
1 4 8 14 25 37 50 49 50 53 55 57 
0 2 5 8 12 16 19 25 27 27 25 24 
3 4 5 6 10 16 24 35 45 53 59 65 
49 79 126 190 264 339 415 443 464 477 470 462 
Z J 
0.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 2.7 4.0 5.4 6.7 7.8 8.8 9.6 10.5 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.3 3.2 4.1 5.2 6.3 7.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.0 6.4 7.7 9.1 
GtC 1.5 19.3 43.4 76.7 121.5 177.0 241.6 309.9 377.3 443.5 507.1 566.8 
389 400 410 420 424 419 407 365 32) 276 243 211 
508 524 555 603 653 694 726 719 702 674 649 624 
0 0 1 2 3 3 3 6 6 2 1 -1 
1168 1144 1102 1044 990 952 929 973 1034 1113 1172 1231 
664 632 601 568 559 557 563 562 567 577 607 637 
2729 2699 2669 2638 2628 2624 2627 2625 2630 2642 2672 2702 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.58 3.64 4.77 5.80 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.25 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.77 3.90 5.05 6.04 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 134 145 161 176 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.2 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 34.8 45.1 44.1 37.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
6.72 
0.16 
6.87 
189 
4.7 
25.1 
224 
35 
50 
6.69 
0.10 
6.79 
180 
4.9 
16.4 
292 
39 
55 
6.66 
0.03 
6.68 
174 
4.9 
11.3 
292 
43 
48 
6.62 
-0.06 
6.56 
173 
5.0 
9.8 
285 
46 
35 
6.39 
-0.23 
6.17 
174 
5.2 
9.5 
275 
48 
33 
6.17 
-0.39 
5.78 
174 
5.4 
9.1 
262 
46 
37 
460 Statistical Table 
Scenario A l v l - M i n i C A M 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Popuiation M i ü i o n 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
E J 
E J 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Soiids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Z J 
GtC 
GtC 
Miiiion ha 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1236 1541 ¡ 8 7 6 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
1.9 
na 
2.8 
na 
4.6 
na 
7.4 
na 
15.4 
na 
27.2 
na 
42.5 
na 
67.0 
na 
94.1 
na 
123.7 155.2 
na na 
190.4 
na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 6 9 12 15 13 11 11 10 10 
17 21 26 33 40 56 78 99 118 136 146 156 
5 6 9 13 21 26 29 38 46 54 55 56 
3 6 9 15 29 47 70 96 120 143 159 176 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 35 49 67 99 141 192 245 296 344 371 399 
4 5 8 11 22 34 48 50 52 53 52 52 
20 22 27 34 41 57 82 105 127 146 156 166 
7 9 14 23 40 55 70 95 116 133 134 136 
0 2 4 5 12 19 27 29 34 40 45 50 
0 1 1 2 4 6 9 12 15 15 15 15 
5 6 8 11 15 19 24 33 40 47 53 60 
35 45 62 86 133 190 258 324 383 434 456 478 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.7 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.3 3.3 4.5 5.8 7.4 8.9 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.8 5.0 6.3 7.7 
1.4 17.8 36.7 58.8 86.9 121.3 162.6 210.9 265.7 325.7 387.2 447.1 
391 363 347 344 334 320 303 272 240 207 180 152 
1510 1594 1727 1906 2102 2257 2373 2296 2170 1996 1880 1763 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 
3641 3591 3480 3308 3121 2975 2868 2970 3128 3341 3487 3633 
1957 1884 1800 1707 1674 1661 1668 1664 1673 1695 1766 1837 
7499 7432 7354 7266 7231 7213 7212 7204 7213 7240 7313 7385 
0.72 1.01 1.22 1.54 2.20 3.02 4.00 4.88 5.66 6.32 6.65 7.00 
0.73 0.82 0.72 0.95 0.91 0.76 0.48 0.31 0.12 -0.09 -0.58 -1.08 
1.45 1.83 1.94 2.49 3.11 3.77 4.48 .5.19 5.77 6.23 6.07 5.92 
77 85 89 99 118 130 134 144 150 154 157 160 
1.2 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 
10.5 12.8 13.7 14.8 15.3 16.1 17,0 12.4 9.6 8.4 8.3 8.1 
0 2 15 39 81 139 184 205 210 210 206 196 
4 4 5 9 14 19 23 26 28 30 31 30 
3 5 10 14 19 32 40 42 37 23 24 26 
Statistical Table 461 
Scenario Alv2-MiniCAM 
World 
Popuîat ion Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5293 5953 6597 7228 7725 8113 8393 8413 8359 8229 8001 7780 
20.7 27.4 36.7 48.4 67.6 91.5 120.2 157.1 197.2 240.8 287.8 339.7 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 56 68 81 98 110 119 97 82 75 72 68 
121 123 130 143 145 164 201 232 262 292 315 337 
52 62 77 97 108 113 112 129 148 168 170 172 
35 52 80 117 163 214 272 325 374 420 460 .501 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 293 355 438 513 602 705 783 866 955 1016 1078 
88 
131 
112 137 163 220 264 295 258 232 217 210 203 
132 139 151 140 154 195 236 273 308 332 356 
70 84 122 183 221 252 277 328 370 405 403 401 
24 25 32 44 62 80 98 98 104 115 128 140 
0 6 11 17 24 30 37 49 54 54 53 51 
24 24 27 31 39 51 66 89 110 129 148 167 
336 384 468 589 705 831 968 ¡ 0 5 7 ¡ ¡ 4 4 1227 1273 1318 
0.1 1.2 2.4 3.9 6.0 8.4 11.1 13.8 16.2 18.5 20.6 22.7 
O.I 1.5 2.8 4.3 5.7 7.2 8.9 11.2 ¡ 3 . 7 ¡ 6 . 6 ¡ 9 . 8 23.1 
0.1 0.9 2.0 3.4 5.5 7.9 10.5 13.7 17.2 21.0 25.0 29.0 
7.1 82.4 168.5 271.7 395.5 536.0 690.4 853.3 1019.8 1189.0 ¡ 3 5 6 . 5 1518.5 
1472 1456 ¡ 4 5 7 1477 1472 1439 1378 1226 1081 943 847 752 
3209 3344 3588 3941 4316 4609 4820 4651 4417 4119 3975 3832 
0 2 5 11 14 18 20 31 31 20 15 10 
4173 4215 4142 3957 3630 3376 3193 3517 3876 4272 4349 4425 
4310 4148 3971 3779 3732 3723 3753 3739 3758 3810 3978 4145 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.18 9.91 11.81 13.54 
Other C 0 2 GtC ! .¡¡ 1.07 1.05 1.51 1.52 1.24 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.23 11.42 13.34 14.78 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 353 400 453 504 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.0 9.2 10.7 12.4 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 76.3 82.8 86.0 81.7 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 791 337 369 482 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 31 43 61 77 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 43 48 66 99 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
15.39 
0.71 
16.10 
541 
14.0 
69.9 
566 
89 
119 
15.95 
0.53 
16.49 
545 
14.6 
49.2 
654 
97 
127 
16.62 
0.18 
16.80 
550 
15.0 
35.3 
659 
106 
113 
17.39 
-0.35 
17.04 
556 
15.3 
28.2 
654 
114 
17.79 
-1.32 
16.47 
565 
16.2 
27.0 
639 
119 
18.22 
-2.29 
15.93 
574 
17.2 
25.7 
614 
115 
95 
462 Statistical Table 
Scenario Alv2-MiniCAM 
OECD90 
Population Million 838 870 893 906 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
E J 
E J 
ZJ 
G t C 
GtC 
MiUion ha 
16,3 
na 
0 
10 
72 
27 
22 
0 
130 
40 
76 
34 
20 
0 
12 
182 
0,0 
0,1 
0.0 
2,8 
20,5 
na 
0 
12 
71 
35 
27 
0 
145 
75 
45 
¡ 5 
2 
11 
193 
0,5 
0,8 
0,5 
33,0 
24.3 
na 
0 
12 
68 
42 
33 
0 
¡ 5 5 
43 
71 
61 
¡ 3 
3 
10 
201 
0.9 
1.6 
1.0 
Cropland 408 407 408 
Grasslands 796 820 866 
Energy Biomass 0 2 3 
Forest 921 931 922 
Others 998 963 924 
Total 3123 3123 3123 
pogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fue¡ C 0 2 G t C 2.83 3.20 3.32 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.13 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.44 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 82 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 13.1 
H F C M i C eq. ¡ 9 58 ¡ 1 0 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 13 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 14 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
27.8 
na 
0 
11 
63 
48 
38 
0 
¡ 6 0 
34 
65 
8 ¡ 
¡ 2 
¡ 0 
206 
1.3 
2.2 
1.7 
410 
933 
3 
894 
883 
3123 
3.29 
0.24 
3.53 
92 
3.0 
7.9 
¡ 0 8 
¡1 
5 
2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
902 879 851 806 763 722 683 646 
28.7 31.5 33.5 35.7 37.9 40.2 42.6 45.1 
[ta na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
¡ 0 10 10 8 6 6 5 5 
57 47 49 49 49 50 50 50 
48 43 39 41 44 48 47 46 
40 45 49 49 50 50 51 51 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
¡ 5 5 ¡ 4 5 146 147 149 ¡ 5 3 ¡ 5 2 152 
36 4 ¡ 43 38 35 32 32 32 
57 43 44 43 43 44 44 44 
80 75 69 72 ,75 77 74 71 
¡ 2 ¡ 2 ¡¡ ¡ 0 ¡ 0 ¡ 0 ¡¡ ¡ 2 
4 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 
¡ 0 ¡ 0 ¡¡ ¡ 2 ¡4 ¡5 ¡ 6 ¡8 
199 185 184 182 182 184 182 181 
1.5 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.9 4.2 
2.5 3.3 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 5,9 
2.1 3.2 4.0 4.7 5.4 6.2 6.9 7.7 
135.8 168.6 199.5 229.3 258.1 285.5 3 Ü . 0 334,6 
406 386 362 318 281 251 226 201 
966 1049 ¡ 0 8 2 ¡ 0 4 8 1008 962 936 911 
3 5 5 7 7 5 4 2 
869 811 792 871 943 1009 1022 1035 
878 873 881 878 883 895 935 974 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
3 . ¡ 9 3.00 3.00 2.92 2.88 2.87 2.82 2,78 
0.23 0.14 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.21 -0.37 -0,52 
3.42 3.14 3.03 2.94 2.82 2.65 2.45 2.26 
96 Ü O ¡ 2 0 127 ¡ 3 5 ¡ 4 2 ¡ 4 6 ¡51 
3.2 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.6 
6.5 5.5 4.8 4.3 4 . ¡ 4.2 4.3 4.4 
¡ ¡ 5 ¡ ¡ 8 122 ¡ 2 3 ¡ 2 3 ¡ 2 4 ¡ 2 5 125 
9 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 
6 7 9 И 13 16 18 20 
Statistical Table 463 
Scenario Alv2-MiniCAM 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 446 460 470 466 454 434 408 380 352 326 .301 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.4 2.2 3.4 4.6 5.9 7.2 8.4 9.4 10.7 12.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 11 10 10 10 10 9 7 5 4 4 3 
Liquids 18 13 11 13 13 13 14 14 14 13 13 13 
Gas 19 16 16 21 23 23 21 21 22 22 20 19 
Electricity 6 9 15 24 29 35 40 41 40 39 40 40 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 56 48 52 67 75 80 84 83 81 78 77 75 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 19 22 26 37 43 44 36 29 22 18 13 
Oil 20 15 13 15 10 8 10 11 13 14 15 16 
Gas 26 22 26 40 45 46 44 45 45 43 39 36 
Nuclear 3 4 7 11 14 15 15 13 11 11 Ij 11 
Biomass 0 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 5 7 9 11 12 13 14 15 
Total 70 64 73 99 113 122 127 122 115 107 100 94 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 Û.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0 7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.1 34.5 50.3 68.3 87.0 105.0 121.5 135.9 147.5 156.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
284 291 300 312 318 315 304 265 227 189 170 152 
395 410 452 521 601 662 704 652 590 519 505 491 
0 0 1 3 5 6 6 7 6 2 1 -1 
1007 1016 996 946 867 808 770 863 960 1063 1066 1069 
691 660 628 595 588 587 593 .591 595 605 635 666 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 
CH4 total MtCH4 47 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 
P F C M t C eq. 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
0.91 
0.00 
0.91 
39 
0.6 
l l .O 
4 
4 
6 
1.01 
0.03 
I. 04 
49 
0.7 
II. 5 
8 
5 
8 
1.36 
0.08 
1.44 
67 
0 9 
12.6 
19 
8 
10 
1.61 
0.12 
1.73 
81 
1.1 
14.8 
29 
14 
14 
1.75 
0.12 
1.87 
91 
1.4 
14.8 
31 
20 
18 
1.80 
0.06 
1.86 
97 
1.6 
12.6 
32 
21 
21 
1.64 
0.10 
1.74 
101 
1.6 
7.5 
33 
22 
19 
1.48 
0.08 
1.56 
99 
1,5 
4.2 
33 
23 
15 
1.30 
0.01 
1.31 
93 
1.5 
2.7 
34 
24 
14 
1.18 
-0.17 
1.01 
91 
1.6 
2.5 
33 
25 
10 
1.07 
-0.35 
0.72 
90 
1.7 
2.2 
31 
24 
11 
464 Statistical Table 
Scenario Alv2-lVIiniCAM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3165 3517 3847 4078 4237 4322 4242 4123 3965 3779 3597 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
1.4 3.1 6.3 11.1 20.7 32.7 46.9 63.7 81.5 100.2 119.0 139,5 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 30 42 55 70 81 88 71 60 55 52 49 
14 19 25 34 42 53 69 80 91 101 108 114 
2 5 9 13 17 19 21 27 32 38 38 39 
4 11 22 40 64 91 122 152 179 203 219 236 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 64 98 142 192 244 299 330 362 397 417 438 
Coal 26 43 65 91 125 151 168 141 124 116 112 107 
Oi l 16 20 27 37 41 51 67 86 102 113 119 125 
Gas 3 8 20 37 57 77 96 121 - 140 153 150 146 
Nuclear 1 4 8 14 25 36 48 49 53 58 63 68 
Biomass 0 2 5 9 13 16 20 27 31 31 30 29 
Other Renewables 3 4 5 6 10 15 23 35 46 56 65 74 
Total 49 81 130 195 270 346 422 460 495 527 538 549 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.9 4.3 5.8 7.3 8.6 9.9 11.0 12.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.2 7.3 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.5 3.7 5.0 6.4 7.9 9.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.5 77.3 123.0 180.2 247.1 318.5 390.0 462.4 534.5 604.7 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 389 397 406 415 420 417 406 366 326 286 259 232 
Grasslands 508 523 553 598 642 678 706 698 682 658 640 622 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 4 6 8 9 16 18 13 11 9 
Forest 1168 1146 1108 1052 1001 964 943 983 1038 1108 1156 1204 
Others 664 635 606 575 569 569 575 573 577 586 615 644 
Total 2729 2702 2674 2645 2638 2636 2639 2637 2641 2652 2681 2710 
jogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.61 3.70 4.90 5.99 6.99 7.03 7.15 7.35 7.33 7.31 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.03 -0.06 -0.21 -0.37 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.80 3.96 5.18 6.24 7.15 7.13 7.18 7.30 7.12 6.94 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 133 144 160 174 187 174 169 171 171 172 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 34.9 44.6 46.3 42.4 32.7 20.9 13.2 9.6 9.0 8.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 18 45 92 153 224 292 292 285 275 262 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 8 15 23 30 35 39 43 46 48 46 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 19 28 42 50 55 48 35 33 37 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
Statistical Table 
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Scenario Alv2.MiniCAM 199O 20OO 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total MtN20-N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1236 1472 1727 2004 2282 2543 
1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 13.9 22,8 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 6 8 10 
17 21 26 33 39 51 
5 7 10 15 22 27 
3 6 10 15 28 43 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 36 50 69 96 132 
4 6 8 11 20 30 
20 22 27 34 40 53 
7 9 15 25 40 54 
0 2 4 6 11 17 
0 1 1 2 4 5 
5 6 8 11 14 18 
35 46 64 89 129 178 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0,7 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1,7 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1,3 
1.4 17.8 36.7 58.8 86 3 118,9 
391 360 343 340 333 321 
1510 1591 1718 1890 2074 2220 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
3641 3597 3494 3329 3150 3010 
1957 1890 1813 1726 1702 1694 
7499 7438 7367 7285 7258 7246 
0.72 1.01 1.23 1.56 2.11 2,79 
0.73 0.82 0.71 0.93 0.89 0,73 
1.45 1.83 1.94 2.49 3.00 3,52 
77 85 89 98 116 129 
1.2 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.7 3,3 
10.5 12.8 13.8 14,8 15,5 16,1 
0 2 15 39 81 139 
4 4 5 9 14 19 
3 5 10 14 19 32 
2785 2957 3092 3190 3213 3236 
33,9 50.5 69.5 91.0 115.5 143.1 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 11 10 10 11 11 
70 89 109 128 145 161 
31 40 50 61 64 68 
62 83 106 128 151 174 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
175 223 274 327 370 413 
40 42 44 46 48 51 
74 95 116 137 154 171 
67 90 111 132 140 148 
23 26 30 36 43 50 
7 10 12 14 14 14 
23 30 37 44 52 59 
235 293 351 409 452 494 
1.0 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.8 3,2 
2.3 3.2 4.2 5.4 6.9 8.5 
1.8 2.7 3.7 4.9 6.3 7.6 
156.9 200.5 250.1 305.2 363,5 423.0 
306 277 247 216 192 168 
2327 2253 2137 1980 1894 1808 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2911 3011 3158 3351 3464 3576 
1704 1697 1704 1724 1793 1861 
7248 7238 7246 7271 7342 7413 
3.60 4.36 5.12 5,88 6,46 7.07 
0.46 0.31 0.13 -0.09 -0.57 -1.05 
4.06 4.67 5.24 5,78 5.88 6.02 
137 142 147 151 156 162 
3.9 4.2 4.4 4,6 5.0 5.4 
16.7 13.5 10.8 8.6 8.2 7.7 
184 205 210 210 206 196 
23 26 28 30 31 30 
40 42 37 23 24 26 
466 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-AIM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6132 7165 8198 9231 10208 11287 12008 12776 13536 14281 15068 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion USS 20.1 25.1 31.8 40.2 50.7 63.9 80.7 101.2 126.9 157.7 194.3 239.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commei'cial 50 57 69 68 69 62 55 36 24 0 0 0 
Solids 36 48 65 79 95 108 121 131 141 1.50 157 165 
Liquids 111 115 135 162 190 204 220 244 270 308 360 421 
Gas 51 56 80 101 129 147 167 177 186 201 220 241 
Electricity 38 51 69 88 116 145 181 226 283 348 420 507 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standar'dized) 
285 327 418 499 599 668 744 824 911 1024 1169 1334 
93 119 177 230 301 344 396 477 575 692 837 1016 
143 155 179 182 176 163 152 134 121 107 92 80 
73 96 133 170 216 244 276 292 • • 309 334 368 406 
6 9 11 14 16 27 48 65 88 116 150 195 
50 48 38 66 99 119 143 161 181 194 199 203 
10 11 13 15 20 25 31 45 67 91 112 140 
376 438 551 677 829 921 1046 1173 1341 1535 1758 2040 
0.1 1.2 2.6 4.7 7.3 10.2 14.3 18.5 23.9 30.4 38.1 47.7 
0.1 1.6 3.3 5.1 6.9 8.3 10.2 11.4 12.7 14.0 14.9 16.0 
0.1 0.9 2.1 3.6 5.5 7.6 10.4 12.9 16.0 19.4 22.8 26.9 
7.1 82.4 
1459 1484 
3389 3411 
0 0 
4296 4248 
3805 3805 
173.4 281.3 406.7 551.9 714.6 898.1 1105.7 1342.9 1617.6 1937.8 
1518 1551 1586 1623 1660 1702 1744 1787 1833 1879 
3446 3478 3510 3546 3582 361! 3640 3664 3683 3701 
0 89 194 252 311 316 322 314 291 268 
4217 4254 4301 4307 4314 4306 4299 4292 4285 4277 
3768 3577 3359 3220 3082 3013 2944 2892 2858 2823 
¡ 2 9 4 9 ¡ 2 9 4 9 /2949 /2949 /2949 ¡ 2 9 4 9 ¡ 2 9 4 9 ¡ 2 9 4 9 ¡ 2 9 4 9 12949 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 9.30 ¡ ¡ . 2 9 
Other C 0 2 GtC L U 1,07 0.92 0.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 10.22 ¡ 1 . 3 6 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 362 385 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.4 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 86.7 105.0 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 785 292 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 41 51 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 50 64 
C O M t C O 879 877 983 952 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 183 205 
NOx MtN 31 32 37 42 
¡ 3 . 7 0 ¡ 5 . 0 5 ¡ 6 . 6 0 18.73 2 ¡ .20 24.41 28.56 33.43 
0.02 0.26 0.64 0.74 0.87 0.97 1.00 1.04 
¡ 3 . 7 2 15.31 17.23 19.47 22.07 25.38 29.56 34.47 
4 ¡ 2 422 434 457 48 ¡ 505 526 549 
7.6 7.9 8.1 8.4 8.8 9.1 9.5 9.8 
132.8 135.1 140.7 151.9 165.1 148.0 И З . З 92.9 
258 291 312 384 457 549 662 753 
64 77 92 113 129 148 168 178 
75 89 104 122 129 135 153 165 
¡ 0 2 9 ¡ ¡ 0 ¡ ¡ ¡ 7 9 ¡ 2 6 8 ¡ 3 6 6 1500 ¡ 6 7 9 ¡881 
230 225 221 208 197 186 177 169 
47 48 50 53 56 60 65 71 
Statistical Table 467 
Scenario A2-AIM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Populalion Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
859 914 966 1018 1071 n i l 
15.3 18.6 21.9 25.5 29.7 34.2 
6 2 1 0 0 0 
10 14 16 18 20 21 
64 69 72 82 88 87 
25 31 38 44 49 51 
22 27 32 37 44 50 
127 142 158 181 201 209 
41 46 60 70 80 86 
76 83 84 84 74 61 
34 46 54 62 70 72 
5 7 8 9 9 11 
6 1 0 6 15 20 
6 6 7 8 10 12 
167 189 211 238 257 262 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.1 
0.1 0.9 1.7 2.5 3.3 3.9 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 2.8 
2.8 33.0 66.7 104.0 144.7 188.0 
381 384 391 398 405 413 
760 765 775 786 797 813 
0 0 0 17 37 48 
1050 1062 1080 1109 1137 1137 
838 818 783 720 652 617 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
2.83 3.20 3.62 4.08 4.41 4.48 
0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 -0.(8 -0.04 
2.83 3.20 3.55 3.90 4.23 4.44 
73 74 74 74 75 69 
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 
22.7 17.0 11.1 8.6 9.2 9.6 
19 57 107 103 m 116 
18 13 14 14 14 14 
23 23 25 28 29 29 
179 161 189 216 251 265 
42 36 37 38 39 35 
13 12 12 12 12 10 
1152 1218 1288 1357 1425 ¡ 4 9 6 
39.4 45.8 53.2 62.3 73.4 86.6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 22 23 23 24 25 
87 88 89 95 106 118 
52 52 51 53 57 61 
57 66 76 88 102 118 
217 228 240 259 289 322 
92 106 122 147 187 238 
50 36 26 19 13 9 
75 73 71 73 79 85 
14 18 22 28 35 45 
27 31 35 37 38 39 
13 18 23 28 31 34 
272 281 299 331 383 450 
4.1 5.1 6.2 7.6 9.4 11.5 
4.6 4.9 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 
3.6 4.3 5.0 5.8 6.5 7.4 
233.4 280.7 329.4 381.3 439.7 507.3 
422 432 442 453 465 477 
830 841 853 860 864 867 
59 61 62 60 56 51 
11.36 1136 1135 1133 1131 1128 
582 560 537 522 513 504 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
4.55 4.70 4.86 5..32 6.17 7.15 
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
4.65 4.80 4.95 5.42 6.27 7,26 
64 66 67 70 73 76 
2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 
10.1 l l .O 12.0 13.7 16.1 19.0 
125 130 135 142 151 160 
14 13 11 13 15 17 
28 26 20 12 14 16 
280 294 307 331 365 404 
32 26 21 20 22 24 
9 9 10 10 1] 13 
468 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-AIM 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MiUion 413 428 444 460 476 497 519 555 593 630 667 706 
GNP/GDP ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.7 4.9 6.4 8.4 10.8 13.9 
GNP/GDP (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 7 10 И 13 14 15 15 16 16 16 17 
Liquids 19 9 8 8 8 8 7 8 9 10 12 14 
Gas 19 13 18 22 27 31 36 37 39 42 46 51 
Electricity 8 9 12 14 16 20 25 30 37 44 52 61 
Others 
Total 58 43 48 55 64 72 82 91 101 113 127 143 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 23 28 33 36 39 49 62 83 118 166 
Oil 22 13 11 10 9 8 7 5 3 2 1 1 
Gas 26 21 27 32 37 40 44 46 47 51 56 61 
Nuclear I 1 2 2 2 4 7 9 12 15 19 24 
Biomass 2 4 0 1 3 5 6 7 8 9 9 9 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 7 10 13 16 
Total 71 58 63 75 85 94 106 121 141 170 215 277 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.5 4.6 6.0 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.5 
Cumulative COÏ Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.5 34.0 46.5 60.7 76.6 94.8 116.2 141.8 173.5 213.4 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 268 270 276 282 288 295 302 309 317 325 333 341 
Grasslands 341 362 366 370 373 376 379 382 385 387 390 392 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 4 9 11 14 14 14 14 13 12 
Forest 966 950 936 938 941 942 942 936 929 924 920 915 
Others 701 694 698 682 665 651 638 634 630 626 621 615 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossi! Fuel C02 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.11 1.30 1.47 1.59 1.73 1.98 2.27 2.73 3.45 4.36 
Other C02 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 
Total C02 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.13 1.16 1.35 1.50 1.68 1.97 2.31 2.80 3.54 4.45 
CH4 total MtCH4 47 39 48 47 45 46 46 53 60 69 79 90 
N20 total MtN20-N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 14.8 17.4 15.3 10.4 7.0 6.4 5.9 6.8 9.5 13.0 
HFC M t C eq. 0 4 8 13 20 27 31 37 41 44 48 52 
PFC M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 17 20 25 30 35 40 42 
SP6 M t C eq. 8 6 7 10 12 15 19 24 28 32 36 38 
CO MtCO 69 41 41 43 46 47 48 50 53 57 62 68 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 14 14 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Statistical Table 469 
Scenario А2-АШ 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 2798 3278 3783 4288 4793 5255 5762 6065 6385 670 ¡ 7013 7339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 1.4 2.3 3.4 5.1 7.4 ¡ 0 . 4 ¡4 .5 19.4 25.9 33.7 42.9 54.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 28 31 37 35 35 30 26 14 7 0 0 0 
Solids 1,5 24 33 41 50 57 67 72 79 84 90 95 
Liquids U 16 22 30 41 47 54 62 71 83 99 l ¡ 8 
Gas 2 3 6 9 14 ¡ 7 2 ¡ 24 26 28 30 31 
Electricity 5 8 14 21 33 42 55 72 94 119 147 181 
Others 
Tola! 61 82 114 ¡ 3 6 172 ¡ 9 6 223 250 28 ¡ 320 369 426 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 30 46 72 95 130 ¡ 4 8 168 203 245 291 338 393 
Oil 17 24 34 37 38 36 33 28 24 20 15 11 
Gas 4 9 16 23 36 46 58 64 71 78 85 92 
Nuclear 0 1 1 2 3 7 15 21 30 40 53 70 
Biomass 28 24 19 2 ¡ 21 26 33 37 42 45 46 47 
Other Renewables 1 2 2 2 4 5 7 12 20 29 37 48 
Total SO 106 144 180 233 267 314 365 431 502 574 662 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.8 3.0 4.2 6.0 7.7 ¡ 0 . 0 12.7 15.8 19.7 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.1 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.8 3.6 4.4 5.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 44.2 76.0 ¡ ¡ 6 . 3 166. ¡ 223.4 289.9 366.7 455.2 556.7 672.7 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 438 440 451 462 473 485 
Grasslands 608 607 612 6 ¡ 6 62 ¡ 625 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 21 45 58 
Forest 535 523 515 529 542 544 
Others 583 593 586 537 484 452 
Total 2164 2 ¡ 6 4 2164 2164 2 ¡ 6 4 2164 
pogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 ¡ .78 2.68 3.44 4.59 5.16 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.26 -0.03 0.07 0.16 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.94 3.41 4.65 5.31 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 ¡ 2 5 1 4 ¡ 154 ¡ 7 ¡ 1 8 ¡ 
N 2 0 total MtN20-N 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 
SOx total MtS ¡ 7 . 7 25.3 38.6 52.7 71.2 70.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 ¡1 18 27 38 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 1 ¡ ¡5 20 25 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 И 16 20 27 
C O M t C O 235 270 304 302 352 383 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 51 60 70 69 
NOx M t N 7 9 ¡¡ ¡ 4 ¡ 7 19 
497 
629 
72 
546 
421 
2164 
5.80 
0.37 
6.16 
¡ 9 2 
3.1 
69.2 
54 
32 
34 
417 
69 
21 
509 
633 
73 
546 
402 
2164 
6.7 ¡ 
0.41 
7 . ¡ 2 
203 
3.2 
70.0 
77 
42 
43 
452 
65 
22 
522 
637 
74 
547 
384 
2 ¡ 6 4 
7.77 
0.47 
8.24 
214 
3.4 
70.7 
100 
49 
49 
491 
62 
22 
535 
641 
72 
548 
368 
2164 
8.96 
0.51 
9.47 
223 
3.5 
56.8 
130 
56 
55 
543 
57 
23 
549 
644 
67 
548 
356 
2164 
¡ 0 . 3 0 
0.53 
10.83 
229 
3.7 
36.3 
167 
64 
62 
615 
52 
24 
562 
648 
6 í 
548 
344 
2164 
¡ ¡ . 8 3 
0.55 
¡ 2 . 3 8 
236 
3.8 
23.4 
204 
67 
67 
696 
47 
25 
470 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-AIM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1192 1512 1972 2432 2892 3338 
2.4 3.4 5.4 8.1 11.5 16.3 
14 20 31 33 34 32 
1 3 6 9 13 16 
17 22 33 42 53 62 
4 9 18 27 39 48 
4 7 11 16 23 32 
40 60 99 126 163 190 
5 10 23 37 58 75 
27 35 50 52 55 59 
9 20 37 53 74 86 
0 0 1 1 2 5 
14 18 19 37 60 68 
2 2 3 3 4 6 
57 85 132 184 254 297 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.6 
0.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.3 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 
1.4 17.8 39.9 67.3 99.3 137.0 
371 390 400 409 419 430 
1680 1677 1693 1706 1719 1732 
0 0 0 47 103 134 
1745 1712 1686 1678 1680 1685 
1684 1700 1701 1639 1558 1499 
5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
0.72 1.01 1.88 2.47 3.23 3.83 
0.73 0.82 0.71 0.42 0.26 0.24 
1.45 1.83 2.59 2.89 3.49 4.06 
77 85 99 109 121 126 
1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 
10.5 12.8 19.3 23.4 34.2 42.0 
0 2 19 32 49 69 
4 4 8 12 16 21 
3 5 7 10 13 18 
396 404 449 391 380 405 
48 55 80 94 107 107 
7 8 10 12 14 15 
3854 4169 4510 4847 5176 5527 
23.1 30.8 41.1 53.2 66.9 84.2 
29 22 17 0 0 0 
19 21 24 26 27 29 
72 85 100 119 143 171 
58 64 70 78 87 97 
44 58 76 96 119 146 
221 253 289 332 384 444 
97 119 145 171 194 220 
62 65 67 66 62 58 
100 109 , 120 133 149 167 
12 17 24 33 43 56 
76 86 97 104 106 109 
7 11 17 24 31 41 
354 406 470 531 586 651 
2.6 3.6 4.9 6.5 8.3 1.7 
3.0 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.5 6.7 
3.3 4.2 5.4 6.7 8.1 12.5 
181.1 232.7 293.4 364.7 447.8 544.3 
440 451 462 474 486 498 
1744 1755 1765 1775 1785 1794 
166 169 172 168 155 143 
1689 1689 1688 1687 1686 1685 
1440 1416 1392 1376 1368 1359 
5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
4.52 5.34 6.29 7.39 8.64 10.10 
0.22 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.28 
4.75 5.58 6.57 7.69 8.93 10.38 
131 135 140 143 145 148 
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 
51.4 61.5 73.5 67.8 48.3 34.5 
98 139 181 233 295 336 
26 34 39 45 50 52 
23 29 32 37 41 43 
434 472 516 569 636 714 
107 104 102 97 91 86 
17 19 21 24 27 30 
Statistical Table 471 
Marker Scenario A2-ASF 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5282 6170 7188 8206 9170 10715 11296 12139 12587 13828 14743 1.5068 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 20.1 25.2 31.9 40.5 51.2 72.3 81.6 101.9 114.1 159.3 218.4 242.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 52 51 58 65 61 58 55 58 61 63 65 67 
Liquids 117 150 187 246 275 304 334 371 408 469 552 635 
Gas 49 53 65 92 124 155 187 209 231 246 254 262 
Electricity 41 48 63 85 125 164 204 247 290 343 405 468 
Others 
Total 257 303 373 488 585 682 779 884 990 1120 1276 1431 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 92 90 106 129 184 239 294 415 536 658 781 904 
Oil 134 172 220 291 270 249 228 148 69 23 12 0 
Gas 71 74 89 126 176 225 275 297 319 330 331 331 
Nuclear 8 13 14 17 32 47 62 87 112 147 190 234 
Biomass 0 0 6 12 32 52 71 92 112 130 146 162 
Other Renewables 8 И 15 20 27 34 42 49 5 6 65 75 86 
Total 313 360 450 595 720 846 971 1088 1204 1353 1535 1717 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.2 4.7 6.9 9.5 13.1 17.9 31,1 38.3 46.8 
Oil 0.0 1.7 3.6 6.2 9.0 11.6 13.9 15.7 16.7 17.0 17.2 17,2 
Gas 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.7 4.2 6.2 8.7 11.6 14.7 17.9 21.3 24.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 170.2 279.3 414.2 568.2 735.7 918.6 U18.8 1339.3 1586.2 1862.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.3 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.46 11.01 13.53 15.01 16.49 18,49 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.25 1.19 1.06 0.93 0.67 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.58 12.25 14.72 16.07 17.43 19,16 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 370 424 486 542 598 654 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7,0 8.1 9.6 10,7 11.3 12.0 12,9 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 74.7 99.5 112.5 109.0 105.4 89.6 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 785 292 258 291 312 384 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 41 51 64 77 92 113 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 50 64 75 89 104 122 
C O M t C O 879 877 977 1075 1259 1344 1428 1545 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 155 179 202 214 225 238 
NOx MtN 31 32 39 50 61 66 71 75 
20.49 
0.40 
20.89 
711 
13.9 
73.7 
457 
129 
129 
1662 
251 
80 
22.97 
0.25 
23.22 
770 
14.8 
64.7 
549 
148 
135 
1842 
275 
87 
25.94 
0.21 
26.15 
829 
15.7 
62.5 
662 
168 
153 
2084 
309 
28.91 
0.18 
29.09 
889 
16.5 
60.3 
753 
178 
165 
2326 
342 
109 
472 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario A2-ASF 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 851 923 975 1027 1072 1131 1151 1202 1228 1323 1451 1496 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 15.3 18.7 22.3 26.0 30.0 37.1 39.9 46.3 50.0 63.1 80.7 87.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 pnces) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 16 
Liquids 67 85 93 99 97 94 92 95 98 109 128 146 
Gas 27 30 29 33 37 41 46 49 52 54 57 60 
Electricity 23 27 33 39 46 52 59 69 79 93 112 130 
Others 
Total 130 154 167 184 193 202 211 227 244 272 312 352 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 33 29 32 37 55 74 92 115 138 164 191 218 
Oi l 76 94 107 116 94 72 49 31 12 2 1 0 
Gas 34 37 37 43 52 61 69 72 74 75 76 77 
Nuclear- 7 10 11 11 14 17 20 27 34 45 58 72 
Biomass 0 0 1 4 10 16 23 23 23 24 26 29 
Other Renewables 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 15 17 20 23 
Total 155 176 194 220 235 250 266 281 296 326 372 418 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.1 2.9 4.0 5.3 6.8 8.6 10.6 
Oi l 0.0 0.9 1.9 3.1 4.1 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.8 6.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.5 103.8 145.7 190.6 237.2 285.6 335.8 389.1 448.0 513.7 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.51 3.96 4.42 4.58 4.74 4.93 5.11 5.55 6.23 6.91 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.51 3.96 4.42 4.58 4.74 4.93 5.11 5.55 6.23 6.91 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 78 84 91 98 105 113 121 133 149 166 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 7.9 8.7 9.3 9.5 9.8 9.3 8.8 9.1 10.5 11.8 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 107 103 111 116 125 130 135 142 151 160 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 14 14 14 14 13 11 13 15 17 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 25 28 29 29 28 26 20 12 14 16 
C O M t C O 179 161 168 175 175 158 141 147 154 174 209 243 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 40 44 46 44 42 44 45 50 58 67 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 16 17 17 16 16 16 17 19 21 
Statistical Table 473 
Marker Scenario A2-ASF 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 418 421 438 454 473 507 519 551 568 622 684 706 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.4 2.1 3.2 3.7 4.9 5.7 8.5 12.5 14.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TriUion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
SoUds 17 10 10 11 11 II 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Liquids 15 10 11 13 14 16 17 19 22 25 31 37 
Gas 15 11 13 17 22 27 32 36 40 42 44 46 
Electricity 8 6 8 11 14 16 19 22 26 31 37 43 
Others 
Total 55 38 43 52 61 70 79 89 99 110 123 137 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 23 12 13 17 19 21 23 26 30 37 48 59 
Oil 17 12 13 15 17 19 21 16 11 7 3 0 
Gas 25 19 22 29 33 37 40 43 46 49 51 52 
Nuclear 1 1 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 14 18 22 
Biomass 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 9 12 14 15 
Other Renewables I 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 
Total 67 45 52 64 74 84 93 102 111 124 139 155 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 9.1 9.5 ¡0 .1 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.0 33.2 46.3 60.6 75.6 91.3 108.3 126.6 147.1 170.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Foiest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G l C 1.30 0.91 1.03 1.22 L40 1.46 1.52 1.63 1.75 1.93 2.17 2.41 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.03 1.22 1.40 1.46 1.52 1.63 1.75 1.93 2.17 2.41 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 41 46 57 67 78 92 106 119 131 143 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 11.1 12.0 12.0 U . l 10.2 8.2 6.2 4.8 4.0 3.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 13 20 27 3 ¡ 37 41 44 48 52 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 17 20 25 30 35 40 42 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 7 ¡ 0 12 15 ¡ 9 24 28 32 36 38 
C O M t C O 69 41 40 40 47 51 56 63 70 83 101 ¡ 1 9 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 19 25 28 3 ¡ 29 27 29 33 37 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 8 
474 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario A2-ASF 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2791 3295 3801 4308 4779 5500 5764 6137 6333 6858 7214 7340 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.4 2.3 3.5 5.3 7.6 12.6 15.0 20.0 23.1 34.9 50.5 57.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commeicial 
Solids 21 28 33 38 33 27 22 22 23 23 23 23 
Liquids 13 24 39 64 77 90 103 118 134 156 185 215 
Gas 2 5 9 19 28 36 45 51 56 59 60 60 
Electricity 5 9 13 20 42 64 86 104 121 140 160 181 
Others 
Total 42 65 95 141 179 218 256 295 334 379 429 479 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 32 43 52 62 86 110 134 181 227 272 313 355 
Oil 17 30 48 77 70 64 57 35 13 1 1 0 
Gas 3 6 13 24 42 60 79 85 ' 91 93 88 84 
Nuclear 0 1 2 3 11 19 26 37 47 60 75 90 
Biomass 0 0 1 3 10 16 23 22 21 20 20 20 
Other Renewables 1 2 3 5 8 12 16 18 21 25 28 32 
Total 53 82 119 174 228 281 335 378 421 470 526 581 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.2 4.4 6.0 8.1 10.6 13.5 16.9 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.3 2.0 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.9 2.7 3.6 4.5 5.4 6.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.6 77.2 121.7 175.4 236.4 305.0 381.1 465.1 558.2 660.8 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.47 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.34 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.81 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 144 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 3.2 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 36.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 11 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 11 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 
C O M t C O 235 270 321 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 41 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 
3.52 4.64 5.45 6.27 7.08 7.90 8.79 9.75 10.71 
0.39 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 
3.92 4.99 5,73 6.48 7.23 7.98 8.83 9.78 10.74 
163 184 205 227 241 255 272 290 308 
4.0 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.2 
51.5 56.6 52.7 48.9 40.1 31.3 25.6 23.1 20.5 
18 27 38 54 77 100 130 167 204 
15 20 25 32 42 49 56 64 67 
16 20 27 34 43 49 55 62 67 
361 435 479 522 576 630 707 806 906 
46 50 53 56 60 64 69 76 82 
16 20 23 26 28 30 33 36 40 
Statistical Table 475 
Marker Scenario A2-ASF 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MilUon 1222 1530 1974 2417 2846 3578 3862 4250 4458 5025 5394 5526 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TriUion USS 2.4 3.4 5.1 7.8 11.5 19.3 23.0 30.6 35.4 52.9 74.7 83.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 1 1 3 5 7 8 10 12 13 14 16 
Liquids 
Gas 
21 31 45 70 87 104 121 138 155 178 208 238 
5 8 13 24 37 50 64 73 83 89 93 96 
Electricity 4 6 9 15 23 32 40 52 64 79 97 115 
Otiiers 
Total 31 47 69 112 153 193 234 273 313 359 411 464 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 4 7 9 14 24 35 45 92 140 185 228 272 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
24 36 53 82 88 94 100 67 34 14 7 0 
8 
0 
0 
11 
0 
0 
17 
0 
2 
29 
1 
5 
48 
4 
12 
68 
7 
19 
87 
9 
25 
97 
15 
43 
107 
20 
60 
114 
28 
74 
116 
39 
86 
118 
50 
98 
Other Renewables 1 2 
7 13 3 5 9 11 16 18 21 25 
Total 38 56 85 137 184 231 278 327 376 433 498 563 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.8 3.0 4.6 6.7 9.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.3 
0.1 
0.8 
0.2 
1.4 
0.5 
2.3 
0.9 
3.2 
1.5 
4.2 
2.2 
5.0 
3.2 
5.5 
4.2 
5.7 
5.3 
5.8 
6.4 
5.8 
7.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.1 100.5 236.7 o5.1 141.6 186.5 293.7 358.5 432.9 517.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
OtUers 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.45 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.77 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.23 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 107 
N 2 0 total MtN20-N 1.2 1.3 1.6 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 16.5 
H F C M l C eq. 0 2 19 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 8 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 7 
C O M t C O 396 404 448 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 60 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 
2.31 
0.85 
3.16 
132 
¡.9 
24,4 
32 
12 
10 
499 
70 
14 
3.08 
0.84 
3.92 
153 
2.2 
31.7 
49 
16 
13 
603 
81 
19 
3.52 
0.78 
4.30 
171 
2.5 
32.6 
69 
21 
18 
656 
89 
21 
3.96 
0.71 
4.68 
188 
2.8 
33.5 
98 
26 
23 
709 
96 
24 
4.84 
0.52 
5.36 
208 
3.1 
29.0 
139 
34 
29 
758 
106 
26 
5.72 
0.32 
6.04 
229 
3.5 
24.4 
181 
39 
32 
808 
115 
29 
6.70 
0.21 
6.91 
246 
3.8 
22.1 
233 
45 
37 
877 
127 
32 
7.79 
0.18 
7.97 
259 
4.1 
21.9 
295 
50 
41 
968 
142 
36 
8.87 
0.16 
9.03 
272 
4.4 
21.8 
336 
52 
43 
1058 
156 
40 
476 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2G-IIVIAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
E J 
E J Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
5297 
21.0 
0.0 
50 
40 
98 
50 
35 
0 
272 
82 
116 
78 
1 
6 
17 
344 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8225 
45.3 
0.0 
40 
44 
145 
108 
91 
0 
428 
101 
175 
187 
6 
40 
37 
546 
2.3 
4.3 
3.8 
11298 
111.3 
0.0 
22 
65 
203 
229 
262 
0 
781 
253 
235 
396 
46 
22 
107 
1059 
7.4 
10.5 
12.2 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 7.98 9.07 12.10 15.14 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 2.04 3.01 2.29 1.56 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 10.02 12.08 14.39 16.70 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 408 493 537 581 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 9.6 12.2 12.7 13.3 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 69.9 70.7 83.8 96.9 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 785 292 258 291 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 41 51 64 77 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 50 64 75 89 
C O M t C O 879 877 812 748 713 678 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 154 166 165 163 
N O x M t N 31 32 37 42 55 68 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18.17 
0.84 
19.01 
625 
13.9 
110.0 
312 
92 
104 
642 
161 
82 
18.05 
1.07 
19.12 
653 
14.5 
104.9 
384 
113 
122 
669 
167 
17.93 
1.30 
19.23 
681 
15.0 
99.7 
457 
129 
129 
696 
172 
78 
17.81 
1.53 
19.34 
709 
15.6 
94.6 
549 
148 
135 
723 
177 
77 
17.69 
1.76 
19.45 
737 
16.2 
89.4 
662 
168 
153 
750 
183 
75 
14719 
248.5 
0.0 
16 
99 
191 
341 
444 
0 
1092 
237 
178 
458 
71 
16 
344 
1304 
21.6 
21.5 
35.5 
7.1 82.4 172.4 282.9 415.3 570.7 749.2 9.39.9 1131.6 1324.4 1518.4 1713.4 
0.0 
0,0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17,57 
1,99 
19,56 
765 
16,7 
84,3 
753 
178 
165 
776 
188 
73 
Statistical Table 477 
Scenario A2G-IMAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
E J 
E J 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Ottiers 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
801 
16.5 
6 
7 
51 
34 
21 
119 
24 
55 
51 
1 
6 
10 
147 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
953 
30.7 
4 
7 
55 
49 
46 
161 
17 
62 
96 
22 
202 
0.5 
1.1 
2.1 
1068 
57.7 
2 
9 
56 
66 
70 
201 
23 
58 
119 
6 
2 
40 
248 
1.0 
2.4 
5.1 
1393 
109.6 
2 
17 
57 
103 
111 
289 
36 
50 
151 
11 
2 
80 
330 
2.5 
4.4 
11.4 
2.8 33.0 66.5 103.2 142.6 184.6 229.0 276.0 325.8 378.2 433.4 491.2 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.40 3.60 3.77 3.95 4.12 4.29 4.45 4.62 4.78 4.95 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.55 0.66 0.76 0.87 0.98 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.51 3.82 4.07 4.32 4.57 4.84 5.11 5.38 5.65 5.92 
CH4 total MtCH4 73 74 88 103 107 111 116 121 127 133 139 144 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 13.4 9.8 10.7 11.6 12.6 13.7 14.8 15.9 17.1 18.2 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 107 103 111 116 125 130 135 142 151 160 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 14 14 14 14 13 11 13 15 17 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 25 28 29 29 28 26 20 12 14 16 
C O M t C O 179 161 123 85 87 89 91 96 102 107 113 118 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 35 34 36 37 38 40 43 45 48 50 
NOx M t N 13 12 11 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 14 
478 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2G-IMAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 421 391 405 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.0 1.5 3.5 6.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 2 1 1 0 
Solids 11 5 3 4 
Liquids 18 15 12 9 
Gas 12 10 12 12 
Electricity 7 10 18 21 
Others 
Total 50 41 46 46 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 26 12 14 12 
Oil 26 21 21 12 
Gas 21 19 27 21 
Nuclear 
Biomass 0 0 1 2 
Non-commercial 2 1 1 0 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 2 4 9 14 
Total 78 58 71 61 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.6 
Oil 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.8 
Gas 0.0 0.5 1.2 2.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 20.2 25.5 30.0 35.3 41.2 47.5 53.4 59.1 64.4 69.5 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.65 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.47 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.22 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.28 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.66 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.49 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 44 50 49 48 48 47 47 46 45 45 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.5 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 13 20 27 31 37 41 44 48 52 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 17 20 25 30 35 40 42 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 7 10 12 15 19 24 28 32 36 38 
C O M t C O 69 41 25 10 11 12 13 12 11 10 10 9 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 12 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 
Statistical Table 479 
Scenario A2G-IMAGE I99O 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 2790 4294 5746 7284 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TriUion US$ 1.4 5.8 25.6 69.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestiation GtC 
28 
20 
14 
2 
4 
29 
17 
3 
0 
28 
2 
79 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
25 
26 
36 
35 
24 
145 
56 
40 
53 
4 
25 
6 
184 
1.2 
0.8 
0.8 
11 
35 
62 
110 
113 
331 
147 
50 
172 
28 
11 
41 
449 
4.1 
2.2 
4.0 
7 
48 
39 
144 
170 
409 
114 
20 
170 
26 
7 
141 
477 
11.9 
3.8 
13.8 
1.5 19.3 43.1 73.6 115.8 174.5 249.6 331.3 409.8 485.1 557.2 626.1 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.15 1.78 2.48 3.19 4.78 6.36 
0.37 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.32 
1.53 2.03 2.72 3.40 5.04 6.69 
113 125 156 186 216 245 
2.3 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
17.7 25.3 28.4 31.5 35.5 39.6 
0 5 11 18 27 38 
3 5 11 15 20 25 
4 7 11 16 20 27 
235 270 252 235 269 304 
33 37 40 42 46 51 
7 9 12 16 23 31 
7.95 7.62 7.29 6.96 6.63 6.30 
0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 
8.33 8.01 7.69 7.37 7.05 6.73 
275 285 295 305 316 326 
4.5 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 
43.6 38.1 32.6 27.1 21.5 16.0 
54 77 100 130 167 204 
32 42 49 56 64 67 
34 43 49 55 62 67 
339 346 353 360 368 375 
55 56 56 57 57 58 
39 37 35 32 30 28 
480 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2G-IMAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1293 2557 4093 5637 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 2.1 7.3 24.5 63.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 10 9 7 
Solids 2 6 17 30 
Liquids 15 40 74 87 
Gas 3 14 42 83 
Electricity 2 12 61 142 
Others 
Total 35 81 203 349 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 4 16 69 75 
Oil 18 51 107 96 
Gas 3 19 78 117 
Nuclear 
Biomass 0 1 11 32 
Non-commercial 14 10 9 7 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & : Hydro 3 5 18 109 
Total 41 103 291 437 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 1.4 5.6 
Oil 0.0 1.9 4.9 11.5 
Gas 0.0 0.4 1.8 7.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 1.4 17.8 42.7 80.6 126.8 176.4 229.4 285.1 342.6 402.0 463.3 526.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.45 1.89 3.12 4.34 5.56 5.67 5.78 5.89 6.00 6.11 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 1.69 2.56 1.67 0.79 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.31 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 3.14 4.45 4.79 5.13 5.47 5.66 5.85 6.04 6.22 6.41 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 120 154 165 176 187 200 212 225 237 250 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 3.2 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.1 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 17.6 22.4 30.4 38.5 46.6 45.9 45.3 44.7 44.0 43.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 19 32 49 69 98 139 181 233 295 336 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 8 12 16 21 26 34 39 45 50 52 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 7 10 13 18 23 29 32 37 41 43 
C O M t C O 396 404 412 419 346 273 201 215 230 245 260 274 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 67 79 72 65 58 60 63 66 68 71 
NOx M t N 7 8 11 14 18 23 28 28 28 28 28 29 
Statistical Table 481 
Scenario A2-MESSAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6170 7188 8206 9170 10715 11296 12139 12587 13828 14743 15068 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.9 25.2 31.9 40.5 51.2 72.3 81.6 101.9 114.1 159.3 218.4 242.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 25.7 31.2 39.7 50.5 63.3 82.2 106.0 132.2 155.2 180.1 208.0 225.6 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 38 23 26 24 22 20 18 17 16 16 15 15 
Solids 42 39 27 20 13 24 32 30 21 9 7 6 
Liquids 111 137 181 235 279 284 296 302 352 391 456 501 
Gas 41 51 58 68 85 105 132 162 145 156 143 161 
Electricity 35 46 60 82 109 147 184 230 277 337 397 459 
Others 8 11 17 28 44 65 88 113 137 158 180 200 
Total 275 306 368 457 552 645 750 855 947 1066 1197 1342 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 91 83 97 122 157 211 273 342 458 569 735 871 
Oi l 128 171 208 253 274 244 205 146 109 86 64 47 
Gas 71 86 108 135 173 208 245 292 268 285 281 289 
Nuclear 7 9 13 17 22 34 47 62 79 97 116 136 
Biomass 46 41 42 50 69 97 141 194 245 271 287 299 
Other Renewables 8 14 21 34 50 77 103 132 165 196 228 280 
Total 352 404 489 610 745 871 1014 1168 1323 1504 1710 1921 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.7 3.9 5.5 7.6 10.3 13.7 18.3 24.0 31.4 
Oil 0.0 1.5 3.2 5.3 7.8 10.5 13.0 15.0 16.5 17.6 18.4 19.1 
Gas 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.7 4.0 5.8 7.9 10.3 13.2 15.9 18.8 21.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 169.6 274.1 398.1 537.8 690.5 855.3 1034.3 1234.7 1466.3 1732.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 » GtC 
Other C 0 2 >  GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total " MtCH4 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5.99 6.90 8.34 10.32 12.28 13.66 15.11 16.46 18.38 21.10 24.90 28.21 
1.11 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.81 0.59 0.38 0.22 0.10 -0.02 
7.10 7.97 9.45 11.46 13.33 14.62 15.91 17.05 18.76 21.32 25.00 28.19 
310 323 363 418 489 592 671 743 803 900 993 1069 
6.7 7.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.1 
70.9 69.0 68.3 79.8 94.2 106.5 103.6 99.0 83.8 74.3 68.1 68.7 
1672 883 785 292 258 291 312 384 457 549 662 753 
32 25 41 51 64 77 92 113 129 148 168 178 
38 40 50 64 75 89 104 122 129 135 153 165 
879 877 972 1100 1246 1396 1585 1810 2075 2250 2426 2646 
139 141 170 204 229 239 242 241 247 262 281 311 
31 32 38 47 56 61 66 71 78 87 97 n o 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A2 land-use data. 
a:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
b; C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (IS92f). 
c: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
d: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
482 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-IVÍESSAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 851 923 975 1027 1072 1131 1151 1202 1228 1323 1451 1496 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 15.3 18.7 22.3 26.0 30 0 37.1 39 9 46.3 50.0 63.1 80.7 87.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 16.0 18.5 20.8 23.1 28.2 30.8 36.2 39.0 49.5 63.8 69.8 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 9 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 72 88 102 105 99 88 78 79 80 85 94 
Gas 22 26 22 16 19 23 28 33 27 26 26 27 
Electricity 22 28 35 43 53 65 75 88 101 117 133 153 
Others 1 1 1 4 7 10 14 18 25 28 33 39 
Total 124 136 151 168 185 197 205 217 232 251 277 314 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 38 40 47 56 71 91 112 126 151 195 232 240 
Oil 72 89 99 105 96 83 62 41 31 23 16 11 
Gas 33 38 42 43 52 52 58 77 80 ' 72 81 99 
Nuclear 6 7 9 11 13 17 19 25 31 36 42 50 
Biomass 6 6 6 8 12 16 21 29 32 35 37 41 
Other Renewables 4 6 7 И 15 21 27 32 39 43 48 55 
Total 159 185 209 233 259 280 300 328 363 404 457 496 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.4 4.6 5.9 7.7 10.1 13.0 
Oi l 0.0 08 1.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.2 
Gas 0.0 0 4 0.7 1.2 ! 6 2.1 2.6 3.2 4.0 4.8 5.5 6 3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emisç ionç G t C 2.8 33.0 67.0 105.0 146.5 191.1 238.2 287.7 341.8 404.0 476.7 556.4 
Carbon Séquestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 » G t C 2.83 3.20 3.61 3.98 4.33 4.58 
Other C 0 2 I' GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.61 3.98 4.33 4.58 
C H 4 total = MtCH4 73 74 72 72 78 89 
N 2 0 total <' M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 11.0 5.9 4.0 3.1 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 107 103 111 116 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 14 14 14 
SF6 M t C eq. 23 23 25 28 29 29 
C O M t C O 179 161 170 180 185 200 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 37 36 35 35 
NOx M t N 13 12 14 15 16 17 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A2 land-use data. 
a:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
b: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (lS92f). 
c: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
d: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
4.83 
0.00 
4.83 
99 
2.6 
2.1 
125 
14 
28 
208 
30 
17 
5.08 
0.00 
5.08 
m 
2.6 
1.9 
130 
13 
26 
226 
27 
18 
5.74 
0.00 
5.74 
126 
2.7 
2.8 
135 
11 
20 
223 
25 
19 
6.70 
0.00 
6.70 
149 
2.7 
3.9 
142 
13 
12 
229 
24 
20 
7.86 
0.00 
7.86 
176 
2.8 
5.1 
151 
15 
14 
233 
24 
2? 
8.06 
0.00 
8.06 
175 
2.9 
5.7 
160 
17 
16 
243 
26 
25 
Statistical Table 483 
Scenario A2-MESSAGE 
REF 
Population Million 
GNfP/GDP (mex) Trillion US$ 
O N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ' 
Other C 0 2 ь 
Total C 0 2 
C H 4 total ' 
N 2 0 total 
SOx total 
H F C 
P F C 
SF6 
C O 
N M V O C 
NOx 
GtC 
GtC 
GtC 
MtCH4 
M t N 2 0 - N 
MtS 
M t C eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C O 
Mt 
M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
418 421 438 454 473 507 519 551 568 622 684 706 
0.9 0.8 1.0 1.4 2.1 3.2 3.7 4.9 5.7 8.5 12.5 14.2 
2,6 2.6 3.2 4.2 5.0 6.2 9.0 10.9 13.0 12.5 12.8 13.8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 1.3 15 18 22 21 21 24 29 33 38 45 
14 14 16 17 18 18 20 19 18 18 19 19 
6 6 7 9 11 15 19 24 27 31 37 43 
7 6 5 7 10 13 14 18 21 22 24 24 
50 43 46 53 62 67 74 85 94 104 117 131 
19 11 11 13 17 18 23 34 47 50 64 82 
20 18 18 20 21 18 13 12 9 6 5 2 
27 28 30 33 39 45 52 47 35 39 45 51 
1 1 1 0 1 1 2 4 5 7 9 10 
1 1 1 2 4 6 11 18 28 26 24 
1 1 2 3 5 8 Ю 13 16 19 22 27 
70 60 62 70 84 95 107 121 131 148 170 195 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.1 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 1.6 1.6 
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 
GtC 1.3 12.3 21.7 31.9 44.0 57,5 72,3 88,5 106,0 124,1 144.9 170.6 
1.30 
0.00 
1.30 
47 
0.6 
17.0 
0 
7 
8 
69 
16 
5 
0.91 
0,00 
0.91 
39 
0.6 
11.0 
4 
4 
6 
41 
13 
3 
0.96 
0.00 
0.96 
41 
0.6 
10.9 
8 
8 
7 
43 
16 
3 
1.09 
0.00 
1.09 
44 
0.6 
12.5 
13 
10 
10 
51 
19 
4 
1.31 
0.00 
1.31 
51 
0.7 
15.3 
20 
14 
12 
61 
21 
5 
1.40 
0.00 
1.40 
58 
0.7 
18.2 
27 
17 
15 
68 
24 
5 
1.54 
0.00 
1.54 
66 
0.7 
20.7 
31 
20 
19 
75 
23 
6 
1.71 
0.00 
1.71 
69 
0.7 
23.3 
37 
25 
24 
82 
20 
7 
1.78 
0.00 
1.78 
72 
0.7 
18.2 
41 
30 
28 
100 
20 
7 
1.86 
0.00 
I. 86 
78 
0.8 
II. 8 
44 
35 
32 
114 
21 
7 
2.30 
0.00 
2.30 
94 
0.8 
6.2 
48 
40 
36 
145 
25 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A2 land-use data. 
a:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
b: C02 emissions from land-use changes (lS92f). 
c: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
d: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
2.84 
0.00 
2.84 
113 
0.8 
6.4 
52 
42 
38 
183 
32 
9 
4 8 4 S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
Scenario A2-MESSAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2791 3295 3801 4308 4779 5500 5764 6137 6333 6858 7214 7340 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 2.3 3.5 5.3 7.6 12.6 15.0 20.0 23.1 34.9 50.5 57.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 7.4 10.3 14.3 19.5 27.3 36.8 47.5 57.1 66.1 74.7 79.9 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 16 17 17 15 14 12 11 11 10 10 9 
Solids 19 19 15 12 9 21 29 28 18 6 4 2 
Liquids 13 26 42 61 85 93 105 104 119 133 155 180 
Gas 2 4 8 17 21 19 26 46 43 53 49 45 
Electricity 4 6 10 17 25 35 46 58 75 96 114 131 
Others 1 4 7 11 17 25 35 44 53 62 71 78 
Total 62 75 100 135 172 207 252 291 319 360 402 445 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 30 27 33 42 54 82 104 128 187 235 310 390 
Oil 15 31 47 67 86 80 71 47 27 16 10 4 
Gas 3 7 15 23 27 23 29 50 47 56 49 41 
Nuclear 0 1 2 3 5 8 13 17 22 29 34 39 
Biomass 24 21 24 29 36 47 63 77 77 79 82 84 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 9 14 22 31 42 57 73 81 90 
Total 74 90 125 173 222 262 312 361 417 489 566 648 
Cumulative Resources (Jse ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.7 3.7 4.9 6.9 9.4 12.8 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.5 3.3 4.0 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.0 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.8 3.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 42.6 72.8 110.7 154.8 203.5 256.9 318.0 390.9 478.9 585.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Mill ion ha 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 » GtC 1.15 1.78 2.36 3.16 3.93 4.48 4.97 5.48 6.61 7.90 9.72 11.69 
Other C 0 2 ь GtC 0.37 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.53 2.03 2.62 3.42 4.15 4.66 5.10 5.57 6.66 7.91 9.69 11.62 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 153 190 232 283 319 356 394 444 487 523 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 27.8 36.7 44.3 52.9 47.2 40.7 30.8 27.5 26.8 26.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 11 18 27 38 .54 77 100 130 167 204 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 11 15 20 25 32 42 49 56 64 67 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 16 20 27 34 43 49 55 62 67 
C O M t C O 235 270 335 422 497 538 589 653 746 859 968 1107 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 49 63 72 73 75 82 91 102 113 128 
N O x M t N 7 9 12 16 19 21 23 25 28 33 38 43 
Emissions coirelated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by 
a:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
b; C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (IS92f). 
c; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from А Ш - А 2 run. 
d; Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
Statistical Table 
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Scenario A2-MESSAGE 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
1222 1530 1974 2417 2846 3578 3862 4250 4458 5025 5394 5526 
2.4 
3.8 
3.4 
5.2 
5.1 
7.7 
7.8 
11.2 
11.5 
15.7 
19.3 
20.4 
23.0 
29.4 
30.6 
37.5 
35.4 
46.1 
52.9 
52.0 
74.7 
56.7 
Million ha 
83.8 
62.2 
14 8 9 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
1 7 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
17 26 36 54 68 71 83 96 125 145 178 183 
4 6 11 19 27 45 58 64 57 59 50 70 
3 5 8 14 20 33 45 61 75 92 113 133 
0 1 3 6 10 18 25 33 39 45 52 59 
39 53 71 101 134 174 219 262 303 350 402 454 
5 5 7 11 15 19 34 53 73 90 129 159 
21 34 44 62 71 62 59 46 42 41 34 30 
8 13 22 36 55 89 107 119 107 118 107 98 
0 1 1 2 4 7 12 17 21 26 31 37 
14 13 12 12 18 31 50 78 117 129 141 151 
2 3 7 11 16 26 35 45 53 60 75 107 
49 69 93 134 179 234 296 358 412 463 517 582 
ZJ 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.5 
0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.5 4.9 5.2 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.3 4.5 5.5 6.7 7.8 
GtC 1.4 17.8 38.2 64.3 96.8 134.4 176.5 222.2 268.6 315.7 365.8 419.9 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 » GtC 0.72 1.01 1.40 2.10 2.71 3.19 3.77 
Other C 0 2 ь GtC 0.73 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.68 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.45 1.83 2.25 2.97 3.54 3.98 4.45 
C H 4 total " MtCH4 77 85 99 112 128 163 187 
N 2 0 total ^^  M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 15.6 21.7 27.6 29.4 30.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 19 32 49 69 98 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 8 12 16 21 26 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 7 10 13 18 23 
C O M t C O 396 404 424 448 503 591 712 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 68 86 101 108 113 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 12 15 18 20 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M A2 land-use data. 
a:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
b: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( l S 9 2 f ) . 
c: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - A 2 run. 
d: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from А Ш - А 2 run. 
4.18 
0.51 
4.69 
207 
0.9 
30.2 
139 
34 
29 
848 
112 
27 
4.25 
0.33 
4.58 
212 
1.0 
29.1 
181 
39 
32 
1007 
112 
24 
4.65 
0.20 
4.85 
229 
1.0 
28.1 
233 
45 
37 
1048 
115 
27 
5.02 
0.13 
5.16 
235 
1.1 
27.0 
295 
50 
41 
1081 
119 
29 
5.61 
0.06 
5.67 
259 
1.1 
26.9 
336 
52 
43 
1113 
125 
32 
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Scenario A2-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population IVIillion 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5293 6208 7174 8192 9250 10284 
20.7 27.4 35.4 44.7 55.6 69.5 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 58 73 88 100 114 
121 125 131 1.39 136 150 
52 62 72 80 82 77 
35 53 78 109 144 190 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 299 353 416 462 532 
88 117 144 170 239 325 
131 135 139 144 111 91 
70 84 113 155 173 181 
24 25 30 39 53 71 
0 6 11 17 25 37 
24 24 27 31 39 52 
336 392 465 .556 640 757 
0.1 1.2 2.5 4.0 6.3 9.2 
0.1 1.5 2.8 4.3 5.4 6.5 
0.1 0.9 1.9 3.2 4.9 6.6 
7.1 82.4 167.9 267.6 382.8 513.5 
1472 1481 1531 1620 1689 1729 
3209 3348 3554 3828 4074 4274 
0 4 8 15 38 75 
4173 4214 4137 3942 3685 3503 
4310 4118 3934 3759 3678 3584 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
5.99 6.90 8.06 9.40 10.81 12.77 
1.11 1.07 1.06 1.44 1.38 1.18 
7.10 7,97 9.12 10.83 12.19 13.96 
310 323 348 381 415 452 
6.7 7,0 7.9 8.8 9.7 10.8 
70.9 69.0 81.1 82.7 91.4 100.7 
1672 883 785 292 258 291 
32 25 41 51 64 77 
38 40 50 64 75 89 
11296 12238 13108 13905 14508 15124 
86.4 108.7 135.2 165.9 204.1 246.6 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
131 131 136 145 150 155 
183 216 257 306 3.54 403 
67 64 66 71 66 62 
246 320 410 517 643 769 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
628 732 869 1039 1214 1388 
429 529 629 729 858 988 
84 69 68 79 72 64 
179 186 201 222 202 183 
93 105 123 148 181 214 
52 77 99 116 139 163 
70 108 153 206 279 353 
907 1074 1272 1501 1732 1964 
12.8 17.9 23.7 30.3 38.6 46.9 
7.3 8.1 8.8 9.5 10,2 11.0 
8.4 10.3 12.2 14.3 16,4 18.4 
664.0 837.0 1033.3 1254.0 1501,5 1779.0 
1739 1676 1629 1598 1585 1573 
4427 4373 4348 4351 4411 4471 
126 201 251 277 336 396 
3396 3591 3717 3772 3636 3500 
3476 3323 3220 3166 3195 3224 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
15.24 17.62 20.34 23.41 26.28 29.39 
0.91 0.82 0.48 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
16.15 18.44 20.83 23.32 26.19 29.30 
485 508 540 580 621 663 
11.7 12.1 12.7 13.5 14.6 15.6 
110.6 112.1 108.7 100.2 89.7 79.3 
312 384 457 549 662 753 
92 113 129 148 168 178 
104 122 129 135 153 165 
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Scenario A2-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
L m d Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
838 916 980 1030 1053 1116 
16.3 20.5 24.5 28.3 29.6 34.2 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 12 13 13 13 14 
72 72 70 67 62 33 
27 35 42 47 46 39 
22 28 35 43 47 59 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
130 147 160 170 167 166 
40 46 47 43 51 75 
76 76 73 68 56 28 
34 46 62 82 82 76 
20 15 13 14 14 16 
0 ••> 4 4 5 8 
12 11 10 10 10 12 
182 196 209 221 218 216 
0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.6 
0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.5 3.2 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.3 
2.8 33.0 66.7 103.1 140.5 178.5 
408 414 427 447 452 461 
796 819 854 899 916 961 
0 4 6 8 13 29 
921 930 921 892 875 836 
998 955 915 875 866 835 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2.83 3.20 3.42 3.53 3.54 3.71 
0.00 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.16 
2.83 3.20 3.54 3.74 3.74 3.86 
73 74 81 88 90 99 
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.3 
22.7 17.0 16.2 8.3 7.5 6.6 
19 57 107 103 111 116 
18 13 14 14 14 14 
23 23 25 28 29 29 
1151 1197 1253 1319 1405 1493 
38.4 42.5 47.6 53.8 62.4 71.6 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 15 14 15 15 16 
57 57 61 68 76 83 
32 28 27 28 26 24 
69 74 83 96 112 128 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
173 174 185 206 229 251 
94 112 131 152 194 236 
18 10 5 5 4 3 
68 63 62 63 52 40 
18 18 19 22 27 32 
11 14 16 18 22 26 
14 18 24 31 42 53 
223 236 259 292 341 390 
3.4 4.5 5.7 7.1 9.0 10.8 
3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 
4.0 4.7 5.3 5.9 6.5 7.0 
218.5 260.7 305.1 352.5 405.0 464.7 
457 440 429 424 419 414 
984 979 978 981 989 996 
41 50 56 60 72 85 
829 877 906 916 894 872 
811 777 754 742 749 756 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
3.99 4.17 4.51 4.98 5.68 6.44 
0.14 0.14 0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 
4.12 4.31 4.57 4.91 5.60 6.33 
105 114 123 133 148 163 
3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 
5.8 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.5 7.3 
125 130 135 142 151 160 
14 13 11 13 15 17 
28 26 20 12 14 16 
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Scenario A2-MmiCAM 
REF 
Í990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 430 439 455 474 495 519 550 585 623 664 707 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 L I 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.7 4.9 6.4 8,3 10,5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 8 7 7 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Liquids 18 12 8 7 7 7 8 9 11 14 16 17 
Gas 19 15 12 10 10 9 7 7 7 8 7 7 
Electricity 6 8 11 14 16 20 24 32 41 51 62 73 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 6 44 39 39 41 43 48 57 68 81 94 106 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 17 18 34 53 76 123 169 214 290 367 
Oil 20 14 10 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 26 20 18 20 20 19 17 17 ' 19 21 18 16 
Nuclear 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 14 17 19 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 3 4 6 9 12 14 17 19 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 5 6 8 11 16 21 28 34 
Total 70 58 55 59 72 91 116 171 227 283 370 457 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0,4 0.5 0.8 1,3 1.9 3.0 4.5 6.3 9,1 11,8 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0,4 0,4 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.1 29.9 40.3 53.1 68.8 89.8 118.1 153.2 197,4 253,9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 297 317 345 368 382 388 368 353 345 348 350 
GrassUmds 395 410 444 498 548 585 611 586 573 572 594 615 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 2 7 14 23 39 49 54 64 74 
Forest 1007 1016 995 942 879 836 815 871 906 919 879 839 
Others 691 655 621 590 576 559 541 514 496 487 493 498 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.30 0.91 0.81 0.83 1.05 1.34 1.68 2.42 3.15 3.90 5.03 6.31 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
1.30 0.91 0.84 0.92 1.16 1.42 1.72 2.47 3.18 3.84 5.00 6.31 
47 39 45 55 65 74 83 99 118 140 171 203 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 
17.0 11.0 10.4 10.0 11.8 13.6 15,4 16.1 16.4 16.2 14.9 13.6 
0 4 8 13 20 27 31 37 41 44 48 52 
7 4 8 10 14 17 20 25 30 35 40 42 
8 6 7 10 12 15 19 24 28 32 36 38 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 4 8 9 
Scenario A2-MiniCAM 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
2790 3296 3802 4308 4817 5302 5763 6180 6558 6898 7133 7372 
1.4 3.1 5.5 8.7 13.0 18.3 24.6 33.0 43.1 54.8 69.1 85.2 
na na na n a na na na na na l U na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 33 46 60 68 78 88 88 92 99 102 106 
14 20 26 32 35 42 54 66 80 96 112 128 
2 5 8 11 11 10 10 10 11 12 12 11 
4 11 22 37 49 67 88 120 159 204 259 314 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 70 103 139 163 197 240 284 341 412 485 559 
26 48 71 96 121 154 192 225 252 273 273 272 
16 22 28 34 28 24 22 16 15 17 14 10 
3 9 18 31 38 43 48 52 58 67 63 58 
1 4 8 13 19 27 38 43 50 61 75 89 
0 2 5 8 12 17 23 33 41 48 57 65 
3 4 5 6 9 15 23 38 57 80 111 142 
49 89 135 187 227 280 345 407 474 546 591 637 
0.0 0.5 1.1 1.9 3.0 4.4 6.1 8.3 10.6 13.2 16.0 18.7 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 L I 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 
0.0 O.l 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.6 
1.5 19.3 43.5 76.3 117.2 16.5.4 222.2 287.9 362.0 444.8 534.1 627.8 
389 
508 
0 
1168 
664 
2729 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 
H F C M t C eq. 0 
P F C M t C eq. 3 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
403 
523 
0 
1141 
630 
2697 
1.78 
0.26 
2.03 
125 
2.6 
25.3 
5 
5 
7 
421 
546 
1 
1100 
599 
2668 
2,60 
0.20 
2.79 
133 
2.8 
36.8 
11 
11 
11 
444 
578 
4 
1043 
570 
2640 
3.50 
0.27 
3.77 
143 
3.1 
46.0 
18 
15 
16 
461 472 476 462 452 445 439 433 
605 630 653 659 665 670 673 676 
12 2"' 33 47 56 60 71 83 
991 944 904 899 896 895 885 876 
557 542 525 501 484 476 481 486 
2626 2610 2592 2568 2553 2545 2550 2554 
4.14 
0.28 
4.42 
152 
3.4 
51.1 
27 
20 
20 
4.96 
0.25 
5.21 
163 
3.7 
55.8 
38 
25 
27 
5.97 
0.19 
6.16 
176 
3.9 
60.2 
54 
32 
34 
6.85 
0.13 
6.98 
180 
4.1 
59.5 
77 
42 
43 
7.77 
0.06 
7.84 
184 
4.3 
56.1 
100 
49 
49 
8.72 
0.00 
8.72 
186 
4.5 
50.1 
130 
56 
55 
9.14 
0.01 
9.15 
179 
4.8 
43.5 
167 
64 
62 
9.57 
0.01 
9.59 
172 
5.0 
36.9 
204 
67 
67 
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Scenario A2-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TriUion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TriUion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
SoUds 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electi'icity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 MtC eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1236 1566 1953 2399 2884 3372 
1.9 2.8 4.3 6.2 9.9 14.7 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 5 7 11 15 
17 22 27 33 37 48 
5 7 10 13 17 19 
3 6 10 16 28 45 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 38 52 68 93 126 
4 6 9 13 26 44 
20 23 28 33 35 38 
7 10 15 22 34 42 
0 2 4 6 12 19 
0 1 1 2 4 8 
5 6 8 11 15 20 
35 48 66 89 126 171 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 
1.4 17.8 36.6 58.3 84.8 116.4 
391 368 365 384 403 414 
1510 1596 1710 1853 1989 2097 
0 0 0 0 0 10 
3641 3585 3478 3318 3161 3028 
19.57 1878 1800 1723 1688 1647 
7499 7427 7353 7279 7241 7196 
0.72 1.01 1.24 1.54 2.08 2.77 
0.73 0.82 0.70 0.87 0.80 0.69 
1.45 1.83 1.94 2.41 2.88 3.46 
77 85 89 96 108 116 
1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 
10.5 12.8 14.7 15.4 18.1 21.7 
0 2 19 32 49 69 
4 4 8 12 16 21 
3 5 7 10 13 18 
3862 4311 4712 5065 5306 5552 
20.7 29.5 39.5 50.9 64.3 79.3 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 20 22 23 24 25 
65 83 104 128 151 174 
18 19 20 23 21 20 
65 94 128 166 210 254 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
167 216 274 340 406 472 
67 69 77 91 101 112 
44 43 48 57 54 51 
46 53 ' 62 72 70 68 
27 33 41 50 62 74 
12 22 30 36 44 53 
26 40 56 74 98 123 
223 261 313 380 430 480 
1.4 2.1 2.8 3.6 4.6 5.6 
1.9 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.4 
1.5 2.0 2.6 3.3 4.0 4.7 
154.5 198.6 248.1 303.5 365.0 432.5 
418 405 394 384 379 375 
2179 2149 2132 2128 2156 2184 
28 65 90 104 129 153 
2920 2930 2936 2939 2890 2841 
1599 1532 1486 1461 1473 1484 
7145 7081 7038 7016 7027 7037 
3.61 4.18 4.91 5.81 6.42 7.07 
0.54 0.49 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.00 
4.15 4.67 5.24 5.84 6.44 7.07 
120 114 115 121 123 125 
3.1 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.6 
26.1 28.1 27.8 25.2 21.9 18.5 
98 139 !8 i 233 295 336 
26 34 39 45 50 52 
23 29 32 37 41 43 
Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-Al-MiniCAM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5293 6007 6762 7558 8332 9054 9723 10217 10696 11161 11620 12090 
G N P / G D P (mex) Tnlhon US$ 20 7 27 4 33 0 37 6 41 8 48 8 58 6 76 4 98 2 123 8 158 1 197 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 puces) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 Ü 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sohds 45 60 70 73 80 90 103 102 106 116 125 135 
Liquids 121 128 130 128 116 124 151 198 253 314 381 447 
Gas 52 64 73 78 81 91 110 128 155 191 208 225 
Electricity 35 55 74 90 101 128 164 237 317 406 523 640 
Otheis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 253 308 346 369 380 433 528 665 831 1027 1237 1447 
Piimaiy Eneigy EJ 
Coal 88 121 136 133 148 167 189 196 213 239 266 294 
O i l 131 138 138 133 114 118 145 200 260 327 395 464 
Gas 70 87 111 142 149 171 209 263 328 405 444 483 
Nuclear 24 27 30 32 37 47 64 95 123 149 214 278 
Biomass 0 6 10 13 16 18 22 34 44 51 55 59 
Other Renewables 24 24 27 31 36 43 51 70 92 118 151 183 
Total 336 403 452 485 499 564 679 857 1061 1289 1525 1761 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Caibon Sequestration G t C 
0 1 1 2 2 5 38 53 6 9 
0 1 1 5 2 9 4 2 5 4 66 
0 1 0 9 19 3 1 4 6 63 
7 1 82 4 164 2 248 7 333 8 422 5 
86 10 6 12 6 14 8 17 5 20 1 
7 9 98 12 1 14 9 18 7 22 5 
8 1 10 6 136 17 1 215 25 8 
523 9 641 8 778 8 943 5 1135 8 1352 2 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1472 1461 1463 1478 1423 1359 1285 1214 1174 1165 1107 1050 
Grasslands 3209 3343 3464 3572 3545 3524 3508 3557 3703 3948 4091 4234 
Energy Biomass 0 4 8 14 16 17 18 45 65 75 71 67 
Forest 4173 4214 4155 3995 4092 4252 4475 4571 4436 4069 3925 3782 
Otheis 4310 4142 4074 4106 4088 4012 3878 3777 3787 3908 3970 4032 
Total 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standaidized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Othei C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq 
P F C M t C e q 
SF6 M t C eq 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5 99 6 90 7 62 7 89 8 13 8 89 
1 11 1 07 0 76 0 62 0 37 0 35 
7 10 7 97 8 39 851 8 50 9 24 
310 323 339 354 363 379 
67 7 0 7 8 8 6 9 I 9 9 
70 9 69 0 73 9 65 7 66 6 70 8 
1672 883 785 292 258 291 
32 25 41 51 64 77 
38 40 50 64 75 89 
Ш Л 6 12 40 14 83 17 77 20 28 23 00 
0 58 0 13 0 04 031 0 10 -0 11 
И 05 12 52 14 87 18 08 20 38 22 89 
402 428 473 537 582 627 
10 6 115 130 15 1 17 2 19 3 
78 1 81 4 84 0 86 2 85 4 84 5 
312 384 457 549 662 753 
92 113 129 148 168 178 
104 122 129 135 153 165 
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1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 Scenario A 2 - A l - M i n i C A M 
O E C D 9 0 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Prunary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Enei'gy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M1CH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
838 874 903 924 926 924 
16.3 20.5 23.5 25.5 26.1 27.9 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 12 13 12 12 12 
72 73 71 66 61 51 
27 36 43 47 47 48 
22 28 34 40 42 48 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.30 149 161 166 161 159 
40 47 46 38 39 42 
76 77 75 68 60 47 
34 46 62 80 80 81 
20 16 14 13 13 14 
0 2 4 4 4 5 
12 U 10 10 10 10 
182 199 210 213 207 198 
0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.6 2.2 
0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.4 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.3 
2.8 33.0 65.9 99.3 131.6 162.9 
408 408 408 406 395 365 
796 819 838 S54 849 840 
0 4 6 7 8 9 
921 93 Í 924 902 919 976 
998 961 946 954 952 933 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2.83 3.20 3.37 3.33 3.23 3.10 
0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
2.83 3.20 3.40 3.27 3.19 3.08 
73 74 81 85 85 87 
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 
22.7 17.0 15.0 9.2 7.8 6.6 
19 57 107 103 111 116 
18 13 14 14 14 14 
23 23 25 28 29 29 
913 895 883 877 882 886 
29.5 31.4 33,7 36.4 40.1 44.1 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
II 9 8 8 9 9 
54 57 60 64 69 73 
52 52 55 61 62 64 
53 57 61 64 72 80 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
170 175 185 198 212 226 
42 39 37 35 38 40 
49 53 57 61 65 69 
86 87 '90 97 98 99 
15 16 18 19 24 30 
5 6 7 7 7 7 
11 12 14 17 19 22 
207 213 223 236 251 267 
2.6 3.0 3,4 3.7 4.1 4.5 
3.9 4.4 4,9 5.5 6.2 6.8 
4.1 5,0 5,9 6.8 7.8 8.8 
194.5 226.6 258.3 291.1 325.5 361.1 
349 329 317 311 285 259 
842 848 873 915 930 944 
9 15 18 18 16 15 
1020 1048 1029 963 962 961 
903 882 886 915 930 945 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
3.22 3.21 3.28 3.43 3.58 3.74 
0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 
3.25 3.15 3.19 3.37 3.50 3.63 
92 100 109 120 131 143 
3.3 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.9 
5.6 5.0 5.0 5.6 6.3 7.0 
125 130 135 142 151 160 
14 13 1! 13 15 17 
28 26 20 12 14 16 
Statistical Table 493 
Scenario A2-Al-MiniCAlVI 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 446 462 475 480 480 475 470 466 464 
470 475 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.2 3.0 3.9 5.1 6.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 pi 'ices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 11 10 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 6 6 
Liquids 18 12 9 8 6 6 6 8 9 11 13 15 
Gas 19 16 13 11 10 10 11 12 ¡ 5 18 19 20 
Electricity 6 9 И 13 13 13 14 20 26 32 39 47 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 56 48 43 40 36 35 37 45 55 66 77 88 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 18 19 19 17 18 19 20 18 18 20 22 24 
Oil 20 \ 5 11 9 6 5 6 8 11 13 15 17 
Gas 26 21 20 21 19 18 18 23 28 33 35 37 
Nuclear 3 4 6 6 6 6 6 8 10 11 15 19 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 
Total 70 64 60 58 55 54 57 67 79 92 105 118 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.0 29.3 36.8 43.6 50.4 57.5 65.2 75.0 86.5 98.8 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 293 301 310 298 281 260 247 244 251 242 232 
Grasslands 395 410 430 458 450 441 428 436 473 539 571 604 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 6 9 9 7 5 
Forest 1007 1016 999 956 978 1018 1075 1093 1054 958 925 891 
Others 691 659 646 652 649 636 612 595 598 621 633 644 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.75 0.88 1.04 1.16 1.29 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.02 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.84 1.11 1.19 1.27 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 43 49 51 55 61 67 78 94 107 120 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 I . l 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.3 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.3 9.8 10.1 10.3 10.5 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 8 13 20 27 31 37 41 44 48 52 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 17 20 25 30 35 40 42 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 7 10 12 15 19 24 28 32 36 38 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
494 Statistical Table 
Scenario A2-Al-MiniCAM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3193 3603 4022 4396 4723 5004 5179 5343 5496 5663 5833 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 3.1 4.5 5.6 6.9 9.6 13.6 22.0 31.9 43.4 58.1 75.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 20 34 43 48 54 63 76 77 80 88 94 99 
Liquids 14 21 24 24 24 30 41 62 84 107 132 156 
Gas 2 6 7 8 8 10 15 21 29 39 43 47 
Electricity 4 12 19 24 28 40 59 100 145 193 250 306 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 72 93 104 114 143 191 260 338 426 517 608 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 26 49 63 68 75 87 105 112 124 141 154 168 
Oil 16 22 26 26 24 28 39 64 90 115 140 165 
Gas 3 10 16 21 24 34 51 79 109 . 140 154 168 
Nuclear 1 4 7 8 11 17 27 45 60 75 105 135 
Biomass 0 2 4 6 7 9 11 18 24 29 31 34 
Other Renewables 3 4 5 6 8 11 15 25 37 51 67 83 
Total 49 92 121 136 148 186 249 344 444 550 652 753 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.5 1.0 L7 2.4 3.2 4.2 5.3 6.5 7.8 9.3 10.8 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.9 3.9 5.3 6.6 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 2.1 3.0 4.2 5.7 7.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 41.7 67.2 94.3 124.5 161.7 208.2 265.2 335.0 416.5 507.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
389 399 406 411 403 390 373 351 339 336 327 319 
508 523 535 545 548 554 562 570 583 601 621 641 
0 0 1 4 5 6 7 21 32 39 39 38 
1168 1145 1124 1104 1108 1114 1122 1125 1114 1090 1075 1061 
664 634 622 628 625 613 592 575 576 597 609 621 
2729 2701 2689 2693 2689 2677 2657 2642 2644 2663 2672 2680 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.27 2.48 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.18 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.44 2.66 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 129 128 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 31.5 30.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 11 18 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 11 15 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 16 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2.66 
0.10 
2.76 
131 
3.2 
32.3 
27 
20 
20 
3.19 
0.07 
3 27 
133 
3.4 
36.0 
38 
25 
27 
4.08 
0.09 
4.17 
136 
3.7 
41.9 
54 
32 
34 
5.10 
0.03 
5.13 
139 
3.9 
43.4 
77 
42 
43 
6.27 
0.02 
6.29 
146 
4.3 
43.8 
100 
49 
49 
7.59 
0.08 
7.67 
159 
4.9 
43.1 
130 
56 
55 
8.59 
0.04 
8.63 
168 
5.5 
40.1 
167 
64 
62 
9.65 
0.00 
9.64 
176 
6.1 
37.1 
204 
67 
67 
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495 
Scenario A2-Al-MiniCAM 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TrilJion (1990 prices) 
E J 
E J 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Gi asslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Z J 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
Fossil Fuel C02 
Other C 0 2 
Total C 0 2 
C H 4 total 
N 2 0 total 
SOx total 
H F C 
P F C 
SF6 
C O 
N M V O C 
NOx 
GtC 
GtC 
GtC 
M t C H 4 
M t N 2 0 - N 
MiS 
M t C eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C eq. 
M t C O 
Mt 
M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
1236 1494 1795 2136 2528 2926 3331 3673 4004 4323 4605 4896 
J.9 2.8 3.9 5.2 7.0 9.9 13.9 20.8 29,6 40.2 54.8 71.7 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 6 8 9 10 11 12 15 17 20 
17 22 26 30 30 37 50 72 99 132 168 203 
5 7 9 12 16 23 32 42 56 74 84 94 
3 6 9 13 19 27 38 60 86 117 162 207 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 38 49 60 73 96 130 184 253 337 431 525 
4 6 8 10 14 18 22 27 34 42 52 61 
20 23 27 30 31 38 51 75 104 138 175 212 
7 10 14 20 27 38 53 75 102 135 157 178 
0 2 4 5 7 11 16 25 35 45 69 93 
0 1 1 2 3 3 4 7 9 11 13 15 
5 6 8 11 14 16 19 25 32 40 51 63 
35 48 63 78 95 125 166 233 315 411 517 622 
0,0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1,3 1.7 2.1 2.6 
0,0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.6 3,5 4.6 6.3 8.0 
0.0 0.1 0,2 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.1 3,0 4.1 5.7 7.2 
1,4 17.8 35.5 52.9 71,0 91.5 117.3 149.6 190,0 242.3 307.3 384.4 
391 362 348 350 339 323 303 287 275 267 253 239 
1510 1592 1660 1716 1703 1690 1676 1702 1775 1892 1969 2045 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 10 10 
3641 3595 3539 3474 3495 3525 3565 3560 3498 3379 3306 3232 
1957 1887 18.59 1872 1864 1830 1771 1725 1727 1775 1799 1822 
7499 7436 7407 7413 7401 7368 7315 7277 7279 7323 7336 7349 
0.72 1.01 1.17 1.35 1.57 1.95 2.50 3.33 4.41 5.71 6.96 8.33 
0.73 0.82 0.54 0.42 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.21 0.13 0.21 0,11 0.02 
1.45 1.83 1.71 1.77 1.85 2.24 2.92 3.54 4.54 5.92 7.07 8.35 
77 85 87 91 96 104 113 123 140 164 176 187 
1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 3,1 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.1 
10.5 12.8 14.1 13.7 14.7 16.4 18.9 20,6 22.4 24.4 25.7 27.0 
0 2 19 32 49 69 98 139 181 233 295 336 
4 4 8 12 16 21 26 34 39 45 50 52 
3 5 7 10 13 18 23 29 32 37 41 43 
4 9 6 Statistical Table 
Scenario B l - A I M 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MlS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
PFC M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M l C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5204 6056 6741 7426 8112 8368 
20.9 27.4 37.3 55.9 73.9 99.7 
50 46 30 24 17 0 
36 39 47 56 62 65 
111 119 130 152 173 186 
51 59 82 104 131 149 
38 50 63 81 103 138 
285 311 353 417 485 549 
93 93 126 162 195 198 
143 161 176 177 170 152 
73 104 143 183 229 264 
6 10 11 14 15 23 
50 48 38 56 77 94 
10 11 14 19 29 49 
376 427 508 610 715 781 
0.1 1.0 2.1 3.5 5.3 7.0 
O.I 1.7 3.4 5.1 6.9 8.2 
0.1 1.0 2.2 3.8 5.9 8.1 
7.1 82.4 169.3 267.6 375.1 489.7 
1459 1466 1464 1461 1458 1452 
3389 3407 3432 3453 3474 3510 
0 0 0 59 137 187 
4296 4255 4231 4264 4335 4404 
3805 3820 3822 3711 3545 3382 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
5.99 6.90 8.47 10.05 11.50 12.00 
1.11 1.07 0.93 0.23 -0.29 -0.31 
7.10 7.97 9.39 10.28 11.22 11.69 
310 323 358 391 426 437 
6.7 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 
70.9 69.0 76.3 89.2 92.9 60.7 
1672 883 784 291 257 298 
32 25 29 32 33 37 
38 40 36 37 47 58 
879 877 968 981 1076 1146 
139 141 157 177 176 171 
31 32 35 38 41 41 
8631 8465 8301 7957 7453 6982 
134.5 165.9 204.8 245.7 286.6 334.3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
67 52 41 31 24 18 
200 202 204 204 200 196 
170 161 152 137 117 100 
186 228 279 314 324 334 
623 652 683 688 668 648 
204 168 1-38 113 92 75 
137 125 115 108 106 103 
308 288 270 241 204 172 
38 36 33 30 27 25 
117 133 150 162 166 171 
87 138 220 290 316 344 
892 887 926 944 911 890 
9.3 10.8 12.5 13.9 14.9 16.0 
9.9 11.0 12.3 13.5 14.5 15.7 
11.3 13.7 16.6 19.3 21.5 23.8 
609.9 725.8 828.4 917.8 994.1 1060.1 
1447 1442 1437 1433 1431 1429 
3547 3,591 3635 3668 3688 3709 
254 260 266 260 242 225 
4475 4522 4570 4619 4668 4719 
3226 3131 3039 2968 2917 2868 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
12.59 11.12 9.86 8.29 7.27 6.40 
-0.24 -0.28 -0.19 -0.09 -0.21 -0.26 
12.35 10.84 9.67 8.20 7.06 6.15 
449 429 410 364 300 248 
6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.2 
42.3 33.1 26.3 22.8 21.4 20.1 
338 337 333 327 315 299 
42 47 45 43 46 45 
68 71 62 46 43 43 
1223 1241 1260 1278 1296 1314 
167 141 119 97 76 58 
40 36 31 28 26 24 
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Scenario B l - A I M 
O E C D W 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (199Û pnces) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Sohds 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Pnmary Energy E J 
Coal 
0 Ü 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resouices Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Eneigy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antlii opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
801 857 896 935 973 991 1008 1013 1018 1023 1029 10.ад 
16.4 20.7 25.5 31.3 38.5 44 9 52.4 59.1 66.7 74.0 80.5 87.7 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 11 10 10 9 8 7 6 4 3 1 2 
64 70 67 70 68 66 64 60 56 53 50 47 
25 31 37 40 43 41 40 35 31 27 23 19 
68 22 27 
29 31 33 38 43 50 59 64 66 
127 141 144 151 153 154 154 153 152 148 142 \Ы 
41 34 37 38 38 36 33 26 21 17 14 И 
76 88 85 81 69 56 46 39 33 29 28 26 
34 51 58 61 63 62 62 54 47 40 34 28 
5 7 8 8 7 8 8 8 7 6 5 5 
6 1 0 4 9 14 20 23 26 28 28 29 
6 6 7 9 13 17 22 32 48 60 65 70 
167 187 195 201 199 192 192 182 181 180 174 170 
0.0 0 4 08 1.1 1.5 1 8 2.5 27 3 0 3.1 3.3 
0.1 0.9 1.8 2.6 3.4 39 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.2 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.2 28 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.3 5.7 
2.8 33.0 64 8 96 5 127.3 156.7 184.3 209 3 230 8 249.1 264.6 277.7 
381 380 378 376 374 370 366 361 357 354 353 352 
760 765 772 779 787 809 832 862 893 912 918 924 
0 0 0 10 23 32 44 45 46 45 41 39 
1050 1059 1074 1094 1117 1133 1149 1154 1159 1167 1179 1192 
838 826 805 770 728 682 639 605 574 551 536 522 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.24 3.27 3.16 2.96 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 -0 11 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3 20 3.18 3.15 3.02 2.85 
C H 4 lotal MtCH4 73 74 71 69 66 60 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 
SOx total MtS 22 7 17.0 10.4 7.8 7.5 7.2 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 108 103 109 112 
PFC M t C eq. 18 13 12 10 8 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 16 5 6 6 
C O M t C O 179 161 172 183 200 205 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 34 31 28 23 
NOx M t N 13 12 11 10 9 7 
2 77 
-0 08 
2.69 
54 
2.3 
6.9 
116 
7 
7 
210 
18 
6 
2 34 
-0.03 
2.31 
50 
2,2 
6.2 
117 
7 
7 
209 
11 
6 
1.97 
001 
1.98 
46 
2,2 
5,5 
117 
7 
8 
209 
5 
5 
1,68 
0,00 
1 68 
43 
2,1 
4.9 
119 
7 
8 
209 
1 45 
-0.03 
1.42 
41 
2 0 
4.3 
120 
7 
8 
210 
-1 
4 
1.25 
-0 06 
1 19 
38 
2.0 
3.8 
120 
6 
8 
212 
-3 
4 
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Statistical Table 
Scenario B l - A I M 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
E J 
EJ 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestraction 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
ZJ 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
413 419 424 430 435 429 423 406 391 374 356 339 
1.1 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.5 3.9 5.9 7.8 10.2 12.9 15.7 19.1 
2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 
19 
6 
9 
5 
7 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
19 13 16 17 18 21 26 23 21 17 13 10 
8 9 9 9 9 12 17 21 25 27 27 27 
58 42 37 36 35 42 51 51 52 50 45 40 
18 13 13 12 11 12 13 11 9 7 6 5 
22 12 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 
13 
26 22 25 26 25 29 33 30 26 22 17 
1 I 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
2 4 0 3 8 12 17 19 22 24 24 25 
1 1 1 2 2 4 8 13 20 25 26 28 
71 54 50 51 53 63 79 78 82 82 76 73 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 
1.3 12.3 21.5 29.6 35.8 40.9 45.3 48.6 51.0 51.3 50.1 49.0 
268 266 266 266 265 265 264 264 263 263 263 262 
341 362 364 366 368 370 372 374 376 378 380 382 
0 0 0 9 20 27 37 38 39 38 35 33 
966 951 934 933 934 953 973 983 993 1005 1018 1031 
701 696 711 702 688 658 630 617 604 592 580 568 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G l C 1.30 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.65 0.66 0.66 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.19 -0.26 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.93 0.68 0.56 0,47 0.40 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 48 50 49 46 43 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0,6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.6 9.2 6.9 4.3 2.7 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 20 24 26 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 6 6 7 8 9 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 4 7 7 8 9 
C O M t C O 69 41 36 34 33 33 33 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 12 11 10 9 9 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 
0.48 
-0.20 
0.28 
34 
0.6 
2.2 
27 
10 
9 
32 
7 
2 
0.35 
-0.15 
0.20 
26 
0.6 
1.9 
27 
9 
7 
32 
6 
1 
-0.11 
-0.02 
-0.14 
20 
0.5 
1.7 
27 
8 
6 
31 
4 
1 
-0.05 
-0.07 
-0.12 
16 
0.5 
1.7 
27 
8 
4 
30 
3 
1 
0.02 
-0.11 
-0.10 
12 
0.5 
1.6 
26 
29 
1 
1 
Statistical Table 4 9 9 
Scenario Bl-AIM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Popuîation Million 2798 3261 35.56 3851 4147 4183 4220 4016 3822 3541 3194 2882 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.9 5.2 9.2 16.2 24.0 35.8 46.0 59.2 73.5 88.2 105.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Tiillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 28 22 20 16 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 15 20 30 39 46 49 52 40 31 24 18 14 
Liquids 11 15 26 35 45 51 58 59 60 60 58 57 
Gas 2 4 10 18 24 28 33 32 31 28 24 20 
Electricity 5 7 15 25 38 54 78 96 119 133 135 137 
Others 
Total 61 69 101 134 162 189 220 232 244 246 236 227 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 39 66 95 122 119 116 94 76 61 49 38 
Oi l 17 29 39 42 44 40 35 31 28 25 24 23 
Gas 4 9 21 37 52 67 87 81 76 67 55 45 
Nuclear 0 1 2 3 4 8 16 15 14 13 12 10 
Biomass 28 24 19 18 15 19 24 27 31 33 34 35 
Other Renewables 1 2 2 4 7 16 34 56 92 122 131 141 
Total 80 103 148 199 244 269 314 306 317 321 304 293 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.7 2.8 3.8 5.2 6.0 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.8 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.6 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.6 5.2 5.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 45.3 81.0 126.0 177.6 232.2 284.2 328.8 367.4 400.5 429.0 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
438 435 435 435 434 434 434 434 433 433 433 433 
608 606 609 612 614 617 619 622 625 628 631 634 
0 0 0 12 28 39 52 54 55 53 50 46 
535 525 518 535 551 557 563 577 593 604 610 616 
583 598 602 571 536 516 496 477 458 446 441 436 
2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 1.15 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 
CH4 total MtCH4 113 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 
H F C M t C eq. 0 
P F C M t C eq. 3 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 
C O M t C O 235 
N M V O C Mt 33 
NOx M t N 7 
1.78 
0.26 
2.03 
125 
2.6 
25.3 
4 
5 
7 
270 
37 
9 
2.87 
0.29 
3.16 
142 
2.6 
40.0 
11 
7 
11 
335 
51 
12 
3.99 
0.00 
3.99 
160 
2.6 
56.5 
20 
9 
17 
366 
63 
15 
4.97 
0.05 
5.02 
183 
2.6 
58.2 
34 
11 
23 
438 
59 
18 
5.19 
O.IO 
5.29 
196 
2.7 
31.2 
56 
14 
27 
473 
60 
19 
5.42 
0.22 
5.63 
209 
2.7 
16.7 
93 
17 
30 
510 
61 
19 
4.74 
0.03 
4.77 
205 
2.7 
11.4 
90 
20 
32 
511 
51 
16 
4.15 
0.01 
4.15 
200 
2.6 
7.8 
85 
18 
26 
511 
42 
13 
3.57 
0.00 
3.58 
177 
2.6 
6.0 
79 
18 
19 
510 
33 
11 
3.03 
0.02 
3.05 
143 
2.6 
5.3 
72 
18 
16 
507 
24 
9 
2.57 
0.08 
2.66 
114 
2.5 
4.7 
64 
18 
16 
504 
17 
500 Statistical Table 
Scenario В1-АШ 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1865 2211 2557 2761 2980 3024 3067 3013 2866 2726 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 3.0 5.4 9.6 16.7 26.0 40.4 52.5 68.2 85.1 101.7 121.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 17 9 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 
Liquids 17 24 31 41 55 64 75 79 84 88 89 90 
Gas 4 10 19 29 46 57 71 70 69 65 57 50 
Electricity 
Others 
4 7 11 16 23 33 48 61 77 89 95 102 
Total 40 60 71 97 135 163 198 215 235 245 244 244 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 7 11 16 24 31 41 36 32 28 24 21 
Oil 27 33 44 47 51 51 52 52 52 52 53 54 
Gas 9 22 39 59 89 106 126 123 121 . ' 112 98 
8 
86 
Nuclear 0 0 1 1 2 5 10 9 9 9 8 
Biomass 14 18 19 31 45 50 56 63 72 77 79 81 
Other Renewables 2 2 3 5 7 13 23 37 61 82 93 105 
Total 57 83 115 159 219 257 308 322 346 360 356 355 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.4 1.7 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.7 4.2 4.7 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.6 3.8 4.9 6.2 7.4 8.4 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.6 60.5 86.0 114.5 148.1 183.7 217.8 249.9 278.9 304.4 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 385 385 384 384 383 383 383 383 382 382 
Grasslands 1680 1675 1686 1696 1705 1714 1723 1732 1741 1750 1760 1769 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 29 66 89 121 124 127 124 115 107 
Forest 1745 1720 1704 1702 1732 1761 1790 1808 1825 1843 1861 1880 
Others 1684 1700 1704 1669 1593 1526 1461 1432 1403 1379 1360 1342 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C McC eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
0.72 1.01 1.48 2.02 2.73 3.20 3.75 3.56 3.39 3.14 2.84 2.56 
0.73 0.82 0.65 0.44 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.12 -0.17 
1.45 1.83 2.13 2.46 2.63 3.08 3.63 3.48 3.34 3.08 2.72 2.39 
77 85 97 112 128 135 143 141 138 124 101 84 
1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1,2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
10.5 12.8 12.2 12.6 17.3 15.0 13.1 10.3 8.1 7.2 7.1 7.0 
0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 89 
4 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 
2 5 5 8 12 17 22 24 21 14 14 14 
396 404 425 398 405 436 470 489 508 528 548 569 
48 55 60 72 80 79 79 73 67 59 50 42 
7 8 9 10 12 12 13 13 12 12 11 11 
Statistical Table 501 
Scenario Bl-ASF 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5264 6117 6827 7537 8039 8526 8704 8527 8444 8022 7282 7056 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion USS 20.6 27.6 38.0 53.5 73.8 114.9 134.3 (67.2 186.9 252.2 314.9 339.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion ( 1990 pnces) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 55 66 80 89 76 62 49 42 35 30 28 25 
Liquids 121 170 228 304 308 311 314 280 247 221 203 186 
Gas 50 58 82 124 149 174 198 185 171 157 143 129 
Electricity 42 55 77 104 149 195 241 283 325 343 339 334 
Others 
Total 269 350 467 621 682 742 802 790 778 752 712 673 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 97 119 149 191 262 332 403 354 305 259 215 172 
Oil 1.39 198 272 354 289 225 160 103 46 14 8 2 
Gas 74 83 118 179 231 283 335 303 272 242 213 184 
Nuclear 7 10 8 7 9 11 13 11 10 9 S 8 
Biomass 0 0 0 14 43 73 102 125 148 167 183 198 
Other Renewables 10 14 23 30 46 61 77 135 192 223 226 229 
Total 326 424 570 774 879 984 1090 1031 973 914 853 791 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 1.2 2.5 4.2 6.5 9.5 13.2 16.9 20.2 23.0 25.3 27.2 
Oil 0.0 1.8 4.2 7.3 10.5 13.0 14.9 16.1 16.8 17.0 17.1 17.2 
Gas 0.0 0.9 1.9 3.3 5.4 8.0 11.1 14.3 17.1 19.7 21.9 23.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 176.1 302.2 458.8 631.1 810.7 978.8 1116.5 1227.0 1317.0 1389.7 
Carbon Sequestration GtC -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.3 -2.5 -2.7 -2.9 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 5.99 6.90 9.65 13.22 15.72 16.61 17.50 14.71 11.93 9.68 7.98 6.27 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.24 1.13 0.98 0.84 0.58 0.32 0.18 0.16 0.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 10.76 14.46 16.85 17.59 18.33 15.29 12.24 9.86 8.13 6.41 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 373 430 479 513 546 513 481 447 412 377 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.1 9.5 10.5 11.0 11.5 11.2 10.8 10.4 9.9 9.3 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 83.6 112.3 104.7 76.4 48.1 38.1 28.1 23.4 24.0 24.6 
C F C / H F C / H C F C MtC eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
C O M t C O 879 877 1039 1162 1338 1316 1293 1199 1105 1029 971 913 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 162 193 218 228 237 255 272 295 322 349 
NOx M t N 31 32 44 59 70 71 72 62 52 45 40 35 
502 Statistical Table 
Scenario Bl-ASF 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 849 919 961 1003 1035 1069 1081 1085 1088 1096 1106 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 15.5 19.2 23.4 27.7 32.4 40.4 43.5 49.7 53.0 64.7 78.7 84.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12 13 12 12 12 11 11 9 8 7 7 6 
Liquids 68 86 91 88 77 66 55 48 41 37 37 36 
Gas 27 29 31 35 36 37 38 35 33 31 31 31 
Electricity 24 27 33 37 40 43 46 54 63 69 74 79 
Others 
Total 131 155 167 172 165 157 150 147 144 144 148 152 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 33 32 34 39 52 66 79 66 52 44 40 36 
Oi l 77 97 106 102 75 47 20 12 5 1 1 0 
Gas 35 38 42 50 54 59 63 57 '51 47 45 43 
Nuclear 6 8 6 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 
Biomass 0 0 0 4 10 15 21 24 27 30 34 38 
Other Renewables 6 7 10 11 13 15 16 27 38 46 50 55 
Total 156 181 198 211 208 205 202 189 176 171 173 175 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.8 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 
Oi l 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.9 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.3 3.0 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.1 5.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.5 102.6 140.3 177.6 212.9 244.3 269.7 290.4 308.8 326.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.51 3.72 3.82 3.63 3.43 2.84 2.24 1.89 1.78 1.68 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.51 3.72 3.82 3.63 3.43 2.84 2.24 1.89 1.78 1.68 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 77 81 86 90 93 90 88 85 81 78 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.8 5.5 6.3 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 108 103 109 112 116 117 117 119 120 120 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 12 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 16 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 
C O M t C O 179 161 165 154 135 100 66 54 42 35 34 32 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 40 43 41 36 32 32 31 33 37 40 
NOx M t N 13 12 13 14 14 13 11 9 7 6 6 5 
Statistical Table 503 
Scenario Bl-ASF 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 417 419 425 431 432 425 423 406 398 374 347 .339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.9 4.6 5.3 6.6 7.4 10.0 12.8 14.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 18 11 11 9 8 6 5 3 2 1 1 I 
Liquids 16 И 12 13 12 II 11 9 8 7 7 7 
Gas 16 12 15 18 17 17 16 14 11 9 8 6 
Electricity 8 7 9 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 8 
Others 
Total 57 42 47 51 48 44 4! 36 32 28 25 21 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 23 13 14 14 14 13 12 9 5 3 2 2 
Oil 18 13 14 15 14 13 13 9 6 4 2 1 
Gas 26 22 26 30 27 24 21 17 14 11 9 7 
Nuclear 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 8 9 
Other Renewables 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 7 6 6 
Total 69 50 57 64 59 55 50 43 36 31 28 25 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 l.I 1.1 1.1 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.9 32.5 42.8 51.8 59.0 64.2 67.4 68.9 69.3 68.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 I.Ol 1.09 0.98 0.81 0.63 0.42 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.01 1.09 0.98 0.81 0.63 0.42 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 43 53 67 78 89 77 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 l l . O 10.4 9.6 8.0 5.7 3.4 2.5 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 
C O M t C O 69 41 41 38 41 38 35 31 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 16 22 27 26 25 24 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 
0.22 
0.00 
0.22 
65 
0.6 
1.6 
27 
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7 
28 
22 
1 
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0.00 
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0.5 
1.0 
27 
8 
6 
25 
22 
1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
46 
0.5 
0.7 
27 
8 
4 
24 
25 
1 
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0.00 
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504 Statistical Table 
Scenario Bl-ASF 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2780 3261 3572 3884 4073 4181 4220 4012 3913 3538 3033 2882 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 1.6 3.4 6.7 12.5 20.5 37.9 46.6 60.0 68.2 94.3 115.9 124.2 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 24 41 55 64 50 36 22 18 15 12 10 8 
Liquids 15 36 67 114 124 134 144 130 116 104 93 83 
Gas 3 8 19 41 55 70 85 78 71 63 56 48 
Electricity 6 13 23 36 68 100 133 149 165 167 155 143 
Others 
Total 47 97 163 255 298 340 383 375 366 346 314 282 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 36 65 88 116 154 193 232 201 170 141 112 83 
Oi l 19 45 85 134 110 86 62 38 13 1 0 0 
Gas 4 10 27 56 89 121 L54 137 . 120 103 86 69 
Nuclear 0 1 1 2 4 6 8 7 6 5 4 4 
Biomass 0 0 0 5 18 30 43 54 65 72 76 80 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 9 19 29 39 67 95 107 102 98 
Total 61 124 207 323 395 466 537 504 470 429 381 333 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.5 1.3 2.3 3.7 5.5 7.6 9.7 11.6 13.1 14.4 15.3 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 1.0 2.1 3.3 4.3 5.0 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.5 3.8 5.3 6.6 7.7 8.6 9.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 48.1 96.8 166.3 249.5 341.8 431.8 508.5 572.7 626.1 669.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Antluopogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 3.38 5.63 7..54 8.51 9.48 8.21 6.93 5.81 4.83 3.86 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 3.72 6.02 7.87 8.77 9.67 8,34 7.00 5.84 4.85 3.86 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 145 163 179 190 202 187 173 158 142 126 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 3.2 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.3 5,1 4.9 4.6 4.3 3.9 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 47.3 66.7 58.2 37.6 17.0 12,1 7.2 4.9 5.2 5.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 56 93 90 85 79 72 64 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 20 18 18 18 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 27 30 32 26 19 16 16 
C O M t C O 235 270 363 438 537 549 561 521 482 445 411 376 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 43 51 58 63 67 72 76 80 84 88 
NOx M t N 7 9 16 25 31 33 35 30 25 20 17 14 
Statistical Table 505 
Scenario B l - A S F 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1218 1519 1869 2218 2500 2851 2980 3023 3044 3013 2795 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 2.5 4.0 6.7 11.3 18.0 32.0 38.9 50.9 58.2 83.3 107.4 117.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 1 2 3 4 7 9 11 11 11 10 10 10 
Liquids 22 38 58 89 94 100 105 94 82 73 66 60 
Gas 5 9 17 31 40 50 60 58 56 53 49 44 
Electricity 4 7 12 20 31 42 54 71 88 98 101 103 
Others 
Total 33 56 89 144 172 201 229 233 237 234 226 217 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 9 14 21 41 61 81 79 77 71 61 51 
Oil 25 43 67 102 90 77 65 43 21 8 5 1 
Gas 8 13 23 42 60 79 97 92 87 80 72 64 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 
Biomass 0 0 0 4 15 26 38 45 53 59 65 71 
Other Renewables 2 3 5 7 10 14 18 35 53 63 67 71 
Total 40 68 108 177 218 259 300 295 291 283 271 259 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.9 2.7 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.4 
on 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.5 4.2 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.7 3.7 4.6 5.4 6.2 6.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 39.6 70.3 109.4 152.2 197.1 238.5 270.9 295.1 312.9 325.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.74 2.79 3.37 3.66 3.95 3.24 2.53 1.91 1.36 0.81 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.52 3.64 4.17 4.38 4.59 3.69 2.78 2.06 1.50 0.95 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 108 132 147 155 163 159 155 149 142 136 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 15.2 25.4 28.5 23.8 19.1 15.4 11.7 9.8 9.6 9.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 89 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 
SF6 MtC eq. 2 5 5 8 12 17 22 24 21 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 470 532 626 629 631 592 553 523 503 482 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 63 77 92 103 113 128 143 159 176 193 
NOx M t N 7 8 11 17 21 22 24 21 19 18 16 15 
506 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario B l - IMAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population Million 5280 6122 6892 
G N P / G D P Onex) Trillion US$ 21.0 26.8 37.3 
1990 US$/cap ^ 3971.0 4372.0 5416.0 
7618 8196 8547 8708 8671 8484 8142 7663 7047 
52.6 73.1 100.7 135.6 171.7 208.5 249.7 290.1 328.4 
6900.0 8916.0 11783.0 15569.0 19803.0 24577.0 30667.0 37856.0 46598.0 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 54 57 60 53 46 37 27 24 22 19 16 14 
Solids 43 43 41 42 43 44 44 40 35 30 25 21 
Liquids 106 117 137 152 156 151 135 115 102 93 84 75 
Gas 46 52 66 70 71 74 79 82 83 82 80 76 
Electricity 39 54 83 122 168 223 260 270 266 255 240 220 
Others 2 4 10 23 38 52 64 70 69 65 59 52 
Total 289 327 398 462 523 581 608 601 576 544 505 458 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 105 109 120 134 163 181 167 133 101 76 58 44 
Oil 129 141 176 206 230 236 228 199 167 143 119 99 
Gas 62 71 108 138 153 166 173 168 154 136 121 103 
Non-Fossil Electric 8 14 22 33 49 73 105 132 151 163 168 165 
Biomass 3 4 11 29 54 77 95 102 99 90 79 67 
Other Renewables 61 68 71 
Total 368 407 508 
Cumulative Resources Production ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.1 2.2 
Oil 0.0 1.3 2.9 
Gas 0.0 0.6 1.5 
66 61 54 46 44 42 41 39 36 
606 710 788 813 778 715 650 584 514 
3.5 4.9 6.7 8.5 10.0 U . l 12.0 12.7 13.2 
4.8 7.0 9.3 11.6 13.8 15.6 17.2 18.5 19.6 
2.8 4.2 5.8 7.5 9.2 10.8 12.3 13.6 14.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 168.7 268.2 376.9 491.0 606.1 711.2 800.8 875.1 935.2 983.0 
Carbon Sequestration •= GtC 2.1 1.7 2.8 3.8 4.5 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.5 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland * 1436 1371 1445 1499 1516 1486 1429 1360 1288 1209 1124 1038 
Grasslands " 3435 3316 3424 3404 3292 3052 2785 2500 2293 2142 2023 1899 
Energy Biomass 8 10 24 68 134 209 268 294 287 262 227 194 
Forest 4277 4261 4179 4258 4274 4375 4551 4711 4897 5130 5349 5543 
Others 3916 4114 3999 3843 3853 3950 4038 4207 4305 4327 4348 4398 
Total 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.50 10.00 11.20 12.20 11.70 10.20 8.60 7.30 6.10 5.20 
Other C 0 2 f GtC L U 1.07 0.78 0.63 -0.09 -0.48 -0.41 -0.46 -0.42 -0.60 • -0.78 -0.97 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.28 10.63 11.11 11.72 11.29 9.74 8.18 6.70 5.32 4.23 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 349 377 385 381 359 342 324 293 266 236 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.3 7.7 7.4 7.0 6.4 5.7 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 73.9 74.6 78.2 78.5 68.9 55.8 44.3 36.1 29.8 24.9 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
C O M t C O 879 877 789 751 603 531 471 459 456 426 399 363 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 141 140 131 123 116 U I 103 99 96 87 
NOx M t N 31 32 36 40 42 43 39 34 30 26 22 19 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d; Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e; Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
Statistical Table 5 0 7 
Marker Scenario Bl - IMAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 799 849 890 932 965 990 1001 1005 1009 1020 1029 1032 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 16.5 20.2 25.9 32.4 38.2 43.9 49.9 55.4 59.8 66.3 73.8 82.3 
1990 US$/cap " 20648.9 23841.8 29100.0 34761.7 39587.5 44382.4 49810.4 55070.9 59257.3 65005.4 71721.0 79765.3 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Solids 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 
Liquids 57 60 60 58 51 41 32 25 20 19 17 16 
Gas 24 27 28 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28 28 
Electricity 24 36 47 54 58 58 57 55 52 51 50 49 
Others 2 3 5 8 13 18 21 22 22 20 19 17 
Total 120 137 152 159 159 L53 146 138 1.30 125 121 116 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 37 46 46 40 36 30 24 19 15 13 11 10 
Oil 67 73 74 72 64 50 39 31 25 22 20 19 
Gas 28 36 42 44 41 38 37 35 34 33 32 31 
Non-Fossil Electric 7 12 18 24 29 32 35 37 37 37 37 37 
Biomass 2 3 5 8 14 18 21 22 23 21 20 19 
Other Renewables 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 
Total 151 178 195 199 193 178 166 154 144 136 131 126 
Cumulative Resources Production Z J ^ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.7 i . l 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.9 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.0 99.3 129.4 155.0 176.1 193.2 207.5 220.0 231.1 241.5 
Carbon Sequestration " GtC 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 379 354 344 349 348 349 352 351 347 345 343 339 
Grasslands " 785 704 619 553 498 459 428 418 408 402 396 389 
Energy Biomass 3 1 2 8 16 27 36 42 42 37 31 26 
Forest 1115 1165 1215 1259 1299 1328 1351 1361 1378 1401 1423 1451 
Others 956 1015 1058 1069 1077 1076 1072 1065 1063 10.54 1045 1033 
Total 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 3238 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.30 3.20 2.80 2.40 
Other C 0 2 ' GtC 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3,20 3.40 3.26 2.78 2.33 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 75 72 68 63 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2,6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 11.8 7.9 5.4 3.6 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 108 103 109 112 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 12 10 8 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 16 5 6 6 
C O M t C O 179 161 153 137 116 100 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 35 33 29 24 
NOx M t N 13 12 12 10 8 6 
2.00 
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1.40 
-0.06 
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2.0 
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7 
8 
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1.30 
-0.14 
1.16 
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1.20 
-0.12 
1.07 
42 
2.2 
2.3 
120 
7 
63 59 
16 15 
3 3 
a; N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
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508 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario Bl - IMAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 412 429 437 443 445 443 432 419 401 384 365 347 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion USS 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.7 2.8 4.3 6.2 8.2 10.3 12.8 15.4 18.1 
1990 US$/cap " 2307.2 1675.8 2335.2 3864.4 6258.7 9702.5 14328.5 19522.7 25650.8 33306.4 42087.4 52209.7 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 3 2 2 2 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Solids 14 10 6 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 
Liquids 21 12 11 12 12 11 10 8 7 6 6 5 
Gas 15 11 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 7 6 6 
Electricity 9 5 7 11 14 18 20 20 19 18 17 16 
Others 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 62 40 37 40 42 46 46 45 41 38 35 32 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 36 18 13 12 12 14 14 12 9 8 6 5 
Oi l 28 13 14 16 16 18 18 16 13 11 10 8 
Gas 25 15 15 18 19 20 18 17 15, 13 11 10 
Non-Fossil Electric 1 1 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 
Biomass 1 1 I 2 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Other Renewables 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 95 52 48 52 56 63 64 60 54 48 43 39 
Cumulative Resources Production ZJt" 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0 
Oil 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 20.9 29.0 36.0 41.8 47.4 52.3 55.4 57.2 58.3 59.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 278 217 219 209 190 173 154 141 128 117 106 98 
Grasslands ' 392 300 321 319 286 248 211 187 170 162 155 148 
Energy Biomass 1 0 1 4 12 28 41 51 57 58 50 46 
Forest 1146 1177 1175 1282 1295 1310 1350 1378 1410 1443 1459 1480 
Others 461 583 562 463 495 519 521 521 512 498 507 506 
Total 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 2278 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.81 
Other C 0 2 ' GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.31 -0.35 -0.36 -0.38 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.30 0.91 0.80 0.81 0.60 0.56 0,55 0.43 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 38 42 44 40 34 33 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 9.0 7.7 6.9 7.0 6.5 5.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 
C O M t C O 69 41 28 23 20 19 19 17 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 12 12 11 11 11 10 
N O x MtN 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 
0.61 
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a: N O T ppp-coirected. 
b: N O T use but production 
c; Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d; Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f: Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
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Statistical Table 509 
Marker Scenario B l - I M A G E 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2781 3246 3609 3929 4142 4235 4220 4088 3871 3594 3262 2886 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 1.4 2.7 4.8 8.7 15.1 24.9 37.9 51.4 64.8 78.7 91.7 103.1 
1990 US$/cap " 502.0 836.8 1336.1 2206.5 3651.1 5885.3 8980.9 12579.4 16732.0 21889.1 28118.6 35726.2 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 29 31 30 24 19 14 9 S 6 5 5 4 
Solids 20 23 23 23 23 22 20 17 14 12 10 8 
Liquids 12 22 29 34 38 39 35 30 26 24 21 19 
Gas 2 6 13 17 19 20 22 23 23 23 21 20 
Electricity 4 9 19 36 56 80 93 95 93 88 84 77 
Others 0 1 3 9 16 23 27 28 26 24 21 18 
Total 68 92 117 144 171 198 205 200 189 175 162 144 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 28 41 51 58 67 74 64 48 35 24 17 11 
Oil 16 27 39 51 63 61 56 49 40 33 27 21 
Gas 4 11 25 42 56 63 59 52 45 38 31 25 
Non-Fossil Electric 0 ! 5 11 24 40 52 60 65 68 67 
Biomass 0 1 3 11 23 34 40 38 37 31 26 22 
Other Renewables 30 33 32 27 23 18 13 12 11 10 9 8 
Total 79 113 153 195 244 273 272 251 227 200 178 1.54 
Cumulative Resources Production ZJ ^ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.9 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Gas 0.0 O.I 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.6 74.7 111.6 152.8 193.4 228.9 258.2 281.7 299.6 311.7 
Carbon Sequestration ' GtC 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland <• 382 392 405 419 422 411 393 362 327 288 252 216 
Grasslands 561 652 734 748 753 753 723 600 531 471 431 386 
Energy Biomass 1 1 3 12 32 71 94 110 95 84 63 50 
Forest 488 403 348 330 316 300 302 334 383 489 599 671 
Others 544 528 486 468 454 441 464 570 640 645 631 653 
Total 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 1.15 1.78 2.58 3.18 3.78 4.08 3.68 3.08 2.48 1.98 1..58 1.28 
Other C 0 2 f GtC 0.37 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.11 -0.09 -0.35 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.82 3.40 3.98 4.27 3.85 3.24 2.62 2.09 1.49 0.93 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 136 148 154 161 157 149 141 128 118 105 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.9 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 29.0 29.1 29.2 27.6 21.4 15.3 10.7 7.7 5.8 4.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 56 93 90 85 79 72 64 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 20 18 18 18 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 27 30 32 26 19 16 16 
C O M t C O 235 270 286 289 280 285 245 238 233 228 222 214 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 40 40 40 40 37 36 33 32 32 29 
NOx M t N 7 9 11 13 15 15 13 11 9 8 7 5 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production 
c: Net Ecosystem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f. Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
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Marker Scenario Bl - IMAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1287 1597 1954 2315 2643 2879 3055 3 ¡ 5 9 3202 3145 3006 2783 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 2.1 3 . ¡ 5.6 9.8 16.9 27.6 41.6 -56.7 73.6 92.0 ¡ 0 9 . ¡ ¡ 2 4 . 9 
1990 US$/cap " 1653.4 1933.0 2839.5 4243.2 6406.6 9580.8 13623.6 17954.7 22996.3 29243.6 363 ¡1 .8 44869.7 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 16 19 24 23 21 18 14 13 11 10 9 7 
Solids 1 3 5 7 10 12 14 14 12 10 8 7 
Liquids 15 23 36 48 55 60 58 53 48 45 40 35 
Gas 4 8 15 16 16 17 21 23 25 25 25 23 
Electricity 4 ¡ 0 2 ¡ 41 67 90 100 101 97 89 79 
Others 0 0 1 4 8 9 13 17 18 18 17 15 
Total 39 57 9 ¡ 119 150 183 2 ¡ ¡ 219 216 205 187 ¡ 6 5 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 3 4 ¡ 0 24 48 64 65 54 42 32 24 ¡8 
Oi l 17 27 48 68 87 107 ¡ 1 4 103 89 77 62 5 ¡ 
Gas 6 10 25 33 36 45 59 64 60 52 47 37 
Non-Fossil Electric 0 0 1 2 5 12 24 36 46 53 55 53 
Biomass 0 0 2 7 14 23 29 36 33 33 28 22 
Other Renewables 18 22 27 26 25 23 20 19 19 18 16 15 
Total 43 64 ¡ ¡ 2 160 216 273 312 313 290 265 232 ¡ 9 6 
Cumulative Resources Production Z J ^ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 
O i l 0.0 0.6 ¡.5 2.6 4.0 5.5 6.9 8.2 9.1 9.9 10.6 ¡ 1 . 1 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 ¡.7 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.3 65.3 99.8 141.4 1 8 9 . ¡ 236.8 279.7 316.2 346.2 370.6 
Carbon Sequestration ^ GtC 1.2 l . ¡ 1.7 2.1 2.1 ¡.7 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 397 408 477 521 .558 553 .530 506 486 460 423 385 
Grasslands 1697 1660 ¡ 7 5 0 1784 ¡ 7 5 5 1592 ¡ 4 2 4 1295 1184 1108 ¡ U 4 ¡ 975 
Energy Biomass 2 7 ¡ 8 44 74 84 96 90 94 84 83 74 
Forest 1528 1517 ¡ 4 4 1 1386 1365 ¡ 4 3 7 ¡ 5 4 8 1639 ¡ 7 2 6 1798 ¡ 8 6 8 1940 
Others 1955 1987 ¡ 8 9 3 1844 1827 ¡ 9 1 5 ¡ 9 8 ¡ 2050 2090 2130 2 ¡ 6 5 2205 
Total 5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 .5579 5579 5579 5579 5579 .5579 5579 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.81 2.71 3.71 4.81 5 . ¡ 1 4.71 4.11 3.51 2.91 2.41 
Other C 0 2 f G t C 0.73 0.82 0,45 0.45 0.04 -0.25 -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.26 3.16 3.75 4.56 4.98 4.56 4.01 3.30 2.69 2.19 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 100 ¡ ¡ 5 1 ¡ 9 117 112 108 103 92 82 70 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 ¡ .9 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.6 
SOx total MtS ¡ 0 . 5 ¡ 2 . 8 2 ¡ . 2 26.8 33.7 37.4 35.6 29.9 24.0 19.5 15.7 12.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 89 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 ¡1 11 11 ¡ 2 12 
SF6 M t C eq. 2 5 5 8 ¡ 2 17 22 24 21 ¡ 4 ¡ 4 ¡ 4 
C O M t C O 396 404 321 301 ¡ 8 6 126 1 2 ¡ 131 143 121 105 83 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 54 55 5 ¡ 48 47 47 45 42 40 36 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 13 ¡ 6 18 ¡ 8 17 15 13 11 10 
a: N O T ppp-corrected. 
b: N O T use but production 
с; Net Ecf tsys íem Production (NEP). 
d: Arable land for crops excluding energy crops and grass & fodder species, 
e: Permanent pasture: F A O category "land for grass & fodder species", 
f; Approximate calculation from complex land-use module. 
Statistical Table щ 
Scenario B l - M A R I A 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population MilUon 5262 6117 6888 7617 8048 8207 8704 8536 8372 8028 7527 7056 
G N P / G D P (raex) TriUion US $ 19.4 25.5 34.2 46.0 60.0 80,7 U0.2 135.8 169.8 214.5 275.5 348.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 48 34 24 
Liquids 138 148 167 
Gas 56 54 79 
Electricity 35 46 53 
Others 0 0 0 
Total 278 282 323 
' Energy EJ 
Coal 90 64 46 
Oil 123 134 146 
Gas 71 91 129 
Nuclear 22 18 17 
Biomass 28 30 37 
17 12 8 6 4 3 2 1 1 
188 215 247 288 349 368 400 410 448 
111 142 171 197 175 173 165 185 177 
61 70 80 98 105 115 131 150 164 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
377 438 507 590 633 658 697 747 791 
34 25 19 14 12 9 7 5 5 
158 177 192 186 177 156 158 147 170 
169 205 237 251 228 223 212 231 219 
15 16 26 43 70 114 173 237 283 
55 75 (04 136 198 231 257 276 291 
Other Renewables 9 8 7 7 6 5 57 63 64 64 63 62 
Total 343 345 382 438 504 583 687 747 797 873 959 1030 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 
Oil 0.0 1.2 2.6 4.0 5.6 7.4 9.3 11.2 12.9 14.5 16.1 17.5 
Gas 0.0 0.7 1.6 2.9 4.6 6.6 9.0 11.5 13.8 16.0 18.2 20.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 163.5 248.3 338.4 434.2 531.6 623.8 708.1 787.8 866.6 947.1 
Carbon Sequesfration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1451 1451 1454 1689 1809 1821 1912 1713 1527 1363 1240 1145 
Grasslands 3395 3395 3392 3160 3040 3029 2773 2609 2609 2609 2609 2609 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 164 528 713 877 1000 1095 
Forest 4138 4142 4170 4199 4231 4265 4310 436] 4408 4412 4412 4412 
Others 4061 4057 4029 3997 3965 3930 3886 3835 3788 3784 3784 3784 
Total 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
7.25 7.80 8.49 9.J3 9.11 8.49 7.94 7.77 7.79 8.06 
0.99 0.91 0.82 0.72 0.53 0.31 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 
8.25 8.71 9.31 9.85 9.64 8.80 8.05 7.88 7.90 8.19 
784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
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Scenario B l -MARIA 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1035 1046 1081 1085 1091 1096 1103 1110 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 15.6 19.6 24.7 31.0 36.4 43.3 50.6 55.3 60.3 66.5 72.2 78.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TrilUon (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12 8 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Liquids 71 74 66 60 59 58 57 78 72 66 62 59 
Gas 28 27 44 58 66 71 77 59 68 76 81 85 
Electricity 21 26 29 32 34 37 39 41 42 44 46 47 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 132 136 145 155 162 168 175 179 182 186 189 191 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 28 21 16 12 10 8 7 6 5 4 4 
Oi l 71 74 66 60 59 58 57 78 72 66 61 57 
Gas 34 47 72 94 107 117 115 99 106 112 116 117 
Nuclear 18 15 12 11 13 15 19 21 26 32 40 48 
Biomass 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 7 
Other Renewables 5 5 4 4 3 3 14 14 16 17 16 16 
Total 171 171 178 187 196 204 214 221 227 235 242 248 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1,6 
Oil 0.0 0.7 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.2 6.0 6.6 7.2 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.7 5.8 6.8 7.9 9.0 10.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.3 98.7 133.3 168.9 204.2 239.2 274.5 309.6 344.4 378.9 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 303 243 195 
Grasslands 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 134 182 
Forest 756 756 756 756 756 756 768 780 780 780 780 780 
Otheis 794 794 794 794 794 794 782 770 770 770 770 770 
Total 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 G t C 2.83 3.20 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
3.25 
0.03 
3.27 
108 
12 
16 
3.35 
0.05 
3.40 
103 
10 
5 
3.43 
0.08 
3.51 
109 
3.50 
0.11 
3.61 
112 
7 
3.40 3.53 
0.05 -0.01 
3.46 3.55 
116 
7 
7 
117 
7 
7 
3.51 
0.01 
3..52 
117 
7 
3.46 
0.04 
3.50 
119 
7 
3.40 
0.07 
3.46 
120 
7 
3.33 
0.09 
3.43 
120 
6 
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Scenario B l - M A R I A 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 427 433 432 430 423 406 391 374 356 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.6 3.6 5.2 6.2 7.9 10.3 13.0 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 13 9 6 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 
Liquids 17 12 11 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 12 
Gas 21 20 23 25 30 35 40 41 43 46 45 
Electricity 7 7 7 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total .58 48 47 45 49 54 60 60 62 65 67 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 19 13 9 6 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 
Oil 19 13 12 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 12 
Gas 27 27 30 32 39 45 50 51 53 55 54 
Nuclear 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 
Biomass 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ! 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 69 57 54 51 56 61 68 68 71 74 77 
Cumulative Resources Use ZI 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 \ \ 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.1 29.2 37.4 46.2 55.7 65.3 74.7 84.2 94.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C Q 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C MtC eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
1.30 
0.00 
1.30 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
0.91 
0.00 
0.91 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
0.82 
0.02 
0.83 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
0.76 
0.03 
0.79 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
0.80 
0.05 
0.85 
15 
6 
7 
20 
7 
7 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
1868 
0.86 
0.06 
0.93 
24 
217 
114 
0 
815 
722 
0.91 
0.06 
0.97 
174 
114 
43 
815 
722 
1868 
0.90 
0.04 
0.94 
139 
114 
78 
815 
722 
1868 
0.91 
0.02 
0.94 
m 
114 
106 
815 
722 
1868 
0.94 
0.04 
0.98 
89 
114 
128 
815 
722 
1868 
0.97 
0.05 
1.03 
0 
20 
39 
10 
0 
0 
20 
47 
8 
I 
3 
0.6 
1.2 
4.6 
0.0 
79 
114 
138 
815 
722 
1868 
1.02 
0.07 
1.09 
26 27 27 27 27 26 
9 10 9 8 8 8 
9 9 7 6 4 4 
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Scenario Bl -MARIA 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy I-J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antluopogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 G l C 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2642 3080 3425 3728 3861 3895 
1.2 2.0 3.4 5.9 10.1 17.0 
20 14 10 7 5 3 
26 33 49 68 86 107 
2 3 4 8 14 21 
4 7 8 11 13 16 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 57 72 93 118 147 
28 20 14 10 7 5 
14 22 30 39 49 56 
3 5 7 U 17 23 
1 1 3 2 2 6 
13 20 27 41 55 72 
I I 1 1 1 1 
61 68 81 104 129 163 
0,0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.Í 1.5 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
1.5 19.3 39.6 60.2 82.0 105.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
366 366 369 380 380 380 
431 431 428 420 420 420 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
365 367 380 390 399 407 
458 456 444 430 421 414 
1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 
1.15 1.78 1.81 1.95 2.16 2.35 
0.37 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.08 
1.53 2.03 2.01 2.10 2.27 2.42 
0 4 11 20 34 56 
3 5 7 9 11 14 
4 7 11 17 23 27 
4008 3814 3632 3368 3040 2744 
28.8 39.0 52.6 70.5 97.3 126.4 
2 2 1 1 1 0 
131 152 165 178 186 187 
24 17 12 8 11 19 
23 24 29 35 42 45 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
180 194 207 221 240 251 
3 2 2 1 1 1 
61 49 46 45 45 46 
25 18 13 9 12 19 
13 18 38 61 79 87 
85 114 127 138 145 144 
17 20 20 20 20 20 
204 222 245 274 301 315 
0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
2.1 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.6 
0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
130.2 153.4 174.0 193.1 211.7 230.9 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
379 375 362 326 285 248 
422 387 387 387 387 387 
0 39 51 88 129 166 
407 407 407 407 407 407 
414 414 414 414 414 414 
1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 
2.45 2.05 1.91 1.82 1.84 1.96 
0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 
2.52 2.13 1.97 1.86 1.86 1.97 
93 90 85 79 72 64 
17 20 18 18 18 18 
30 32 26 19 16 16 
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Scenario Bl -MARIA 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Etnissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1348 1699 2071 2449 2720 2836 
1.7 2.7 4.6 7.2 10.9 16.8 
•} n 1 1 1 
J 
24 2 9 41 51 61 73 
5 4 7 19 32 44 
3 6 9 13 16 20 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 40 60 84 110 138 
6 4 3 2 1 1 
18 25 38 49 59 68 
7 12 19 32 42 51 
0 0 0 0 0 3 
8 6 7 12 19 31 
2 2 1 1 1 1 
41 48 69 95 123 155 
0.0 0.1 O.l 0.1 O.l 0.2 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.9 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 
1.4 17.8 37.6 60.3 85.8 113.7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
490 490 490 714 834 846 
2095 2095 2095 1870 1750 1739 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 2204 2220 2239 2261 2288 
2086 2084 2068 2050 2027 2000 
6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
0.72 1.01 1.37 1.75 2.11 2.41 
0.73 0.82 0.75 0.67 0.58 0.47 
1.45 1.83 2.12 2.42 2.69 2.88 
0 2 16 28 42 64 
4 4 5 6 7 8 
2 5 5 g 12 17 
Я 92 3231 3259 3190 3029 2864 
25.6 35.3 49.0 67.1 93.0 127.4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 no 122 148 150 182 
56 57 49 35 48 36 
28 32 35 43 53 62 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
175 199 207 225 252 280 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
58 40 28 38 29 47 
61 61 52 36 50 37 
9 27 47 76 111 140 
51 83 102 116 126 1.39 
22 25 25 24 24 24 
202 236 254 290 339 386 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2.6 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.5 
1.6 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.2 
141.5 165.9 185.0 200.8 216.3 232.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
939 787 648 623 623 623 
1482 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 
164 445 584 609 609 609 
2321 2360 2407 2411 2411 2411 
1967 1928 1881 1878 1878 1878 
6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
2.35 1.99 1.60 1.55 1.58 1.74 
0.34 0.19 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
2.69 2.18 1.62 1.54 1.55 1.70 
98 102 102 101 96 89 
9 11 11 11 12 12 
22 24 21 14 14 14 
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Scenario Bl-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
World 
Population Mill ion 5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20,9 26.8 36.2 52.1 73.1 100.7 135.6 171.6 208.5 249.8 290.0 328.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 25.7 33.3 44.6 61.6 82.2 108.4 140.0 171.8 204.1 242.5 281.3 318.8 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 38 27 22 16 10 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 42 52 61 59 55 39 23 18 9 3 2 1 
Liquids 111 123 155 185 214 239 243 220 190 153 131 114 
Gas 41 47 61 71 74 73 63 53 47 45 39 31 
Electricity 35 44 61 87 117 148 172 194 204 213 209 200 
Others 8 10 18 33 52 75 98 123 136 144 138 124 
Total 275 303 379 450 522 581 604 608 585 556 520 469 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
91 91 109 110 97 71 
128 155 172 189 203 198 
71 84 119 161 221 278 
7 8 11 15 20 27 
46 45 55 70 89 111 
8 13 23 41 62 103 
352 395 488 586 692 788 
0.0 0.9 1.8 2.9 4.0 5.0 
0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.6 8.6 
0.0 0.7 1.6 2.8 4.4 6.6 
7.1 82.4 167.5 258.6 350.7 443.3 
37 21 15 16 18 22 
192 161 132 95 64 46 
297 302 281 267 232 215 
36 42 47 48 46 41 
121 129 150 174 215 235 
156 211 239 248 239 197 
837 865 865 848 813 755 
5.7 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.8 
10.6 12.5 14.1 15.4 16.4 17.0 
9.4 12.3 15.3 18.2 20.8 23.2 
'32.4 613.9 686.3 749.0 801.1 844.4 
Land Use a Million ha 
Cropland 1459 1466 1464 1461 1458 1452 1447 1442 1437 1433 1431 1429 
Grasslands 3389 3407 3432 3453 3474 3510 3547 3591 3635 3668 3688 3709 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 59 137 196 254 260 266 261 243 225 
Forest 4296 4255 4231 4264 4335 4405 4475 4522 4570 4619 4669 4719 
Others 3805 3820 3822 3711 3545 3386 3226 3133 3040 2968 2918 2868 
Total 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 5.99 6.90 8.26 9.19 9.93 9.91 9.24 8.36 7.32 6.36 5.24 4.68 
Other C 0 2 " GtC 1.11 1.07 0.79 -0.03 -0.65 -0.66 -0.67 -0.62 -0.57 -0.57 -0.61 -0.65 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.05 9.16 9.27 9.25 8.57 7.74 6.75 5.79 4.63 4.04 
C H 4 total -I M t C H 4 310 323 356 386 421 442 453 436 424 392 334 279 
N 2 0 total = M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 65.6 55.2 47.5 37.9 29.9 24.7 20.2 16.5 13.9 12.2 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
C O M t C O 879 877 1001 1120 1233 1326 1331 1268 1288 1307 1409 1436 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 164 180 183 180 175 154 141 121 93 70 
NOx M t N 31 32 38 44 47 46 40 33 27 23 20 17 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M В 1 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d; Non -energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from AIM-B1 emulation run. 
e: Non -energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
Statistical Table 517 
Scenario B l -MESSAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.6 26.0 32.4 38.3 43.9 49.9 55.4 59.8 66.3 73.9 82.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 17.7 22.4 28.1 33.3 38.3 43.6 48.5 52.5 58.4 65.1 72.7 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 69 75 73 69 65 61 57 52 44 42 39 
Gas 22 28 34 35 33 29 21 14 10 9 7 5 
Electricity 22 28 35 43 49 53 54 56 57 60 61 62 
Ottiers 1 1 2 5 7 8 9 12 13 13 12 11 
Total 124 1.36 152 159 159 154 146 139 131 126 123 117 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 33 36 37 31 14 5 4 2 1 1 0 
Oi l 72 85 83 73 62 53 44 36 29 21 15 12 
Gas 33 45 57 68 80 87 84 75 73 77 76 78 
Nuclear 6 7 8 10 11 14 21 25 27 24 20 15 
Biomass 6 8 10 13 15 18 20 26 31 39 50 53 
Other Renewables 4 5 8 13 17 22 24 27 29 31 32 32 
Total 159 183 202 213 215 207 198 192 191 192 193 190 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Oil 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.6 5.8 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.9 3.7 4,5 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.6 98.3 129.2 L56.4 178.9 198.0 214.7 229.9 243.6 255.9 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use ' 
GtC 
Million ha 
Cropland 381 380 378 376 374 370 366 
Grasslands 760 765 772 779 787 809 832 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 10 23 33 44 
Forest 1050 1059 1074 1094 1117 1133 1149 
Others 838 826 805 770 728 684 639 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
logenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 >  GtC 2.83 3,20 3.40 3.35 3.13 2.60 2.16 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 
Total C 0 2 G t C 2.83 3.20 3.32 3.22 2.97 2.46 2.04 
C H 4 total " MtCH4 73 74 73 70 67 62 57 
N 2 0 total = M t N 2 0 - N 2,6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 
SOx total MtS 22,7 17.0 8.9 2.3 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 108 103 109 112 116 
PFC M t C eq. 18 13 12 10 8 7 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 16 5 6 6 7 
C O M t C O 179 161 177 181 160 145 125 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 38 36 31 27 23 
NOx MtN 13 12 14 14 13 10 7 
361 
862 
45 
1154 
607 
3029 
1.84 
-0.08 
1.76 
54 
2.2 
-0.1 
117 
7 
7 
123 
21 
5 
357 
893 
46 
1159 
574 
3029 
1.63 
-0.04 
1.58 
52 
2.2 
0.3 
117 
7 
8 
121 
21 
3 
354 
912 
45 
1167 
551 
3029 
1.50 
-0.04 
1.46 
51 
2.1 
0.6 
119 
7 
8 
122 
20 
9 
353 
918 
42 
1179 
537 
3029 
1.35 
-0.08 
1.27 
50 
2.1 
0.9 
120 
7 
8 
139 
14 
1 
Emissions coirelated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from AIM-B1 emulation ran. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
e; Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
352 
924 
39 
1192 
522 
3029 
1.31 
-0.12 
1.19 
51 
2.1 
1.5 
120 
6 
8 
134 
9 
1 
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Scenario B l - M E S S A G E 
R E F 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1.1 
2.6 
413 419 427 433 
0.8 
2.2 
1.1 
2.6 
1.7 
3.3 
435 
2.8 
4.3 
433 
4.3 
5.3 
423 
6.2 
6.4 
409 
8.2 
8.2 
392 
10.3 
10.3 
374 
12.8 
12.8 
357 
15.3 
15.3 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 1.30 0.91 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.92 0.97 1.03 
Other C 0 2 ^ • GtC 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.20 -0.28 -0.23 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.89 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.81 
C H 4 total d MtCH4 47 39 40 40 41 43 43 39 
N 2 0 total « M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS !7.0 11.0 7.1 4.6 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 
C O M t C O 69 41 45 46 51 60 65 60 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 17 20 23 27 29 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
1.02 
-0.17 
0.85 
37 
0.6 
1.3 
27 
9 
7 
50 
31 
3 
0.90 
-0.15 
0.75 
33 
0.6 
1.4 
27 
8 
6 
38 
28 
2 
0.73 
-0.14 
0.59 
30 
0.6 
1.5 
27 
8 
4 
34 
21 
1 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B I emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
339 
18.1 
18.1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 10 10 13 15 17 18 16 13 10 9 8 
14 10 11 10 9 8 6 4 4 4 3 2 
6 5 6 7 9 12 14 15 15 15 15 15 
7 6 6 7 9 9 9 10 10 10 9 7 
50 36 37 40 43 46 47 45 41 39 35 32 
19 12 9 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 
20 14 13 15 17 16 16 15 11 9 6 5 
27 21 25 28 33 40 43 49 53 48 40 31 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 6 9 
1 1 1 3 4 5 6 6 6 7 9 10 
70 51 49 53 59 67 70 74 74 69 63 57 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 LO 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.0 4.4 
1.3 12.3 21.3 29.5 36.9 44.2 51.3 58.7 67.0 75.0 81.7 86.8 
268 266 266 266 265 265 264 264 263 263 263 262 
341 362 364 366 368 370 372 374 376 378 380 382 
0 0 0 9 20 29 37 38 39 38 35 33 
966 951 934 933 934 954 973 983 993 1005 1018 1031 
701 696 711 702 688 659 630 617 604 592 580 568 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
0.56 
-0.14 
0.42 
26 
0.6 
1.6 
26 
8 
4 
30 
14 
1 
Statistical Table 519 
Scenario B l - M E S S A G E 
A S I A 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 4.8 8.7 15.1 24.9 37.9 51.4 64.8 78.7 91.7 103.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 8.2 12.0 17.3 24.6 34.1 46.1 57.4 67.7 79.3 91.7 103.1 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 16 12 8 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 33 47 48 46 32 19 14 6 2 1 0 
Liquids 13 22 35 50 65 82 87 78 68 55 45 38 
Gas 2 3 7 11 11 14 11 10 10 10 10 10 
Electricity 4 6 11 19 30 42 49 57 60 64 63 58 
Others 1 2 6 11 18 27 34 45 49 52 50 45 
Total 62 82 117 146 175 199 202 204 193 182 170 150 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 30 42 57 58 51 44 24 13 8 8 9 10 
Oi l 15 26 38 52 66 68 72 61 52 37 25 17 
Gas 3 5 13 24 36 51 53 53 50 46 34 27 
Nuclear 0 1 1 3 5 9 11 13 14 17 17 17 
Biomass 24 22 26 30 39 49 54 61 63 67 72 73 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 12 20 35 54 77 83 85 87 74 
Total 74 98 141 178 217 256 268 278 270 260 244 218 
Cumulative Resoui'ces Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.1 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.3 71.2 100.9 132.5 163.1 189.1 210.1 227.1 240.4 251.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ^ Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 435 435 434 434 434 434 433 433 433 433 
Grasslands 608 606 609 612 614 617 619 622 625 628 631 634 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 12 28 40 52 54 55 54 50 46 
Forest 535 525 518 535 551 557 563 578 593 604 610 616 
Others 583 598 602 571 536 516 496 477 458 446 441 436 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 1.15 1.78 2.56 3.01 3.27 3.33 2.93 2.41 2.06 1.69 1.29 1.06 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 -0.10 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.75 2.84 3.09 3.23 2.90 2.31 1.89 1.51 1.15 0.96 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 145 164 183 196 201 194 189 172 141 109 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 31.8 29.9 26.3 19.3 13.1 9.3 6.7 4.4 3.1 2.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 56 93 90 85 79 72 64 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 20 18 18 18 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 27 30 32 26 19 16 16 
C O M t C O 235 270 345 421 511 597 632 621 603 587 583 559 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 48 56 58 59 57 46 40 32 25 20 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 14 16 17 15 12 10 8 7 6 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 enmlation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use chiuiges (AIM-B 1 emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
520 Statistical Table 
Scenario B l - M E S S A G E 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Sohds 
Liquids 
Gas 
ElecUicity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Eneigy E J 
Coal 
O d 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use •> Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total <i MtCH4 
N 2 0 total ^  M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C e q 
P F C M t C e q 
SF6 M t C e q 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
(192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 
19 2 7 4 4 9 3 17 0 27 6 
38 5 1 7 6 12 8 20 1 30 6 
14 11 11 8 6 4 
1 4 5 6 7 7 
17 22 34 48 64 75 
4 6 10 15 22 22 
3 5 9 17 29 42 
0 1 5 10 18 32 
39 49 73 105 145 182 
5 4 8 10 12 10 
21 30 39 49 59 62 
8 12 24 42 73 100 
0 0 1 2 4 4 
14 14 18 25 33 42 
2 4 7 13 22 42 
49 65 96 141 201 259 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 
0 0 0 3 0 6 0 9 1 4 2 0 
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 9 1 6 
1 4 17 8 37 4 59 6 83 7 1102 
371 385 385 385 384 384 
1680 1675 1686 1696 1705 1714 
0 0 0 29 66 93 
1745 1720 1704 1702 1732 1761 
1684 1700 1704 1669 1593 1527 
5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
0 72 101 1 46 1 98 2 66 3 05 
0 73 0 82 0 62 0 38 -0 19 -0 22 
1 45 1 83 2 08 2 36 2 46 2 83 
77 85 98 H 2 130 ¡ 4 1 
1 2 1 3 0 7 0 6 05 0 5 
10 5 12 8 14 8 15 4 14 8 13 8 
0 2 16 28 42 64 
4 4 5 6 7 8 
2 5 5 8 12 17 
396 404 434 472 510 523 
48 55 63 70 74 71 
7 8 10 12 14 15 
2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
41 6 56 7 73 6 92 0 109 1 124 8 
44 0 57 8 73 6 92 0 109 1 124 8 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 4 3 ¡ 1 1 
77 69 57 44 35 29 
25 25 23 22 18 ¡ 4 
54 66 72 74 70 65 
46 56 65 69 67 61 
210 220 219 209 192 170 
6 3 4 6 7 9 
59 50 40 29 18 12 
¡ ¡ 6 ¡ 2 5 106 96 81 79 
4 4 6 6 7 8 
44 39 54 65 88 ¡ 0 ¡ 
72 100 121 ¡ 2 5 1 ¡ ¡ 8 ¡ 
301 321 330 327 3 ¡ 3 290 
0 5 05 0 6 0 6 0 7 0 7 
2 6 32 3 7 4 1 4 4 4 6 
26 38 5 0 6 1 7 0 78 
139 1 168 0 194 5 2 ¡ 7 0 235 4 250 8 
383 383 383 383 382 382 
1723 1732 1741 ¡ 7 5 0 ¡ 7 6 0 ¡ 7 6 9 
1 2 ¡ 124 ¡ 2 7 124 ¡ 1 6 107 
1790 1808 1825 ¡ 8 4 3 ¡ 8 6 2 ¡ 8 8 0 
1461 1432 ¡ 4 0 3 1379 1 3 6 ¡ ¡ 3 4 2 
5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
3 18 3 08 261 2 27 ¡ 86 ¡ 75 
0 25 -0 22 -0 19 0 20 -0 24 0 29 
2 94 2 86 2 43 2 07 ¡ 62 ¡ 46 
¡ 5 ¡ 149 146 135 l ¡ 4 93 
0 5 05 0 5 0 5 0 5 05 
¡ 2 9 11 1 89 7 1 54 4 ¡ 
98 102 102 101 96 89 
9 ¡ ¡ 11 11 ¡ 2 ¡ 2 
22 24 21 14 ¡ 4 14 
509 465 513 559 654 7 ¡ 4 
68 58 50 42 33 27 
¡ 4 ¡ 2 1¡ I ¡ ¡ 0 9 
Emissions corre¡ated to ¡and use change and detorestation were ca¡cu¡ated by usmg A I M B l ¡and-use data 
a Land use taken from A I M В1 emulation run 
b C 0 2 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial piocesses ( M E S S A G E data) 
с C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulahon run) 
d Non-eneigy related C H 4 emissions were taken fiom A I M B l emulation run 
e Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken fiom A I M B l emulation run 
Statistical Table 521 
Scenario B l -Min iCAM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.7 27.4 37.5 51.0 73.0 100.7 134.1 172.7 211.9 251.8 289.9 330.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 45 50 55 60 66 66 61 43 32 25 24 22 
Liquids 121 112 109 113 113 123 142 152 162 172 176 181 
Gas 52 57 66 82 86 86 81 78 78 79 81 84 
Electricity 35 46 63 85 113 147 185 219 247 270 272 273 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 253 264 294 341 378 421 469 493 518 546 553 561 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 88 98 107 113 131 136 127 93 68 51 49 47 
Oi l 131 120 116 119 115 123 144 156 167 177 183 188 
Gas 70 76 100 144 162 169 165 160 155 148 149 151 
Nuclear 24 22 24 29 41 49 54 51 46 38 40 41 
Biomass 0 5 9 13 17 20 23 26 27 24 23 22 
Other Renewables 24 24 28 33 44 76 129 185 234 277 257 238 
Total 336 345 384 451 509 573 642 672 696 716 701 687 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.1 1.1 2.1 3.2 4.4 5.7 7.1 8.1 8.9 9.5 10.0 10.5 
Oil 0.1 1.4 2.6 3.7 4.9 6.1 7.4 8.9 10.6 12.3 14.1 15.9 
Gas 0.1 0.8 1.8 2.9 4.5 6.1 7.8 9.4 11.0 12.5 14.0 15.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 164.2 253.8 352.1 452.4 549.4 641.3 726.4 801.1 865.9 922.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1472 1467 1456 1439 1377 1287 1168 989 833 699 598 496 
Grasslands 3209 3349 3590 3933 4240 4443 4544 4268 3976 3668 3522 3375 
Energy Biomass 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forest 4173 4214 4144 3963 3737 3611 3584 4038 4428 4754 4796 4837 
Others 4310 4133 3972 3828 3810 3823 3868 3870 3928 4043 4250 4458 
Total 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13165 13166 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 7.39 8.23 8.99 9.23 9.30 8.58 8.06 7.73 7.83 7.92 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.00 1.30 1.14 0.72 0.15 0.36 0.02 -0.86 -1.75 -2.64 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 8.38 9.53 10.13 9.94 9.45 8.94 8.08 6.87 6.07 5.28 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 351 399 439 483 512 506 505 510 535 561 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.1 9.5 U . l 13.0 14.8 15.4 16.1 16.8 18.5 20.2 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 69.0 69.0 65.6 57.1 43.7 30.4 21.6 17.3 16.9 16.6 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
522 
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OECDTO^^"'^ '"" '^^ ^ 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Tnllion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Sohds 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Otheis 
Total 
Prunary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resouices Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthiopogenic Emissions (standaidized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C e q 
P F C M t C eq 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 
16 3 20 5 25.1 30 1 32 0 38 8 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 11 10 7 7 6 
72 63 55 48 43 34 
27 31 36 41 39 35 
22 24 25 27 28 31 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.30 128 126 123 117 107 
40 38 32 22 22 23 
76 67 58 49 43 32 
34 40 50 64 61 54 
20 13 9 8 8 8 
0 2 3 3 3 3 
12 11 10 10 10 14 
182 171 162 155 148 133 
ZJ 
0 0 0.4 08 1 1 1.2 1.5 
0.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.7 
0 0 0.4 0 9 1 4 1.7 2.6 
28 33 0 64 7 95.3 124 5 150 8 
408 410 407 399 386 343 
796 821 867 933 960 1022 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
921 931 923 897 883 862 
998 959 925 894 893 896 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2.83 3 20 3 04 2 83 271 2 43 
0.00 ООО 0 10 0 16 0 13 0.00 
2.83 3 20 3 14 2 99 2.84 2.43 
73 74 82 93 100 119 
26 26 28 3.1 3 2 3.8 
22.7 17 0 12 2 68 58 4 9 
19 58 108 103 109 112 
18 13 12 10 8 7 
24 23 16 5 6 6 
1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 1112 
44.6 .50 3 56 5 63.2 71.0 79 3 
na na na l U na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 5 4 3 3 3 
35 35 36 38 39 41 
32 30 30 32 33 33 
35 38 42 46 47 47 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
108 108 112 118 122 126 
23 18 13 9 10 11 
32 33 35 38 40 41 
49 46 45-- 45 47 49 
7 7 6 6 6 7 
3 3 4 3 3 3 
20 27 34 42 41 39 
134 134 137 143 147 150 
1 7 1 9 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 
3 0 3.3 37 4 0 4 4 48 
3 1 36 4 0 4 5 4 9 5 4 
174 4 196 7 217 6 236 7 2.54 0 269 7 
305 259 221 193 158 124 
1037 988 939 891 850 809 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
873 968 1040 1090 1117 1145 
907 908 922 949 998 1046 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3124 
2.37 2 23 2.13 2 08 2.16 2 24 
-0.09 -0 05 -0.11 -0 28 -0 51 -0 74 
2 28 2.17 2.02 1.80 I 65 1 50 
132 140 143 143 155 167 
4 1 4.3 4 4 4 7 4.9 5 1 
4 2 37 34 34 3.6 38 
116 117 117 119 120 120 
7 7 7 7 7 6 
7 7 8 8 8 8 
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Scenario B l - M i n i C A M 
R E F 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
428 425 426 433 434 431 423 408 392 374 357 340 
1.1 1.1 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.1 5.3 7.1 9.2 11.5 13.4 15.6 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
0 
1 13 10 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 
18 12 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 6 6 6 
19 15 14 16 16 14 12 10 9 8 8 7 
6 8 11 15 17 19 21 22 23 22 21 20 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 44 40 46 47 46 45 42 40 38 36 34 
18 17 16 15 16 16 15 9 6 5 4 3 
20 13 10 10 9 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 
26 20 20 28 28 26 21 18 15 13 12 11 
3 4 5 7 7 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 
0 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 4 5 6 10 16 20 23 24 21 19 
70 57 56 66 68 69 69 63 58 54 49 44 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 
1.3 12.3 21.2 30.6 40.8 50.6 59.2 66.6 72.9 77.4 80.0 81.4 
284 294 300 304 295 278 251 205 166 133 117 101 
395 410 452 522 587 627 643 564 493 430 428 426 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 1016 997 948 893 867 869 994 1093 1167 1147 1127 
691 657 628 604 602 606 614 615 626 647 685 724 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
1.30 0.91 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.78 0.60 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.35 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.O8 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.07 -0.17 -0.28 
1.30 0.91 0.86 1.01 1.03 0.95 0.77 0.71 0.56 0.33 0.20 0.07 
47 39 46 60 70 78 84 78 78 84 90 97 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 
17.0 11.0 9.6 8.9 9.5 8.6 6.5 3.6 1.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 27 27 27 26 
7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 8 8 
8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 7 6 4 4 
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Scenario B l - M i n i C A M 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 3.1 6.4 11.5 21.7 34.1 48.6 63.3 77.6 91.5 103.9 117.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 20 27 34 42 46 46 41 29 20 16 14 13 
Liquids 14 18 23 29 34 40 47 50 53 55 55 55 
Gas 2 5 8 13 15 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 
Electricity 4 10 19 32 47 63 81 95 105 113 111 109 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 59 84 115 141 165 185 189 194 200 196 193 
Primaiy Energy E J 
Coal 26 39 53 68 79 79 68 47 33 25 22 20 
Oil 16 19 25 32 35 41 49 53 56 57 58 58 
Gas 3 8 18 33 44 51 54 52 ' 48 44 43 42 
Nuclear I 3 7 11 18 23 26 24 21 17 17 17 
Biomass 0 2 4 7 9 11 12 14 14 13 12 11 
Other Renewables 3 4 5 7 12 28 54 79 100 117 105 94 
Total 49 75 111 157 197 232 263 269 272 272 257 242 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.2 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.1 4.6 
Gas 0.0 O.l 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 42.2 71.6 107.2 145.8 184.3 219.3 249.8 276.1 299.3 320.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 389 400 406 408 399 381 354 302 255 213 186 160 
Grasslands 508 524 554 600 641 671 691 673 648 615 593 572 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forest 1168 1144 1108 1060 1027 1012 1017 1086 1159 1236 1283 1330 
Others 664 633 606 584 583 587 596 597 608 628 665 701 
Total 2729 2700 2674 2652 2650 2651 2657 2659 2671 2692 2728 2763 
Anthr-opogenic Emissions (standaidized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.36 3.08 3.58 3.78 3.68 3.20 2.84 2.59 2.52 2.46 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.16 -0.30 -0.45 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.55 3.32 3.79 3.94 3.75 3.27 2.83 2.42 2.22 2.01 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 133 144 154 161 165 158 153 148 149 150 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.8 6.4 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 31.2 36.9 34.1 27.8 18.0 11.1 6.7 4.7 4.4 4.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 56 93 90 85 79 72 64 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 20 18 18 18 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 27 30 32 26 19 16 16 
C O M l C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
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Scenario B l - M i n i C A M 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1236 1541 1876 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
G N P / G D P (mex) TrilUon USS 1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 14.4 23.7 35.6 52.0 68.6 85.6 101.5 118.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TriUion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 7 6 5 5 5 
Liquids 17 19 23 28 33 41 52 60 67 73 76 80 
Gas 5 6 9 13 18 21 22 22 23 24 25 27 
Electricity 3 5 8 12 21 33 48 63 77 89 93 96 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 33 43 57 79 103 131 153 172 190 199 207 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 4 5 6 8 14 18 21 18 15 13 13 13 
Oil 20 20 23 29 33 42 54 62 69 75 79 83 
Gas 7 8 13 20 30 38 42 44 46 46 48 49 
Nuclear 0 2 3 4 8 11 14 15 14 13 14 14 
6 
Biomass 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 7 7 6 
Other Renewables 5 6 8 11 15 24 39 59 77 94 89 85 
Total 35 42 55 73 103 138 176 205 229 247 249 251 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.8 4.6 5.4 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 36.1 56.3 79.6 105.1 131.5 158.7 186.1 211.0 232.6 251.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antlu-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
391 363 342 329 309 285 258 223 190 160 136 l U 
1510 1594 1717 1879 2025 2123 2174 2043 1897 1733 1651 1568 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3641 3591 3493 3348 3218 3137 3105 3271 3453 3650 3756 3862 
1957 1884 1813 1746 1733 1734 1750 1749 1771 1818 1902 1987 
7499 7432 7366 7301 7285 7280 7286 7286 7311 7361 7445 7528 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 
SF6 MtC eq. 2 5 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.15 
0.68 
1.83 
90 
1.7 
13,0 
16 
5 
5 
1,38 
0,82 
2,20 
102 
2.2 
13.4 
28 
6 
1.77 
0.71 
2.47 
116 
2.9 
13.3 
42 
7 
12 
2.13 
0.49 
2.62 
126 
3.6 
12.8 
64 
8 
17 
2.48 
0.18 
2.65 
131 
4.2 
12.0 
98 
9 
22 
2.55 
0.24 
2.79 
131 
4.6 
9.0 
102 
11 
24 
2.62 
0.06 
2,67 
132 
5.0 
6.7 
102 
11 
21 
2.67 
-0.35 
2.31 
135 
5.3 
5.2 
101 
11 
14 
2.77 
-0.76 
2,01 
141 
6.0 
4.8 
96 
12 
14 
2.87 
-1.17 
1,70 
147 
6.6 
4.4 
89 
12 
14 
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Scenario B I T - M E S S A G E 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources (Jse 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use " 
E J 
EJ 
ZJ 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
20.9 26.8 36.2 52.1 73.1 100.7 135.6 171.6 208.5 249.8 290.0 328.4 
25.7 33.3 44.6 61.6 82.2 108.4 140.0 171.8 204.1 242.5 281.3 318.8 
38 27 22 16 10 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 
42 51 58 52 47 38 21 16 6 2 I 1 
111 123 158 192 224 250 261 244 215 191 L56 131 
41 47 63 73 87 101 97 92 76 52 41 33 
35 44 62 89 120 151 174 196 204 208 203 193 
8 10 16 27 36 47 57 68 84 96 103 95 
275 303 379 449 524 593 616 616 586 548 503 452 
91 91 109 109 98 77 39 19 7 4 2 2 
128 155 172 189 203 197 190 159 124 96 68 48 
71 84 119 159 212 258 258 258 •234 210 183 166 
7 8 11 16 27 43 48 42 24 17 18 21 
46 45 53 68 86 107 123 138 148 148 138 128 
8 13 24 43 62 97 161 230 303 347 372 348 
352 395 488 583 687 779 819 846 840 822 780 714 
0.0 0.9 1.8 2.9 4.0 5.0 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 
0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.6 8.6 10.6 12.5 14.1 15.3 16.3 16.9 
0.0 0.7 1.6 2.8 4.3 6.5 9.0 11.6 14.2 16.5 18.6 20.5 
7.1 82.4 167.6 258.2 349.2 439.5 523.3 595.5 655.3 703.8 742.3 772.5 
Cropland 1459 1466 1464 1461 1458 1452 1447 1442 1437 1433 1431 1429 
Grasslands 3389 3407 3432 3453 3474 3510 3547 3591 3635 3668 3688 3709 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 59 137 196 254 260 266 261 243 225 
Forest 4296 4255 4231 4264 4335 4405 4475 4522 4570 4619 4669 4719 
Others 3805 3820 3822 3711 3545 3386 3226 3133 3040 2968 2918 2868 
Total 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
pogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossii Fuel C 0 2 G t C 5.99 6.90 8.26 9 . U 9.77 9.61 8.48 7.26 5.92 4.92 3.96 3.33 
Other C 0 2 " GtC L U 1.07 0.79 -0.03 -0.65 -0.66 -0.67 -0.62 -0.57 -0.57 -0.61 -0.65 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.05 9.08 9.11 8.95 7.81 6.63 5.35 4.35 3.35 2.68 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 357 387 426 455 465 446 427 385 326 268 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 64.7 52.4 44.5 36.9 29.1 24.3 19.2 15.9 13.3 11.4 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 327 315 299 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 43 46 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 46 43 43 
C O M t C O 879 877 1000 1129 1271 1414 1460 1426 1333 1192 1063 966 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 164 183 192 199 194 171 143 114 87 68 
NOx M i N 31 32 39 45 51 53 49 44 36 28 21 16 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
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Scenario BIT-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 20Й0 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.6 26.0 32.4 38.3 43.9 49.9 55.4 59.8 66.3 73.9 82.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Tiillion (1990 prices) 14.1 17.7 22.4 28.1 33.3 38.3 43.6 48.5 52.5 58.4 65.1 72.7 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 69 74 72 64 58 55 52 48 45 41 37 
Gas 22 28 34 35 38 36 28 21 14 11 9 7 
Elecfricity 22 28 36 44 50 53 56 57 59 61 63 63 
Others 1 1 2 5 5 5 6 7 8 8 7 7 
Total 124 136 151 158 158 153 145 137 129 124 120 114 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 33 35 35 30 14 5 3 1 1 0 0 
Oil 72 84 81 71 56 45 36 30 24 18 14 10 
Gas 33 45 58 67 76 75 73 70 74 71 62 53 
Nuclear 6 7 8 10 15 27 30 23 8 3 6 8 
Biotnass 6 8 10 14 16 17 19 23 27 33 37 42 
Other Renewables 4 5 9 14 17 22 31 41 55 61 64 64 
Total 159 182 200 211 211 200 194 189 188 186 182 176 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Oil 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.1 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.4 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.4 97.6 127.3 151.5 170.3 186.4 201.5 215.6 227.4 236.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ' MilHon ha 
Cropland 381 380 378 376 374 370 366 361 357 354 353 352 
Grasslands 760 765 772 779 787 809 832 862 893 912 918 924 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 10 23 33 44 45 46 45 42 39 
Forest 1050 1059 1074 1094 1117 1133 1149 1154 1159 1167 1179 1192 
Others 838 826 805 770 728 684 639 607 574 551 537 522 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ' GtC 
Other C 0 2 = GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total " M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total « M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2.83 3.20 3.37 3.28 2.93 2 22 1.80 1.61 1..54 1.36 1.12 0.90 
0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 
2.83 3.20 3.29 3.15 2.77 2.08 1.69 1.53 1.50 1.32 1.04 0.78 
73 74 72 70 67 62 58 55 52 51 50 49 
2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
22.7 17.0 8.9 2.4 0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.6 
19 58 108 103 109 112 116 117 117 119 120 120 
18 13 12 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
24 23 16 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 
179 161 177 183 167 151 137 129 119 113 104 103 
42 36 38 37 32 27 24 22 20 18 14 10 
13 12 14 14 13 11 9 7 6 4 2 1 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M В1 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non -energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
528 Statistical Table 
Scenario BIT-MESSAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 419 427 433 435 433 423 409 392 374 357 339 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.8 4.3 6.2 8.2 10.3 12.8 15.3 18.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 2.6 2.2 2.6 3.3 4.3 5.3 6.4 8.2 10.3 12.8 15.3 18.1 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 15 10 10 13 14 16 18 17 14 13 12 10 
Gas 14 10 12 12 12 12 9 7 5 4 3 2 
Electricity 6 5 6 7 9 12 14 15 15 15 15 15 
Others 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 
Total 50 36 37 40 43 47 48 45 41 38 35 32 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 19 12 9 6 3 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Oil 20 14 13 15 16 16 18 16 11 9 7 5 
Gas 27 21 25 28 33 39 39 38 39 39 34 30 
Nuclear 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Biomass 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 6 7 8 9 9 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 3 4 5 6 8 8 9 9 10 
Total 70 51 50 53 58 65 67 68 66 64 59 54 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0,4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0,7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 2,5 3.0 3.4 3.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.4 29.5 36.8 43.8 50.0 55.9 62.0 67.9 73.3 77.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 268 266 266 266 265 265 264 264 263 263 263 262 
Grasslands 341 362 364 366 368 370 372 374 376 378 380 382 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 9 20 29 37 38 39 38 35 33 
Forest 966 951 934 933 934 954 973 983 993 1005 1018 1031 
Others 701 696 711 702 688 659 630 617 604 592 580 568 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Antlu-opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 1.30 0.91 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.62 0.52 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.20 -0.28 -0.23 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.90 0.72 0.74 0.66 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.48 0.38 
C H 4 total " MtCH4 47 39 40 41 44 46 45 40 35 31 28 25 
N 2 0 total " M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.2 4.7 3.0 2.1 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 27 27 27 26 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 8 8 
SF6 M t C eq. 8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 7 6 4 4 
C O M t C O 69 41 46 50 58 72 81 72 54 48 35 25 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 18 21 25 28 27 26 25 19 14 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 
Emissions con-elated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M В 1 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation am. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
Statistical Table 529 
Scenario BIT-MESSAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2798 3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 4.8 8.7 15.1 24.9 37.9 51.4 64.8 78.7 91.7 103.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 8.2 12.0 17.3 24.6 34.1 46.1 57.4 67.7 79.3 91.7 103.1 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 16 12 8 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 32 45 42 39 31 17 13 5 1 0 0 
Liquids 13 22 37 55 73 94 99 92 82 74 62 50 
Gas 2 3 7 11 13 17 20 25 23 15 10 8 
Electricity 4 6 12 21 32 44 49 57 59 60 58 53 
Others 1 2 5 9 12 15 16 20 24 27 30 28 
Total 62 82 117 145 173 203 204 206 193 176 159 139 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 30 42 57 58 49 44 24 12 4 2 I 0 
Oil 15 26 39 53 67 71 71 58 47 37 26 18 
Gas 3 5 13 24 35 48 48 48 45 38 31 24 
Nuclear 0 I 2 3 7 9 10 11 9 8 7 7 
Biomass 24 22 25 30 39 50 53 61 61 62 59 50 
Other Renewables 1 3 6 12 20 33 53 75 92 101 113 110 
Total 74 98 142 179 217 255 258 266 259 249 237 208 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2 3 3 3.3 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.1 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.4 71.5 100.9 131.8 161.0 184.6 202.3 215.4 225.4 232.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use * Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 435 435 434 434 434 434 433 433 433 433 
Grasslands 608 606 609 612 614 617 619 622 625 628 631 634 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 12 28 40 52 54 55 54 50 46 
Forest 535 525 518 535 551 557 563 578 593 604 610 616 
Others 583 598 602 571 536 516 496 477 458 446 441 436 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 •> GtC 1.15 1.78 2.58 3.01 3.21 
Other C 0 2 <^  GtC 0.37 0.26 0.20 -0.17 -0.18 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.78 2.84 3.04 
CH4 total lVItCH4 113 125 146 163 183 
N 2 0 total ' M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 30.9 27.3 22.9 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 
C O M t C O 235 270 343 422 523 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 48 56 60 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 15 18 
3.26 
-0.10 
3.16 
196 
2.3 
18.2 
56 
14 
27 
624 
64 
19 
2.72 
-0.03 
2.69 
203 
2.2 
12.4 
93 
17 
30 
654 
61 
17 
2.13 
-0.10 
2.03 
197 
2.2 
9.0 
90 
20 
32 
661 
53 
15 
1.66 
-0.17 
1.49 
192 
2.2 
6.3 
85 
18 
26 
622 
43 
13 
1.32 
-0.18 
1.14 
172 
2.2 
4.6 
79 
18 
19 
558 
30 
10 
1.00 
-0.14 
0.86 
138 
2.2 
3.2 
72 
18 
16 
512 
21 
8 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy lelated C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulauon run. 
0.75 
-0.10 
0.65 
105 
2 ^ 
2.2 
64 
18 
16 
451 
16 
6 
530 Statistical Table 
Scenario BIT-MESSAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 4.4 9.3 17.0 27.6 41.6 56.7 73.6 92.0 109.1 124.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 3.8 5.1 7.6 12.8 20.1 30.6 44.0 57.8 73.6 92.0 109.1 124.8 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 11 11 8 6 4 3 0 0 0 0 
1 
0 
Solids 1 4 4 5 7 6 4 3 1 1 1 
Liquids 17 22 37 53 72 82 90 83 72 59 42 33 
Gas 4 6 10 15 24 36 40 39 34 22 19 16 
Electricity 3 5 9 18 29 42 55 68 71 72 68 62 
Others 0 1 3 7 12 19 27 34 46 56 61 56 
Total 39 49 73 106 149 190 219 228 224 210 190 168 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 4 8 11 15 18 11 5 2 2 1 2 
Oi l 21 30 40 50 64 65 66 55 42 32 22 15 
Gas 8 12 23 39 68 96 98 101 ' 76 62 56 60 
Nuclear 0 0 1 2 4 5 7 8 8 6 5 7 
Biomass 14 14 17 24 30 37 47 48 53 46 32 27 
Other Renewables 2 4 7 14 21 37 70 106 148 176 186 165 
Total 49 65 96 140 201 259 300 322 328 322 302 275 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.4 4.7 4.9 
Gas 0.0 O.l 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.3 5.9 6.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.4 59.6 84.3 112.4 141.9 168.5 189.6 204.9 216.3 225.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 385 385 384 384 383 383 383 383 382 382 
Grasslands 1680 1675 1686 1696 1705 1714 1723 1732 1741 1750 1760 1769 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 29 66 93 121 124 127 124 116 107 
1880 
Forest 1745 1720 1704 1702 1732 1761 1790 1808 1825 1843 1862 
Others 1684 1700 1704 1669 1593 1527 1461 1432 1403 1379 1361 1342 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 0.72 1.01 1.46 1.98 2.76 3.27 3.09 2.69 1.94 1.50 1.22 1.16 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.62 0.38 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.29 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.08 2.36 2.57 3.05 2.85 2.47 1.75 1.31 0.97 0.87 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 98 112 133 151 1.59 154 148 132 110 89 
N 2 0 total « M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 14.8 15.0 15.2 14.1 13.1 11.4 9.0 7.1 5.4 4.1 
89 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 
SF6 M t C eq. 2 5 5 8 12 17 22 24 21 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 434 475 522 568 588 564 538 473 412 387 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 64 72 80 83 81 68 54 41 33 28 
8 
NOx M t N 7 8 10 13 16 19 19 18 14 11 10 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
b;C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B 1 emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation ran. 
Statistical Table 531 
Scenario B l H i g h - M E S S A G E 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
EJ 
EJ 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primiuy Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Z J 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6117 6888 7617 8182 8531 8704 8667 8463 8125 7658 7056 
20.9 26.8 36.7 56.5 88.5 126.0 166.0 212.3 253.8 290.1 322.7 350.3 
25.7 33.3 45.7 66.9 96.0 130.3 166.8 208.9 246.1 281.7 313.4 340.2 
38 25 20 16 10 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 
42 52 54 58 58 44 29 24 14 11 2 1 
111 123 152 180 212 238 259 262 242 208 179 161 
41 47 58 66 71 75 74 67 62 58 53 45 
35 44 57 83 116 152 186 231 264 291 307 313 
8 10 17 32 52 76 104 139 173 201 218 213 
275 302 359 434 519 593 659 723 755 768 758 732 
91 91 100 111 103 87 64 50 43 47 60 60 
128 155 172 188 204 197 191 162 139 100 70 53 
71 83 110 149 215 273 306 324 304 287 263 244 
7 8 10 14 20 30 45 66 79 81 80 82 
46 44 47 60 79 101 123 159 203 245 280 316 
8 13 21 39 63 112 183 272 348 406 431 404 
352 393 460 560 682 798 911 1033 1117 1167 1184 1157 
0.0 0.9 1.8 2.8 3.9 5.0 5.8 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.9 8.5 
0.0 1.4 3.0 4.7 6.6 8.6 10.6 12.5 14.1 15.5 16.5 17.2 
0.0 0.7 1.6 2.7 4.1 6.3 9.0 12.1 15.3 18.4 21.2 23.9 
7.1 82.4 165.7 254.0 345.4 440.0 535.2 627.2 712.0 787.5 854.7 915.0 
1459 1466 1464 1461 1458 1452 1447 1442 1437 1433 1431 1429 
3389 3407 3432 3453 3474 3510 3547 3591 3635 3668 3688 3709 
0 0 0 59 137 196 254 260 266 261 243 225 
4296 4255 4231 4264 4335 4405 4475 4522 4570 4619 4669 4719 
3805 3820 3822 3711 3545 3386 3226 3133 3040 2968 2918 2868 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 7.90 8.99 9.97 10.27 10.11 9.57 8.60 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 0.79 -0.03 -0.65 -0.66 -0.67 -0.62 -0.57 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 8.69 8.96 9.32 9.61 9.44 8.94 8.03 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 351 385 423 449 468 452 441 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.5 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 62.0 53.8 48.1 39.7 32.4 26.9 24.1 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 784 291 257 298 338 337 333 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 29 32 33 37 42 47 45 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 36 37 47 58 68 71 62 
C O M t C O 879 877 951 1065 1193 1323 1470 1549 1658 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 157 177 184 190 199 185 173 
NOx M t N 31 32 37 42 47 47 45 40 35 
7.63 
-0.57 
7.06 
411 
5.4 
20.6 
327 
43 
46 
1731 
152 
29 
6.99 
-0.61 
6.38 
359 
5.4 
17.8 
315 
46 
43 
1793 
125 
26 
6.33 
-0.65 
5.68 
302 
5.4 
15.5 
299 
45 
43 
1871 
103 
23 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation ran. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-Bl emulation run), 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation ran. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
532 Statistical Table 
Scenario BlHigh-MESSAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 919 965 1007 1043 1069 1081 1084 1089 1098 1108 1110 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.4 20.6 25.5 31.1 37.2 43.5 49.8 56.2 63.0 70.5 78.6 86.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 17.7 22.1 27.0 32.4 37.9 43.5 49.2 55.3 62.1 69.3 76.8 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 69 75 75 73 70 71 68 66 62 58 55 
Gas 22 28 31 30 31 30 25 20 14 12 10 7 
Electricity 22 28 34 42 50 58 64 70 76 83 88 92 
Others 1 1 1 5 7 9 11 15 17 19 19 18 
Total 124 136 146 155 162 168 171 173 174 175 175 173 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 38 33 34 35 30 14 7 7 4 1 1 1 
Oi l 72 84 83 75 64 55 48 38 31 24 18 14 
Gas 33 45 53 62 81 91 95 86 90 104 114 116 
Nuclear 6 7 8 9 11 16 27 42 50 47 38 32 
Biomass 6 8 8 13 17 20 23 31 40 50 62 68 
Other Renewables 4 5 8 13 17 27 34 37 37 39 41 43 
Total 159 182 194 207 220 224 233 240 252 264 275 274 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Oil 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.0 
Gas 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.8 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.2 97.1 127.7 155.5 180.2 202.2 222.4 241.9 261.3 280.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 381 380 378 376 374 370 366 361 357 354 353 352 
Grasslands 760 765 772 779 787 809 832 862 893 912 918 924 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 10 23 33 44 45 46 45 42 39 
Forest 1050 1059 1074 1094 1117 1133 1149 1154 1159 1167 1179 1192 
Others 838 826 805 770 728 684 639 607 574 551 537 522 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.32 3.27 3.14 2.73 2.46 2.16 2.00 1.99 2.01 1.96 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.25 3.14 2.98 2.59 2.34 2.08 1.96 1.94 1.93 1.84 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 71 69 66 62 59 56 53 53 53 53 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 9.1 2.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.9 
H F C M t C eq. 19 58 108 103 109 112 116 117 117 119 120 120 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 12 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 16 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 
C O M t C O 179 161 166 170 163 162 157 164 171 177 180 166 
N M V O C M t 42 36 36 35 32 31 30 29 29 29 24 18 
N O x M t N 13 12 13 13 13 11 9 7 6 4 3 2 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 eiTiissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from AIM-B1 emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
Statistical Table 
533 
Scenario BlHigh-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
REF 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
O d 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx MtN 
413 419 427 433 435 433 
1.1 0.8 1.0 2.0 4.9 7.9 
2.6 2.2 2.5 3.6 5.7 7,9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 2 1 0 
15 10 11 14 17 17 
14 10 11 11 11 10 
6 5 6 7 10 12 
7 6 6 7 9 9 
50 36 37 42 48 48 
19 13 9 6 4 3 
20 14 13 16 18 16 
27 20 23 28 35 40 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 2 3 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
70 50 48 55 64 68 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0,5 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0,8 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1,3 
1.3 12.3 21.3 29.4 37.4 45,3 
268 266 266 266 265 265 
341 362 364 366 368 370 
0 0 0 9 20 29 
966 951 934 933 934 954 
701 696 711 702 688 659 
2276 2276 2276 2276 •2276 2276 
1.30 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.96 0.95 
0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.20 
1.30 0.91 0.88 0.76 0.84 0.75 
47 39 39 41 43 45 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
17.0 11.0 7.1 4.6 3.0 1.7 
0 4 9 15 20 24 
7 4 6 6 7 8 
8 6 4 7 7 8 
69 41 44 49 58 63 
16 13 15 18 21 23 
5 3 3 4 4 4 
423 409 392 374 357 339 
9.9 11.9 13.8 15.6 17.4 19.0 
9.9 11.9 13.8 15.6 17.4 19.0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 14 14 12 11 10 
8 5 4 4 3 2 
14 15 16 17 18 18 
9 10 11 11 10 8 
47 45 45 43 41 38 
3 3 4 5 5 4 
13 11 10 8 8 7 
44 49 50 46 37 27 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
3 3 5 8 13 18 
6 8 9 11 12 13 
70 74 78 77 76 71 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1,4 1.5 
1.8 2.2 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.4 
52.5 59.7 67.7 75.8 83.0 88.7 
264 264 263 263 263 262 
372 374 376 378 380 382 
37 38 39 38 35 33 
973 983 993 1005 1018 1031 
630 617 604 592 580 568 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
0.96 0.98 1.01 0,93 0.79 0.62 
-0.28 -0.23 -0.17 -0,15 -0.14 -0.14 
0.69 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.65 0.48 
46 41 38 36 32 27 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
2.0 1.9 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.8 
26 27 27 27 27 26 
9 10 9 8 8 8 
9 9 7 6 4 4 
60 53 49 40 35 33 
25 27 30 30 23 15 
4 3 2 2 1 1 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from AIM-B1 emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
534 Statistical Table 
Scenario BlHigii-MESSAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2798 .3261 3620 3937 4147 4238 4220 4085 3867 3589 3258 2882 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.7 5.9 14.0 28.0 44.1 60.5 81.5 99.6 112.8 123.9 131.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 8.3 13.7 23.5 36.7 51.2 65.4 84.4 99.6 112.8 123.9 131.7 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 24 15 12 8 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 19 33 42 49 52 39 26 21 13 10 1 0 
Liquids 13 22 37 55 74 94 111 113 106 85 68 58 
Gas 2 3 7 11 13 16 18 17 17 16 17 16 
Electricity 4 6 11 21 35 49 63 83 96 104 107 106 
Others 1 2 6 11 21 31 44 59 75 86 95 91 
Total 62 82 114 155 198 234 264 293 306 302 288 271 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 41 52 64 64 63 46 32 23 24 34 29 
Oi l 15 26 40 57 72 74 77 69 66 48 31 23 
Gas 3 5 14 24 39 55 68 74 68 52 44 34 
Nuclear 0 1 1 3 7 11 16 19 22 24 27 32 
Biomass 24 22 25 31 41 53 64 75 82 95 98 99 
Other Renewables 1 3 5 12 25 44 75 124 159 183 183 169 
Total 74 98 138 191 247 300 346 393 419 425 417 386 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.2 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.8 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.1 2.9 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.5 5.8 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 42.9 72.0 105.6 143.1 181.7 217.4 248.4 274.1 296.0 314.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 438 435 435 435 434 434 434 434 433 433 433 433 
Grasslands 608 606 609 612 614 617 619 622 625 628 631 634 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 12 28 40 52 54 55 54 50 46 
Forest 535 525 518 535 551 557 563 578 593 604 610 616 
Others 583 598 602 571 536 516 496 477 458 446 441 436 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.49 3.29 3.78 4.01 3.84 3.44 3.04 2.46 2.23 1.79 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.20 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 -0.10 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.69 3.12 3.60 3.90 3.81 3.33 2.87 2.28 2.09 1.70 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 144 166 188 203 212 203 197 180 152 118 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 30.2 31.5 29.6 23.3 16.1 11.5 9.4 6.3 4.0 3.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 56 93 90 85 79 72 64 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 20 18 18 18 18 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 27 30 32 26 19 16 16 
C O M t C O 235 270 338 432 543 645 764 792 800 775 773 751 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 47 60 65 68 75 69 61 48 40 34 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 16 18 20 19 17 14 12 10 9 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B l land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 1 emulation run. 
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Scenario BlHigli-MESSAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1519 1875 2241 2557 2791 2980 3089 3115 3064 2934 2727 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 4.3 9.3 18.3 30.5 45.7 62.7 77.5 91.1 102.9 112.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 3.8 5.1 7.4 12.8 21.2 33.3 47.9 63.4 77.5 91.1 102.9 112.7 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 10 9 8 6 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Liquids 17 22 28 36 49 57 63 66 57 49 43 39 
Gas 4 6 9 13 17 18 22 24 27 26 23 19 
Electricity 3 5 7 13 21 33 46 63 76 87 94 96 
Others 0 1 4 8 15 27 40 55 70 85 94 96 
Total 39 48 61 82 111 143 178 211 231 248 254 251 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 4 5 5 5 6 7 10 13 17 21 26 
Oil 21 30 35 41 49 52 52 44 31 20 13 8 
Gas 8 12 20 34 60 87 100 114 96 86 68 67 
Nuclear 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 5 7 10 13 16 
Biomass 14 13 13 16 19 25 33 50 77 94 108 131 
Other Renewables 2 4 7 II 17 35 67 103 143 174 194 179 
Total 49 63 80 108 152 206 262 326 368 400 417 426 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 05 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Oil 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8 33 3.6 3.8 3.9 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.3 3.3 4.6 5.6 6.5 7.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 36.3 55.4 74.7 96.0 120.9 147.8 173.5 195.6 214.4 231.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 371 385 385 385 384 384 383 383 383 383 382 382 
Grasslands 1680 1675 1686 1696 1705 1714 1723 1732 1741 1750 1760 1769 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 29 66 93 12) 124 127 124 116 107 
Forest 1745 1720 1704 1702 1732 1761 1790 1808 1825 1843 1862 1880 
Others 1684 1700 1704 1669 1593 1527 1461 1432 1403 1379 1361 1342 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.25 1.56 2.10 2.58 2.85 2.99 2.55 2.26 1.96 1.96 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.62 0.38 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.29 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 1.87 1.95 1.90 2.36 2.60 2.77 2.36 2.06 1.71 1.67 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 97 109 125 138 151 153 153 143 122 104 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 12.7 12.5 12.0 11.8 11.6 10.4 8.5 7.2 5.9 4.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 89 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 
SF6 M t C eq. 2 5 5 8 12 17 22 24 21 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 403 414 429 453 489 540 638 738 806 922 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 59 64 67 67 68 60 53 45 39 36 
NOx M t N 7 8 9 10 12 12 13 13 12 12 11 11 
Emissions ( 
a: Land-use taken from AIM-B1 emulation run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data), 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes ( A I M - B l emulation run), 
d: Non-energy telated C H 4 emissions were taken fiom A I M - B l emulation run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B l emulation run. 
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Scenario BlHigh-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Popuhition MiUion 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TriUion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
SoUds 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
OU 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
O i l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
5293 6100 6874 7618 8122 8484 
20.7 27.4 37.5 51.0 73.0 100.7 
na na na na ua na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 54 62 69 71 70 
121 118 117 119 113 118 
52 59 64 67 64 58 
35 49 69 97 143 189 
0 0 16 47 73 107 
253 279 328 400 465 542 
88 106 122 134 146 153 
131 127 125 127 116 118 
70 79 118 186 261 310 
24 23 26 31 35 41 
0 5 11 20 36 54 
24 24 28 33 41 68 
336 365 430 532 635 743 
0.1 1.1 2.3 3.5 5.0 6.4 
0.1 1.4 2.7 3.9 5.1 6.3 
0.1 0.8 1.9 3.3 5.8 8.6 
7.1 82.4 166.4 262.9 373.9 492.9 
8703 8623 8430 8126 7621 7137 
134.0 172.6 211.9 251.7 289.7 330.6 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
65 47 34 28 28 27 
132 152 170 187 197 208 
50 55 59 63 65 67 
235 281 322 360 370 381 
148 167 182 194 201 209 
630 701 768 832 861 891 
155 119 94 80 80 81 
133 158 179 197 210 222 
334 371 399 419 429 438 
48 49 46 41 43 46 
74 81 81 75 75 74 
113 169 224 278 265 253 
857 946 1023 1089 1101 И 1 4 
8.0 9.2 10.3 11.2 12.0 12.8 
7.5 9.1 10.8 12.6 14.7 16.7 
11.7 15.4 19.2 23.3 27.5 31.8 
.14.2 736.9 859.7 979.5 1093.6 1201.1 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1472 1467 1455 1435 1373 1284 1167 992 833 691 592 493 
Grasslands 3209 3349 3591 3935 4239 4439 4537 4270 3979 3665 3479 3293 
Energy Biomass 0 0 6 18 47 83 125 125 109 79 70 61 
Forest 4173 4215 4 1 4 4 3963 3720 3568 3506 3931 4339 4731 4805 4879 
Others 4310 4134 3968 3813 3785 3790 3829 3847 3904 3999 4219 4438 
Total 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5.99 6.90 7.81 9.15 10.49 11.28 
1.11 1.07 1.01 1.34 1.22 0.82 
7.10 7.97 8.82 10.48 11.70 12.09 
310 323 352 398 443 489 
6.7 7.0 8.1 9.5 11.0 12.9 
70.9 69.0 73.4 75.6 67.0 56.1 
1672 883 784 291 257 298 
32 25 29 32 33 37 
38 40 36 37 47 58 
11.93 12.00 12.15 12.40 12.81 13.22 
0.25 0.36 0.05 -0.66 -1.73 -2.79 
12.18 12.35 12.21 11.74 11.08 10.43 
521 524 529 536 558 579 
14.6 15.3 16.1 16.8 18.2 19.7 
42.8 29.8 21.4 17.6 17.7 17.9 
338 337 333 327 315 299 
42 47 45 43 46 45 
68 71 62 46 43 43 
S t a t i s t i c a l T a b l e 
5 3 7 
O E C D T O " ' ' " " " ^ ' " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " " ^ 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion f 1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
i4on-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy lEJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nucleai-
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MiS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
838 908 965 1007 1024 1066 
16.3 20.5 25.1 30.1 32.0 38.8 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 12 10 7 6 4 
72 66 57 45 37 20 
27 33 34 32 29 20 
22 25 27 26 25 24 
0 0 12 37 43 61 
130 136 141 146 140 129 
40 41 36 23 23 22 
76 71 61 47 38 18 
34 42 60 87 89 91 
20 14 10 7 6 4 
0 2 4 7 8 13 
12 11 11 10 10 10 
182 181 180 181 173 159 
0.0 0.5 08 1.1 1.2 1.6 
0.1 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.6 
0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.5 
2.8 33.0 65.3 97.4 128.3 156.1 
408 411 406 394 382 340 
796 822 866 929 955 1014 
0 0 4 13 17 30 
921 931 923 897 881 850 
998 959 924 890 888 888 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2.83 3.20 3.15 2.99 2.85 2.54 
0.00 0.00 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.03 
2.83 3.20 3.26 3.17 3.01 2.57 
73 74 82 91 96 П 4 
2.6 2.6 2.8 3,0 3.2 3.7 
22.7 17.0 12.1 5.1 3.6 2.6 
19 58 108 103 109 112 
18 13 12 10 8 7 
24 23 16 5 6 6 
1081 1084 1090 1098 1105 1112 
44.6 50.2 56.4 63.1 71.0 79.3 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 3 2 2 2 2 
16 17 18 19 20 21 
14 15 16 17 18 19 
23 26 29 32 33 34 
73 75 77 80 83 85 
131 135 141 150 155 160 
24 20 16 11 12 13 
14 15 17 20 22 23 
89 92 97 101 104 107 
4 4 4 3 4 4 
17 17 16 15 15 15 
13 17 21 26 26 25 
160 165 171 177 183 188 
1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 
2.7 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.7 
4.4 5.3 6.2 7.2 8.2 9.3 
181.0 204.9 228.5 251.3 272.7 292.5 
303 258 219 187 156 125 
1028 983 937 890 841 793 
42 38 34 28 27 26 
853 941 1017 1079 1110 1140 
897 902 916 938 989 1039 
3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
2.46 2.44 2,44 2,47 2.56 2.65 
-0.07 -0.05 -0,11 -0,24 -0.50 -0.75 
2.39 2.39 2,33 2.22 2.06 1.90 
127 137 143 145 153 161 
4.0 4.2 4,4 4.6 4.8 5.0 
2.2 2,1 2,2 2,4 2.7 3.0 
116 117 117 119 120 120 
7 7 7 7 7 6 
7 7 8 8 8 8 
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Scenario BlHigh-MiniCAM I990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Kfc/1 
Population Million 428 425 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) TriUion ( 1990 prices) na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 
Solids 13 10 
Liquids 18 11 
Gas 19 15 
Electricity 6 8 
Others 0 0 
Total 56 44 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 
on 20 13 
Gas 26 20 
Nuclear 3 4 
Biomass 0 1 
Other Renewables 3 3 
Total 70 57 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 
Oi l 0.0 0,2 
Gas 0.0 0.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
426 433 434 431 423 408 392 374 357 340 
1.4 2.0 3.0 4.1 5.3 7.1 9.2 11.4 13.4 15.5 
na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 7 5 4 4 2 2 1 1 1 
8 8 8 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 
13 13 11 9 7 6 6 5 5 5 
11 16 20 23 24 24 23 23 22 21 
0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
40 44 45 44 43 41 39 36 35 33 
16 16 16 16 17 9 6 5 5 5 
10 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 
20 28 31 30 24 22 19 17 16 15 
5 6 6 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 
1 2 4 4 5 4 4 3 3 3 
4 5 6 8 13 16 18 19 17 16 
56 67 69 70 69 62 57 53 50 46 
0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 
:i.2 30.7 41.0 51.1 60.1 67.9 74.8 80.0 83.5 85.2 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
284 293 300 304 297 282 259 211 169 131 115 99 
395 410 453 523 588 631 652 576 502 428 417 406 
0 0 1 2 5 7 7 3 1 0 0 0 
1007 1016 997 948 889 857 851 973 1081 1177 1163 1150 
691 657 628 602 598 600 609 613 624 642 682 722 
2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
1.30 0.91 0.84 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.82 0.65 0.53 0.46 0.44 0.43 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.09 -0.04 -0.19 -0.34 
1.30 0.91 0.87 1.02 1.04 0.97 0.82 0.75 0.62 0.42 0.26 0.09 
47 39 47 63 72 82 92 86 86 90 100 111 
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.9 
17.0 11.0 9.9 9.5 9.1 8.1 6.5 3.8 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 
0 4 9 15 20 24 26 27 27 27 27 26 
7 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 8 8 
8 6 4 7 7 8 9 9 7 6 4 4 
Statistical Table 539 
Scenario BlHigh-MiniCAM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2790 3226 3608 3937 4115 4210 4219 4062 3852 3589 3245 2919 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 3.1 6.4 11.5 21.7 34.1 48.6 63.3 77.6 91.5 103.9 117.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 20 29 40 51 53 53 49 35 25 20 19 18 
Liquids 14 19 25 33 39 47 54 60 66 70 73 75 
Gas 2 5 8 11 13 13 13 14 15 16 16 16 
Electricity 4 11 22 40 68 96 123 143 161 176 179 182 
Others 0 0 2 6 12 21 33 38 41 43 43 44 
Total 40 64 97 140 185 229 271 290 308 326 330 335 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 26 43 62 84 92 93 87 65 49 41 40 39 
Oi l 16 20 27 36 41 47 55 63 70 74 78 81 
Gas 3 9 23 45 87 115 129 140 146 147 147 147 
Nuclear 1 4 8 13 17 21 27 26 24 21 21 22 
Biomass 0 2 5 9 16 24 32 35 34 31 30 29 
Other Renewables 3 4 5 7 11 26 52 80 107 132 124 116 
Total 49 81 129 194 264 327 381 408 430 446 440 434 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.5 6.9 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.6 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.3 2.3 3.5 4.9 6.3 7.8 9.2 10.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.3 76.5 119.4 169.3 222.3 274.3 323.6 370.4 415.4 459.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
389 399 406 408 395 373 343 296 254 215 186 158 
508 524 554 599 636 663 680 666 646 620 593 565 
0 0 1 4 16 30 44 44 36 22 16 10 
1168 1144 1107 1058 1020 999 995 1056 1126 1207 1268 1329 
664 633 605 581 578 580 587 591 602 620 659 697 
2729 2700 2674 2650 2645 2645 2650 2653 2664 2683 2721 2759 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.58 3.61 4.51 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.23 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.77 3.86 4.74 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 133 144 155 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.8 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 34.7 43.5 37.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 11 20 34 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 7 9 11 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 11 17 23 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5.06 
0.18 
5.24 
160 
4.2 
29.4 
56 
14 
27 
5.27 
0.08 
5.36 
161 
4.7 
19.1 
93 
17 
30 
4.99 
0.07 
5.06 
157 
4.9 
11.7 
90 
20 
32 
4.79 
0.01 
4.79 
155 
5.1 
7.1 
85 
18 
26 
4.68 
-0.12 
4.56 
154 
5.4 
5.3 
79 
18 
19 
4.71 
-0.27 
4.44 
151 
5.8 
5.3 
72 
18 
16 
4.75 
-0.43 
4.31 
148 
6.3 
5.3 
64 
18 
16 
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Scenario B l H i g h - M i n i C A M 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Eneigy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anlln'opogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C MtC eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
1236 1541 1876 2241 2531 2778 2980 3068 3096 3064 2913 2766 
1.9 2.8 4.6 7.4 14.3 23.7 35.6 .52.0 68.6 85.6 101.5 118.7 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 6 7 8 9 7 6 5 5 5 
17 21 26 33 37 44 55 68 80 91 99 106 
5 7 9 12 15 17 16 19 22 25 26 27 
3 6 10 15 30 47 65 88 109 129 137 145 
0 0 1 4 И 24 40 52 63 70 75 79 
27 36 50 70 101 139 185 235 280 321 341 362 
4 6 8 И 16 22 28 26 24 22 23 25 
20 22 27 34 38 46 57 72 85 96 104 112 
7 9 16 27 52 74 93 117 137 153 161 169 
0 2 3 5 7 10 13 15 15 15 16 17 
0 1 2 3 7 13 20 25 27 26 27 27 
5 6 8 12 15 23 36 57 78 101 98 96 
35 46 65 91 136 188 246 311 366 413 429 446 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.8 3.6 4.4 5.5 6.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.3 3.5 4.7 6.1 7.7 9.3 
1.4 17.8 36.6 58.4 85.1 116.3 150.9 189.8 232.8 277.7 322.0 364.2 
391 363 342 329 311 289 263 226 191 157 134 111 
1510 1594 1719 1884 2033 2131 2177 2045 1895 1727 1628 1528 
0 0 0 0 5 16 33 39 38 30 27 25 
3641 3592 3492 3343 3203 3111 3065 3227 3415 3629 3753 3876 
1957 1884 1812 1740 1724 1722 1736 1740 1762 1799 1890 1980 
7499 7432 7365 7296 7276 7269 7273 7277 7300 7343 7431 7520 
0.72 1.01 1.24 1.59 2.18 2.78 3.38 3.92 4.40 4.79 5.09 5.40 
0.73 0.82 0.68 0.84 0.74 0.54 0.23 0.23 0.06 -0.27 -0.77 -1.27 
1.45 1.83 1.93 2.43 2.92 3.31 3.62 4.15 4.46 4.53 4.32 4.13 
77 85 90 101 120 134 142 143 145 147 154 160 
1.2 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.3 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.9 6.5 
10.5 12.8 13.7 14.5 13.7 12.9 12.1 9.1 7.0 5.6 5.3 5.0 
0 2 16 28 42 64 98 102 102 101 96 89 
4 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 
2 5 5 8 12 17 22 24 21 14 14 14 
Statistical Table 541 
Scenario B2-AIM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6091 6851 7612 8372 8855 9367 9638 9917 10129 10271 10414 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 20.9 28.2 36.4 48.4 66.9 86.3 111.2 133.7 160.7 186.9 210.5 237.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 50 38 34 30 26 18 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 36 43 54 66 77 82 88 84 80 76 72 69 
Liquids 111 118 132 146 168 191 217 225 234 241 246 251 
Gas 51 54 74 97 123 148 179 193 209 221 228 236 
Electricity 38 50 65 81 105 135 175 215 266 311 344 381 
Others 
Total 285 304 359 420 499 578 671 730 795 850 892 936 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 93 105 141 180 214 242 278 272 268 262 254 247 
Oi l 143 160 175 185 188 178 173 154 139 126 113 102 
Gas 73 93 123 153 187 226 277 297 320 337 344 352 
Nuclear 6 9 13 19 29 35 46 53 63 72 79 88 
Biomass 50 48 38 38 53 79 120 144 173 198 215 233 
Other Renewables 10 11 13 16 22 32 48 79 132 186 222 264 
Total 376 427 502 590 693 793 941 1000 1095 1181 1227 1285 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.1 1.1 2.3 3.9 5.9 8.0 10.8 13.1 15.9 18.7 21.2 24.0 
Oil O.I 1.6 3.3 5.1 7.0 8.6 10.6 12.0 13.5 14.9 16.1 17.3 
Gas 0.1 0.9 2.0 3.4 5.1 7.0 9.7 12.2 15.4 18.8 22.0 25.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 169.4 268.9 380.8 507.1 649.8 801.2 951.5 1100.3 1246.1 1388.4 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1459 
3389 
0 
4296 
3805 
1481 
3409 
0 
4252 
3806 
1510 
3436 
0 
4225 
3778 
1540 
34.54 
14 
4251 
3690 
1570 
3473 
92 
4292 
3522 
1598 
3508 
163 
4322 
3325 
1626 
3543 
288 
4353 
1656 
3577 
312 
4380 
3139 3019 
1686 
3610 
337 
4407 
2904 
1718 
3641 
341 
4441 
2805 
1751 
3668 
324 
4481 
2721 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.51 10.21 11.83 13.24 14.96 14.82 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 0.92 0.26 0.07 0.12 0.24 0.24 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.43 10.47 11.90 13.36 15.20 15.07 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 310 323 358 391 429 453 482 485 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 78.3 77.6 69.8 51.9 44.2 38.4 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 786 299 272 315 346 413 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 42 55 70 88 107 120 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 48 55 60 76 79 80 
C O M t C O 879 877 953 941 1002 1086 1180 1224 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 161 179 186 191 197 181 
NOx M t N 31 32 35 38 39 40 42 40 
14.75 
0.26 
15.01 
489 
7.7 
34.2 
483 
128 
74 
1272 
167 
38 
14.56 
0.19 
14.76 
485 
7.8 
32.8 
548 
130 
63 
1332 
153 
37 
14.24 
0.17 
14.41 
475 
7.9 
33.3 
603 
127 
65 
1407 
141 
36 
1784 
3696 
307 
4522 
2639 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
13.93 
0.10 
14.04 
465 
8.0 
33.8 
649 
121 
69 
1487 
130 
34 
542 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-AIM 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
E J 
E J 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestraction 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Outers 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
ZJ 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
859 916 942 968 994 985 976 964 952 943 935 928 
16.4 21.1 24.5 28.3 32.8 35.3 37.9 41.0 44.3 48.0 52.1 56.7 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 12 12 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
64 71 70 71 72 70 67 62 58 55 54 52 
25 30 36 41 45 46 47 45 44 43 43 43 
22 27 31 34 38 40 43 48 53 59 63 68 
127 141 148 157 166 166 166 164 163 163 165 168 
41 39 44 46 46 48 49 43 38 34 32 30 
76 88 84 82 73 58 47 38 31 27 25 24 
34 48 55 59 62 64 66 63 .60 58 58 57 
5 7 8 11 13 12 11 11 12 13 14 15 
6 1 0 1 6 11 23 27 33 37 40 44 
6 6 7 8 10 12 14 20 29 37 42 49 
167 189 198 206 210 204 208 202 202 206 212 219 
0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.8 2 2 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.6 
0.1 0.9 1.8 2.6 3.4 3.9 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.1 
0.0 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.8 6.4 
2.8 33.0 65.4 98.7 132.1 164.8 196.8 226.5 252.7 275.9 297.2 317.0 
381 384 391 398 406 411 417 423 429 435 442 449 
760 764 770 773 776 787 798 811 826 838 849 860 
0 0 0 2 17 31 54 59 63 64 61 58 
1050 1059 1069 1082 1095 1104 1113 1124 1136 1151 1171 1190 
838 822 799 774 734 689 647 609 574 538 504 471 
3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.32 3.41 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.30 3.36 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 71 67 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 10.3 7.4 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 105 99 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 13 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 23 
C O M t C O 179 161 174 186 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 34 32 
NOx M t N 13 12 11 10 
3.37 
-0.06 
3.31 
64 
2.6 
7.2 
102 
12 
17 
203 
29 
3.27 
-0.04 
3.24 
59 
2.6 
7.3 
101 
11 
13 
210 
25 
3.18 
-0.02 
3.16 
54 
2.6 
7.4 
102 
10 
13 
216 
21 
2.81 
-0.03 
2.78 
52 
2.5 
7.0 
101 
8 
11 
215 
15 
6 
2.49 
-0.05 
2.45 
51 
2.5 
6.6 
100 
7 
10 
214 
10 
5 
2.28 
-0.07 
2,21 
49 
2.5 
6.4 
98 
7 
11 
216 
7 
5 
2.16 
-0.11 
2.05 
48 
2.5 
6.2 
98 
7 
10 
221 
2.04 
-0.14 
1.90 
47 
2.5 
6.0 
97 
7 
10 
227 
6 
5 
Statistical Table 543 
Scenario B2-AIM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
REF 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use MilUon ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C MtC eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 MtC eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
413 415 416 416 416 411 
1.1 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.7 4.2 
2 3 0 0 0 0 
9 7 7 7 6 6 
19 10 9 8 8 9 
19 13 18 22 25 30 
8 9 11 12 14 17 
58 42 45 49 53 61 
18 15 17 19 19 19 
22 15 13 11 10 9 
26 22 28 31 33 38 
I 1 2 3 4 5 
2 4 0 0 2 4 
1 1 1 2 2 3 
71 58 61 65 6 9 78 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 
1.3 12.3 21.9 31.4 40.5 50.3 
268 269 274 280 285 291 
341 362 366 368 370 373 
0 0 0 1 6 10 
966 951 939 944 947 944 
701 693 697 683 668 656 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
1.30 0.91 1.01 1.05 1.06 1.11 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 
1.30 0.91 1.01 0.89 0.94 1.02 
47 39 47 48 47 48 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
17.0 11.0 11.7 9.7 6.9 3.4 
0 4 9 15 21 25 
7 4 8 10 14 19 
7 6 5 7 9 12 
69 41 40 40 42 45 
16 13 13 13 12 12 
5 3 3 3 3 3 
406 398 390 385 382 379 
6.5 8.0 10.0 11.7 12.9 14.3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 4 4 3 3 2 
10 10 10 10 10 9 
36 36 37 37 35 34 
20 24 28 31 32 33 
71 75 80 81 80 79 
20 19 19 18 16 15 
8 7 6 5 4 3 
44 44 44 43 41 39 
6 6 7 7 7 8 
8 9 11 12 14 15 
6 9 14 19 21 23 
91 95 102 105 103 102 
1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 
0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
1.9 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.6 4.0 
61.1 72.3 83.2 93.4 102.6 111.1 
296 302 308 314 320 327 
377 380 383 386 389 392 
18 20 21 22 20 19 
941 940 939 941 945 949 
644 634 624 613 601 589 
2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
1.17 1.13 1.09 1.02 0.91 0.82 
-0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 
1.14 1.10 1.08 0.95 0.89 0.80 
48 44 40 36 32 28 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 
25 26 26 26 27 27 
25 28 30 30 28 27 
15 16 15 14 14 14 
48 50 51 53 55 57 
12 11 10 9 9 8 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
544 Statistical Table 
Scenario В2-АШ 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2798 3248 3603 3958 4312 4500 4696 4768 4842 4897 4932 4968 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.5 3.5 6.5 12.1 22.7 31.8 44.5 54.4 66.4 78.3 89.2 101.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 28 18 17 14 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 15 23 33 44 54 59 65 63 60 58 56 54 
Liquids 11 17 27 37 51 62 74 76 79 81 82 83 
Gas 2 4 8 17 31 41 55 62 71 79 85 91 
Electricity 5 8 15 25 40 54 75 94 118 140 157 176 
Others 
Total 61 69 100 137 184 222 268 298 330 358 381 404 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 30 44 69 98 125 142 161 L57 154 151 147 144 
Oil 17 26 41 53 63 61 59 48 39 33 29 25 
Gas 4 8 17 33 56 76 103 115 '128 138 145 153 
Nuclear 0 1 2 4 9 14 20 24 29 33 37 41 
Biomass 28 24 19 15 11 17 27 33 39 45 48 53 
Other Renewables 1 2 2 3 6 10 18 31 56 82 99 120 
Total 80 104 150 206 269 319 388 408 444 481 506 536 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.8 2.9 4.1 5.8 7.1 8.7 10.3 11.8 13.4 
Oil 0,0 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.5 3.4 4.6 6.0 7.4 9.0 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1,5 19.3 45.1 80.6 127.3 185.2 253.4 327.3 401.4 475.5 549.2 622.4 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 438 439 448 457 466 475 484 494 503 514 524 535 
Grasslands 608 607 611 615 618 623 627 631 636 640 644 647 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 21 37 65 70 76 77 73 69 
Forest 535 525 518 533 548 553 558 563 567 .571 575 580 
Others 583 593 587 557 512 469 430 405 381 362 347 333 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1,15 1.78 2.82 4.00 5.26 6.13 7.13 7.15 7.17 7.15 7.09 7.03 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.29 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 3.11 4.00 5.33 6.26 7.38 7.40 7.42 7.40 7.35 7.29 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 148 176 209 224 240 241 243 239 230 221 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2,9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 40.1 44.9 36.2 19.0 9.8 10.0 10.3 10.5 10.6 10.8 
H F C M t C eq, 0 5 21 40 66 95 130 164 199 233 267 302 
P F C MtC eq. 3 5 14 22 30 38 46 51 54 54 53 51 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 18 25 32 36 36 33 27 29 30 
C O M t C O 235 270 332 356 412 455 503 521 538 563 594 627 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 50 66 72 77 83 78 74 69 62 56 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 15 18 18 19 17 16 15 14 14 
Statistical Table 545 
Scenario B2-AIM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1511 1891 2270 2649 2952 3289 3502 3729 3904 4020 4139 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 4.1 6.0 8.6 13.9 22.3 29.7 39.6 48.9 56.2 64.4 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 17 18 16 18 15 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 1 2 3 4 6 7 9 9 9 9 9 8 
Liquids 17 20 25 29 36 49 66 75 86 95 100 106 
Gas 4 7 12 17 22 30 42 49 56 62 65 68 
Electiicity 4 6 8 10 14 23 36 49 65 81 91 103 
Others 
Total 40 52 66 77 96 126 166 191 221 246 265 285 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 5 7 11 17 24 34 48 52 57 59 58 58 
Oil 27 32 37 39 43 50 59 61 63 61 55 49 
Gas 9 15 23 31 37 49 64 76 89 97 100 103 
Nuclear 0 0 0 1 2 4 9 12 15 19 21 24 
Biomass 14 18 19 22 35 47 63 76 91 104 112 122 
Other Renewables 2 3 3 5 7 11 19 33 49 59 72 
Total 57 75 94 113 145 191 254 295 348 388 406 428 
C u m u l a ü v e Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3 1.7 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.7 4.3 4.8 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.3 5.3 12.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 37.0 58.2 80.9 106.7 138.5 175.0 214.2 255.6 297.1 337.9 
Carbon Sequestraction GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 371 389 397 405 413 421 429 437 446 455 464 474 
Grasslands 1680 1676 1689 1699 1709 1725 1741 1754 1766 1777 1787 1797 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 7 48 85 151 163 176 179 170 161 
Forest 1745 1717 1699 1692 1701 1721 1740 1752 (765 1777 1790 1803 
Others 1684 1698 1695 1676 1608 1510 1419 1371 1325 1291 1268 1246 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.36 1.76 2.14 2.73 3.48 3.73 3.99 4 . U 4.07 4.04 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.65 0.46 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.01 2.22 2.32 2.84 3.52 3.78 4.07 4.20 4.12 4.04 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 93 100 108 123 139 147 156 162 165 168 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 
SOx total MlS 10.5 12.8 13.2 12.6 16.4 19.2 22.4 16.6 12.3 10.7 11.0 11.3 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 12 20 32 54 84 120 157 190 211 223 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 14 20 27 33 37 39 39 37 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 20 16 17 15 11 13 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 408 359 345 376 413 439 468 501 536 576 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 64 69 72 77 81 77 73 68 64 60 
NOx M t N 7 8 9 9 10 12 14 15 16 16 15 15 
546 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2 -ASF 
Worid 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5256 6091 6870 7650 8277 9072 9367 9632 9771 10132 10.341 10414 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 20.3 26.1 33.8 43.3 54.8 76.3 85.7 104.8 116.3 158.9 214.6 237.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 53 55 66 71 64 57 49 49 48 48 48 48 
Liquids 118 156 194 254 271 288 305 317 329 353 391 428 
Gas 49 55 70 98 121 144 167 177 187 190 186 183 
Electricity 41 50 67 89 116 144 171 185 199 216 234 253 
Others 
Total 261 316 397 512 572 632 692 727 763 807 859 912 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 94 99 124 146 197 247 297 363 430 489 541 594 
Oi l 136 181 232 305 273 240 207 136 65 24 13 2 
Gas 73 78 99 140 180 220 260 268 276 273 258 243-
Nuclear 8 11 10 9 12 15 17 19 21 22 24 25 
Biomass 0 0 4 8 28 49 69 88 108 125 141 156 
Other Renewables 8 11 16 24 31 39 46 52 58 70 86 103 
Total 319 380 486 633 721 809 897 927 957 1002 1062 1122 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 1.0 2.2 3.5 5.3 7.5 10.2 13.5 17.5 22.1 27.3 33.0 
Oil 0.0 1.7 3.8 6.5 9.4 11.9 14.1 15.8 16.7 17.1 17.2 17.3 
Gas 0.0 0.8 1.7 2.9 4.5 6.5 8.9 11.6 14.3 17.1 19.7 22.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G l C 7.1 82.4 172.2 285.7 423.0 574.4 733.3 897.2 1063.8 1234.4 1412.4 1599.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -1.6 -2.0 -1,6 -2.0 -1.9 -1.5 -1.8 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Amliiopogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.85 11.48 13,60 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.25 1.15 
Total C 0 2 G t C 7.10 7.97 9.97 12.73 14.75 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 367 414 459 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 8.0 9.5 10.5 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 77.2 101.3 108.1 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 786 299 272 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 42 55 70 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 48 55 60 
C O M t C O 879 877 984 1077 1233 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 157 180 199 
NOx M t N 31 32 41 52 61 
14.51 
LOO 
15.51 
493 
11.0 
97.4 
315 
88 
76 
1275 
205 
64 
15.42 
0.85 
16.27 
527 
11.5 
86.8 
346 
107 
79 
1318 
211 
66 
15,93 
0.60 
16,52 
545 
11,7 
68,1 
413 
120 
80 
1361 
221 
66 
16,43 
0.35 
16,78 
563 
11,8 
49,4 
483 
128 
74 
1405 
230 
66 
17,13 
0,22 
17.35 
579 
11.9 
38.7 
548 
130 
63 
1485 
248 
18.03 
0.21 
18.24 
593 
12.0 
36.0 
603 
127 
65 
1600 
276 
72 
18.93 
0.20 
19.13 
607 
12.0 
33.3 
649 
121 
69 
1716 
304 
77 
Statistical Table 547 
Scenario B2-ASF 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Goaf 
O d 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
848 916 947 978 990 979 
15.4 19.1 23.1 27.0 30.9 37.0 
12 12 12 12 13 13 
68 86 92 97 91 85 
27 30 32 35 38 40 
23 27 33 39 41 43 
130 156 168 183 182 181 
33 30 34 39 54 68 
77 97 108 117 94 71 
35 38 41 48 55 61 
6 9 8 6 6 6 
0 0 1 2 8 13 
5 6 8 10 11 12 
156 180 200 223 927 230 
0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.1 
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.1 4.2 5.0 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.3 
2.8 .33 0 66.8 104.6 146.1 188.9 
976 963 957 941 930 928 
39.4 43.8 46.2 54.3 64.2 68.0 
13 13 12 12 12 12 
78 75 72 73 77 82 
43 45 47 48 46 45 
45 47 49 53 58 62 
180 180 181 185 194 202 
83 92 102 109 116 122 
47 29 11 2 1 0 
68 69 69 68 64 60 
6 6 7 7 8 8 
18 19 21 23 25 28 
13 14 15 17 21 25 
234 229 225 226 235 244 
2.9 3.8 4.7 5.8 6.9 8.1 
5.5 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
3.0 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.7 6.3 
31.3 272.9 313.2 352.7 392.5 433.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antluopogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2 83 3.20 3..57 3.99 4.30 4 26 4.22 4.09 3.97 3.94 4.02 4.10 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.57 3.99 4..30 4.26 4.22 4.09 3.97 3.94 4.02 4.10 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 77 81 85 87 89 90 91 93 96 99 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 8.0 8.5 8.7 8.5 8.3 7.5 6.8 6.7 7.4 8.1 
H F C MtC eq. 19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
C O M t C O 179 161 167 170 161 135 110 105 100 102 110 119 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 40 43 43 39 36 35 34 35 37 40 
NOx MtN 13 12 14 16 16 15 14 13 12 12 12 13 
548 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-ASF 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 416 415 416 417 415 408 406 398 394 385 380 379 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.3 3.5 4.1 5.1 5.7 7.9 10.8 11.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion ( 1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 18 11 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 4 3 
Liquids 16 11 11 13 14 14 15 15 15 16 18 19 
Gas 15 II 14 17 19 21 23 22 21 20 18 16 
Electricity 8 7 9 11 11 11 U 11 11 10 10 10 
Others 
Total 56 39 44 51 52 54 55 53 52 50 50 49 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 23 12 14 15 16 16 16 14 11 12 15 19 
O i l 18 12 13 16 16 17 17 14 10 6 3 0 
Gas 26 21 24 30 30 29 29 27 25 23 21 18 
Nuclear 1 1 î 1 / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Biomass 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 9 12 13 15 
Otlier Renewables 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Total 68 48 55 64 65 66 67 63 59 57 57 58 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 22.0 33.0 45.0 56.7 67.7 77.8 87.0 95.3 103.4 111.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 1.03 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.30 0.91 (.03 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 41 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.9 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 6 5 
C O M t C O 69 41 40 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 15 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 
1.17 
0.00 
1.17 
46 
0.7 
10.9 
15 
10 
7 
39 
20 
4 
1.21 
0.00 
1.21 
55 
0.7 
9.6 
21 
14 
9 
45 
25 
4 
1.14 
0.00 
1.14 
63 
0.7 
7.5 
25 
19 
12 
46 
26 
4 
1.06 
0.00 
1.06 
71 
0.7 
5.3 
25 
25 
15 
48 
27 
4 
0.96 
0.00 
0.96 
76 
0.7 
4.5 
26 
28 
16 
49 
25 
3 
0.86 
0.00 
0.86 
82 
0.6 
3.6 
26 
30 
15 
51 
22 
3 
0.81 
0.00 
0.81 
87 
0.6 
2.8 
26 
30 
14 
55 
22 
3 
0.81 
0.00 
0.81 
91 
0.6 
1.9 
27 
28 
14 
61 
25 
3 
0.81 
0.00 
0.81 
95 
0.6 
1.0 
27 
27 
14 
67 
27 
3 
Statistical Table 549 
Scenario B2-ASF 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2776 3248 3617 3986 4270 4584 4696 4769 4806 4899 4951 4968 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.5 2.5 4.1 6.6 9.7 16.5 19.7 26.3 30.4 46.2 67.6 76.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 22 31 41 46 38 29 21 20 19 19 18 17 
Liquids 14 26 43 72 83 95 106 115 124 138 156 174 
Gas 2 5 10 22 32 42 51 55 60 61 59 57 
Electricity 6 10 16 24 43 62 81 86 92 97 103 108 
Others 
Total 43 72 110 163 195 227 259 277 295 314 335 356 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 33 49 65 77 101 126 151 184 218 245 265 286 
Oil 17 34 55 88 79 71 63 38 14 1 1 0 
Gas 4 7 15 29 50 71 92 96 100 97 89 80 
Nuclear 0 1 1 2 4 6 9 9 10 11 11 И 
Biomass 0 0 1 3 7 12 17 18 20 22 24 26 
Other Renewables 1 2 4 6 11 15 19 22 24 29 35 42 
Total 55 92 140 205 253 302 351 368 386 404 425 445 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.2 6.9 8.9 11.2 13.8 16.5 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.3 3.0 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.2 4.1 5.1 6.1 6.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 19.3 44.9 81.9 130.7 188.3 252.6 322.3 395.8 473.1 554.2 639.1 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Million ha 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.73 3.94 5.08 5.84 6.59 7.03 7.47 7.89 8.27 8.66 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 3.07 4.34 5.42 6.10 6.77 7.16 7.54 7.92 8.30 8.67 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 144 159 176 191 206 212 217 220 221 221 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 3.2 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 39.6 56.4 59.3 52.1 45.0 31.7 18.4 11.0 9.3 7.7 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 21 40 66 95 130 164 199 233 267 302 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 14 22 30 38 46 51 54 54 53 51 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 18 25 32 36 36 33 27 29 30 
C O M t C O 235 270 326 369 438 470 502 533 563 611 672 734 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 41 46 50 52 54 57 60 64 70 76 
NOx M t N 7 9 13 18 22 24 27 27 28 29 30 32 
550 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-ASF 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
1216 1511 1890 2269 2603 3100 3289 3502 3615 3908 4080 4139 
2.4 3.6 5.4 8.2 11.8 19.2 22.6 29.7 34.0 50.5 72.1 81.2 
1 1 2 3 5 7 9 10 11 13 14 15 
21 33 47 72 83 94 106 112 117 127 139 152 
5 8 14 25 33 41 49 54 59 62 63 65 
4 6 10 16 22 28 35 41 48 55 64 73 
31 49 74 115 143 171 198 217 235 257 281 305 
4 7 10 15 26 37 48 73 99 123 145 167 
25 38 56 85 83 81 79 54 30 14 8 1 
8 12 19 32 45 58 71 77 82. 84 84 84 
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 
0 0 2 3 13 23 34 46 58 69 79 88 
I 
39 
2 4 5 7 9 12 14 16 20 26 31 
60 91 141 176 210 245 267 288 314 345 375 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.7 3.8 5.2 6.7 
0.0 0.3 0.8 1.5 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 
0.0 o.l 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.4 2,1 2.8 3.6 4.5 5.3 6.1 
1.4 17.8 38.5 66.1 101.3 140.4 181.6 224.2 267.8 313.2 362.2 415.5 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 
SOx total MtS 10.5 
H F C M t C eq. 0 
P F C M t C eq. 4 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 
C O M t C O 396 
N M V O C Mt 48 
NOx M t N 7 
1.01 
0.82 
1.83 
85 
1.3 
12.8 
2 
4 
5 
404 
55 
1.52 
0.78 
2.30 
105 
1.6 
15.6 
12 
7 
5 
451 
61 
10 
2.38 
0.85 
3.22 
128 
1.9 
22.5 
20 
10 
7 
499 
71 
14 
3.00 
0.82 
3.82 
143 
2.2 
27.5 
32 
14 
9 
590 
81 
18 
3.28 
0.74 
4.02 
151 
2.5 
26.3 
54 
20 
20 
624 
88 
20 
3.55 
0.66 
4.21 
160 
2.7 
25.2 
84 
27 
16 
658 
95 
22 
3.84 
0.47 
4.31 
166 
2.9 
21.4 
120 
33 
17 
674 
104 
23 
4.13 
0.28 
4.41 
173 
3.0 
17.5 
157 
37 
15 
689 
114 
24 
4.50 
0.18 
4.68 
179 
3.1 
15.2 
190 
39 
11 
717 
127 
25 
4.93 
0.19 
5.12 
185 
3.2 
14.4 
211 
39 
13 
757 
143 
27 
5.36 
0.19 
5.55 
191 
3.3 
13.5 
223 
37 
14 
797 
160 
29 
Statistical Table 551 
Scenario B2-IMAGE 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 piices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear-
Biomass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
5297 
21.0 
0.0 
50 
40 
98 
50 
35 
0 
272 
82 
116 
78 
1 
6 
17 
344 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
7.1 82.4 
0.0 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 
Other C 0 2 GtC L U 1.07 
Total C 0 2 G t C 7.10 7.97 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7.0 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69.0 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 
C O M t C O 879 877 
N M V O C Mt 139 141 
NOx M t N 31 32 
7.68 
1.50 
9.19 
396 
9.3 
52.6 
786 
42 
48 
755 
147 
36 
7869 
41.2 
0.0 
35 
36 
106 
102 
99 
0 
377 
113 
130 
182 
6 
35 
41 
506 
3.1 
3.3 
3.5 
9875 
75.7 
0.0 
15 
46 
124 
143 
177 
0 
504 
197 
1.33 
212 
34 
15 
90 
679 
8.0 
7.3 
9.6 
168.2 266.2 373.5 487.3 607.7 729.7 
0.0 
8.47 
I. 94 
10.40 
469 
II. 5 
47.7 
299 
55 
55 
632 
152 
39 
9.39 
I. 67 
11.06 
491 
II. 8 
42.4 
272 
70 
60 
615 
151 
43 
10.31 
1.40 
11.7! 
514 
12.2 
44.8 
315 
88 
76 
597 
149 
47 
0.0 
11.23 
1.13 
12.36 
536 
12.5 
41.7 
346 
107 
79 
580 
147 
51 
10.84 
1.20 
12.04 
540 
12.5 
42.5 
413 
120 
80 
596 
149 
49 
10360 
198.7 
0.0 
9 
73 
128 
160 
355 
0 
726 
168 
86 
187 
76 
9 
322 
846 
17.9 
12.3 
19.6 
8.5 964.0 1076.4 1183.5 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10.46 
1.26 
11.72 
544 
12.6 
43.3 
483 
128 
74 
612 
151 
10.07 
1.33 
11.40 
548 
12.6 
41.7 
548 
130 
63 
629 
1.54 
46 
9.68 
1.39 
11.07 
551 
12.7 
37.9 
603 
127 
65 
645 
156 
44 
9.30 
1.46 
10.75 
555 
12.7 
34.0 
649 
121 
69 
661 
158 
43 
552 Statistical Table 
Scenario В2-ШАСЕ 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 801 993 1022 1005 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.5 27.9 39.2 65.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion ( 1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 6 5 2 1 
Solids 7 6 6 8 
Liquids 51 40 38 25 
Gas 34 53 64 78 
Electricity 21 48 57 68 
Others 
Total 119 152 166 179 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 24 22 27 17 
Oil 55 45 39 20 
Gas 51 96 97 88 
Nuclear 
Biomass 1 6 10 
Non-commercial 6 5 2 I 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 10 25 35 62 
Total 147 195 206 197 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.9 1.6 2.6 
Oil 0.1 0.8 1.7 2.5 
Gas o.l 1.8 4.6 9.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 66.1 101.4 138.2 175.6 213.5 251.2 288.0 323.9 358.9 392.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.25 3.10 2.96 2.81 2.66 
Other C 0 2 G t C 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.42 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.64 0.69 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.42 3.65 3.71 3.76 3.82 3.73 3.63 3.54 3.45 3.35 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 87 101 101 102 103 102 100 99 98 97 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 10.2 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
C O M t C O 179 161 119 77 79 80 82 83 84 84 85 86 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 36 36 36 36 35 35 35 34 34 33 
NOx M t N 13 12 11 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 7 
Statistical Table 553 
Scenario B2-IMAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
E J 
413 
1.0 
2 
11 
18 
12 
7 
50 
432 
2.1 
1 
4 
15 
9 
13 
41 
435 407 
3.5 5.7 
0 0 
3 3 
10 7 
9 9 
14 13 
36 31 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biotnass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (NucleatySolar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
26 
26 
21 
0 
2 
2 
78 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
16 
21 
19 
0 
1 
5 
63 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
1.3 12.3 20.4 26.2 .30.6 34.1 
13 6 
13 8 
16 13 
3 3 
0 0 
8 10 
53 40 
1.1 1.6 
1.0 1.5 
1.1 2.0 
36.8 38.9 40.7 42.3 43.6 44.6 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.68 0.46 0.34 0.23 0.12 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.20 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.29 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.69 0.48 0.39 0.31 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 45 50 48 45 42 41 39 38 36 34 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 5.0 3.6 2.7 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 6 5 7 9 12 15 16 15 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 69 41 26 10 8 6 3 2 1 -1 „2 -3 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 12 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 
NOx M t N 5 3 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 
554 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-IMAGE 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
EJ 
EJ Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear-
Biomass 
Non-commercial 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
2790 
1.4 
28 
20 
14 
2 
4 
68 
29 
17 
3 
0 
28 
2 
79 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4123 
5.7 
21 
22 
26 
34 
31 
134 
63 
32 
60 
3 
21 
7 
185 
1.4 
0.7 
0.9 
4956 
17.7 
7 
26 
32 
59 
79 
203 
120 
22 
82 
19 
7 
34 
284 
4.3 
1.5 
3.1 
4783 
70.6 
3 
39 
28 
48 
164 
282 
64 
3 
48 
28 
3 
163 
309 
9.4 
1.9 
5.9 
1.5 19.3 43.2 73.9 111.3 154.6 204.1 2.54.3 299.7 340.6 376.7 408.1 
Anlhropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.15 1.78 2.51 3.24 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.19 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.73 3.43 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 153 180 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.4 
SOx total MlS 17.7 25.3 20.5 18.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 21 40 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 14 22 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 18 
C O M t C O 235 270 247 225 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 39 41 
N O x M t N 7 9 12 16 
3.80 
0.24 
4.03 
194 
3.6 
17.6 
66 
30 
25 
237 
43 
19 
4.36 
0.28 
4.64 
209 
3.8 
17.1 
95 
38 
32 
249 
45 
22 
4.92 
0.33 
5.25 
224 
4.0 
15.3 
130 
46 
36 
262 
46 
25 
4.46 
0.32 
4.78 
225 
4.0 
15.2 
164 
51 
36 
262 
46 
22 
4.00 
0.31 
4.31 
226 
4.0 
15.0 
199 
54 
33 
263 
46 
20 
3.54 
0.31 
3.85 
227 
4.0 
¡ 4 . 0 
233 
54 
27 
263 
46 
¡ 7 
3.08 
0.30 
3.38 
228 
4.0 
¡2 .1 
267 
53 
29 
264 
46 
¡5 
2.62 
0.29 
2.91 
229 
4.0 
¡ 0 . 2 
302 
51 
30 
264 
46 
¡ 3 
Statistical Table 555 
Scenario B2-IMAGE 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1293 2321 3462 4165 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 2.1 5.5 15.3 56.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 14 8 6 4 
Solids 2 4 10 24 
Liquids 15 25 45 68 
Gas 3 6 11 25 
Electricity 2 7 26 111 
Others 
Total 35 51 99 233 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 4 12 38 80 
Oil 18 31 59 55 
Gas 3 8 17 38 
Nuclear 
Biomass 0 1 5 36 
Non-commercial 14 8 6 4 
N T E (Nuclear/Solar) & Hydro 3 4 12 86 
Total 41 64 137 300 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 1.0 4.4 
Oil 0.0 1.2 3.0 6.4 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.8 2.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 38.7 64.6 93.4 123.0 153.3 185.3 220.0 257.3 297.3 339.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.19 1.37 1.84 2.32 2.79 3.07 3.36 3.64 3.93 4.21 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 1.15 1.47 1.08 0.68 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 2.34 2.85 2.92 2.99 3.07 3.33 3.60 3.86 4.13 4.40 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 111 138 148 158 168 173 179 184 189 195 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 3.0 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 14.1 15.6 12.8 17.2 17.1 18.8 20.5 20.7 19.2 17.8 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 12 20 32 54 84 120 157 190 211 223 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 14 20 27 33 37 39 39 37 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 20 16 17 15 11 13 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 362 320 291 262 233 249 265 282 298 315 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 60 64 62 59 56 59 62 65 68 71 
NOx M t N 7 8 9 10 12 14 15 17 18 20 21 23 
556 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-MARIA 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6091 6891 7672 8372 8930 9367 9704 9960 10159 10306 10414 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 19.5 27.2 37.0 49.7 64.0 83.1 108.0 130.5 156.3 182.0 206.2 232.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 48 40 45 55 80 124 174 234 287 328 333 264 
Liquids 138 159 180 204 229 261 292 308 301 317 348 375 
Gas 56 56 87 119 141 144 132 118 115 96 86 148 
Electricity 35 49 60 71 84 95 116 125 141 152 158 159 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 278 305 371 449 535 625 714 784 844 893 925 946 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 90 71 68 72 93 135 182 239 291 331 335 265 
Oi l 123 140 150 167 172 181 197 189 152 131 14! 185 
Gas 71 99 147 190 222 248 217 196 188 164 147 202 
Nuclear 22 21 28 26 27 44 69 112 180 228 264 233 
Biomass 28 32 40 62 97 107 114 132 159 192 212 225 
Other Renewables 9 8 7 7 6 6 58 62 61 60 59 58 
Total 343 372 441 523 617 721 837 931 1031 1107 1159 1169 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.9 1.6 2,3 3.0 3.9 5.3 7.1 9.5 12.4 15.7 19.1 
Oi l 0.0 1.2 2.6 4.1 5.8 7.5 9.3 11.3 13.2 14.7 16.0 17.4 
Gas 0.0 0.7 1.7 3,2 5.1 7.3 9.8 11.9 13.9 15.8 17.4 18.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 166.5 260.4 365.3 484.0 616.0 757.3 904.8 1055.4 1207.2 1358.9 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standai'dized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1451 1451 1457 1743 1937 2049 2079 1999 1868 1701 1578 1500 
3395 3395 3392 3114 2944 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 219 396 519 597 
4138 4138 4138 4138 4138 4122 4124 4138 4138 4138 4138 4138 
4061 4061 4058 4051 4027 3970 3937 3924 3916 3907 3907 3907 
13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
5.99 6.90 7.75 8.85 10.00 11.66 12.74 13.72 14.19 14.46 14.49 14.42 
1.11 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.05 1.04 0.96 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.71 0.73 
7.10 7.97 8.84 9.93 11.05 12.70 13.70 14.55 14.96 15.16 15.20 15.15 
1672 883 786 299 272 315 346 413 483 548 603 649 
32 25 42 55 70 88 107 120 128 130 127 121 
38 40 48 55 60 76 79 80 74 63 65 69 
Statistical Table 
557 
Scenario B2-MARIA 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MilUon 859 917 953 982 994 988 976 965 952 941 934 928 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 15.6 20.7 26.1 30.2 33.4 37.1 41.1 43.8 47.9 52.9 57.7 62.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 12 8 6 4 13 29 50 65 76 83 89 75 
Liquids 71 80 74 67 62 58 55 52 51 50 50 50 
Gas 28 26 45 61 62 53 37 26 18 13 9 20 
Electricity 21 28 32 35 37 38 40 41 43 44 45 46 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 132 142 157 167 174 178 182 184 188 190 194 192 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 38 28 20 15 22 36 56 69 79 85 90 76 
Oi l 71 80 74 67 62 58 55 52 51 50 50 50 
Gas 34 49 79 102 107 100 75 63 55 49 43 51 
Nuclear 18 15 12 13 16 20 24 30 38 45 54 65 
Biomass 6 4 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Other Renewables 5 5 4 4 3 3 15 14 14 14 14 13 
Total 171 180 193 202 212 218 225 230 237 244 252 255 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.6 4.5 5.4 
Oil 0,0 0.7 1.5 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.1 4.7 5.2 5.7 6.2 6.7 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.6 2.6 3.7 4.7 5.5 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.9 100.1 135.8 173.1 211.3 250.1 290.3 331.4 373.3 414.3 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 303 243 
Grasslands 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 134 
Forest 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
Others 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Total 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2.83 3.20 3.36 3.42 3.59 3.76 3.81 3.93 4.04 4.09 4,13 3.86 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 
2.83 3.20 3.38 3.47 3.66 3.80 3.83 3.95 4.07 4.16 4.22 3.98 
19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
558 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-1VIARIA 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 415 417 418 416 411 406 396 389 384 381 379 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.6 4.1 6.7 8.1 10.0 11.5 12.9 14.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 13 9 6 4 9 16 27 45 58 66 72 68 
Liquids 17 13 12 11 12 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Gas 21 24 30 36 40 43 44 31 22 15 11 12 
Electricity 7 8 8 9 10 12 15 16 17 17 17 17 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 58 54 56 60 71 84 100 105 110 112 113 111 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 19 13 9 6 10 17 28 45 58 67 72 68 
Oi l 19 14 12 11 12 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Gas 27 33 40 47 55 62 65 53 '44 37 31 32 
Nuclear 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 7 8 10 13 
Biomass I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Total 69 64 64 68 81 96 114 120 126 129 130 130 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.4 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.4 30.4 40.6 53.3 69.0 87.4 107.7 129.2 151.1 173.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
217 217 217 217 217 217 217 174 139 111 89 89 
114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 78 106 128 128 
815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 
722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 0 
P F C M t C eq. 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
0.91 0.88 0.90 1.14 1.44 
0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
0.91 0.90 0.91 1.13 1.41 
1.78 2.04 
-0.05 -0.09 
1.73 1.95 
2.25 
-0.13 
2.12 
2.36 
-0.19 
2.16 
2.40 
-0.18 
2.22 
2.32 
-0.16 
2.16 
4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
6 5 7 9 12 15 16 15 14 14 14 
Statistical Table 559 
Scenario B2-MARIA 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2642 3062 3450 3796 4089 4316 4479 4613 4720 4813 4851 4888 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.2 2.9 6.3 13.0 19.9 28.1 37.8 46.9 57.0 67.2 77.1 87.9 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 20 20 31 43 51 68 79 93 102 111 96 67 
Liquids 26 39 66 93 109 125 139 148 146 148 162 176 
Gas 2 2 4 7 15 15 14 15 23 27 38 64 
Electricity 4 8 12 18 24 27 35 37 43 47 49 48 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 52 70 113 160 198 236 266 293 314 333 345 355 
Primaiy Energy E J 
Coal 28 26 36 46 54 70 80 94 102 111 96 67 
Oil 14 23 38 57 54 58 69 72 52 43 42 65 
Gas 3 5 8 14 21 29 23 22 27 30 40 65 
Nuclear 1 5 14 11 9 21 35 49 76 94 105 81 
Biomass 13 22 33 53 85 89 85 86 101 110 124 128 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 20 20 20 20 19 
Total 61 82 130 181 222 266 309 343 379 408 426 427 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.3 5.3 6.5 7.4 
Oil 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.8 5.2 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 42.5 72.1 106.3 144.9 188.4 235.8 284.6 333.2 380.8 427.5 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 366 366 373 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 361 343 
Grasslands 431 431 428 425 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 37 
Forest 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 
Others 458 458 455 451 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
Total 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.15 1.78 
0.37 0.26 
1.53 2.03 
2.36 
0.25 
2.61 
3.07 
0.23 
3.31 
3.33 
0.22 
3.55 
3.94 
0.21 
4.15 
4.34 
0.21 
4.55 
4.75 
0.19 
4.94 
4.66 
0.16 
4.82 
4.76 
0.14 
4.90 
4.50 
0.12 
4.62 
4.61 
0.11 
4.72 
0 5 21 40 66 95 130 164 199 233 267 302 
3 5 14 22 30 38 46 51 54 54 53 51 
4 7 12 18 25 32 36 36 33 27 29 30 
560 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-MARIA 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
A L M 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1348 1697 2071 2476 2873 3214 
1.7 2.4 3.2 4.9 8.1 13.8 
3 2 2 4 7 11 
24 27 28 34 47 65 
5 4 7 15 24 32 
3 6 8 10 14 18 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 38 45 63 91 127 
6 4 3 4 7 12 
18 23 26 32 44 53 
7 12 19 28 40 58 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 6 4 7 11 17 
2 2 1 1 1 2 
41 46 53 72 103 141 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 
i.4 17.8 36.8 57.8 82.6 112.8 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
490 490 490 768 963 1075 
2095 2095 2095 1820 1648 1609 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 2202 2202 2202 2202 2186 
2086 2086 2086 2083 2060 2004 
6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
0.72 1.01 1.16 1.46 1.95 2.52 
0.73 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.81 
1.45 1.83 1.96 2.24 2.72 3.33 
0 2 12 20 32 54 
4 4 7 10 14 20 
3 5 5 7 9 20 
3506 3730 3900 4021 4141 4220 
22.4 31.6 41.4 50.4 58.5 67,8 
19 31 51 68 76 54 
85 94 91 105 122 135 
37 46 52 41 29 51 
26 31 39 44 47 48 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
167 202 233 258 274 288 
19 31 51 68 76 54 
60 50 35 25 35 57 
55 58 61 47 33 54 
5 27 59 81 95 74 
28 46 57 82 88 96 
23 25 24 24 23 23 
190 238 288 326 350 357 
0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.1 2,8 
1.9 2,5 3.0 3.4 3.6 4,0 
1.6 2.2 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.2 
147.4 184,0 222.2 261.6 302.0 344,1 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1105 1067 972 832 825 825 
1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
0 37 141 290 297 297 
2188 2202 2202 2202 2202 2202 
1971 1958 19.50 1941 1941 1941 
6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
2.81 2.99 3.24 3.25 3.46 3.63 
0.78 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.66 
3.60 3.71 3.94 3.94 4,14 4.29 
84 120 157 190 211 223 
27 33 37 39 39 37 
16 17 15 11 13 14 
Statistical Table 561 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
5262 6091 6891 7672 8372 8930 9367 9704 9960 10158 10306 10414 
20.9 28.3 38.6 50.7 66.0 85.5 109.5 134.8 161.5 186.3 210.3 234.9 
25.7 34.8 46.9 60.2 75.5 93.2 113.9 136.8 160.7 183.8 207.4 231.8 
38 27 27 24 18 14 11 10 9 8 7 7 
42 47 40 36 29 30 19 17 16 16 13 7 
111 134 167 200 236 255 268 273 267 270 289 294 
41 46 50 59 70 86 105 119 130 130 118 i l l 
35 47 62 85 113 150 188 227 272 321 366 409 
8 11 17 25 41 51 63 78 90 104 116 123 
275 311 362 429 507 586 654 723 783 848 909 951 
91 91 98 98 96 93 86 91 119 170 231 300 
128 168 195 214 240 238 227 201 146 101 72 52 
71 84 107 150 194 251 297 356 390 402 385 336 
7 8 11 16 23 32 48 61 83 99 120 142 
46 43 46 53 61 79 105 136 184 236 280 315 
8 14 22 34 54 80 107 131 153 176 197 212 
352 408 479 566 667 773 869 976 1074 1184 1285 1.357 
0.0 0.9 1.8 2.8 3.8 4.7 5.7 6.5 7.4 8.6 10.3 12.6 
0.0 1.4 3.1 5.1 7.2 9.6 12.0 14.3 16.3 17.7 18.7 19.5 
0.0 0.7 1.6 2.7 4.2 6.1 8.6 11.6 15.1 19.0 23.1 26.9 
7.1 82.4 166.2 255.4 350.1 453.1 561.5 674.1 789.6 908.5 1033.2 1163.8 
1459 1481 1510 1540 1570 1598 1626 1656 1687 1718 1751 1784 
3389 3409 3436 3454 3473 3508 3543 3577 3611 3641 3668 3696 
0 0 0 14 92 190 288 313 338 342 325 307 
4296 4252 4225 4251 4292 4323 4353 4380 4407 4441 4482 4522 
3805 3806 3778 3690 3522 3330 3139 3023 2907 2807 2723 2639 
12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 12949 
Marker Scenario B 2 - M E S S A G E 
World 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Olhers 
Total 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ^ Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 
Other C 0 2 <= GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total ' M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
5.99 6.90 7.99 9.02 10.15 10.93 
1.11 1.07 0.80 0.03 -0.25 -0.24 
7.10 7.97 8.78 9.05 9.90 10.69 
310 323 349 384 426 466 
6.7 7.0 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2 
70.9 69.0 65.9 61.3 60.3 59.0 
1672 883 786 299 272 315 
32 25 42 55 70 88 
38 40 48 55 60 76 
879 877 935 1022 1111 1220 
139 141 159 180 199 214 
31 32 37 43 49 53 
11.23 11.74 11.87 12.46 13.20 13.82 
-0.23 -0.24 -0.25 -0.31 -0.41 -0.50 
11.01 11.49 11.62 12.15 12.79 13.32 
504 522 544 566 579 597 
6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 
55.7 53.8 50.9 50.0 49.0 47.9 
346 413 483 548 603 649 
107 120 128 130 127 121 
79 80 74 63 65 69 
1319 1423 1570 1742 1886 2002 
217 214 202 192 178 170 
54 56 56 59 61 61 
Emissions conelated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B2 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B2 run). 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A1M-B2 run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
562 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario B2-MESSAGE 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 916 953 982 994 988 976 965 951 941 934 928 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 16.4 21.1 26.5 30.3 33.1 35.8 38,3 40.9 44.4 47.9 52.0 56.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 14.1 18.3 23.0 26.3 28.8 31.3 33.5 35.9 39.2 42.4 46.1 50.4 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 9 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 66 71 79 86 92 88 76 68 64 60 60 58 
Gas 22 24 26 25 27 31 35 38 34 29 24 17 
Electricity 22 29 36 44 50 56 61 65 71 76 83 89 
Others 1 1 2 4 7 8 10 12 14 16 17 18 
Total 124 133 146 162 177 183 182 183 183 182 184 182 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 38 34 36 39 33 24 20 19 23 26 29 34 
O i l 72 86 91 90 90 81 65 54 42 30 23 17 
Gas 33 41 50 61 71 86 99 114 1 Í 3 123 127 121 
Nucleiir 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 16 21 21 25 29 
Biomass 6 7 6 7 8 9 12 15 22 28 31 33 
Other Renewables 4 5 8 11 15 20 25 29 33 36 39 41 
Total 159 180 200 219 230 234 236 248 253 265 273 274 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.3 
Oil 0.0 0.8 1.7 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.2 5.8 6.4 6.8 7.1 7.3 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.3 5.4 6.6 7.8 9.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 2.8 33.0 66.3 101.9 138.3 173.6 206.9 239.0 269.9 299.8 329.6 359.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 381 384 391 398 406 411 417 423 429 435 442 449 
Grasslands 760 764 770 773 776 787 798 812 826 838 849 860 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 2 17 36 54 59 64 64 61 58 
Forest 1050 1059 1069 1082 1095 1104 1113 1125 1136 1151 1171 1190 
Others 838 822 799 774 734 691 647 611 575 540 506 471 
Total 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 3029 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 b GtC 2.83 3.20 3.50 3.71 3.70 3.51 3.26 3.25 3.08 3.10 3.14 3.10 
Other C 0 2 с GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.48 3.64 3.62 3.45 3.22 3.19 2.99 2.99 2.98 2.91 
C H 4 total d M t C H 4 73 74 72 71 68 67 69 69 70 72 75 78 
N 2 0 total e M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 11.3 6.7 5.7 4.9 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
PEG M t C eq. 18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
C O M t C O 179 161 163 173 180 187 185 185 195 213 207 197 
N M V O C Mt 42 36 37 39 42 45 43 41 38 36 33 30 
NOx M l N 13 12 !3 15 ¡ 6 1 6 !5 i5 1 4 13 12 II 
Emissions coiTclated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B2 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A1M-B2 run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B2 ran). 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A1M-B2 run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
Statistical Table 563 
Marker Scenario B2-MESSAGE 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 413 415 417 418 416 411 406 396 389 384 381 379 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.8 2.8 4.5 6.6 8.6 10.5 11.9 13.2 14.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.3 4.3 5.6 7.2 9.5 11.6 13.3 14.8 16.2 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 9 5 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquids 15 14 17 17 17 19 19 18 18 19 20 22 
Gas 14 14 12 15 18 19 19 18 16 15 12 10 
Electricity 6 6 6 7 9 13 18 21 24 27 30 32 
Others 7 6 6 7 10 11 12 14 15 16 16 15 
Total 50 45 44 49 55 63 68 71 73 76 78 79 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 19 15 11 7 9 10 12 8 11 15 21 29 
Oil 20 18 20 19 18 18 20 16 7 5 4 0 
Gas 27 26 24 31 38 49 51 59 66 63 52 43 
Nuclear 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 6 7 9 
Biomass 2 I 1 1 2 2 4 6 10 13 16 22 
Other Renewables 1 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 16 19 21 
Total 70 62 57 62 73 86 97 102 111 117 119 125 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Gas 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.9 4.6 5.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 20.8 28.0 35.1 44.2 55.3 67.0 78.7 90.7 102.5 114.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 268 269 274 280 285 291 296 302 308 314 320 327 
Grasslands 341 362 366 368 370 373 377 380 383 386 389 392 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 1 6 12 18 20 21 22 20 19 
Forest 966 951 939 944 947 944 941 940 939 941 945 949 
Others 701 693 697 683 668 656 644 634 624 613 601 589 
Total 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 2276 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.80 0.81 0.94 1.11 1.24 1.18 1.22 1.24 1.21 1.18 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.79 0.63 0.80 1.02 1.20 1.15 1.19 1.21 1.17 1.14 
C H 4 total d MtCH4 47 39 36 40 45 50 53 50 47 47 46 47 
N20 total = M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 7.1 3.5 1.6 1.3 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 6 5 7 9 12 15 16 15 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 69 41 43 48 59 69 74 73 68 72 70 79 
N M V O C Mt 16 13 14 16 21 28 32 31 30 30 27 26 
NOx M t N 5 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B2 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A1M-B2 run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B2 run). 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A1M-B2 run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from AIM-B2 ш п . 
564 Statistical Table 
Marker Scenario B2-MESSAGE 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population MiUion 2798 3248 3649 4008 4312 4538 4696 4790 4856 4902 4938 4968 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) TrUUon US$ 1.5 3.5 7.2 13.2 21.3 30.7 41.8 52.7 64.1 75.0 85.8 97.1 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 5.3 9.3 15.1 22.4 30.7 39.3 49.3 59.0 68.7 78.5 89.2 100.4 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 24 16 16 13 11 9 7 6 5 5 5 4 
Solids 19 30 29 28 24 25 17 14 12 12 9 2 
Liquids 13 26 41 60 81 96 112 117 109 107 114 122 
Gas 2 3 5 9 13 18 22 30 38 37 34 33 
Electricity 4 8 14 24 37 53 70 87 108 131 151 169 
Others 1 3 7 10 16 20 25 31 35 43 51 55 
Total 62 86 111 144 181 220 252 284 308 335 363 385 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 30 38 47 47 48 53 48 56 71 105 144 180 
Oil 15 32 45 63 82 88 93 82 61 41 27 21 
Gas 3 6 16 31 43 55 61 72 79 66 51 39 
Nuclear 0 1 2 4 7 13 21 29 38 47 56 65 
Biomass 24 22 25 28 32 41 54 68 88 109 123 129 
Other Renewables 1 4 7 12 21 31 43 52 61 71 81 88 
Total 74 103 141 185 233 281 319 359 397 439 482 521 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.7 4.3 5.3 6.7 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.3 4.2 5.0 5.6 6.1 6.3 
Gas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 4.5 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1,5 19.3 42.6 70.0 101.7 138.9 179.3 220.9 263.3 307.3 355.0 408.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use ^ MilUon ha 
Cropland 438 439 448 457 466 475 484 494 504 514 524 535 
Grasslands 608 607 611 615 618 623 627 632 636 640 644 647 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 3 21 43 65 70 76 77 73 69 
Forest 535 525 518 533 548 553 558 563 567 571 575 580 
Others 583 593 587 557 512 471 430 406 382 362 348 333 
Total 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ G t C 1.15 1.78 2.42 3.02 3.62 4.07 
Other C 0 2 ^  G l C 0.37 0.26 0.20 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.53 2.03 2.62 2.87 3.46 3.98 
C H 4 total MtCH4 113 125 146 171 201 219 
N 2 0 total <= M t N 2 0 - N 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 
SOx total MtS 17.7 25.3 30.1 32.9 33.3 32.0 
H F C M t C eq. 0 5 21 40 66 95 
P F C M t C eq. 3 5 14 22 30 38 
SF6 M t C eq. 4 7 12 18 25 32 
C O M t C O 235 270 314 375 428 472 
N M V O C Mt 33 37 44 53 59 60 
NOx M t N 7 9 12 15 18 20 
4.12 
-0.03 
4.10 
234 
2.6 
26.4 
130 
46 
36 
518 
59 
19 
4.26 
-0.03 
4.22 
241 
2.6 
24.3 
164 
51 
36 
549 
56 
20 
4.30 
-0.04 
4.26 
251 
2.7 
22,1 
199 
54 
33 
579 
52 
20 
4,57 
-0,05 
4,53 
260 
2.8 
21,5 
233 
54 
27 
598 
45 
22 
5.07 
-0.05 
5.01 
265 
2.8 
21.3 
267 
53 
29 
617 
41 
24 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B2 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
b:C02 emissions from fossU fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B2 run). 
d; Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A1M-B2 run. 
5.69 
-0.06 
5.63 
272 
2.9 
20.6 
302 
51 
30 
651 
39 
26 
Statistical Table 565 
Marker Scenario B 2 - M E S S A G E 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1192 1511 1872 2263 2649 2992 3289 3554 3764 3931 4053 4139 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.7 3.7 5.5 8.8 14.6 22.8 32.6 42.6 51.4 59.3 66.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 3.8 4.9 6.2 8.2 11.7 17.0 23.9 32.4 41.2 49.6 57.2 64.9 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 14 10 11 11 7 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Solids 1 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 5 
Liquids 17 23 30 37 46 53 61 71 76 83 95 93 
Gas 4 5 8 10 14 19 28 34 42 48 48 52 
ElecDicity 3 5 7 11 16 28 40 54 70 86 102 119 
Others 0 1 3 4 8 12 17 21 25 30 32 35 
Total 39 47 61 75 95 120 152 186 219 255 284 306 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 5 5 4 5 6 6 6 7 14 24 37 58 
Oi l 21 32 40 42 50 51 50 50 36 25 18 14 
Gas 8 11 18 27 41 62 87 111 132 150 155 133 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 13 20 26 32 39 
Biomass 14 13 14 17 20 28 36 46 64 86 HI 132 
Other Renewables 2 3 6 8 13 23 32 40 47 53 58 62 
Total 49 63 81 100 131 172 217 267 314 364 411 437 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 
Oi l 0.0 0.3 0.6 LO 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.2 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.7 2.7 3.9 5.2 6.6 8.1 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 36.5 55.5 75.0 96.3 120.0 147.2 177.7 210.7 246.0 282.4 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use " Million ha 
Cropland 371 389 397 405 413 421 429 438 446 455 464 474 
Grasslands 1680 1676 1689 1699 1709 1725 1741 1754 1766 1777 1787 1797 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 7 48 100 151 164 177 179 170 161 
Forest 1745 1717 1699 1692 1701 1721 1740 1752 1765 1777 1790 1803 
Others 1684 1698 1695 1676 1608 1513 1419 1372 1326 1292 1269 1246 
Total 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 5480 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 ^ GtC 0.72 1.01 1.26 1.48 1.88 2.24 2.60 3.04 3.27 3.55 3.79 3.84 
Other C 0 2 = GtC 0.73 0.82 0.63 0.42 0.12 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 1.90 1.90 2.01 2.25 2.49 2.94 3.17 3.43 3.63 3.64 
CH4 total MtCH4 77 85 94 102 112 129 149 162 175 187 193 200 
N 2 0 total = M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 14.4 1.5.2 16.7 17.8 19.4 20.0 19.6 19.1 18.0 17.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 12 20 32 54 84 120 157 190 211 223 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 14 20 27 33 37 39 39 37 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 20 16 17 15 11 13 14 
C O M t C O 396 404 416 427 445 492 542 616 728 860 992 1075 
N M V O C Mt 48 55 65 72 78 81 83 86 82 80 77 75 
NOx M t N 7 8 9 10 11 13 15 16 17 19 20 20 
Emissions correlated to land-use change and deforestation were calculated by using A I M B2 land-use data, 
a: Land-use taken from AIM-B2 run. 
b;C02 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes ( M E S S A G E data). 
c: C 0 2 emissions from land-use changes (AIM-B2 run). 
d: Non-energy related C H 4 emissions were taken from A I M - B 2 run. 
e: Non-energy related N 2 0 emissions were taken from A1M-B2 run. 
566 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-MiniCAM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
E J 
E J 
Final Energy 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Bionrass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
ZJ 
GtC 
GtC 
Million ha 
5293 6147 7009 7880 9304 9874 10216 10453 10585 10501 10418 
20.7 27.4 36.3 47.4 62.1 80.3 102.0 127.9 156.0 186.3 219.2 255.1 
na na na na na na na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 55 67 79 90 97 103 85 75 73 73 72 
121 121 127 140 138 156 192 228 264 300 327 355 
52 60 73 91 101 107 109 118 132 152 157 162 
35 51 73 102 137 181 234 292 352 413 470 527 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
253 286 339 411 465 541 637 723 823 937 1027 1117 
88 110 128 143 176 201 218 191 175 170 169 167 
131 130 134 145 134 147 185 228 270 309 338 367 
70 81 111 159 186 209 229 260 292 325 330 335 
24 24 28 34 46 62 82 93 105 120 150 181 
0 5 10 15 19 24 28 38 43 45 44 43 
24 24 32 47 65 88 116 155 195 234 255 275 
336 375 443 542 626 731 858 965 1080 1203 1286 1370 
0.1 1.1 2.3 3.7 5.3 7.2 9.3 11.2 13.1 14.8 16.5 18.2 
0.1 1.4 2.8 4.1 5.5 7.0 8.6 10.8 13.3 16.1 19.4 22.7 
0.1 0.9 1.9 3.1 4.9 6.9 9.1 11.6 14.4 17.4 20.7 24.0 
7.1 82.4 166.7 263.6 373.5 492.4 619.7 754.8 895.8 1040.8 1187.8 1335.6 
1472 1473 1491 1526 1525 1493 1431 1295 1175 1070 988 906 
3209 3347 3572 3885 4175 4393 4540 4391 4245 4101 4067 4033 
0 2 4 6 6 7 8 22 25 16 10 4 
4173 4214 4140 3952 3705 3547 3480 3818 4092 4304 4278 4252 
4310 4128 3956 3795 3753 3724 3706 3639 3628 3673 3821 3970 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 7.86 9.11 10.24 11.35 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.03 1.38 1.27 0.92 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7,97 8.88 10.48 11.51 12.27 
C H 4 total MtCH4 310 323 350 391 430 469 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 6.7 7,0 8.0 9.1 10.4 11.9 
SOx total MtS 70.9 69,0 76.6 80.6 85.2 87.1 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 786 299 272 315 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 42 55 70 88 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 48 55 60 76 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
12.73 13.29 
0.45 0.56 
13.18 13.85 
498 499 
13.2 
86.4 
346 
107 
79 
13.7 
71.9 
413 
120 
14.11 
0.23 
14.34 
509 
14.4 
59.0 
483 
128 
74 
15.20 
-0.53 
14.67 
528 
15.3 
47.7 
548 
130 
63 
15.86 
-1.13 
16.54 
-1.72 
14.73 14,82 
548 569 
16.7 
41.1 
603 
127 
65 
18.1 
34.6 
649 
121 
69 
Statistical Table 567 
Scenario B2.MiniCAM 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 838 907 958 993 1003 1024 1023 1013 1006 1002 1003 1004 
G N P / G D P (mex) TriUion US$ 16.3 20.5 24.5 28.5 29.5 33.2 36.3 38.4 40.9 43.7 47.4 51.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 12 12 11 11 11 11 8 7 6 6 6 
Liquids 72 69 66 63 57 47 49 49 50 52 53 55 
Gas 27 34 42 50 50 48 45 44 45 49 49 49 
Electricity 22 26 31 36 38 44 50 52 54 56 59 63 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 130 141 151 160 156 149 154 153 156 163 168 173 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 40 43 40 31 32 35 37 33 30 29 28 27 
Oil 76 73 69 64 56 42 44 44 45 47 49 51 
Gas 34 43 59 79 79 76 73 72 72 75 74 73 
Nuclear 20 15 12 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 16 20 
Biomass 0 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Other Renewables 12 11 12 15 15 18 19 22 25 28 30 32 
Total 182 188 194 203 197 187 190 189 191 197 201 206 
Cumulative Resources Use Z J 
Coal 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 1,9 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.8 
Oi l 0.1 0.8 1.5 2.2 2.5 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.5 5.0 5.4 5.9 
Gas 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 2.0 3,2 3.9 4.6 5.4 6.1 6.8 7.6 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 2.8 33.0 65.9 100.1 134.0 165.9 196.2 226.0 254.8 282.2 308.3 333.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 408 412 417 423 419 399 375 339 309 286 261 236 
Grasslands 796 820 861 918 942 1002 1025 998 974 955 945 935 
Energy Biomass 0 2 3 3 3 4 4 8 8 6 3 1 
Forest 921 931 922 894 878 847 850 926 980 1014 1016 1018 
Others 998 958 920 885 881 871 868 853 851 862 897 932 
Total 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 3123 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.28 3.26 3.16 2.98 3.02 2.90 2.86 2.88 2.90 2.91 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.21 -0.35 -0.49 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.39 3.45 3.33 3.05 3.02 2.94 2.82 2.68 2.55 2.42 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 82 92 95 106 114 120 128 138 148 158 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.8 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 13.2 7.0 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.9 5,3 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
568 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-MiniCAM 
REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 425 427 435 438 438 435 429 423 418 412 407 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.4 4.5 5.7 7.0 8.3 9.8 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 8 7 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 
Liquids 18 12 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 
Gas 19 15 13 13 13 12 11 10 11 12 12 12 
Electricity 6 8 10 14 15 17 19 20 22 25 27 29 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 6 44 39 42 42 41 41 41 43 47 50 52 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 16 15 20 22 22 16 13 12 10 9 
Oil 20 13 10 9 6 4 5 6 8 9 9 10 
Gas 26 20 19 23 23 22 19 19 20' 21 21 20 
Nuclear 3 4 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 8 9 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 
Other Renewables 3 3 4 7 8 10 11 13 15 16 17 17 
Total 70 57 54 61 64 66 66 63 63 67 67 68 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.1 29.8 .39.3 48.8 -57.8 66.2 74.2 81.3 87.5 93.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 295 308 324 330 326 3(3 277 245 217 203 189 
Grasslands 395 410 448 511 572 615 640 592 553 520 529 539 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Forest 1007 1016 996 945 885 850 841 935 1008 1060 1038 1017 
Others 691 656 625 597 .591 587 584 573 571 580 607 633 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
oogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.74 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.70 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.18 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.84 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.85 0.83 0.76 0.66 0.59 0.52 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 46 60 69 76 81 80 81 84 87 91 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1,1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.2 9.6 10.5 11.0 11.1 8.8 6.7 5.0 4.1 3.2 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 6 5 7 9 12 15 16 15 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
Statistical Table 569 
Scenario B2-MiniCAM 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population MilUon 2790 3261 3707 4127 4463 4739 4953 5037 5070 5052 4932 4814 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.4 3.1 6.0 10.3 17.5 25.9 35.6 46.6 58.4 71.0 84.5 99.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 20 30 42 55 64 69 72 59 52 50 50 50 
Liquids 14 19 26 35 41 50 64 78 91 103 111 119 
Gas 2 5 9 13 17 19 22 25 30 35 35 36 
Electricity 4 11 22 37 55 77 102 131 160 189 215 241 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 40 66 99 140 176 216 260 293 332 377 411 445 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 26 44 64 86 104 116 121 103 92 88 88 87 
Oil 16 21 28 37 39 48 62 80 95 109 117 126 
Gas 3 9 19 35 48 62 75 90 103 114 114 114 
84 Nuclear 1 4 8 12 20 29 40 45 51 57 71 
Biomass 0 2 5 8 10 13 15 20 23 24 24 24 
Other Renewables 3 4 7 12 21 33 48 67 86 105 114 123 
Total 49 83 130 190 243 300 36! 405 450 498 528 558 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.7 3.8 5.0 6.0 7.0 7.9 8.8 9.7 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.9 3.8 4.8 5.9 7.1 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.1 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.2 7.3 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.2 75.6 116.4 163.7 216.2 271.4 327.4 385.2 444.2 503.6 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 389 401 413 425 430 428 417 381 349 321 300 279 
Grasslands 508 523 550 589 625 655 679 674 666 655 649 643 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 3 3 3 3 10 12 8 6 4 
Forest 1168 1143 1104 1052 1010 981 965 1000 1039 1082 1110 1139 
Others 664 632 603 577 572 568 566 555 554 562 588 614 
Total 2729 2699 2671 2646 2639 2634 2630 2620 2619 2628 2653 2678 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G t C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1.15 1.78 2.55 3.48 4.18 4.82 5.39 5.45 5.64 5.96 6.11 6.26 
0.37 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.29 
1.53 2.03 2.74 3.73 4.43 5.02 5.49 5.54 5.67 5.88 5.92 5.96 
113 125 133 142 154 163 171 164 160 160 163 167 
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.8 
17.7 25.3 35.9 45.6 48.5 48.2 44.7 34.6 26.2 19.4 16.0 12.5 
0 5 21 40 66 95 130 164 199 233 267 302 
3 5 14 22 30 38 46 51 54 54 53 51 
4 7 12 18 25 32 36 36 33 27 29 30 
570 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2-MiniCAlVI 
ALIW 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1236 1554 1917 2326 2725 3104 3463 3737 3953 4113 4153 4192 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.8 4.4 6.8 11.8 18.4 26.8 38.5 51.1 64.6 78.9 94.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 2 3 4 6 9 12 15 14 14 14 14 14 
Liquids 17 21 27 34 40 52 73 94 116 138 155 173 
Gas 5 7 10 14 21 27 31 38 46 56 61 65 
Electricity 3 6 9 15 27 43 63 89 116 143 169 195 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 36 50 69 97 134 182 235 292 351 399 448 
Primaiy Energy EJ 
Coal 4 6 8 11 19 28 37 39 40 42 43 45 
Oi l 20 23 28 35 40 53 75 98 122 145 163 181 
Gas 7 9 14 22 36 50 62 80 98 115 122 129 
Nuclear 0 4 5 9 16 23 29 36 43 55 68 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 3 5 7 10 12 13 13 13 
Other Renewables 5 6 9 13 20 28 37 53 68 84 94 103 
Total 35 46 64 88 128 179 241 309 376 441 490 538 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.0 
Oi l 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.3 3.2 4.3 5.6 7.2 8.8 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.5 3.3 4.4 5.6 6.8 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.4 17.8 36.5 58.0 83.8 114.1 149.5 191.3 239.4 292.1 347.8 405.7 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 391 365 353 355 351 341 326 299 272 246 224 202 
Grasslands 1510 1594 1713 1867 2012 2121 2197 2127 2052 1970 1943 1916 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 1 -1 
Forest 3641 3589 3487 3334 3190 3085 3018 3114 3218 3330 3379 3428 
Others 1957 1882 1808 1735 1714 1698 1688 1658 1651 1669 1730 1791 
Total 7499 7430 7361 7291 7266 7246 7229 7201 7197 7217 7276 7336 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.22 1.53 2.03 2.68 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.69 0.85 0.75 0.58 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 1.91 2.38 2.78 3.26 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 89 97 112 123 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.1 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 14.2 15.3 16.9 19.3 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 12 20 32 54 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 14 20 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 20 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
3.47 
0.34 
3.82 
131 
3.7 
22.6 
84 
27 
16 
4.19 
0.35 
4.54 
135 
3.9 
21.0 
120 
33 
17 
4.92 
0.17 
5.09 
140 
4.3 
18.7 
157 
37 
15 
5.64 
-0.18 
5.46 
146 
4.6 
15.8 
190 
39 
11 
6.14 
-0.47 
5.67 
149 
5.1 
13,2 
211 
39 
13 
6.67 
-0.76 
5.91 
153 
5.7 
10.5 
223 
37 
14 
Statistical Table 571 
Scenario B2C-MARIA 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5262 6091 6891 7672 8372 8930 9367 9704 9960 ¡ 0 ¡ 5 9 ¡ 0 3 0 6 ¡ 0 4 1 4 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 19.5 27.2 37.0 49.8 64.1 83.2 108.1 1.30.5 156.2 181.5 205.4 231.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercia] 
Solids 48 48 67 107 ¡ 6 1 221 277 322 356 381 394 395 
Liquids 138 148 158 187 217 251 248 284 291 325 354 377 
Gas 56 61 88 87 75 60 79 58 67 47 33 23 
Electricity 35 49 60 71 84 97 U 4 124 134 143 147 ¡ 5 3 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 278 305 373 451 537 629 718 788 847 895 928 949 
Piimary Energy EJ 
Coal 90 79 90 124 175 232 287 331 363 387 399 400 
Oi l 123 134 141 158 191 197 162 178 163 172 185 206 
Gas 71 105 151 170 ¡ 8 3 193 198 197 223 223 223 228 
Nuclear 22 19 16 13 Ü ¡ 0 8 7 ¡ 2 ¡ 0 9 8 
Biomass 28 27 34 47 47 76 101 117 136 ¡ 5 8 ¡ 7 2 173 
Other Renewables 9 8 7 7 6 5 58 63 66 66 64 62 
Total 343 372 438 519 613 714 815 893 962 1015 1052 1077 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.9 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.6 7.9 10,8 14.1 17.7 2 ¡ . 6 25.6 
Oil 0.0 1.2 2.6 4.0 5.6 7.5 9.4 II. l 12.8 14.5 16.2 18.0 
Gas 0.0 0.7 1.8 3.3 5.0 6.8 8.7 10.7 12.7 14.9 17.2 19.4 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 167.9 266.9 384.5 522.5 673.8 835.5 1008.2 1189.8 1378.5 1572.8 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 1451 1451 1458 1744 1940 2051 2079 2013 1906 1777 1691 1691 
Grasslands 3395 3395 3392 3113 2925 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 2904 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 Ü 0 66 173 302 388 388 
Forest 4138 4138 4138 4138 4138 4100 4099 4131 4138 4138 4138 4138 
Others 4061 4061 4058 4051 4043 3990 3963 3931 3924 3924 3924 3924 
Total 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 13045 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 5.99 6.90 8.03 9.56 11.73 13.49 14.28 15.73 16.65 17.46 18.04 18.57 
Other C 0 2 GtC 1.11 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.26 1.23 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.14 
Total C 0 2 GtC 7.10 7.97 9.12 10.67 12.85 14.76 15.51 16.81 17.74 18.57 ¡ 9 . ¡ 6 ¡ 9 . 7 1 
CH4 total MtCH4 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 1672 883 786 299 272 315 346 413 483 548 603 649 
P F C M t C eq. 32 25 42 55 70 88 107 120 128 130 ¡ 2 7 ¡ 2 ¡ 
SF6 M t C eq. 38 40 48 55 60 76 79 80 74 63 65 69 
C O 
N M V O C 
NOx 
M i c o 
Mt 
MtN 
5 7 2 
Statistical Table 
Scenario B 2 C - M A R I Â 
OECD90 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 859 917 953 982 994 988 976 
965 952 941 934 928 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion USS 13,6 20.7 26.1 30.2 33.4 37.1 41.2 
43.8 47.9 52.8 57.5 62.5 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
96 Solids 12 8 6 21 44 62 73 81 88 92 96 
Liquids 71 74 68 63 59 56 53 51 50 50 50 50 
Gas 28 32 51 48 34 24 17 12 8 6 4 3 
Electricity 21 28 32 35 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 132 142 157 167 175 180 183 185 189 191 194 194 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G l C 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 
Land Use Million ha 
38 28 21 33 53 70 81 88 94 98 101 100 
71 74 68 63 59 55 50 47 42 36 27 34 
34 55 85 91 84 78 63 61 58 59 61 63 
18 15 12 11 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 
6 4 3 2 1 2 4 5 9 14 23 16 
5 5 4 4 3 3 14 14 17 16 15 15 
171 180 193 203 210 216 219 221 225 229 232 233 
0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.7 2,4 3,2 4.1 5.1 6.0 7,0 
0.0 0.7 1.5 2.1 2.8 3.4 3,9 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.7 5,9 
0.0 0.3 0.9 1.7 2.6 3,5 4,2 4,9 5.5 6.1 6.7 7.3 
2,8 
0.0 
33,0 
0.0 
65,8 101.2 140,0 182,2 225,4 268,7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
312.5 356.6 400.6 445.3 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cropland 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 354 312 251 202 202 
Grasslands 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 736 7.56 756 756 756 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 65 127 176 176 
Forest 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 756 
Others 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Total 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 2684 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 G l C 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2,83 3,20 3.35 3.64 3.99 4.25 4.21 4.29 4.32 4.31 4.24 4.39 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.17 
2,83 3.20 3.38 3.69 4.07 4.36 4.29 4.36 4.40 4.42 4.39 4.56 
19 57 105 99 102 101 102 101 100 98 98 97 
18 13 14 13 12 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 
24 23 25 23 17 13 13 11 10 11 10 10 
Statistical Table 573 
Scenario B2C-MARIA 
REF 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mexj Trillion USS 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cuinulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
413 415 417 418 416 411 406 396 389 384 381 379 
0.9 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.6 4.2 6.8 8.2 10.0 11.5 12.9 14.5 
13 9 7 15 26 43 61 68 75 78 80 81 
17 13 12 И 12 12 9 7 5 7 9 11 
21 24 29 26 24 17 17 15 15 10 7 5 
7 8 8 9 10 12 15 16 16 16 16 17 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 54 56 60 72 85 101 106 111 113 113 113 
19 13 10 17 27 44 61 69 75 79 81 81 
19 14 12 11 12 12 9 6 4 7 9 11 
27 33 39 38 40 38 40 40 40 36 33 32 
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
69 64 65 68 81 96 114 119 124 126 126 126 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.3 4.1 4.9 
0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 
0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.0 
1.3 12.3 21.4 31.2 43.4 59.3 79.5 102.7 127.5 153.5 180.2 207.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
217 217 217 217 217 217 217 174 139 111 103 103 
114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 78 106 114 114 
815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 
722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 1868 ¡ 8 6 8 ¡ 8 6 8 ¡ 8 6 8 
1.30 0.91 0.89 1.02 1.33 1.74 2.16 2.30 2.44 2.52 2.56 2.58 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 
1.30 0.91 0.91 1.05 1.38 1.81 2.24 2.40 2.55 2.65 2.70 2.74 
0 4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
7 4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
7 6 5 7 9 12 15 16 ¡5 ¡ 4 14 14 
574 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2C-MARIA 
ASIA 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 2642 3062 3450 3796 4089 4316 4479 4613 4720 4813 4851 4888 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.2 2.9 6.3 12.9 19.9 28.1 37.8 46.8 56.9 67.0 76.7 87.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 20 28 48 61 75 89 98 109 116 123 126 126 
Liquids 26 34 54 82 100 119 135 148 158 167 176 183 
Gas 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Electricity 4 8 12 16 23 27 34 36 40 42 44 46 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 52 71 115 161 199 237 267 294 314 333 346 355 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 28 34 52 64 77 91 99 110 116 123 126 126 
Oil 14 23 38 55 76 70 58 58 56 56 74 101 
Gas 3 5 8 14 21 28 29 35 41 ' 49 54 59 
Nuclear' 1 2 I 1 I 1 0 0 6 4 3 3 
Biomass 13 17 26 42 43 70 91 100 110 116 105 85 
Other Renewables 1 1 1 I 1 1 17 20 20 21 20 20 
Total 61 82 127 176 219 260 295 324 349 369 383 393 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.5 6.7 7.9 9.2 
Oi l 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.8 
Gas 0.0 0.0 O.I 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.9 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.5 19.3 43.8 75.8 115.8 161.7 209.1 258.1 310.0 364.5 422.9 486.9 
Carbon Sequestration G t C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
366 366 373 380 380 380 380 380 380 379 350 350 
431 431 428 425 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 30 30 
365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 365 
449 
458 458 455 451 449 449 449 449 449 449 449 
1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 1621 
1.15 1.78 2.61 3.33 4.21 4.54 4.53 4.90 5.11 5.43 5.94 6.54 
0.37 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 O.IS 0.17 0.15 0.14 
1.53 2.03 2.85 3.56 4.43 4.75 4.72 5.08 5.29 5.61 6.09 6.69 
5 21 40 66 95 130 164 199 233 267 302 
5 14 22 30 38 46 51 .54 54 53 51 
7 12 18 25 32 36 36 33 27 29 30 
Statistical Table 575 
Scenario B2C-MARIA 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 1348 1697 2071 2476 2873 3214 3506 3730 3900 4021 4141 4220 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 1.7 2.4 3.2 4.9 8.1 13.9 22.3 31.7 41.4 50.2 58.2 67.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) 
Final Energy EJ 
Non-commercial 
Solids 3 2 5 10 17 28 46 64 77 87 92 94 
Liquids 24 26 25 31 45 63 51 77 77 100 118 133 
Gas 5 4 7 12 16 18 45 31 43 30 2! 15 
Electricity 3 6 8 10 14 18 25 31 36 41 43 46 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 35 38 45 63 91 127 167 203 234 258 275 287 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 6 4 7 11 17 28 46 64 77 87 92 94 
Oil 18 23 22 30 44 60 45 68 61 73 74 61 
Gas 7 12 19 28 39 50 67 62 84 78 75 74 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Biomass 8 6 4 3 2 4 6 10 17 27 44 72 
Other Renewables 2 2 I 1 1 1 24 25 26 26 25 24 
Total 41 46 53 73 103 142 188 228 264 291 310 325 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.8 2.6 3.5 4.4 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.7 4.4 5.2 
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.7 4.5 5.2 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 1.4 17.8 36.9 58.6 85.2 119.3 159.8 206.0 258.3 315.3 374.6 433.2 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 490 490 490 769 965 1076 1104 1104 1075 1036 1036 1036 
Grasslands 2095 2095 2095 1818 1630 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 68 68 68 
Forest 2202 2202 2202 2202 2202 2164 2163 2195 2202 2202 2202 2202 
Others 2086 2086 2086 2084 2076 2024 1997 1965 1958 1958 1958 1958 
Total 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 6873 
Antliropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 1.18 1.57 2.19 2.96 3.39 4.23 4.78 5.20 5.30 5.07 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.66 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.45 1.83 1.98 2.36 2.96 3.84 4.26 4.98 5.49 5.90 5.98 5.73 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C MtC eq. 0 2 12 20 32 54 84 120 157 190 211 223 
PFC M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 14 20 27 33 37 39 39 37 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 20 16 17 15 11 13 14 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
576 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2High-lVIiniCAM 
World 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 5293 6147 7009 7880 8640 9304 9874 10216 10453 10585 10501 10418 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 20.7 27.4 36.3 47.3 61.8 79.8 101.1 126.5 154.0 183.6 215.7 250.7 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 45 57 72 89 104 118 131 119 111 108 105 102 
Liquids 121 124 131 143 143 159 193 225 258 292 318 344 
44 
Gas 52 62 72 84 81 74 62 58 57 60 52 
ElecO-icity 35 53 80 116 159 209 268 339 415 497 574 651 
Otliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 253 295 355 433 486 560 654 740 841 957 1049 1141 
Primary Energy E J 
Coal 88 115 145 178 263 362 474 540 592 630 700 771 
Oi l 131 133 139 149 114 91 80 74 77 88 72 57 
Gas 70 83 115 165 180 185 181 183 191- 206 173 140 
Nuclear 24 25 31 42 60 79 100 108 121 142 161 180 
Biomass 0 6 12 17 27 40 56 86 110 128 150 172 
Other Renewables 24 24 27 32 40 55 75 115 158 202 254 305 
Total 336 386 468 582 684 812 966 1105 1248 1395 1510 1625 
five Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.1 1.2 2.5 4.1 6,5 9.7 13.7 19.0 24.6 30.6 37.5 44.4 
O i l 0.1 1.5 2.8 4.3 5.5 6.5 7.4 8.1 8.9 9.7 10.5 11.2 
Gas 0.1 0.9 1.9 3.2 5.0 6.8 8.6 10.5 12.4 14.3 16.1 17.9 
live C 0 2 Emissions GtC 7.1 82.4 168.5 271.1 392.9 532.5 691.9 870.2 1062.5 1263.9 1471.7 1686.1 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Million ha Land Use 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total M t C H 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
C F C / H F C / H C F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
1472 1473 1491 1526 1522 1488 1423 1284 1163 1060 975 890 
3209 3347 3570 3880 4164 4370 4501 4326 4168 4027 3957 3886 
0 3 8 13 36 74 128 233 308 352 430 507 
4173 4214 4140 3952 3701 3531 3441 3733 3962 4129 4093 4058 
4310 4127 3955 3794 3742 3701 3672 3588 3562 3596 3710 3824 
13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 13164 
5.99 6.90 8.20 9.92 11.77 13.87 16.44 18.03 19.52 20.92 21.97 23.10 
L U 1.07 1.03 1.38 1.29 0.99 0.57 0.62 0.28 -0.44 -0.88 -1.32 
7.10 7.97 9.23 11.30 13.06 14.86 17.02 18.65 19.80 20.47 21.09 21.78 
310 323 353 397 439 483 520 533 549 567 590 613 
6.7 7.0 8.0 9.2 10.4 11.9 13.2 13.7 14.3 15.2 16.3 17.5 
70.9, 69.0 81.6 86.9 97.7 104.4 107.0 86.4 69.1 55.0 45.6 36.2 
1672 883 786 '299 272 315 346 413 483 548 603 649 
32 25 42 55 70 88 107 120 128 130 127 121 
38 40 48 55 60 76 79 80 74 63 65 69 
Statistical Table 577 
Scenario BlHigli-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
OECD90 
Population Million 838 907 958 993 1003 1024 1023 1013 1006 1002 1003 1004 
G N P / G D P ( т е х ) Trillion US$ 16.3 20.5 24.5 28.4 29.4 32.9 35.9 38.0 40.4 43.0 46.6 50.3 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 10 12 13 13 13 13 14 12 11 10 10 9 
Liquids 72 71 69 65 59 47 47 46 45 46 47 47 
Gas 27 35 42 47 44 34 26 22 20 20 17 14 
Electricity 22 28 34 42 44 52 58 61 64 67 72 76 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 130 146 158 166 160 146 146 140 139 143 145 146 
Primary Energy 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
E J 
ZJ 
GtC 
G t C 
Million ha 
40 45 46 41 47 67 82 93 104 113 136 159 
76 76 72 66 53 23 13 7 4 3 3 2 
34 45 61 82 79 67 57 50 46 44 36 27 
20 15 13 13 14 15 15 14 14 IS 17 18 
0 2 4 4 5 8 10 14 16 18 21 24 
12 11 10 10 10 11 13 16 20 24 29 34 
182 195 206 216 208 190 189 194 203 217 241 265 
0.0 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.6 2.5 3.2 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.5 8.8 
0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 2.1 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.3 5.6 6.0 
2.8 33.0 66.5 102.2 138.3 173.0 207.2 241.8 276.3 310.1 343.9 378.9 
Cropland 408 412 416 
Grasslands 796 819 859 
Energy Biomass 0 3 6 
Forest 921 931 922 
Others 998 958 920 
Total 3123 3123 3123 
)Ogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.39 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Total C 0 2 GtC 2.83 3.20 3.50 
C H 4 total MtCH4 73 74 82 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 2.6 2.6 2.8 
SOx total MtS 22.7 17.0 14.8 
H F C M t C eq. 19 57 105 
P F C M t C eq. 18 13 14 
SF6 M t C eq. 24 23 25 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
422 
915 
7 
894 
885 
3123 
3.46 
0.19 
3.65 
91 
3.0 
6.7 
99 
13 
23 
417 
938 
11 
877 
879 
3123 
3.39 
0.17 
3.56 
95 
3.1 
5.5 
102 
12 
17 
397 
993 
24 
843 
374 
1013 
36 
840 
3123 3123 
3.30 
0.09 
3.39 
105 
3.5 
4.8 
101 
11 
13 
3.42 
0.03 
3.45 
113 
3.8 
4.4 
102 
10 
13 
337 
984 
53 
907 
842 
3123 
3.41 
0.05 
3.47 
117 
3.8 
3.5 
101 
8 
11 
308 
960 
65 
954 
837 
285 
940 
71 
980 
846 
260 
924 
84 
981 
3.44 
-0.02 
3.43 
123 
3.9 
3.2 
100 
7 
10 
3.52 
-0.18 
3.33 
130 
4.1 
3.7 
98 
7 
11 
3.73 
-0.29 
3.44 
141 
4.4 
4.3 
98 
7 
10 
235 
908 
97 
981 
902 
3123 3123 3123 3123 
3.95 
-0.40 
3.55 
152 
4.6 
5.0 
97 
7 
10 
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REF 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Population Million 428 425 427 435 438 438 435 429 423 418 412 407 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.4 5.6 6.9 8.2 9.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 13 10 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 
Liquids 18 11 8 8 7 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 
Gas 19 14 12 11 10 8 5 5 5 5 4 3 
Electricity 6 8 11 15 16 18 19 22 26 29 31 33 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total .56 44 38 41 39 38 37 39 42 45 46 47 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 18 17 17 18 38 61 86 113 147 188 236 283 
Oi l 20 13 10 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas 26 20 18 22 20 17 13 12 11 12 9 6 
Nuclear 3 4 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 
Biomass 0 1 1 2 3 3 5 7 9 10 12 13 
Other Renewables 3 3 3 4 5 6 7 9 12 14 16 18 
Total 70 57 55 62 76 94 117 149 187 231 280 328 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.1 3.1 4.5 6.1 8.3 10.6 
Oil 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Gas 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions GtC 1.3 12.3 21.2 30.3 41.4 54.8 70.7 90.0 113.6 141.8 175.3 215.0 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Liuid Use Million ha 
Cropland 284 295 308 324 331 328 317 281 250 225 211 198 
Grasslands 395 410 448 510 569 611 636 588 551 524 529 534 
Energy Biomass 0 0 1 2 5 9 15 28 36 38 43 47 
Forest 1007 1016 996 945 884 846 831 915 979 1023 1005 987 
Others 691 656 625 597 589 583 578 564 561 568 590 612 
Total 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.83 0.90 1.13 1.39 1.69 2.06 2.53 3.11 3.75 4.45 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 
Total C 0 2 GtC 1.30 0.91 0.86 0.98 1.22 1.47 1.71 2.14 2.59 3.06 3.64 4.29 
C H 4 total MtCH4 47 39 47 61 75 88 99 108 123 144 162 179 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 0.6 0.6 • 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9 
SOx total MtS 17.0 11.0 10.3 10.3 12.6 14.3 15.3 12.8 10.3 7.7 5.9 4.1 
H F C M t C eq. 0 4 9 15 21 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 
P F C M t C eq. 7 4 8 10 14 19 25 28 30 30 28 27 
SF6 M t C eq. 7 6 5 7 9 12 15 16 15 14 14 14 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
N O x M t N 
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Scenario BlHigh-MiniCAM 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
ASIA 
Population Million 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion ( 1990 prices) 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 
Solids 
Liquids 
Gas 
Electricity 
Others 
Total 
Primary Energy EJ 
Coal 
O d 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Total 
Cumulative Resources Use ZJ 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions G t C 
Carbon Sequestration GtC 
Land Use Million ha 
Cropland 
Grasslands 
Energy Biomass 
Forest 
Others 
Total 
Anthropogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 
Other C 0 2 GtC 
Total C 0 2 GtC 
C H 4 total MtCH4 
N20 total M t N 2 0 - N 
SOx total MtS 
H F C M t C eq. 
P F C M t C eq. 
SF6 M t C eq. 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
2790 3261 3707 4127 4463 4739 
1.4 3.1 6.0 10.3 17.4 25.6 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 32 46 62 74 83 
14 20 27 36 43 53 
2 5 9 13 13 13 
4 11 24 43 64 88 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 68 106 153 193 237 
26 47 72 104 142 182 
16 22 29 39 33 28 
3 9 20 37 48 56 
1 4 9 15 25 36 
0 2 5 9 14 20 
3 4 5 6 10 17 
49 87 141 210 272 339 
0.0 0.5 1.1 1.9 3.2 4.9 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 
1.5 19.3 44.1 79.6 126.6 184.0 
389 401 413 425 426 418 
508 523 550 588 621 647 
0 0 2 5 15 28 
1168 1143 1104 1052 1007 973 
664 632 603 577 569 563 
2729 2699 2671 2646 2637 2630 
1.15 1.78 2.72 3.92 4.97 6.05 
0.37 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.22 
1.53 2.03 2.92 4.18 5.23 6.26 
113 125 134 145 155 166 
2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0 
17.7 25.3 38.4 50.6 57.0 59.1 
0 5 21 40 66 95 
3 5 14 22 30 38 
4 7 12 18 25 32 
4953 5037 5070 5052 4932 4814 
35.2 45.9 57.4 69.7 82.9 97.2 
na na na na na na 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 81 75 73 70 68 
67 79 91 104 112 119 
12 12 13 14 12 11 
115 147 182 220 253 287 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
284 319 361 410 447 484 
224 251 254 234 226 218 
25 21 21 25 19 12 
61 63 68 75 62 49 
47 50 56 65 73 81 
27 38 48 55 63 71 
27 45 65 86 109 132 
411 470 513 540 551 562 
6.8 9.3 11.8 14.2 16.5 18.8 
1.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 
2.0 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.7 5.3 
Í51.8 327.7 408.1 489.7 569.9 648.2 
403 365 332 304 278 252 
668 662 654 642 628 615 
43 67 84 95 117 139 
951 972 997 1026 1043 1060 
559 545 541 547 565 584 
1 6 2 4 2611 2608 2614 2632 2650 
7.14 7.80 8.14 8.18 8.04 7.90 
0.14 0.11 0.04 -0.05 -O.II -0.17 
7.28 7.90 8.19 8.12 7.93 7.73 
178 183 179 166 160 154 
4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.4 
56.9 43.7 32.8 24.3 19.4 14.4 
130 164 199 233 267 302 
46 51 54 54 53 51 
36 36 33 27 29 30 
580 Statistical Table 
Scenario B2Higli-MiniCAM 
A L M 
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 
Popuiation Miiiion ¡ 2 3 6 ¡ 5 5 4 1917 2326 2725 3104 3463 3737 3953 4 1 ¡ 3 4153 4 ¡ 9 2 
G N P / G D P (mex) Trillion US$ 1.9 2.8 4.4 6.8 11.8 18.4 26.6 38.2 50.6 63.9 78.0 93.6 
G N P / G D P (ppp) Trillion (1990 prices) na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Final Energy E J 
Non-commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solids 2 3 5 7 И 15 20 20 20 2 ¡ 21 21 
Liquids 17 22 27 35 41 54 73 94 ¡ 1 4 ¡ 3 5 152 170 
Gas 5 7 10 13 ¡7 19 19 19 20 22 20 17 
Electricity 3 6 10 17 32 51 76 109 144 181 218 255 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 27 37 52 72 101 139 ¡ 8 8 242 299 359 4 ¡ ¡ 463 
Primary Energy 
Goal 
Oi i 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Biomass 
Other Renewables 
Tota¡ 
Cumulative Resources Use 
Coal 
Oi l 
Gas 
Cumulative C 0 2 Emissions 
Carbon Sequestration 
Land Use 
E J 
4 6 10 ¡ 4 30 53 83 82 86 96 103 110 
20 23 28 36 37 40 42 46 52 59 51 43 
7 10 15 24 36 45 50 58 66 ' 75 66 58 
0 2 4 7 ¡ 4 22 31 37 44 54 64 73 
0 1 1 3 5 9 15 27 37 44 55 65 
Z J 
GtC 
GtC 
M i ü i o n ha 
5 6 8 Ü ¡5 21 28 44 61 79 100 122 
35 47 67 95 ¡ 3 7 189 249 293 345 407 439 471 
0.0 0.1 0,1 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.3 4.2 5.2 6.2 
0.0 0,2 0,5 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.5 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.2 4.9 
¡ .4 17,8 36.7 59.0 86.7 120.6 162.2 210.8 264.5 322.3 382.5 444.0 
Cropland 391 365 353 355 353 
Grasslands 1 5 ¡ 0 1594 1 7 ¡ 3 1867 2013 
Energy Biomass 0 0 0 0 1 
Forest 3641 3589 3487 3333 3186 
Others 1957 ¡ 8 8 2 ¡ 8 0 8 1735 1 7 ¡ 0 
Total 7499 7430 7 3 6 ¡ 7290 7263 
pogenic Emissions (standardized) 
Fossil Fuel C 0 2 GtC 0.72 1.01 ¡ .27 , 1.64 2.28 
Other C 0 2 GtC 0.73 0.82 0.69 0.85 0.77 
Total C 0 2 G t C 1.45 1.83 ¡ .96 2.49 3.05 
C H 4 total MtCH4 77 85 90 99 ¡ ¡ 4 
N 2 0 total M t N 2 0 - N 1.2 1.3 ¡.6 2.1 2.6 
SOx total MtS 10.5 12.8 15.1 16.2 ¡9 .5 
H F C M t C eq. 0 2 12 20 32 
P F C M t C eq. 4 4 7 10 ¡ 4 
SF6 M t C eq. 3 5 5 7 9 
C O M t C O 
N M V O C Mt 
NOx M t N 
344 330 301 274 247 226 205 
2118 2183 2091 2004 1921 1875 1829 
12 34 85 123 148 186 223 
3074 2996 3067 3147 3234 3263 3292 
1690 1675 1636 1623 1635 1681 1727 
7239 7217 7182 7171 7185 7230 7275 
3.13 
0.61 
3.74 
124 
3.1 
23.3 
54 
20 
20 
4.18 
0.39 
4.58 
129 
3.7 
27.5 
84 
27 
16 
4.76 
0.38 
5.14 
125 
4.0 
23.4 
¡ 2 0 
33 
17 
5.40 
0.20 
5.60 
124 
4.3 
19.7 
157 
37 
15 
6.11 
-0.15 
5.96 
127 
4.6 
16.4 
190 
39 
11 
6.45 
-0.37 
6.08 
127 
5.1 
1 3 . ¡ 
211 
39 
13 
6.81 
-0.59 
6.22 
128 
5.6 
9.7 
223 
37 
14 
VIII 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
582 A c r o n y m s a n d A b b r e v i a t i o n s 
Acronyms and Abbreviations DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
DOE Department of Energy 
A l SRES scenario family A1 E B C / U D O Energy Balance Climate/Upwelling Diffusion 
A l B Scenariogroup within the A l scenario family Ocean model 
(balanced energy supply mix) E C N Netheriands Energy Research Foundation 
A l C Scenario group within A l scenario family E E A European Environmental Agency 
(emphasis on coal) E E U Central and Eastem Europe 
A l F I Scenariogroup within the A1 scenario family (see Appendix III) 
(fossil-intensive, combination of A l C and EIA Energy Infonnation Administration (US) 
A I G ) EIS Energy-Industry System (IMAGE model) 
A I G Scenario group within A I scenario family EJ Exajoules (lO'^J) 
(emphasis on oil and gas) ENDS Environmental Data Services 
A I T Scenario group within A l scenario family E M E P European Monitoring and Evaluation 
(emphasis on non-fossils) Programme (for air pollutants) 
A2 SRES scenario family A2 E M F Energy Modeling Forum (Stanford 
A A G R -Average Annual Growth Rate University) 
AEEI Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement EPA Environmental Protection Agency (US) 
(rate) ERB Edmonds, Reilly and Barns model 
A F E A S Altemative Fluorocarbons Environmental ESD Emissions Scenario Database 
Acceptability Study ETSAP Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix III) Programme (lEA) 
A G C / M L O Atmospheric General Circulation/Mixed E U European Union 
Layer Ocean model FAO U N Food and Agriculture Organization 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome F B C Fluidized Bed Combustion 
A I M Asian Integrated Model (see Appendix IV) FETC Federal Energy Technology Center (US) 
A L M SRES region - Africa, Latin America and FGD Flue Gas Desulfurization 
Middle East (see Appendix III) FSU Former Soviet Union (see Appendix III) 
A/O G C M Afmosphere/Ocean General Circulation F U N D Climate Framework for Uncertainty 
Model Negotiation and Distribution model 
AOS Atmosphere-Ocean System (IMAGE model) G C M General Circulation Model 
ASF Atmospheric Stabilization Framework model G C A M Global Change Assessment Model 
(see Appendix IV) GDI Gender related Development Index (UNDP) 
ASIA SRES region - Asia excluding the Middle GDP Gross Domestic Product 
East (see Appendix III) G E M Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP) 
B l SRES scenario family В1 G H G Greenhouse Gas 
B2 SRES scenario family B2 GNP Gross National Product 
B G F Biomass based gaseous fuels ( IMAGE GRP Gross Regional Product 
model) GWP Global Waiming Potential 
B L F Biomass based liquid fuels (IMAGE model) GtC Gigaton of carbon (1 GtC = 10'-'' gC = 
BLS Basic Linked System of National Agricultural 1 PgC ~ 3.7 Gt carbon dioxide) 
Models (see Appendix IV) GWP Global Warming Potential 
BP British Petroleum HABITAT United Nations Centre for Human 
C C G T combined cycle gas turbine Settlements 
CES constant elasticity of substitution HDI Human Development Index (UNDP) 
CETA Carbon Emissions Trajectory Assessment HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
model HS Harmonized Scenarios 
CIESIN Center for Intemational Earth Science l A Integrated Assessment 
Information Network I C A M Integrated Climate Assessment Model 
C02DB Carbon Dioxide Database (see Appendix IV) ICAO Intemational Civil Aviation Organization 
COP Conference of the Parties ID Identification 
CORINAIR Coordination of Information on the l E A Intemational Energy Agency 
Environment - Air l E A CIAB l E A Coal Industry Advisory Board 
CPA Centrally Planned Asia and China l E W International Energy Workshop (IIASA -
(see Appendix III) Stanford University) 
СРВ Central Planning Bureau (the Netherlands) IGCC Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
GRP Current Reduction Plans IGU Intemational Gas Union 
D E V Developing countries IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems 
DICE Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy model Analysis 
A c r o n y m s a n d A b b r e v i a t i o n s 583 
I M A G E Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse 
Effect 
IND Industrial(ized) countries 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IS92 IPCC scenarios 1992 
l U Inverted U-curve 
J Joule 
ISO International Standards Organization 
km Kilometers 
kt Kilotons 
L A M Latin America and Caribbean 
(see Appendix III) 
L B N L Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (US) 
L N G Liquid Natural Gas 
L P G Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
M A C R O Macroeconomic model (see Appendix IV) 
M A G I C C Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse 
gas-Induced Climate Change 
M A R I A Multiregional Approach for Resource and 
Industry Allocation model (see Appendix IV) 
M E A Middle East and North Africa 
(see Appendix III) 
M E R G E Model for Evaluating the Regional and 
Global Effects of G H G Reduction Policies 
M E S S A G E Model for Energy Supply Strategy 
Alternatives and their General Environmental 
Impact (see Appendix IV) 
M F R Maximum Feasible Reduction 
M i n i C A M Mini Climate Assessment Model 
(see Appendix IV) 
MJ Megajoule (10''4) 
Mt Megaton = 10*^  tons = Tg 
MtS Megaton (elemental) Sulfur 
MWe Megawatts of electricity (electric capacity) 
N A M North America (see Appendix III) 
NAPAP National Acidic Precipitation Assessment 
Program (US) 
NIES National Institute for Environmental Studies 
(Japan) 
NIS Newly Independent States (of the Former 
Soviet Union) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
N M V O C Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds 
(hydrocarbons) 
N T E Non-Thermal Electric 
ODS Ozone Depleting Substances 
ODT Oven Dry Tons 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECD90 SRES region - OECD member states as at 
1990 (see Appendix III) 
OLS Operational Linescan System 
OS Other Scenarios 
PAGE Pohcy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect 
model 
PAO Pacific OECD (see Appendix III) 
PAS Other Pacific Asia (see Appendix III) 
PgC Petagrams of carbon (1 PgC = 1 GtC) 
PIEEI Price Induced Energy Efficiency 
Improvement 
P N L L Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (US) 
ppbv Parts per billion by volume (10^) 
ppmv Parts per million by volume (10*^ ) 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
pptv Parts per trillion by volume (10'^) 
RAINS Regional Acidification INformation and 
Simulation model (see Appendix IV) 
R & D Research and Development 
R C W Rapidly Changing World scenario 
R D & D Research, Development and Demonstration 
REF SRES region - Central and Eastern Europe 
and Newly Independent States of the former 
Soviet Union (see Appendix Ш) 
R I V M Netherlands National Institute of Public 
Health and the Environment 
S A90 1990 Scientific Assessment of the IPCC 
SAR Second Assessment Report of the IPCC 
SAS South Asia (see Appendix III) 
SC Sulfur Control (scenario) 
S C E N G E N Scenario Generator model 
(University of East Anglia) 
sew Slowly Changing World scenario 
SG Scenario Generator model (IIASA) 
(see Appendix IV) 
S P M Summary for Policymakers 
SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
SRTT Special Report on methodological and 
technological issues in Technology Transfer 
t Ton 
TAR Third Assessment Report of the IPCC 
TE Thermal Electric 
TES Teirestrial Environment System (IMAGE 
model) 
TFR Total (average) Fertility Rate 
TgC Teragrams of Carbon (1 TgC = 1 MtC) 
TGCIA Task Group on Climate scenarios for Impact 
Assessment 
TgN Teragrams (million tons) of (elemental) 
Nitrogen 
TgS Teragrams (million tons) of (elemental) 
Sulfur 
TIMER Targets I M A G E Energy Regional simulation 
model 
T S U Technical Support Unit 
U N United Nations 
UNAIDS Joint Unhed Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS 
U N C E D United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization 
U N F C C C United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
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USCB United States Census Bureau W B C S D World Business Council for Sustainable 
us DOC United States Department of Commerce Development 
US DOE United States Department of Energy W E C World Energy Council 
US EPA United States Environmental Protection W H O World Health Organization 
Agency W G Working Group 
VNIR Visible and Near-InfraRed light W M O World Meteorological Organisation 
V O C Volatile Organic Compounds (hydrocarbons) WRI World Resources Institute 
W B World Bank ZJ Zetajoule (lO^iJ) 
IX 
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Chemical Symbols 
С Carbon 
CF4 Tetrafluoromethane - CFC-14 
C2F6 Hexafluoroethane - CFC-116 
CFC Chlorofluorocarbon 
CFC-14 Tetrafluoromethane - C F , 
CFC-116 Hexafluoroethylene - CjFg 
(CH2)4(COOH)2 Adipic Acid 
C H , Methane 
CFI3OH Methanol 
CO Carbon Monoxide 
C02 Carbon Dioxide 
H Atomic Hydrogen 
H2 Molecular Hydrogen 
HCFC Hydrochlorofluorocarbon 
H C O 3 Bicarbonate Ion 
HFC Hydrofluorocarbon (Hydrogenated 
FluoroCarbons) 
HFC-134a CH2FCF3 
H N O 3 Nitric Acid 
MeOH Methanol 
N Atomic Nitrogen 
N2 Molecular Nitrogen 
NH3 Ammonia 
N M V O C Non-Methane Volatile Organic 
Compounds (hydrocarbons) 
N2O Nitrous Oxide 
NO Nitric Oxide 
NO J, Nitrogen Oxides 
(the sum of NO and NO2) 
О Atomic Oxygen 
02 Molecular Oxygen 
03 Ozone 
PFC Perfluorocarbon 
S Atomic Sulfur 
SFg Sulfur Hexafluoride 
SO^ Sulfur Oxides 
SO2 Sulfur Dioxide 
X 
Units 
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Units 
T a b l e X - 1 : SI (Système I m e r n a t i o n a l e ) U n i t s a n d F r a c t i o n s a n d M u l t i p l e s H a v i n g S p e c i a l Names 
Physical Quantity Name of Unit Symbol 
amount of substance mole mol 
area hectare ha 
energy joule J (kg m2 s-2) 
force newton N (kg m s-2) 
frequency hertz Hz (s"' = cycles per second) 
length metre (meter in this report) m 
length micron \1т(Ш^ m) 
power watt W(kgm2s-3 = Js-') 
pressure pascal Pa (kg m-is-2 = N m'^ 
temperature kelvin К 
time second s 
weight (mass) kilogram kg 
weight tonne (ton in this report) t (103 kg) 
weight gram g (10-3 kg) 
Fraction Prefix Symbol 
10-'2 pico P 
10-9 nano n 
10-6 micro M 
10-3 milli m 
10-2 cent с 
10-' deci d 
10 deca da 
102 hecto h 
103 kilo к 
10" mega M 
109 giga G 
1012 tera T 
lO's peta P 
10i« exa E 
1021 zetta Z 
T a b l e X - 2 : N o n - S I U n i t s 
°C degrees Celsius (0°C = ~273K); Temperature differences are given 
in °C rather than the more correct form of "Celsius degrees" 
Btu British Thermal Unit (1.055 kJ) 
kWh kilowatt-hour (3.6 M i ) 
MW^ megawatts of electricity (electrical capacity) 
ppmv parts per million by volume (10^) 
ppbv parts per billion by volume (10^) 
pptv parts per trillion by volume (10i2) 
tce tons of coal equivalent (29.31 GJ) 
toe tons of oil equivalent (41.87 G J) 
TWh terawatt-hour (3.6 PJ) 
U n i t s 
XI 
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Glossary of Terms 
Afforestation 
The act or process of establishing a forest, especially on land 
not previously forested. 
Alternative Energy 
Energy derived from non-fossil fuel sources. 
Anthropogenic Emissions 
Emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) associated with 
human activities. These include buming of fossil fuels for 
energy, deforestation, and land-use changes. 
Annex I Countries 
Annex I to the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) lists all the 
countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), plus countries with economies in 
transition, Central, and Eastern Europe (excluding the former 
Yugoslavia and Albania). By default the other countries are 
refeixed to as Non-Annex I countries. Under Article 4.2 (a&b) 
of the Convention, Annex I countries commit themselves 
specifically to the aim of returning individually or jointly to 
their 1990 levels of G H G emissions by the year 2000. 
Annex П Countries 
Annex II to the Climate Convention lists all countries in the 
OECD. Under Article 4.2 (g) of the Convention, these 
countries are expected to provide financial resources to assist 
developing countries comply with their obligations such as 
preparing national reports. Annex II countries are also 
expected to promote the transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies to developing countries. 
Annex В Countries 
Annex В in the Kyoto Protocol lists those developed 
countries that have agreed to a target for their G H G 
emissions, including those in the OECD, Central and Eastem 
Europe, and the Russian Federation. Not quite the same but 
similar to Annex I, which also includes Turkey and Belarus, 
while Annex В includes Croatia, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and 
Slovenia. 
Baseline 
A projected level of future emissions against which 
reductions by project activities could be determined. 
Base Year 
A common year for calculating emission inventories or to 
begin model simulations for future scenarios. 
Biofuel 
A fuel produced from dry organic matter or combustible oils 
produced by plants. Examples of biofuel include alcohol (from 
fermented sugar), black liquor from the paper manufacturing 
process, wood, and soybean oil. 
Biomass 
The total dry organic matter or stored energy content of living 
organisms. Biomass can be used for fuel directly by burning 
it (e.g., wood), indirectly by fermentation to an alcohol (e.g., 
sugar), or by extraction of combustible oils (e.g., soybeans). 
Carbon Cycle 
The natural processes that influence the exchange of carbon 
(in the form of carbon dioxide (CO,), carbonates and organic 
compounds, etc.) among the atmosphere, ocean, and 
teirestrial systems. Major components include photosynthesis, 
respiration, and decay between atmospheric and terrestrial 
systems (approximately 100 biUion tons/year (gigatons)); 
thermodynamic invasion and evasion between the ocean and 
atmosphere, operation of the carbon pump and mixing in the 
deep ocean (approx. 90 billion tons/year). Deforestation and 
fossil fuel burning releases approximately 7 Gt into the 
atmosphere annually. The total carbon in the reservoirs is 
approximately 2000 Gt in land biota, soil, and detritus, 750 
Gt in the atmosphere, and 38,000 Gt in the oceans. (Figures 
from IPCC WGI Scientific Assessment 1990.) 
Carbon Dioxide 
A naturally occurring gas, CO^ is also a by-product of 
buming fossil fuels and biomass, as well as land-use changes 
and other industrial processes. It is the principal 
anthropogenic G H G that affects the earth's temperature. It is 
the reference gas against which other GHGs are measured 
and therefore has a "Global Warming Potential" (GWP) of 1. 
Carbon Sequestration 
The long-term storage of carbon or CO2 in the forests, soils, 
ocean, or underground in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, coal 
seams, and saline aquifers. Examples include the separation 
and disposal of COj from flue gases or processing fossil fuels 
to produce Hj- and C02-rich fractions, and the direct removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere through land use change, 
afforestation, reforestation, ocean fertilization, and 
agricultural practices to enhance soil carbon. 
Carbon Sinks 
Natural or man-made systems that absorb COj from the 
atmosphere and store them. Trees, plants, and the oceans all 
absorb CO2 and, therefore, are carbon sinks. 
CFCs 
See "Chlorofluorocarbons". 
See "Methane". 
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Chlorofluorocarbons 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are GHGs covered under the 
1987 Montreal Protocol and used for refrigeration, air 
conditioning, packaging, insulation, solvents, or aerosol 
propellants. As they are not desti'oyed in the lower 
atmosphere, CFCs drift into the upper atmosphere where, 
given suitable conditions, they break down ozone. These 
gases are being replaced by other compounds, including 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), which are GHGs covered under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Climate Change ( U N F C C C d e f i n i t i o n ) 
A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly 
to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate 
variability over comparable time periods. 
Climate Convention 
See " U N Framework Convention on Climate Change". 
Climate Models 
Large and complex computer programs used to 
mathematically simulate global climate. They are based on 
mathematical equations derived from our knowledge of the 
physics that governs the earth-atmosphere system. 
Co-generation 
The use of waste heat from electric generation, such as 
exhaust from gas turbines, for either industrial puiposes or 
district heating. 
Commercialization 
Sequence of actions necessary to achieve market entry and 
general market competitiveness of new innovative 
technologies, processes, and products. 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 
The supreme body of the U N Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), comprises countries that have 
ratified or acceded to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The first session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP-1) was held in Berlin in 1995, COP-2 in Geneva 1996, 
COP-3 in Kyoto 1997, and COP-4 in Buenos Aires. COP-5 
will be held in Bonn. 
CO2 
See "Carbon Dioxide". 
Cost-effective 
A criterion that specifies that a technology or measure 
delivers a good or service at equal or lower cost than current 
practice, or the lowest cost ahemative for the achievement of 
a given target. 
Decarbonization 
A decrease in the specific carbon content of primary energy 
or of fuels. 
Deforestation 
The removal of forest stands by cutting and burning to provide 
land for agricultural purposes, residential or industrial building 
sites, roads, etc., or by harvesting the trees for building 
materials or fuel. 
Demand-Side Management 
Policies and programs designed to reduce consumer demand 
for electricity and other energy sources while maintaining (or 
even increasing) the services the energy use renders. It helps 
to reduce the need for constructing new power facilities. 
Dematerialization 
A decrease in the material intensity of economic activity in 
general, or of individual production processes and end-use 
applications. 
Economic Potential 
The portion of technical potential for G H G emissions 
reductions or energy efficiency improvements that could be 
achieved cost-effectively in the absence of market barriers. 
The achievement of market potential requires additional 
poHcies and measures to break down market barriers. 
Emissions 
The release of GHGs and/or their precursors into the 
atmosphere over a specified area and period of time. 
Emissions Category 
The SRES Scenarios are grouped into four categories of 
cumulative CO^ emissions (all sources) between 1990 and 
2100: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high emissions. 
Each category contains scenarios with a range of different 
driving forces yet similar cumulative emissions. See also 
"(Scenario) Category." 
Emission Standard 
A level of emission that under law may not be exceeded. 
Energy Intensity 
This is the ratio of energy consumption to economic or 
physical output. At the national level, energy intensity is the 
ratio of total domestic primary energy consumption or final 
energy consumption to gross domestic product or physical 
output. 
FCCC 
See ' U N Framework Convention on Climate Change'. 
Final Energy 
Energy supplied that is available to the consumer to be 
converted into useful energy (e.g. electricity at the wall outlet). 
Fossil Fuels 
Carbon-based fuels, including coal, oil, and natural gas and 
their derived fuels such as gasoline, synthesis gas from coal, 
etc. 
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Fuel Switching 
Policy designed to reduce COj emissions by requiring electric 
utilities or consumers to switch from high-carbon to low-
carbon fuels (e.g. from coal to gas). 
GHGs 
See "Greenhouse Gases". 
GHG Reduction Potential 
Possible reductions in emissions of greenhouse gasses 
(quantified in terms of absolute reductions or in percentages 
of baseline emissions) that could be achieved through the use 
of technologies and measures. 
Global Warming 
The hypothesis that the earth's temperature is being 
increased, in part, because of emissions of GHGs associated 
with human activities, such as buming fossil fuels, biomass 
buming, cement manufacture, cow and sheep rearing, 
deforestation, and other land-use changes. 
Global Warming Potential 
A measurement technique to define the relative contribution 
of each G H G to atmospheric warming. A GWP can only be 
calculated for specified time horizons (e.g. 20 to 500 years) 
and for given G H G concentration levels (e.g. current). Both 
direct and indirect effects are considered. (Indirect effects 
include changes in atmospheric chemistry such as ozone 
formation and changes in stratospheric water vapor.) COj has 
been assigned a GWP of 1, against which all other GHGs are 
compared. For example, methane (CH^) has a GWP that is 
currently estimated to be about 21 times greater than that of 
over a 100 year time horizon, and thus CH^ has a GWP 
of 21. (Note that in the economic literature GWP usually 
denotes gross world product, referrred to as global GDP in 
this report.) 
Greenhouse Effect 
The trapping of heat by an envelope of naturally occurring 
heat-retaining gases (water vapour, CO2, nitrous oxide (NjO), 
CH4, and ozone) that keeps the earth about 30°C (60°F) 
warmer than if these gases did not exist. 
Greenhouse Gases 
Gases in the earth's atmosphere that absorb and re-emit 
infrared radiation. These gases occur through both natural and 
human-influenced processes. The major G H G is water 
vapour. Other GHGs include COj, N2O, CH^, ozone, and 
CFCs. 
Gridding 
The provision of emission or socio-economic activity data in 
spatially highly explicit form. 
GWP 
See "Global Warming Potential". 
HFCs 
See "Hydrofluorocarbons". 
Harmonization 
A procedure to ease comparabifity of model results by 
adopting common (exogenous) input assumptions. Through 
harmonization, differences in emissions outcomes resulting 
from differences in model input assumptions (e.g. exogenous 
population growth) can be separated from differences that 
arise from different intemal model parametrizations (e.g. of 
the dynamics of technological change). The scenarios 
reported here can be classified into three categories: "fully 
harmonized" scenarios share population, GDP, and final 
energy use assumptions at the level of the four SRES regions 
(and hence also at the global level) between 1990 and 2100 
within prespecified bounds. "Globally harmonized" scenarios 
share global population and GDP assumptions at the global 
level for the 1990 to 2100 period within prespecified bounds 
(deviations in one 10-year interval are not considered). "Other 
scenarios" have adopted altemative assumptions for 
population and GDP than the ones suggested for scenario 
harmonization. 
Hydrofluorocarbons 
HFCs are among the six GHGs to be curbed under the Kyoto 
Protocol. They are produced commercially as a substitute for 
CFCs. HFCs are used largely in refrigeration and semi-
conductor manufacturing. Their GWPs range from 1300 to 
11,700 times that of CO2 (over a 100 year time horizon), 
depending on the HFC. 
Illustrative Scenario 
A scenario that is illustrative for each of the six scenario 
groups reflected in the Summary for Poticymakers of this 
report. They include four revised "scenario markers" for the 
scenario groups A I B , A2, B l and B2, and two additional 
scenarios for the A l F I and AIT groups. A l l scenario groups 
are equally sound. See also "(Scenario) Groups" and 
"(Scenario) Markers". 
Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) 
Organizations constituted of govemments. Examples include 
the World Bank, the OECD, and the Intemational Civil 
Aviation Organization. The U N F C C C allows accreditation of 
these IGOs to attend the negotiating sessions. 
International Energy Agency (lEA) 
Paris-based organization formed in 1973 by the major oU-
consuming nations to manage future oil supply shortfalls. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) 
Non-govemmental, intemational, interdisciplinary research 
institute located in Laxenburg, Austria. IIASA is supported by 
the Academy of Sciences and similar leamed societies from 
15 countties. Its research focuses on the human dimensions of 
global change. 
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Kyoto Mechanisms (formerly k n o w n as F l e x i b i l i t y 
M e c h a n i s m s ) 
Economic mechanisms based on marlcet principles that 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can use in an attempt to lessen 
the potential economic impacts of G H G emission-reduction 
requirements. They include J o i n t I m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Article 6), 
the C l e a n D e v e l o p m e n t M e c h a n i s m s (Article 12), and 
E m i s s i o n s T r a d i n g (Article 17). 
Kyoto Protocol 
The Protocol, drafted during the Berlin Mandate process, that, 
on entry into force, would require countries listed in its 
Annex В (developed nations) to meet differentiated reduction 
targets for their G H G emissions relative to 1990 levels by 
2008-2012. It was adopted by all Parties to the Climate 
Convention in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997. 
Marker (Scenario) 
See "(Scenario) Marker". 
Market Penetration 
The share of a given market that is provided by a particular 
good or service at a given time. 
Market Potential (or Currently Realizable Potential) 
The portion of the economic potential for G H G emissions 
reductions or energy efficiency improvements that could be 
achieved under existing market conditions, assuming no new 
policies and measures. 
Measures 
Actions that can be taken by a govemment or a group of 
govemments, often in conjunction with the private sector, to 
accelerate the use of technologies or other practices that reduce 
G H G emissions. 
Methane 
One of the six GHGs to be mitigated under the Kyoto 
Protocol, it has a relatively short atmospheric lifetime of 10 ± 
2 years. Primary sources of C H , are landfdls, coal mines, 
paddy fields, natural gas systems, and livestock (e.g., cows 
and sheep). It has a GWP of 21 (100 year time horizon). 
Model 
A formal representation of a system that allows quantification 
of relevant system variables and simulation of systems' 
behavior, e.g. the implications on future G H G emissions of 
altemative demographic, economic and technological 
developments (scenarios). 
Montreal Protocol 
Intemational agreement under the U N which entered into 
force in January 1989 to phase out the use of ozone-depleting 
compounds such as CFCs, methyl chloroform, carbon 
tetrachloride, and many others. 
NGO 
See "Non-Govemmental Organization". 
Nitrous Oxide 
One of the six GHGs to be curbed under the Kyoto Protocol, 
N^O is generated by buming fossil fuels and the manufacture 
of fertilizer. It has a GWP 310 times that of COj (100 year 
time horizon). 
Non-Annex I Parties 
The countries that have ratified or acceded to the U N F C C C 
that are not included in Annex I of the Convention. 
Non-Annex В Parties 
The countries that are not included in the Annex В list of 
developed nations in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Non-Governmental Organization/Observer 
Non-Govemmental Organization (NGOs) include registered 
non-profit organizations and associations from business and 
industry, environmental groups, cities and municipalities, 
academics, and social and activist organizations. 
No Regrets 
Actions that result in G H G limitations and abatement, and 
that also make good environmental and economic sense in 
their own right. 
Ozone 
Ozone (O3) in the troposphere, or lower part of the 
atmo,sphere, can be a constituent of smog and acts as a GHG. 
It is created naturally and also by reactions in the atmosphere 
that involve gases resulting from human activities, including 
nitrogen oxides (N0^^), from motor vehicles and power plants. 
The Montreal Protocol seeks to control chemicals that destroy 
ozone in the stratosphere (upper part of the atmosphere), 
where the ozone absorbs ultra-violet radiation. 
PAMs 
See "Policies and Measures". 
Perfluorocarbons 
Among the six GHGs to be abated under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Perñuorocarbons (PFCs) are a by-product of aluminum smelting 
and uranium enrichment. They also are the replacement for 
CFCs in manufacturing semiconductors. The GWP of PFCs is 
6500-9200 times that of CO2 (100 year time horizon). 
PFCs 
See ' Perñuorocarbons '. 
Policies and Measures 
In U N F C C C parlance, policies are actions that can be taken 
and/or mandated by a govemment - often in conjunction with 
business and industry within its own country, as well as with 
other countries - to accelerate the application and use of 
successful measures to curb G H G emissions. Measures are 
technologies, processes, and practices used to implement 
policies that, if employed, would reduce G H G emissions 
below anticipated future levels. Examples might include 
carbon or other energy taxes, standardized fuel efficiency 
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standards for automobiles, etc. "Common and co-ordinated" 
or "hannonized" policies refer to those adopted jointly by 
Parties. (This could be by region, such as the European Union 
(EU), or by countries that comprise a given classification, for 
example, all Annex I nations.) 
Precautionary Principle 
From the U N Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Article 3): P a r t i e s s h o u l d t a k e p r e c a u t i o n a i y measures t o 
a n t i c i p a t e , p r e v e n t o r m i n i m i z e t h e causes of c l i m a t e c h a n g e 
a n d m i t i g a t e i t s adverse effects. W h e r e t h e r e a r e t h r e a t s of 
s e r i o u s o r i r r e v e r s i b l e d a m a g e , l a c k of f u l l s c i e n t i f i c c e r t a i n t y 
s h o u l d n o t be used as a r e a s o n f o r p o s t p o n i n g such measures 
t a k i n g i n t o a c c o i m t t h a t p o l i c i e s a n d measures t o d e a l w i t h 
c l i m a t e c h a n g e s h o u l d be cost-effective so as t o ensure g l o b a l 
benefits a t t h e l o w e s t p o s s i b l e cost. 
Primary Energy 
Energy embodied in natural resources (e.g., coal, crude oil, 
sunlight, uranium) that has not undergone any anthropogenic 
conversion or transformation. 
Quantified Emissions Limitations and Reductions 
Objectives 
Abbreviated to QELROs, these are the G H G emissions 
reduction commitments made by developed countries listed in 
Annex В of the Protocol. (See also "Targets and Timetables".) 
Regulatory Measures 
Rules or codes enacted by govemments that mandate product 
specifications or process performance characteristics. 
Renewables 
Energy sources that are, within a short timeframe relative to 
the earth's natural cycles, sustainable, and include non-carbon 
technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, and wind as 
well as carbon-neutral technologies such as biomass. 
Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Scientific/technical research and development of new 
production processes or products, coupled with analysis and 
measures that provide infomration to potential users regarding 
the application of the new product or process; demonstration 
tests, and feasibility of applying these products processes via 
pilot plants and other pre-commercial apphcations. 
Scenario 
A plausible description of how the future may develop, based 
on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions 
("scenario logic") about key relationships and driving forces 
(e.g., rate of technology change, prices). Note that scenarios 
are neither predictions nor forecasts. 
(Scenario) Category 
The SRES Scenarios are grouped into four categories of 
cumulative CO^ emissions (all sources) between 1990 and 
2100: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high emissions. 
Each category contains scenarios with a range of different 
driving forces yet similar cumulative emissions. See also 
"Emissions Category". 
(Scenario) Family 
Scenarios that have a similar demographic, societal, economic 
and technical-change storyline. Four scenario families 
comprise the SRES scenario set: A l , A2, B l and B2. 
(Scenario) Group 
Scenarios within a family that reflect a consistent variation of 
the storyline. The A l scenaiio family includes four groups 
designated as AIT, A I C , A I G and A I B that explore 
alternative structures of future energy systems. In the 
Summary for Policymakers, the A I C and A I G groups have 
been combined into one "Fossil Intensive" A l F I scenario 
group. The other three scenario families consist of one group 
each. The SRES scenario set reflected in the S P M thus 
consists of six distinct scenario groups, all of which are 
equally sound and together capture the range of uncertainties 
associated with driving forces and emissions. 
(Scenario) Marker 
A scenario that was originally posted in draft fomt on the 
SRES website to represent a given scenario family. The 
choice of markers was based on which of the initial 
quantifications best reflected the storyline, and the features of 
specific models. Markers are no more likely than other 
scenarios, but are considered by the SRES writing team as 
illustrative of a particular storyline. They are included in 
revised form in this report. These scenarios have received the 
closest scrutiny of the entire writing team and via the SRES 
open process. Scenarios have also been selected to illustrate 
the other two scenario groups (see also "Scenario Group" and 
"Illustrative Scenario". 
(Scenario) Set 
A set of scenarios developed using a particular méthodologie 
approach. The SRES scenario set comprises 40 scenarios 
grouped into four scenario families, seven (six in the SPM) 
scenario groups and four (cumulative CO,) emissions 
categories. 
(Scenario) Storyline 
A narrative description of a scenario (or a family of 
scenarios) highlighting the main scenario characteristics, 
relationships between key driving forces and the dynamics of 
their evolution. 
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Standardization 
Adopting standardized numerical values to improve model and 
scenario comparability. In this report, emissions are 
standardized for the two reporting years 1990 and 2100 across 
all models and scenarios, and individual scenario differences 
thereafter are corrected for differences between original model 
outputs and standardized values ("offsets"). (Base year 
differences reflect scientific uncertainty in source/sink strengths 
for many GHGs as well as differences in model calibration and 
simulation time horizons, e.g. for some models 1990 is a 
projected year as simulations begin by an earlier base year. 
See "Sulfur Hexafluoride". 
Sinks ( U N F C C C D e f i n i t i o n ) 
Any process or activity or mechanism that removes a G H G , 
aerosol, or precursor of a G H G into the atmosphere. 
Source ( U N F C C C D e f i n i t i o n ) 
Any process or activity that releases a GHG, aerosol, or 
precursor of a G H G into the atmosphere. 
Standards/Performance Criteria 
Set of rules or codes that mandate or define product 
performance (e.g., grades, dimensions, characteristics, test 
methods, rules for use). 
Structural Change 
Changes, for example, in the relative share of GDP produced 
by the industrial, agricultural, or services sectors of an 
economy; or (more generally) systems transformations 
whereby some components are either replaced or potentially 
substituted by other ones. 
Sulfur Hexafluoride 
One of the six GHGs to be curbed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Sulfur hexafluoride (SF^) is largely used in heavy industry to 
insulate high-voltage equipment and to assist in the 
manufacturing of cable-cooling systems. Its GWP is 23,900 
times that of C O ^ (100 year time horizon). 
Targets and Timetables (see also QELROs) 
A target is the reduction of a specific percentage of G H G 
emissions (e.g., 6%, 7%) from a baseline date (e.g., "below 
1990 levels") to be achieved by a set date, or, timetable (e.g., 
2008-2012). For example, under the Kyoto Protocol's 
formula, the E U has agreed to reduce its G H G emissions by 
8% below 1990 levels by the 2008-2012 commitment period. 
These targets and timetables are, in effect, a cap on the total 
amount of G H G emissions that can be emitted by a country 
or region in a given time period. 
Technical Potential 
The amount by which it is possible to reduce G H G emissions 
or improve energy efficiency by using a technology or practice 
in all applications in which it could technically be adopted, 
without consideration of its costs or practical feasibility. 
Technology 
A systems of means towards particular ends that includes both 
hardware and social information, e.g. a piece of equipment or 
a technique for performing a particular activity. 
Trace Gas 
A minor constituent of the atmosphere. The most important 
trace gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect are COj , 
ozone, CH4, NjO, ammonia, nitric acid, ethylene, sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), nitric oxide, CFCs, HFCs HCFCs, SFg, methyl 
chloride, carbon monoxide, and carbon tetrachloride. 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 
A treaty signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
by more than 150 countries. Its ultimate objective is the 
"stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic (human-induced) interference with the climate 
system". While no legally binding level of emissions is set, 
the treaty states an aim by Annex I countries to return these 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The treaty took 
effect in March 1994 upon the ratification of more than 50 
countries; a total of some 160 nations have now ratified. In 
March 1995, the U N F C C C held the first session of the COP, 
the supreme body of the Convention, in Berlin. Its Secretariat 
is based in Bonn, Germany. In the biennium 2000-01, its 
approved budget and staffing level are approximately US$12 
million annually with approximately 80 personnel. 
Values 
Values are based on individual preferences, and the total 
value of any resource is the sum of the values of the different 
individuals involved in the use of the resource. The values 
that are the foundation of the estimation of costs are 
measured in terms of the willingness to pay (WTP) by 
individuals to receive the resource or by the willingness of 
individuals to accept payment (WTA) to part with the 
resource. 
Voluntary Measures 
Measures to reduce G H G emissions that are adopted by firms 
or other actors in the absence of govemment mandates. 
Voluntary measures help make climate-friendly products or 
processes more readily available or encourage consumers to 
incorporate environmental values in their market choices. 
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Climate Change—The IPCC Scientific Assessment 
The 1990 Report of the IPCC Scientific Assessment Working Group (also in Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish) 
Climate Change—The IPCC Impacts Assessment 
The 1990 Report of the IPCC Impacts Assessment Working Group (also in Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish) 
Climate Change—The IPCC Response Strategies 
The 1990 Report of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group (also in Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish) 
Emissions Scenarios 
Prepared for the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group, 1990 
Assessment of the Vulnerability of Coastal Areas to Sea Level Rise-A Common Methodology 
1991 (also in Arabic and French) 
Climate Change 1992—The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment 
The 1992 Report of the IPCC Scientific Assessment Working Group 
Climate Change 1992—The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Impacts Assessment 
The 1992 Report of the IPCC Impacts Assessment Working Group 
Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments 
IPCC First Assessment Report Overview and Policymaker Summaries, and 1992 IPCC Supplement 
Global Climate Change and the Rising Challenge of the Sea 
Coastal Zone Management Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group, 1992 
Report of the IPCC Country Studies Workshop 
1992 
Preliminary Guidelines for Assessing Impacts of Climate Change 
1992 
IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
Three volumes, 1994 (also in French, Russian, and Spanish) 
IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations 
1995 (also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish) 
Climate Change 1994—Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an Evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emission Scenarios 
1995 
Climate Change 1995—The Science of Climate Change - Contribution of Working Group I 
to the Second Assessment Report 
1996 
Climate Change 1995—Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses -
Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report 
1996 
Climate Change 1995—Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change - Contribution of Working Group III 
to the Second Assessment Report 
1996 
Climate Change 1995—IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information Relevant to Interpreting 
Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
1996 (also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish) 
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Technologies, Policies, and Measures for Mitigating Climate Change - IPCC Technical Paper I 
1996 (also in French and Spanish) 
An Introduction to Simple Climate Models used in the IPCC Second Assessment Report - IPCC Technical Paper II 
1997 (also in French and Spanish) 
Stabilization of Atmospheric Greenhouse Gases: Physical, Biological and Socio-economic Implications -
IPCC Technical Paper III 
1997 (also in French and Spanish) 
Implications of Proposed COj Emissions Limitations - IPCC Technical Paper IV 
1997 (also in French and Spanish) 
The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability - IPCC Special Report 
1998 
Aviation and the Global Atmosphere - IPCC Special Report 1999 
Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry - IPCC Special Report 2000 
Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer - IPCC Special Report 2000 
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